BLUESKY GNSS FIREWALL

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Agenda

Update on PNT (Position, Navigation & Time) industry initiatives and trends for Critical Infrastructure

BlueSky GNSS Firewall product overview

GPS Anomalies (BlueSky Performance Monitoring)

Summary

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Why should you be concerned?

Until recently, GPS devices were viewed simply as radio receivers. However, they are actually computers with similar security risks. Threats include denial-of-service attacks (jamming) and the introduction of bad data into the system (spoofing). The advent of software-defined radios has increased the ease and lowered the cost with which these types of attacks can be launched. Efforts should be made to ensure accurate and resilient timing for your GPS device.

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GNSS has become the “utility of utilities”

Data/Cloud Services

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GNSS is a single point of failure for Critical Infrastructure

Data/Cloud Services

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Spoofing and Jamming in Norwegian Sea

Russian military trainingRussian battleships

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GPS disruptions in recent NATO war games in Scandinavia

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National Timing Security Act• The National Timing

Resilience and Security Act requires the Department of Transportation to establish a timing system to back up GPS by December 2020.

• Now signed by Congress and the President.

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DOT moves aggressively on GPS backup

Congressional mandates The first mandate was in a law passed in

2017. The National Defense Authorization Act tasked the Departments of Defense, Transportation, and Homeland Security to jointly conduct a technology demonstration of GPS backup technology.

The National Timing Resilience and Security Act requires the Department of Transportation to establish a timing system to back up GPS by December 2020.

https://www.gpsworld.com/us-dot-moves-aggressively-on-gps-backup-rfp-this-month/

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BlueSky GNSS Firewall

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Signal in space vulnerabilities are generally categorized based on the failure mode they induce in a GNSS receiver Jamming: Partial or complete loss of ability to receive

GNSS signals Spoofing: Tricking a GNSS receiver into receiving

illegitimate signals

Multi GNSS systems are available for use but they provide minimal protection against signal-in-space vulnerabilities Use of multiple constellations can help in detecting errors

but: GNSS constellations are relatively close in frequency so

jamming events often impact all the constellations It is only slightly more difficult to spoof multiple GNSS

systems than it is to spoof a single GNSS system

Signal-in-Space Vulnerabilities

We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking that we used when we created them.

- Albert Einstein

GPS Galileo

BeiDou GLONASS

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Current GPS Receivers Civilian GPS receiver

Commercial GPS receivers utilize L1 signal for tracking Varying levels of multi-constellation support and limited security

features Civilian GPS receivers make-up the majority of GPS receivers

used by Critical Infrastructure

Military GPS receiver Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) receivers utilize

L1 and the encrypted L2 signal for GPS tracking Provide better anti-jam performance and better protection against

more advanced GPS attacks Not available for commercial applications

Civilian GPS Receivers

Military GPS Receiver

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Firewall conceptPhysical Firewall at Electrical Substation

Secure PNT for Critical Infrastructure

Unprotected PNT from the Sky

Network Firewall

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Secure Firewall Overlay Protects against GNSS spoofing and jamming

Simple connection between GNSS antenna and GPS system

Optional internal MAC for holdover

1PPS and 10 MHz timing reference inputs for extended holdover (connection to external cesium reference)

Redundant AC or DC power options

“BlueSky Performance Monitoring” integrated within TimePictra

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BlueSky GNSS Firewall Overview (Hardened vs. Validated)

orOptional(inside)

HardenedOutput (GPS format)

ValidatedOutput (all bands)

Holdover

Live SkyReception/Anomaly

Detection

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BlueSky Software Engine• BlueSky software engine manages all the

elements of the GNSS firewall• Contains algorithms to aggregate and

interpret the data from anomaly detectors• Makes informed decisions on the validity of

Live Sky input and takes action to protect downstream GNSS systems

• BlueSky software engine reports on the status of the firewall and the status of the GNSS environment

• Provides Graphical User Interface (GUI) for monitoring current status of the GPS firewall

• Interfaces with TimePictra to provide situational awareness of your entire GNSS infrastructure

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All signals are analyzed using three types of analytics Waveform Analytics: Analyze characteristics of the physical

signal (e.g. carrier frequency, power level, spectrum shape) Data Analytics: Analyze characteristics of the received data

(e.g. week number, leap second info, satellite ephemeris) Solution Analytics: Analyze characteristics of the solution

output (e.g. time, position, velocity)

Decision engine determines signal validity Decision is based on the aggregate information from the

anomaly detectors because there are many opportunities for false alarms from any one anomaly detector

Good coverage comes from having detectors of each type

GNSS security means intelligently analyzing the signals It is not based on the “number of detectors” but rather the

intelligence of the detectors

BlueSky GNSS Signal Analysis

WaveformAnalytics

Live Sky Unprotected GNSS Signals

DataAnalytics

SolutionAnalytics

Protected GNSS Signals

Vulnerable Live-Sky Environment

Decision Based on Detector Intelligence

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BlueSky GNSS Firewall Deployment models

SyncServer S600/S650

MAC

Validated

Equipment requiring GPS/L1 signal

Hardened

GPS Splitter

Firewall usingValidated Output

Firewall usingHardened Output

Firewall deployed for monitoring only

Optional MACOptionalCesium

Equipment requiring GPS/L1 signal

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Visibility of GNSS Anomalies(BlueSky Performance Monitoring)

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Causes of GNSS AnomaliesPower received on Earth from a GPS satellite, -160 dBW, is as “bright” as a flashlight in Los Angeles when viewed in New York City, approx. 5000 km away

12,000 miles between satellites and receiver

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Sample of GNSS metricsMetric Characteristic of Signal Anomaly

Tracked Satellite Count Are the expected number of satellites in view?

GPS Position Delta Is the position data coming from the sky moving too much relative to surveyed antenna position?

Phase Time Deviation Is the sky received “time” moving? (suddenly, gradually, etc?)

GPS Signal Average Is the GNSS signal strength of the visible satellites in the expected range?

Satellites in view Are individual satellites at expected carrier-to-noise level?

RF Power Is the RF power level within expected threshold?

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TimePictra - BlueSky GNSS Firewall Management

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RF Power Detection GNSS RF Power operates at a very low signal level

Typically, when connected to antenna, signal is in the 60db to 90db range

Small power shifts, just enough to take over the reception of the receiver

Time based performance monitoring shows characteristics of knock-off signal

Dashboard views are also convenient for seeing alarm condition

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Time Jump Anomaly Timing anomalies can be sudden jumps or gradual time shifts Autonomous timescale algorithms are used to detect time

offsets (sudden, gradual, etc.) When detected, GPS synthesizer technology driven by the

timescale(Hardened Output), can maintain operation300nS jump

Anomaly detected; howeverTimescale remains stable

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Position Movement Anomaly

Position MovementPosition Movement

Position Movement

Threshold set to 10meters

Anomaly position detector can be set to the desired threshold, for example 10 meters

Once threshold is crossed, alarm is generated

Time based performance monitoring provides plot of position movements

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Observing multiple anomaly types to detect root cause

GPS Position movement occurring relative to surveyed antenna position

GPS phase movement relative to internal time-scale

Both position and time are repeatedly occurring

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System designers can no longer treat GPS as a “trusted” source of time GPS signal-in-space threats are not just a theoretical possibility – they have

been realized GPS receivers are actually computers with similar security risks

Securing GPS-based systems from signal-in-space attacks requires a layered approach Detection: Rapidly identify local GPS anomalies such as

spoofing or jamming Resiliency: Design systems that can continue their operations

during periods of GPS outages Visibility: Provide situational awareness of the GNSS

environment

Last but not least: The sky is not falling Practical things can be done today to harden

your system against signal-in-space threats

Key Points

Design Approach for Securing Systems Against GPS Signal-in-Space Threats

BlueSky Performance Monitoring

BlueSky GNSS Firewall

Detection, Resiliency, Visibility