Boethius as a Paradigm of Late Ancient Thought

8/9/2019 Boethius as a Paradigm of Late Ancient Thought

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Boethius as a Paradigmof Late Ancient Thought

Herausgegeben von Thomas Böhm, Thomas Jürgaschund Andreas Kirchner


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ICBS

International Center for Boethian Studies

Freiburg i. Br.

ISBN 978-3-11-031058-0

e-ISBN 978-3-11-031075-7

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A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress.

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Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen

Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über

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Inhalt

Vorwort 7

John Magee

Boethius’s Consolatio and Plato’s Gorgias 13

Monika Asztalos

Nomen and Vocabulum in Boethius’s Theory of Predication 31

Margherita Belli

Boethius, disciple of Aristotle and master of theological method.

The term indemonstrabilis 53

Claudio Moreschini

Subsistentia according to Boethius 83

Thomas Jürgasch

Si divinae iudicium mentis habere possemus.

Zu den formalen Argumentationszielen des Boethius in den Theologischen

Traktaten und in der Consolatio Philosophiae 101

Jorge Uscatescu Barrón

Boethius’ Glückseligkeitsbegriff zwischen spätantikem Neuplatonismus

und Christentum vor dem Hintergrund einer an Gott orientierten Ethik 147

Andreas Kirchner

Die Consolatio Philosophiae und das philosophische

Denken der Gegenwart.

Was uns die Philosophia heute noch lehren kann 171

Fabio Troncarelli

Boethius from Late Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages 213

John Marenbon

Boethius’s Unparadigmatic Originality and its Implications

for Medieval Philosophy 231

Elisabeth Schneider

Naturae rationalis individua substantia.

Eine theologische oder juristische Definition der Person? 245


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Vorwort

Boethius – dieser Name ist zumeist verbunden mit der Consolatio philosophiae. Dieses

bedeutende Werk, das bis in die Gegenwart so viele Generationen von Leserinnen und

Lesern beschäftigt und begeistert hat, gilt in der Regel als eine gelungene Zusam-

menfassung populärer klassisch-antiker Gedanken. Bei aller Anerkennung, die ein

solches Lob enthält, beinhaltet diese Einschätzung doch zugleich auch eine gewisse

Abwertung, die häufig das Werk des Boethius als ganzes trifft: Wird ihm doch allzu

oft – wie übrigens auch der Spätantike insgesamt – nur eine eingeschränkte Bedeu-

tung im Sinne eines bloßen Vermittlers zwischen klassisch-griechischer Antike und

lateinischem Mittelalter zugesprochen.

Nun erweist sich eine solche reduktionistische Sicht sowohl auf das Werk des

Boethius als auch auf die Spätantike insgesamt als höchst unangemessen. Dies

lässt sich vor allem anhand eines Denkers wie Boethius aufzeigen, der manchem

schlichtweg als „der Philosoph“ gelten konnte und dessen Schriften über Jahrhun-

derte nicht nur als Grundlagenwerke jeglicher Theologie und Philosophie, sondern

auch der Mathematik und Musiktheorie dienten. Indem dieser Aspekt des boethia-

nischen Werkes in jüngerer Zeit wieder verstärkt ins Bewusstsein rückt, beginnt sich

auch die Sichtweise auf die Bedeutung des Boethius allmählich zu ändern. Mehr und

mehr lässt sich heute auch eine Wertschätzung in der Begegnung mit diesem Denker

erkennen, die über die plakativen Label „Vermittler“, „Tradent“, „Christ“ und „Philo-

soph“ hinausgeht. So gehört Boethius nach diesem sich wandelnden Verständnis zu

den herausragenden Denkern der spätantiken Geistesgeschichte. Mag diese gewan-

delte Perspektive dabei nach wie vor auch umstritten sein, bezieht sich die Tendenz

zur Neubewertung doch längst nicht mehr nur auf Boethius, sondern auch auf das

Denken seiner Zeit. Auch dieses nämlich wird zunehmend in seiner Eigenständig-

keit gewürdigt. Demnach werden Boethius wie auch die Spätantike nicht mehr nur

in ihrer Brückenfunktion als Instanzen der Vermittlung klassisch antiken Wissens in

das christliche Mittelalter angesehen; vielmehr wird ihnen in höherem Maße auch

ein eigenes Fundament und eine eigene Gedankenlandschaft zugesprochen. Worin

aber besteht die Originalität des Boethius und des durch ihn wesentlich geprägten

spätantiken Denkens des lateinischen Westens? Kann die Spätantike tatsächlich als

eine eigenständige geistesgeschichtliche Epoche betrachtet werden? Wie ist sie dann

zu charakterisieren? Inwiefern ist Boethius als eine – oder vielleicht sogar die – para-

digmatische Gestalt der Spätantike zu beschreiben?

Vor dem Hintergrund dieser und ähnlicher Fragen veranstaltete das International

Center for Boethian Studies ( ICBS) gemeinsam mit der Freiburger Graduiertenschule

Theology and Religious Studies eine Konferenz zu dem Thema „Boethius as a Para-

digm of Late Ancient Thought“. Diese fand vom 18. bis zum 20. Oktober 2012 an der

Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg statt. Neben namhaften Boethiusforscherinnen

und -forschern waren dabei auch Nachwuchswissenschaftlerinnen und -wissen-


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8 Vorwort

schaftler eingeladen, die sich in ihren Projekten der Person und dem Werk des Boe-

thius widmen. Da die teilnehmenden Forscherinnen und Forscher in einer Vielzahl

unterschiedlicher Disziplinen beheimatet sind – ein Hinweis auf die Vielschichtigkeit

der behandelten Figur –, wiesen die Vorträge und Diskussionen stark interdiszipli-

näre Züge auf, wovon auch die in diesem Band gesammelten Beiträge zeugen.

Das ICBS

Zunächst allerdings noch einige Worte zum International Center for Boethian Studies

( ICBS). Um die Forschung zu Boethius und seiner Zeit voranzubringen und umfas-

send zu fördern, wurde im Dezember 2010 in Freiburg im Breisgau das ICBS gegrün-

det. Dieses sucht seine Ziele konkret unter anderem durch die Erstellung einer kriti-

schen Edition der boethianischen Opera omnia und durch die verstärkte Vernetzung

der internationalen Boethius-Forschung zu erreichen. Gerade zu dieser Vernetzungkonnte die oben genannte Konferenz einen wichtigen Beitrag leisten, weshalb auch

für die nähere Zukunft weitere Tagungen und Workshops geplant sind.

Der vorliegende Band nun stellt ein erstes Ergebnis dieser Unternehmungen

dar. Er versammelt die Beiträge, welche im Zuge der genannten Konferenz rund um

das Thema „Boethius as a Paradigm of Late Ancient Thought“ gehalten wurden. Die

Auswahl der Zugänge der teilnehmenden Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaft-

ler, seien es bereits ausgewiesene Boethius-Expertinnen und -Experten, seien es die

Nachwuchswissenschaftlerinnen und -wissenschaftler, vermittelt dabei einen ersten

Eindruck bezüglich der offenen Forschungsfragen der verhandelten Thematik wieauch der Boethius-Forschung insgesamt.

Beiträge und Themen

Die Beiträge sind grob nach der zeitlichen Ordnung der über Boethius selbst hinaus-

greifenden behandelten Quellen geordnet. Diese reichen etwa von Platons Gorgias

über stoische und neuplatonische Texte bis hin zu den mittelalterlichen Kanonisten.

Zuerst vergleicht J M (Toronto) in seiner Studie „Boethius’s Consolatio

and Plato’s Gorgias“ Passagen der Consolatio Philosophiae mit Platons Gorgias. Er

erörtert dabei verschiedene Entsprechungen und Argumentationsmuster, stellt aber

auch wesentliche Unterschiede und Entwicklungen heraus, die sich im Text des Boe-

thius finden lassen. Damit wird eine zentrale Vorlage des Werkes weiter aufgearbeitet.

Im Mittelpunkt des Aufsatzes „ Nomen and Vocabulum in Boethius’s Theory of Pre-

dication“ von M A (Oslo) stehen zunächst die von Boethius zugrunde

gelegten Bedeutungen und Verwendungsweisen von vocabulum und nomen. Darüber

hinaus gibt der Text aber auch wichtige Einblicke in die schwierige Arbeit der Erstel-

lung einer Edition bzw. Übersetzung, indem er unter anderem aufzeigt, was alles zum


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Vorwort 9

Verständnis eines so voraussetzungsreichen philosophischen Textes wie des Katego-

rienkommentars des Boethius zu beachten ist.

M B (Cassino) untersucht in ihrem Beitrag „Boethius, Disciple of

Aristotle and Master of Theological Method. The Term indemonstrabilis“ einen wichti-

gen Aspekt der Aufnahme und Transformation der aristotelischen Logik im Werk des

Boethius. Ausgehend von Boethiusʼ Bestimmungen des Terminus indemonstrabilis

stellt der Text heraus, wie Boethius die aristotelische indemonstrabilis-Konzeption für

seinen Ansatz einer rationalen Theologie fruchtbar macht.

C M (Pisa) diskutiert in seiner Studie „Subsistentia according

to Boethius“ die Vorkommen und Bedeutungen des subsistentia-Begriffes im Werk

des Boethius sowie in anderen zeitgenössischen Schriften christlicher wie auch

nichtchristlicher Autoren. So kontextualisiert er die Verwendungsweise des Boe-

thius, eröffnet ein tieferes Verständnis für die verhandelte Thematik und leistet einen

wesentlichen Beitrag zur Interpretation dieses schwierigen Begriffs.

T J (Freiburg) beleuchtet in seinem Beitrag „Si divinae iudicium

mentis habere possemus. Zu den formalen Argumentationszielen des Boethius in den

Theologischen Traktaten und in der Consolatio Philosophiae“ die Consolatio Philoso-

phiae im Vergleich zu den Theologischen Traktaten näher. Im Mittelpunkt der Betrach-

tung stehen die von Boethius verfolgten formalen Argumentationsziele, die mit Blick

auf ihre Ausgestaltung in der Consolatio Philosophiae auf der einen Seite und in den

Theologischen Traktaten auf der anderen Seite untersucht werden. Die Betrachtung

dieser Argumentationsziele, so eine der Thesen, lässt unter anderem auch wichtige

Rückschlüsse auf Boethiusʼ theologische und philosophische Methode zu.

J U B (Freiburg) untersucht „Boethius’ Glü̈ckseligkeitsbegriff

zwischen spätantikem Neuplatonismus und Christentum vor dem Hintergrund einer

an Gott orientierten Ethik“. Er unternimmt mit kritischem Blick die feinere Verortung

des in der Consolatio entwickelten beatitudo-Begriffs. Ein besonderes Augenmerk legt

der Text dabei auf den philosophischen Kontext der Spätantike, vor dessen Hinter-

grund er die boethianische beatitudo-Konzeption genauer zu fassen sucht.

A K (Freiburg) unternimmt in seinem Aufsatz „Die Consolatio vor

dem Hintergrund der Philosophie der Gegenwart. Was uns die Philosophia heute noch

lehren kann“ den Versuch einer nicht nur neuerlichen, sondern auch neuen Lektüre

der Consolatio vor dem Hintergrund aktueller philosophischer Entwicklungen. Exem-

plarisch erörtert der Text einige „Konzepte des Raumes in der Consolatio“ und möchte

so zeigen, inwiefern auch die Texte der Philosophie der Spätantike immer wieder neu

in den Horizont der Gegenwart eingeholt werden können und müssen.

In seinem Beitrag zu „Boethius from Late Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages“

zeichnet F T (Rom) Boethiusʼ Nachleben von der Spätantike bis zur

Zeit des frühen Mittelalters nach und stellt dieses in einen geistesgeschichtlichen und

politischen Kontext. Besonders bemerkenswert sind dabei die verschiedenen „Erfin-

dungen“ (inventions) der Figur des Boethius, auf die der Text hinweist. Wie hierbei


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10 Vorwort

deutlich wird, haben diese Erfindungen eine wichtige Rolle für die Rezeptionsge-

schichte des Boethius gespielt.

Kritisch und kontrovers diskutiert J M (Cambridge) in seinem

Aufsatz „Boethius’s Unparadigmatic Originality and its Implications for Medieval

Philosophy“ die Möglichkeit, Boethius im Sinne eines Paradigmas zu fassen. Der

Autor formuliert die These, dass eine Einordnung des Boethius in eine bestimmte

Kategorie grundsätzlich nicht sinnvoll sei; er entwickelt stattdessen ein alternatives

Verständnis dessen, was „Originalität“ im Fall des Boethius und der Denker der mit-

telalterlichen Tradition überhaupt bedeuten kann.

E S (Paris) nähert sich abschließend einem berühmten

Diktum des Boethius von einer alternativen Seite, genauerhin der Rechtsgeschichte.

In ihrem Beitrag „‚ Naturae rationalis individua substantia‘. Eine theologische oder

juristische Definition der Person?“ arbeitet sie unter anderem die mittelalterliche

Rezeptions- und Transformationsgeschichte der boethianischen Bestimmung der

Person heraus und trägt so auch dazu bei, die Bedeutung des Boethius für die ihm

folgenden Epochen adäquat zu bestimmen.

Jedem Beitrag wurde eine vollständige Bibliografie der verwendeten Literatur ange-

hangen. Außerdem wurde die jeweils erste Nennung eines Titels in den Fußnoten

ebenfalls möglichst vollständig wiedergegeben.

Die Beiträge umfassen also philologische, theologische, philosophische und

geschichtswissenschaftliche wie auch rechtsgeschichtliche Spektren. Diese Vielfalt

und Breite gründet im Werk des Boethius selbst, welches damit allerdings noch nicht

angemessen eingeholt wird. In späteren Bänden werden deshalb auch noch unter

anderem musikgeschichtliche sowie mathematikgeschichtliche Abhandlungen hin-

zukommen.

Danksagung

Die Herausgeber möchten an dieser Stelle denen danken, die auf so vielfältige Weisen

zur Organisation der Konferenz und zur Erstellung dieser Publikation beigetragen

haben. Neben den Autoren seien folgende Mitwirkende besonders erwähnt: FrauMonika Fuchs hat durch ihre vorausschauende und gewissenhafte Sicht geholfen,

viele Schwierigkeiten fernzuhalten. Sie hatte damit einen wesentlichen Anteil am

Gelingen der Tagung. Die Herren Thomas Gruner und Peter Paul Morgalla haben die

Manuskripte des vorliegenden Bandes sorgfältig Korrektur gelesen und überarbeitet.

Mit großem Engagement und oftmals leisem Einsatz haben sie außerdem nach Kräften

an der Organisation der Konferenz mitgewirkt. In besonderer Weise sei hier auch dem

Verlag Walter De Gruyter, namentlich Frau Johanna Wange und Herrn Florian Rup-

penstein für die freundliche und geduldige Betreuung der Publikation sowie vor allem

auch Frau Dr. Serena Pirrotta für den intensiven Austausch und die vielen Mühen und


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Vorwort 11

ihr Entgegenkommen gedankt. Die große Bereitschaft zur vielfältigen Unterstützung

dieses Projektes und die stets kompetente und freundliche Zusammenarbeit halfen,

die Publikation trotz vielfältiger Schwierigkeiten und Verzögerungen fertigzustellen.

Freiburg im Breisgau, am 14. Juli 2014 Thomas Böhm

Thomas Jürgasch

Andreas Kirchner


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John Magee

Boethius’s Consolatio and Plato’s Gorgias

Our understanding of Boethius the Platonist is remarkably less clear than that of

Boethius the Peripatetic, owing to the fact that the precise range of Boethius’s laterPlatonic sources is difficult to ascertain from his extant writings, which include notranslation of or commentary on a Platonic dialogue.¹ Although there has been muchdiscussion of his interpretation of the Timaeus, especially as evidenced in Consola-tio III,m9², and although numerous allusions to other Platonic dialogues have beenteased out of various Boethian works, the evidence is generally rather piecemeal. Forexample, does Boethius’s reference to Plato on the rule of philosopher-kings³ indicatea direct knowledge of the Republic or is it merely echoing a commonplace? And if theformer, then how much of the Republic are we entitled to read into our interpretation

of the Consolatio or of Boethius’s Platonism generally? The most notable exceptionsto this rather sparsely populated terrain are perhaps Consolatio IV,2 and IV,4, prosesections which since Klingner have been taken to reflect direct engagement withPlato’s Gorgias. The contrast between Boethius’s use of the Timaeus and his use ofthe Gorgias seems particularly striking. For if the Timaeus serves in the context ofthe Consolatio to affirm the essential goodness of creation and to foster hope for themind’s ascent to the ordered serenity of the heavens, the Gorgias, with its pessimistic

1 Cf. John Magee: “Boethius”, in: Lloyd P. Gerson (Ed.):The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity , vol. 2, Cambridge 2010, 798–810. I would like to thank my hosts in Freiburg, especially Dr.Thomas Jürgasch, for their hospitality and the invitation to present the paper on which the presentessay is based.2 Cf. Friedrich Klingner: De Boethii consolatione philosophiae, (= Philologische Untersuchungen; 27),Berlin 1921, 38–67; Pierre Courcelle: La consolation de philosophie dans la tradition littéraire. Anté-cédents et postérité de Boèce, Paris 1967, 163–165; Pierre Courcelle: Late Latin Writers and their GreekSources, transl. by Harry E. Wedeck, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1969, 302–303; Helga Scheible: DieGedichte in der Consolatio Philosophiae des Boethius, (= Bibliothek der Klassischen Altertumswissen-

schaften; 2/n. F. 46), Heidelberg 1972, 101–112; Henry Chadwick: Boethius: The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and Philosophy , Oxford 1981, 233–235; Béatrice Bakhouche: “Boèce et le Timée”, in:Alain Galonnier (Ed.): Boèce ou la chaîne des savoirs: Actes du colloque international de la Fonda-tion Singer-Polignac, Paris, 8–12 juin 1999, (= Philosophes médiévaux; 44), Louvain/Paris 2003, 5–22;Joachim Gruber: Kommentar zu Boethius, ‚De consolatione philosophiae‘ , (= Texte und Kommentare;9), Berlin/New York 22006, 275–288. 3 Cf.Cons. I,4,5. All citations of theConsolatio are from Boethius: De consolatione philosophiae. Opus-cula theologica, ed. C. Moreschini, (= Bibliotheca Teubneriana), München/Leipzig ²2005. Internal di-visions indicate prose passages unless marked by the letter “m” (e. g. III,9,3; III,m9,3). Plato’s Gorgias is cited according to the traditional Stephanus numbers.4 Cf. (e. g.) Pierre Courcelle: La consolation de philosophie dans la tradition littéraire, 60–62. 5 Friedrich Klingner: De Boethii consolatione philosophiae, 84–88.


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14 John Magee

sense of a philosophical life desperately wagered on hopes for improved conditionshere on earth, is suggestive of much darker undercurrents within Boethius’s dialogue.It seems worth reconsidering the case of the Gorgias, and in what follows I hope toshed some light on Boethius’s understanding of that great dialogue. Did he merelycopy from it, or did he form an original interpretation? If the latter, then is it necessaryto suppose that he had a copy of the Gorgias to hand when he wrote theConsolatio, ordid he work from memory? And did he work exclusively from Plato, or did he consulta later intermediary?

1. Boethius’s Adaptation of the Gorgias

Boethius did not adapt the whole or scattered portions of Plato’s dialogue but worked

from its central panel, the Polus colloquy (461b–481b), which gives rise to the famousparadoxes. Philosophia explicitly flags them as paradoxes and treats of them in thefollowing order:1. IV,2,1–46: that the good are powerful and the wicked powerless;2. IV,4,12–21: that the wicked are happier when punished than when unpunished;3. IV,4,32–37: that those who do wrong are unhappier than those who suffer it.

The arguments of Consolatio IV,2 are driven by a distinction between what one wants(voluntas, velle) and what one is capable of ( potestas, posse), to which IV,4 then adds

the further specification of what one actually accomplishes ( perficere). Thus thefocus is neatly divided between the questions of power and its implications for moralhappiness: Is the wrongdoer happier for achieving his aims and bringing potency intoact?

The problems of evil and desert mark the essential point of intersection betweenthe Consolatio and the Gorgias. They are ubiquitous in Book I of the Consolatio butthen fade from view in Books II and III; when they emerge again at the beginning ofBook IV they develop into the Kernproblem¹ of the Consolatio. The reason for theirrecurrence is that the reductio ad unum (ad bonum) in the second half of Book III is

6 So Eric R. Dodds in Plato: Gorgias, a revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, ed. E.R.Dodds, Oxford 1959, 31.7 Cf.Cons. IV,2,33 (mirum); IV,4,3 (incredibile). 10 (mira). 12 (mirum); Plato Gorg. 467b; 473a; 480e. Inwhat follows I use “Boethius” (in quotation marks) to indicate Philosophia’s interlocutor (as opposedto the author of the Consolatio).8 Cf.Cons. IV,2,5–9; IV,4,4–5; I,4,29 (velle ... posse).9 On the distinction, see Peter King: “Boethius on the Problem of Desert”, in:Oxford Studies in Medi-eval Philosophy 1 (2013), 5–7.10 So Joachim Gruber: Kommentar zu Boethius, ‚De consolatione philosophiae‘ , 131.


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made to result in an uncompromisingly rational account of happiness, one whichappears to provide only cold comfort for the suffering of the innocent.¹¹ “Boethius” isleft feeling unsatisfied by Philosophia’s arguments in support of the Good and so atthe beginning of Book IV seeks further explanation for why innocent people suffer,implicitly framing his concern in a kind of square of opposition. Here are his words:

Sed ea ipsa est vel maxima nostri causa maeroris quod, cum rerum bonus rector exsistat, vel esse

omnino mala possint vel impunita praetereant; quod solum quanta dignum sit admiratione pro-

fecto consideras. At huic aliud maius adiungitur: nam imperante florenteque nequitia virtus non

solum praemiis caret, verum etiam sceleratorum pedibus subiecta calcatur et in locum facinorum

supplicia luit. Quae fieri in regno scientis omnia, potentis omnia, sed bona tantummodo volentis

dei, nemo satis potest nec admirari nec conqueri.¹²

The dichotomies are formed throughout in the starkest possible terms. Peopleare either good or evil,¹³ and human experience consequently divides in the samebinary manner. Philosophia has two ways of describing it. On one account peopleare either rewarded or punished, while on the other their fortunes are either prosper-ous or adverse.¹ Of course, in a just world good is never actually punished or evilrewarded, although good people may well suffer adversity and wicked ones prosper;but the point is that the suffering of the good and prosperity of the wicked are strictlyspeaking matters, not of justice, but of fortune. This becomes particularly clear atIV,7,3, wherein Philosophia, in casting a final glance¹ back at popular conceptions ofFortuna, resolves the square of opposition into a diaeresis. In the minds of ordinaryfolk, she explains, the just and providential dispensation of lots—what she sketchedout at IV,6,32–49—will be construed as a matter of mere fortune, and individualfortunes are either prosperous or adverse; if they are prosperous, then they will beseen as a matter of either just rewards (for the good) or beneficial correctives (for the

11 Cf. John Marenbon: “Rationality and Happiness: Interpreting Boethius’s Consolation of Philoso-phy”, in: Jiyuan Yu/Jorge J.E. Gracia (Eds.): Rationality and Happiness: From the Ancients to the Early Medievals, (= Rochester studies in philosophy; 4), Rochester 2003, 184–186; id.: Boethius, (= GreatMedieval Thinkers), Oxford/New York 2003, 112.

12 Cons. IV,1,3–5: “But the primary reason for my grief is precisely this, that despite the existenceof a good ruler of affairs evils either should be allowed to exist in the first place or that they shouldpass unpunished. Surely you understand the degree of wonder this fact alone is fit to arouse. But itis compounded by yet a greater one, for while wickedness dominates and flourishes virtue not onlygoes unrewarded but is actually trampled underfoot by criminals and pays the penalty for crimes thatare not its own. And no one can in proper measure wonder at or lament the fact that all of this occurswithin the kingdom of a god who is omniscient, omnipotent, and wills only the good.”13 Unlike (e. g.) Aristotle’s tragic hero (cf. Poet . 13, 1452b 34–1453a 17).14 Cf.Cons. I,4,28–30.46; I,m5,28–36; IV,5,3–6; V,3,29–32; V,6,45.15 Reluctantly, and with several disclaimers: IV,7,6–7 (“sermo communis [...] vulgi sermonibus [...] nenimium velut ab humanitatis usu recessisse videamur ”). 11–12 (“vulgus [...] populus”). 16 (“tametsi nemoaudeat confiteri”).


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16 John Magee

wicked), whereas if they are adverse they will be seen as a matter of either beneficialtesting (of the good) or just punishment (of the wicked).

Two rules tacitly governing the arguments of Consolatio IV,2 and IV,4 suggest thatBoethius seriously intended the stark antitheses of the Consolatio’s moral landscape.The first is that there will be no consideration of contrarily opposed evils or goods. Itseems noteworthy, for example, that at IV,3,18–19 Philosophia instances the lion anddeer as representative of moral defects (ferociousness and timidity) which are pre-sumably opposed to separate virtues, and that she does so without any acknowledge-ment of the mutual contrariety between the two defects themselves.¹ The fact thatin his Categories commentary Boethius takes that very point up for consideration,noting that timidity is contrary not only to a good (bravery) but to another moraldefect (rashness),¹ suggests that her silence is intentional, and it is not difficult toguess at its motivation: her aim is to reduce the plurality of goods, real and apparent,to the one transcendent Good¹ or universal object of desire, and conversely, to reduceall evils to non-being;¹ her aim, in other words, is to draw good and evil per se intothe sharpest possible relief. The second and related rule is that there will be no dis-cussion of intermediate or indifferent goods. Here too the omission would appear tobe intentional, since in the same commentary Boethius discusses mediated contrari-eties and the Stoic ἀδιάφορα in some detail.² Philosophia’s silence on this point is allthe more remarkable in that at Gorgias 467c–468e Plato himself highlights indifferentgoods, extracting from them the means/end distinction which proves so importantto Socrates’s case against Polus: Things which are neutral in themselves prove goodor bad (beneficial or harmful) only in relation to the ends they are made to serve.Philosophia for her part invokes virtually the same means/end distinction in order toexplain why people err,²¹ but she never argues with an explicit appeal to the possibil-ity of things being neither good nor bad in themselves. To put it bluntly: for her, it willbe Good against Evil, and nothing will be allowed to fall between the two. With this inmind, we may now turn to the arguments of IV,2.

16 Her only possible hint at any such distinction would appear to be at IV,6,48 (“ Nam ut probis atque

improbis nullum foedus est, ita ipsi inter se improbi nequeunt convenire”).17 Cf. Boethius: Commentarius in Categorias Aristotelis libri quatuor , ed. J.-P. Migne, (= PatrologiaLatina; 64), Paris 1847, 281B–282A.18 Cf.Cons. III,9,21; III,10,36–37; III,11,5.19 Cf.Cons. III,12,26–29, discussed below, p. 19.20 Cf. Boethius In cat ., ed. J.-P. Migne, (= PL; 64), 267A–269A; Boethius: De divisione liber , ed. J.-P.Migne, (= Patrologia Latina; 64), Paris 1847, 884A; also Boethius: De divisione liber , critical edition,translation, prolegomena, and commentary, ed. J. Magee, (= Philosophia Antiqua; 77), Leiden/Bos-ton 1998, 28,3–4. On the background from Aristotle to Boethius, see Jorge Uscatescu Barrón: “ZurGeschichte der Entgegensetzung des Guten und des Schlechten”, in: Perspektiven der Philosophie 31(2005), 239–263.21 Cf.Cons. III,10,38–40.


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a) IV,2,1–46: First Paradox. That the Good are Powerful and theWicked Powerless ( Gorg. 466b–468e)

Plato’s argument is roughly as follows: Actions are undertaken only as means towhat is presumed good for their agents; hence what people wish for in choosing theircourses of action is the good; but the courses of action are, as neutral (μεταξύ) meansto an end, neither good nor bad (οὔτε ἀγαθòν οὔτε κακόν) in themselves, and thoseactions the results of which are not in fact good therefore do not reflect the will (ἃβούλονται) of their agents, although the latter may think them good (ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖςβέλτιστα εἶναι); thus the tyrant who commits an unjust murder does what he believesto be good but does not do what he wishes; but anyone who does not do what hewishes is powerless (to do as he wishes). In Consolatio IV,2 this paradox takes theform of an established proposition—that the good are powerful and the wicked pow-erless (bonos quidem potentes, malos vero imbecilles esse)—which in good scholasticfashion is first laid out as the demonstrandum (2) then punctuates each of the sup-porting arguments in the manner of a “Q.E.D.” (15.24.42.45). The mode of argumenta-tion is described by Philosophia as a kind of διάλληλος δεῖξις ( demonstratio alteriusex altero), which comports with the emphasis on unmediated contrarieties that hasbeen noted above: proof that the good are powerful will eo ipso amount to proof thatthe evil are powerless, and vice versa—no possibility will be left open for anythingbetween the two. As Philosophia says:

Primum igitur [...] bonis semper adesse potentiam, malos cunctis viribus esse desertos agnoscas

licebit, quorum quidem alterum demonstratur ex altero. Nam cum bonum malumque contraria ²² sint, si bonum potens esse constiterit, liquet imbecillitas mali, at si fragilitas clarescat mali, boni

firmitas nota est. Sed uti nostrae sententiae fides abundantior sit, alterutro calle procedam nunc

hinc nunc inde proposita confirmans.²³

She then proceeds to offer four arguments in support of the proposition.

First Argument, from Natural Intention, or the End (IV,2,10–16)

The first is based on conclusions which have been established in Book III, and itfocuses on the notions of natural intention and the good qua universal end:

– All human intention is naturally directed toward obtaining happiness;²

22 Cf.Cons. IV,3,11 (“adversa fronte [...] contraria parte”).23 Cons. IV,2,2–4: “Well then [...] my first task will be to help you see that good people are always inpossession of power and evil ones bereft of it; and indeed, one of the propositions is demonstrablefrom the other. For since good and evil are contraries, once it is established that the good is powerfulthe weakness of evil is revealed, while once the fragility of evil becomes clear the strength of the goodis made known. But in order that this doctrine of mine may carry greater conviction, I will proceedalong both paths, confirming the propositions in both directions.”24 Cf.Cons. III,2,2.


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– but happiness is the good;² – therefore all human intention is naturally directed toward obtaining the good.²

– But to obtain the good is to become good;² – thus those who are good have [by definition] obtained the good, whereas those

who are wicked [by definition] have not; – therefore the good are powerful and the wicked powerless.

The argument evidently assumes some connection between power (powerlessness)and success (failure) in obtaining the good; we shall return to this point presently.Klingner maintained that it is the same as the argument employed by Socrates atGorgias 466b–468a², which essentially states that an act of will, in order to be such,must result in what is good or beneficial for the agent, but that since unjust acts arenot good or beneficial for their agents, they therefore cannot reflect their will. There isindeed a superficial similarity between the two arguments insofar as each supposes(implicitly, in the case of the Consolatio) the failure of a particular condition to obtainvis-à-vis the good or the acquisition thereof. Otherwise, however, they cut very differ-ent trajectories, and at the core of Plato’s are distinctions which play no role at all inthe Consolatio. Thus Socrates reduces Polus to a state of confusion by playing off ofthe different senses of αἴσχιον and κάκιον (474c), Callicles eventually retorting that,although doing wrong may be fouler by convention (κατὰ νόμον αἴσχιον), it is nottherefore worse by nature (κατὰ ϕύσιν κάκιον, 482d–483d). Neither point is raised byPhilosophia, for the obvious reason that her interlocutor “Boethius” has no share inthe cynicism of Plato’s Polus or Callicles; indeed, the whole of his public life, as hehimself pointed out in I,4, was motivated by the desire to do what was just and rightrather than what was merely socially acceptable. The most significant departure,however, is in Philosophia’s assuming a point crucially at issue in the Gorgias, i. e.that all human endeavor is directed toward the good. There are two reasons for this:The point had already been established by III,11,38, and “Boethius”, unlike Polus, isobviously not poised to challenge such an assumption. A significant part of Boethi-us’s divergence from the Gorgias, in other words, stems from the radically differentmise-en-scène of theConsolatio: Philosophia, unlike Plato’s Socrates, is preaching tothe congregation, stimulating the recollection of truths which “Boethius” has tempo-rarily forgotten.

Second Argument, from Natural Function, or Means (IV,2,17–25)

The second argument is closely related to the first but shifts the focus onto the notionof natural function, or the means by which various ends are attained:

25 Cf.Cons. III,2,19–20.26 Cf.Cons. III,10,36–37; III,11,38.27 Cf.Cons. III,10,23–25; and to opposite effect, IV,3,11–21.28 Cf. Friedrich Klingner: De Boethii consolatione, 85 (the referencing is obscure).


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– Those who employ things in accordance with their natural function are morepowerful than those who do not.

– The natural function of the virtues (employed by the good) is to obtain the good;– but the wicked do not obtain the good;– therefore the good are powerful and the wicked powerless.

The premiss tacitly assumed in the first argument surfaces, bringing matters dan-gerously close to petitio principii insofar as some direct relationship between power(powerlessness) and success (failure) in obtaining the good—what Philosophia essen-tially takes for granted here—was precisely the point at issue with the general demon-strandum of Consolatio IV,2. The argument is perhaps saved to some degree by thefact that the notion of natural function (naturale officium) is made to serve as a kindof middle term: those who employ the virtues in accordance with their natural func-tion (of obtaining the good) are powerful; but the good employ the virtues in accord-ance with their natural function; therefore the good are powerful. Still, Philosophia’sconclusion is indefensible at least to the extent that what followed was, not that thewicked are powerless (imbecilles, 24), but that they are less powerful (cf.valentior , 22)than the good; but this change comports with her insistence on pushing the argumentto extremes, making an all-or-nothing proposition of the swing between good andevil, power and powerlessness, etc. And as in her first argument, so here too Philoso-phia essentially assumes one of the points at issue in the Gorgias, in this case that thenatural function of the virtues is to lead to the good. Being confronted by no Polusto taunt her with harboring a hidden lust for power and by no Callicles to insist thatmight alone is sanctioned by nature,² she is left instead to develop a line of argumentwhich originates in III,11,14–38: every natural intention (naturalis intentio, cf. IV,2,26)amounts to a relentless and irresistible impulse toward the good. Philosophia is notrecycling an argument from the Gorgias.

Third Argument, from the Non-Being of Evil (IV,2,32–42)

At III,10,22–25 Philosophia posited as a corollary to the proposition that supreme hap-piness is supreme divinity the observation that human beings are actually divinizedby participation in supreme happiness. Shortly thereafter, she proceeded to reduce

evil to a state of complete non-being, as follows (III,12,26–29):– God is omnipotent, and the omnipotent is incapable of nothing;– but God is incapable of evil;– therefore evil is nothing.

She now turns the earlier conclusion to opposite effect, in a bipartite argument thefirst part of which is in three steps (IV,2,37–39):

29 Cf. PlatoGorg . 468e; 482d–484c.


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– The wicked are capable of evil ( possunt mala); – but evil is nothing (malum nihil est ); – therefore the wicked are capable of nothing (nihil posse improbos liquet ).

This is essentially sound: every A (improbus) is capable of B (malum); but B is C (nihil);therefore every A is capable of C. There is of course an element of ambiguity in the dis-tinction between the capacity for and the non-being of evil, but then one of the goalsof this part of IV,2 is to demonstrate, not simply that the wicked are powerless, butthat they absolutely are-not (32–36), and in playing thus on the equivocity of “esse”³ Philosophia is anticipating IV,3,15–21 (cf. IV,4,1), wherein the wicked are describedas ceasing to be human despite retaining human form. One senses a verbal sleightof hand in what appears to be a tacit concession to some common-sense view to theeffect that the wicked in fact wield power, for Philosophia describes what they do,whether it be malum ornihil, as a potentia and possibilitas (37.39–40). And when sheconsigns the wicked themselves to a state of non-being we are left to wonder what thiswhole argument is really meant to explain. Are we to infer, for example, that if theiracts are ultimately nothing then the suffering which the wicked inflict is nothing aswell? This ought to be a point of some concern, given that at Gorgias 476b–d Socratesurges a similar interconnection of correlates: if an agent’s action is of a particularquality, then the patient’s being acted upon will be of precisely the same quality, andvice versa. But no such thought is developed by Philosophia, whose view is probablysummed up best by her assertion that there is no suffering “but thinking makes itso”³¹. The second part of her argument then follows (IV,2,40–42):– The highest Good is omnipotent but incapable of evil;

– human beings are not omnipotent but are capable of evil; – therefore that which is capable of evil is less powerful [than that which is inca-

pable of it].

Philosophia has just specified that the wicked are capable only (tantummodo, 39)of evil and here indicates that the omnipotent is capable only (tantummodo, 42) ofgood, as though she were driving toward the conclusion that the wicked are com-pletely powerless, as in the first part of the argument. Instead, however, she arrives atthe comparative formulation, “less powerful” (minus posse, 42), evidently targetingthereby the human race as a whole rather than those alone who are wicked; but herconclusion is weak, for the demonstrandum was that the wicked are powerless, notthat humanity as a whole is less than omnipotent. This third argument, like thosebefore it, develops quite independently of anything in the Gorgias.

30 Cf. John Marenbon: Boethius, 116. 31 Cf.Cons. II,4,18 (“ Adeo nihil est miserum nisi cum putes, contraque beata sors omnis est aequanimi-tate tolerantis”); IV,7,2 (“Omnem, inquit, bonam prorsus esse fortunam”).


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Fourth Argument, that the Capacity for Evil is not a Power (IV,2,43–44)

Philosophia proceeds finally to demonstrate that the capacity for evil is not a power: – Every power ( potentia) is counted among the objects of desire (expetenda),

which are directed toward the good³² (referri ad bonum); – but since the capacity to commit evil ( patrandi sceleris possibilitas) is not direc-

ted toward the good, it does not count as an object of desire; – therefore the capacity to commit evil is not a power.

This too is essentially sound: If all B ( potentia) belongs to C (expetenda quae adbonum referuntur ) but no A ( patrandi sceleris possibilitas) belongs to C, then no A is B.Philosophia once again assumes a point crucially at issue in the Gorgias, since a Polusor Callicles would presumably reject out of hand the claim that the capacity for evildoes not count as an object of desire.³³ And unless the term “ possibilitas” (44) is beingused as a bizarre proxy for “impotentia”³, this argument, like the third, must dependon some common-sense view to the effect that the wicked in fact wield some form ofpower. As with the previous three arguments, so this one develops independently ofanything in the Gorgias.

IV,2 then builds to one of the most carefully orchestrated conclusions of any inthe Consolatio, bringing Plato into view as under a sudden flash of light. Philosophiaspeaks:

Ex quibus omnibus bonorum quidem potentia, malorum vero minime dubitabilis apparet infir-

mitas veramque illam Platonis esse sententiam liquet, solos quod desiderent facere posse sapien-

tes, improbos vero exercere quidem quod libeat, quod vero desiderent explere non posse. Faciuntenim quaelibet, dum per ea quibus delectantur id bonum quod desiderant se adepturos putant; sed

minime adipiscuntur, quoniam ad beatitudinem probra non veniunt .³

Readers familiar with the Gorgias will readily detect the echoes of 466d–467b: exer-cere quod libeat [...] faciunt quaelibet ~ ποιεῖν ὅτι ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι;quoddesiderent facere (explere) ~ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλονται. They will also note, however, thatwith these echoes Boethius is signalling to his readers a philosophical point whichhas not been picked up inConsolatio IV,2—is signalling, in other words, that he has

32 Qua final cause (cf. III,10,36–40). 33 E. g. PlatoGorg . 466c; 469c; 491e–492c. 34 Note a similar terminological imprecision at IV,4,4 (voluisse prava). 35 Cons. IV,2,45–46: “From all of the above the power of good people and the unquestionable weak-ness of evil ones is made manifest, and the truth of Plato’s doctrine is revealed: that the wise alonehave the power to do what they wish, whereas the wicked may well do what they please but arepowerless to achieve what they wish. For they do what they please while supposing that by meansof their pleasures they will obtain the good they wish for, but they fail altogether to obtain it, sincewickedness does not arrive at happiness.”


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devised new arguments in support of the celebrated Platonic dictum, argumentswhich have been carefully tailored to the internal requirements of the Consolatio.Boethius had the Gorgias firmly in mind here, but he was not mechanically copyingfrom it as from a “source”.

With Consolatio IV,4, the focus shifts to the question of happiness, and Philoso-phia pursues two further paradoxes drawn from the Gorgias.

b) IV,4,12–21: Second Paradox. That the Wicked are Happierwhen Punished than when Unpunished ( Gorg. 472d–473e;476a–479d)

After IV,3 which, as noted, looks back to III,12 and the third argument of IV,2, Philoso-phia returns to the Gorgias. The ostensible point of thematic continuity is the ques-tion of what the wicked themselves suffer for succeeding in their aims (IV,4,2), whichthen summons up the next Socratic paradox. Philosophia approaches it as follows:– The good are happy and the wicked unhappy;³

– the unhappy become happier [less unhappy] by the addition of some good butunhappier by the addition of some evil;

– it is just for the wicked to be punished but unjust for them to be unpunished; – but the just is good and the unjust evil; – therefore the wicked acquire some good when punished but some evil when

unpunished;– therefore the wicked are unhappier when unpunished than when punished.

Plato’s handling of the theme at Gorgias 476a–477e is very different from whatBoethius offers here. For Plato has Socrates argue that if something acts then some-thing else is acted upon, and that as the one acts so the other is acted upon; thus ifsomeone punishes then someone else is punished, and if the punishment is just thenthe being punished is just as well; but that which is just is morally fair, and that whichis morally fair is good or beneficial; therefore just punishment is good or beneficialfor those who are punished. Socrates then points out that the benefit of being pun-ished is precisely that it lessens the greatest of evils, i. e. those which affect the soul.Philosophia essentially disregards the first part of the Socratic argument³ but subtlyreworks its last part for her second premiss, that the unhappy become more or lessunhappy by the addition of some evil or good, and her perspective is, as Marenbonremarks, rather “hard to make much sense of in moral terms”, adding up as it does

36 Cf.Cons. IV,1,7; IV,3,1.12; PlatoGorg. 470e. 37 Note in particular her reduction of the δίκαιον = καλόν = ἀγαθόν transitivity (cf. PlatoGorg. 476e–477a) to iustum =bonum (cf.Cons. IV,4,19).


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goods and evils as “in a board game”³. Another change to the Socratic argument iseffected by her third premiss, that it is just for the wicked to be punished and unjustfor them not to be, which her interlocutor “Boethius” readily accepts (Quis id neget?;IV,4,18) but Plato’s Polus concedes only under duress. Thus the situation here is con-sistent with what has been observed in connection with the arguments of IV,2, thedifference between Boethius’s and Plato’s treatments coming down to one of theirrespective dramatic settings. “Boethius” grants what Socrates is at pains to demon-strate in the Gorgias precisely because of the particular lot he (“Boethius”) represents,which is that of an unjustly wronged victim.

c) IV,4,32–37: Third Paradox. That Those who do Wrong areUnhappier than Those who Suffer it ( Gorg. 469b–c, 474b–475e)

– Every wicked individual is deserving of punishment; – but wicked individuals are unhappy;³ – therefore [every] individual deserving of punishment is unhappy. – The perpetrator rather than victim is deserving of punishment; – therefore the perpetrator is unhappier than the victim.

The first part builds on the preceding argument but serves in context to link meritedpunishment and unhappiness as common attributes of wickness; the second partthen targets degrees of unhappiness, and from what ought stricto sensu to have beenthe conclusion—that the perpetrator rather than victim is unhappy—Philosophiaextracts the point that the perpetrator is unhappier (miserior , 36) than the victim. Butit is presumably not her intention here to argue against the possibility of the victimsuffering any unhappiness at all, and her conclusion may be designed to align withthe comparative expressions (μᾶλλον … ἢ) employed by Socrates at Gorgias 474b and475e. In the event, her argument differs toto caelo from its Socratic counterpart. Plato’sSocrates attacks the contradiction inherent in Polus’s maintaining that, althoughdoing wrong is less honourable (αἴσχιον) than suffering it, suffering wrong is never-theless worse (κάκιον) than doing it. For the honourable is pleasant, beneficial, orboth, such that if doing wrong is less honourable than suffering it, then it is becauseit is less pleasant, less beneficial, or both; but since it is not less pleasant, it must beless beneficial; and if it is less beneficial, then it is worse. Philosophia’s approachappears cut-and-dried by comparison: She lines up the premises and draws her con-clusion, with “Boethius” endorsing each step on cue. For her the transparency of the

38 John Marenbon: “Rationality and Happiness”, 187. 39 For the first two premises, cf.Cons. IV,4,15 (with IV,3,1.12) and 18.40 Although note the observation above, p. 20, with n. 31.


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argument is crucial, and as a result one of the most fascinating aspects of theGorgias,the psychological interplay between its interlocutors, is lost. Boethius will howevermake one effort to preserve some small element of the latter, in the conclusion to IV,4.

d) IV,4,38–41: Socratic Irony?

Philosophia attempts finally to imitate the comic irony with which the Polus colloquyof the Gorgias is brought to a conclusion (480a–481b). She makes two main claims,that the lawyers (oratores) seek to arouse pity (miseratio) for victims when they shouldinstead be advocating mercy (miseratio) for perpetrators, who should be brought tojustice as to medical therapy (38), and that the wicked themselves should surrenderto their accusers and judges (40). That is more or less in keeping with Plato, althoughwe note Philosophia’s attempt at her own minor note of irony in the remark that truly

just conditions, should they ever obtain, would either drive the public defenders towork for the district attorney’s office or simply drive them out of work altogether (39).More importantly, however, Boethius suppresses Plato’s final note of irony, whereinSocrates is made to recommend that rhetoric be employed actually to prevent wrong-doers from being brought to justice (481a). The latter is what brings the dramaticintensity of the Polus colloquy to a head: Polus collapses under the weight of his con-cession that doing wrong is less honorable than suffering it (474c) as Gorgias beforehim collapsed under his concession that the rhetorician knows and will teach thegood (460a); at that point Callicles can no longer contain himself, and he, unlike

Gorgias and Polus, will be hunting much bigger game: not rhetoric, but philosophyitself (481d–484c). The Polus colloquy, in other words, had to end on a note of pointedabsurdity if Callicles was finally going to pounce. The Consolatio, of course, has abso-lutely no room for a Callicles—Philosophia is there to instruct and console her inter-locutor, not to defend herself against him¹—and the omission is telling: Boethius wasin no mood to joke about any possible use of oratory to get criminals off the hook.

The adaptation ultimately falls flat. The topic of orators arises without due prepa-ration (38), and we are implicitly invited to form some puzzling comparisons acrossthe pairs of interlocutors, “Boethius” and Polus in particular. The strain on the liter-

ary conceit of a Platonic dialogue is perhaps felt more acutely here than anywhere elsein the Consolatio, and we are left to wonder whether Boethius might not to have donebetter to bring IV,4 to an end in some other way. This closing passage does howeverfurnish one useful insight insofar as it reveals Boethius’s determination to shoe-hornsome version of the conclusion to the Polus colloquy in even at the risk of undercut-ting the integrity of his own literary artifice.

41 Cf.Cons. I,3,4–6.


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2. Conclusion

Boethius set for himself the task of incorporting the Platonic paradoxes withoutthereby violating the philosophical aims of his own work or pitting his interlocu-tors against one another in the manner of a Polus and Socrates. He strove, in otherwords, to think and write as a Platonist . Although his Philosophia can be said to rep-resent certain broadly Socratic positions, she is in the end no Socrates and managesto imitate his unique form of argumentation and irony only with a noticeable degreeof stiff artificiality. Similarly, “Boethius” and Polus. There was no place for the latter’saggressive impetuousness in the Consolatio, whose interlocutors stand in the rela-tionship of magistra toalumnus² and who in general lack the psychological complex-ity of Plato’s characters. If Consolatio IV,2 were to be given a title of its own, it wouldpresumably have to be something like, “Four Proofs in Support of the Propositionthat the Good are Powerful and the Wicked Powerless, Without Regard to ArgumentsMounted in Plato’s Gorgias”. For there is, as we have seen, an air of scholasticism tothe whole of IV,2, as also to IV,4, and one inevitable consequence of Philosophia’sassuming so much of what Socrates is compelled to demonstrate in the Gorgias is thather interlocutor “Boethius” is reduced to a kind of yes-man for much of the discus-sion.

Of course, many centuries had elapsed between Plato and Boethius, and the lit-erary genre of the philosophical dialogue had evolved in the meantime. Cicero hademployed it, identifying its two main types³ and creating interlocutors who by com-parison with Plato’s tend to sound like stiff school teachers or mouthpieces for estab-lished doctrines. Augustine too had employed it, in both the Cassiciacum dialoguesand the Soliloquia, that most intimate of all dialogues. The pitfalls of the literary formwere there for Boethius to see. The pretence of an expository dialogue in Dexippus’sCategories commentary was patently brittle and artificial—Porphyry showed goodsense in opting instead for the disembodied question-and-answer approach—andalthough Boethius himself had once tried his hand at the genre, he clearly found itunsatisfying. There was for Boethius no real possibility of returning directly to Plato,but Augustine’s Soliloquia had suggested an alternative which might at least be saidto be in the spirit of Plato: philosophy as a form of inner dialogue. And if the latter

42 Cf.Cons. I,3,2–4; III,9,28; III,11,40.43 Cf. Marcus Tullius Cicero: Epistulae ad Atticum XIII,19,4, ed. D.R. Shackleton Bailey, (= BibliothecaTeubneriana), Stutgardiae 1987, 529 (the traditions of Heraclides and Aristotle).44 Cf. Jonathan Barnes: “Boethius and the Study of Logic”, in: Margaret T. Gibson (Ed.): Boethius: His Life, Thought and Influence, Oxford 1981, 78; John Magee: “On the Composition and Sources ofBoethius’s Second Peri Hermeneias Commentary”, in:Vivarium 48 (2010), 12, with n. 24.45 Cf. AugustineSolil. I,1,1 (Augustine: Soliloqui. Testo latino a fronte, ed. O. Grassi, (= Bompiani testia fronte; 53), Milano 2002) (“ait mihi subito sive ego ipse sive alius quis, extrinsecus sive intrinsecus,nescio”); Plato Theaet . 189e–190a.


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undermined the conceit of a more spontaneous or mimetic genre, it neverthelessoffered compensation in the form of a stricter economy of means: arguments could beheaped up with an eye to maintaining the internal unity of the literary organism.

To return briefly to a question intimated earlier, that of the Gorgias as Boethius’ssource. Klingner’s view may summed up as follows: Far from merely excerpting indi-vidual points of doctrine from the Gorgias, Boethius selected the whole of the Poluscolloquy to work from, going so far as to target its conclusion as a kind of peroratio forhis own prose section, IV,4. Moreover, he preserved Plato’s broader structure, treatingfirst of power and then of happiness, while incorporating later Platonic themes suchas the non-being of evil. In short, the Gorgias—whether a physical exemplar or mererecollection thereof, Klingner did not specify—was constantly before Boethius as hepenned the first half of Consolatio IV. And Courcelle’s refinement of Klingner mayin turn be summed up as follows: Boethius’s adaptation of the Gorgias is overlaidwith certain Neoplatonic elements, as Klingner observed. Of the four known ancientcommentaries on the Gorgias, those of Eubulus, Hierocles, Ammonius, and Olympio-dorus, only Olympiodorus’s is extant, which however may be assumed to preservetraces of the lost commentary of Olympiodorus’s teacher Ammonius. Hence, the Neo-platonic elements—or indeed the whole—of Consolatio IV,2 and IV,4 in all probabilityderive from Ammonius’s lost commentary.

Courcelle’s analysis in particular is riddled with problems. Above all, it isover-determined by a desire to prove that Boethius studied under Ammonius inAlexandria, an aim which left Courcelle more or less blind to other possibilities,such as that Boethius and Ammonius drew from a common source rather than onefrom the other, that other sources of which we have no direct knowledge may havebeen in play, and so on. In addition, Courcelle often misinterpreted the evidence,and his argument to the effect that Boethius relied upon Ammonius’s Gorgias com-mentary is a case in point. For example, he explained Consolatio IV,4,22–23, whereinPhilosophia declines to discuss the punishments that await after death, on theassumption that Boethius was “plagiarizing rather awkwardly from a Neoplatonic[sc. Ammonius’s] commentary on the Gorgias”, since “[i]n the same place”, i. e. in hiscommentary on Gorgias 480b 2 (καὶ ἀνίατον)¹, Olympiodorus postpones discussion

46 Cf.Cons. IV,2,26.47 Cf.Cons. III,12,38; V,4,13.48 Above, p. 13, n. 5.49 Pierre Courcelle: La consolation de philosophie dans la tradition littéraire, 173–175; id.: Late LatinWriters, 307–308; in the former (174: “Boèce ne suit pas directement Platon”) apparently restrictingBoethius’s source to Ammonius’s commentary, but in the latter possibly assuming direct use also ofthe Gorgias (307, n. 77: “Boethius’s exposition follows step by step the argumentation of theGorgias”). 50 Pierre Courcelle: Late Latin Writers and their Greek Sources, 316–318. 51 Cf. Olympiodorus: In Platonis Gorgiam commentaria XXIV,5, ed. W. Norvin, (= Bibliotheca Teubne-riana), Lipsiae 1936, 119,24–120,1.


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of punishment in the underworld to his elucidation of the closing myth of the Gor- gias.² This, however, misses the point entirely insofar as Boethius and Olympiodoruscan be said to be “in the same place” only on the assumption that Consolatio IV,4 waswritten—or on Courcelle’s interpretation, copied—as some form of commentary on theGorgias, which, as we have seen, is quite impossible. Olympiodorus postpones thediscussion precisely because it falls to him as commentator to point out the subject’srelevance to the eschatological myth at the end of the Gorgias, whereas Philosophiais made to sidestep the question because an eschatological myth formed no part atall of Boethius’s plan for the Consolatio.³ What he has Philosophia offer in its placeare speculations on why good and wicked people either prosper or suffer in thislife (IV,6,32–49). Neoplatonic echoes undoubtedly abound in theConsolatio, Book IVincluded, but to invoke Ammonius’s lost Gorgias commentary as a kind of hermeneu-tical deus ex machina in this way seems a stubborn failure to see Boethius’s literaryand philosophical masterpiece for what it really is.

Finally, did Boethius have access to a copy of the Gorgias to hand when he wrotethe Consolatio or was he working from memory? The question is ultimately unan-swerable—haecine est bibliotheca? (I,4,3)—, although we are not completely lackingin evidence to consider and the concern is one of intrinsic interest. To begin withthe three paradoxes. The form of expression in which each is cast suggests a ratherrigid reduction of or abstraction from Plato’s much more fluid idiom. That is perhapsunsurprising given the great antiquity of the Platonic tradition by Boethius’s day, andwe have noted in particular the scholastic manner in which he has Philosophia lay outand then prove her demonstranda, carefully working her way back in the case of thefirst paradox to Plato himself (IV,2,45–46), her undisputed philosophical authority.We have further observed that Boethius follows the general arrangement of the Poluscolloquy in assigning the treatment of power to Consolatio IV,2 and that of happi-ness to IV,4. This much, at any rate, could easily have been done from memory, i. e.without there being a copy of the Gorgias to hand, especially since the individualarguments marshalled in support of the three central philosophical theses are soobviously designed to meet the internal requirements of the Consolatio itself. Severaldetails suggest, however, that Boethius may indeed have consulted a copy of theGorgias as he wrote. The first occurs at IV,2,45–46, which, as we have seen, virtuallyquotes from Gorgias 466d–467b but without picking up on the particular aspect of

52 Pierre Courcelle: Late Latin Writers and their Greek Sources, 308; cf. id.: La consolation de philosophie dans la tradition littéraire, 175. 53 Cf. John Magee: “The Good and Morality: Consolatio 2–4”, in: John Marenbon (Ed.): The Cam-bridge Companion to Boethius, Cambridge 2009, 181–206, at 194–195; id.: “Boethius”, 807; Peter King:“Boethius on the Problem of Desert”, 10–13. 54 Followed by a cautionary note on the inscrutability of divine providence (cf. IV,6,53–54; 32: “ pauca,quae ratio valet humana”).


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28 John Magee

Plato’s argument which is thereby targeted. Similarly, we have noted that a premissarticulated by Philosophia at IV,4,16–17, that those who are unhappy are made lessso by the addition of some good but more so by the addition of some evil, reworksa detail from Gorgias 477a–e on the remedial effects of punishment, or acquiringrelief from (vs. compounding) evil. Finally, we have remarked on Boethius’s brittleattempt to ensure that Consolatio IV,4, like the Polus colloquy, should end on a noteof comic irony. These points suggest that Boethius may have had his eye on Plato’stext, although they do not amount to stringent proof that he did. As to the questionof later intermediaries, there is again no possibility of decisive proof. The Consolatio obviously distills a considerable amount from various later Platonic traditions, butmuch work remains to be done before Boethius’s later Platonic sources can be identi-fied with any certainty.

55 Above, p. 21–22. 56 Above, p. 22–23. 57 Above, p. 24.


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Monika Asztalos

Nomen and Vocabulum in Boethius’s Theoryof Predication

Anyone who tries to make sense of Boethius’s commentary on Aristotle’s Categories

will be intrigued by his use of the terms nomen and uocabulum. Sometimes it is clear

that he cannot be using the terms to refer to names (in our sense of the word) and

words, but then how does he use them? They may appear to be interchangeable,¹ but

there is a difference in how Boethius uses these terms, and it is important to estab-

lish what the difference is, given that they are essential in Boethius’s theory of pre-

dication. Then there is a cluster of verbs—uocare, nominare, nuncupare—which are

clearly connected with uocabulum and nomen, but how? The purpose of this paper

is to present Boethius’s thoughts on predication by exploring the way he uses these

key terms.

I will be quoting extensively from my own forthcoming edition of Boethius’s com-

mentary on the Categories. I have not given references to the text printed in Migne’s

Patrologia Latina vol. 64 but have specified which lines in Aristotle’s text the passages

quoted comment on. This will make it fairly easy for readers to find the appropriate

places in the Migne edition. All translations are my own.

In Boethius’s commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, nomina and uocabula are

couched in a theory involving also res, uox , significare, significatio, and designare.

These are main protagonists in Boethius’s commentaries on the De interpretatione, a

work in which nomina and uocabula take the back seat.

The Categories discusses how ten kinds of information are communicated in

answer to questions about objects of inquiry. The method of questions and answers

about objects of inquiry that are present, or somehow made present, both to the

person asking and to the one replying is introduced in the Topics (Book I, chapters

4–9) and put to use in the Categories.

Aristotle uses the verb ἀποδίδωμι for what the person answering a question

does. This is a key term in the Categories. Its first occurrence in that work is at 1a 4–6:

‘For if someone were to assign what it is for each of them [man and image] to be an

animal², he will assign to each its own account’. When Boethius translates this verb

in the lemmata of his commentary, he employs a plethora of verbs: assigno, designo,

profero, reddo. These are interesting choices, because each focuses on a particular

1 In her recent book Boethius on Mind, Grammar and Logic. A Study of Boethius’ Commentaries on Peri

hermeneias, (= Philosophia antiqua; 127), Leiden/Boston 2012, Taki Suto holds: “Even though there

may be some difference in Boethius’ usage of these two expressions, the difference is slight, and he

may not differentiate between them.” (p. 68, note 109).

2 In Greek ‘ζῷον’ can refer both to an animal and to an image.


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32 Monika Asztalos

aspect of the rather large and open semantic field of the Greek verb. Assigno focuses

on the speaker making a choice of what answer to give, designo on his marking some-

thing out, profero on his giving voice to something he has in mind, and reddo on his

giving an answer.

In the Topics Aristotle uses the word πρᾶγμα for the thing about which informa-

tion is communicated; it is also found in the De interpretatione and in the Greek com-

mentaries on the Categories. Boethius refers to it as a res; to keep the context of ques-

tions and answers alive I translate ‘object of inquiry’ everywhere.

An utterance that is a spoken answer to a question about an object of inquiry

is called a uox by Boethius. It does not translate any word in the Categories but cor-

responds to the Greek φωνή that we find, again, in the De interpretatione and in the

Greek commentaries on the Categories.

‘To communicate information about’ is my translation of Aristotle’s σημαίνειν

and Boethius’s significare. The common translation, ‘signify’, is problematic. To

begin with, the subjects of significare are persons, concepts, and words. ‘I signify’

is not a viable English expression. Furthermore, in passages like the following one,

taken from the introduction to Boethius’s commentary on the Categories, the transla-

tion ‘to signify’ is impossible:

(0.15) Namque cum de substantia uel facere uel pati dicitur, non ita tractatur, quasi unum eorum

casibus inflecti possit, aliud uero temporibus permutari, sed quasi aut hominem aut equum aut

indiuiduum aliquid aut speciem genusue significet .³

Doing something andundergoing something cannot be said to signify a substance, beit an individual or a species or a genus, nor do utterances like ‘he cuts’ or ‘he is being

cut’ signify a substance, but they do communicate information about a substance.

The verb significare often occurs together with designare in Boethius’s commen-

taries on the Categories and De interpretatione. If one believes that Boethius uses

‘significare’ as a modern philosopher uses ‘sense’, it is tempting to go in search of

a term in Boethius’s writings that might correspond to ‘reference’ in modern phi-

losophy. In his book Boethius on Signification and Mind, John Magee states with

due caution: “Occasionally Boethius seems to use significatio (-are) for what we call

‘sense’, and designatio (-are) for ‘reference’, but in fact the two words are almostalways interchangeable.” Taki Suto agrees with Magee: “In the contemporary phi-

losophy of language, we use ‘designate’ for reference—pointing out a thing outside

3 “(0.15) For when doing something or suffering something is spoken of in reference to a substance,

this is not to say that one of them is something that can be inflected by cases, whereas the other is

something that can undergo changes by tenses, but that it communicates information about either a

man or a horse or some individual thing or a species or genus.”

4 John Magee: Boethius on Signification and Mind, (= Philosophia antiqua; 52), Leiden/New York/

København/Köln 1989, 62.


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the mind—but this is not the case for Boethius. He uses ‘designare’ and ‘significare’

interchangeably: for pointing out a thing outside the mind as well as a thought in the

mind. He says that spoken words designate thoughts, but he says a few lines later that

they signify thoughts. He says that spoken words signify things and, soon after says

that they designate things”. The conclusion she reaches is correct: Boethius does

not use ‘significare’ in the way in which ‘sense’ is used in contemporary philosophy.

However, from the fact that both significare and designare are used with mental and

extra-mental objects it does not follow that the two verbs are used interchangeably.

Furthermore, there is another verb that often appears together with designare:

definire. There is a difference between designare and definire in that the first activity

is to indicate, mark out, objects of inquiry that a spoken word communicates infor-

mation about, whereas the second is to show how objects of inquiry that have been

marked out differ from other things in the same genus. The following passage from

Boethius’s comment on 8b 25 will illustrate this difference:

(67.9) Sed si ordinata definitio generalisque in hoc generalissimo genere poni potuisset, recte cul-

pabilis determinatio uideretur. (10) Nunc autem frustra contenditur, cum, iam ut saepe dictum est,

descriptionis potius loco hunc terminum quam definitionis alicuius addiderit. (11) Quocirca, si desi-

gnatio tantum quaedam et quodam modo adumbratio eius rei, de qua quaeritur, et non definitio

est, (12) absurda calumnia est […].

I propose that the three verbs should be understood as follows: significare = to com-

municate information about; designare = to mark out or indicate;definire = to define

by means of a genus and differentiae.

As for ‘uocabulum’ and ‘nomen’, I will begin by giving a list of claims about each

term.

Vocabulum

1. A uocabulum is not a spoken or written word but a mental collection of things to

which an object of inquiry (res) that has been singled out is referred by means of

an utterance (uox ). When we say ‚a man is an animal‘, animal is a uocabulum.

2. A uocabulum is created by a human mind.

5 Taki Suto: Boethius on Mind, Grammar and Logic, 24.

6 Cf.ibid. 24–25.

7 “(67.9) And indeed, if it had been possible to posit a classifying definition involving a genus in the

case of this most general genus, one would be right in considering his determination faulty. (10) But in

this case the claim is made in vain, since—as has often been pointed out by now—he added this term

as an indication rather than a definition. (11) Therefore, given that it only serves as a kind of demarca-

tion and, in a manner of speaking, an outline but not a definition of the object of inquiry about which

we are inquiring, (12) it is an absurd charge [...].”

8 This translation fits all three types of subject mentioned above.


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34 Monika Asztalos

3. A speaker brings a uocabulum to a halt in the mind of the listener; in this it

resembles a concept (intellectus).

4. A uocabulum differs from a concept (intellectus) in not existing by nature (φύσει)

but by position (θέσει), i. e., by not being the same for all human beings irres-

pective of the language they speak or understand.

5. A syllable or combination of syllables is attached to a uocabulum by a decision

or convention (ad placitum).

6. A syllable or combination of syllables attached to a uocabulum is auox.

7. Different uocabula may be attached to one and the same substance depending

on what aspect of the substance is singled out by the one who communicates

information about it.

8. A uocabulum is attached to a certain substance temporarily (e. g. health to a

man) or permanently (e. g. animal to a man).

9. The verb used for attaching a uocabulum to a certain object of inquiry isuocare.

10. Vocabula are predicated (uoces are not).

11. There are ten uocabula referred to as ten praedicamenta (predicates).

12. Rules for connecting objects of inquiry with the ten praedicamenta are provided

in Aristotle’s Categories.

Nomen (claims 2 and 4–6 aboutuocabula apply also to nomina)

1. A nomen is not a spoken or written word but a mental collection of things

comprising any object of inquiry of a certain kind. When we say ‚a man is an

animal‘, man is a nomen, for it stands for every man.2. Nomina can be referred to uocabula. This happens for example when a species

(e. g. man) is referred to a genus (e. g. animal). In that case the genus is a uoca-

bulum predicated in reference to the species which is anomen.

3. Objects of inquiry (not substances) belong permanently to a nomen. The justice

in the soul of any man always belongs to the nomen justice.

4. A definiendum is a nomen, the entire collection of things defined.

5. A definition that is given in accordance with a nomen is convertible with it.

6. The verb used for making an entire nomen the definiendum isnominare.

7. The verb used for including things in a nomen (i. e. in a definiendum) isnuncu- pare (from ‘nomen’ and ‘capio’). It is a means of finding out whether objects of

inquiry are spoken of equivocally or univocally (see below).

8. There are ten nomina that are the highest genera of objects of inquiry ( genera

rerum). They cannot therefore be formally defined by means of a genus.

9. Rules for which genera rerum objects of inquiry can be counted in are provided

in or can be extracted from Aristotle’s Categories.

9 I am not going to discussnomina (= nouns) and uerba (= verbs) which are words.


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In what follows I will use italics for both uocabula (I reluctantly translate ‘vocables’)

and nomina.

It appears that Boethius has appropriated a Latin word, uocabulum, which nor-

mally means ‘name, designation, appellation’, and given it a new application. In

his second commentary on the Isagoge there is a good illustration of his use of the

term. The context is an explanation that the genus animal is divided intorational and

mortal animal (a man), irrational and mortal animal (e. g.a horse), and rational and

immortal animal (a god):

Sed hic, ut diximus, deum corporeum intellegi oportet, ut solem et caelum ceteraque huiusmodi,

quae cum animata et rationabilia Plato esse confirmat, tum in deorum uocabulum antiquitatis

ueneratione probantur assumpta […].¹

The choice of the verb assumere with the preposition in followed by a noun in the

accusative is particularly revealing; in classical Latin that expression is used in thesense of ‘to add (to a class or group)’, ‘to adopt (into one’s family)’. Among the exam-

ples given in the Oxford Latin Dictionary, s. v. 9, are: noui homines […] in senatum

crebro assumpti, “upstarts who were often admitted to the senate” (Tac. Ann. 3.55),

in consilium assumptus, “admitted to the council” (Pliny Ep. 4.22.1), and—particu-

larly apposite— Liuia in familiam Iuliam nomenque Augustum assumebatur , “Livia was

admitted to (adopted into) the family and the name Augustus” (Tac., Ann. 1.8). By

using this particular construction with uocabulum (in deorum uocabulum assumpta)

Boethius indicates that a uocabulum is something to which access can be given by a

decision and volition, in other words, ad placitum.The following passage as well, which occurs in the first set of comments on quan-

tity (4b 20–37), reveals that a uocabulum is not a word:

(28.36) Quoniam uero Graeca oratione λόγος dicitur etiam animi cogitatio et intra se ratiocinatio,

λόγoς quoque et oratio, ne quis Aristotelem, cum diceret λόγov, id est orationem, quantitatem esse

discretam, de eo putaret dicere, quem quisque λόγov, id est rationem, in propria cogitatione dispo-

neret, hoc addidit: (37) “Dico uero illam, quae fit cum uoce, orationem”. Apud Romanam namque

linguam discreta sunt uocabula orationis atque rationis, Graeca uero oratio utrisque uocabulum,

et rationis et orationis, λόγov appellat .¹¹

10 “But here, as we have stated, one should understand a corporeal god, as, for example, the sun

and the heaven and other things of this sort, for not only does Plato confirm that they are animate

and rational, it is also attested that in the old religion they were admitted to the vocable of the gods

[…].” Boethius: In Porphyrii Isagogen commenta, ed. S. Brandt, (= Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum

Latinorum; 48), Wien 1906, 259, 18–22.

11 “(28.36) But since in a Greek spoken statement a sequence of thoughts and reasoning within the

mind is spoken of as a λόγoς, and a spoken statement is also spoken of as a λόγoς, in order that no one

should think that Aristotle, when he said that a λόγoς (that is to say, a spoken statement) is a discrete

quantity, was speaking of the λόγoς (that is to say, the mental statement) that each person could set

out in a sequence of thoughts of his own, he added: (37) “But the spoken statement I speak of is the


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36 Monika Asztalos

What this comment says in effect is that the Romans have attached one combina-

tion of syllables to the vocable oratio and another to the vocable ratio. Any spoken

statement will be referred to the vocable oratio, any mental account to ratio. The

Greeks have attached a combination of syllables (‘λόγoς’) to one vocable to which

both spoken and mental statements are referred. Boethius could have added that this

makes the Greek vocable equivocal: For if one would want to give an account of what

it is for a spoken statement to be a λόγoς, one account would be given, but if asked

what it is for a mental account to be a λόγoς, one would produce another definition.

The use of the word nomen for a collection of things, on the other hand, is well

attested in Latin. A nomen can of course be a word: anomen proprium such as ‘Cicero’

or a nomen appellatiuum such as ‘man’¹², but it can also refer to a family, a nation, a

population, an army, in short: a collection of individuals that form some kind of unit.

A few examples of this last use from Livy’s Ab urbe condita will suffice:ubi deletum

omnibus uideretur nomen Romanum (23.6.3, “where it seemed to everyone that the

Roman name (i. e., army) was annihilated”); Volscum nomen prope deletum est

(3.8.10, “The Volscan name (i. e., army or perhaps people) was almost annihilated”).

No reader of Livy would imagine that he is referring to names that seemed to have

disappeared from the current Latin vocabulary. A reader of Boethius’s commentary

should be prepared to take nomen in all three senses: anomen proprium that we use

for an individual thing, e. g. ‘Cicero’, a nomen appellatiuum, that is to say a name like

‘homo’, and a named collection of things. In fact, it is almost exclusively in the third

sense that the word is used in the commentary on the Categories. This use is not some-

thing that Boethius introduced in his commentary on the Categories but it is evident

already in his first commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge as the following quote shows:

Item eodem modo nomen Romuli Romanos omnes continet, quemad

Documents

Boethius as a Paradigm of Late Ancient Thought