Blake. Disraeli Revival

8/13/2019 Blake. Disraeli Revival

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Theonservative Party

from Peel to hurchillROBERT BLAKE

FONTANA COLLINS


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itg6 CONSERVATIVE P A R T Y P E E L TO CHURCHILL

NoteFate of the Peelites

McCalmont s Poll hook suitably amended gives g Liberal Conservativesi.e. Peelites returned at the election of 1847; 62 in England, 7 in Wales,11 in Scotland, g in Ireland. 16 of them had been office holders inPeel s government. Geographically their s trength jn England lay inthe west and 35 of them were returned for counties or boroughs westof a line drawn along the eastern boundaries of Lancashire, Cheshire,Staffordshire, Warwick, Gloucester, Wiltshire and Dorset. At theelection of 1852 there were 45 Peelites; 28 in England, 6 in Wales, BinScotland, 3 in Ireland. In both parliaments, therefore, they held thebalance of power, and used it to such effect at the end of 1852 that theysecured the premiership and half the Cabinet in a coalition government.In the election of 1852, 31 of the original Peelites stood again and wonas Peelites for the same seats as in 1847, 2 for different seats; 10 werebeaten for the same seats, for a different seat. g stood and won custraight Conseavatives for the same seats, 2 stood and won as Liberalsfor the same seats, 3 stood and lost as Conservatives for the same seats.15 did not stand (no reason given), 4 applied for the Chiltern Hundredsbetween 1847 and 1852, 8 died, 2 succeeded to peerages, 2 acceptedoffices of profit under the Crown. There were new Peelites who gotn at the 1852 election, 6 of them for seats won by Peelites in 1847 5for different seats.In the election of 1857 26 Peelites were returned, 20 of them for thesame seats as in 1852. The distribution was England 13 Wales gScotland 7 Ireland 3The Pee1ites won 10 English county seats in 1847, 8 in 1852 3 n1857 In English boroughs with an electorate over I,ooo they wonseats in 1847, 3 in 1852 and 3 in 1857 In Engli


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g8 CONS ERVATI VE P A R T Y P E E L TO C H U R C H I L Lwas carried, which was expected by most people to give furtherstrength to the Liberals. The first election on the new suffrage didnot entirely confirm that judgment for the Liberal majority wasslightly down, but it seemed quite enough for practical purposes.Although the political convulsion caused by Gladstone's espOusalof Irish Home Rule brought the Conservatives back in August1886, few people even as late as that would-have predicted theprolonged ascendancy which followed.

This is a period which has-attracted much more attention frornhistorians than the previous twenty years and there is livelycontroversy about some of its problems.

The first great question is the Reform Act of 1867. The issuecame to the fore because of the death of Pahnerston. Russell whowas his successor had long wished to carry a second Reform Act,and Gladstone who became leader of the House of Commons wasalso by now a convinced reformer. As Derby had predicted, thechange involved a distinct shift in the Radical direction. a r l i a ~mentary reform had been debated off and on ever since 1851.It was the symbol, the patent mark as it were, of progressivism. Itwas the flag and shibboleth of the new nation against the old. It strue that since 1859 the Liberals had ceased to have a mnpo,lyin this field Derby and Disraeli in their unsuccessful Reformof that year had staked the Conservative claim to legislate too. Buteverything depended on what was m e ~ n t by reform. The Conservative measure was so palpably designed, despite Di11ra


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100 C O N S E R V A T IV E PARTY - P EEL TO C H U R C H IL L

reform groups but a straightforward Conservative m i n o ~ i t ygovernment, like those of I852 and 1858-g, does not a c c o ~ d ~ n gto form. It brings in and carries a Reform Act which by gtvmghousehold suffrage in the towns extends the franchise much morewidely than the Liberal Bill that the Conservatives have helpedto reject only twelve months earlier. . .To explain this paradox there have been three mam theones.The first theory is the Liberal one that the Bill in its final form Wasforced on Disrae1i by Gladstone; that acceptance of Gladstone'samendments widening the Bill was the price p:lld by an--_ unscrupulous Tory minority ministry for staying in office. The truefacts were recognised by the newly enfranchised r ~ n h o u s e ~ o l d e r swho expressed their gra titude to Gladstone by e ~ r m n g the i b e ~ a l swith an increased majority (up from 6o to 100) m the_ first electionunder the new Act. In a broad sense this is the theory favouredby Morley, Justin McCarthy, and G. M. Trevelyan. .The second theory which is a direct counter-blast to the first lSthat of Tory democracy', According to this the Reform Act farfrom being forced on a reluc tant Disraeli represented f u l ~ m e n tof his early aspirations. Had he not on frequent occas10ns m theISgos maintained that the Conservatives were the truly democratic party? And in his Young England days, though contemptuous of the party that called itself Conservative, had he notseemed to advocate some kind of alliance between the aristocracyand the urban working class? It was of a somewhat hazy natureno doubt but the Reform Act of 1867 at least on the surfaceseemed be connected with it, and if the new franchise did notlead to a Conservative break through in 1868, the party indisputably triumphed in 1874. By then no doubt t ~ e urban h o u ~ e -holder had had time to see who was his true fnend. The socialreforms of I875 and I876 on one interpretation lend furtherto the view that the Conservative party was in someover the heads of the Liberal middle classes to that rather nebuloclSfigure the Conservative working man . Far from yielding.pressure in r867, Disraeli was educating his party, and P ''P''rutgit for the inevitable future. 1

The latest and ablellt exponent of this general theory is Miss Gertrude Hi


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102 CONSERVATI VE P A R T Y P E E L TO CHURCHI L Lto a colleague as the extinction of the Conservative partyand of the real Whigs' .1This observation from a man who had spent a lifetime inpolitics and who had been a member of the Whig governmentwhich brought in the Reform Act of 1832 is not to be ignored. Thedetails are too complicated for discussion here. It is enough to saythat the reduction in the borough franchise, together with the

, clause which added the borough leaseholders to the electorate inthe surrounding county, was bound in itself to involve s o ~ eConservative losses, v n if redistribution is entirely, ignored. Thiswas also true of the final version of the 1867 Bill. But the r e d i s t r i ~bution provisions of the 1866 Bill, unlike those of the 1867 ~ c tmade matters much worse from the viewpoint of Conservativesand real Whigs'.The great hope of the Conservatives lay in their belief thatalmost any redistribution was bound to increase the number ofseats in the countie : which in terms of electors per M.P. were badlyunderrepresented. This, it was expected, would compensate forthe lowering of the franchise and certain other likely features ofredistribution such as the creation of extra seats for Scotland, fornew boroughs and for the big cities. The 1866 Bill did indeed ~ d dseventeen seats to the counties, but not, as the Conservativeswanted, by creating extra county divisions. Instead t u r n ~ dseventeen two-member counties into three -member constituenciesand, given the counties chosen for this addition, it is reckoned byMr Cowling that there would have been an actual bonus to theLiberals of two or three seats.2 The net effect of these and otherredistribution provisions, quite apart from the change in thefranchise, would have been enough to give the Liberals from eightto fifteen ex tra seats.These considerations illustrate the great importance which,that largely vanished3 dimension of politics, attached to contr-ol;over redistribution. They also render the alleged paradoxDerby's and Disraeli's attitude to reform a good deal lessdoxical than it seems at first sight. It made perfecdy good sense

1 Cowling, op. cit., 70, quo ting Derby Papers, 190/2, May w 1866.11 ibid.a Not wholly, witness the 1g6g d ~ p u t e about the recommendation of the

Commission.

DISRAELIAN REVIVAL I 866-81 103the Conservatives to ally with the right wing Liberals, the so~ a . U e ? Adullamites, in order to reject a Bill which was highly tnJunous to the party and then a year later to pass one which wasfar less so. Public opinion- not merely that of the Reform Leagb ueut m ormed, intelligent, middle class opinion - was strongly infavour of reform, and the ConserVatives could not simply sit backand do nothing. In 1867 they at least had the initiative over

r e d i s t r i ~ u ~ o n c v ~ n they did not have complete control. Theywere still m a mmonty and they had on occasion to defer to the House: But ~ i ~ e r a l s w ~ r e in a state of chaos thanks to Derby's

and D1sraeh s bnllmnt tactics. For a brief period the Conservativeswere able to get their own way to a much greater extent than theirnumbers warranted.

~ h e franchise p r o ~ s i o n s of the J Act seem to have operatedagamst the Conservatives- anyway m the next election- althoughit does not follow that the effect of Household suffrage was anymore adverse than that of the more limited provisions of Glad-

, stone's Bill or the abortive Ten Minute Bill. But the Conservativesayin redistribution undoub tedly helped them. This is shown by thecontrast e ~ e e n their il.l fortune in constituencies where no chang etook place m boundanes or number of MPs and their relative

:prosperity in those areas of England where major changes were. made. In the f o r m ~ r the Liberals gained 25 seats (they won 57

lost 32) a net mcrease of 50 in their majority. In the fourteenco1 nlties where a large scale redistribution occurred there were inold p a r l i a ~ e n ~ 52 county MPs and 14 sitting for boroughs. were red1stnbuted. Of these 66 MPs, 34 were Conservative,Liberal. Under the new order the total representation rose from

to 87, of which 57 were Conservative. This meant a reduction25 in the Liberal majority, and it was a valuable offset to

advantages such as the inescapable increase in ScottishrepreS


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104 CONSERVATIVE P A R T Y P E E L TO CHURCHILLConservatives great prob lem was to prove themselves as a viableparty of government. Throughout the 1Ssos their position hadbeen curiously analogous to that of the Labour party in the 1920s.Like MacDonald, Derby had to show that the neW party createdin 1846- for there is a sense in which the Derby-Disraeli partywas as new and untried as Labour after the First World War- wasfit to rule. In 1852, the year of the Who? \Nho ? ministry, almostas many people entered the Cabinet for the first time and tooktheir privy councillor s oath as in Ramsay MacDonald s Cabinetof 1924; and Derby s minority government lasted just about slong as MacDonald s. Their second chance in 1858 came at asimilar interval of time to MacDonald s in 1929; in both cases itwas again a minority administration; in both cases it ended inearly defeat, although Derby s government did not break up intotal disorder like MacDonald s in 1931. Perhaps because of thelong shadow cast by Peel, the Right has been instinctively morecohesive than the Left, whether Liberal or Labour.

The reasons for Labour being out in the cold during the twodecades after 19 I8 were basically the same as those which keptthe Conservatives out during the two decades following the repealof the corn Jaws - a deep distrust by middle of the road moderateopinion of their competence and capacity to govern. In the caseof Labour, this was because the revolutionary language used bysome of its supporters gave an impression of reckless irresponsibility; in the case of the Conservatives seventy years earlier, because the reactionary language of a section gave the whole partythe reputation of being the stupid party, likely to provokerevolution by pursuing a narrow agrarian class interest. Of course,anyone who examined the speeches and attitudes of Derby andDisraeli could see that they no more echoed the opinions ofthe red-faced country .squires who thronged the back benches,than MacDonald and Henderson echoed those of the Clyde -siders. But it was the general impression which had to be changedin each case, i f the m i n ~ : > r i t y party was to be regarded as fit togovern .The difficulty is that the charge of being unfit to govern can onlybe disproved by governing; and the more the charge is believedthe less chance there is of showing it to be false. Moreover, neither

DISRAELIAN REVIVAL r866-Bt 105J?erby in the 1850s nor MacDonald in the 19208 hadticularly successful during their brief m i n i s ~ D been par-Lues. erby s dgovernment was rather better than his first b h seconthi t k bli ut e had doneno ng o rna e pu c opm10n positively prefe hid t P I . . r m t o t h eomman a merstoman coalition. It was vital th rth d tr chance should not be muffed. Palmerston was d d Rd GI d ea ussellan a stone had m de a hash of their Reform ill Th L b. . e Ieralparty was spht w t d ~ open. On the other hand the Conservatives

w e ~ e outnumbered m the House and neither Derby nor Disraelibeheved tha.t a general election would improve their position. 1In these Circumstances the great need was for the Co:nservat1

. ffi -o stay m o ce on their own for long enough to show at least thatthey were party of government, and ideally that they were theparty of government. These were the aims of the leaders andt h o u ~ h they did not succeed in the second, for Derby neve;acqmred the mantle of Palmerston - nor did Disraeli h dth h h . ' aro u ~ e tned t h e ~ did succeed in the first. In spite of theelection of 1868, m spite of the increased Liberal majority the v e ~ ~ of the previous thirty months had permanently altered th:position of the Consentatives. They had ceased to be the stupidparty. They had become a viable alternative to the still dominantbut no longer unchallengeable Liberals.

This o b j ~ c t i v e of establishing their party as a party of government ~ p l a m s mos_t of the actions of Derby and Disraeli throughout: the cnsis. It ~ p l a m ~ why t h ~ y sabo.taged in June 1866 the projectto form a fuswn with the nght wmg of the Liberals: the Conservatives had to govern on their own; incidentally, fusion wouldhave been a ~ a ~ to the personal position of both men, but this neednot alter one s judgment tl1at they acted in the best interests of theparty as ~ e l l as t h e m s e ~ v e s . The same purpose explains why they: b ~ o . u g h t m a Reform Bill at all: it was vital to keep the Liberals

d i v i d e ~ , and nothing was surer to do so than reform. Of course~ l i m a t e . of o p i n ~ o n was relevant too, though not publicag:ttatmn which had httle effect on Derby or Disraeli. But a viable

. ~ o n s e r v a t i v e government had to show that it could move with thetimes. 1 Curiously n ~ u g h Russell, and Brand, the Liberal whip, thought that the ConservatiVes would wm 1f there was a dWolution. Cowling, op. cit., 131.


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I06 CONSERVATIVE PARTY-PEEL TO CHURCHILL

f overnment also explains the form ofThis aim to be a party o g . . 1 and the principle had tothe Bill. It had to be based ond a p n n C l ~ : reality all sides of andia : t from Gla stone s. dappear ueren f C mons want ed a mo er.ateI ative House o omintense y conserv d th- , siduum' _ i.e. the poorest,hich would exdu e e re kimeasure w . ru tible element in the urban wor ngmost feckless and e a s ~ y c : n ~ a s e d on personal payment of ratesclass. The ConservatiVe d d restr1 ctions have produced. . . . al safeguar s an ,would, Wlth Its ongm Glad t ne's 7 rental limit. But ita very similar e l e c t o r a ~ n : t o sdo more democratic principle.d to body a d.iuerent an hseeme em . . de a final resting place or t eWhat was more, It seemed ~ r o V I based on rental could alwaysquestion, whereas any name dgture thing at all and turned intotill it was reduce o no ,be cut away 1 Thi ument had some substance.straight manhood suffrage. all s a:gh d but household suffrageD. li' safeguards varus e 'True, 15rae s t ) did remain the basis of the( d d x885 to the coun tes d dexten e m Adul t male suffrage 1 notelectoral system for half a c e n t ~ r y. n 8 d female till 1928.come m ti I 9 . kee the Liberals off balance - andThe same deterrrunatwn to I hy Derby and Disraeli wereth elves in power- exp ams w .hence ems h d off to aCcept the resignationsready, after the first ~ h o c k e ~ a b 7 : : t n r a t h e r than put forward a Bill

of a powerful group m th f ch . g these objects. The grouphi h had no chance o a levm M fw c h 1 ter became 3rd arquess oconsisted of Lord Cranborne, r aLord Carnarvon, a priggish

Salisbury and lead.er of the tyti n and Sir Robert Peel's son,Puseyite much addicted to r e s ~ g n a o ' D b 'You will find hima p 1 f h m Disraeh wrote to er y Gener ee o .w o th h e househol d suffrage , whenvery placable, e x c e ~ t e. p ~ a ~ n February 25 as a result ofhis eye lights up Wlth lnsamty: the rou declared that theyCranborne's statistical c _ a l c u l a t l o ~ t h s dr gn /aken off balance the 1 s the Bill was w1 aw must resign un es . B'll based on a 6 rating franchiBe,Cabinet agreed to s u b s ~ t u t e ab 1 th party meeting at which

d did 1 ten rrunutes e ore e .an so on y th osals to a party meeting.d to announce e prop _ . disDerby was _ue . ' . became called thanks to the mThe Ten Mmute Bdl : t f th Cabinet Sir John Pak.ington,cretion of another mem er o . e ty Worse still it seemed .pleased no one in the Conservatlve p ~ r . '

1 Cowling, op. Cit., 172.

DISRAELIAN REVIVAL I866- -Qi

be a surrender not only to Cranborne's group but to Glads. d d lik I b . d th h" tone,m ee un e y to e carne WI out IS support. Th why Derby and Disraeli changed their minds. It ex ; r u ~ sD" r h" d t ti th b k ams w YISrae w tppe up a on amo?g e benches againstconcesswns to the anb.-party group m the Cabmet, thus setting aprecedent for Harold Wilson's alleged intra-party activities overarms for South Africa, which so many journalists confidently saidwere unprecedented. It explains why Derby on March 2 acceptedthe resignations of ministers whom he had seemed ready to appeaseat great cost only five days earlier.

The leaders were perhaps lu ky in that the resigning ministerswere not ready to try to organise the sort of revolt that Disraelihimself, along with Bentinck, had organised against Peel twentyone years earlier. Derby was by no means confident of the consequences of his decision. This is the end of the Conservative Party,he is recorded by Lord john Manners as saying when Cranborneanc . his friends rose to leave the Cabinet room. But it was nothingof the sort, and, although the attacks made in the House werevery bitter, especially against Disraeli personally, he survived andso did the party. Seven years later Cranborne (now Salisbury) andCarnatvon accepted Disraeli's invitation to join his Cabinet. Thiswould not have seemed at all likely in 1867.Desire to keep the Liberals divided probably also explainsDisraeli's acceptance of Hodgkinson's amendment which in effectenfranchised all ratepayers and seemed the most sensational

. example of what his foes termed betrayal . A cardinal feature ofthe Bill on its first introduction had been the restriction of therating suffrage to those who paid their rates direct to the localauthority. Disraeli had dwelt at length upon the special virtues ofthose who were personally responsible for their rates, contrasted with those who, in the jargon of the day, 'compounded', i.e. paid

the rent collected by their landlords. In fact Disraeli'sarJ


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108 CONSERVATIVE P A R T Y P E E L TO CHURCHILL

Liberals were still in a state of confusion. This meant getting onwith things as quickly as possible. The Radicals had the power tofilibuster and they could have held up the Bill till an autumnsession which Disraeli particularly wished to avoid for its own sake,even apart from the danger that delay would consolidate theopposition.There may have been another reason. We are perhaps too e a d ~' to underestimate the extent to which even men as clever as D1sraelimay :find themselves the prisoners of their o; n arguments. Afterall Hodgkinson did not propose to enfranchise compounders. Hemerely proposed to abolish c o m p ~ u n d i n g a ~ d ~ a k e everyoccupier personally responsible for his rates. DlS:aelt h a ~ nevertied his colours to the retention of compoundmg, wh1ch wasindeed open to much criticism in the form in h i ~ h it was adopted.He had simply said that only those who patd ~ r e c t s h ~ u l d havethe vote. Under Hodgkinson's amendment thts was JUSt whatwould still happen. The only difference was that there would be agreat many more of them. .Perhaps it is permissible to draw a parallel With a more recentepisode. When Sir Anthony d ~ n and ~ Guy ~ o l l e t declaredthat their purpose in the Suez mtervent10n was to separate thecombatants', everyone except the inordinately naive suspectedthat this was a form of words designed to cover another - and tomany people entirely creditable - objective, viz, to seize ~ o n t r o lof the Suez Canal and bring down Nasser. But when after SIX daysthe combatants obviously had been separated, it was difficult tothink of a plausible excuse to go on, even though the Canal zonehad not been occupied and Nasser had not been brought down.No doubt there were other factors -world opinion, U.S. pressureon sterling, etc. But we should not forget the major difficultyraised by the particular casus belli chosen. At any rate, whateverthe truth about Suez, one can see Disraeli's genuine dilemma overthe compound householder.The manreuvres of Derby and Disraeli over reform makesense i their aim was to show that their party was fit to guvc' ''and i they were hoping to inherit Palmerston's mantle inchanged circumstances caused by Palmerston's death.1 The

See Cowling, op. cit., ch. IX, 'Palmenton's mantle'.

DISRAELIAN REVIVAL I 866-8 I togthey carried was probably as conservative a measure as couldhave been carried by a minority Conservative government in1867. Moreover, because of their say in redistribution it was farless adverse to thei rparty than any measure which the i b ~ r a l s wouldhave pass.ed, in spite of Liberal support of a restrictive franchise.

The b1d for the mantle of Palmerston was not immediatelysuccessful. The events of 1867 did however make the C. , , onserva-ttves a genuine alternative government. They also gave Disraeli

p ~ r s o n ~ l y a notable boost. When Derby retired early in 1868,DISraeli was bound to be his successor. This might not have beentrue .two years earlier, nor one year later when the loss of the firstelectJ.on on the new franchise had dealt a heavy blow to his

p r ~ s h g e Fortu.nately. had by then the immense advantage ofbemg an e x - P n m ~ Mmtster- and there is only one example in thewhole of our p ~ n o d o f ~ .Conservative ex-Prime Minister beingtoppled when m opposition - Balfour in 1911. But the twicerepeated effort_s in 186g and 1870 of the patrician section of theparty to make Salisbury leader in the House of Lords show howshaky Disraeli's position was. 1 Had they come off, he would havebeen bound to resign, as no doubt Salisbury's supporters intended.The two men e r e not even on speaking terms, and Salisbury had

r e c ~ ~ t l y descnbed Disraeli in the uarterly Review as 'a merepohtical gamester'.But, although the Conservatives had become a plausible partyof o v ~ r n m e n t they did not yet look like becoming the majority

party m the way that they had seemed to be under Peel in 1841that the Liberals really had been under Palmerston. Glad.saw to that early in 1868 by taking up the cause of dis-. . of the Irish Church. He brilliantly turned the tablesDtsraeh, and. exploited one of his opponents' major weaknesses.Conservatives had o f t ~ n been jeered at as the party of

and protection. Maynooth and the corn lawsthe political danger of both these causes. Protectionismbeen dropped, but not protestantism, i.e. defence of the

fAI>gli c:an Establishment interpreted in its evangelical sense whichcommanded by far the greatest support in the Church.

1See E. J. F e u c h r n : ~ e r Disruli


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1 0 CONSERVATIVE P A R T Y - P E E L TO C H U R C H IL L

Protestantism had often been a political incubus. It had causedBentinck s resignation in 1848. I t had made a coalitio? w i ~ ~Peelites and Irish impossible in 1852. It had wrecked D1sraeh sbid for Irish support in 1859 Derby for all his grandeur andinsouciance was the spirit incarnate of this attitude; his inveteratehostility to popery in general and to Irish popery in p a r t i c ~ l a rmay well have enhanced his authority among the country sqmres,rbut it positively repelled outside support. .Yet it is doubtful whether Derby s retirement early l f i r868made the situation any better. Disraeli from miscalculation madethe same error that Derby would have made from conviction; hebased his programm e on identification of the cause of no-poperywith that of the Irish Church and hoped that popular uproarwould check disestablishment. Perhaps he had no choice. Tocompromise over the Irish Church would have fatally split hisrank and file. When Gladstone chose the Anglican Establishmentin Ireland for attack he was no doubt acting from deep felt conviction but he was also shrewdly moving the political battle on tothe C o ~ e r v a t i v e s weakest ground. The Church of Ireland waspredominantly evangelical, and the party was officially b ~ u n d todefend it in the last ditch. Yet its numbers and endowments werenot easily defensible in a Church ministering to only n e - e i g h ~ ofthe nation for which it was designed. A great many Conservativeswere uneasy about it. The Fenian troubles had made all parties inEngland anxious to do something about I r e l a n ~ . Disraeli s ~ l a nhad been the old one of Pitt and Castlereagh. I t m1ght be descnbedas levelling up instead of levelling down, for it involved concurrentendowment of the Roman Catholic and Presbyterian Churches,leaving the Anglican Establishment undisturbed. The d i f f i c u ~ t ywas that it also involved the tax-payer s money, and the Enghshtax-payer was not likely to look on expenditure for such a purposewith any friendly eye. However, Disraeli believed that he m i g ~ tsucceed and at least that Cardinal Manning and the Catholichierarchy would be with him. But Manning to Disraelis a n g e ~ ,ceased negotiation the moment that Glad.stone a n ~ o u n c e ~ hisplan. All hope of a ConseiVative alliance wtth the Insh vamshedovernight.Gladstone could not have selected a better issue on which to

DISRAELIAN REVIVAL r 8 6 6 - B I IIIunify his own party and divide his opponents Wh th thther r hi 1 e er Iswaseason 10r s e ectoral victory must rem k I 1 am non-proven forwe now so It t e about the psephology of a centu B .se h ry ago. ut Items certrun t at m England Disraeli s appeal fell fl t L hi d I a , except ma ~ c a : ~ e , an at east probable that the big jump in the LiberalmaJonty m Ireland (from 5 in 1865 to 25 in 1868) w dI fG , as a Irectresu t o lads tone s espousal oflrish disestablishment It b blh id proaye pe him m Scotland too where in any case the extra seatscreated by the Reform Act were bound to be advantageous (in1865 the Libera l share was 41 out of 53 seats in 1868 it was 2 tof6 . . th . S . . . , 5 ou. o - a nse. m . etr cottlsh maJOrity of 15). In fact the Liberalgam was mamly m t ~ e Celtic fringe, for their numbers also wentup from 18 out of29 m Wales to 22 out of 30.Yet, al.though their English majority remained virtually the~ a r n e , I 7 n s t e a d f 25, there were some important changes withinIt. The Liberals made substantial gains in the big cities, but thesewere offset by two significant movements in favour of the Con

~ e r v a t i v e s w ~ h are shown on Table Don page 1 I2 . The first wasm. Lancashire and Cheshire, where, as we already saw theexistence of a large Irish immigrant population had cau;ed aProtestant anti-Irish reaction even in 1865 against the party whichseemed more closely identified with the Irish. The extension ofthe f ~ n c ~ s e to working class householders, together with Gladstone s pohcy of disestablishment, greatly strengthened this trend.n 18?9 the Conservatives won 15 out of the 36 seats in the nvocounties. 1865 the figures had risen to 18 and in I868 the

,ConservatiVes won no less than 31 out of the 46 seats allocated tothe_ two counties by the new Reform Act. The second movementwh1ch ~ a s even more significant for the future, was that ofmiddl;class opm10n in the south. It was shown in Westminster whereW H. Smith, ~ i m s e l f a symbol of the change, for he had been a

m 1865, defeated J S. Mill, and in MiddlesexJ,>vhcereLordGeorge Hamilton ousted Henry Labouchere, although

t ~ e year ?efore the seat had seemed so hopeless that no Con.il


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DISRAELIAN REVIVAL 1866-81 II3


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I I 4 CONSERVATIVE P A R T Y P E E L TO C H U R C H IL L

dared tell Disraeli this, and neither he nor Derby made any move.Then quite suddenly Disraeli decided to assert himself. H ~ h ~ d

been by no means as inactive as he had seemed, even before this.The party organisation, on his initiative, was to some extent v e r ~hauled by J. E. Gorst. To what extent is open to argument.But the Central Office with Gorst as Principal Agent and aforgotten but very able figure, the Ron. C. K. Keith-Falconer assecretary, was undoubtedly a more efficient i n ~ t r u m e ~ t . thanDisraeli's personal firm of solicitors which had been on_gmallychosen to deal with its client's finances rather than w1th theelectoral management of a great political party 1 Gorst and KeithFalconer succeeded in fielding far more candidates in the 1874election than ever before. In 1868 and 1874 about half the 650 orso seats in parliament were virtually uncontested in the sense thatone of the two major parties was not in the battle at all. But,whereas in 1868 the Liberals had nearly twice as many walkoversas the Conservatives (213 compared with u6), in 1874 the proportions had sharply changed. U ncontested ConseiVativcseatsrosefrom u6 to qS; uncontested Liberal seats declined from 213 toISO Altogether the Conservatives seem to have put b e t w ~ e n 40and 50 more candidates in the field in r874, whereas the L1beralshad some 70 fewer. .The other important organisational change was the creation ofthe National Union of Conservative and Constitutional Associations in 1867. This was designed originally as a_means of organising the newly enfranchised working class men m the boroughs.At the time its significance did not seem very great. was onlyone of a number of similar movements and organisatiOns, and 1tgot off to a poor start. The first annual conference ~ fixed withremarkable fatuity to take place four days after Chnstmas 1868.Not surprisingly only six members, apart from the c h a i r ~ a nLord Dartmouth, turned up. It was Disraeli who put the N at10nalUnion on the map. He made it his audience on two importantoccasions in 1872. The first of these was his speech on May 3 to a .gathering of the Lancashire s s o c i t i o n ~ at ti:e Free T r a ~ e Hall,Manchester. The desirability of Disraeli making some major pronouncement in this electorally promising area had long been can-

Far a fuller diaeu 'lion of party organisation, see below, PP 137-49

D iS k A E L IA N REVIVAL 1866-BI 115v.assed. It is measure of his unpopularity that the invitationhad not been Issued much earlier, as Disraeli had hoped. In thee ~ e n t t.he ~ c l a y may well have been beneficial. It resulted inDISraeh stnld.ng at just the right psychological moment when

G l a ~ s t o n e was running out of steam and into trouble. He followedup his first blow with a second only seven weeks later onJun 24when he addressed the London Conference of the National u i O I ~at the Crystal Palace.

The natqre and effect of these two pronouncements have beento som.e extent ~ t o r t c d in retrospect. They do not constitutesome ktnd o_fpolitical charter like the L;t.bour party s in 1gr8, noreven a positive programme, like the Liberals' Newcastle programme_ of 1891. i ) r a e ~ d e ~ o t e d most o f ~ time to an essentially

~ e s t r u c t l v e t h e ~ the meptltude of the government, t he harrassm ~ and u ~ e t t l i n g nature of its legislation, the dangerous attitudeof _ts left wmg. For Gladstone since 1868 had been engaged in a

~ a J ? r progra IliJlt of what would nowadays be called 'modernisa~ o " : was the overdue process of removing from the nation'sJDBti_tutlons some of the ancient dust and cobwebs which had lainu . n ~ I s t u r ~ e d fur g _ e n ~ r ~ t i o n s past. The army, the universities, thectvil service, the JUdiCiary, the Irish Church, the Irish land lawthe conduct of election,s, had all been reformed. Disraeli had b e e ~careful not to f.I.SSOciate himself with the defence of really flagranta b u ~ e s , but he was fully prepared to take advantage of the moodof diScontent, injured interests, and vague uneasiness about thefuture, which Liberal reforming zeal had created. And the ex

t r e ~ e Left, then as ~ l w a _ y s , provided an excellent target. Inparticular, the repubhcarusm of some Radicals was a constantembarrassment to Gladstone, Here was a chance such as Palmerstan never afforded for the Conservatives to be a voice and not anecho.

this was true in home affairs it was even truer in externalpohcy. To a great many people Gladstone here was an u n w e l ~o ~ c o n t r ~ s t with Palmerston. He accepted the award Qf thearbitrators m the case of the Alabama a southern warship which

h ~ d escaped from Liverpool in the American Civil War and infli.cted great _damage on northern shipping. To many people thedamages pa1d to the American government seemed grossly


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DISRAELlAN REVIVAL 1 8 6 6 8 1 117excessive. There was also Russia's decision in I 87o to abrogate thclauses of he Treaty of Paris of1856 which after the Crimean Waiforbade a Russian navy in the Black Sea. Britain could and diddo nothing, but Gladstone's popular ity was not enhanced, Finallythere was Britain's palpable impotence during the FrancoPrussian War. All these episodes seemed signs of either feeblenessor of the postponement of British interests to some sort of highermoral and international law. Many Liberals, moreover, appearedto display a certain shamefacedness, i not positive guilt, towardsthe overseas Empire. In all these fields Disraeli was an instinctivePalmerstonian. He had the intense alien patriotism not infrequently found among people whose country is in a sense adoptedand not really their own; and with it went an acute dislike ofthose genuinely British figures who seemed to be le tting down theside and who ought to have known better. This was largely whatprompted Disraeli's emphasis on empire in both his speeches, andhis attacks on Gladstone's foreign policy right up to the generalelection.

Disraeli did not say very much about empire to the NationalUnion and what he said was vague. He said little more aboutsocial reform- the other question in which he is usually supposedto have made a major initiative; and here too he was equallyunspecific. Not that vagueness should be regarded as a reproach.Disraeli had heeded the warning of his old chief against whatDerby considered Bentinck's besetting sin 'of starting detailedprojects when in opposition' 1 But Disraeli did sound a new notewhen he declared that the English people would be idiots i theyhad not 'long perceived that the time had arrived when social andnot political improvement is the object which they ought topursue'.

MME This was a perfectly sensible bid for working class support. ButTHE CONSERVATIVE PROGRA it would be untrue to suppose that Gladstone had wholly neglectedIlL WANT TO KNOW TBB CONSERVATIVE PBOOBUIIlll lf.ISO


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120 CONSERVATIVE PARTY- -PEEL 1 0 CHURCHI L L

equated with the preservation of Turkey as a bulwark againstRussian expansion.Being tough and in office with a majority ('the best repartee' ashe once described it) Disraeli got his way and brought back 'peacewith honour from Berlin. But it is the way of the world that thosewho defend the cause of realpolitik against moral arguments may,if they are careless or if their opponents are skilful, appear to be

12

too for reasons which will be discussed in thewas Disraeli's election address ve . . . next chapter. Noring about social reform on w h i l ~ ; n ~ : ~ It c ~ ~ t a i n e d nothcongratulated himself and was pn . all d l e g ~ t l m a t e l y have. ' nc1p y concerned h .warnmgs about the danger of I . h . WI cryptic. ns separatism. Althou h hwarmng was to come true remarkabl soon g t echimera to most people in I 88o and o l ' It s e e ~ e d a merefurther the Irish vote in England Th senred to alienate evenbacks in India and . ese actors, along wit the setthat followed. Even ~ c c a ~ s : jutttde enouthgh to explain the disastere e own eTorycause and thwent weH only in south-east England Th L"b I ' mgsgain of 103 seats which gave them 353. to tehe CI era s m ~ d e a nethil th H onservatiVes' 2 38w e e orne Rulers rose from 5 I to 6 'Un-English thou h h n li h . g e was, Israeli had one quality on which

s men pnde themselves. He was a good lose H .Grelpatdnset or recrimdinate, or throw up the leadership ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ n ~ ~one seeme to the bl h . 'pu IC to ave done m I87s Old d ti:::.cepted the unanimous request of a party c o n ~ l a v e : c ~ n :

DISRAELIAN REVIVAL I 866-8 I

' positively condoning immorality. Gladstone managed to equatein many people's minds the cause of empire with the cause of evil,and when two expensive and initially disastrous campaigns (theAfghan and Zulu wars of 1879) had to be fought on the confines ofempire largely because of the prancing proconsuls' on the spotdisobeying orders, he had the further charges of waste andincompetence to add to that of wickedness. Hence the apparentsuccess of the two Midlothian campaigns at the end of I879 andat the election of I88o, when Gladstone successfully challengedthe sitting member for Midlothian, the Earl of Dalkeith, son of thegreatest Conservative landowner in Scotland, the Duke of Buccleugh, and used the occasion for a whirlwind denunciation ofDisraeli's foreign and imperial policy.Yet, although Gladstone may well have prolected a picture of The situation [he wrote to Lord Lytton] Wh requtres youth andDisraeli's extravagance, gaudiness and lack of principle, he e n e ~ g y en they a re found - and they will be found_ 1 h 11would not have been so successful in t88o but for the industrial rna e my bow. In the meantime I must act as i I sand agricultural depression which had been growing deeper dur- ; i _ ~ ~ g ; : ~ : : ~ u ~ : n d d t s t c a t ~ p e l t a n l e l s o t e f p t s h i e n T m o y r y p o p w a e r r t y t o T S t : h ; : ~ n h ~ ~ ~ing the last two years of the ministry. Hard times' Disraeli believedto be the cause of his downfall. He may have been right. The existed for more than a century and a h If ey .ave 1 a as an orgamzedagricultural depression raised the whole question of re-enacting p o l i t l ~ a c ~ n n e x i o n & having survived the loss of the Americanprotection. Disraeli wisely rejected it. The urban working class co omes, t e first Napoleon & Lord Grey's Reform Act thsuffering from unemployment and finding its only consolation in must not be snuffed out. ' eycheaper food would never have tolerated measures which made it I ~ o p h e s y [he ended] as becomes one in the sunset of lifedearer. Roughly 70 per cent of working class budgets went on orra erlshouldsaythetwilightofexistence. -food and drink, and these items accounted for as much as 45 per lJut did not ?ehave like this at all. He completed a new novelcent even of middle class budgets. By enfranchising the urban Endymwn for which he received the largest publish , d 'working class householder in 1867 Disraeli, the defender of recorded a d h b er s a vanceprotection in IB46, had made its revival electorally impossible. -- -'> ve i ' n e egan another - a lampoon on Glad-But by refusing he weakened the party' s position in its traditional total ;: : ~ ~ : ;:;;,t, ~ a s ~ never completed. He gave confident

h ld h li h. . a g_a VIce to the Queen on her constt"tutt"onal

strong o - t e Eng s counbes where the Conservatives (luckil h d d' y s e_ l not act on it). He led his party ,n theno less than 27 seats. The party' s organisation was badly run Blake, Dmsdl 721-2, quoting Knebworth Papera.


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PARTY - P E EL T O CHURCHI L L122 CONSERVATIVE

1

_. . and a lomb. He attended a series of clearly and convincingly than any previous historian. WithoutHouse of Lords With vtgodur I p ld not last The winter and 1 belittling the Conservative p e r f o r m a n c ~ in this field, which wasch i bleroutsinLon on. tcou f d b dJ d bl h h th h dl" l1as ona _ ld t in the century. Returning rom a un ou te y very con:u era e, e s ows at 1t a 1tt e coh 4spring were among the co ~ ~ l l -d died of bronchitis a month nection with Disraeli's early Toty philosophy, and that it was

dinner party he caught a c 1 ' 'fi nee of his career has been neither a rebellion against conventional wisdom, nor a revival ofA r i l2 I r88I The true stgm ca . f di blater on P ' ' b d At least there must be agreement Tory paternalism, nor a precursor o re stn utive State i n t e r ~and will be endlessly de ate d ry incongruous fascinating, vention in the interest of the have-nots. In fact m ~ e has only to

h h a s the most extraor rna ' ' d th Jik thi I b bt at e rem m h 1 d the Conservative party, wor e suggestion e s to see 1U essertt:Ja 1mpro a ility.'fresh and timeless figure ever to ave e Apart from ariything else, collectivism of that sort would have

DISRAELJAN REVIVAL 1866-81

d fi h ty? It is a measure of the clashed with a far deeper conviction ofDisraeli- his detestation ofWhat had Disraeli achieve or. 18 p: : e ~ d answer to this ques- -centralisation, bureaucracy and the whole of that side of e n t h a m ~enigma of his c a r e e ~ that t h t ~ = t I s i ; ~ e reeked the party in 1846, ism which is associated with the name of Sir Edwin Chadwick, thetion. One can certamly say d ' b " ding it by the end of his life. great civil servan t and health reformer. Disraeli believed sttonglyh d long way towar 8 re m d I h h h I ' he a gone a . f ovcrnment between the second an qmte consistent y t roug out IS 11e m a Butkean concept ofThe Conservatives were a party

0gth y had not been one in the diversity, multiplicity of centres of power, the importance ofd th . d Reform Acts whereas e d d Jik th Ch h h , an If ' 1 f th m laws The change cannot in epen ent mstltutwns e e urc , t e umversities, thetwenty years after the repea 0 col . di :d al There was an county Bench, etc. Indeed those who seek a lesson from DisraelibTty f a smg e m VI u .be attributed to t ~ e a II ~ t i e s the replacement ofPalmerston -to the modern Conservative party in the sphere of domesticelement of chance In person. 'h. h might not otherwise have poli cy are better advised to look at that side of his philosophy thanI d ve an opemng w tc . .by G a stone ga d social curr ents movmg at his social legislation.Th re were moreover, eep d Th a C h Sal f F d dcome. e ' . d these were largely outsi e e pnncip onservative measures - t e e o oo anfavourably for the ConservatJ.ves, an Act, the Public Health Act, the Artisans' Dwellings Act,

the control of any single pfelrsonk. b t the test of a political leader is Rivers' Pollution Act, the Factory Acts of 1874 and 1875, theD. I h dameasureo uc u lola.bour I . I . f 8 d"d ru= l ' hmrae 1 a , . k d n this test Disraeh comes out egts ahon o 1 75 - 1 not uer very great y 1TOID t ehis ability to ~ x p l m t e h ~ ~ ~ a ~ c t 00r 1867 without splitting his which a Liberal govern'ment might have carried.well. He earned th d "t?IfDisraelilosttheensuinggeneral added up to a substantial instalment of social reform, butparty. Could Peel have t ~ : ~ ilie cards were so heavily stacked to a major new departure. Disraeli took up the social cry inelection the reason was d thing else He had at any largely because there was a general movement in that t him that he could have one no d I b ] k I d d h L"b lagams 1 after defeat wait on events an party ecause It was 1 e y to IVI e t e I era s.rate the good s e ~ s e to keep ca ; ; al showed that he had office he was bound to do something about it. The electoralhit back at the nght moment. e so made complete negativism a recipe for disaster. But thereH . cli l to take office in I873 was annot to snatch. 15 r usa k bl because it was by no meam no question of a Tory-working class alliance of the mode h moreremara e b Sd l 1 h l f li Th kisagactty, e . . h t The victory of 1s 4 owed y a er near y a a century ear er. e wor "ngkeeping with his preVtous c a r ~ c er. his ca aoity to was kept at arms length. In the election of 188o the Nationalmuch to his prudence and pattence as tO p was a feeble affair compared with the Liberal Caucus,with new id::as and frah proposals. t d by some under Joseph Chamberlain's rule was a tail that waggedH' - hi ment in office has been exaggera e . . d~ - ~ ~ ~ 1 \ n u ' : e t h , l however, has analysed his socialleg tslatton ogu E ...u tJO truth was that a reaUy vigorous policy of paternalisti;

1 [ i w a ~ l i a n Const:n tllism and Joci/JJ r ~ . f o t m .


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I24 CONSERVATIVE P A R T Y P E E L TO CHURCHILL DJSRAELIAN REVIVAL I 866-81. . b half of the working class ran into direc t conflict This had not always been the case. At times iri opposition tocollectlVlSID on e 1 r. ce which was moving, almost Palmerston, the Conservative leaders had taken almost a 'Little-. h ther great electora 10r th E I d '1 D " f fi I dWit ano 1 Conservative effort, mto e ng an er me. tsrae 1was m 1avour o a pac1 c po ICY towar s"th t the need for any specta h d th d f th C W tl h h I d b D bWl ou . The middle classes began to be fng tene_ e en o c nmean ar, 1oug e was overru e y er y.Conservative_ p a r ~ . Gladstone's ministry approached Derby himself attacked- Palmerston's high-handed attitude

by Gladstoman hberaltsm, as . . . f the number of towards China in 1857 It is true that Disraeli on that occasion was. Th. rna seem surpnsmg m vtew o1ts end. lS. Y rried in their interest _ reforms of the more wary. He remembered how Palmerston had extricated him-measures which ca'ties the civil service and the army, for self when he was attacked for throwing Britain's weight behind the udicature, the umverst. ' t a characteristic of voters. Having dubious cause of Don Pacifico seven years before. Nevertheless, heexample. But gratitude lS nod f the Liberals the middle class put his doubts aside and joined with Gladstone and all the leadinggot much of what they a n k i t ~ r ~ : s militancy joseph h a m b e r ~ statesmen of the day in attacking and defeating the government inb tobealarmedatwor ngc ' d th h H fC It P h P I~ g ~ n di r S'r Charles Dilke's republicanism, an .o e: t e ouse o ommons. was a yrr 1c VIctory, or a merstonla1n s ra ca Ism, . C 've government under Disraeh at once dissolved on the patriotic cry and easily won the ensuingni II. hich a o n s e r v a ~ hrna esta ons w h k than Gladstone however much e election. A few months later the boot was on the other foot and

dmorel ikely tocec ' h h P I t td b" ffi tl Jh B l l ihseeme d D' l i knew what he was aomg w en e a mers on was ous e tOr emg msu c1en y o n u s overpersonally i s a p p r o ~ e . ' ~ s ~ : n s e r v a t i v e slogans about the m o n ~ the Orsini affair. But he did not make that mistake again and forrevived all the t r a d i t i O n ~ ti It was vital to avoid doing a n y ~ the six years of his last ministry the Conservatives once againarchy Church and constttu on. II A quiet low found themselves out-trumped by 'the most English minister', as' . d f . ht n away these new a Ies. 'thing wh1ch woul_ r g e:rl always better for the Conservatives Palmers ton was once described.temperature electiOn 15 n d Y able to raise the temperature f he Conservatives could lay no special claim to be the patr iotich h ponents Gla stone was . .t ant e1r 0 P . h. 88 buthecouldnotdoitlll 1874 party while Palmerston lived, still less could they be described ashigh in 8 ~ B a n d t o f e v e r ' ; t ~ u : ; e t i ~ e to one appeal which also 'the party of Empire'. No doubt there was a sense in which no

The nuddle c l ~ s s w p atriotic card which Palmerston party could claim that description in the first half of Queen_ affected the workmg clas; The p layed no less effectively by Victoria's reign. Apart from India, which was considered to be aI d a ed with such euect was p th r b b fB h th d th f


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28 cONSERVATIVE P A R T Y P E E L TO CHURCHILLmay become the source of incalculable strength and happinessto this land.

lRobert McKenzie and Allan Silver, AngJ.r in mtl fblt, UXJTking clos r C r m s t n l l l l i ~ J a l' ' glomi . g68), . . . ibid., 51-73-


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EL TO C H U R C II IL Ll 3 0 C O N S E R V A T I V E PARTY - P E

h dOn the verge of producing a secondl i whic seemeof a Tory po cy . as rather different.Crimean War . the P l C t : ~ e w lasting contr ibution to the successThat then, IS Dtsraeh s most. l ty' It cannot be said thatd h atwnapar. .of his party. He rna e lt t e n -The most plausible alternabvethis was an inevi table developmentd. b the I 5th Earl of Derby.. [ . th I87os ha een .leader to DISrae I m e d th ty n that directiOn, event h lc eparHe certainly would no a;e after Derby's departure to theDisraeli was a trifle u n f a ~ s w ~ ~ n f r i e n d and declared, I ~ o tLiberals, he rounded on_ h ld excite enthusiasm m htm. ything t at wou . lknow that there IS an der of some nattona1 tes the surrenexcept when he contemp a diti from,which the party has

TlflR.Session.'l But Disraeli set a t ~ a . otnhe years to come the Con-r-- , e A and agam m finever devmt . gain . n the label of spiritual treason u p ~ n rstservatives were to t ry to P1 _ ts and i f they dtd notth . Labour opponen histheir Liberal then etr d t often enough to make t

e th managed to o I Halways succe , ey . the party game. The orneone of their most profitable m o ~ e s s exposed by the ZinovievRulers the pro-Boers, the pro- usstan d b Winston Churchill , kl gs' denounce Y .Letter, the Labour wea m I d Egypt- one can multiplyd ng to ran an , hin 1951 foc surren en . k mmick. f he 'Left as lya tnc oragexamples. Nor was It stmp . u onal party this is be- I f ill d as the antJ.-na .so often found ttse p one_ d hers who behaved as i f theycause it has so often conta me mem t their own. It is only a. d f ry country excep .were the frlen s o eve . [ h l ast English of Enghshmen,. d that Dtsrae 1, t e esuperficial para ox m the lesson home.should have been the person to ra

1 Ina speech in lhe HouseofLords, March I, IBBIDisraeli VI, 6o4.

CHAPTER VTory democracy and the rule ofLord Salisbury t88t -1902

IThe dominant figure of the next twenty-one years was LordSalisbury.1 He was the most successful of all the Conservativeleaders in the period covered by this book, i f we regard success asmeasured by the electoral performance of the party he led. Hefought five general elections and won three of them easily. Of histwo defeats, one - that of 18g2 - was only marginal and profitedhis opponents little, while the other- that of 1885- was reversedwithin seven months. Lord Salisbury led the Conservative peersfor twenty-one years, the party as a whole for seventeen. He wasPrime Minister for thirteen and a half years, and for just overeleven of these held the Foreign Office as well. It was a remarkable record. Only Baldwin, who also won three out of five elections, approaches it. But he had nothing like so long a tenure of 11epremiership.

Yet:, although a major break-through occurred under his lead,Salisbury never seeiru to have had quite the place in the Conservative pantheon which one would have expected. Perhaps thisis because he is so difficult to fit into any kind of stereotype. Peelis the middle-of-the-road reformer, Derby the dashing patrician,Disraeli the romantic adventurer, Balfour the intellectual in

1 One of the great gaPII in nineteenth century political biography is the Jack of afatofot 'cy lifu ofbim. Thill b not to disparage his d a u g h t e r ' ~ work -LadyGwendolenCecil, The lift i obert Margui i Salisbury vols I, II (1921), III, IV 1 ~ 3 1 - whichdoea indeed give a wonderful penonal portrait such as we rardy have of any majorJtate9man. But her four volumes end in 18g2, and neither in their account of oreignpolicy nor in their account f S a J i s b u r y ~ relations with his party can they I:Je regarded

ll wholly satisfactory.

Documents

Blake. Disraeli Revival