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The Boundaries of
Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility
Geoffrey P. Lantos
Professor of Business Administration
Box D-55
Stonehill College
North Easton, MA 02357
June 2001
Phone: 508.565.1205
Fax: 508.565.1444
E-mail: [email protected]
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The Boundaries of
Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility
Keywords Corporate social responsibility (CSR), Roles of business, Stakeholder theory, Ethical CSR,
Responsibilities and duties, Altruistic CSR, Strategic CSR,
Abstract Reviews the development of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) concept and its four
components: economic, legal, ethical, and altruistic duties. Discusses different perspectives on the proper
role of business in society, from profit making to community service provider. Suggests that much of the
confusion and controversy over CSR stem from a failure to distinguish its ethical, altruistic, and strategic
forms of CSR. On the basis of a thorough examination of the arguments for and against altruistic CSR,
concurs with Milton Friedman that altruistic CSR is not a legitimate role of business. Proposes that ethical
CSR, grounded in the concept of ethical duties and responsibilities, is mandatory. Concludes that strategic
CSR is good for business and society. Advises that marketing take a lead role in strategic CSR activities.
Notes difficulties in CSR practice and offers suggestions for marketers in planning for strategic CSR and
academic researchers in further clarifying the boundaries of strategic CSR.
Introduction
It is no news that today’s business organizations are expected to exhibit ethical behavior and moral
management. However, over the past half century the bar has been steadily raised. Now, not only are
firms expected to be virtuous, they are being called to practice “social responsibility” or “corporate
citizenship”(Carroll 2000, p. 187), accepting some accountability for societal welfare. Marketers, as
boundary spanners responsible for the enterprise’s dealings with various publics, have a primary interest in
and should take a major role in defining and implementing their firm’s social responsibility efforts.
Unfortunately, too frequently marketers still focus solely on their products and markets while neglecting
the social impact of their activities (Flores, 2001).
Perhaps this is because the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a fuzzy one with unclear
boundaries and debatable legitimacy. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the CSR concept by offering
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an historical perspective on CSR, reviewing the different viewpoints on the role of business in society, and
distinguishing three types of CSR: ethical, altruistic, and strategic, thereby establishing parameters for its
practice. I argue that for any organization ethical CSR (avoiding societal harms) is obligatory, for a
publicly-held business altruistic CSR (doing good works at possible expense to stockholders) is not
legitimate, and that companies should limit their philanthropy to strategic CSR (good works that are also
good for the business). I conclude with suggestions for marketers and others responsible for strategic CSR
as well as for further research.
The legitimacy of CSR relates to a set of fundamental and crucial questions: Why do corporations exist?
Should enterprises also be concerned with their social performance as well as economic results? If so, what
does it mean to be “socially responsible”? Should economic performance be sacrificed for social
performance? To whom do businesses owe “responsibilities” (a.k.a. “duties” or “obligations)? What kinds
of activities and programs should CSR include? To what extent should social responsibility activities
consume the company’s precious resources? How can we measure social performance and thereby know
when companies have fulfilled their societal obligations? What are the interests of consumer marketers in
CSR efforts? This paper will offer suggestions for answering these questions based on a synthesis and
analysis of the literature, while recognizing that empirical research is needed for definitive answers to
many. .
History of corporate social responsibility (CSR)
Society’s rising expectations for business
The notion that business has duties to society is firmly entrenched, although in the past several decades
there has been a revolution in the way people view the relationship between business and society. Archie
Carroll (1979) and other researchers believe that we should judge corporations not just on their economic
success but also on non-economic criteria. Carroll (1979) proposed a popular four-part definition of CSR,
suggesting that corporations have four responsibilities or “four faces” (Carroll, 2000, p. p. 187) to fulfill to
be good corporate citizens: economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic (which I call “altruistic” or
“humanitarian” CSR). I believe that much of the uncertainty about the legitimacy and domain of CSR
stems from failure to distinguish the ethical and philanthropic dimensions as well as from the misguided
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notion that it is somehow objectionable for business to prosper from good works (what I call “strategic
CSR”).
Economic responsibilities. Ever since the industrial revolution, we have depended on business as a
major economic institution for producing want-satisfying goods and services; providing jobs and fair pay
for workers; seeking raw materials supplies; discovering new resources, technological improvements, and
products; paying taxes for public needs; generating the investment capital necessary for economic growth;
all while earning a profit for the owners and serving as an investment opportunity. Previously, if a firm did
all of this while obeying the law, it was praised.
Eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations, provided us with a
framework for modern business and its relationship to society. Smith proposed that capitalism, by
encouraging the pursuit of gain and efficiency, works to create greater wealth than any other economic
system, and maximizes liberty by allowing individuals freedom of choice in employment, purchases, and
investments, thereby benefiting the common good. Endeavoring to beat one’s rivals, and toiling to produce
better work to earn the next promotion, if done ethically, will result in high personal development and
therefore excellent use of one’s time and talents and the firm’s treasury (Johnson, 1990). The manager’s
role is to act as a fiduciary or trustee to a principal, the owners or shareholders, being their steward in
effectively and efficiently managing the organization’s assets.
Economic responsibility, then, is to be profitable for principals by delivering a good quality product at a
fair price is due to customers. Novak (1996) more fully delineated a set of seven economic responsibilities.
These are to: (1) satisfy customers with goods and services of real value, (2) earn a fair return on the funds
entrusted to the corporation by its investors, (3) create new wealth, which can accrue to nonprofit
institutions which own shares of publicly-held companies and help lift the poor out of poverty as their
wages rise, (4) create (and, I would add, maintain) new jobs, (5) defeat envy though generating upward
mobility and giving people the sense that their economic conditions can improve, (6) promote innovation,
and (7) diversify the economic interests of citizens so as to prevent the tyranny of the majority. I call these
duties economic CSR. Societal expectations in this realm have appeared to hold steady over the years.
Legal responsibilities. Legal duties entail complying with the law and playing by the rules of the game.
Laws regulating business conduct are passed because society does not always trust business to do what is
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right. However, laws have certain shortcomings to ensure responsible behavior: they are of limited scope
(they can’t cover every possible contingency); merely provide a floor or moral minimum for business
conduct; are reactive, telling us what ought not to be done, rather than proactive, telling us what ought to be
done; and might be followed involuntarily out of fear of punishment rather than voluntarily out of internal
moral conviction.
Ethical responsibilities. Ethical duties overcome the limitations of legal duties. They entail being
moral, doing what is right, just, and fair; respecting peoples’’ moral rights; and avoiding harm or social
injury as well as preventing harm caused by others (Smith and Quelch, 1993). Ethical responsibilities those
policies, institutions, decisions, or practices that are either expected (positive duties) or prohibited (negative
duties) by members of society, although they are not necessarily codified into law (Carroll, 2001). They
derive their source of authority from religious convictions, moral traditions, humane principles, and human
rights commitments (Novak, 1996). Today, virtually all members of the business system agree, at least in
theory (although, unfortunately, often not in practice) with this third set of “social responsibilities.” I call
ethical duties ethical CSR.
Prior to the 1960s, business ethics was not a major concern of businesspeople. Rather, it was left to
theologians to discuss issues of fair wages, unfair labor practices, and the morality of capitalism. The
Protestant work ethic taught people to work hard and be successful—this was the essence of business’
social responsibility.
Beginning in the 1960s ethical issues in business were raised on an unprecedented scale. There was a
heightened realization that repressive labor practices could be found at even some of the most admired
corporations, unsafe products were being sold, the business system was taking a toll on the natural
environment, society was not succeeding in elevating those most economically deprived, bribery was
occurring on an international scale, and morality was being compromised in the pursuit of money and
power. Liberal consumerist media portrayed business as evil, implying that almost any business activity is
morally reprehensible. Consequently, we heard consumer outcries against insensitive and immoral
business practices. As a reaction to the negative publicity, by the mid-1970s, the concept of raising
corporate America’s consciousness was in vogue in both corporate boardrooms and college classrooms.
The idea was that enterprises should not single-mindedly pursue profit without regard to morality.
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Thus, since the 1970s, society’s expectations of business ethics have been climbing. Unlike yesteryear,
productivity alone is no longer considered sufficient to morally justify a business organization. Also
important is how wealth generation affects non-economic aspects of society, such as the welfare of
employees, customers, and other members of the business system, as well as other outside groups and the
natural environment.
Altruistic responsibilities. Carroll’s discretionary or philanthropic responsibility—“giving back” time
and money in the forms of voluntary service, voluntary association, and voluntary giving—is where most
of the controversy over the legitimacy of CSR lies. Over the past half century, business increasingly has
been judged not just by its economic and its moral performance, but also by its social contributions. Henry
Ford II identified this when he spoke at the Harvard Business School as far back as 1969: “The terms of the
contract between industry and society are changing…Now we are being asked to serve a wider range of
human values and to accept an obligation to members of the public with whom we have no commercial
transactions” (Chewning et. al, 1990, p. 207).
CSR actually has its roots in the thinking of early twentieth century theologians and religious thinkers,
who suggested that certain religious principles could be applied to business activities. For example,
Andrew Carnegie devised a classic twofold statement of corporate social responsibility based on religious
thinking. First, was the charity principle, which required more fortunate individuals to assist less fortunate
members of society. However, by the 1920’s community needs outgrew the wealth of even the most
generous wealthy individuals, with the result that some people expected business organizations to
contribute their resources to charities aiding the unfortunate. Second, was the stewardship principle, a
biblical doctrine that requires businesses and wealthy individuals to see themselves as stewards or
caretakers, not just of shareholders’ financial resources, but also of society’s economic resources, holding
their property in trust for the benefit of society as a whole.
Thus, there was a concern for the macro-level outcome of business decisions in ways that went beyond
the loyal agent's argument that a manager's duty is solely to loyally serve the employer by contributing to
profit maximization. Now, it was suggested that stewardship of the corporation’s resources somehow be
melded with a view of stewardship of society’s resources to more broadly serve society. Business was said
to have stewardship responsibilities not just to shareholders, but also to so-called "stakeholders" (a.k.a.
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constituencies or publics) , notably employees, customers, competitors, suppliers, distributors, the local
community in which the enterprise operates, the general public, and the natural environment. When
corporations make business decisions they have both short- and long-term effects on many sectors of
society.
During the latter half of twentieth century there arose the idea of the corporate social contract, which
today underlies the CSR concept. Given the sometimes-adverse effects of business decision-making on
society as well as corporate reliance upon society, the notion of an implied corporate social contract was
conceived by social and economic theorists. This contract spells out society’s expectations of business as
well as (although much less discussed) business’ expectations of society. The social contract theory of
business is widely held today by both business ethicists and business decision-makers (Bowie, 1983).
The corporate social contract concerns a firm’s indirect societal obligations and resembles the “social
contract” between citizens and government traditionally discussed by philosophers who identified the
reciprocal obligations of citizen and state. Originally, this social contract focused solely on economic
responsibilities. Social progress and quality-of-life advancement were assumed to be a by-product of
economic growth. Business’ social responsibility was to maximize profits, subject to the constraints of the
law. Private business had no accountability for the general conditions of life or the specific conditions in
local communities. (Anshen, 1988).
This new social contract postulated that social progress should weigh equally in the balance with
economic progress. The idea that corporations as organizations have “social responsibility” and
obligations tying them to a wider society became popular in the 1950s, and continued through the 1960s
and 1970s, when American businesses rapidly gained in size and power (Davis, 1983). Several groups
were responsible for this heightened social consciousness, including the feminist movement and those
advocating for the mentally and physically challenged, for native people, and for minorities. Much of the
public embraced the concerns of these groups because unfortunate events brought the realization that some
special-interest groups were worth listening to, such as environmentalists , consumer advocates, and anti-
apartheid supporters.
Thus, it was suggested that business, as a social institution, should join with other social structures like
the family, educational system, and religious institutions, to help enhance life and meet needs (Chewning
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et. al, 1990). Whereas in Adam Smith’s model, property was owned by individuals who directly decided
how it was to be used, the modern corporation is characterized by professional managers who make
decisions on behalf of the stockholder owners, and these decisions affect tens of thousands of citizens
(Miller and Ahrens, 1993). Moreover, corporations need the resources of society if they are to survive and
thrive. Corporate taxes are supposedly not sufficient to pay for these resources, and so the corporation
should, out of a duty of gratitude, assist in solving social problems (Bowie, 1995).1 Moreover,
multinational corporations control a tremendous amount of economic and productive resources, such as
technology, finances, and labor power on a scale that no adequate accounting of their duties should ignore
(Lippke, 1996). Therefore, social contract theorists feel these resources should have some use beyond
producing more brands of household cleaners for consumers and wealth for stockholders. The corporate
social contract holds that business and society are equal partners, each enjoying a set of rights and having
reciprocal responsibilities.
According to social contract thinking, the enterprise’s responsibilities should be commensurate with its
economic, social, and political power (Bowie, 1983; Davis, 1983; Lippke, 1996). Some even say that,
because of its size and special legal status, the modern corporation should be considered as a public
institution, a creature of the state, rather than a private organization, so that it can be held to a higher legal
and moral accountability than the traditional business enterprise. In any case, social responsibility
proponents argue that corporations must be held to higher standards of social responsibility than mere
individuals (Miller and Ahrens, 1993). However, the social contract is a rather vague concept, however, as
it is not written in one place, varies from one region to another, changes as society changes (Chewning et.
Al, 1990), and does not specify to what extent the corporation should be considered a public vs. a private
enterprise and how that might vary with the size of the enterprise
Concern about CSR prevailed through the “kinder and gentler” 1990s, due to the growing recognition
that governments had failed to solve many social problems as well as the diminished scope of governments
(Smith, 2001). Also, for most of the period since 1960, disposable incomes and leisure time have been
sufficiently high to allow the public to focus on issues beyond earning a living. Additionally, due to
1 However, some observers suggest that, like citizens, corporations pay their fair share of taxes to cover thecost of using of these resources, and so they should not have responsibilities beyond those of othertaxpayers (Lippke, 1996).
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advances in satellite communications, which have allowed virtually "live" coverage of worldwide
problems, the thinking of the North American public has become less inner directed and parochial, and
more sensitive to the shortcomings of business exposed by wide-ranging investigative reporters.
Interest in doing good for society regardless of its impact on the bottom line is what I call altruistic or
humanitarian CSR. I shall argue that genuine philanthropy, rather than that which is public relations
driven, is not proper for corporate responsibilities to practice. On the other hand, philanthropic CSR used
as a marketing tool to enhance the firm’s image—what I call strategic CSR—is legitimate since it helps
achieve the firm’s financial obligations.
Defining Corporate Social Responsibility
According to proponents of CSR, then, the large American corporation is inherently a social institution
as well as economic enterprise, and so businesses should weigh the social consequences of their activities,
balancing carefully conflicting responsibilities to various stakeholders. CSR has been variously defined
as:
• “An organization’s obligation to maximize its positive impact and minimize its negative effects in
being a contributing member to society, with concern for society’s long-run needs and wants. CSR
means being a good steward of society’s economic and human resources (Journal of Consumer
Marketing call for papers for special issue on social responsibility for consumer marketing practice,
http://www.literaticlub.co.uk/news/call18.html, 1/24/01);
• “The obligations of the firm to its stakeholders—people and groups who can affect or a who are
affected by corporate policies and practices. These obligations go beyond legal requirements and the
company’s duties to its shareholders. Fulfillment of these obligations is intended to minimize any
harm and maximize the long-run beneficial impact of the firm on society” (Bloom and Gundlach,
2001, p. 142);
• “The intelligent and objective concern for the welfare of society that restrains individual and corporate
behavior from ultimately destructive activities, no matter how immediately profitable, and leads in the
direction of positive contributions to human betterment, variously as the latter may be defined”
(Kenneth R. Andrews, quoted in Hartman, 1998, p. 243).
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In summary, CSR entails the obligation stemming from the implicit "social contract" between business
and society for firms to be responsive to society's long-run needs and wants, optimizing the positive effects
and minimizing the negative effects of its actions on society. Note the focus on both minimizing harms
(ethical CSR) and promoting benefits for society (altruistic CSR if the firm does not reciprocally benefit
and strategic CSR if management plans for the firm to profit too).
Conflicting pressures for CSR
Social responsibility is a balancing act: business must balance economic performance, ethical
performance, and social performance, and the balance must be achieved among various stakeholders. This
suggests a dual bottom line with economic criteria and noneconomic criteria. In fact, many companies
have multiple objectives. For instance, at Ben & Jerry's employees are evaluated on both financial
contribution and social contribution to the community.
In the 21st century the public demands that businesses make social issues a part of their strategies.
Today, managers continually meet demands from various stakeholder groups to devote resources to CSR.
Such pressures come from constituencies enumerated above, even including some stockholders, especially
institutional shareholders. (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). Examples of employee pressures include
recognition of certain employee rights in the workplace, including provisions for worker health and safety
as well as nondiscrimination in hiring, firing and promotion; tying pay to performance; a zero-layoff
policy; family-friendly leave programs; and stock ownership by employees. Consumer pressures include
withholding price increases to cover rising costs, production of safe products, and greater amounts of
consumer information. Community and environmental pressures encompass ensuring that the business’
operations do not threaten the safety of the local community, giving financial assistance to minority
neighborhoods, providing special training and jobs for the hard-core unemployed, investing in pollution-
abatement equipment, contributing to charitable and not-for-profit organizations, and making executives
available to serve without compensation on public boards or other non-business assignments. The mandate
is clear: “Decades of studying business’ corporate social performance…lead one to conclude that corporate
citizenship is real—it is expected of business by the public, and it is manifested by many excellent
companies” (Carroll, 2000, p. 187, italics in the original).
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Yet, at the same time, there is the competing pressure for improved financial performance from
institutional investors, notably mutual and pension fund managers, who have a fiduciary duty to their
investors to earn a maximum return on investment. The wealth of many American households is now
closely tied to the stock market, and so corporate managers are under the gun by both individual and
institutional investors to do whatever it takes to increase the stock price (Boatright, 199). This leads to the
push and pull of forces arguing for strict profit maximization vs. those pushing for better social
performance.
We should note that such a dilemma does not exist to a great extent within privately-owned businesses
(sole proprietorship or partnership) since there is no issue of economic agency where the manager, as a
loyal agent of his or her employer or stockholders, has a duty to maximize profits for them. The owners of
an unincorporated business are accountable only to one another regarding their business performance; they
are not subject to the market for corporate control. They may define their mission and goals of their
organization as they wish. For instance, no one takes issue with the well-known fact that Tom’s of Maine
engages in many practices that voluntarily restrict profit in order to promote the general welfare.2
The controversy over CSR arises when publicly held companies undertake “socially responsible”
activities that might restrict profits. Although there are different types of corporations with differing
perspectives, such as family, closely held, not-for-profit, and public, this paper will take the perspective of
the publicly held corporation since the debate over CSR generally rages in companies held by many
individual and institutional investors, where ownership is divided from management, control, and
responsibility. Some managers disdain demands for CSR, believing that such efforts clash with profit
maximization and the interests of shareholders, whom they believe have primacy above all other
stakeholders.
Popular perspectives on business’ role in society
Figure 1 shows a spectrum of opinions regarding the appropriate role of business in society. At one end
are those who say business only has an economic responsibility to make a profit while obeying the law (the
pure profit-making view or economic CSR). In the middle are people who simply want corporate
2 A philosophy of altruistic CSR for a privately held firm is a subject for a follow-up article in this journal.
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management to be more sensitive to the societal impact of their decisions, especially regarding potential
harms to stakeholders (the socially aware view or ethical CSR). At the other end of the spectrum are those
who want to see corporations actively involved in programs which can ameliorate various social ills, such
as by providing employment opportunities for everyone, improving the environment, and promoting
worldwide justice, even if it costs the shareholders money (the community service view or altruistic CSR).
At one end of the spectrum the basic concern is with economic values such as productivity and efficiency,
while avoiding social involvement. At the other end of the spectrum the primary concern is societal
welfare even at the expense of profits (Miller and Ahrens, 1993).
Another way of envisioning the spectrum is that at one end is property rights theory—the corporation is
viewed as the private property of its stockholders, while at the other end—the social institution theory—the
firm is considered a public institution sanctioned by the state for some social good (Boatright, 2000). A
moderate and relatively recent view which now dominates thinking in financial economics and public
law—the contactual theory of the firm—holds that a company’s assets are provided by many groups in
addition to shareholders, such as employees, customers, suppliers, and the like, and so the company arises
from the property rights and right of contract of every corporate constituency, not just stockholders
(Boatright, 2001).
Author Position on Business’ Role in Society
Albert Carr Pure profit-making view—economic CSR: Business has lower standards of ethics
than society and no social responsibility other than obedience to the law.
Milton Friedman Constrained profit-making view—economic CSR: Business should maximize
shareholder wealth, obey the law, and be ethical.
R. Edward Freeman Socially aware view—ethical CSR: Business should be sensitive to potential
harms of its actions on various stakeholder groups.
Archie Carroll Community service view/corporate social performance perspective—altruistic
CSR: Business must use its vast resources for social good.
Figure 1. Spectrum of viewpoints on the role of business in society
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The pure profit-maximizing view
The most extreme position on economic CSR was taken by Albert Carr (1996) in his classic Harvard
Business Review article “Is Business Bluffing Ethical?” Carr said that the sole purpose of business is to turn
out a product at a profit. Due to the prevalence of competition and negotiation, he viewed businesspeople
as having a lower set of moral standards than those in the rest of society have. He argued that business has
the impersonal nature of an isolated game, like poker, in which anything goes within the accepted rules of
the game (legally set by the government and the courts). Thus, the lower business ethics standards permit
things like misstatement and concealment of pertinent facts during negotiations, lying about one’s age on a
resume, automobile companies' neglect of car safety—in short, “bluffing,” i.e., deception. Those who don't
play by the "rules of the game" will not be very successful in business. One’s duties to the employer as a
loyal agent override her other moral obligations. Carr’s only standard of social responsibility above
economics was obedience to the law.
However, almost all commentators agree that business as a game is a bad metaphor. Whereas games
are isolated from the rest of our lives, business is an integral part of society. Also, business competition is
not always voluntary, and there are other involuntary players, viz. the firm’s various stakeholders.
Carr subscribed to the all-too-common fallacy that the morality of one's business life should be
compartmentalized from the morality of the rest of his or her life. However, the dichotomy between one’s
business life and personal life is nonexistent. One cannot partition life into work and personal, or business
and pleasure. Nothing that we spend so much time and energy on can be separate from the rest of our lives
(Johnson, 1990). To ignore this and to encourage us to develop a different and sometimes contradictory set
of priorities, preferences, and values on the job can produce schizophrenia and multiple personalities, a Dr.
Jekyll and Mr. Hyde phenomenon (Sikula, 1996).
Contrary to the pure profit-maximizing view, there is nothing special about business that somehow sets
it apart from our ordinary ethical obligations. Businesspeople are not professionals with a different set of
moral standards.
The constrained profit-maximizing view
The best-known argument for a purely profit-based position on CSR was laid out by neoclassical
economist Milton Friedman of the conservative Chicago School of Economics, although Adam Smith was
13
probably the first to espouse this perspective (Hartman, 1998). Outlined in Friedman’s 1960 tome
Capitalism and Freedom as well as in his seminal 1970 article “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to
Increase It Profits” (1996), Friedman’s “custodian-of-wealth model” asserted that, "[In] a free
economy…there is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and to engage in
activities designed to increase its profit so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say,
engages in open and free competition without deception and fraud," (p. 245) i.e., act subject to the
constraints of the law and morality. Like Carr, Friedman too advocated just economic values, not social
values, which he felt to lie beyond the company’s mandate to maximize shareholder value while acting
legally, ethically, and (unlike Carr) honestly. He felt that solving social problems is part of the role of
government and social agencies, not the role of business. Friedman advised corporate managers to avoid
interjecting personal values into matters such as environmental concerns or community interests if
shareholder wealth is threatened. Thus, for instance, the responsible manager will close or relocate plants
whenever he can improve the profitability of his operations by so doing, even if this causes hardship to
employees. In marketing, “buyer beware” is the tocsin.
Friedman recognized legal and ethical responsibilities for business, and so his conception of economic
CSR goes further than Carr’s to includes a fairly extensive range of moral duties to other stakeholders:
maintaining open and free competition, abiding by the rule of law, avoiding deception and fraud, and
exemplifying fair play within the rules of the game (Boatright, 2000). This is important to note since many
of his disciples as well as his critics claim that he advocated a bare-knuckled, no-holds-barred business
environment. Likewise, Theodore Levitt (1983), even earlier in his 1958 Harvard Business Review article
“The Dangers of Social Responsibility,” said that the only social responsibility of business beyond seeking
material gain is “to obey the elementary canons of everyday face-to-face civility (honesty, good faith, and
so on)” (Levitt, 1983, p. 86). Corporate managers, business schools, and the financial community
embraced this dictum, and to this day some still do.
The socially aware view and the stakeholder model of CSR
What Friedman ignored was that a businessperson's decisions in the ethical and social responsibility
realms could affect many different people, groups, and institutions, which, in turn, can influence the
organization’s well being. Whereas Friedman said that the primary stakeholder of concern in business
14
decision making is the stockholders/owners, subscribers to the idea of a corporate social contract take the
short- and long-term interests of other parties into account too. Social contract theorists observe that
business decisions often impact large numbers of individuals, groups, or institutions, i.e., stakeholders.
Stakeholders include: (1) any individuals or groups affected by the organization's actions, policies, and
decisions. (they have a stake in outcome of the company’s decisions), as well as (2) any individual or group
who is vital to the survival and success of the enterprise (Freeman, 2001).
The stakeholder model is a reaction to Friedman’s shareholder paradigm where no entity other than shareholders has a
claim on the business. Stakeholder theory explains that there is more than just a relationship between an agent who has
fiduciary responsibility to a principal—there are also third parties to whom the corporation owes morally significant non-
fiduciary obligations. “These duties exist because, like stockholders, these other stakeholders also make investments in
enterprises: employees invest their time and intellectual capital, customers invest their trust and repeated business,
communities provide infrastructure and education for future employees as well as tax support, and so on” (Graves et. al,
2001, p. 17). In other words, we need to go beyond profit maximization to trusteeship, or the multifiduciary stakeholder
concept , whereby management sees itself as responsible for achieving balance among all stakeholders' interests
(Goodpaster, 1996), especially in avoiding harm to any groups or rectifying any injuries caused. In fact, today’s corporate
mission statements often pay homage to contribution to society in addition to the traditional product, market, and
technology dimensions (Rae and Wong, 1996).
How many stakeholder groups and individuals there are depends on whom you ask. However,
stakeholders can be envisioned as existing at four levels. First, is the systemic/macroenvironmental/general
environment level—larger societal factors, including the entire business system, the social system, plus
society at large, which consists of institutions and forces, such as economic, legal, political, technological,
natural, media and sociocultural forces. The second level of stakeholders is the corporation’s
microenvironment/operating/task environment— its immediate environment, consisting of exchange
relationship partners (such as suppliers and distributors), plus competitors, customers, the local community,
and the financial community (stockholders, bondholders, and creditors). A third level of stakeholders is
found within the business organization , notably superiors, subordinates and other employees, and labor
unions. The final level of stakeholder is significant others of business decision makers, such as peers,
family, friends, etc.
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The Community Service View
This most-developed version of CSR demands that corporations help alleviate “public welfare
deficiencies,” i.e., problems such as drugs, poverty, crime, illiteracy, underfunded educational institutions,
chronic unemployment, etc. (Brenkert, 1996). Whereas the economic, legal, and ethical obligations are
mandatory, philanthropic responsibility is desired by society, i.e., it is optional in that it is not expected
with the same degree of moral force (Carroll, 2001) since corporations are not causally responsible for the
deficient conditions they are attempting to rectify. However, there are increasing pressures and rising
expectations for such altruistic CSR because there has been a decline in the social institutions that have
traditionally tied communities together, viz. families, religious organizations, and neighborhoods, along
with higher mobility, and so it many people believe that it is business’ obligation to help fill the void
(Carroll, 2001).
Distinctions needed: ethical CSR vs. altruistic CSR vs. strategic CSR
To decide on the parameters and legitimacy of CSR for a publicly held enterprise, we need to draw
distinctions between three different types of CSR a business can practice. Although the threefold
classification of CSR I propose does not explicitly appear in the literature, there appear to be three mutually
exclusive types of CSR based on their nature (required vs. optional) and purpose (for stakeholders’ good,
the firm’s good, or both): ethical CSR, altruistic CSR, and strategic CSR. Ethical CSR is morally
mandatory and goes beyond fulfilling a firm’s economic and legal obligations, to its responsibilities to
avoid harms or social injuries, even if the business might not benefit from this. There is nothing especially
commendable about this level of fulfillment of “social responsibilities” since it is what is ordinarily
expected in the realm of morality. Ethical CSR entails a “negative injunction” to avoid and correct
activities that injure others (Simon et. al, 1983, p. 87).
Some would say that CSR is most noble when it fulfills alleged altruistic responsibilities. Altruistic
(humanitarian, philanthropic) CSR. involves contributing to the common good at the possible, probable, or
even definite expense of the business. Humanitarian CSR has firms go beyond preventing or rectifying
harms they have done (ethical CSR) to assuming liability for public welfare deficiencies that they have not
caused. This includes actions that morality doesn’t mandate but which are beneficial for the firm’s
16
constituencies although not necessarily for the company. This is the pursuit of “affirmative duties,” i.e., the
affirmative pursuit of some good” (Simon et. al, 1983, p. 87). However, like Friedman, I shall conclude
that altruistic CSR, although appearing noble and virtuous, lies outside of the firm’s proper scope of
activities. It is probably for this reason that altruistic CSR is probably relatively rare (Smith and Quelch,
1993).
Strategic CSR—the fulfillment of a firm’s “social welfare responsibilities”—is, however, admirable
since it creates a win-win situation in which both the corporation and one or more stakeholder groups
benefit. I shall focus primarily on the nature and problems of strategic CSR, which I believe most firms
practice instead of humanitarian CSR, whether they profess to or not.
Ethical CSR
The nature of ethical CSR
Ethical CSR involves fulfilling the firm’s ethical duties. This is “social responsibility” in the sense that
a corporation is morally responsible to any individuals or groups where it might inflict actual or potential
injury (physical, mental, economic, spiritual, and emotional) from a particular course of action. Even when
the two parties to a transaction aren't harmed others parties (stakeholders) might be.
Any organization not adhering to its ethical responsibilities would be acting as a morally irresponsible
agent. Although harms cannot always be avoided, they should be minimized where feasible. For example,
when a company decides to close or relocate a plant because the product is no longer selling or the source
of raw materials has changed, this would seem sound. While the shift might cause temporary difficulties
for some employees and their community, it makes more efficient use of resources and therefore benefits
society as a whole, i.e., it is the socially responsible thing to do so long as injuries to workers are
minimized as much as reasonably possible via means such as advance notification and severance pay.
Ethical edicts must be adhered to even at the firm’s expense in terms of possible foregone profits since
by definition, ethics deals with moral standards that override self-interest. Sometimes actions need to be
taken because they are right, not because they are profitable (Chewning et. al, 1990; Goodpaster, 1996;
Miller and Ahrens, 1993). Managers of a corporation do not have an obligation to maximize profits for
shareholders without regard to the means used. As in all social responsibility decisions, there are tradeoffs,
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and with ethical CSR it is often between short-run profitability and moral actions. For instance, money
spent on product safety or pollution control might reduce shareholder profits, but the alternative is to
unethically threaten the welfare of others in society (Boatright, 2000). As another example, it would seem
that owners of long-distance phones are doing the morally correct thing by not charging for emergency 911
calls.
However, experience, anecdotal evidence, and empirical evidence reveal that in the long run “good
ethics is good business.” First, moral behavior builds trust and enhances the firm’s reputation, which
attracts customers, employees, suppliers, and distributors, not to mention earning the public’s goodwill.
Second, ethical actions minimize the cost of fines and litigation, not to mention the bad publicity that
unethical actions often attract, especially with today’s instantaneous, global communications and media.
For instance, we all know that several well-known firms came under fire for running or letting their
suppliers manage “sweatshops” in overseas manufacturing facilities in order to cut costs.
Clearly, the boundaries of ethical CSR are not clear; otherwise we would not have so many interesting
ethics discussions in corporate boardrooms and college classrooms. However, the parameters for ethical
responsibilities are beyond the scope of this paper, which focuses on why altruistic CSR is wrong and
strategic CSR is right.3 Here, I shall restrict the discussion of ethical CSR to that of ethical responsibilities.
The nature of ethical duties and responsibilities
In order to better distinguish ethical CSR and altruistic CSR, I now survey the moral concept of
responsibility, which looms large in the ethics literature. The terms duty and obligations are used
synonymously with responsibility, suggesting its mandatory nature. In fact, responsibility has been
described as “the cornerstone of ethics” (Solomon, 1994, p. 114). The term suggests both accountability
and usually a position of trust and authority (Solomon, 1994).
In the context of ethical CSR, corporations are said to have special moral obligations to their various
stakeholders outside of the organization. So as to determine the nature of corporate duties to these
constituencies, it is helpful to understand both ordinary language and philosophers give the term
3 In a forthcoming paper on the boundaries of ethical CSR for this journal I shall argue that a properunderstanding of the various ethical theories actually results in a narrower range of mandatory ethicalresponsibilities and a wider range of optional strategic social responsibilities than many people believe.Here, I shall restrict the discussion to that of duties and responsibilities.
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“responsibility” three usages (Goodpaster and Matthews, 2001; Shaw and Barry, 1992). First, there is a
capability usage—someone has the ability to accomplish something. Examples would be an individual
assuming responsibility for the success of a project since it falls within her area of expertise, or declaring
that a marketing manager is not responsible for the death of a brand in the marketplace since she had no
control over the heavy competition which contributed to the product’s demise. Capability responsibility is
a major argument for humanitarian CSR—the enterprise has the resources to solve societal ills and
therefore should do so.
Second, causal responsibility means that someone caused something to happen and is therefore morally
responsible or accountable for its consequences. Therefore, causal responsibility is most closely tied to
ethical CSR—the organization is responsible for correcting harm it has done or preventing possible damage
it could cause. For example, we could say that management is responsible for the failure of the business,
given its poor planning, or that the ad agency is responsible for the decline in brand awareness because
their ads are not memorable. It can at times be controversial where the boundaries for causal responsibility
lie. For example, jury verdicts in recent years have held manufacturers responsible for injurious effects of
their products. Should cigarette and gun manufacturers be held liable for who buys their products and how
they are used, or is that the responsibility of the retailer, or perhaps (in the case of minors) of parents? In
fact, often causal responsibility is shared, not just among members of a business but also among members
of society (Solomon, 1994). Consequently, buck-passing does occur. For instance, recently
Bridgestone/Firestone and Ford fought very publicly about who was responsible for at least 174 deaths and
700 injuries resulting from vehicles crashing after losing tire tread, with Ford officials blaming the tires and
Bridgestone/Firestone representatives blaming Ford for dangerous trucks and giving bad advice about tire
pressure, with both sides losing consumer trust in the process (Kiley, 2001).
Third, is role-related responsibility—the duties or proper behavior that go along with a given role or
particular position within a social group or society (Solomon, 1994). For instance, accountants are
responsible for the independence and objectivity of their judgments and must report the financial
misconduct of clients, journalists are duty-bound to print fair and accurate accounts of newsworthy items,
and marketers are obliged to serve and satisfy their customers. A person who shirks his role-related
responsibilities is also violating standards of ethical CSR.
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A complication is sometimes caused by role conflict—a given role sometimes has irreconcilable
conflicting duties. Consider the salesperson who is expected to help maximize the company’s profits while
simultaneously maximizing the customer’s well being or engage in prospecting while also building
customer relationships, or the boss who must keep employees loyal while criticizing them for poor
performance. It is this type of conflict that proponents of altruistic CSR set managers up for, pitting the
shareholders against society’s welfare. How does one resolve the conflicts inherent in serving these two
masters?
To answer this question we must know whether the proper or legitimate role of a business organization
is merely economic or also social. Those who suggest that a corporation is not a private entity but rather is
a public institution that interacts with and affects many stakeholders advocate the social role.
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In addition to the proper role of business as an institution, we also need to investigate the societal role of
professionals, as business managers are generally considered professionals in their fields. In order to do
this, we need to distinguish general duties from special duties. General duties or civic responsibilities are
widely accepted ethical requirements for how people should treat one another in a civilized society. They
are a kind of cement to the implied social contract that people in society all have with one another.
Examples include, "Do no harm (ethical CSR) and "If possible, do good "(altruistic CSR). Special duties
are situational—we are required to do something given our circumstances. Managers and professionals are
said to have special duties due to their privileged position within society.
In the study of professional ethics, it is often claimed that professionals have these special duties
because society has granted them various privileges, including meaningful work experiences, high incomes,
prestige, high social status, work autonomy, access to massive resources, and, in many cases, self-
regulation and licensing. In turn, these privileges carry with them various special duties or social
responsibilities—society expects professionals to conduct themselves in a way that will yield some benefits
to society beyond economic and legal duties, to moral and quality-of-life obligations. In other words,
professionalism carries with it an extra burden of accountability—the special duty of "professional
reciprocity,” i.e., the social obligation to act in ways which benefit society. Thus, the social contract model
of business can be used also to justify the social duties of business as an institution, as well as of
professionals as individuals within those institutions.
Specifically, these special social responsibilities include provision of nondiscriminatory access to
professional services, fairness in setting fees, service to clients in a fiduciary manner, maintenance of
professional competence, diligence and avoidance of negligence, preservation and protection of the values
of the profession, and obedience to professional codes of conduct (e.g., the American Marketing
Association Code of Ethics) (Cottell and Perlin, 1990). A quick review of the codes of conduct in the
professions would confirm the important role attached to the notion of social service in professional life.
Every such code itemizes the social aspects of professional work, suggesting that rendering service to
society should be a high priority in the professions. Given that the American Marketing Association has
recently established professional credentialing, such special duties will likely become increasingly
important to marketers.
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Altruistic CSR
The nature of altruistic CSR
The terms altruistic or humanitarian CSR I have coined to suggest genuine optional caring, even at
possible personal or organizational sacrifice. Humanitarian CSR is Carroll’s “fourth face” of CSR—
philanthropic responsibilities—to be a “good corporate citizen” by “giving back” to society, furthering
some social good, regardless of whether the firm will financially reap what it has spiritually sown. It
demands that corporations help alleviate “public welfare deficiencies” (Brenkert, 1996, p. 525), such as
urban blight, drug and alcohol problems, poverty, crime, illiteracy, lack of sufficient funding for
educational institutions, inadequate moneys for the arts, chronic unemployment, and other social ills within
a community or society. The business has no “moral obligations,” only alleged “social obligations”
(DeGeorge, 1990, p. 168). Humanitarian CSR is based on capability responsibility—the company has the
resources to be able to do social good. In some peoples’ thinking it is also founded on role-related
responsibility—companies and their professionals are participants in the social contract, as we have just
seen. However, there is no causal responsibility.
Humanitarian CSR includes all philosophies, policies, procedures, and actions intended to enhance
society’s welfare and improve the quality of life, and it involves linking core corporate competencies to
societal and community needs. Altruistic CSR, then, goes beyond ethics to somehow making the world a
better place by helping to solve social problems.
Unlike strategic CSR, where it is believed that the money put into good works will yield a return on
investment for the business, with altruistic CSR this is not the motive (although the firm could conceivably
benefit as a byproduct). For instance, if a firm adopts an inner-city school and pours resources into it, there
is no guarantee that the business will immediately gain when tomorrow’s workers are better educated, as
they could work for other area organizations or even move away (Singer, 2000). Or, if a firm provides job
training for the hardcore unemployed, there is no certainty that they will be productive employees or even
end up working for that organization. Indeed, some firms can free ride off the efforts and expenditures of
other companies.
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In the past decade or two we increasingly have seen such activities as charitable contributions, community
service programs, employee voluntarism, environmentally friendly policies, executive loan programs, and
various quality-of-life efforts. Regarding charitable giving, companies increasingly strive to align
charitable giving with the hearts of workers and customers. For instance, LensCrafters donates eye exams
and glasses to the needy; Avon, with a rep force that is 98% women, raises money for breast cancer
research; and Ben & Jerry's gives 5% of pretax profits to politically correct causes that its founders believe
in, such as antinuclear campaigns, gay rights groups, etc. Endowing universities doing research in the
firm’s field is another common example of charitable giving.
In the realm of community service programs, Stride Rite opened the first corporate on-site day care
center in 1971 at the company's factory in Roxbury, a poor section of Boston, and the nation's first on-site
fitness center for employees.
Employee volunteerism programs grew in the 1990s, including mentoring students. (e.g., some Stride
Rite employees tutor inner-city students two hours a week), painting low-income houses, and distributing
food to the needy. Reasons for involving employees included increased employee mobility, creating a
desire to quickly get to know one’s coworkers and community, and the inability of local governments to
keep pace with the demand for services. For instance, at Tom's of Maine, 5% of an employee's work time
can be donated to community outreach at the regular pay rate. The Body Shop requires employees to do a
certain amount of community service on company time.
Quality-of-life issues include rebuilding inner cities, providing job training for the hardcore
unemployed, helping renovate parks, sponsoring cleanup programs, establishing manufacturing plants in
ghetto areas, offering seminars to high school students on how to effectively seek employment, supporting
minority business ventures, fighting illicit drug traffic, funding cultural programs, and providing
educational videos, instructors, and tutors to public schools.
The debate over altruistic CSR
The case for altruistic CSR. There are a number of arguments for altruistic CSR, all of which contain
some truth but none of which, individually or collectively, builds a strong case for the practice. The most
basic justification for humanitarian CSR is the social contract argument previously discussed. “Business is
a major social institution that should bear the same kinds of citizenship costs for society that an individual
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citizen bears” (Davis, 1983, p. 95). It is said that just as you and I have an obligation to take into
consideration all of the parties that we directly and significantly affect, so too are businesses required to
take into consideration all parties that they will affect.
In the moral realm this is true. For example, businesspeople have the same obligation to tell the truth in
their advertisements that you and I do when we are talking with strangers who stop by at a garage or a yard
sale. And, just as you have to take special care when you are dealing with children that come by your
garage sale, advertisers must take special care when designing advertisements aimed at youth audiences.
This is an argument for ethical CSR—avoiding harms or social injuries
However, the argument doesn’t extend to humanitarian CSR—mandating doing good works—because
the analogy between people as individuals and business organizations as institutions breaks down when we
discuss providing for social welfare . First, he idea of you and I doing good works in our role as
compassionate persons as an analogy for an enterprise to also do good work as a compassionate corporate
creature is fallacious. It is true that a “socially responsible” individual is one who takes active part in the
community, helps those who are less fortunate, participates in the civic life of the community, and so forth.
However, whereas human beings are multifaceted individuals with diverse interests, corporations are
formed for limited economic ends that do not include good works and social welfare.
Second, while it is true that in American culture individuals with wealth are expected to share it with
those less fortunate (Trevino and Nelson, 1999), it is a different story when we are talking about
corporations whose stockholders might not be particularly well-to-do and who are counting on the funds
for needs such as their retirement or college for their youngsters. It is the individual and institutional
stockholders’ funds that are being expended, not those of some amorphous creature known as “The
Corporation.” It is true that society provides businesspeople with resources such as an education, training,
and other nurture. Especially executives from less privileged backgrounds who got help from others in
pulling themselves up by their bootstraps are justified in feeling the need to “give back.” However, they
can best do this as private individuals, not as corporate humanitarian ambassadors.
A rebuttal to this is that when a corporation views itself as acting only with its stockholders’ financial
interests in mind, stock market pressures often result in the achievement of short-term financial interests at
the expense of long-term financial and societal welfare. However, this only argues for ethical behavior,
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which should not be sacrificed for ill-gotten financial gain, not acts of charity, which Robin-Hood style rob
from the rich to give to the poor.
Another point made by champions of humanitarian CSR is that, as the two most powerful institutions
in the U.S., business and government are obliged to address and rectify problems of social concern ("Power
begets responsibility."). They say corporate philanthropy is a preferable substitute for government welfare,
or at least is necessary in the face of deficient public welfare, which, indeed, is partially due to corporate
opposition to higher taxes (Benkert, 1996). The public is apparently transferring its expectations for
solving social problems from failed “Great Society” government programs to business (Carroll, 2001).
Also, humanitarian CSR is favored over government welfare in that the aid is voluntarily, more personally
and perhaps more efficiently bestowed, whereas state contributions come via the inefficiency and plodding
pace of government bureaucracy and legislators through faceless bureaucrats. Granted, taking money out
of the cash registers and paychecks of businesspeople to pay for inefficient, wasteful, centralized, bloated
government programs is not a good idea. However, just as government welfare coerces taxpayers to hand
over a generous portion of their income to “compassionate” legislators, altruistic CSR forces stockholders
to sacrifice part of their income so managers can be “generous” with shareholders’ funds. Moreover, there
is a false dichotomy in saying that only either business or government (neither of whose proper role is
charity) can solve social problems. We also have private individuals (many of whom are businesspeople)
and the collective efforts of these individuals through charitable and social service organizations,
foundations, and not-for-profit organizations.
A final and purely pragmatic argument for humanitarian CSR is enlightened capitalism. Being socially
responsible does not necessarily mean profits will fall—indeed, they might rise because of the favorable
publicity and goodwill, enhanced employee morale leading to higher productivity, and less government
intervention, which historically has led to excessive power, tyranny, corruption, and abuse of rights
(Novak, 1996). However, if business prospers, this means we are discussing strategic CSR, nor altruistic
CSR.
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In short, all of the pro-altruistic CSR arguments really only hold for ethical CSR or strategic CSR.
There is no foundation for the firm acting out of purely benevolent motives.
The case against altruistic CSR. I will now examine criticisms concerned with what the proper role of
a business organization is, the competence of businesses to effectively contribute to societal welfare, the
difficulty of deciding what is meant by “socially responsible,” the uncertainty over whether business has
an obligation to “give back,” the undue influence which companies might gain over society through their
largesse, and the possibility that philanthropic giving will put the company at a competitive disadvantage.
While the latter two arguments are flawed, together the others build a strong position against altruistic
CSR.
A set of philosophic objections concerns the proper roles of government, corporations, and individuals
in society. Some still view the enterprise as having a purely economic role. Adam Smith’s "invisible
hand" argument says that by giving the public a product it wants at a reasonable price, businesses
unconsciously transfers the profit motive into consumer welfare. If a company makes a profit, employees
will benefit through higher wages (and, in some cases, through stock ownership/profit sharing), and the
company will grow, enabling it to employ more people and contribute to the community in the form of
taxes. Thus, from an economic viewpoint, it is more beneficial for companies to continue expanding rather
than giving money away to charity and good works (Donaldson 1993).
Similarly, the microeconomic theory of Pareto Optimality says that free-market forces ensure that
maximum social benefits will be achieved at minimum social costs when each company tries to maximize
profits. Society's scarce resources are used so efficiently by producing firms, and the goods and services
are distributed so effectively by competitive markets, that it would be impossible to make any single person
better off without making some other person(s) worse off. The maximum economic benefits for society
will be produced, recognizing the full personal and social costs of that production.
However, the assumption of Pareto Optimality breaks down if we do not have perfect competition,
where no market participants can control or influence the marketplace, especially prices. The “invisible
hand” model was reasonably descriptive in an agrarian economy characterized by commodities. However,
“modern corporations bear about as much resemblance to Smith’s self-sufficient farmers and craftspersons
as today’s military complex bears to the Continental militia” (Shaw and Barry, 1992, p. 216). Today,
26
successful companies can be less than fully efficient and less than entirely satisfy consumer wants. In
imperfect markets, companies need to go beyond maximizing profits and consider whether their actions
are serving society by avoiding unreasonable harms, since several ways of increasing profits actually hurt
society, such as deceptive advertising, bribery, tax evasion, and price fixing.
Thus, profit is an incomplete measure of social performance and therefore a nonaccurate measure for
resource allocation (Rivoli, 1996). One reason is externalities—deleterious, unintended side effects of
business activities that result in costs to society that are not reflected in the company’s cost structure and
are not considered by the neoclassical economic model. Examples of such unintended consequences of
business activity include pollution, job-related accidents, injuries to customers by defective products, and
even the unintended societal impact of advertising (Pollay, 1986).
Since the industrial revolution, companies have attempted to internalize the benefits and externalize the
costs of their actions where feasible (Freeman, 2001). In economic theory, these are costs of production,
and if they are absorbed by the firm and factored into the prices that companies pay—that is, if they are
internalized— then, economists argue, the market itself takes care of the problem. Thus, a business causing
air or water pollution should dispose of waste in an environmentally safe (albeit more expensive) way or
pay for the damage the waste does downstream. Then the price of this firm’s widgets will reflect their true
social cost. Forced to pay the true cost of pollution, instead of being able to use air and water as free
resources, companies have an incentive to stop polluting. However, the costs of pollution control are often
not internalized but passed on to workers, consumers, and the public as spillover effects or externalities
because government fails to perform its role to police such activities.
When externalities are present, the problem of damage must be addressed directly in business decision
making, either voluntarily (ethical CSR) or via government regulation. For instance, "environmentally
friendly" products reduce pollutants and waste so that pollution costs are not borne by and charged against
the profits of other companies, towns, and entities. Note that the problem of externalities falls outside the
realm of altruistic CSR. Internalizing the externalities voluntarily might also be practicing strategic CSR in
that such companies keep government out of their decision making (Boatright, 2000, p. 344).
Another difficulty with the economic argument is that it assumes that producing whatever the buying
public wants is good. This ignores controversial or “socially undesirable” products like recreational drugs,
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liquor targeted toward children and alcoholics, handguns, and pornography. Nobody but a diehard
libertarian would advocate giving customers whatever their hearts desire. For example, Wal-Mart refuses
to carry CDs with lyrics or cover art it finds offensive (and in the process probably actually satisfies a
customer group larger than teenagers—their parents). Unfortunately, the market does not always correct
such abuses. But, since here we are discussing what is morally good or bad, we are considering ethics, not
altruism.
One other systemic problem with unbridled free markets is the sometimes exclusion of minorities and
the poor. It is observed that these groups, because they lack ownership of any of the factors of production
beyond their unskilled labor, receive inadequate income to participate in many product markets and
consequently cannot maximize their own satisfactions in any meaningful way. In effect, there is
discrimination against the needs of segments that are too uneconomic or small to serve.
The question is, who should provide for their needs? This again raises the question of the relative roles
of business, government, and private individuals in promoting the general good. Friedman (19960 and
Levitt (1983) seem to believe that it is government’s obligation to provide for all kinds of individual and
community needs. However, the proper, limited role of government as found in both the Bible (especially
Romans 13:1-7) and the U.S. Constitution is to preserve peace and order, promote justice and enforce the
law, and to punish evildoers, not to provide all kinds of “public services” and “free lunches.” Although this
suggests that government is responsible for holding companies accountable for the harms they create
(Trevino and Nelson, 1999), civil government should not provide for welfare. Our Founding Fathers
understood that the right to “pursue happiness” meant that others could not infringe on our right to obtain
these things. The right to education, health care, etc. means we have the right to obtain these, either
through our own means or with the help of others, not that the government, or business for that matter,
must provide them to us (at taxpayers’ or stockholders’ coerced expense) (Ahlseen, 2000). It is the duty of
individual citizens, sometimes collectively through dedicated organizations, to voluntarily provide funds
for societal needs. Nowhere in Scripture or the Constitution is there a call for progressive taxation and
forced, governmental redistribution of income, which Friedman’s adherents feel government should
implement as an alternative to corporate benevolance (Boatright, 2000). In fact, such compulsory
redistribution of income violates the 8th Commandment against theft (Ahlseen, 2000).
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To conclude this discussion on the economic role of business, the “Adam Smith’s invisible hand doesn’t
work” arguments, while meritorious, are actually irrelevant to altruistic CSR. Since these arguments
concern harms, they are relevant to ethical CSR and should be taken seriously by managers who would like
to replace the hand of government with “the hand of management” (Goodpaster and Matthews, 1982, p.
74). In the case of provision of welfare, individuals and charities provide a better option to government and
business.
It should be the role of individuals, not business, to provide for such needs since for business to go
beyond profit maximization would not be in shareholders' best interests and would constitute social
engineering, an improper corporate function. The corporation is not a welfare agency, but is rather an
economic association with specific and limited responsibilities (Novak, 1996). Once you add social goals
to the demands of serving customers, employing workers, and making a profit for stockholders, your
business suffers and stockholders starve. Devotion of corporate resources to social causes is contrary to an
implied contract with investors to maximize their profits and is, in effect, tantamount to stealing
stockholders’ money. In effect, you are taxing the owners via deliberations that do not include their
representation ("taxation without representation") and spending these taxes on social causes, (Benkert,
1996; Friedman, 1996). ). There does not appear to be any instances of a corporation deciding which
causes to support and to what extent by polling its stockholders (Bowie, 1995). Alternatively, you must
raise the price to your consumers, thereby taxing them, or lower the wages (price of labor) of your workers,
in the process taxing them (Friedman, 1996). Executives become unelected civil servants with the power to
tax some group(s), and corporations become government agencies, not part of their proper economic role in
the business system (Friedman, 1996
Although polling stockholders on proposed CSR initiatives might help solve the problem of “taxation
without representation,” we would still end up with unelected businesspeople substituting their judgment of
what constitutes the social good for consumers' beliefs or the views of elected policymaking officials.
Corporate responsibility for public welfare threatens to reduce, transform, and even on occasion eliminate
important aspects of public life (Brenkert, 1996). DeGeorge (1990) warns:
“There is great danger in expecting corporations to take upon themselves the production of public welfare,because they already have enormous power and are not answerable for its use to the general public.Politicians are elected by the public and are expected to have the common good as their end. We shouldnot expect corporations to do what they are neither competent nor organized to do…” (p. 171).
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Another cited problem with business assuming the (illegitimate) welfare role of government and the
(legitimate) welfare role of individuals is that those needing welfare assistance tend to be the powerless.
Corporate responsibility for their well being tends to perpetuate their dependency since there is no formal
relationship between the enterprise and the aid recipients, and hence the division between the powerless
and the powerful continues (Brenkert, 1996; DeGeorge, 1990). However, this argument would seem to be
more applicable to CSR in the form of outright grants and gifts rather than CSR involving training workers,
educating children, and otherwise helping people to help themselves (giving a man a fish vs. teaching him
to fish). Nonetheless, at least with the welfare state there are safeguards and guarantees not imposed on
corporations, such as voting, representation, public hearings, and sunshine laws (Brenkert, 1990), although
it many political conservatives argue that state welfare also tends to keep its recipients dependent.
The end of the matter is that altruistic social responsibility is neither in the proper domain of business
nor of government, but only of individuals, often working collectively. The kind of help provided by these
groups is on a "small and human scale," as President George W. Bush remarked during his graduation
speech at Notre Dame (Colson, 2001).
A second major area of concern about the properness of altruistic CSR is competence—it is objected
that corporate executives are "inept custodians," (Shaw and Barry, 1992) i.e., they lack the moral and social
expertise and authority to make noneconomic decisions for improving society (Freeman, 2001). Very few
businesspeople have special qualifications in defining and acting in the public interest, with the result often
being unintended consequences of managers’ well-intentioned actions. For instance, in the mid-1990s
McDonald's responded to pressures from a small but very vocal group of noncustomer environmentalists
who protested the waste of disposable containers, labeled the McFare "junk food," and accused the
company of clogging American arteries and hyping high blood pressure. Consequently, McDonald's
treated the customer who has no health problems as the exception rather than the rule. No one consulted
the customer about tasteless fries with less salt, the unpopular “healthy” McLean Deluxe burger (made
from seaweed extract!), and abandoning foam containers, which keep food hot. Fortunately, the market is
usually able to correct such mistakes when customers are the victims—if one business does not meet
consumer needs very well, this gives rivals the opportunity to jump in and fill the void. However, this
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problem of managerial ineptness in the social realm is not necessarily subject to market forces when the
recipients of “aid” are outside of the firm’s business arena.
Opponents of altruistic CSR also suggest that individual initiatives are preferable to managerial actions
regarding philanthropy because what exactly is "socially responsible” becomes debatable in a pluralistic
society. The question is, “Whose agenda and values should be followed?” For instance, liberals and
conservatives have very different viewpoints on issues such as the value of recycling, supporting “faith-
based initiatives,” providing “safe sex” education to teens, ridding the Internet of “smut,” and fighting for
“gay rights.” Therefore, while most “socially responsible” mutual funds filter out companies involved in
tobacco, alcohol, and gambling, there is little consensus on what other screens are appropriate. Funds with
a liberal worldview (e.g. the Calvert and Domini groups) tend to shun environmentally insensitive
companies, firearms producers, nuclear power generators, or employers of child labor. At the conservative
end of the spectrum is the evangelical Christian Timothy Plan fund, which boycotts companies that provide
health benefits to the partners of gay employees and firms that profit from pornography and abortion.
There are also so many debatable issues beyond what constitutes a worthy cause, such as how much
money should be given, whether it should be a certain percent of corporate income (and if so, before or
after taxes) or an absolute amount, and so on. Such questions are virtually impossible to answer to
everyone’s satisfaction for altruistic CSR and are even difficult for strategic CSR, although as we shall see,
in that case optimizing the bottom line underlies all decisions. Although, if individuals are concerned
about their corporations investing in the “wrong” causes, they can investigate for them selves, it appears
that most are unwilling to take the time and effort to do so.
It is generally easier to enjoin and correct an ethical wrong than it is to prescribe affirmatively what is
good for society, although drawing the line between ethical CSR and altruistic CSR is at times difficult—
what some view as affirmative duties might be seen by others as correction of social injury (Simon et. al,
1983). For instance, affirmative action programs might be seen as some as altruistic CSR to promote
diversity in the workplace and, hence, the general welfare, while others might view them as ethical CSR to
right past social injustice in treatment of minority groups.
Whether the issue is altruistic or strategic CSR, companies would be wise to avoid controversial causes,
walking a fine line between conservative and liberal critics of philanthropic giving, as it is becoming
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increasingly difficult to avoid offending at least one important constituency (Carroll, 2001). A well-
publicized example was when retailer Dayton Hudson made a contribution to Planned Parenthood, right-to-
lifers noisily stood outside the stores cutting up their credit cards. When the retailer then contributed to
right-to-life groups in an effort to appease them, Dayton Hudson incurred the wrath of the pro-choicers. In
a similar dilemma, U.S. West gave funds to the Boy Scouts of America and was beat up by gay-rights
activists because the Scouts fought for their right as a private association to exclude openly homosexual
leaders. Upon withdrawing support from the Boy Scouts, U.S. West upset conservative religious groups
(Carroll, 2001). Even “safe” groups with broad public support can at times become controversial, such as
when some local United Way chapters withheld funds from the Boy Scouts over the homosexual issue and
rose out of favor with many conservatives. Companies should support causes that will be favorably
received by their targeted constituencies.
Another argument against philanthropic CSR is that the notion of “returning” something to the
community and "giving back" to society for the firm’s good fortune is fallacious. CSR advocates suggest
that businesses have a special obligation to do more than the rest of us, to do special things for society or to
solve society's problems. Critics reply that the obligations of business extend no further than the
obligations all human beings have to each other. If businesses have obligations to do something for
society, it is because you and I have exactly the same obligations.
However, what this viewpoint overlooks is the previously-discussed notion of special duties. As an
economically and socially powerful institution, perhaps business does have special obligations, as do
professionals as privileged members of society. But recall tat this line of reasoning is only valid regarding
ethical CSR, not social CSR.
Another argument against philanthropic CSR is that shareholders are also consumers, employees
(increasingly so with stock options and profit sharing), environmentalists, and community citizens, and so
stockholders are affected when corporations fail to act responsibly (Boatright, 2000). However, this argues
for ethical CSR but not philanthropic CSR since, as private citizens. stockholders can contribute to causes
of their choosing out of their own pockets.
The final two objections to humanitarian CSR seem to have little basis in fact. One concerns the undue
influence over society it might grant business. Theodore Levitt argued that corporate responsibility for
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welfare threatens to reduce pluralism and to create a monolithic society (Levitt, 1983). This will
supposedly happen because if business starts doing the “government’s job” (Bowie, 1995) the government
will take over business, with Big Government and Big Business merging into one powerful group at the
sacrifice of our democratic institutions. This relates back to the roles-of business-vs.-government problem
in that altruistic CSR could supposedly create demands for public participation in corporate management or
governance (e.g., seats by members of each stakeholder group on the board of directors, election of
managerial social servants through a political process), threatening the private role of the corporation
(Friedman, 1996; Goodpaster, 1996). However, there does not seem to be any evidence of this happening
since Friedman first warned of it over thirty years ago.
Alternatively, it is alleged, business will be granted an excessive concentration of power which would
threaten the pluralistic division of powers among our various social institutions, thereby threatening our
democratic freedoms (Smith, 1998). Moreover, neither business nor government are monolithic institutions
at present, and it is doubtful that they ever will be. In short, the fear that corporate CSR will result in a
radical re-division of power in society seems to be unfounded.
Another objection is that humanitarian CSR will put the firm at a competitive disadvantage since social
action entails costs that competitors need not bear (Smith, 1998). However, this might or might not be the
case as there are possible publicity and goodwill that can accrue to the enterprise from CSR, in which case
it is strategic CSR, not altruistic CSR.
In fact, skeptics say that often, good works are just a publicity stunt or a public relations ploy. There is
no doubt that companies practicing social responsibility often, and probably usually, have ulterior motives.
For example, volunteerism can lead to higher employee morale, which then leads to higher productivity.
Or, "giving back" to the local community might make it easier to attract desirable employees. Companies
usually become good corporate citizens because it makes good business sense. However, the objection
here to is strategic CSR, and the basis for a philosophical objection to business killing two birds with one
proverbial stone (doing well while doing good) is unclear. Somehow the critics find CSR worthy only
when business (stockholders, again, many of whom are individuals counting on the returns to meet future
needs) does not benefit in the process.
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Nonetheless, when such strategic CSR efforts cross the ethical line, then the critics have a point. For
instance, educational materials for the public schools that include a religious message would violate the
constitutional separation of church and state. Grayer but still ethically dubious is liberally sprinkling such
materials with the corporate logo or slogan (Brenkert, 1996). Many such CSR efforts are said to foster the
“materialization of society,” although it can just as easily be said that this is already occurring through
traditional marketing activities such as advertising and retailing (Shaw and Barry, 1992) or, more likely,
that such efforts are merely appealing to an already materialistic society.
Friedman (1996) believed that CSR activities are indicative of an agency problem arising from
separation of ownership and control, i.e., a conflict between the interests of managers and shareholders
where managers use CSR as a means to further their own personal agendas at the expense of shareholders
(McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). Thus, one explanation for some humanitarian CSR activity might lie in
“ego” or agency costs. As a vast literature in economics, finance, and accounting demonstrates, where
there is separation of ownership and managerial control, managers will be tempted to be poor stewards of
corporate resources and consume excessive perquisites, feathering their own nest at the expense of
stockholders (e.g., golden parachutes, nepotism, and accepting "gifts"). An example from strategic CSR is
corporate sponsorships of sporting events, the arts, and such. While participating in these might give the
appearance of corporate caring and thereby generate some goodwill, the major motivation might be the
non-pecuniary benefits which managers enjoy from participating in such events, such as ego gratification
and pleasure (Cornwell et. al, 2001).
Strategic CSR
Strategic CSR or “strategic philanthropy” (Carroll, 2001, p. 200) is done to accomplish strategic
business goals—good deeds are believed to be good for business as well as for society. With strategic
CSR, corporations “give back” to their constituencies because they believe it to be in their best financial
interests to do so. This is “philanthropy aligned with profit motives” (Quester and Thompson, 2001)—
social goals might be profitable in the long run since market forces provide financial incentives for
perceived socially responsible behavior. Stakeholders outside the stockholder group are viewed as means
to the ends of maximizing shareholder wealth (Goodpaster, 1996).
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Such strategic philanthropy grew popular beginning around the mid-1980s (Jones, 1997), and Carroll
(2001) expects it to grow in the years ahead. The idea is that while being socially responsible (and ethical,
too) often entails short-run sacrifice and even pain, it usually ultimately results in long-long-gain.
Expenditures on strategic CSR activities should properly be viewed as investments in a “Goodwill Bank”
(Vaughn, 1999, p. 199) which yields financial returns (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). These long-term
benefits might not immediately show up on a firm’s financial statements, as is true of economic outcomes
of many marketing activities, such as marketing research and image-building advertising. Also, a company
is wise to make deposits in this bank of goodwill in order to make withdrawals when it comes under fire.
For instance, Ford spent millions of dollars on an advertising campaign to convince parents that most 4-to
8-year-old children should ride in booster seats, which raise children in auto seats so that adult seat belts fit
better, and Ford gave away one million such seats. The goodwill generated among customers, government
regulators, and consumer advocates from such efforts might likely justify the investment.
Providing for good works from the corporate coffer is therefore compatible with Friedman’s
neoclassical economic view so long as the firm reaps indirect financial benefits (Boatright, 2000). As
Douglas W. Leatherdale, chairman and CEO of The St. Paul Companies, said, “We view corporate social
responsibility as an asset [emphasis added] we continue to nurture and grow. It’s a critical part of how we
do business and balances the needs of all our constituents. In the long-term, it will benefit our company
and its shareholders” (Business Ethics, 2001, p. 12). Thus, we might find a corporation practicing strategic
CSR by providing charitable good deeds such as providing shelter for the destitute, building a museum, or
renovating the local park if, as a result, those helped will feel grateful and indebted to that organization, and
will reciprocate in various ways by giving it their business, recommending it to others, asking government
regulators to stay at bay, and so on. And, some of those not directly helped will still look more favorably
on the firm and thereby turn their loyalties toward it (Brenkert, 1996).
Cynics carp that strategic CSR is self-serving and somehow impoverishes the notion of citizenship
(Brenkert, 1996). However, I would argue that this is certainly preferable to politicians “bringing home the
bacon” (theft of other citizens’ bacon) in order to curry voter favor and loyalty. Unlike government
largesse, which is, at best, a zero-sum game, corporate generosity can grow the size of the economic pie
and thereby contribute to generating new wealth. Also, why is it that philanthropic behavior of wealthy
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individuals is usually very publicly recognized, and yet we do not claim that their behavior is less worthy,
whereas if corporations are generous we view this as somehow tainted?
There is nothing morally objectionable to doing well while doing good, to help the stockholders while
aiding other stakeholders. Yet, it is perhaps because of the cynics that most companies say they shun
publicity for fear of making their efforts appear insincere (Jones, 1997). Nonetheless, now the federal
government encourages such publicity via the Ron Brown Award for leadership, which goes to companies
whose programs improve the well-being of employees or enhance the communities in which they live and
work (Jones, 2001).
The wisdom of strategic CSR is seen in the fact that some of the most successful corporations are also
among the most socially responsible, with some of the most prominent examples being the Body Shop, Ben
& Jerry’s, and Tom’s of Maine (Boatright, 2000; Smith, 2001). With all of the media attention focused on
corrupt business ethics over the past two decades, many consumers are eager to do business with businesses
they believe are ethical and have a social conscience (Rae and Wong, 1996).
Types of strategic CSR
Novak (1996) makes a strong case for his seven “responsibilities outside business” (p. 145), suggesting
that all are ultimately necessary for the survival of business as an institution. While he views these as
moral responsibilities, all but the obligation to respect the law seem to be optional altruism that nonetheless
can potentially profit the firm.
Three of Novak’s extra-legal social responsibilities would appear to directly benefit a business. These
are to: (1) communicate frequently and fully with investors, shareholders, customers, employees, and other
constituencies in order to gain their support; (2) establish within the firm a sense of community and respect
for the dignity of persons, which should foster motivation, teamwork, fulfillment, and, hence productivity;
and (3) protect the “moral ecology” (p. 151) by accepting some responsibility for the television programs
(and, I would add, other media environments) in which they advertise, avoiding shows laced with sex,
violence, and denigration of either business or religion. This should help enhance the organization’s
reputation.
The problems with Novak’s (1996) other three responsibilities are that it would appear to be difficult to
directly link them to the firm’s welfare, and rivals could also hitchhike off a company’s efforts. The first of
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these indirectly beneficial social duties is to protect liberty’s political roots, since the survival of business
depends on the survival of free institutions. Thus, businesses should encourage their employees, retirees,
and shareholders to participate in politics. The second indirectly advantageous social responsibility is to
uphold social justice, since for its welfare and survival business depends on its members being active in
civil society. Thus, Novak urges businesses to encourage employees to volunteer for civic activities and to
be good citizens in the local community. If businesses practice these two responsibilities through simple
exhortation and encouragement, they would seem to be low-cost efforts that should not detract from their
bottom line. The third indirectly beneficial responsibility however is potentially expensive and, outside of
its goodwill value, the least likely to earn the firm any financial return; hence, in my view, it should be
practiced only when it can be clearly demonstrated to yield a return on investment. This is the duty to
contribute to making the surrounding society a better place by taking a leadership role in that society.
Especially industry giants can serve as an example and create a standard for others to follow. This
responsibility includes welfare activities such as contributing to not-for-profit institutions and charities,
caring for the environment and the elderly, meeting the needs of marginalized groups such as the homeless
and the poor, and so on. An indirect benefit of this, Novak believes, is less government involvement in
these affairs.
Unresolved issues with strategic CSR
One unsettled difficulty lies in ethically and strategically balancing the tradeoffs among stakeholder
groups. For instance, while customers would prefer that more money be spent on improved products or
that prices be lowered, employees want higher wages and benefits. Although Freeman (2001) argues for
the need for balance in serving the various constituencies, he does not offer clear guidelines on how to
achieve this.
Another issue is that the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of strategic CSR as a good investment
is equivocal—it is not clear whether socially responsible corporations outperform or underperform other
companies (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Trevino and Nelson, 1999). Although in any given case it is
difficult to quantify the returns to social responsibility, research studies have found that short-term profits
sometimes increase and at other times decrease when executives include social objectives. Some research
shows that companies that practice social responsibility prosper in the long run, although this these studies
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are neither conclusive nor exhaustive, nor do they clarify causality (Business Ethics, 2001). One researcher
even found a curvilinear relationship, with moderately socially responsible firms being more profitable than
very high CSR and very low CSR organizations (Singer, 2000, p. 195). This suggests that, just as it is
possible to overspend on computers, research and development, advertising, and other investments, it is
also possible to go overboard regarding strategic CSR—as is true of all marketing expenditures, there is
apparently an optimal level of spending on strategic CSR. Nonetheless, the research evidence is
correlational, not causal. Thus, when positive correlations were found, it was not clear whether social
responsibility led to increased financial performance or whether better economic results yielded surplus
funds corporations could devote to social performance (Trevino and Nelson, 1999).
A problem in assessing the effectiveness of CSR efforts is that factors contributing to profits in this
arena are often qualitative and hence difficult to measure and quantify, such as the value of employee
morale, corporate image, reputation, public relations, goodwill, and popular opinion (Miller and Ahrens,
1993). There is plenty of soft, anecdotal evidence of CSR’s effectiveness. For instance, Ray Anderson
built Interface Inc., a billion-dollar international carpet manufacturer by becoming the world’s first
environmentally sustainable manufacturing enterprise, recycling everything possible, releasing no
pollutants, and filling no landfills. When Marriott set up a 24-hour multilingual hotline whom employees
with personal problems could call for help, Marriott’s turnover was cut to 35% compared to an industry
average of 100%, with the human resources director explaining, “We’ve documented increases in
productivity, morale, and better relations with managers and co-workers as a result of the hotline. But
we’re not able to quantify [italics added] the gain in managers’ time” (Daviss, 2001, p.208). Then, there is
the well-known case of the Malden Mills factory in Lowell, Massachusetts that burned to the ground during
the 1995 Christmas season. Nonetheless, owner Aaron Feuerstein continued to pay workers’ salaries and
benefits until a new plant was built. The result: productivity in the new facility rose by 25% and quality
defects dropped by two-thirds (Daviss, 2001, p. 209). 4 Harder evidence of the pecuniary benefits of CSR
can also be found. For instance, returns for the Domini 400 Social Index, a group of 400 publicly traded,
“socially responsible” businesses monitored by the investment advisory firm Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini&
4 This is not to suggest that Feurstein did this with strategic considerations in mind. Although he wasapparently motivated by humanitarian considerations, his good deeds prospered him in the long-run..
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Co., consistently beat those for the Standard & Poor’s 500 (Daviss, 2001, p. 209). Other quantitative
research also attests to the business performance gains from CSR (Daviss, 2001).
The future of strategic CSR
Due to belt tightening and increased pressure for accountability for expenditures, the trend will likely be
toward funding only those good works expected to financially benefit companies (Carroll, 2001).
Nevertheless, in view of rising public expectations for corporate good works, returns to strategic CSR
should rise. The Iron Law of Responsibility will continue: “In the long run, those who do not use power in
a manner which society considers responsible will tend to lose it” (Boatright, 2000, p. 344).
We might also find social audits becoming almost as common as financial audits. More companies are
conducting such audits to rate their social and environmental performance. Social audits are either
conducted internally by company personnel or externally by ethics consultants, social auditing
organizations (e.g., The New Economics Foundation), or a Board of Directors audit committee.
Shareholders and special interest activists will place greater pressure on businesses to be audited by these
entities. (Carroll, 2001). Like corporate ethics codes, they will increasingly be used as public relations
tools.
Reciprocal Stakeholder Responsibilities
One last consideration for strategic CSR planners is the notion of reciprocal stakeholder responsibilities.
Recall that the corporate social contract should spell out society’s expectations of business as well as
business’ expectations of society. Freeman (2001) notes that the “stakes” in the stakeholder model are
reciprocal, since both the corporation and its constituencies can affect the other in terms of rights and
responsibilities. Bowie (1995) suggests that if we are to have a truly comprehensive theory of CSR, we
must be able to determine the parameters for the reciprocal duties of corporate stakeholders to the
organization. What these duties entail has hardly been discussed.
If management has certain duties to its constituencies, it seems reasonable to suppose that these publics
also have responsibilities to the business. Social responsibility is rightly thought of as a shared duty, and
the stakeholder model mandates that each stakeholder has reciprocal duties with others. For example,
while business ethicists frequently discuss the unjust treatment of employees during plant closings, seldom
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do they criticize employees who leave a corporation on short notice to take a better job (Bowie, 1995).
Similarly, perhaps employees have a duty to speak favorably about a company (Freeman 2001), or at least
not denigrate it.
Marketers are especially interested in the consumer’s responsibilities, rarely mentioned in discussions
of CSR (Solomon, 1994). However, customers have an obligation to support socially responsible firms
rather than socially irresponsible or socially indifferent businesses. For instance, it is often possible for
consumers to refuse to support polluting businesses or be willing to pay more for pollution control. In fact,
Friedman suggested, “the people responsible for pollution are consumers, not producers. They create, as it
were, demand for pollution. People who use electricity are responsible for the smoke that comes out of the
stacks of the generating plants” (quoted in Solomon, p. 259). Yet, environmentally friendly products which
cost a bit more or cause consumer inconvenience (such as Downy fabric softener in concentrated form
which requires less packaging but which also is less convenient because it must be mixed with water) have
not been big sellers. In this case, it would seem that the environmentalists, as well as marketers, should
share some of the burden of educating the public about the importance of adopting such products. Other
consumer examples of social irresponsibility include buyers who complain about poor-quality products to
their friends, but not the manufacturer, retailer, or Better Business Bureau; people who do not contact
companies about advertising they find offensive or misleading; and customers who turn a blind eye when
they learn of businesses which engage in any kind of illegal or unethical practices.
Social responsibility for marketing activities, then, is a collective responsibility, to be divided among all
stakeholders, including, outside partners and vendors such as suppliers of materials, parts, and services;
wholesalers, retailers, and other distributors; advertising agencies and other marketing communications
creators; marketing research firms and other information vendors; the media and other marketing
communications carriers; government agencies; consumer protection champions; and even consumers
themselves. Marketers have an opportunity to take a leadership role, encouraging other stakeholders to
take social responsibility too.
Besides consumers, another group with social responsibility is stockholders, who have the duty to
evaluate corporations in which they invest not only in terms of financial security and expected return but
also vis a vis their ethical and social performance, as do “ethical investors.” Even if one’s knowledge of
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the business is limited to news reports or reading the quarterly or annual report, that is usually sufficient to
let one know what he or she is supporting (Solomon, 1994).
Others who share collective responsibility include competitors, who can blow the whistle on others in
their industry who they think are being socially irresponsible; suppliers of services such as advertising
agencies and marketing research agencies, who should recommend that their partners do business in a
socially responsible manner or else refuse to deal with them; and other facilitators such as transportation
agencies and the media, who can also refuse to do business with socially irresponsible or indifferent
businesses.
Suggestions for Managers and Researchers
Managerial implications
Senior management leadership for strategic CSR is vital. One of the most important factors in the
literature on corporate cultures is the influence of leaders within the organization. It is their behavior that
serves as a model and message-sender to all. Therefore, top-management commitment to strategic CSR is
key—commitment is signaled by chief executives (CEO, CFO, COO, CIO, etc.), including chief marketing
officers, president- and vice-president-level executives, including marketing VPs, and affirmation by the
board of directors .
As the business function most closely related to satisfying and communicating with most of the
organization’s constituencies, marketing should take a leadership role in responsibility for CSR. This
consumer marketing social responsibility (CMSR) is marketing’s duty to society to advance life, liberty,
and the general welfare of consumers through value-creating marketing activities that increase the
efficiency, effectiveness, and enjoyment of economic life while benefiting the firm.
Leaders of corporations should discover and communicate a few simple shared values and visions that
form a common ground upon which all ethical and strategic CSR activities can stand, proclaiming them
continuously, and demonstrating devotion to these values and visions by actions (not just words),
encouraging groups and teams to invent and innovate new CSR ideas that conform to these values and
visions, listening to everyone's ideas, rewarding every attempt to advance these values and visions, and
making everyone feel like a winner in these efforts.
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These values and visions and the business’ commitment to strategic CSR should be embodied in a
corporate credo—a succinct statement of the organization's philosophy of business and core values (e.g.,
respect for people, focus on the customer, continuous improvement, etc.) and ethical and social
responsibilities to its stakeholders. These should be sincere, not just public relations fluff stuff to look good
in employees' and the public's eyes, and must be made clear in some sort of a public forum.
Mission and vision statements can be used to make the values and firm’s commitment to CSR clear
among the company’s many external constituencies as well as to motivate employees with a vision worth
getting up out of bed for in the morning. Measurable and achievable goals should be set in each of the CSR
activities, including expected benefits to both stakeholders and the firm (e.g., “To train twenty poverty-
level adults to perform such-and-such by the end of the fiscal year, and to achieve awareness of twenty per
cent in the community regarding our involvement in this activity”).
Targets for strategic CSR. To minimize the problem of pluralism regarding what is, in fact, socially
responsible,” strategic CSR must be targeted to receptive publics. The balancing act among stakeholder
groups is always a tricky one, and solutions to resolving tradeoffs must usually be found on a case-by-case
basis, considering the relative importance of each stakeholder group to the company.
Boatright (2000), following Simon et. al’s (1983) criteria for determining ethical responsibility, suggests
several criteria for establishing groups to target. These are groups: (1) with an urgent need; (2) in close
proximity to a corporation (3) a corporation is capable of responding to effectively; and (4) for which the
likelihood is high that the need will not be met unless a corporation acts (called the “last resort” criterion).
Because of the danger of assuming someone else will act or not acting because one assumes the need is not
strong since no one else is acting, the last resort criterion is less useful (Smith and Quelch, 1993)
In most cases customers and employees are the two groups whose welfare seems to be most closely
linked to the business and therefore whose needs and wants should generally be given primacy.
Companies can use strategic CSR to boost consumer patronage and loyalty and worker morale and loyalty.
I will also briefly examine government and special interest groups as frequent targets of strategic CSR.
Marketers have a noble calling—to serve and satisfy consumers’ legitimate needs. Socially responsible
marketing boils down to providing consumers with products of genuine value which will enhance their
physical or psychological well-being, pricing them at a level that yields a fair return to the firm but which is
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also done with integrity, distributing products effectively and efficiently (Chewning et. al, 1990), and
promoting them with honesty and in a wholesome environment (Dunkerton, 1990).
Surveys that are periodically reported in the press attest to the fact that consumer responsiveness is a
mandate for CSR. By 1992, a survey by the Public Relations Society of America revealed that one of the
industry’s ten hottest trends was social issues marketing—celebrating a company’s commitment to public
issues as well as to its products and customers (Carroll, 2001). A 1994 study by Walker Research and
Analysis found that 88% of consumers claimed they were much or somewhat more likely to buy from a
firm which is socially responsible and a good corporate citizen if quality, service, and price are all
comparable to those of competitors, while 92% said they would be much or somewhat less likely to buy
from a company that lacks social responsibility (Smith, 2001, p. 155). A 1997 Cone/Roper survey revealed
that 76% of consumers claimed they would switch brands or stores that seem concerned about the
community (Jones, 1997).
Clearly, marketers have an important role to play in strategic CSR designed to enhance customer
goodwill and provide a way of differentiating the company and its products (McWilliams, 2001; Stodder,
1999), notably through “leveraging” these activities via marketing communications such as publicity and
advertising. Very common areas of activity here are sponsorship of the arts and marketing-driven
sponsorships (Quester and Thompson, 2001). Also common is giving to local community endeavors. For
instance, the retailer Target boldly proclaims in their advertising campaigns that they contribute large
percentages of their profits back into their communities. During the 1990’s, many companies practiced
“green marketing” for the goodwill they imagined they would get from touting a brand’s social attributes,
such as being pesticide free and nonpolluting, although abuses have somewhat curtailed that practice.
Cause-related marketing, which involves linking consumer purchases of a firm’s products with fund-
raising for worthwhile causes or charitable organizations, has grown exponentially over the past few
decades. It is effective because of consumers’ growing social consciousness; consequently, consumers now
buy products as an expression of their own social consciousness. Case studies suggest that cause-related
marketing is effective in boosting brand loyalty and preventing the onset of commodity status for a brand
(Dupree, 2000).
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Opportunities are limited only by the marketer’s creative imagination. For instance, Wells Fargo Bank
teamed with Austin, Texas police to offer bank accounts to undocumented workers who are often targets of
violent robberies because they must carry cash. Although the bank’s regional president said they were
doing this because “It is just the right thing to do,” (Garcia, 2001, p. 8B), the marketing value was clear: it
gave the bank an opportunity to tap into the rapidly growing Hispanic market. “This is not a marketing
effort, though we’d hope that people far and wide discover and use the program,” the ban’s regional
president admitted (Garcia, 2001, p. 8B).
The consumer psychology is that companies that actively support CSR are honest, more reliable and,
hence, produce high-quality products (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). Thus, social attributes such as
“environmentally friendly” or a “caring company” can serve as signals of product quality. Consumers also
tend to think, “Those are pretty good folks, I ought to give them a chance” (Harvey, 2001).
Employees are a second vital target of strategic CSR efforts. An organization's greatest resource is
people, not property, manpower, nor money. The rate of return on human capital can be higher than the
rate of return on physical or technological capital. An old adage in the advertising industry is, "Our assets
go down the elevator every evening." Thus, most efforts to help employees will yield business benefits.
Marketers know the importance of internal marketing, especially to front-line employees: if they are
happy, they will more likely work to satisfy customers. Efforts here can include “progressive” labor
relations policies, workplace safety, financial security, flextime and job sharing, workplace amenities such
as recreational facilities and on-site childcare, and matching employee contributions to charity. In return,
businesses expect to be rewarded with increased worker loyalty, morale, and productivity (McWilliams and
Siegel, 2001). One-third of large companies now have a formal policy whereby they pay workers or give
them release time to do community volunteer work. Studies have confirmed what managers have
suspected: workers who do volunteer work for something they find meaningful return to their job more
motivated and fulfilled, and with stronger community ties, which lessens their propensity to move
elsewhere for a different job and also aids recruitment (Jones, 1997).
Employees should be evaluated on not just financial criteria, but also on ethical and social responsibility
criteria. Employees should see their peers who have modeled ethical and socially responsible behavior
44
recognized and rewarded, even if there was a short-term cost to the bottom line (so long as there is believed
to be a long-run return to the firm’s value).
Legislators and regulators are another important public for strategic CSR. For instance, if a firm is sued
for, say, racial discrimination, it can help their cause to tell the jury about employee volunteer work for,
say, minority literacy programs (Jones, 1997). Strategic CSR might also be done with a view to
minimizing government regulation. For example, in the real estate industry, builders and developers
routinely need zoning clearances in order to conduct their businesses; thus, if these outfits are viewed as
good community citizens, zoning decisions are more likely to be favorable and faster.5
Strategic CSR can also be used to keep at bay public-interest (special-interest) groups—non-profit
organizations that have been founded to promote a cause perceived (at least by their members) to be in the
“public interest.” These groups are important constituencies since they can bring pressure to bear via direct
lobbying of government officials, such as via personal presentations and testifying at congressional
hearings; trying to alter public opinion through activities which will garner public relations, such as
demonstrations, picketing, and letter writing; organizing boycotts; and releasing research results. (Smith,
2001).
Also, it is in a company’s best interests to target those individuals or organizations which promote the
firm’s own values and agenda (Brenkert, 1996). Thus, it might be financially beneficial to donate to
universities doing basic research in an organization’s field, whereas it would be objectionable to support
colleges whose professors denounce the free enterprise system.
Strategic considerations. As Novak (1996) suggests, companies need to clearly communicate with their
various constituencies, including stockholders. They need to state in their investment prospectuses, annual
reports, and other corporate communications the causes they support and provide a breakout of the costs
and benefits of their various CSR efforts. This will give potential and current investors “informed consent”
in deciding to purchase shares (Rae and Wong, 1996). Additionally, management can poll stockholders to
determine their preferences for areas of strategic CSR the company should get involved in or to get them to
specifically approve the company’s CSR activities when they cast their annual proxy vote for the election
5 . Of course, if favoritism is sought, this would violate canons of fairness and hence ethics.
45
of the board and other issues (Bowie, 1995).
Determining the amount to spend on strategic CSR is admittedly difficult, since, as is true for most
marketing communications, it is complex to directly correlate the effort expended with financial
performance measures such as sales and profits. In theory, so long as the marginal contribution margin
exceeds the marginal cost of strategic CSR, CSR activities should be undertaken. In practice, given the
multiplicity of factors causing business performance and in view of the lagged effects of many CSR efforts
(e.g., corporate reputation is slow to build and a function of many variables), this is impossible to do. As is
true for measuring the effectiveness of advertising and other marketing communications, marketers will
need to use surrogates for sales and profits as a indicators of CSR’s value to the firm, such as enhanced
trust and reputation. Nonetheless, especially in view of their added societal benefits, more companies
should consider reallocating funds from traditional marketing communications activities to strategic CSR.
If stockholders derive nonpecuniary benefits from CSR, these should somehow be weighed in the balance
too.
Suggestions for future research
A fuller theory of strategic CSR should be developed, including reciprocal stakeholder responsibilities.
Although I have drawn some general boundaries on appropriate CSR efforts, a full delineation of strategic
CSR efforts, more details on the appropriate boundaries of each of these areas, and the roles of marketers as
well as other functional area involvement is required.
We also need a theory of how to balance the tradeoffs inherent in serving the various corporate
constituencies. While I suggest customers and employees are most critical, stakeholder theory as it now
exists does not prioritize among stakeholder groups (Freeman, 2001). We should determine how certain
stakeholder groups should be weighted in importance for targeting these efforts. For each stakeholder
group we need to learn which types of CSR activities yield the highest payback. We should discover if
there are the general limits that should be set on spending on these activities.
The event study analysis (ESA) technique (Miyazaki and Morgan, 2001) is a useful academic research
methodology which can help provide some answers. ESA originated in and is now widely accepted in the
finance and economics disciplines, and it has also been borrowed in recent years by marketing scholars.
ESA examines the impact of a single event (or series of events) on the value of a business. In marketing,
46
ESA has been used to investigate the influence on the firm’s value of new-product announcements, brand-
extensions, celebrity endorsements (Miyazaki and Morgan, 2001), slogan changes, new advertising agency-
client relationships (Knowles, Mather, and Rangan, 1997), and special event sponsorship (Cornwell, Pruitt,
and Van Ness, 2001).
The idea underling ESA is that stock markets are generally efficient in that stock prices correctly and
rapidly incorporate all publicly available information, and so changes in information valued by the market
should lead to significant changes in stock prices, with information perceived to signal future earnings
increases (decreases) leading to a stock price increase (decrease). ESA entails measuring how a given
event, such as an announcement concerning a change in present and future marketing strategies of a
company, influences movement in a company’s stock price. The impact of the announcement is gauged by
comparing the amount of change in the stock price around the event date with the predicted change in stock
price based on inspecting the past relationship between the stock and the market from time series data
(Cornwell et. al, 2001; Miyazaki and Morgan, 2001). The advantages of using stock price changes as a
measure of CSR effectiveness are that this measure is free of some of the biases of more subjective metrics
such as communication measures (e.g., awareness, attitude, image, etc.) (Cornwell et. Al, 2001), it can
more cleanly be associated with changes in marketing strategies than can communication variables, and it
is directly tied to shareholder interests since CRM activities that move the stock price significantly upward
are defensible from the shareholders’ perspective.
Since ESA data is only correlational, it can be supplemented with field experimental research that
demonstrates cause-and-effect relationships. For instance, sponsorship effectiveness has been studied using
a before-after (pretest-posttest)-with-control-group design, in which “before” and “after” measures of
attitudes toward sponsors and sponsorships were taken, comparing control and treatment groups (Quester
and Thompson, 2001). Because this method would substitute communications measures of the
effectiveness of CSR for the financial measures of event study analysis, I recommend that researchers use
both ESA and field experience simultaneously in order to achieve convergent validity.
Conclusion
47
The jury is in—CSR is increasingly expected and can be rewarding for both societal stakeholders and
the firm. Ethical responsibilities, i.e., ethical CSR, is the mandatory minimal level of social responsibility
an enterprise owes its constituencies. Given the ultimate responsibility of a corporation to its stockholders,
strategic CSR, which financially benefits the business through serving society in extra-economic ways, is
justifiable, and from society’s perspective, should be applauded, not condemned as “self-serving.”
Altruistic CSR, whose benefit to the company is uncertain and even irrelevant, lies outside the scope of
business responsibility. If managers wish to do good works of questionable return to the firm, they may do
them on their own time and with their own dollar. Marketers, as the corporation’s key need satisfiers and
corporate communicators, should be in the vanguard of strategic CSR efforts. While difficult issues
remain, such as balancing conflicting stakeholder interests and measuring returns to strategic CSR, in view
of the public’s rising expectations for CSR, marketers should press ahead. If the future academic research
recommended above is undertaken, and as marketers do their own proprietary research, the task should
become easier.
48
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