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Arrest, search and seizure People v. Escaño 323 SCRA 754 FACTS: During a checkpoint, a police saw a firearm on the lap of the accused. As a result, other passengers were searched and all firearms were seized. Are checkpoints illegal? HELD: As long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection is limited to a visual search, such routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of the right against unreasonable search. Valmonte vs. De VillaFacts: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold bloodby the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Issue: WON the installation of checkpoints violates the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures Held: Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se, illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military, indeed, committed specific violations of petitioners'' rights against unlawful search and seizure of other rights. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may not also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the govt, in the interest of public security. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual’s right against a warrantless search w/c is, however, reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during 1

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Arrest, search and seizure

People v. Escao323 SCRA 754FACTS:During a checkpoint, a police saw a firearm on the lap of the accused.As a result, other passengers were searched and all firearms were seized.Are checkpoints illegal?

HELD:As long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection is limited to a visual search, such routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of the right against unreasonable search.Valmonte vs. De VillaFacts:On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission ofconducting security operations withinits area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region.As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents ofValenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or atdawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold bloodby the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air.Issue:WON the installation of checkpoints violates the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizuresHeld:Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning thecheckpoints are notsufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints perse, illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military, indeed, committed specific violations of petitioners'' rights against unlawful search and seizure of other rights. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable arenot forbidden. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may not also be regardedas measures to thwart plots to destabilize the govt, in the interest of public security. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individuals right against a warrantless search w/cis, however, reasonably conducted, the formershould prevail. True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost ofoccasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted w/in reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.Alvero vs. dizonFACTS:The petitioner has been accused of treason; that at the hearing on his petition for bail, the prosecution presented, as part of its evidence, certain documents which had been allegedly seized by soldiers of the United States Army, accompanied by Filipino Guerrillas in the petitioners house. The Petitioner further contends that the seized documents should be returned as it obtained by means of force and intimidation or through coercion, those are not his personal papers but part of the files of the New Leaders Association, which was proven to be an organization created for the purpose of collaborating with the enemy. Lastly, the presentation of the seized documents in the trial is tantamount to compelling him to testify against himself, in violation of his constitutional rights.ISSUES:1. Whether or not the seized documents are legal?2. Whether or not the documents seized should be admitted as evidence in the trial court?HELD.No. The petition for Certiorari with Injunction is absolutely no merit.RATIONALE:The right of the officer and men of the United States Army to arrest the petitioner as a collaborationist suspect, and to seize his personal papers is unquestionable. Also, proclamation of General Douglas McArthur, as Commander in Chief of the United States of Army, declaring his purpose to remove certain citizens of the Philippines, who had voluntarily given aid and comfort to the enemy, in violation of the allegiance.EXCEPTION:Important exception to the necessity for a Search Warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest. A lawful arrest may be made either while a crime is being committed or after its commission. The right to search includes in both instances that of searching the person of him who is arrested, in order to find and seize things arrested with the crime as its fruits as the means by which it was committed.The Petitioner consented to the presentation of the seized documents, as part of the evidence for the prosecution, at the hearing in his petition for bail and at the trial of the case on the merits, without having insisted that the question of the alleged illegality of the search and seizure of said papers and documents should first have been directly litigated and established by a motion.COMPULSORY SELF-INCRIMINATIONNot violated by the use of evidence of articles obtained by an unconstitutional search and seizure. Thus, the petitioner is estopped from questioning their admission.PURPOSE: (Adam vs New York)The purpose of the constitutional provisions against unlawful searched and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative and judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted.Stonehill vs Diokno,declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Mercado vs Peoples Court.The case at the bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of state authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused / appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.The contraband in this case at bar having come into possession of the government without the latter transgressing appellants rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason whty the same should not be admitted.FACTUAL CONSIDERATIONS Readily foreclose the proportion that NBI agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise, clearly that the NBI agents made no search and seizure much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused / appellant.CHADWICK vs STATE, having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereofBILL OF RIGHTSThe protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy, protection against whom, protection against the STATE.Bache and co. v ruizOn 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to J Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec 46(a) of the NIRC, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter. The next day, de Leon and his witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search warrant. At that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his DeputyClerk of Courtto take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. J Ruiz signed de Leons application for search warrant and Logronios deposition. The search was subsequently conducted.ISSUE:Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant.HELD:The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds.1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.Personalexaminationby the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause.2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. As ruled inStonehillSuch is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in the Search WarrantUnregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts,promissory notesand deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications, accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized.A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.Stonehill v dioknoStonehill et al and the corporation they form were alleged to have committed acts in violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. By the strength of this allegation a search warrant was issued against their persons and their corporation. The warrant provides authority to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing allbusiness transactionsincluding disbursements receipts, balance sheets andprofit and loss statementsand Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups, namely:(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for:(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them;(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law.The prosecution counters, invoking the Moncado doctrine, that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against them. In short, the criminal cannot be set free just because the government blunders.ISSUE:Whether or not the search warrant issued is valid.HELD:The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The SC emphasized however that Stonehill et al cannot assail the validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation for Stonehill are not the proper party hence has no cause of action. It should be raised by the officers or board members of the corporation. The constitution protects the peoples right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met. The warrant was issued from mere allegation that Stonehill et al committed a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code, as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing allbusiness transactionsincluding disbursement receipts, balance sheets and relatedprofit and loss statements.Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to allbusiness transactionsof Stonehill et al, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of Stonehill et al and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. The Moncado doctrine is likewise abandoned and the right of the accused against a defective search warrant is emphasized.Alvarez vs. CFIFacts: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to Judge David a sworn affidavit that a certain Narciso Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts, chits, lists used by him as money lender/usurer charging usurious rates in violation of law. Affiant Almeda, chief of the task force, didnt say that the information was based on his personal knowledge but was only received by him from a reliable source. Subsequently, the judge issued the warrant ordering the search of Alvarez house. On June 4, 1936, the agents raided the subject place and seized different documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit receipts, etc. Thereafter, the articles seized was not brought immediately to the custody of the judge who issued the SW. Alvarez moved that the agents of the Board be declared guilty of contempt and prays that all articles in question be returned to him because the SW issued was illegal. On the other hand, the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be allowed to retain custody of the articles seized for further investigation. When the judge sustained the latters motion. Alvarez elevated the matter to the SC and prayed that the search warrant as well as the order of the judge authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to retain custody be declared null and void.Issue: Whether the SW issued by the judge is illegal for having solely as basis the affidavit of Agent Almeda in whose oath the latter declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as basis for the issuance of the warrant but he had knowledge thereof only through information secured from a person whom he considered reliable.Ruling:Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders 58 require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God.The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. The affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. The Constitution does not provide that it is of an imperative necessity to take the depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the applicants knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the factsJose Burgos vs. Chief of StaffG.R. No L-64261

Facts:Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities. Petitionersprayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties.

Issue:Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.

Held:The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrant.As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the case ofDavao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo,ruling that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.Corro v. Lising Philippine Times conclusions of law of military officers will not satisfy probable cause requirement for issuance of search warrantsPEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHUA HO SAN@ TSAY HO SAN, accused-appellant.FACTS:Inresponsetoreportsoframpantsmugglingoffirearmsandothercontraband, Chief of Police Jim Lagasca Cid of Bacnotan Police Station, LaUnionbeganpatrollingtheBacnotancoastlinewithhisofficers.Whilemonitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, he intercepted a radio call ataround12:45p.m.fromBarangayCaptainJuanAlmoiteofBarangayTammocalaorequestingforpoliceassistanceregardinganunfamiliarspeedboat the latter had spotted. According to Almoite, the vessel looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisher folk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and six of his men led by SPO1ReynosoBadua,proceededimmediatelytoTammocalaobeachandthereconferred with Almoite. Cid then observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger, who was later identified as Chua Ho San. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, carrying a multicolored strawbag,andwalkedtowardstheroad.Uponseeingthepoliceofficers, theman changed direction. Badua held Chuas right arm to prevent him from fleeing.They then introduced themselves as police officers; however, Chua did not understand what theyre saying. And by resorting of sign language, Cid motioned with his hands for the man to open his bag. The man acceded to the request. The said bag was found to contain several transparent plastics containing yellowish crystalline substances, which was later identified to bemethamphetaminehydrochlorideorshabu.ChuawasthenbroughttoBacnotan Police Station, where he was provided with an interpreter to inform him of his constitutional rights.ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure conductedbythePoliceOfficersconstituteavalidexemptionfromthewarrantrequirement.RULING: The Court held inthe negative.The Court explains that the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid ofavalidsearchwarrantissuedinaccordancewiththeRules.However,warrantless searches may be permitted in the followingcases, to wit:(1)search of moving vehicles,(2)seizure in plain view,(3)customssearches,(4)waiver or consent searches,(5)stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and(6)searchincidental toa lawfularrest. It is required in cases of in flagrante delicto that the arresting officer must have personalknowledge ofsuchfacts or circumstancesconvincingly indicativeorconstitutiveofprobablecause. Probablecausemeansa reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. In the case at bar, there are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of CHUA's participation in ongoing criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process ofperpetrating an offense. With these, the Court held that there was no probable cause to justify a search incidental to alawful arrest.The Court likewise did not appreciate the contention of the Prosecutionthattherewasawaiverorconsentedsearch.IfCHUAcouldnotunderstand what was orally articulated to him, how could he understandthepolice's"signlanguage?"Moreimportantly,itcannotlogicallybeinferredfromhisallegedcognizanceofthe"signlanguage"thathedeliberately, intelligently, and consciously waived his right against such an intrusive search. Finally, being a forbidden fruit, the subject regulated substance was held to be inadmissible inevidence. Hence, the accused was acquitted as the evidence was not sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.Microsoft v. Maxicorp software probable cause such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it arelegally just and proper; OATH must refer to the truth of the facts WITHIN THE PERSONAL KNOLEDGE OF THE PETITIONER OR HIS WITNESSES; probable cause deals with probability and not absolute certaintySoliven v. Makasiar The judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. He shall: 1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by thefiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest OR 2) if on the basis thereof, he does not find probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report andrequire the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion of the existence of probable causeLim Sr. v. Felix certification by the fiscal of the existence of probable cause does not bind the judge. Preliminary inquiry determines probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant (prosecutor);preliminary examination (judge) - investigation for the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest; preliminary investigation proper ascertains whether the offendershould be held for trial or be released.PADERANGA vs DRILONFACTS:Definition of Preliminary ExaminationGenerally inquisitorial, often only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaintor information. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the Fiscal. He has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine wither or not a criminal case should be filed in Court.General Rule:Injunction will not be granted torestrain a criminal prosecutionException (Brocka vs Enrile):1.Afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights ofthe accused2.Necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity ofactions3.When there is aprejudicial question4.When the acts of the officers are without orexcess of authority5.Double jeopardy is clearly apparent6.When the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense7.A case of persecution rather than prosecution8.The charges are manifestly false and motivated by vengeance9.Clearly no Prima Facie case against the accusedThe right of the accused toask clarificatory questions is not ABSOLUTE.QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE required in preliminary investigation is such such evidence sufficient toengender a well-founded belief as to the fact of the omission of a crime and respondents probable guilt.

People v. CA the general rule is that search warrants must be served during the daytime (protect the public from the abrasiveness of official intrusions). Exception: a search at any reasonable hourof day or night may be made when the application asserts that the property in on the person or place ordered to be searched. Absence of abuse of discretion, a search conducted at night where so allowed is not improper

Abdula v. Guiani326 SCRA 1HELD:If a judge relies solely on the certification of the prosecutor when the records are not before him, he has not personally determined the existence of probable cause.The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied.The judge does not have to personally examine the witnesses.However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the certification of the prosecutor.All these should be before the judge.Republic v Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 155832)FACTS:Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Commissioner Daza gave written authority to two lawyers to sequester any property, documents, money, and other assets in Leyte belonging to Imelda Marcos. A sequestration order was issued against the Olot Resthouse in Tolosa, Leyte. Imelda Marcos filed a motion to quash claiming that such order was void for failing to observe Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations. The Rules required the signatures of at least 2 PCGG Commissioners.The Republic opposed claiming that Imelda is estopped from questioning the sequestration since by her acts ( such as seeking permission from the PCGG to repair the resthouse and entertain guests), she had conceded to the validity of the sequestration. The Republic also claims that Imelda failed to exhaust administrative remedies by first seeking its lifting as provided in the Rules; that the rule requiring the two signatures did not yet exist when the Olot Resthouse was sequestered; and that she intended to delay proceedings by filing the motion to quash.Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash and ruled that the sequestration order was void because it was signed not by the 2 commissioners but by 2 agents. Hence the certiorari.ISSUE:Whether or not the sequestration order is valid.HELD:No. The Order is not valid. Under Sec. 26, Art 18 of the Constitution, a sequestration order may be issued upon a showing of a prima facie case that the properties are ill-gotten wealth. When the court nullifies an Order, the court does not substitute its judgment for that of the PCGG.In the case, the PCGG did not make a prior determination of the existence of the prima facie case. The Republic presented no evidence to the Sandiganbayan. Nor did the Republic demonstrate that the the 2 PCGG representatives were given the quasi-judicial authority to receive and consider evidence that would warrant a prima facie finding. The Republic's evidence does not show how the Marcoses' acquired the property, what makes it ill-gotten wealth,and how Ferdinand Marcos intervened in its acquisition.As regards the issue on estoppel, a void order produces no effect and cannot be validated under the doctine of estoppel. The Court cannot accept the view that Imelda should have first sought the lifiting of the sequestration order. Being void, the Sandiganbayan has the power to strike it down on sight.*Decision of Sandiganbayan affirmed and orders the annotation of lis pendens on the title of the Olot Resthouse with respect to the claim of the Republic in another civil case

Pasion Vda. De Garcia vs.LocsinFacts: Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usuary Board, obtained from the justice of the peace of Tarlac, a search warrant commanding any officer of the law to search the person, house or store of the petitioner at Victoria, Tarlac, for certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents and other papers relating to her activities as usurer.The search warrant was issued upon an affidavit given by the said Almeda.On the same date, the said Mariano G. Almeda, accompanied by a captain of the Philippine Constabulary, went to the office of the petitioner in Victoria, Tarlac and, after showing the search warrant to the petitioners bookkeeper, Alfredo Salas, and, without the presence of the petitioner who was ill and confined at the time, proceeded with the execution thereofThe papers and documents seized were kept for a considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury Board and thereafter were turned over by it to the respondent fiscal who subsequently filed six separate criminal cases against the herein petitioner for violation of the Anti-Usury Law.The legality of the search warrant was challenged by counsel for the petitioner in the six criminal cases and the devolution of the documents demanded. The respondent Judge denied the petitioners motion for the reason that though the search warrant was illegal, there was a waiver on the part of the petitioner.HELD:Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a search warrant to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause;(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.In the instant case the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but by the applicant. All that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. He did not decide for himself. It does not appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even accepting the description of the properties to be seized to be sufficient and on the assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently detailed within the meaning of the law, the properties seized were not delivered to the court which issued the warrant, as required by law.Instead, they were turned over to the resp. provincial fiscal & used by him in building up cases against petitioner. Considering that at the time the warrant was issued, there was no case pending against the petitioner, the averment that the warrant was issued primarily for exploration purposes is not without basis.Alvarez v. CFI of Tayabas definition of a search warrant an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or justice of peace and directed to a peace officer commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before court, OATH - any form ofattestation that a party signifies that he is bound by conscience to perform an act faithfully or truthfullyMata vs. BayonaFACTS:Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended by PD 1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by selling illegal tickets known as Masiao tickets without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned. Mata claimed that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona, presiding Judge of the City Court of Ormoc replied, it is with the court. The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the records. This led Mata to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979, stating that the court has made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a certification to that effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the search warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these documents are to be attached to the records. Matas motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied, he came to the Supreme Court, with the petition for certiorari, praying, among others, that the Court declare the search warrant to be invalid for its alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that all the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the matter.ISSUE:WON the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him?HELD:YES. Under the Constitution no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, The Rules provide that thejudge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or nonexistence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.

PEOPLE VS TEE

FACTS: Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman, and a resident of Baguio City. A raid conducted by operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Philippine National Police Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) at premises allegedly leased by appellant and at his residence yielded huge quantities of marijuana.Appellant moved to quash the search warrant on the ground that it was too general and that the NBI had not complied with the requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. The pendency of said motion, however, did not stop the filing of the appropriate charges against appellant. In an information dated July 24, 1998, the City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged Modesto Tee, alias Estoy Tee, with illegal possession of marijuana.ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant's contention that the description on the serach warrant which says an undetermined amount of marijuana, was too general and hence makes the warrant void for vagueness.HELD: SC held that the appellants contention, has no leg to stand on. The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things to be seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizures. What the Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad or general characterization or sweeping descriptions, which will authorize police officers to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an offense. However, it is not required that technical precision of description be required, particularly, where by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, since the requirement of a technical description would mean that no warrant could issue.Prudente vs. Dayrit, GRNo.82870Facts: Based on an information from a verified source that petitioner violated the Dangerous Drug Act of 1972, police officers applied for a search warrant which was subsequently issued by respondent judge. Petitioner assailed the validity of the search warrant on the ground that there was no probable cause for the issuance of search warrant.Issue: Whether or not a warrant issued based on verified information to the police is valid.Held: No. Probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses and not simply on hearsay.TOMAS CHIA vs COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMSG.R. No. L-43810 September 26, 1989FACTS:A verified report of a confidential informant that asserted electronic and electrical equipment and other articles illegally imported into the Philippines by a syndicate engaged in unlawful shipside activities (foreign goods are unloaded form foreign ships in transit through the Bureau of Customs, thereby evading payment of the corresponding customs duties, and were found inside the Toms electronics and Sony Merchandising after valuation, the Collector of Customs issued warrants of seizure and detention Nos: 14925 ad 14925-A. Search Warrant:Various electronics equipment like cassette tape recorders, car stereos, phonograph needles, portable TV sets, imported long playing records, spare parts of TVs and Radios and other electrical appliancesISSUE:Whether the warrants of seizure and detention are general warrant issued in violation of Rule 126, Sections 3 of Rules of Court?HELD:Petition dismissed.Section 2208 (Customs) Tariff and Customs Code Right of Police Officer to enter in closure, a warehouse, store, or other building or in closure used for keeping or storage or articles does not become a dwelling house within the meaning.Section 2536 (Seizure of other articles) The Commissioner of Customs and Collector of Customs and or any other Customs officer, with the prior authorization in writing by the commissioner, may demand evidence of payment of duties and taxes on foreign articles.Search of Dwelling House (Section 2209) Upon warrant issued by a Judge of the Court or such other responsible officers as may be authorized by law, upon sworn application showing probable cause and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.The warrants issued by the Collector of Customs in this case were not general warrant, as erroneously alleged by petitioner for they identified the stores to be seized, described the articles to be seized and specified the provision of the Tariff and Customs Code.20th century foxTHE FACTSPetitioner 20thCentury Fox Film Corporation sought the assistance of the NBI in conducting searches and seizures in connection with the NBIs anti-film piracy campaign. Petitioner alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in violation of PD No. 49 (the old Intellectual Property Law).The NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed three (3) applications for search warrants against the video outlets owned by the private respondents.The lower court issued the desired search warrants. The NBI, accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and seized the items described in the three warrants.Private respondents later filed a motion to lift the search warrants and release the seized properties, which was granted by the lower court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the lower court. The CA affirmed the trial court.II.THE ISSUEDid the judge properly lift the search warrants he issued earlier?III.THE RULING[The Court DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the questioned decision and resolution of the CA.]YES,the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier.The lower court lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of probable cause that the private respondents violated P.D. 49.NBI agents who acted as witnesses during the application for search warrant did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony, which was the alleged commission of the offense of piracy by the private respondents. Only the petitioners counsel who was also a witness during the application stated that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. The lower court lifted the warrants, declaring that the testimony of petitioners counsel did not have much credence because the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during the application.The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films, from which the pirated films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in their possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation of the master tapes at the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious.The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former.This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano, 132 SCRA 152 (1985)FACTS: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary Security Group (CSG). Milagros had been wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP. The arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon of the same day, her premises were searched and 428 documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes were seized.Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Pao issued a search warrant to be served at Aguilar-Roques leased residence allegedly an underground house of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of the documents seized, charges of subversion and rebellion by the CSG were filed by but the fiscals office merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive materials. Aguilar-Roque asked for suppression of the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained and that the search warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has not been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicants witness.ISSUE: WON the search warrant was valid?HELD:NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes.It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description were considered null and void for being too general.PICOP v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253) (1999)FACTS: On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant before the RTC of Quezon City, stating: 1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP compound, is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and which . . . are [being kept] and conceal[ed] in the premises described; 2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession and bring to the described properties. After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested search warrant. On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and seized a number of firearms and explosives. Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash before the trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash and a Motion to SuppressEvidence. On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners motions. On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its second contested Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.ISSUE: WON the search warrant issued was validHELD:The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3)the place to be searched was not described with particularity.UNILAB, INC. vs. ERNESTO ISIP and/or SHALIMAR PHILIPPINESFACTS:UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported to be manufacturing fake UNILAB products, especially Revicon multivitamins. The agent took some photographs where the clandestine manufacturing operation was taking place. UNILAB then sought the help of the NBI, which thereafter filed an application for the issuance of search warrant in the RTC of Manila. After finding probable cause, the court issued a search warrant directing the police to seize finished or unfinished products of UNILAB, particularly REVICON multivitamins. No fake Revicon was however found; instead, sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened contained 60 ml bottles of Disudrin and 200mg tablets of Inoflox, both were brands used by UNILAB. NBI prayed that some of the sized items be turned over to the custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The court granted the motion. The respondents then filed a motion to quash the search warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that the seized items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and therefore inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging that the boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox were seized under the plain view doctrine. The court, however, granted the motion of the respondents.ISSUE:Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, were valid under the plain view doctrine.HELD:It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under the plain view doctrine. However, seized things not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must adduce evidence to prove that the elements for the doctrine to apply are present, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to prove that the items were seized on plain view. It is not enough that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents. However, the NBI failed to present any of officers who were present when the warrant was enforced to prove that the the sealed boxes was discovered inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were incriminating and immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the enforcing officers had personal knowledge whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof were incriminating and that they were immediately apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they were opened. In sum then, the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove that the plain view doctrine applies to the seized items.People vs. arutaIn the morning of 13 Dec 1988, the law enforcement officers received information from an informant named Benjie that a certain Aling Rosa would be leaving forBaguio Cityon 14 Dec 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana; At 6:30 in the evening of 14 Dec 1988, Aruta alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers; NARCOM officers approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her travelling bag, she gave the same to him; When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves; Aruta was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.ISSUE:Whether or not the conducted search and seizure is constitutional.HELD:The SC ruled in favor of Aruta and has noted that some drug traffickers are beingfreeddue to technicalities. Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Aruta was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to Aruta and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended Aruta were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. The SC could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests. Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of Arutas bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are fruits of a poisoned tree and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.156 Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs [GR L-27968, 3 December 1975]Facts: M/V Jolo Lema had been under strict surveillance by the combined team of agents of the NBI, PC, RASAC, and City Police of Davao prior to its apprehension at a private wharf in Batjak, Sasa, Davao City. M/V [Jolo Lema] was skippered (sic) by Capt. Aquilino Pantinople and chartered by Mr. Tomas Velasco. During the period from the latter part of August to September 18, 1966, the said vessel was in Indonesian waters where it loaded copra and coffee beans from Taruna, Pitta, and Mangenito, all of Indonesia. In its trip to Indonesia it brought various merchandise from the Philippines which were exchanged and/or bartered for copra and coffee beans and subsequently taken to Davao City. Said vessel passed Marore, Indonesia on 18September 1966 on its a way to Tahuna, Indonesia before proceeding to Davao City where it wasapprehended on 19 September 1966. At about 3:00 p.m. of the said day, when the vessel was searched and after Captain Pantinople informed the team that Velasco, the charterer of the vessel, had other documents showing that vessel came from Indonesia carrying smuggled copra and coffee, a combined team of Constabulary and Regional Anti-Smuggling Center operatives headed by Earl Reynolds, Senior NBI Agent of Davao, proceeded to the Velasco's room at the Skyroom Hotel in Davao City, to ask for said document. Velasco was not inside the hotel room when they entered the room. There are conflicting claims whether the manicurist Teofila Ibaez or whether Velasco's wife, who was allegedly inside the room at that time, voluntarily allowed the police officers to enter; and whether the police officers "forcibly opened luggages and boxes from which only several documents and papers were found, then seized, confiscated and took away the same," or whether Mrs. Velasco volunteered to open the suitcases and baggages of Velasco and delivered the documents and things contained therein to Reynolds. The Collector of Customs of Davao seized 1,480 sacks of copra and 86 sacks of coffee from the M/V motor vessel Jolo Lema. The seizure was declared lawful by theCourt of Tax Appeals, and its decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court on 29 November 1974 in Nasiad vs. Court of Tax Appeals (GR L-29318, November 29, 1974, 61 SCRA 238). In the present special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus; the only question left then is whether the search conducted by a party headed by Reynolds without the search warrant for the hotel room of Velasco, who entered into a contract with Jose G. Lopez, the awardee of such Philippine Reparations Commission vessel, for its operation and use ostensibly for fishing, is violative of such constitutional provision.Issue: Whether there was consent on the part of the person who was the occupant of the hotel room then rented by Velasco.Held: There was an attempt on the part of Lopez and Velasco to counteract the force of the recital of the written statement of Teofila Ibaez (allegedly wife of Tomas Velasco) by an affidavit of one Corazon Y. Velasco, who stated that she is the legal wife of Velasco, and another by Velasco himself; reiterating that the person who was present at his hotel room was one Teofila Ibaez, "a manicurist by occupation." If such indeed were the case, then it is much more easily understandable why that person, Teofila Ibaez, who could be aptly described as the wrong person at the wrong place and at the wrong time, would have signified her consent readily and immediately. Under the circumstances, that was the most prudent course of action. It would save her and even Velasco himself from any gossip or innuendo. Nor could the officers of the law be blamed if they would act on the appearances. There was a person inside who from all indications was ready to accede to their request. Even common courtesy alone would have precluded them from inquiring too closely as to why she was there. Under all the circumstances, therefore, it can readily be concluded that there was consent sufficient in law to dispense with the need for a search warrant.People v. Ramos [GR 85401-02, 4 June 1990]Facts: On 29 November 1982, a civilian informer came to the Narcotics Command Office in Olongapo City and reported that a cigarette vendor by the name of "Mama Rose" (Rosalinda Ramos) was selling marijuana at the corner of 3rd Street and Rizal Avenue in Olongapo City. Tests buys were made using marked money. The Narcotics Command (NARCOM) team proceeded to the place where appellant was selling cigarettes, and arrested the latter for illegal peddling of marijuana. Ramos was requested to take out the contents of her wallet. The four marked five-peso bills used in the test buys were found among her possessions and were confiscated after the serial numbers were confirmed. Search of Ramos stall yielded 20 sticks of marijuana cigarettes in a trash can placed under the small table where Ramos displayed the wares she was selling. Ramos was thereafter brought to the station. At the station, Ramos executed a statement confessing to her crimes which she swore to before Assistant City Fiscal. The marijuana sticks confiscated were sent to the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory (PCCL) for analysis, and thereafter were confirmed to be marijuana. The defense contends however that she assented to the invitation of the NARCOM operatives for investigation, after search of her buri bags (which she stores the fruits that she sells) were fruitless. She claimed that she was forced to affix her signature on the four 5-peso bills by one Sgt. Sudiacal, purportedly to be the same money which was used to buy marijuana from her, but which she insists was her money being saved for the rentals. She was later brought to the Fiscals Office after investigation, where she signed a document. She claimed she was not assisted by any counsel during the investigation, neither during the time she signed the document at the Fiscals Office. Two informations were filed against Ramos, one for sale (Criminal Case 5991) and the other for possession of marijuana (Criminal Case 5990). After trial, the RTCOlongapo City (Branch 73) found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case 5990 for violating Section 8 of RA 6425 and sentenced her to imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day and a fine of P6,000. She was likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case 5991 for violating Section 4 of RA 6425 and was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000. Ramos sought reversal of the decisions with the Supreme Court.Issue: Whether Ramos waived her right against the warrantless search of the trash can, where illegal drugs were found, under her control.Held: The trash can (where the contraband were found) was found under the table where her legitimate wares were being sold. Ramos he was the only person who had access to the trash can. The same was under her immediate physical control. She had complete charge of the contents of the trash can under the table to the exclusion of all other persons. In law, actual possession exists when the thing is in the immediate occupancy and control of the party. But this is not to say that the law requires actual possession. In criminal law, possession necessary for conviction of the offense of possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute may be constructive as well as actual. It is only necessary that the defendant must have dominion and control over the contraband. These requirements are present in the situation described, where the prohibited drugs were found inside the trash can placed under the stall owned by Ramos. In fact, the NARCOM agents who conducted the search testified that they had to ask Ramps to stand so that they could look inside the trash can under Ramos' papag. The trash can was positioned in such a way that it was difficult for another person to use the trash can. The trash can was obviously not for use by her customers. Therefore, the twenty sticks of marijuana are admissible in evidence and the trial court's finding that Ramos is guilty of possession is correct.Veroy v. Layague [GR 95630, 18 June 1992]Facts: Leopoldo and Ma. Luisa Veroy are husband and wife residing in Davao City. When Veroy was promoted to the position of Assistant Administrator of the Social Security System sometime in June 1988, he and his family transferred to Quezon City. The care and upkeep of their residence in Davao City was left to 2 houseboys, Jimmy Favia and Eric Burgos, who had their assigned quarters at a portion of the premises. The Veroys would occasionally send money to Edna Soquilon for the salary of the said houseboys and other expenses for the upkeep of their house. While the Veroys had the keys to the interior of the house, only the key to the kitchen, where the circuit breakers were located, was entrusted to Edna Soquilon to give her access in case of an emergency. On 12 April 1990, Capt. Reynaldo Obrero of the Talomo Patrol Station, PC/INP raided Veroys house in Davao City on information that the said residence was being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with the help of the caretakers but did not enter the house since the owner was not present and they did not have a search warrant. Permission was requested by phone to Ma. Luisa Veroy who consented on the condition that the search be conducted in the presence of Major Macasaet. The following day, Capt. Obrero and Maj. Macasaet met at the Veroys house to conduct the search pursuant to the authority granted by Ma. Luisa. Capt. Obrero recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a magazine containing 7 live bullets in a black clutch bag inside an unlocked drawer in the childrens room. 3 half-full jute sacks containing printed materials of RAM-SFP were also found in the children's room. A search of the children's recreation and study area revealed a big travelling bag containing assorted clothing, a small black bag containing a book entitled "Islamic Revolution Future Path of the Nation", a road map of the Philippines, a telescope, a plastic bag containing assorted medicines and religious pamphlets was found in the master's bedroom. Inventory and receipt of seized articles were made. The case was referred for preliminary investigation to the Quezon City Assistant Prosecutor , who was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor for Davao City by the DOJ through Department Order 88 (16 May 1990). In a resolution dated 6 August 1990, the Fiscal recommended the filing of an Information against the Veroys for violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Furtherance of Rebellion). Hence, on 8 August 1990, an Information for the said offense was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City before the RTC Davao City). No bail was recommended by the prosecution. The fiscals resolution was received by theVeroys on 13 August 1990. The latter filed a motion for bail on the same day which was denied for being premature, as they have not been arrested yet. The Veroys voluntarily surrendered to Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao, but who refused to receive them o the ground that his office has not received copies of their warrants of arrest. In the meantime, on 15 August 1990, the Veroys were admitted to the St. Luke's Hospital for various ailments brought about or aggravated by the stress and anxiety caused by the filing of the criminal complaint. On 17 August 1990, Gen. Dumlao granted their request that they be allowed to be confined at the hospital and placed under guard thereat. Upon arraignment on 1 October 1990, the Veroys pleaded not guilty and filed a motion for hospital confinement, which was denied. The court ordered their commitment at the Davao City Rehabilitation Center pending trial on the merits. At the conclusion thereof, the court issued a second order denying their motion for reconsideration. The Veroys were returned to the St. Luke's Hospital where their physical condition remained erratic. Gen. Dumlao informed the Veroys that he had issued a directive for their transfer from the St. Luke's Hospital to Camp Crame on the basis of the 2 October 1990 Order. They would proceed with their transfer pursuant to the order of the trial court, unless otherwise restrained by the court. The Veroys filed the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.Issue: Whether the permission granted by ma. Luisa Veroy for ascertaining thereat the presence of alleged rebel soldiers include the authority to conduct a room to room search once inside the house.Held: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution). However, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute one. Among the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view (People v. Lo Ho Wing). The necessity of the permission obtained from Ma. Luisa underlines the recognition of Capt. Obrero of the need of a search warrant to enter the house. The permission granted by was for the purpose of ascertaining thereat the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to conduct a room to room search once inside the house. The police officers had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not. Warrantless searches were declared illegal because the officials conducting the search had every opportunity to secure a search warrant. The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal search, violative of their constitutional rights. As such, they are inadmissible in evidence in the criminal actions instituted against them. The offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the Veroys in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms. Besides, assuming that there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala prohibita, while there is no need of criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the same existed. Without the knowledge or voluntariness there is no crime.People vs. Damaso [GR 93516, 12 August 1992]Facts: On 18 June 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary officer connected with the 152nd PC Company at Lingayen, Pangasinan, and some companions were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In said place, the group apprehended Gregorio Flameniano, Berlina Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa and Deogracias Mayaoa. When interrogated, the persons apprehended revealed that there was an underground safehouse at Gracia Village in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After coordinating with the Station Commander of Urdaneta, the group proceeded to the house in Gracia Village. They found subversive documents, a radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45 firearm and other items. After the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier arrested. They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie Aritumba. She stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza/Basilio Damaso. She guided the group to the house rented by Damaso(@Mendoza). When they reached the house, the group found that it had already vacated by the occupants. Since Morados was hesitant to give the new address of Damaso (@Mendoza), the group looked for the Barangay Captain of the place and requested him to point out the new house rented by Damaso (@Mendoza). The group again required Morados to go with them. When they reached the house, the group saw Luz Tanciangco outside. They told her that they already knew that she was a member of the NPA in the area. At first, she denied it, but when she saw Morados she requested the group to go inside the house. Upon entering the house, the group, as well as the Barangay Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled "Ang Bayan," xerox copiers and a computer machine. They also found persons who were companions of Luz Tanciangco (namely, Teresita Calosa, Ricardo Calosa, Marites Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados). The group requested the persons in the house to allow them to look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw books used for subversive orientation, oneM-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, Kenwood radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro and Laguna and other items. They confiscated the articles and brought them to their headquarters for final inventory. They likewise brought the persons found in the house to the headquarters for investigation. Said persons revealed that Damaso (@Mendoza) was the lessee of the house and owned the items confiscated therefrom. Thus, Basilio Damaso, was originally charged in an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City with violation of Presidential Decree 1866 in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion, together with Luzviminda Morados y Galang @ Ka Mel, TeresitaCalosa y Macabangon @ Ka Tessie, Ricardo Calosa y Perez @ Ka Ric, Marites Calosa y Evangelista @ Ka Tess, Eric Tanciangco y Capira @ Ka Ric and Luz Tanciangco y Pencial @ Ka Luz. Such information was later amended to exclude all other persons except Damaso from the criminal charge. Upon arraignment, Damaso pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution rested its case and offered its exhibits for admission. The defense counsel interposed his objections to the admissibility of the prosecution's evidence on grounds of its being hearsay, immaterial or irrelevant and illegal for lack of a search warrant; and thereafter, manifested that he was not presenting any evidence for the accused. On 17 January 1990, the trial court rendered its decision, finding Damaso guilty beyond reasonable doubt, sentencing the latter to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs of the proceedings. Damaso appealed.Issue: Whether there was waiver on the part of Damaso to allow the warrantless search of his house.Held: Damaso was singled out as the sole violator of PD 1866, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion. There is no substantial and credible evidence to establish the fact that the appellant is allegedly the same person as the lessee of the house where the M-14 rifle and other subversive items were found or the owner of the said items. Even assuming for the sake of argument that Damaso is the lessee of the house, the case against him still will not prosper, the reason being that the law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid search and seizure proceedings. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one cannot he waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her . The records show that Damaso was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it. There is no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz Morados was indeed Damaso's helper or if it was true that she was his helper, that Damaso had given her authority to open his house in his absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an authority. Without this evidence, the authorities' intrusion into Damaso's dwelling cannot be given any color of legality. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. As a consequence, the search conducted by the authorities was illegal. It would have been different if the situation here demanded urgency which could have prompted the authorities to dispense with a search warrant. But the record is silent on this point. The fact that they came to Damaso's house at nighttime, does not grant them the license to go inside his house.People v. Omaweng [GR 99050, 2 September 1992]Issue: Whether Omaweng was subjected to search which violates his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.Held: Omaweng was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as a violation of his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. He willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle and travelling bag. The testimony of the PC Constable (Layung) was not dented on cross-examination or rebutted by Omaweng for he chose not to testify on his own behalf. Omaweng waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures when he voluntarily submitted to a search or consents to have it made in his person or premises. He is precluded from later complaining thereof right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly. Since in the course of the valid search 41 packages of drugs were found, it behooved the officers to seize the same; no warrant was necessary for such seizure.People v. Barros [GR 90640, 29 March 1994]Issue: Whether the failure of the carton bearer to object to the search made in the moving vehicle, resulting to his warrantless arrest, constitutes a waiver.Held: The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The evidence secured thereby i.e., the "fruits" of the search and seizure will be inadmissible in evidence "for any purpose in any proceeding." The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute. There are certain exceptions recognized in our law, one of which relates to the search of moving vehicles. Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles automobiles, trucks, etc. without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. In carrying out warrantless searches of moving vehicles, however, peace officers are limited to routine checks, that is, the vehicles are neither really searched nor their occupants subjected to physical or body searches, the examination of the vehicles being limited to visual inspection. When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law offender or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.People vs. dela Cruz [GR 83260, 18 April 1990]Issue: Whether the warrantless seizure incidental to the buy-bust operation violates Beltrans constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure.Held: A buy-bust operation is the method employed by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. It is essentially a form of entrapment since the peace officer neither instigates nor induces the accused to commit a crime. Entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker from whose mind the criminal intent originated. Oftentimes, it is the only effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of the offense. While it is conceded that in a buy-bust operation, there is seizure of evidence from one's person without a search warrant, needless to state a search warrant is not necessary, the search being incident to a lawful arrest. A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense. It is a matter of judicial experience that in the arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act in a buy-bust operation, the malefactors were invariably caught red handed. There being no violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure, the confiscated articles are admissible in evidence.People vs. Tangliben [GR L-63630, 6 April 1990]Issue: Whether the warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest, even in light of the Courts ruling in People vs. Aminnudin.Held: One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 12 (Search incident to a lawful arrest) of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that "A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant." Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Tangliben was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid. The Court is not unmindful of its decision in People v. Aminnudin (163 SCRA 402 [1988]). In that case the PC officers had earlier received a tip from an informer that accusedappellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. Acting on this tip, they waited for him one evening, approached him as he descended from the gangplank, detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. Said bag contained marijuana leaves. The Court held that the marijuana could not be admitted in evidence since it was seized illegally, as there was lack of urgency, and thus a search warrant can still be procured. However, herein, the case presented urgency. Although the trial court's decision did not mention it, the transcript of stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer who pointed to Tangliben as carrying marijuana. Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant. The Court cannot therefore apply the ruling in Aminnudin herein. To require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons are associated.People v. Evaristo evidence in plain view Harris v. Coolidge, Coolidge v. New Hampshire no search warrant needed; Malacat v. CA valid waiver must be made in writing and in the presence ofcounsel; search incidental to a lawful arrest v. stop and frisk Terry Case probable cause is not required to conduct stop and frisk but mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate it. A genuine reason must exist.People v. Musa [GR 96177, 27 January 1993]Issue: Whether the contents of the red plastic bag found in the kitchen may be admitted as evidence as evidence acquired incidental to a lawful arrest.Held: Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting officer to make a search upon the person of the person arrested. An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested and money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause. Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money found on the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. When the discovery of the evidence did not constitute a search, but where the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view, the warrantless seizure of the object was legal on the basis of the "plain view" doctrine and upheld the admissibility of said evidence. The "plain view" doctrine, however, may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of