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107 Transportation 7 (1978) 107-114 © Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Amsterdam - Printed in The Netherlands BOOK REVIEWS Ralph Gakenheimer, Transportation Planning As Response to Controversy: The Boston Case. Cambridge, Mass., and London, England: MIT Press, (1976), 370 pp. $16.95. Starting with the Detroit, Chicago, and Philadelphia studies in the 1950s and 1960s, a standardized procedure was developed for metropolitan transportation planning. The 1962 Highway Act made this procedure mandatory for all urbanized areas, and gradually it was formalized and embodied in computer packages. The process was highly technical and usually involved no citizen input and little public attention. It emphasized long-range, general system planning and typically produced plans for expressway corridors and -in the larger cities - major line-haul transit facilities. Meanwhile, a grass roots anti-highway movement swept the country, stimulated by protests against the social, aesthetic, and environmental impacts of urban expressways and fed by the political activism of the 1960s. Consequently, many of the highway pro- posals have never been implemented. This situation inevitably led to considerable re- vamping of the transportation planning process. The first of the new, "open" studies was the Boston Transportation Planning Review, conducted during 1971--73. This book is an analysis of the BTPR by Ralph Gakenheimer of MIT. It is a case study, but not of the usual type organized around a chronological recounting of events. Instead, he views the experience from several different perspectives -- in terms of the principal actors, the major issues, and the methodology used. He seeks to identify what was different about the BTPR and what is likely to reoccur in other studies of the new breed. The first of the book's three parts gives a capsule history of events preceding and during the BTPR. Boston had a conventional transportation study, the Eastern Massa- chusetts Regional Planning Project, which lasted from 1963 to 1968. Before the plan could be implemented, anti-highway resistance gained such political strength that in February 1970 Governor Francis Sargent declared a moratorium on highway construction in the Boston metropolitan area.* This was followed by the BTPR, which was essentially a restudy of earlier plans, with emphasis on community participation and "a search for a negotiated balanced among the competing incommensurate issues." The upshot of the restudy was a package of improvements, announced by Sargent in November 1972, that was heavily weighted in favor of transit and contained no expressways. The second part describes the major interest groups involved (pro- and anti-highway, regional and local), their positions and strategies, and the ways in which they interacted. * A fuller account of this period is given by Alan Lupo, Frank Colcord, and Edmund P. Fowler in Rites of Way: The Politics of Transportation in Boston and the U.S. City (1971). Boston: Little, Brown.

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Transportation 7 (1978) 107-114 © Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Amsterdam - Printed in The Netherlands

BOOK REVIEWS

Ralph Gakenheimer, Transportation Planning As Response to Controversy: The Boston Case. Cambridge, Mass., and London, England: MIT Press, (1976), 370 pp. $16.95.

Starting with the Detroit, Chicago, and Philadelphia studies in the 1950s and 1960s, a standardized procedure was developed for metropolitan transportation planning. The 1962 Highway Act made this procedure mandatory for all urbanized areas, and gradually it was formalized and embodied in computer packages. The process was highly technical and usually involved no citizen input and little public attention. It emphasized long-range, general system planning and typically produced plans for expressway corridors and - i n the larger cities - major line-haul transit facilities.

Meanwhile, a grass roots anti-highway movement swept the country, stimulated by protests against the social, aesthetic, and environmental impacts of urban expressways and fed by the political activism of the 1960s. Consequently, many of the highway pro- posals have never been implemented. This situation inevitably led to considerable re- vamping of the transportation planning process. The first of the new, "open" studies was the Boston Transportation Planning Review, conducted during 1971--73.

This book is an analysis of the BTPR by Ralph Gakenheimer of MIT. It is a case study, but not of the usual type organized around a chronological recounting of events. Instead, he views the experience from several different perspectives -- in terms of the principal actors, the major issues, and the methodology used. He seeks to identify what was different about the BTPR and what is likely to reoccur in other studies of the new breed.

The first of the book's three parts gives a capsule history of events preceding and during the BTPR. Boston had a conventional transportation study, the Eastern Massa- chusetts Regional Planning Project, which lasted from 1963 to 1968. Before the plan could be implemented, anti-highway resistance gained such political strength that in February 1970 Governor Francis Sargent declared a moratorium on highway construction in the Boston metropolitan area.* This was followed by the BTPR, which was essentially a restudy of earlier plans, with emphasis on community participation and "a search for a negotiated balanced among the competing incommensurate issues." The upshot of the restudy was a package of improvements, announced by Sargent in November 1972, that was heavily weighted in favor of transit and contained no expressways.

The second part describes the major interest groups involved (pro- and anti-highway, regional and local), their positions and strategies, and the ways in which they interacted.

* A fuller account of this period is given by Alan Lupo, Frank Colcord, and Edmund P. Fowler in Rites of Way: The Politics of Transportation in Boston and the U.S. City (1971). Boston: Little, Brown.

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The interest groups were strongly polarized: none was interested in compromise, and none really altered its positions during the study. The anti-highway faction was much more effective than its opponent. Not only did it have broader support and more political acumen, but it was better prepared on technical matters.

The third part concerns methodology and - after commenting on the deliberately limited effort given to land use and travel forecasting - demonstrates the heavy weight given to social and environmental impacts in the final decisions. Techniques for analyzing some of these impacts were not well developed, and the professional staff found itself venturing into areas not part of traditional transportation planning.

What was different about the BTPR, when compared to earlier transportation stud- ies? The following points stand out:

1. The planning process was largely politicized. The key body was the Working Committee, which contained representatives of all organized interest groups willing to participate on a continuing basis. Although it was nominally an advisory body, it really dictated the agenda for technical studies. It almost seems as though the lobbyists did the planning.

2. The final decisions were made by the Governor, who was always recognized as the ultimate client of the study. (On a day-to-day basis, he was represented by his Secre- tary of Transportation, Alan Altshuler.) This contrasts with the earlier practice of deci- sions by a "policy committee," usually made up of top bureaucrats from selected agen- cies.

3. There was little interest in comprehensive planning or in the regional viewpoint. The emphasis was on projects and corridors; there was far more concern with small-scale issues than in earlier transportation studies. The improvements approved by the Governor really constituted a potpourri of projects, and not a general, long-range plan.

4. Low priority was given to travel demand forecasting; only about ten percent of the staff effort went to this. The forecasting models used were relatively crude; there was no desire to be ambitious in this area. Travel time savings - the usual justification for expressways - were accorded little weight.

5. Unprecedented emphasis was placed on the external effects of proposed facilities - housing and business displacements, air pollution and noise, and damage to wildlife and the ecology of wetlands.

Unlike most books about urban transportation politics, this one is quite objective; it is not intended to promote anti-highway fervor. On the other hand, it is not very exci- ting, since it focuses on the methodology of public participation in planning and tries to develop abstractions out of concrete events. The organization is confusing, and the book seems redundant, since it tends to analyze the same events from several different viewpoints. Nevertheless, Gakenheimer offers many useful insights, and the book is clearly a valuable contribution to urban transportation planning.

Alan Black University o f Texas at Austin

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K. J. Button, The Economics of Urban Transport. Farnborough, Hampshire: Saxon House, (1977), x + 181 pp., $19.00.

The purpose of this beatifully produced book is to analyze the economic problems posed by urban transport and to outline the economic principles upon which solutions may be formulated. Case studies are provided from British cities. The basic problems dealt with include: "congestion; . . . . environmental damage; ... . access; .... the use of limited resources;" "unprofitable public transport services;" and "social considerations."

The style of the book is terse and clear, with many aspects covered. The discussion of cost-benefit analysis, parking charges, road pricing, traffic management, taxis and economies of scale in bus operation is often illuminating. The urban transport modelling process is explained, and the strengths and weaknesses of the different methodologies described, with no offers of instant remedies. The basic problem with these models is brought out: they "make no allowance for the longer term impact of transport on land usage and employment locations; these are assumed given and determined independently of the transport system."

Surprisingly little attention is given to the comparison of railway and buses on reserved routes, though the New York busway, and other references, are given. But there is no mention of the Tyneside Metro, nor of other proposed urban railway investments. Are there no lessons to be learned from them?

The subject is discussed in the light of the conventional wisdom that there has to be "considerable official intervention" because "the numerous ill-informed and uncoor- dinated decisions which would be necessary in a free market situation cannot lead to a socially optimal pattern of travel and movement." Reliance on conventional wisdom is useful insofar as it helps those who work in, and for, the public sector, to communicate in a language which the authorities understand, or at least are prepared to listen to. How- ever, it can result in dubious economics, and in the costly perpetuation of inefficiencies.

An example in the book is the treatment of public transport. The author accepts without question that "the recent decline in the real value of revenues collected by public transport operators has resulted in the need for subsidies," and does not discuss the potential for shared taxis, minibus services or any of the hundreds of self-financing unconventional public transport services that are to be found outside the UK. In the Washington DC area, for example, the citizens of Reston charter 37 buses each day to ob- tain low-cost, unsubsidized public transport. The Reston secret? Part-time drivers are em- ployed for peak-period services.

The neglect of market principles is also apparent in the discussion of the use of the revenues obtainable from road pricing. The possibilities of using surpluses to expand the road system are dismissed without adequate discussion, and the conclusion that they should be used to subsidize public transport is stated but not justified. The reader is surely entitled to know why, if full economic prices were paid for the use of roads, people should have the freedom to buy cars but be denied the freedom to "buy" road space.

The starting point of the book is that "the provision of suitable transport services, both between urban areas and within them, is . . . essential . . . [for] . . . the successful

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and continued existence of urban society." It is a pity that this theme is not pursued. What is the level of "suitable" transport services for (e.g.) London? What is the level of mobility necessary for its successful and continued existence? What are the likely conse- quences of the rationing of existing roads by congestion and the refusal to build urban motorways? Will residences and jobs continue to leave the central areas? Are European cities to go the way of New York and Detroit? These questions are not answered by Ken Button in this book - it is to be hoped that he will tackle them in his next.

The Economics of Urban Transport is not for the layman, but a useful and well- produced text for the economists, transport technologists, and urban planners who grapple with the day-to-day problems of traffic in towns, and who are interested in economic approaches to their alleviation.

G. J. Roth World Bank, Washington, DC

T. D. Heaver and James C. Nelson, Railway Pricing under Commercial Freedom: The Canadian Experience. Vancouver, Canada: Centre for Transportation Studies, University of British Columbia, (1977), xi + 344 pp., $15.00.

A rail freight pricing policy which is optimal from an economic efficiency point of view can be achieved by only accepting traffics which can cover their long run marginal costs and by ruthlessly abandoning those traffics whose rates cannot be made to cover their marginal costs. Price discrimination can then be used to maximize the railways' revenue subject to this constraint that unremunerative traffics are not carried. The discri- minating rates that the railways can charge will be limited by the effects of competition from other carriers and by the ability of shippers to compete successfully in the markets where they hope to sell their products. This policy has the advantage that, in the absence of second-best considerations, it accords with economists' notions of economic efficiency, and that it is consistent with the profit maximization objective. Railway managers there- fore have clear objectives and their incentives are not dulled by the cushion of open- ended Government subsidies. Instead, subsidies are limited to those ear-marked grants for specific unremunerative railway services which the Government believes should be provided on social grounds.

This brief sketch broadly describes rail freight pricing policy in Canada since the 1967 National Transportation Act freed CN and CP from most of the regulation of freight rates. Heaver and Nelson set themselves the task of reviewing how well this deregulation has worked in practice. They present a detailed outline of the rate-making process in Canada, which is based on rates which must- not lie below variable costs but which can be negotiated with shippers above this minimum floor. Some limited maximum rate and public-interest control of rates under section 278 of the Railway Act and section 23 of the National Transportation Act remains, and the relatively few appeals which have been made under these sections are outlined in full. Heaver and Nelson note, too, that CN and CP do not receive full compensation for losses on unprofitable passenger services, and

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that they are forced to carry some traffic at unremunerative rates, for which they do not receive compensation, as a result of the 1897 Crows Nest Pass Agreement.

On the basis of a large number of interviews with shippers and railway managers, and some 60 case studies of railway rate negotiations, Heaver and Nelson conclude that, in their judgement, de-regulation has worked well. They argue that transportation in Canada conforms with J. M. Clark's model of dynamic competition. For example, they show .cases of how even where a shipper has no alternative mode of transport available, the railways' ability to levy a high freight rate has been limited by the price which the shipper has been able to charge for his final product. In addition, truck competition may be effective for some commodities over very long distances, while CN and CP may even face competition for transcontinental traffic from sea transport via the Panama Canal. In all, Heaver and Nelson conclude that the monopoly power of the railways is limited to relatively few types of traffic, and that de-regulation, rather than strengthening this power, has led to a narrowing of the gap between railway rates and costs through compet- itive pressures.

De-regulation appears to have had other desirable effects. The negotiating procedure has led both railways and shippers to pay more attention to research on costs of alterna- tive modes and on marketing possibilities. Differential increases in rates enable the rail- ways to charge more for those traffics which require investment in new facilities, and to retain traffics which though profitable need rate cuts to counter competition from other modes. Heaver and Nelson are not sympathetic to the Prairie Provinces' belief that their regional development has been retarded by unfair rates, and they are critical of the view that rail freight rates can or should be used to further regional development objectives.

One limitation of the study is that although rates are supposed to lie above variable costs, almost nothing is said about how the railways actually carry out their costing exer- cises. This is a pity, particularly since CN and CP are said to be "at the forefront of rail- way cost ascertainment". The effectiveness of the type of pricing policy described does depend on costing procedures which ensure that all costs which are properly variable are identified and allocated to the appropriate traffic. Such an allocation exercise needs to take account of the effects of withdrawing blocks of traffic and ofinterdependencies within a complex network. For example, three trains may use a route, and the revenue from each train may cover the train running costs. But if all three trains are withdrawn then the route maintenance costs become a variable cost; does the revenue from all three trains cover these route costs as well as train running costs? If all track and signalling costs are treated as fixed, then competition from other modes in the future may lead to an erosion of the difference between revenue and variable costs, and insufficient surplus to cover the really-not-completely-fixed overhead costs.

In conclusion, Hearer and Nelson have produced a very useful study which (though it might have benefitted from some condensing and the provision of an index) will be of particular interest in those countries whose rail pricing sectors are still tangled in a web of Government intervention.

J. S. Dodgson Department of Economics, University of Liverpool

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Charles Vidich, The New York Cab Driver and His Fare. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkrnan Publishing Company, (1976), 186 pp.

Transport planners know relatively little of the history and social setting of taxicab transportation, and certainly this is one of the least studied modes of travel in the modern city. In this book, Mr. Vidich introduces us to some of the complexities of the New York City taxi industry, its historical evolution, and its present dilemmas. The author presents a picture of an unhappy industry with an unhappy history. The taxicab owner is presented as an unreasonable and ruthless businessman, seeking to extract every possible penny from his drivers while granting no rights or favors. The safety and comfort of his vehicles are of no concern to him any more than they are to the drivers, whose main activity is presented as swindling the public and the fleet owners alike. The taxicab drivers' union is presented as a dictatorship which has gained little for the drivers and has provided much income for its own executives. The regulatory authorities, consisting in earlier days of the Police Department's Hack Bureau and later of the Taxi and Limousine Commission, are depicted as corrupt and distinterested in the public welfare. The city's criminals are shown to prey continually upon the taxi drivers, and as a defense mechanism the drivers are reluctant to deliver their services to areas of the city where crimes against them are most likely to occur. An entirely new industry of unlicensed "gypsy" cabs has emerged to fill this void in service, and this has resulted in open hostility between the licensed and unlicensed fleets. Allin all, this industry's history is a sordid one, complete with gangsters, payoffs, riots and endless struggle.

The book is divided into two sections. In one, Mr. Vidich presents a portrait of the New York City taxi driver. This section is impressionistic and, while it was often colorful and interesting, I felt that the picture presented was unsupported by any substantial social science research. At times it reflected the preconceptions of the author as much as any objective reality. The other main division of the book is a social history of the entire taxi industry, going back to the turn of the twentieth century. This part of the book is more informative, more factual, more carefully written, and more precisely documented. A careful reading of the history of licensing and unionization, of labor contracts and public regulation, can lead to a great deal more insight into the potentials and problems involved in the delivery of better public service through taxicab operations in the future.

This work is poorly edited, containing an inordinate number of grammatical errors and much sloppy sentence structure. At times the author refers to 1971 as "this year," and in other chapters he refers to 1974 as "last year". In spite of such flaws, the book is unique, and the area of study is so important to transport policy, that it should be read by the many transport planners who glibly propose deregulation of the taxi industry or changes to shared-ride taxi systems as part of an overall strategy for dealing with urban mass transportation. ! completed it realizing how important the history of this industry is in coloring the potential for success or failure inherent in such proposals, and much more pessimistic about the potential for transformation. While the New York experience may not be typical of other cities around the world, there are many lessons to be learned

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from the study of this important metropolis. Certainly the New York taxicab industry is one of the seamier chapters in the long story of public transportation in America.

Martin Wachs School of Architecture & Urban Planning, University of California, Los Angeles

(Now on Sabbatical leave at the Transport Studies Unit, Oxford, England)

In addition to the books reviewed, the following publications have been received:

Transportation Policy." Regulation, Competition, and the Public" Interest, Karl M. Ruppenthal and W. T. Stanbury. University of British Colombia, Vancouver, Canada (1976).

Public Transportation and Land Use Policy, Boris S. Pushkrev and Jeffrey M. Zupan. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana and London, (1977), ix + 242 pp., £13.90.

Elements of Publicness in Urban Transit, William H. Dodge and Donald Harmatuck. Uni- versity of Wisconsin, Madison, (1977), approx. 200 pp., no price given.

MOglichkeiten rechnergestutzten Entwerfens in der Verkehrsplanung, Henning Budel- mann. Heft 22, Ver6ffentlichungen des Instituts fiir Stadtbauwesen Technische Universi- t~t Braunschweig, Postfach 3329, (1977), 121 pp., DM 20.00.

En twicklung und Anwendung integrieter Personen Verkehrsmodelle auf der Basis indivi- dueller Berhaltensmuster, Cord Weichbrodt. Heft 24, Ver6ffentlichungen des Instituts f~ir Stadtbauwesen Technische Universit~t Braunschweig, Postfach 3329, Braunschweig, (1977), 174 pp., no price given.

Isolated Communities. Digest of Transportation Social and Economic Data, Canadian Transport Commission, 275 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1A 0N9,395 pp.

Toekomstscenarios voor ons Vervoerssysteem, G. Hupkes. Kluwer, Deventer, The Nether- lands, (1977), Vol. 1:299 pp., Vol. 2:200 pp., no price given.

Taxi och Framtiden, All Ekstr6m, Transportforskningsdelegationen, Wenner-Gren Center, Sveavggen 166, 14tr, 113 46 Stockholm, Sweden, (1977), 146 pp., no price given.

Citizen Participation in Planning, Michael Fagence. Pergamon Press, Oxford, (1977), 378 pp., $17.00, £8.50 (hardback); $10.50, £5.25 (paperback).

New Zealand Transportation Models 1954-1976, M. Douglass and M. G. Smith. National Roads Board, Wellington, NZ, (1977), 178 pp., no price given.

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Urban Development Models, M. C. Forster, M. S. Rosser, G. B. Sinclair and M. A. Taylor. National Roads Board, Wellington, NZ, (1977), 123 pp., no price given.

The following reports have been received from the Transport and Road Research Labora- tory, Crowthorne, Berkshire, England, from which they, are available gratis:

An Opinion Survey of the Yorkshire Dales Rail Service in 1975, A. O. Grigg and P. G. Smith. Lab. Report 769, 3 pp.

Car Ownership Trends and Forecasts, J. C. Tanner. Lab. Report 799, 117 pp.

The Management of Urban Freight Movements." the Proceedings of a Seminar held May ,1976. Supplementary Report 309,141 pp.

Symposium on Unconventional Bus Services: Summaries of Papers and Discussions. Sup- plementary Report 336, 43 pp.