Bowlderized: The Domestication of Thailand's Mass Media

BOWDLERIZED T H E D O M E S T I C A T I O N O F T H A I L A N D ’ S M A S S M E D I A

AMSTERDAM & PEROFF LLP

T H A I L A N D 2 0 1 1 G E N E R A L E L E C T I O N R E P O R T S E R I E S , N O . 3

One year ago, the Royal Thai Government massacred al-

most ninety people to avoid an early election it feared it

might lose. Finally, the early general elections for which

dozens of Red Shirts gave their lives are scheduled to take

place on July 3, 2011. While it is hoped that the elections

will be free of outright fraud and ballot stuffing, the com-

petitiveness and fairness of the process are being under-

mined in many other ways.

The upcoming elections will take place in a context of in-

timidation and repression, coupled with the continuing

efforts by most of the institutions of the Thai state to

secure a victory for the Democrat Party. Aside from com-

peting against a hobbled opposition under rules design

to artificially boost its seat share, the Democrat Party will

once again avail itself of the assistance of the military,

the bureaucracy, the judiciary, and the royalist establish-

ment. These institutions stand ready to commit whatever

money, administrative resources, and television airtime

might be necessary to haul the otherwise unelectable

Mark Abhisit over the hump.

In this series of reports, Amsterdam & Peroff details the

attempts by Thailand’s Establishment to fix the results of

the upcoming general elections. This report — the third in

the series — focuses on the bowdlerization of Thailand’s

mass media, resulting from draconian legal restrictions

on freedom of expression, the harassment of opposition

media and independent news outlets, and the subservi-

ence of Thailand’s mainstream press to the Establish-

ment’s political agenda.

AMSTERDAM & PEROFF | 2011 GENERAL ELECTION REPORT SERIES, NO. 3 1

1. INTRODUCTIONThailand’s general election campaign got underway in the presence of the most

stringent limitations to freedom of expression and freedom of the press the

country has witnessed since the late 1970s. The events of past month alone

exemplify the degree to which the opposition is being denied the opportunity

to compete on an equal footing. Eighteen Red Shirt leaders — many of them

candidates for the opposition party Pheu Thai — were charged with sedition

and lese majeste in connection to a speech given by incumbent member of

parliament Jatuporn Prompan during the commemoration of last year’s April 10

massacre. While Jatuporn was subsequently jailed when the courts revoked his

bail, the others were charged on the basis of “body language” exhibited during

the speech — smiling, clapping, and cheering were cited as their offenses. A

few days after targeting the Red Shirt leaders, the Internal Security Operations

Command (ISOC) ordered police to raid thirteen community radio stations

that had played Jatuporn’s now infamous speech. The stations were shut down

and their equipment seized.1 Meanwhile, Thailand’s controversial lese majeste

laws claimed two additional high-profile victims among opposition activists

and critics of the regime. The editor of a banned opposition magazine, Somyot

Prueksakasemsuk, has been held without bail since late April, while well-known

historian Somsak Jeamteerasakul was summoned by police to acknowledge

charges filed, in an unprecedented move, by the Royal Thai Army.

Coming on the heels of a two-year campaign of media censorship, draconian

restrictions on freedom of speech, legal harassment of political opponents,

and the disproportionately harsh sentencing of many of those charged with

offending the monarchy, recent developments do not bode well for the freedom,

fairness, and competitiveness of the upcoming elections.

Virtually every international organization monitoring freedom of the press

around the world has strongly condemned the Royal Thai Government’s

campaign to silence the opposition, criminalize its own critics, and gag

unsympathetic media. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) now ranks Thailand

153rd in its “Press Freedom Index,” issued in October 2010. Weeks after the

release of a detailed report on internet freedom, moreover, Freedom House

1. Human Rights Watch, “Thailand: Authorities Silence ‘Red Shirt’ Community Ra-dios,” April 27, 2011.http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/04/27/thailand-authorities-silence-red-shirt-community-radios


downgraded Thailand’s overall status to “Not Free” in its annual “Freedom

of the Press” survey. This had never happened since Freedom House started

assessing press freedom in 1980. Even in the 1980s, when Freedom House

used to give separate scores for “print” and “broadcast,” Thailand’s “Not Free”

rating on broadcast had always been accompanied by a rating of “Partly Free”

on print media. Since 1989, when Freedom House began releasing combined

scores, Thailand had never done worse than “Partly Free,” including in the

wake of coups in 1991 and 2006. Thanks to the administration of Mark Abhisit

Vejjajiva, press freedom in Thailand has been rolled back over thirty years.

Human Rights Watch director Brad Adams aptly described the outgoing

administration as “the most prolific censor in recent Thai history,”2

As the country gears up for a historic election, this report describes the

government’s attempt to silence voices of dissent, as well as the various

forms of pressure (both legal and otherwise) it has brought to bear on each of

the various components of Thailand’s mass media. Aside from exposing the

politicized, persecutory manner in which the legislation criminalizing dissent

is enforced, the report examines the stranglehold that the Thai Establishment

exercises over broadcast and print media. The English-language press is singled

out as a special case, owing to both its egregiously distorted coverage in the

service of the Democrat Party and its Establishment backers as well as its

influence on international news and perceptions of Thailand. Attention is also

given to the war that the Thai state is waging for control of the internet, which

presents unique challenges for the country’s overzealous censors. The report

concludes with a package of minimal reforms necessary to the restoration of

a free press and the re-establishment of basic democratic freedoms. These

reforms, in turn, are crucial to government accountability as well as to the

responsiveness of political institutions to the Thai people’s needs, interests,

and aspirations.

2. WEAPONIZING THE LAWWhile Thai citizens have long dealt with official restrictions on their ability

to speak openly about important aspects of the structure and practice of

government, especially with regard to the monarchy, in recent years such

2. Human Rights Watch, “Thailand: Authorities Silence ‘Red Shirt’ Community Ra-dios,” April 27, 2011.http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/04/27/thailand-authorities-silence-red-shirt-community-radios


constraints have increased in kind, scope, and the vigor with which they are

enforced. The state’s most powerful and controversial instrument to limit

freedom of expression is Article 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, defining

the crime of lese majeste: “Whoever defames, insults or threatens the King,

Queen, the Heir-apparent or the Regent, shall be punished with imprisonment

of three to fifteen years.” While a version of Article 112 has been in force for

more than a century, penalties have gradually increased over past decades.

At the same time, new legislation has provided the state with a variety of

additional means to prohibit, suppress, deter, and punish political speech.

In 2007, the military junta introduced the “Computer Crimes Act,” which

features harsh penalties for various types of electronic activities, including

posting or transmitting writings and images injurious to the monarchy. Aside

from traditionally strict criminal defamation laws, moreover, the emergency

legislation promulgated (and grossly abused) in recent years — above all the

2005 Emergency Decree and the 2008 Internal Security Act — confers upon

the authorities broad discretion to restrict, frequently without judicial review,

the publication or broadcast of content deemed a threat to vaguely defined

notions of public order.3

Since coming to power in late 2008, Prime Minister Mark Abhisit Vejjajiva has

often faced tough questions about his government’s approach to freedom of

expression. Especially when appearing before foreign audiences, the Prime

Minister invariably professed his commitment to free speech and condemned

the occasional “abuse” of the legislation. His government, however, almost

immediately launched an all-out assault on freedom of expression. At least

since the period following the 1976 student massacre, no administration,

civilian or military, has done more to limit free expression than Abhisit

Vejjajiva’s government.

In 2009 alone, the courts are reported to have accepted charges of lese majeste

for 164 cases. That exceeded the previous record of 126 cases set in 2007, in

the wake of the coup, and more than doubled the number of cases (seventy-

seven) taken up by the judiciary in 2008. It should be noted that the highest

number of cases prior to the coup was recorded in 2005, when thirty-three

were successfully submitted to the courts. Owing to both legal restrictions and

the unwillingness of major media outlets to discuss information that might

damage the image of the monarchy, the vast majority of the cases have gone

3. For a more comprehensive discussion, see David Streckfuss, The Truth on Trial in Thailand: Defamation, Treason, and Lèse-Majesté (London: Routledge, 2010).


unreported by the local and international press.4 While no figures are currently

available for cases initiated in 2010 and 2011, arrests for lese majeste have

continued to occur with alarming regularity.5 Experts believe that the number of

people detained for alleged violations of Article 112 could be in the hundreds.6

What is worse, the situation threatens to deteriorate further. Following the

dispersal of the Red Shirt rallies in May 2010, in a crackdown justified in part

by the government’s claims that the opposition was involved in a conspiracy to

overthrow the monarchy, the Department of Special Investigations announced

it had assigned three hundred agents to identifying individuals whose

statements and behavior with regard to the monarchy were “detrimental or

ill-minded.”7 Department of Special Investigations Deputy Head, Pol. Lt. Col.

Seksan Sritulakarn subsequently reported to the Senate that as many as two

thousand suspected cases of lèse majesté are currently under investigation.8

Together with the dramatic spike in the volume of arrests and prosecutions, an

equally notable development is constituted by the increasingly harsh sentencing

and inhumane treatment reserved for those accused of lese majeste. Most

disturbing is the case of Darunee Charnchoensilpakul (“Da Torpedo”), who

was sentenced to eighteen years in prison for three charges of lese majeste

(one per offending comment) stemming from a speech she gave at a rally in

July 2008. Her trial was held in secret, ostensibly for reasons of “national

security.” Contrary to most defendants facing similar accusations and the

routine denial of due process, Da Torpedo refused to plead guilty and beg for

forgiveness. In return, she not only received an extraordinarily severe sentence.

Once convicted, she was placed in solitary confinement and was forced to wear

a name tag that identified the crime for which she was convicted, exposing her

4. Marwaan Macan-Markar, “Thailand: Lese Majeste Cases Rise but Public in the Dark,” Inter Press Service, May 14, 2010.http://ipsnews.net/login.asp?redir=news.asp?idnews=51434

5. For a partial account of the most controversial recent cases, see Junya Yimprasert, “Some Cases of Lèse Majesté (LM),” Time Up Thailand, May 11, 2011.http://hirvikatu10.net/timeupthailand/?p=1226

6. Pravit Rojanaphruk, “Lese Majeste Cases Creating Cimate of Fear, Critics Say,” The Nation, May 10, 2011.http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2011/05/10/national/Lese-majeste-cases-creat-ing-climate-of-fear-critic-30154978.html

7. “DSI Sets Up Large Lese Majeste Force,” The Nation, July 9, 2010.http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/2010/07/09/politics/DSI-sets-up-large-lese-majeste-force-30133403.html

8. “Rong senabodi DSI yom rup me kan muang saek saeng tuk chai per kruang mue,” Matichon, July 12, 2010.http://www.matichon.co.th/news_detail.php?newsid=1278918895&catid=17


to harassment.9 While her conviction was recently thrown out on procedural

grounds, she continues to be denied bail pending re-trial.

The abuse of the Computer Crimes Act has often complemented prosecutions

of lese majeste. The three highest profile prosecutions for violations of the

Computer Crimes Act are those mounted against Suwicha Thakor, Tantawut

Taweewarodomkul, and Chiranuch Premchaiporn. Suwicha Thakor was arrested

in January 2009 for posting on an internet forum a picture deemed offensive

of the King. While he was later sentenced to twenty years based on both the

Computer Crimes Act and Thailand’s lese majeste statute, the sentence was

commuted to ten years on account of his guilty plea. After spending a year and

a half in prison, Suwicha eventually received a royal pardon on June 28, 2010.

In March 2011, Tantawut Taweewarodomkul was sentenced to thirteen years

behind bars, based on a similar combination of lese majeste and computer

crimes. His “crime” is to have served as the web designer for an opposition

website (www.norporchorusa.com) that published content deemed by the

court as insulting to the monarchy. Tantawut was never accused of having

written the material, nor did he have any control over the site’s content. His

association with the website was sufficient to earn him more than a decade in

prison.

Chiranuch Premchaiporn, the web manager of independent publication

Prachatai, was arrested in March 2009 and charged with ten counts of violating

the Computer Crimes Act. She is being prosecuted owing to her failure to

promptly remove comments on the Prachatai forum that the authorities

had deemed injurious to the monarchy. The comments in question were

subsequently removed at the urging of the Ministry of Information and

Communications Technology (MICT), but that did not spare Chiranuch from

prosecution. She currently faces a sentence of fifty years in prison at the

end of a criminal trial that began in February 2011. Meanwhile, the Prachatai

website has been blocked repeatedly by the authorities since the start of the

Red Shirts demonstrations in March 2010. While awaiting trial, Chiranuch was

arrested again in early October 2010, upon returning from a conference held

in Europe on the subject of internet freedom, and charged with additional

counts.10 For her bravery and stoicism in the face of government repression,

9. “Corrections Dept Asked to Explain Da Torpedo’s Solitary Confinement,” Prachatai, September 14, 2009.http://www.prachatai.org/english/node/1400

10. Seth Mydans, “Fighting for Press Freedom in Thailand,” New York Times, Novem-


she was recently awarded the prestigious Courage in Journalism Award by the

International Women’s Media Foundation.

Other arrests for supposed violations of the Computer Crimes Act include

those of Nat Sattayapornpisut (for transmitting anti-monarchy videos via

email), Wipas Raksakulthai (for posting an offensive comment on Facebook),

Joe Gordon (for posting a link to the banned book The King Never Smiles),

and four people accused of spreading “rumors” about the King’s health — at

least two of them for merely translating a Bloomberg article on the subject.11

After facing criticism from activists in Thailand and abroad for its inaction and

connivance with Thai authorities, Amnesty International recently named Wipas

Raksakulthai a “prisoner of conscience” — the first use of such classification

for someone accused of insulting the monarchy.12

Aside from the diversification in the instruments of repression, and the

intensification in both the frequency of prosecutions and the harshness of the

penalties, recent incidents show just how far the statutes have been “stretched”

to serve the political agenda of the Establishment. Jatuporn Prompan’s speech

on April 10, 2011, which prompted the Army Commander in Chief to dispatch

representatives to file a complaint with police, is alleged to have violated

Article 112 not for criticizing the royal family, but for denouncing the Royal

Thai Army’s strategy of justifying the murder of protesters based on the need

to protect the monarchy. The Red Shirt leaders who shared the stage with

Jatuporn may face trial for the same charges — again, not for “defaming,

insulting or threatening” the royal family, but for smiling and clapping during

a speech that criticized the army. Likewise, the charges pending against

Thammasat University professor Somsak Jeamteerasakul are based on a pair

of open letters Somsak wrote to Princess Chulabhorn following an appearance

on television. Even if Somsak’s letters were to be deemed in any way offensive,

the Princess is not covered by Article 112.

The stretching of these provisions so far beyond the original meaning or

intent of the laws suggests two conclusions. First, these incidents confirm

ber 1, 2010.http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/02/world/asia/02thai.html

11. “EDITORIAL: Criminals or Scapegoats?,” Bangkok Post, November 3, 2009.http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/26746/criminals-or-scapegoats

12. Pravit Rojanaphruk, “Amnesty International Names Thailand’s First ‘Prisoner of Conscience’,” The Nation, May 10, 2011.http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2011/05/14/national/Amnesty-International-names-Thailands-first-prison-30155366.html


the suspicion that lese majeste is invoked to protect Thailand’s social and

political hierarchy far more often than it is to defend “the King, Queen, the

Heir-apparent or the Regent.” The legislation is especially effective in light

of the King’s popularity, the lack of transparency in the resulting judicial

proceedings, and the historic reluctance of international organizations to

condemn its use. Second, the laws are not only an instrument to discredit,

intimidate, and punish the alleged offenders, but on occurrence can be used

to great effect to block the diffusion of information or content that various

components of the Establishment might consider damaging. Whether or not,

for instance, Jatuporn is ultimately tried and convicted for his speech, the fact

that charges based on the speech are pending serves to discourage anyone who

might consider distributing its contents. The frivolous lese majeste complaint

filed by Democrat Party MP Watchara Petthong against Robert Amsterdam and

former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra over the “White Paper” published

by Amsterdam & Peroff in July 2010 is another clear example. More than to

punish the accused, the charges were a ruse to get bookstores to take copies of

the “White Paper” off their shelves, after the book had become a best-seller.13

Many observers of the Thai political crisis have correctly pointed out that the

abuse of the lese majeste laws, though expedient in the short run, in the long

run undermines the institution that the laws are designed to protect.14 Most

generals, politicians, and media personalities who wield this blunt object to

bludgeon their enemies no doubt understand this. That they persevere is a

clear sign of heedlessness, desperation, or most likely a combination of both.15

3. MEDIA WARSHistorically, the Thai media world has evidenced a degree of bifurcation between

broadcast and print. The broadcast media, access to which has always been

easiest for much of the population (especially in the provinces), has typically

13. For a description of Watchara’s complaint, see “Police Urged to Charge Thaksin for Robert Amsterdam’s Book,” Prachatai, November 18, 2010.http://www.prachatai.com/english/node/2145

14. For the most recent example, see Joshua Kurlantzick, “Will Thailand’s Lèse Majes-té Arrests Backfire?” Council on Foreign Relations, May 12, 2011.http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2011/05/12/will-thailand’s-lese-majeste-arrests-backfire/

15. For a similar analysis, see Jon Ungpakorn, “Is the Military Really Protecting Our Monarchy?” Bangkok Post, May 18, 2011.http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/237520/is-the-military-really-pro-tecting-our-monarchy


been the subject of tight state controls. Radio stations are often owned and

operated by the military and by the government. Similarly, both the government

and the military have traditionally owned and in some cases directly managed

all major television stations. As a result, radio and television are known for

broadcasting state-sanctioned programming, including a hefty amount of

outright propaganda, and to zealously self-censor coverage of events that

might show the government and the army in a negative light. The print media,

conversely, has tended to be a great deal more diverse, vibrant, and critical.

Since the late 1970s (and indeed much of the time before then), ownership

of large-circulation newspapers has been private. Though major publications

have always had to contend with varying restrictions as governments came and

went, the degree of editorial control exercised by the state has generally been

negligible. With the important exception of royal coverage, by the late 1990s

the Thai print media had “largely secured the right to say what it like[d].”16

The print media’s freedom from state control, however, has never signified

independence, objectivity, impartiality, or adherence to basic journalistic

standards. As Duncan McCargo described it a decade ago, press coverage

tends to be driven by personal agendas and vendettas, distorted by incestuous

and often corrupt ties between journalists and state officials, and generally

impoverished by the lack of rigorous analysis, the absence of any investigative

impulse, and dubious journalistic ethics. In McCargo’s words, the Thai press

has always worked as a “partisan political actor,” albeit one with “multiple

loyalties”17 to politicians, high-ranking state officials, generals, godfathers,

and business interests.

The bifurcation has largely persisted to this day, though important developments

driven by technological change and events on the ground have resulted in an

important change in the role of the broadcast media. On the one hand, the

state has largely preserved its dominant ownership role and editorial control

over the vast majority of licensed radio stations and all terrestrial television

channels. On the other hand, both kinds of broadcast media have experienced

a degree of pluralization as a result of the proliferation of hundreds of

community radio stations and a variety of satellite television channels. The

diversification has been accompanied by the growing role of the broadcast

media for protest movements seeking to offer their own political commentary

16. Duncan McCargo, Politics and the Press in Thailand : Media Machinations (London: Routledge), p. 1.

17. Ibid., p. 21.


and mobilize supporters. The People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) used its

free-to-air satellite television channel ASTV to great effect in its campaigns

against the governments of Thaksin Shinawatra and Samak Sundaravej. The

PAD’s approach was later emulated by the National United Front for Democracy

against Dictatorship (UDD). The Red Shirts have also benefited from the

activities of community radio stations in the provinces, which continue to help

disseminate alternative narratives of Thailand’s political crisis.

Whereas freedom of the press has experienced a drastic deterioration since the

2006 coup, and especially under the government led by the Democrat Party,

traditional print and broadcast media have been less affected by censorship,

shutdowns, and prosecutions. Terrestrial television stations rarely stray off the

official narrative. Meanwhile, given that most newspapers are closely affiliated

with Establishment interests, many have been outspoken in their support of

the military and the Democrat Party, while some have been eager participants

in the government’s campaign to discredit the Red Shirts before and after last

year’s massacres.18 Even less conservative outlets have shown restraint and

deference in their criticism of the government, and have generally refrained

from asking difficult questions about the killings, the cover-ups, or the illegal

detentions.19 Whatever impulse individual journalists might feel to take on the

Establishment with greater vigor is easily limited by the intervention of their

editors or, failing that, disciplinary action, defamation, and lese majeste.20

Consequently, Thai authorities do not generally need to take very public,

draconian measures to shape the traditional media’s coverage. Interference

is constant, but generally takes place informally. With the exception of small

magazines explicitly affiliated with the UDD, at least five of which were banned

after the state of emergency was declared in 2010,21 episodes of official

censorship of the local print media are rare. Even the Economist, which has

published several articles critical of the monarchy in recent years, has never

18. For a number of examples, see Pravit Rojanaphruk, “Some Attitudes Towards Red Shirts Shameful,” The Nation, April 1, 2010.http://www.prachatai.com/english/node/1697

19. Jon Ungpakorn, “Thai News Media Not Asking Any Questions,” February 23, 2011.http://facthai.wordpress.com/2011/04/09/thai-news-media-not-asking-any-ques-tions-bangkok-post/

20. For three examples of broadcast journalists punished for straying from the gov-ernment’s position during the 2010 Red Shirt rallies, see “Wassana Nanuam Becomes Latest Victim of Thai Media Intimidation,” TumblerBlog, April 26, 2010.http://www.tumblerblog.com/2010/04/wassana-nanuam-becomes-latest-victim-of-thai-media-intimidation/

21. Human Rights Watch, “Thailand: Descent into Chaos,” May 2011, p. 145.


been formally banned by the state; the distribution of the offending issues has

always been blocked on the distributor’s own initiative (or accord).

While the mainstream press has remained docile throughout the crisis

precipitated by the 2006 coup, few print outlets have supported the destruction

of democracy and the rule of law with as much zest as the English-language

newspapers — the Bangkok Post and the Nation. Both newspapers are only read

by a tiny sliver of the population in Thailand and almost never break news of

any consequence. As a result, what renders their role problematic is not their

power to influence the domestic debate or shape domestic public opinion;

it is rather the effect that both outlets have on the international coverage of

Thailand.22 Troubling though it may be, the Bangkok Post’s slogan is accurate

— these papers are indeed “the world’s window to Thailand.” Unfortunately,

the “window” is offered by newspapers that routinely disseminate government

propaganda, occasionally incite violence,23 applaud or rationalize the murder of

Thai citizens,24 cheer impunity,25 defend restrictions to freedom of the press,26

or openly fantasize about theocracy.27 As highlighted by a pair of editorials

recently published by the Nation, even when the paper is compelled to lament

developments that attract international condemnation, great care is taken to

absolve the government of responsibility28 or spread the blame around.29

22. See Jim Taylor, “Truth and Media Hegemony,” Prachatai, April 22, 2010.http://www.prachatai3.info/english/node/2433

23. For an example, see Sophon Ongkara, “City Residents Become Hostages to Red-Shirt Anarchy,” The Nation, April 6, 2010.http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/2010/04/06/opinion/City-residents-be-come-hostages-to-red-shirt-anarch-30126446.html

24. For example, see “Debasing a World Court,” Bangkok Post, November 1, 2010.http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/204183/debasing-a-world-court

25. For example, see “Questionable Use of the Law,” February 2, 2011.http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/219413/questionable-use-of-the-law

26. For example, see Thanong Khantong, “Lese Majeste Allows Criticism but Not Abuse,” The Nation, March 6, 2009.http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2009/03/06/opinion/opinion_30097261.php

27. For example, see Bangkok Pundit, “Columnist: Buddhist Principles not Democracy the Answer to Thailand’s Ills,” March 4, 2011.http://asiancorrespondent.com/49580/thai-columnist-buddhist-principles-and-not-democracy-is-the-answer-to-thailands-ills/

28. See “Thailand Can No Longer Celebrate Freedom of Speech,” The Nation, May 4, 2011.http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2011/05/04/opinion/Thailand-can-no-longer-celebrate-freedom-of-speech-30154496.html

29. See “No One Will Accept Responsibility for their Actions,” May 6, 2011.http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2011/05/06/opinion/No-one-will-accept-respon-sibility-for-their-action-30154673.html


While the Bangkok Post has a long history of supine coverage and pro-

Establishment bias, it is the Nation that has most recently produced the kind of

rabidly conservative content that most stands out for intellectual dishonesty

and disregard of the facts. The Nation’s transformation into the premier

outlet for “anti-Reds propaganda”30 represents the complete betrayal of the

important role that the newspaper played in 1992 to expose the army’s crimes

during the crackdown of “Black May.” Much like government mouthpieces

in neighboring countries, like the New Light of Myanmar in Burma31 or the

People’s Daily in China,32 the Nation was not content with simply demonizing

protesters and justifying the government’s abuses, but actively orchestrated a

campaign against media outlets like CNN and BBC, which had sought to present

a more balanced coverage of the Red Shirt rallies in 2010.33 Award-winning

CNN reporter Dan Rivers was driven out of the country by the ostracism that

resulted from this odious campaign.34

Given the complicity of much of the mainstream media, and the effectiveness

of the informal pressure applied by the state, much of the outright repression

on broadcast and print has focused on alternative outlets such as opposition

magazines, community radio stations, and the UDD’s free-to-air satellite

television stations. Even before the most recent raids, Thai authorities had

repeatedly sought to silence community radio stations in the provinces. After

the imposition of the emergency decree in April 2010, the government shut

down forty-seven radio stations in thirteen provinces in Central and Northeast

Thailand, with the pretext that the stations either incited unrest or distorted

information.35 Meanwhile, satellite television channels associated with the UDD

have recurrently been censored. Once again, the imposition of the Emergency

Decree was used to block “D-Station” and “People’s Television” (PTV) during

the mass protests of April 2009 and April 2010, respectively. PTV stopped

30. See Elizabeth Garrett, “Q&A: Dutch Journalist Michel Maas Talks to IPI about Being Shot in Thailand Clashes,” International Press Institute, July 6, 2010.http://www.freemedia.at/singleview/5032/

31. See Kerry Howley, “Don’t Be Bought By Those Slickers,” Reason, October 5, 2007.http://reason.com/blog/2007/10/05/dont-be-bought-by-those-slicke

32. See Chris Hogg, “How the Chinese Reported Tiananmen,” BBC, June 4, 2009.http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8069940.stm

33. See Napas Na Pombejra, “Open Letter to CNN,” The Nation, May 19, 2010.http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/2010/05/19/opinion/Open-letter-to-CNN-30129682.html

34. See Nirmal Ghosh, “Dan Rivers Leaving Thailand,” September 5, 2010.http://blogs.straitstimes.com/2010/9/5/cnn-s-rivers-leaving-thailand

35. Human Rights Watch, “Thailand: Descent into Chaos,” May 2011, p. 142-143.


airing programming at the end of the crackdown.

One other key feature of Thailand’s media landscape and regime of censorship

and control is its obvious double standard. While opposition media outlets

are routinely shut down on the pretext that they encourage violence and

instability, pro-establishment media, such as the PAD-owned ASTV television

station and its offshoot, the Manager website and newspaper, have never been

sanctioned or censored. From the routine publishing of personal details of

persons it deems a threat to the monarchy — such as home addresses and

phone numbers — to outright abuse and the vicious language of hatred

displayed towards Cambodians (a favorite target), the tone of the PAD media is

as low as it gets. In recent months, outright calls for war with Cambodia have

peppered the PAD’s usual mix of racist hate-speech and extreme right wing

fanaticism. Furthermore, while often drawing on violent imagery and ugly

stereotypes, ASTV and Manager have clearly encouraged the PAD to engage in

illegal activities, including violent attacks on elected Thai politicians and police

officers. They have, as yet, almost completely escaped any form of censure.

It is nonetheless the world wide web that has become the main battlefield where

the war to suppress alternative sources of information is waged. The internet

presented a near impossible challenge to the Thai authorities. The government

cannot impose the licensing requirements that make radio stations vulnerable

to closure, while the nominal start-up costs involved in opening and operating

a website or a blog removed the barriers to entry that used to ensure only the

wealthy and well-connected could work as producers of news content. The

diversification brought by the world wide web, the sheer volume of comments

and posts, the degree of anonymity one might be able to maintain, and the

possibility of easily hosting content in countries where speech is protected

have both complicated the task of policing nonconformists and neutralized the

effectiveness of the informal pressure with which the government easily keeps

the mainstream media in line. At the same time, the smart, well-researched

commentary that often appears on the web has undermined the credibility

of mainstream media outlets whose job it is carry the government’s water.

Perhaps the best example is the role that the internet has played in turning

the Nation into a laughingstock among those who follow Thai politics closely.

The level of repression unleashed by the state on the world wide web, and the

clumsiness with which it has gone about doing so, is driven by the pluralization

inherent to the medium’s diffusion and the growing irrelevance of traditional


means of managing information. Unable to shape news coverage through less

conspicuous methods, Thai authorities have taken a brute force approach

to the internet. Old and new legislation has been used to hound editors of

online publications, bloggers, web designers, and users who post comments

and pictures on public forums. Substantial resources have been committed to

monitoring and surveillance. New agencies like the “Bureau of Prevention and

Eradication of Computer Crime” have been set up.36 State-sanctioned volunteers,

whose rhetoric and indoctrination are evocative of infamous civilian vigilantes

from the 1970s,37 trawl the web for content they can report to the authorities.38

Most prominently, in recent years the Ministry of Communication and

Information Technology (MICT) has undertaken a campaign to block access to

thousands of internet sites found to contain inappropriate (or inconvenient)

content, frequently attracting condemnation for its tendency to do so without

the requisite court order. While estimates of the number of blocked websites

are disputed, in May 2010 Police Colonel Suchart Wongananchai, Inspector

of the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology, admitted

to blocking over fifty thousand websites.39 As a result of the prolonged

enforcement of the Emergency Decree (which allowed the authorities to block

websites arbitrarily and without seeking the courts’ permission) through most

of 2010, censorship has intensified since then. The watchdog group Freedom

Against Censorship Thailand (FACT) estimated that by the end of 2010 more

than four hundred thousand webpages had been blocked.40

The government’s war on the internet has turned into an unmitigated

public relations disaster. While the information the authorities have sought

to suppress continues to be available, censorship has only heightened the

36. “MICT to Curb Violations of Computer Act,” National News Bureau of Thailand Public Relations Department, June 15, 2010. http://thainews.prd.go.th/en/news.php?id=255306150051

37. Nicholas Farrelly, “From Village Scouts to Cyber Scouts,” New Mandala, July 2, 2010.http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2010/07/02/from-village-scouts-to-cy-ber-scouts/

38. Daniel Rook, “Thai ‘Cyber Scouts’ Patrol Web for Royal Insults,” AFP, May 11, 2011.http://news.brisbanetimes.com.au/breaking-news-technology/thai-cyber-scouts-patrol-web-for-royal-insults-20110511-1eijz.html

39. “50,000 Websites Shut Down, MICT Inspector Says,” Prachatai, May 7, 2010.http://www.prachatai.org/english/node/1795

40. “Thailand’s Backdoor Censorship– 425,296 Webpages Blocked,” Freedom Against Censorship Thailand, January 5, 2011.http://facthai.wordpress.com/2011/01/05/factorial-thailand’s-backdoor-censorship-425296-webpages-blocked/


public’s interest by underscoring just how threatening the banned content is

considered by the state. Meanwhile, these extreme measures have attracted

unprecedented international scrutiny and condemnation, damaging the

government’s credibility, diminishing the country’s prestige, and destroying

the myth of Thailand as a country tolerant of alternative political views. Recent

reports by Freedom House suggest that the overall decline that Thailand’s

freedom of the press has experienced in recent years is driven primarily by

the shambles that is the country’s record with regard to internet freedom.41

The scrutiny also exposed senior Establishment figures to ridicule for the

outrageous public statements they were forced to make to rationalize the

campaign. Shortly after his appointment in June 2010, for instance, Minister of

Information and Communication Technology Juti Krai-rirk claimed that “the

government has given too much freedom for its citizens” — hence the need for

more censorship.42

4. BEYOND ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISMElections are an essential component of any functioning democratic regime.

Democracy, however, is not just about elections, even when elections are

free of outright fraud. Democracy cannot exist when elections are undone

by the courts or rendered meaningless by the military’s refusal to submit to

the control of an elected civilian government. Democracy cannot exist when

political parties are barred from fielding their best candidates, are denied

the opportunity to mount a vigorous campaign, and are forced to enter into

alliances by threats of dissolution. Equally important, democracy cannot exist

when voters are denied access to alternative sources of information, such that

they cannot make a free and informed judgment about the options before

them. Without the rule of law, freedom of association, freedom of speech,

and an independent press, elections cannot, on their own, make a country a

democracy. Indeed, elections held in these circumstances often run the risk of

becoming just another instrument of authoritarian rule. That is the difference

between “electoral democracy” and “electoral authoritarianism.”

In Thailand, the subversion of each of these indispensable features of

41. Freedom House, “Freedom on the Net 2010: Thailand,” April 2011.http://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/FotN/Thailand2011.pdf

42. “MICT to Curb Violations of Computer Act,” National News Bureau of Thailand Public Relations Department, June 15, 2010. http://thainews.prd.go.th/en/news.php?id=255306150051


democracy casts a dark shadow on both the conduct and the significance of

the upcoming elections. While previous reports in this series have described

the manner in which the army and the courts undermine the competitiveness

and the democratic content of Thailand’s elections, the restrictions placed in

recent years on freedom of expression and freedom of the press are especially

troubling. Political parties must now tread carefully on controversial issues for

fear of being branded enemies of the monarchy — a label that is increasingly

easy to earn given the stretching of lese majeste provisions. Citizens are

denied the right to speak freely, which in turn deprives them of an opportunity

to shape government policies, party platforms, and public debate based on

their true political preferences. And while the mainstream press offers for the

most part one-sided information designed to benefit the Establishment and

boost the electoral prospects of its parliamentary wing, the Democrat Party,

alternative media outlets are continuously engaged in a cat and mouse game

with the authorities. Much of their financial resources, manpower, and time

are expended trying to elude government censorship, circumventing filtering

mechanisms, and fending off the threat of arrest or prosecution.

Thailand’s general elections cannot be described as genuinely free, fair, and

competitive so long as citizens do not have the right to express their opinions

and are denied access to a wide range of alternative information. For that to

happen, old and new restrictions on freedom of speech must be lifted, while

the regulatory framework that governs Thailand’s media landscape must

be brought in line with fundamental principles shared by every democratic

society. At the very least, this requires a series of reforms:

(a) The Thai armed forces, and any member thereof, must be prohibited

from owning and operating any television or radio station;

(b) Defamation laws must be overhauled, such that the offense of

defamation/libel is decriminalized and re-classified as a civil offense

punishable only by a monetary fine. In addition, proving defamation in

court must require proof that the statements in question are false, and

evidence that they were made by the accused with knowledge of the

truth and intent to cause harm;

(c) The 2007 Computer Crimes Act must be repealed in its entirety;

(d) Article 112 of the Criminal Code, sanctioning the crime of lese majeste,

must be amended in accordance with legislation that exists in countries


that have the benefit of both a stable constitutional monarchy and

a functioning democracy. In practice, any such reform must entail

limitations to the right to file a complaint, the drastic reduction of

prison terms, the requirement that the proceedings not be held in

secret, the lifting of media restriction on reporting on the charges, and

the admissibility of truth as a viable defense. Aside from removing

the most serious impediment to freedom of expression in Thailand,

reforming Article 112 is arguably the most constructive, most sensible

way to uphold the monarchy. The reforms guarantee that ill-intentioned

people or groups seeking political advantage can no longer use the

monarchy as a weapon to stifle debate and criminalize oppositions;

(e) Finally, no political content, whether in print or in electronic format,

shall be censored by the state, whether before or after its publication,

and under no circumstances prior to a court judgment finding that the

content in question constitutes defamation or lese majeste (according

to the revised definitions).

Army Commander in Chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha recently spoke

to reporters about his apparent unease with one of the central tenets of

democracy. “The Thai people,” he stated, “cannot have freedom of thought,

because with freedom of thought come problems.”43 General Prayuth’s fears

are well founded. Freedom of thought, freedom of expression, and freedom

of the press have always presented military regimes with insurmountable

“problems.” Indeed, that is possibly the most compelling reason why such

freedoms must be restored. Ultimately, it should not be up to the generals,

or any other member of the Establishment, to decide what rights the people

deserve to enjoy. It is rather for the Thai people to decide, through open and

public debate, the configuration of Thailand’s political institutions and the

prerogatives exercised by each. Judging from the draconian measures put in

place over the last five years to stifle public debate, there is nothing the Thai

Establishment finds quite so downright terrifying.

43. DNN-News, April 29, 2011: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d-T0SVEIEFU

T H A I L A N D 2 0 1 1 G E N E R A L E L E C T I O N R E P O R T S E R I E S , N O . 3

Documents

Bowlderized: The Domestication of Thailand's Mass Media