Body in Mind: The Role of Embodied Cognition in Self-Regulation

Body in Mind: The Role of Embodied Cognition inSelf-Regulation

Emily Balcetis* and Shana ColeOhio University

Abstract

We review a growing body of literature that evidences the reciprocal relationship between bodyand mind, known as embodied cognition. We argue that an embodied mind may serve a func-tional purpose, aiding in self-regulatory processes. Specifically, we suggest that embodied cognitionassists in self-regulation by increasing signal strength, encouraging appropriate goal-relevant action,and incorporating situational constraints to cue appropriate information processing styles. Further-more, we propose that affect serves as the link between an embodied mind and self-regulatoryaction. Finally, we situate this research in debates on theories of mind, and we advocate for ahighly interactive system that integrates information across modalities.

Body in Mind: The Role of Embodied Cognition in Self-Regulation

Want to increase the amount of attention you can muster to slog through the Sundaymorning New York Times crossword? Try sitting upright instead of the more likely andmore popular slouched weekend position (Riskind & Gotay, 1982). Need help achievingthat straight posture? Think of the last costume party for which you convincingly dressedas Martha Stewart or Donald Trump…or any other act, in which you consider yourselfsuccessful (Weisfeld & Beresford, 1982). Historically, proposing that motor and cognitivesystems are active bedfellows may have seemed as curious as claiming the palatability ofpickles with cheese or chocolate on crickets. Indeed, many traditional perspectives onhow the mind works advocate for an isolated, encapsulated cognitive system (Fodor,1983). They argue that cognition functions with little more than minimal influence fromsources outside the higher-order cognitive system. However, mounting evidence suggeststhat the interaction between motor and cognitive systems is strong and pervasive. In thisstudy, we review research that suggests that bodily movements, like head nodding andshaking, exert a powerful influence on cognition in seemingly unrelated, incompatibledomains—and do so outside of awareness. Judgments and decisions once described aseffortful, deliberate, or intentional may be influenced unknowingly by seemingly unre-lated movements of the body. The relationship, however, is not unidirectional, as cogni-tion can reciprocally influence the body.

While evidence attesting to these bidirectional relationships mounts, only recently haveresearchers and theorists begun exploring the pressures that have created, and the conse-quences of, these connections. In this manuscript, we suggest one of many possibleanswers to these inquiries. We suggest that embodied cognition might serve a functionalpurpose by aiding in self-regulatory processes. We further propose that affect plays a criti-cal role in this process; body movements can trigger affective responses, which in turn actas a cue that self-regulation is necessary or discretionary. We advocate for interactivemotor and cognitive systems, and argue against an encapsulated, modular theory of mind.

Social and Personality Psychology Compass 3/5 (2009): 759–774, 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2009.00197.x

ª 2009 The AuthorsJournal Compilation ª 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

In the sections that follow, we briefly review the historical and current perspectives onthe architecture of the human mind. We discuss the challenge posed by embodied cogni-tion for those perspectives that do not accept complex interactions between differentmodalities. We follow with a summary of the evidence attesting to the interaction ofbody and mind. Finally, we propose that such an embodied mind might assist in self-regulation and suggest that an embodied mind might accomplish this through theaffective system.

Perspectives on the Structure of the Mind

What does the mind ‘look’ like? For hundreds of years, philosophers and scientists alikehave questioned the structure or architecture of the mind, fueling arguably one of themost heated debates in scientific history. Back into the 19th century, the mind wasdescribed as a modular system. For instance, Franz Joseph Gall proposed a type of phre-nology whereby mental faculties directly and predictably mapped onto areas of the brain.He proposed, for example, that a person with greater intelligence would have a largerposterior parietal lobe, which would produce a measurable bump on the crown of theskull. This simplistic view of modularity has, of course, been disproven (see Simpson,2005).

The modular perspective on the human mind is traditional, yet still powerfully present.With incredible popularity, a modern perspective on modularity was advocated for inFodor’s (1983) The Modularity of Mind. This monograph was in such demand that it wentthrough nine printings in its first 12 years. This perspective and the iterations that fol-lowed advocate for a mind that is constructed out of a mass of encapsulated micro-components that are grouped into subsystems (defended by Caramazza, Hillis, Rapp, &Romani, 1990; Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Fodor, 1983, 2000; Sperber, 1994; Pinker,1997; Pylyshyn, 1973; Samuels, 1998). Each subsystem serves a specialty function or setof functions (Carruthers, 2005). Because each subsystem is dissociable from another orencapsulated, to some degree, the entire system finds an advantage in being less suscepti-ble to disruption (Simon, 1962). That is, any subsystem could be damaged yet theremaining systems could still function. Because this is true in the operation of cells, cellu-lar assemblies, organs, and multi-organism units like a bee colony (Seeley, 1995), it must,by extension, also be true of the organization of the mind.

In fact, some phenomena suggest that the mind may be constructed in this way. Pros-opagnosiacs who have lost their capacity to recognize human faces and aphasiacs whohave sustained damage to language capabilities rarely experience deficits in other cognitivesystems or domains (Farah, 1990; Spreen & Risser, 2003; but see Bates, 1994; Bateset al., 2001). Likewise, some patients experiencing category-specific semantic deficits canhave difficulty indicating whether a ‘whale has legs’ but may have no difficulty makingsimilar judgments about nonanimals (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). This evidence suggeststhat one system can sustain serious damage yet the other systems remain intact.

Yet, this perspective on the mind is undermined by a growing, cross-disciplinary litera-ture, which refutes the encapsulated, protected, modular systems theory. Much evidencesuggests that systems including major senses, motor systems, and cognition are highlyinteractive. Consider the following: Traditional perspectives argue that language produc-tion originates in specialized language-specific centers in the brain. If this is true, Broca’sarea, the proposed center of language production, should be highly localized and easilydiscernible. However, there is little agreement about the precise location of Broca’s area(Poeppel, 1996). At the same time, other aspects of language production have been

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ª 2009 The Authors Social and Personality Psychology Compass 3/5 (2009): 759–774, 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2009.00197.xJournal Compilation ª 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

located in every lobe of the brain (Pulvermuller, 1999). Similarly, when asked to nametools, participants’ premotor cortex shows increased activation (Chao & Martin, 2000).Blind individuals often perform tactile and auditory tasks in a far superior manner com-pared with sighted others (Gougoux, Zatorre, Lassonde, Voss, & Lepore, 2005; Gougouxet al., 2004) and recruit the visual cortex to do so (Merabet et al., 2004). This evidenceargues against the assertion that subsystems specialize to process any single type of infor-mation. Instead, the brain seems highly interactive. As Prinz (2006) wrote, neural process-ing centers can ‘moonlight.’ They interact with and help one another to achievefunctional goals. Why would cognition not work in the same cross-modal capacity toachieve functional ends? This chapter describes research that suggests cognition does infact interact with other modalities and argues that this may occur in the service of func-tional goals including self-regulation.

Embodied Approaches to Cognition

Given that the interaction often occurs outside of conscious awareness, the general pub-lic may find it difficult or unusual to think that what the body is doing could influencewhat the mind is doing. Embodied perspectives on cognition have developed to explainthis surprising combination. Embodied perspectives on cognition provide an interfacingsystem or a theoretical framework that integrates a diversity of informational sources andtypes. Not so much a unified theory, embodiment is rather an emergent property of var-ious perspectives on how the mind works. Generally speaking, embodied cognitionargues for the interaction of the body, the environment, and the mind. Primarily,embodied theories of cognition propose that cognition incorporates information acrossmodalities that stems from real, bodily interactions with the world. And evidence ismounting to support the embodied cognitive assertions that the body influences themind and the mind influences the body. Although it provides a general framework forthe interaction of mind and body, an embodied perspective on cognition is not a uni-fied, sufficiently nuanced theory from which specific predictions can be made. Instead,the majority of research currently available documents instances of embodied cognition,while the evolutionary, neural, and psychological theories regarding moderators andmechanism develop.

The body influences the mind

Imagine struggling through a laborious department meeting after a rough night on thetown. Your eyes fall upon the new faculty member you have not yet met. This strangerto the group may seem friendlier and more pleasant if you are holding a warm cup ofcoffee rather than an iced latte (Williams & Bargh, 2008). Although unusual to think thatnewly developing friendships might be subject to the temperature of a mug in yourhands, such influences of the body on the mind are quite prevalent. For instance, headmovements influence information processing. Nodding one’s head leads to more positiveevaluations of products and arguments, while shaking one’s head leads to more negativeevaluations. Nodders, compared with shakers, more favorably evaluated and indicated agreater desire to buy positively valenced consumer products, such as tasty candy bars(Forster, 2004). Similarly, nodders compared with shakers were more likely to agree withan argument about university issues (Wells & Petty, 1980), because nodding relative toshaking increases feelings of confidence regarding one’s opinions (Brinol & Petty, 2003).In addition, the effects of nodding and shaking can be exaggerated when the self is

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actively engaged (Epley & Gilovich, 2001). In fact, head nodders compared with shakerswere more likely to accept their own initial opinion as true.

Bodily gestures can also bias information processing, arguably because of a strong evo-lutionary link between gesture and language (Corballis, 2003; Glenberg & Kaschak,2002). Participants experienced difficulty making sensibility judgments that requiredmovement in a direction opposite of that implied by the phrase (Glenberg & Kaschak,2002). For example, upon encountering such phrases as ‘close the drawer,’ participantswere faster to move their finger from a central resting position to a button located furtheraway from rather than closer to their bodies. Participants also moved their hand in adownward motion more slowly to indicate that a car had a roof than to indicate it hadwheels (Borghi, Glenberg, & Kaschak, 2004). This suggests that the cognitive systemimmediately detects the embodied implications of an object upon perceiving and process-ing its features. As a result, information processing is facilitated when action aligns withcognition. In sum, these are just a few among many demonstrations of the influence ofthe motor system on what might seem to a naıve observer a distant cousin—cognition.In general, the effects of bodily states on cognition indicate that seemingly purposeful andcognitively effortful assessments and conclusions may in fact not be made in as deliberatea manner as is usually thought.

The mind influences the body

Converging evidence suggests that the motor system impinges on cognitive tasks, but thereciprocal relationship is also true. Information processing encroaches upon lower levelsystems to produce a medley of bodily responses, frequently without awareness. Forinstance, thinking of past successes rather than failures leads people to assume a moreerect, and less slouched, physical stature (Weisfeld & Beresford, 1982). Also, languageprocessing can systematically bias eye movements. When listening to descriptions of birdsor tall skyscrapers, participants’ eyes floated up, but when listening to descriptions ofworms or a deep canyon, eyes floated down (see Barsalou, 2005; Spivey & Geng, 2001).Language processing also biases facial movements. Simply reading positive wordsincreased activation of the zygomatic major muscle, which is responsible for creating asmile on a person’s face. Reading negative words activated the corrugator supercilii mus-cle (but not the zygomatic major), which is responsible for creating a frown (Foroni &Semin, 2008). These examples suggest that language processing resonates in the motorsystem.

The link between cognition and behavior need not even be recognized. Cognition caninfluence action even when the behavior is not consciously decided and even whenthoughts are activated nonconsciously. For instance, thoughts of moral transgressions ledpeople, without their awareness, toward actions meant to physically cleanse themselves(Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). Feelings of social rejection led people to physically experi-ence a room as colder than they otherwise would (Zhong & Leonardelli, 2008). Noncon-scious thoughts of the elderly led people to walk down a hallway slower (Bargh, Chen,& Burrows, 1996) and react to decisions with less efficiency (Dijksterhuis, Spears, &Lepinasse, 2001). Priming fast animals like cheetahs or slow creatures like snails, too,influenced the speed at which participants left one room and arrived at the next (Aarts &Dijksterhuis, 2002).

In sum, cognition influences bodily movements in predictable manners. Embodimentseems to be at the root of seemingly disparate relationships between higher-orderthoughts and basic bodily action. Taken together, these interactions of body and mind



challenge the view of a protected, isolated, or encapsulated cognitive system that simplyprocesses information delivered by perceptual systems to produce judgments and deci-sions.

Embodied Cognition in the Service of Self-Regulation

While the list of embodied cognitive processes grows, one important question still lays inwait. Why would body and mind mutually influence one another? One possible answer,that certainly warrants further investigation, is that embodied cognition may ultimatelyassist in self-regulation, thereby serving a functional purpose.

What is self-regulation?

Self-regulation is a capacity to override and alter responses. Regulation refers to behaviorchange meant to align one’s current state with some standard such as an ideal or goal byexerting control, making choices, and initiating behavior meant to assist in goal pursuit(Baumeister & Vohs, 2007). There are two ways in which behavior change occurs. First,a person might extend or amplify a particular behavioral pattern to gain a reward. Sec-ond, a person might engage in self-restraint to avoid harm by overriding an urge (Polivy,1998). We suggest that an embodied mind can assist in promoting goal-relevant actionand reducing goal-hindering action.

How an embodied mind assists self-regulation

For an embodied mind to serve self-regulatory purposes, motor movements must interactwith cognitive processes in a way that facilitates goal-relevant actions. While this argu-ment is quite speculative at this point, mounting evidence suggests that an embodiedmind is capable of this. We suggest that an embodied mind can assist in self-regulation by(1) increasing the signal strength indicating whether this object, person, or experience isgoal-promoting, (2) amplifying approach and avoidance behavioral tendencies, and (3)integrating situational information to flexibly adapt to changing demands.

Embodied cognition increases signal strength. To engage in successful self-regulation, it is nece-ssary to know whether the object, person, or situation is goal-relevant and affords pro-gress on the goal. While a person might already have a judgment about whether theobject, person, or situation can assist in goal pursuit, it is necessary for this judgment tobe clear and obvious. Embodied cognitive processes can create a clear signal about therelevance of the object, person, or situation to goal progress by polarizing evaluations.That is, evaluations of objects are more extreme when engaging in certain bodily move-ments thereby assisting in one aspect of self-regulation.

While the facial expressions displayed by interaction partners can serve to signalwhether they are a friend or a foe, often the expressions displayed on another’s face areambiguous. While the emotional signal might be unclear, embodied cognition can assistin clarifying others’ emotions. For instance, participants watched a video of a face morphfrom one expression to another (Niedenthal, Brauer, Halberstadt, & Innes-Ker, 2001).Participants who were smiling while watching this transition were faster to identify whenthe initially happy expression changed into a sad one. Likewise, frowning participantswere faster to indicate when a sad expression became a happy one. However, when par-ticipants held a pen in their mouths to freeze their expressions, the ability to detect



changes in the emotions decreased. This suggests that the congruence of affective displaysfacilitated the judgments of emotionality, but particularly when participants were capableof actively mimicking the emotion. Participants who were free to mimic the emotion onthe video may have been quicker to detect a shift in expression because it likely produceda change on their own face. In other words, signals supplied by one’s own motor move-ments aided in clarifying perception of others’ ambiguous facial expressions.

Subjective, holistic evaluations of social and nonsocial objects, too, are facilitated andextremitized by embodied cognition. For example, participants evaluated products andpoliticians as more pleasant when they flexed rather than extended their arms (Forster,2004; Forster & Werth, 2001). In addition, evaluations of out-group members, aboutwhom attitudes are often multifaceted and ambiguous, can be made more extreme byconcurrent arm movements. Participants who responded to photographs of Black faces bypulling a joystick toward themselves exhibited decreased implicit racial prejudice and laterresponded more warmly toward a Black confederate compared with those who pushed ajoystick away from themselves in response to Black faces (Kawakami, Phills, Steele, &Dovidio, 2007). In other words, evaluations of and attitudes toward out-group membersbecame more favorable when engaging in concurrent specific motor movements. Embod-ied cognition assisted during the evaluation process to make clearer whether the personwas safe or threatening.

Similarly, physical body movements can influence assessments of whether others canassist in satisfying a goal. If one is deciding whether to approach another person as a pos-sible love interest—a dilemma faced by many single people entering the datingscene—embodied cognition can lead to more extreme evaluations of that person. By cre-ating an extreme evaluation, it could be clear that approaching this person would assist insatisfying the social goal. Indeed, the physical, motor act of approaching another persondoes influence social judgments of that person. Single people participating in a speed-dating event with the goal of finding a romantic interest either literally approached theirpotential dates or remained seated while participating in a 4-minute conversation (Finkel& Eastwick, 2008). Those participants randomly assigned to rotate around the speed-dating tables, compared with those assigned to stay seated, reported more positiveevaluations of, greater romantic desire toward, and more romantic chemistry with theirspeed-dating partners. Thus, it seems the physical movement of approach, coupled withconcurrent cognitive evaluative processes, led to more extreme (and in this case, positive)evaluations of another person who could satisfy the active goal.

Embodied cognition encourages appropriate goal-relevant action. After evaluation, successful self-regulation also requires that appropriate action be taken in response to targets in question.To navigate the social world, one must avoid harmful objects, people, information, andenvironments. At the same time, one must approach or acquire helpful objects, people,information, and environments. Bodily movements are, of course, a primary means toevading danger, securing rewards, and other such self-regulatory behaviors. The repeateduse of avoidance behaviors in response to aversive experiences and repeated use ofapproach behaviors in response to pleasant experiences can become automatized (Caci-oppo, Priester, & Bernston, 1993). It seems plausible then that avoidance or approachbehaviors, even when haphazard or unintentionally enacted, can serve as a signal that thesituation, object, or person is either dangerous or desirable. Future research could investi-gate whether behaviors, like a clenched fist that engages forearm flexors associated withapproach cues (Cacioppo, Priester, & Bernston, 1993) or extension of the fingers in anopenhanded gesture associated with avoidance cues (Tops & de Jong, 2006), influence



other downstream self-regulatory behaviors. For instance, while pulling up rather thanpushing down on a surface increases the favorability of social evaluations, future researchmight also investigate if the act of pulling up also activates physical approach intentionsor engages prepotent approach action tendencies and associated motor systems.

Embodied cognition is sensitive to situational constraints. Beyond approaching good and avoid-ing bad objects and environments, a successful self-regulatory system must be sensitive todifferent information processing needs. At times the environment requires more deliber-ate, effortful investigation while at others it can be processed in a shallower manner.Successfully navigating the local bar so you do not awkwardly run into your ex likelyrequires effortful, detailed processing of the environment. In contrast, Aunt Mildred’s80th birthday party with the family may not be an environment that necessitates the samecareful attention.

One function of an embodied mind might be to help signal benign or problematic sit-uations. Such a signal emanates from particular motor movements, which send cues sug-gesting whether a situation is benign or dangerous based on a past history of learnedassociations. If the body moves in a way that has previously been associated with theacquisition of reward, the cognitive system may interpret this bodily cue as a sign ofsafety. If a body moves in a way that has been associated with harm, the cognitive systemmay interpret this bodily cue as a sign of threat. As a result of the signal suggested by aspecific motor movement, the cognitive system can be tuned to meet the requirementsof a particular situation.

There are two types of motor movements that could send signals or safety or threat.Approach-relevant motor movements have been implicated in top-down processingstyles while avoidance-relevant motor movements signal the need for detail-oriented,bottom-up processing. For example, Friedman and Forster (2000) had participants pressup on a table or down against its surface while answering analytical reasoning questionstaken from the Graduate Record Exam. As expected, extending their arm activateddetail-oriented systematic processing style. As a result, participants solved nearly twice asmany problems correctly than when flexing it. Arm extension also decreased creativityin the Embedded Figure Test (Witkin, Oltman, Raskin, & Karp, 1971) and the SnowyPicture Test (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976), which require global orholistic processing. And extension led participants to assume that it was more probablethat Linda, a hypothetical young woman described as outspoken and interested in socialjustice issues, is a feminist bank teller than simply a bank teller (Riis & Schwarz, 2003).This occurred because extension led to a detail-oriented processing style that errone-ously focused attention on irrelevant details and interfered with recognizing the logicalinsight necessary to avoid the conjunction fallacy. Conversely, when flexing their arms,participants were more likely to include unusual exemplars such as ‘feet’ and ‘camel’ ina category like ‘vehicles,’ suggesting the use of more broad, higher-order processingstrategies. Flexing also led to greater attentional flexibility when participants indicatedwhether a letter was the same as one presented two letters prior (Friedman & Forster,2005).

This research suggests that motor movements associated with benign situations encour-age heuristic, top-down processing, resulting in greater creativity and exploration of noveloptions. Likewise, bodily movements usually associated with problematic situations fosterthe spontaneous adoption of a detail-oriented, bottom-up processing style. The result ofthis form of embodied cognition assists in self-regulation by functionally adjusting to situ-ationally dependent information processing needs.



Affect as a Link Between an Embodied Mind and Self-Regulatory Action

Effective self-regulation requires monitoring. To assess one’s progress toward goals and toknow whether behavior change is needed, it is essential to compare one’s current state tothe end-state (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007; Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1982, 1998). Theresult of such comparisons can be various affective experiences. Negative affect can signalthe need for behavior change, while positive affect can signal that goal progress is satisfac-tory.

We propose that motor movements can immediately trigger affective responses, whichprompt self-regulatory behaviors. In fact, Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, and Zhang (2007)offered that the very purpose of emotions is to control the person experiencing them (seealso Frijda, 1987; James, 1899). Below, we support the following assertions detailing theconnection between motor movements, affective states, and self-regulatory behavior.First, motor movements are linked to affective experiences. Second, emotions indirectlychange behavior. Finally, emotion-guided behavioral change serves self-regulation.Together, these three arguments suggest that changes in affect that co-occur with motormovements might serve self-regulatory purposes.

Motor movements guide affective experiences

Across many different cultures, specific body movements and specific emotional statestend to co-occur (Hejmadi, Davidson, & Rozin, 2000). All around the world, peopletend to adopt the same behavioral response to similar affective states (Ekman, 1999), andthe behavioral displays can vary as a function of affective intensity (Ekman, Friesen, &Ancoli, 1980). Darwin (1872 ⁄1965) proposed, as early as the 19th century, that bodyexpressions can augment or intensify associated feelings, and suppression of expressionsmay hinder emotional experiences. Arguably, as a result of the frequent pairing of affec-tive states and behavioral responses, simply engaging in a particular bodily movement canspuriously increase the paired affective experiences. For instance, assuming upright pos-ture leads to increased feelings of personal pride (Stepper & Strack, 1993). Likewise, func-tional magnetic resonance imaging studies show that body positions activate brain regionsassociated with the perception of specific emotional expressions (de Gelder, 2006). Inaddition, the link between bodily movements and affective reactions can be indirectlymeasured through the consequences movements have on cognition. Facial feedback theo-ries argue facial expressions can lead to affective responses that form the basis of judg-ments. For example, motor activity that facilitates smiling leads perceivers to interpretcartoons as more humorous than if they had not assumed that facial posture (Strack, Mar-tin, & Stepper, 1988). Thus, motor movements are linked to, implicated in, and directaffective experience.

Emotions indirectly produce behavior change

Once emotions are activated or experienced, the consequences for behavior change areevident. In fact, one traditional guiding theory suggests that emotions evolved for thedirect control of behavior (James, 1899). Emotions guide a person toward selectivebehavioral patterns (Frijda, 1987, 2005) and encourage the allocation of the necessarymetabolic support for specific actions (Ohman & Wiens, 2003). For instance, feelings ofanger should motivate a person to engage in a certain set of anger behaviors like fistclenching or preparation for physical or verbal attack. Feelings of fear should motivate a



person to flee. And anger should facilitate a different set of behaviors than the experienceof sadness (Mascolo, Fischer, & Li, 2003). Emotions, according to this view, suggestappropriate behavioral responses that are most adaptive in the situation (Tooby & Cos-mides, 1990).

However, it is problematic to suggest that emotions exert a direct influence overbehavior. To propose that emotions directly cause behavior requires, at some level, thatbehavioral responses be hardwired. Yet, in real life, the experience of any given emotiondoes not perfectly predict the same behavioral response. For instance, anger does notalways lead to attack and fear does not always lead to fleeing (Schwarz & Clore, 1996).At best, emotions are linked with vague and underspecified generic urges to either dosomething or do nothing (Fredrickson, 2001).

Rather than suggesting that emotions directly instigate specific behaviors, it is morelikely that emotions serve as signals. These signals, through learning mechanisms, shapeaction to encourage appropriate, functional, and adaptive behaviors. After a behavior isemitted, emotional reactions follow (see Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007).Faking an illness to your audibly disappointed grandmother when she calls to see if youwill play cards with her on Saturday night may produce an intense affective response.After hanging up the phone, the guilty emotions that follow can motivate a variety ofbehaviors that lead to reduction in the feeling, including behaviors to repair the damagecaused by the initial act (e.g., calling her back and marveling at your miraculous sponta-neous recovery), and thoughts, counterfactuals, and lesson-learning to avoid the behaviorand emotional consequences later. In other words, emotions may not be directly andcausally related to behavioral repertoires, but instead serve as a signal that behaviorchange, and self-regulation more generally, are needed in the first place (Baumeister,Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007).

Emotion-guided behavior change serves self-regulation

Indeed, it seems fairly uncontroversial to propose that emotions serve as a signal that self-regulation is necessary. Higgins (1987) proposed that perceived discrepancies betweenactual and desired states, the impetus for self-regulatory actions, are marked by differentpatterns of emotional reactions. Believing one has fallen short of how one ought to beproduces high-arousal negative emotions, while believing one is still far from the idealproduces low-arousal feelings of dejection (but see Tangney, Niedenthal, Covert, & Bar-low, 1998). More generally, the emotional outcomes of comparing one’s current progresstoward the completion of any type of goal can change goal pursuit (Carver & Scheier,1990; Scheier & Carver, 1980). One might feel despondent that a goal still looms largeand has not yet been attained, which could initiate behaviors aimed at resolving the dis-crepancy between the current state and the final goal. In other words, it is not just apurely cognitive comparison of one’s current and ideal state that can change behavior,but the experienced emotions that arise during such a comparison promote self-regulatoryaction.

Although emotional reactions that result from comparing one’s current state to theideal state can prompt self-regulatory action, one must also have the resources to accom-plish these goals. Indeed, to move from the current state toward the ideal state is effortfuland takes resources, which can be depleted (Gailliot et al., 2007). However, the antidotemight be positive affect. Positive affect has a remarkable power to restore self-regulatoryabilities (Tice, Baumeister, Shmeuli, & Muraven, 2007). Positive affect can serve as aresource to assist in continued goal pursuit for the following reasons. First, emotions are



linked to both physiological and psychological arousal and tension (Thayer, 1989). Sec-ond, positive affect promotes action and maintains and increases motivation. For instance,positive affect motivates people to approach and engage in activities that are adaptive andbeneficial (Fredrickson, 2001; Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999). In fact, positiveaffect can increase a person’s willingness to engage in goal-relevant action even in theface of physical or psychological depletion (Muraven & Slessareva, 2003).

Importantly, the source of the positive affect need not be tied directly to goal-relevantaction to assist in self-regulation. Receiving a small gift or watching a funny movie clipincreased positive affect. This source of positive affect was entirely unrelated to the subse-quent tasks, but did serve as a resource from which participants drew strength to persistthrough a disgusting taste test or a strenuous physical task after psychological resourceshad been depleted (Tice, Baumeister, Shmeuli, & Muraven, 2007).

Because self-regulation is costly, an efficient system should implement strategies to mit-igate the costs of self-regulation and replenish resources needed for self-regulation. Weargue, as have many others, that affect can be one source of replenishment. Regardless ofwhether positive affect is the conscious result of deliberate cognitive comparisons betweenone’s current state and the goal, or whether positive affect is a by-product of an external,unrelated experience, an efficient self-regulatory system should capitalize on this replen-ishing resource. Bodily movements that activate positive affect, regardless of whether theactivation is deliberate or spurious, might provide a resource to assist in self-regulation.Future research could investigate whether the mere act of engaging in physical move-ments associated with positive affect (i.e., a smile) can promote actual affective experi-ences that contribute to a pool of self-regulatory resources from which people can drawto persist through difficult or depleting goal-relevant tasks.

Negative affect also informs self-regulatory processes. Mood can serve as an importantsource of information about whether an environment, person, or object is benign or not.Negative mood signals a threat or danger and motivates individuals to engage in morecareful or systematic processing (Frijda, 1988). Similarly, negative mood can also be acritical signal that self-regulation is necessary, indicating that one is falling short of one’sgoal and signaling that increased effort may be needed to reach a goal (Carver & Scheier,1990). Motor movements that signal negative affect may thus imply behavior change isnecessary to reduce discrepancies between present states and goal states. For example, afurrowed brow might signal negative affect, result in judgments that a task is difficult orgoal-obstacles plentiful, and thus provide a signal that effort needs to be increased toaccomplish the goal. In this way, an embodied mind is functional, allowing the cognitivesystem access to another source of information about the necessity of behavior change toassist in goal pursuit. Again, future research could explore whether physical movementschange actual affective experience and subsequently self-regulatory action.

In summary, we have argued here that bodily states are one source of information thecognitive system calls upon to make judgments, decisions, and self-regulatory determina-tions. We argued for the functional purpose of embodied cognition, outlined how anembodied mind assists self-regulation, and proposed specifically that motor movementsoften coincide with affective responses that inspire self-regulatory processes. Importantly,while myriad demonstrations of the effects of body states on cognition provide initial sup-port for the functional role of an interactive system, further research is certainly neededto expound the hypothesis that body movements trigger affective responses, both spuri-ously and deliberately, which cue self-regulation processes. Future research could exploreimplicit and explicit affective responses when engaged in the various body motions wehave reviewed here. Such investigations have the potential to support the role of affect in



embodied cognition. For instance, one might expand upon Riskind & Gotay’s (1982)research to investigate whether upright body posture and other physical movements facili-tate persistence in difficult tasks, direct attention, and guide information processing whenresources are depleted. To the extent that body states trigger affective responses, theyshould also aid self-regulation in the same ways as other sources of emotion. Such explo-rations could serve as a promising area of future research in embodied cognition, movingbeyond demonstrations of the phenomena to more unified theories of the purpose of aninteractive system.

Caveat: Direct Link Between Movement and Cognition or Indirect Signal?

According to embodied accounts of cognitive processing, pulling one’s hand closer toone’s body, flexing one’s arm, and smiling are all behaviors that suggest an opinion, per-son, object, or environment is safe and rewarding. A direct account of the influence ofmotor movements on cognition argues that the simple enactment of any of the abovebehaviors should lead to increased liking, more heuristic global processing, and other suchapproach-like behaviors. However, recent evidence undermines or calls into questionsuch a direct link between motor movements and cognition. Instead, motor movementsmore likely serve as an indirect signal, which is used to shape cognition. Consider thisexample. Imagine quickly pulling a hand away from a hot stove. Now, imagine grabbingthe last glass of champagne from the waiter’s tray as he walks by in the crowded recep-tion. Both scenarios employ the same gross motor movement—a flexing arm that movescloser to the body. However, the context, motivation, and implications of the move arequite disparate. One is for the purpose of avoiding pain, while the other roping inpleasure.

Rather than a simplistic and solely direct relationship between motor and cognitivesystems, an embodied mind can function in a more complex manner. In particular, thebody can influence the mind in a way that is responsive to the implications for the self.For instance, participants pull their hand closer to their physical body when positivewords appear, suggesting that such arm movements are typically associated with approach,acquisition, and reward. However, movements toward a strong representation of the self,and not just the physical body, can produce the same positive facilitation. Specifically,pushing arm movements that may normally be associated with avoidance and negativitycan be reconstrued as ones that will garner reward (Markman & Brendl, 2005). Forexample, in a video game, participants saw their names positioned within the game space.During the game, valenced words appeared on the screen in response to which partici-pants had to move a joystick that directed the words toward or away from their name.People were faster to move positive words toward their name regardless of whether thisresponse required a pushing movement away from their physical body or a pulling move-ment toward it. This evidence suggests the embodied mind does not function so simplis-tically as to unilaterally associate movements toward the body with positivity andmovements away from the body with negativity. Rather the embodied mind recognizesthat motions toward the body can be the result of harm or negativity, as in the case ofdrawing a hand back in recoil from a hot stove. The mind does not simply maintain adiscrete list of actions that directly and unfailingly signal approach, safety, and reward.Instead, the signal sent to the mind by motor movements is contextually dependent.

While the discrete actions of the motor system do not directly signal approach oravoidance, the interaction of the motor system and environmental cues provides an indi-rect signal to safety or threat, which serves a self-regulatory function. For example, upon



entering a potentially aversive environment, such as a dark alley or dinner with thein-laws, information from the motor system may help signal avoidance motivations orcue a problematic situation. When finding oneself walking through a dark alley, the actof extending one’s arm away from the body while holding a Maglight flashlight mightactually serve as a source of comfort rather than threat. However, pulling your mother-in-law’s creamed Green Giant string beans with fried onion crunch topping closer toyour own plate, although certainly the right thing to do while she watches with delight,might actually threaten your digestive tract rather than calm your hungry stomach. Insum, motor movements can influence cognition, yet the meaning of the movement anddirection of their influence may depend on the situation or context and the implicationsof the movement for the goals one has for the self. An embodied mind is sensitive to thetype of movement but also to the implications or meaning of the movement. With con-sideration of both these inputs, the body directs the mind and the mind directs the body.

Embodied Cognition as a Sequential or Parallel Processing System?

We cited many examples of how discrete actions influence immediate, concrete judg-ments. We have often suggested that embodied cognition employs a temporally orderedsequence, whereby some motor movement precedes a change in thought. Or somethought precedes a change in motor movements. Unfortunately, the convenient descrip-tion, and the one we chose to employ, simplifies the process of embodied cognition.We wish not to suggest that motor movements or thoughts are themselves encapsulated,symbolic entities. Certainly, it is common, in addition to pragmatically useful, to usethis type of description. For instance, it is easier to consider (at least to us) that first thearm is flexed, then at a specific point in time later on evaluations of another personbecome more favorable. It is harder (for us) to discuss the more neurologically plausibleaccount that describes how motor movements unfold over time and occur simulta-neously as judgments are being formed (although Spivey, 2007 describes this quite bril-liantly).

Embodied cognition should not be thought of as a factory line, assembly constructionprocess where one function like the movement of the arm or the expression on the facemust be completed before a judgment is rendered. Instead, action and cognition occurconcurrently. There is no linear progression from one distinct stage to the next, no dis-tinct and rigid temporal order of tasks. Although the outcome of embodied cognitiveprocesses might be quite discrete (i.e., choosing to invest in a risky gamble), the patternsof embodied cognition that emerge over the course of processing and the mechanismsresponsible for reaching a judgment fluctuate and are rarely static. In other words, therelationship between cognition and action is mutually constraining, highly interactive,and emergent over time.

Conclusion

During the 2004 Presidential election, John Kerry stated that he ‘‘actually did vote forthe $87 billion…before [he] voted against it.’’ Disregarding his need to appeal to bothsides of the aisle, perhaps the hand movements left and right that accompanied this state-ment led the audience to label him a flip-flopper. In a 2008 television interview, Vice-Presidential candidate Sarah Palin explained the basis for her foreign policy initiatives.Perhaps, it was the fact that Palin sat uncomfortably near to Katie Couric that sheannounced her policy was derived from Alaska’s physical proximity to Russia.



Although proponents of modular, encapsulated systems might believe the cross-modalinteraction implausible, and lay opinion might fail to recognize the often unconsciousinfluence, the body certainly does interact with the mind. Motor systems do interact withcognition. Interestingly, this interaction can occur at high levels. Seemingly effortful,deliberate, and intentional judgments and decisions might actually be less a consciouschoice and more a reaction to basic bodily systems. Furthermore, as we have argued, theinfluences of body states on judgment processes may serve an important purpose, provid-ing information to aid the self-regulation system by harnessing the signaling power of theaffective system. As Andy Clark (2001) advanced, the mind is not naked but is insteadclothed in the actions of the body and the environment. People do not think anythought, reach any haphazard judgment, form any random conclusion, but instead, astouted by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1999), our minds think only what ourembodied minds allow.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank David Dunnng, Tom Gilovich, Melissa Ferguson, andMichael Spivey for their comments on an earlier version of this manuscript.

Short Biography

Emily Balcetis’ research interests fall at the intersection of social and cognitive psychology.Specifically, she investigates what and how motivations constrain visual perception, socialjudgment, and decision-making. She authored or coauthored papers in these areas for theJournal of Personality and Social Psychology, Psychological Science, Personality and Social Psychol-ogy Bulletin, and Perception. She is currently editing a volume on the social psychology ofvisual perception along with colleague Daniel Lassiter. Before coming to Ohio Universityin Athens, Ohio, where she presently teaches introduction to psychology and graduateseminars in motivations and automatic social cognition, she earned her BA in Psychologyand BFA in Music Performance from the University of Nebraska, Kearney, and a PhD inSocial and Personality Psychology from Cornell University where she held a Sage Fel-lowship and earned the Society of Experimental Social Psychology 2006 DissertationAward for her research on motivated visual perception. She will join the faculty at NewYork University in the Fall of 2009.

Shana Cole is a social psychology graduate student at Ohio University. Her earlygraduate career has already afforded her the opportunity to explore a wide range ofresearch interests, including work on motivated distance perception, dissonance-inducedarousal and time perception, sabotage behaviors in different relationship dyads, and theinfluence of perceptual processes on emotional reactivity. In addition, her Master’s thesisinvestigates emotional responses to informal social feedback as a function of feedbacksource and accuracy-driven differential evaluation. Before attending Ohio University,she received her BA in Psychology from The College of New Jersey. She will transferto the graduate program in social psychology at New York University in the Fall of2009.

Endnote

* Correspondence address: Department of Psychology, 200 Porter Hall, Ohio University, Athens, OH 45701,USA. Email: [email protected]



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Body in Mind: The Role of Embodied Cognition in Self-Regulation