Blagojevich vs. Illinois Taxpayers

8/3/2019 Blagojevich vs. Illinois Taxpayers

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/blagojevich-vs-illinois-taxpayers 1/28

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Graphics

Gahic : Aal esio ovefdig/defdig dig Blagoevich yeas .................................................................................

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“I (expletive) busted my ass and pissed people off and gave your grandmother a free (expletive) ride on a bus.OK? I gave your (expletive) baby a chance to have health care. And what do I get for that? Only 13 percent of you all out there think I’m doing a good job. So (expletive) all of you.”

– Rod Blagojevich, federal wiretap from November 2008 1

Introduction

Rod Blagojevich’s tenure as governor of Illinois will have a lasting effect on the state’s reputation and scal condition. From

January 2003 to January 2009, Blagojevich made headlines for his sensational comments, political feuds and backroom deals

After being arrested in December 2008 on charges of political corruption, the Legislature removed him from ofce the follow

ing month. He since has been convicted on federal criminal charges.

Blagojevich was a master at pairing populist rhetoric with new programs directed toward his core constituencies. That mastery

however, was confounded by incredible lapses of judgment and public grandstanding that bafed both voters and politicians

Programs such as free bus rides for seniors and free health care for children beg the question: Did he target seniors and children

because it was politically expedient, or because he truly believed in these programs? In promoting new programs, did he thinkhe was more powerful than the federal courts and U.S. Food and Drug Administration, or was he really a social entrepreneur

with great resolve? Was he was a narcissist obsessed with reaching the White House, or a great man of the people? These are

questions Illinoisans still are trying to answer.

What is fact, however, is that to pursue his highly visible programs and agendas, Blagojevich needed money. He found it by di-

verting billions from the state’s pension system. By taking “holidays” from required pension system contributions and by nearly

doubling Illinois’s debt, he burdened future generations to support favored groups in the present.

Offered in this report are 10 programs, policies and issues that capture the essence of the Blagojevich administration. The rs

two are structural issues, which had a signicant effect on the state’s nancial condition. The next four are signature programs

focused on Blagojevich’s core constituencies; these programs were not effective and overextended Illinois’s spending capabilities

The nal four are smaller initiatives that exemplify Blagojevich’s predilection to use taxpayer money to make political statementsrather than improve the lives of Illinoisans.

Blago vs. Illinois taxpayers

How the scal legacy of former Gov. Rod Blagojevich is alive and well

Amanda Grifn-Johnson is a senior budget and tax policy analyst for the Illinois Policy Institute. Ted Dabrowski is the vice president of policy for the

Illinois Policy Institute.



Page 4 of 28

10.vignettes.that.define.the.Blagojevich.administration

Perhaps worst of all, as CEO of Illinois, Blagojevich institutionalized a culture of decit spending. He

accomplished this so effectively that Blagojevich’s successor, Gov. Pat Quinn, and today’s lawmakers

feel comfortable perpetuating the ruinous habits of spending and borrowing more than the state can

afford. Fiscal ineptitude is the new norm.

Blagojevich was Illinois’s leader for six years. His legacy will last for a generation and possibly lon-

ger. He left Illinois on a dysfunctional path toward scal ruin. Fixing his mess is not just an issue of

cleaning up the state’s nancial position; it also is about restoring faith in an honest and constructive

government that works for the people of Illinois.

Blagojevich

was Illinois’s

leader for

six years.

His legacy

will last for a generation

and possibly

longer.



Page 5 of 28

No.1:.Disregarded.obligations.to.

state.pensionersShorted the pension system by more than $2.3 billion; Foregone investment income: as much

as $1 billion

Policy:

Blagojevich diverted billions of dollars from the pension funds of future govern-

ment retirees to pay for his own spending priorities.

Problem:

Blagojevich ballooned existing spending programs, ignoring his responsibility to

ensure the health of the state’s pension systems. Retirees and taxpayers are on the

hook for his political expediency.

Program.cost:

Excess of $3 billion for future taxpayers

During his six-year tenure as governor, Blagojevich shirked his responsibility to supply the pension

funds for employees of state government. By not putting aside the billions of dollars necessary to pay

for those retirements, Blagojevich contributed to the instability of Illinois’s public pension system.

Illinois has ve pension systems for the state’s public school teachers, judges, university employees,

state workers and members of the General Assembly. These employees save for their retirements by

regularly contributing to the state’s public pension systems. The state also legally is required to make

employer contributions to these pension systems to ensure each retiree receives his or her contractual

pension at retirement.

Unfortunately, Blagojevich’s wayward priorities took precedence over the state’s pension obligations.

Blagojevich had many special interests he wanted to satisfy, and for that, money was necessary. It didn’t

take long for him to nd the “golden” source – the state’s retirement systems. By not contributing the

billions required for the pension system, Blagojevich was able to spend more freely on other govern-

ment programs and pet projects.

Blagojevich and his legislative partners got away with this for two reasons. First, there is an absolute

lack of transparency in determining the health of the pension system. Since Blagojevich was not short-

ing existing pensioners, but instead government workers who planned to retire in the subsequent 15

years to 30 years, everyone looked the other way. Second, rather than demand that politicians pay the

pension system to protect their members, some unions supported Blagojevich’s spending increases forhis other favorite programs2.

It must be noted that Blagojevich did not act alone; other politicians, including many still in ofce, have

played a role in today’s pension crisis and its $85 billion underfunding. The number of ngerprints

on the dollars diverted from the pension system is too many to count here. But under his tenure, the

pension raiding became the norm.

Unfortunat

Blagojevich

wayward

priorities to

precedence

over the

state’s pens

obligations.



Page 6 of 28

Pension.borrowing

Blagojevich was fully aware when he took ofce that the pension systems already faced serious prob-

lems. Early in his administration, he took two actions that often are misconstrued as attempts to x the

system. First, Blagojevich raised $10 billion in 2003 by issuing pension obligation bonds. The money

from those bonds allowed him to inject billions directly into the pension system (this report will ad-

dress more on the bonds later). Second, he called for a “Governor’s Pension Commission” in February 2005 to review the pension crisis and make recommendations for his administration. The commis-

sion’s rst two guiding principles instructed that 1) the state must fully honor its pension obligations,

and 2) under no circumstances should pension payments be deferred. By the end of 2005, Blagojevich

would begin to ignore the principles that came from the very pension commission he mandated.

Using the strictest method to measure how underfunded the pension system became during his ten-

ure, it becomes clear that Blagojevich did nothing to improve the health of the retirement system.

Each year the General Assembly’s scal and economic research organization, the Commission on

Government Forecasting and Accountability, calculates the annual dollar contributions necessary sim-

ply to keep the pension system underfunding problem from getting worse – much like paying the

minimum amount necessary to keep a credit card balance from growing. Graphic 1 shows this in-

formation. Blagojevich and the Legislature failed to contribute to that minimum, and as a result, thesystem was underfunded by $2.5 billion to $3.5 billion each year, save one, of his governorship. While

Illinois law doesn’t require the Legislature to make the payment equal to the minimum amount, the

level of underfunding is one of the key measures to determine the health of a pension funding system.

Graphic.1.Annual.pension.overfunding/underfunding.

during.Blagojevich.years

Figures.represent.funding.necessary.to.halt.

growth.of.pension.underfunding.(in.billions)

Source: Commission on Government Forecasting and Accountability

The only time Blagojevich did “fully fund” the pension system was in 2004, when he borrowed $10

billion using the 2003 Illinois Pension Obligation Bonds. A majority of those dollars directly went into

the pension system, giving the impression that Blagojevich greatly improved the pension situation. But

this did nothing to change the total liabilities of Illinois. The reality is he did nothing more than bor-

row from the state credit card to pay off the state mortgage.

In issuing these pension bonds, Blagojevich more than doubled the amount of debt owed by Illinois

taxpayers. Adding insult to injury, a majority of the debt repayment is pushed 20 years to 30 years into

the future, burdening future generations.

The state

pension

system was

underfunded

by $2.5 billion

to $3.5 billion each year, save

one, of his

governorship.



Page 7 of 28

Blagojevic

and the 94

General

Assembly quickly

signed a la

that allow

Illinois to

take what

is called a

“pension holiday.”

Under the

holiday, th

state was n

obligated t

contribute

the full amount to

the retirem

system tha

is required

under

existing la

Unfortunately this would not be the last time Illinois borrowed to cover the pension payment.

Quinn and the Legislature used this gimmick twice — issuing $3.466 billion of pension obligation

bonds for the scal year 2010 pension contribution and an additional $4.096 billion in bonds for the

scal year 2011 contribution.3

Graphic.2.Blagojevich.doubles.

Illinois.direct.bond.obligations

Source: Illinois Ofce of the Comptroller

Pension.holidays

Feeling satised with the bond issue and the 2004 “funding” of the pension system, Blagojevich and

the 94th General Assembly quickly signed a law that allowed Illinois to take what is called a “pension

holiday.” Under the holiday, the state was not obligated to contribute the full amount to the retirementsystem that is required under existing laws. Blagojevich had found his cash cow.

The new law allowed Illinois to underpay the pension system a cumulative $2.314 billion from 2006-

07. And with that, the idea that pension contributions should not be deferred was betrayed.

Lost.investment.income

Not only did Blagojevich shortchange the retirement system by billions of dollars, but every missing

dollar has meant lost investment income for the system. Had the money been available for invest-

ment, and assuming they had been invested in U.S. Treasuries at a 4.5 percent annual rate of return,

the retirement system would have had an additional $250 million to $1 billion in earnings by the end

of Blagojevich’s tenure. That missing money is an affront to retirees and taxpayers alike.

Any way you measure it, Blagojevich’s action severely undercut pensioners and taxpayers.



Page 8 of 28

No.2:.A.culture.of.deficits A six-year string of decits is crippling Illinois

Policy:

Grow spending to appease Blagojevich’s core constituencies.

Problem:

While Blagojevich was creating and expanding unaffordable programs, the state’s

nancial position deteriorated year after year.

Program.cost:

Worst rating of net assets in the nation.

After the scal year 2004 budget passed, the rst of his tenure, Blagojevich announced:

“We have changed business as usual in Springeld. We have stopped years of mismanagement and unchecked spending that had left … Illinois with the

worst nancial condition of all 50 states.” 4

Nothing could be more false. Immediately after this budget, Blagojevich started cementing a culture

of borrowing, spending and decits that eventually would disgrace Illinois’ reputation and national

standing. In fact, this culture has become so institutionalized and so ingrained, that even with the re-

jection of Blagojevich and all that he stood for, his successor Gov. Pat Quinn and subsequent general

assemblies have done nothing but embrace it. Even worse, they’ve supercharged that culture – but

more on that later.

Under Blagojevich, massive budget decits continued every year, eventually escalating to new record

highs and leaving Illinois in shambles. A budget decit in a given year means that the state has spentmore than it received in revenues. These decits or shortfalls have to be paid down at some point, but

in the short term, they have to be nanced. Just as a household that mismanages its budget might load

up its credit card, draw on a home equity line, or eat into its retirement money, so must the state in

order to meet its bloated spending obligations.

Regrettably, the state has overspent year after year, leaving Illinois and future generations on the hook

to pick up the tab. The graphic below exhibits the continuous mismanagement of Illinois’ general

fund budget. The general fund is the main budget managed by the governor and Legislature to pay for

the state’s daily operations, including education, health care, public safety, human services and other

areas.

Blagojevich

started

cementing a

culture of

borrowing,

spending and decits that

eventually

would

disgrace

Illinois’

reputation

and national standing.



Page 9 of 28

. Graphic.3.Cumulative.general.revenue.fund.deficits

Source: Illinois Comprehensive Financial Annual Report 2010

The trend of decits and scal irresponsibility is clear.

Blagojevich and the Legislature particularly were adept at nding sources to pay for these serial de-

cits. They racked up more debt by borrowing, they systematically underpaid the retirement system and

they stopped paying bills to vendors. It’s that debt Illinois taxpayers now must pay down.

Most people will have difculty measuring how large these “billions” of decits are, and they could

be forgiven for thinking that Illinois is no different than other states. But the next two graphics, which

exhibit the level of a state’s “net assets,” or in layman’s terms, its “net worth,” will illuminate how dire

Illinois’ situation really is.

A state’s net assets are calculated much the same way an individual measures his net worth – by taking

total assets (real estate, receivables, investments, etc.) and subtracting total liabilities (accounts payable,

debts, etc.). Of course, every household wants to grow its net worth.

According to the Illinois Comptroller’s Ofce, “Over time, increases and decreases in net assets mea-

sure whether the state’s nancial position is improving or deteriorating.”5 That Illinois’ net assets were

negative should have been alarming. The fact that net assets continued to decline year after year is

indefensible.

The graphic on the next page shows Illinois’ net asset position each year and its sharp decline during

the Blagojevich tenure. Sadly, the drop has accelerated under Quinn’s leadership.

Blagojevic

and the

Legislatu

racked upmore debt

borrowing

they

systematic

underpaid

the retirem

system anthey stopp

paying bil

to vendors



Page 10 of 28

Graphic.4.Illinois’.total.net.assets.for.fiscal.years.2003-10

Source: Illinois Auditor General’s Ofce

Blagojevich oversaw a $16.7 billion decrease in the state’s net assets, to a total decit of $29.5 billion

in scal year 2009. This simply means that Illinois has more debt and obligations than it has in total

assets, and in the private sector, this would imply bankruptcy. This type of scal imbalance is rare in

the U.S. The Illinois Auditor General’s Ofce found that only three other states – New Jersey, Con-

necticut and California – had negative net assets as of scal year 2010 (Note: Hawaii has yet to release

their annual report and was not analyzed).6

For those thinking that Illinois is not really that different from the other states, the graphic on the

next page will change that perception. In 2010, Illinois was dead last in net assets in the nation. That

amount of wealth destruction only can be described as scandalous and it is a key reason that Illinois’debt is the worst rated in the nation.

With Blagojevich gone, and a public rebuke of his legacy by those in government, one would expect

Illinois to experience a major turnaround on both the scal and reputational fronts. But that has not

been the case. The institutionalization of spending and borrowing of the Blagojevich years is in-

grained, too powerfully, in Springeld. And with Quinn’s lead, good governance, distressingly, is not

making a comeback.

After running massive decits in 2010, with unpaid bills to vendors exceeding $6 billion and a con-

tinued increase in debt, Quinn further hurt Illinoisans and businesses by signing a record income tax

increase in 2011. Because spending wasn’t cut – and in fact, actually increased

7

– the state’s unpaidbills to vendors still totaled $3.8 billion at year’s end.8 The cycle that Blagojevich sped up continues

unabated.

Because

spending

wasn’t cut

– and in

fact, actually

ncreased – the state’s

unpaid bills

to vendors

still totaled

$3.8 billion

at year’s end.



Page 11 of 28

Graphic.5.State.comparison.of.total.net.assets,.

as.of.fiscal.year.2010.(in.billions)


In 2010,

Illinois w

dead last

net assetsthe nation

That amo

of wealth

destructio

only can b

described

scandalouand it is a

key reaso

that Illino

debt is th

worst rate

the nation



Page 12 of 28

No.3:.All.KidsHundreds of millions of dollars for middle class entitlements

Policy:

Expand Medicaid to all children in Illinois regardless of citizenship or family

income

Problem:

Blagojevich traded the future of state pensioners for middle class entitlements in

the present. Even though the program signicantly spent more money per child

than predicted, still it was ineffective at accomplishing its goals.

Program.cost:

$316.5 million over ve years

In 2005, Blagojevich signed into law the “Covering All Kids Health Insurance Act.” The act expanded

Illinois’ KidCare program, which covered populations enrolled in Medicaid and the State Children’s

Health Insurance Program to include all uninsured children in Illinois regardless of citizenship or

family income, with varying premiums based on eight income levels.9 Previously, state-provided insur-

ance coverage was reserved for minors whose family income was less than 200 percent of the federal

poverty level, or FPL, or $38,700 for a family of four.10 After All Kids, millionaires could enroll their

children for government-subsidized health care.11

The All Kids program was made effective in July 2006 and was forecasted to enroll 204,000 children by

its fth year, at an annual cost of $96 million.12 Under this prediction, the program’s cost per child in

2011 would have been $471.13 As it turns out, the All Kids expansion has provided coverage to a frac-

tion of the children projected at a much higher per-enrollee cost. In 2011, the program only enrolled37 percent of the children projected, but at more than double the original per-child cost estimate.

Graphic.6.Annual.All.Kids.expansion.

expenditures.and.eligibility

State scal

year

Total payments

(net of premiums)Eligibility

Average cost

per child

2007 $36,990,314 54,958 $673

2008 $58,786,364 66,043 $890

2009 $69,208,854 71,623 $966

2010 $76,874,175 73,793 $1,042

2011 $74,664,879 74,887 $997

Cumulative total $316,524,586

Source: Department of Healthcare and Family Services and calculations by the Illinois Policy Institute

Although the program is more expensive per child than predicted, the program has failed to stop the

growth of uninsured children in Illinois. From 2007-09, the number of uninsured children in Illinois

increased by more than 64,000. Over the coming years, All Kids signicantly is set to add to the state’s

mounting Medicaid costs, which already make up almost a third of Illinois’ total expenses.14

As it turns

out, the

All Kids

expansion

has provided

coverage to a fraction of

the children

projected at a

much higher

per-enrollee

cost.



Page 13 of 28

Graphic.7.All.Kids.expansion.and.number.

of.uninsured.children.in.Illinois

Source: Department of Healthcare and Family Services, U.S. Census Bureau15 (Illinois children younger than 18).

All Kids emerged as a government-centric idea to reduce the number of uninsured children in Illinois.

Yet years into its existence, 291,000 children remain uninsured in Illinois, and the program’s cost per

child signicantly is higher than predicted.

In January 2011, lawmakers passed a Medicaid reform bill that decreased eligibility to children whose

family income is at or below 300 percent of the federal poverty level, or $66,150 for a family of four.16

While this was a step in the right direction, All Kids is far from the best solution for achieving the goal

of affordable, sustainable health care coverage for Illinois children.

Medicaid is a broken system, and All Kids increasingly strains a program that is supposed to act as a

safety net for those who need it most. In Illinois, doctor shortages, low provider reimbursement rates

and the unreliable nature of state payments have made it difcult for Medicaid recipients to access

care. A study conducted in 2010 of specialist clinics in Illinois found that Medicaid patients were six

times more likely than privately insured patients to be denied an appointment. 17

The Covering All Kids Health Insurance Act should be replaced with more effective and economical

health care solutions, such as introducing medical savings accounts or reducing insurance mandates.18

Years int

existence

the All K

program,291,000

children

remain

uninsured

Illinois, a

the progra

cost per chsignican

is higher

predicted.



Page 14 of 28

No.4:.Illinois.Cares.Rx$750 million since 2006

Policy:.

Expand prescription drug coverage beyond Medicare eligibility

Problem:.

Blagojevich spent money the state did not have to expand a program that could

not be sustained, creating dependency among one of the state’s most vulnerable

populations.

Program.cost:.

$750 million since 2006

In 2006, the federal government made Medicare Part D, a voluntary prescription drug benet, avail-

able for Medicare recipients. In response to the new Medicare program, which required enrollees to

pay monthly premiums, deductibles and copays, Blagojevich promoted state-based prescription drug

coverage to pay most of those costs for seniors. He signed the “No Senior Left Behind” law in June

2005, which created Illinois Cares Rx by combining and expanding the state’s previous prescription

program SeniorCare and Circuit Breaker to t the new Medicare Part D plans.19 The program was set

to have the income limits at 200 percent of FPL, or $28,480 for a household of two.20 But over the

years, the maximum income limits have been expanded. In scal year 2011, the income limits were

about 250 percent of FPL, or $36,775 for a household of two.21

But creating and expanding a program that the state cannot afford can create a culture of dependency

that is painful to end. Because of a “maintenance of effort” clause in the Patient Protection and Af-

fordable Care Act, also known as ObamaCare, state authorities now are unable to adjust many healthcare programs that receive federal money. As an optional program that does not receive federal reim-

bursement, Illinois Cares Rx is one of the few health care programs legislators can adjust, making it a

likely target for necessary budget cuts.22

Graphic.8.Historical.funding.for.Illinois.Cares.Rx

Fiscal yearGeneral Rev-

enue Fund

Other state

funds

Combined

total

2006 $6,164 $120,301,602 $120,307,766

2007 $84,767,193 $103,916,079 $188,683,272

2008 $47,631,121 $69,176,267 $116,807,388

2009 $39,996,231 $39,694,629 $79,690,860

2010 $42,226,077 $79,724,313 $121,950,390

2011 $910,987 $127,669,592 $128,580,579

Cumulative

total$215,537,773 $540,482,482 $756,020,255

Source: Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services

Creating and

expanding

a program

that the state

cannot afford

can create a culture of

dependency

that is

painful to

end.



Page 15 of 28

Creating

program t

state can’

pay for onto take it

away crea

uncertain

and

instability

for the

state’s eld populatio

For scal year 2012, the Legislature cut the program’s budget to $53.7 million.23 As part of the pro-

gram reforms, the maximum income requirement has been decreased to 200 percent of FPL, and

co-pays for generic drugs were increased to $5 from $2.50.24

While Illinois Cares Rx understandably is a popular program by those who enroll, Illinois simply

does not have the ability to pay for such expansive benets. Creating a program the state can’t pay

for only to take it away creates uncertainty and instability for the state’s elderly population. A pre-scription assistance program also can distort the market and actually keep prescription drug prices

articially high by hiding the true cost of medicines from consumers. The state should work toward

reducing subsidizes for prescription drugs rather than encouraging higher prices.



Page 16 of 28

No.5:.Preschool.for.All$107 million over three years

Policy:.

Expand government-paid preschool programs beyond those at risk for academic

failure

Problem:.

Another example of Blagojevich unnecessarily expanding middle-class entitle-

ments, even though state resources already were stretched too thin

Program.cost:.

$107 million over three years

As part of his scal year 2007 budget, Blagojevich proposed Preschool for All, a program “which

would allow every three- and four-year-old in Illinois to attend high-quality preschool.”25 The program

required participating preschools to be staffed by experienced teachers with bachelor’s degrees and

early education training. 26 The initiative received endorsements from groups such as the Illinois Fed-

eration of Teachers, the Chicago Teachers Union, the National Association of Social Workers and the

Chicago Fraternal Order of Police.27, 28

The preschool programs could be offered at public and private schools, child care centers, community

and faith-based organizations, Head Start and other settings. Unlike the state’s existing early educa-

tion programs which only targeted children at risk of academic failure, eligibility would be expanded.

According to one of Blagojevich’s news releases, “The new Preschool for All program will continue

to prioritize at-risk children, but expands it to also serve middle-income families.”29 Under the legisla-

tion, eligibility for the program rst was prioritized on children at risk for academic failure and thenon children with family incomes of less than 400 percent of FPL, or $82,600 for a family of four.30

While promoting Preschool for All, the governor claimed there would be huge payoffs from the

program. In another news release, Blagojevich is quoted: “Study after study and basic common sense

tell us that giving kids the chance to start reading early and learning early is the single most important

step we can take towards helping them become successful students.”31 The news release also includes

claims such as: “Children who begin reading at age three or four do better throughout their academic

careers.”32

While some research nds preschool has positive effects for low-income, minority students,33 the

research in universal early education programs does not necessarily support such optimistic claims. In

January 2010, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services released the results of an impact

study of Head Start, one of the oldest and most established early education programs in the United

States. The study used the “gold standard” of research, a random assignment design with a very large,

representative sample. It found that Head Start fundamentally has no lasting effects on participants.34

Researchers concluded that “by the end of 1st grade, there were few signicant differences between

the Head Start group as a whole and the control group as a whole for either cohort.”35 Other studies

have found similar results with the academic gains from preschool fading out after a few years.36

While some

research nds

preschool

has positive

effects for

low-income,minority

students, the

research in

universal

early

education

programs does not

necessarily

support such

optimistic

claims.



Page 17 of 28

Graphic.9.Historical.Preschool.for.All.allocations37

Fiscal year 2007 2008 2009

Preschool for All total $45,000,000 $29,606,941 $32,400,000

Chicago $16,650,000 $10,954,568 $11,988,000

Downstate $28,350,000 $18,652,373 $20,412,000

Source: Illinois State Board of Education

Over three years, the Illinois State Board of Education allocated more than $100 million to Preschool

for All. Since 2009, all of the state’s pre-kindergarten programs have been integrated under the “Pre-

school for All” banner and programs now have to serve at least 80 percent at-risk children.38 In light of

the fact that many of the benets of preschool dissipate by the end of elementary school, programs

such as Preschool for All solely should be focused on at-risk children.

In light of

fact that m

of the bene

of preschodissipate by

the end of

elementary

school,

programs s

as Prescho

for All solshould be

focused on

risk childr



Page 18 of 28

No.6:.Seniors.Ride.Free$100 million over three years

Policy:.

Provide free rides for all seniors on the Chicago-area regional transportation sys-

tem, regardless of the rider’s ability to pay

Problem:.

Blagojevich created another unsustainable, feel-good program for seniors that ig-

nored the nancial condition of both the Regional Transportation Authority and

general government nances.

Program.cost:.

$100 million over three years

In 2008, suburban Chicago’s commuter train system, the Regional Transportation Authority, faced

signicant service cuts because of nancial problems. In response, the General Assembly approved a

0.25 percent sales tax increase to provide the system, or RTA, with more money. Blagojevich included

a provision in an amendatory veto that provided “all Illinois senior citizens can ride public transporta-

tion for free.”39 He encouraged the General Assembly to approve his amendatory veto, which they did,

and the Seniors Ride Free program began March 17, 2008.

The program rapidly grew. Fewer than 2,000 people were registered for the program in March 2008,

and by December 2009 more than 396,000 people were registered. A survey of Senior Ride Free par-

ticipants found that 28 percent had annual incomes greater than $55,000. 40 During that period, free

senior rides represented 5.2 percent of the Chicago Transit Authority’s total ridership.41

But high participation in the program came at a high cost. A study of the Seniors Ride Free program

in 2010 by the University of Illinois at Chicago’s Urban Transportation Center concluded that the

program was unsustainable. The UIC study estimated that the revenue loss from the Seniors Ride Free

program to be $38.5 million for 2009. The study forecasted that, without a fare increase, the estimated

revenue loss of the Seniors Ride Free program by 2030 would be around $73.5 million.42

Graphic.10.Forecasts.of.RTA.revenue.loss.from.the.Seniors.

Ride.Free.program

Year 2008* 2009 2010 2015 2020 2030

Medianvalueof

revenueloss

$19.1-$51.2

million $38.5million $40.2million $46.3million $54.5million $73.5million

*March 2008 through December 2008

Source: University of Illinois at Chicago’s Urban Transportation Center report

Note: Assumes no fare increase for all years.

Faced with the scal challenges of the program, lawmakers enacted reforms in 2011.43 Beginning in

September 2011, Seniors Ride Free changed to an income-based program. Under the reforms, all se-

niors are eligible for a 50 percent reduced fare on transit, but free rides only will be available to seniors

with annual incomes of $27,610 or less for a one-person household, $36,635 or less for a two-person

household and $45,657 or less for a household of three or more.44

A study of the

eniors Ride

ree program

2010 by

e University

f Illinois t Chicago’s

Urban

ransportation

enter

ncluded

at the

rogram was nsustainable.



Page 19 of 28

Blagojevich’s Seniors Ride Free program might have been well-intentioned, but scally it was not

responsible. Government services cost money, and exempting entire segments of users from bearing

those costs – while sticking taxpayers with the tab – is pandering at its worst. Unnecessary and expen-

sive “feel good” programs, such as these, end up crowding out money for other government services.

These programs create the illusion that Illinois has a revenue problem, which can lead to tax and fee

increases, when in reality Illinois has a scal responsibility problem.

Without a

fare increa

the estimat

revenue losof the Sen

Ride Free

program by

2030 wou

be around

$73.5 mill



No.7:.Flu.vaccines$2.6 million

Policy:.

Bypass the FDA and federal law to acquire u vaccines during vaccine shortage

Problem:.

Blagojevich ignored the federal government and spent $2.6 million on unneces-

sary vaccines that could not be imported to the U.S. The vaccines eventually were

destroyed in Pakistan.

Program.cost:.

$2.6 million

In October 2004, the nation was facing a u vaccine shortage after the FDA deemed that half of

the u vaccine supply was unsafe.45 In response to this shortage, ofcials from the governor’s ofce

sought other avenues to acquire u vaccine doses to cover Illinois’ priority population, which includes

residents older than 65, the chronically ill, pregnant women and others. In late October 2004, a memo

from the Illinois Department of Public Health, or IDPH, stated that 160,000 to 200,000 doses would

cover Illinois’ priority population.46

The state quickly entered into a tentative agreement with a European pharmaceutical supplier to buy

more than 250,000 u vaccine doses for Illinois’ use – 25 percent more doses than IDPH estimated

that the state would need. State ofcials also worked with the supplier to secure doses for other states

and local governments. The agreement was subject to FDA approval, as importation of vaccines

without FDA approval is illegal. In the meantime, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

procured enough vaccine for Illinois’ priority population.47

Documentation shows that although stateofcials knew that FDA approval to import the vaccines was unlikely and the state was going to re-

ceive enough vaccine doses from the federal government, the governor’s ofce went ahead with the

purchase in January 2005.

The state spent $2.6 million on vaccine doses that ofcials knew they were not allowed to bring into

the country. After unsuccessful attempts to sell the supply internationally, the doses were donated to

earthquake survivors in Pakistan a year later. By then the doses had expired, and Pakistan destroyed

the vaccines.48 This is a story that shouldn’t have happened. A report from the Illinois auditor general

found a number of discrepancies in the state’s dealings with the European pharmaceutical company,

including problems with the timeliness of the contract and inadequate planning and coordination. 49

But it could have been worse. The auditor general’s report found that ofcials from the governor’s

ofce did not have written contracts with other state and local governments for which it worked to

procure vaccines, which could have made Illinois liable for the entire stock of vaccine at a cost of

more than $8.2 million.50

When Blagojevich was asked about the vaccines in March 2005, he replied:

“When I think about the decisions I’ve made as governor, I would say that’s probably the best decision I’ve ever made.” 51

But in the end, the state wasted $2.6 million.

The state spent

2.6 million

n vaccine

oses that

fcials knew

hey were not llowed to

ring into the

ountry.

Page 20 of 28



No.8:.I-SaveRx$1 million

Policy:.

In another attempt to bypass the FDA, Blagojevich set up a prescription drug

importation program from Canada and other countries.

Problem:.

Blagojevich promoted a program that encouraged residents to aunt federal law,

resulting in more wasted taxpayer money.

Program.cost:.

$1 million

In 2003, Blagojevich wanted to address prescription drug costs for Illinois residents. His solution was to import drugs from countries such as Canada, which articially have lower prescription prices

because of price controls. Blagojevich petitioned the FDA to allow the state to import drugs from

foreign countries and released a study claiming a drug importation system could save the state more

than $90 million.52

In June 2004, the FDA responded that they “do not believe a waiver could be granted” to Illinois to

import prescriptions, but nonetheless in October 2004, Blagojevich launched I-SaveRx, a prescription

drug importation program.53 Through an online portal, I-SaveRx was meant to facilitate the purchase

of prescription drugs for Illinois residents from foreign pharmacies. By mid-2006, Wisconsin, Ver-

mont, Kansas and Missouri also joined the I-SaveRx program.

There was a signicant push to publicize the program. In all, the Illinois auditor general estimates thestate spent at least $944,471 to promote I-SaveRx and complete fact-nding and inspection trips.54 But

this gure likely underestimates the actual cost as the Auditor General’s Ofce only could estimate

payroll costs for 29 percent of the employees who participated in marketing the program because of

data limitations. Blagojevich also toured the state speaking with community leaders to spread the word

about the program.55 Despite all this work to promote I-SaveRx, in its rst 19 months of operation,

only 4,954 individuals placed orders through the program with 3,689 participants from Illinois.

Graphic.11.I-SaveRx.related.expenditures

Expenditure

description Amount

Payrollcost $488,000

Travel $111,000

Contractualservices $71,018

Marketing $54,453

Legalservices $220,000

Total $944,471


Aside from low participation, one glaring problem with the program was that it violated federal law.

According to a report from the auditor general, “Virtually every time an individual or entity imports

The FDA

said they “

not believe

waiver coube granted

to Illinois

to import

prescription

but noneth

in October

2004,Blagojevich

launched

I-SaveRx,

prescription

drug

importatio

program.

Page 21 of 28



or causes the importation of a prescription drug, they are in violation of [federal law].”56 Although

the FDA did not pursue civil action or criminal prosecution against individuals as it could have under

federal law, by March 2005 federal ofcials were stopping some shipments of prescription drugs from

entering the United States.57

The auditor general also found problems with the inspection of foreign pharmacies by Illinois of-

cials. In their review of Pharmacy Inspection Forms for the foreign pharmacies, the Auditor General’sOfce found that 40 percent of pharmacies did not have completed inspection forms, only 11 percent

of the forms indicated whether the pharmacy was approved and in some cases supervisory review was

done by the same person who performed the inspection.

The program quietly suspended operation in February 2009. 58 If state ofcials believe that federal laws

are not productive, there are more suitable ways to challenge those laws than using taxpayer money to

encourage residents to violate federal law. Blagojevich went ahead anyway.

f state

fcials believe

hat federal

aws are not

roductive,

here are more uitable ways

o challenge

hose laws

han using

axpayer

money to

ncourage esidents

o violate

ederal law.

Blagojevich

went ahead

nyway.

Page 22 of 28



No.9:..Video.game.lawsuit$520,000

Policy:.

Protect children by banning the sale of certain video games to minors

Problem:.

Blagojevich ignored existing court decisions that established the bans violated the

First Amendment. He challenged the courts at taxpayers’ expense.

Program.cost:.

$520,000

In 2005, Blagojevich pushed for a law banning sales of certain video games to minors. Multiple states

and cities previously had passed similar laws, but all had been thrown out by federal judges on the

basis that they violated the First Amendment. In fact, in 2001, a decision by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, which is binding on Illinois courts, came to this same conclusion.59 In the 2001 decision, the

city of Indianapolis had to pay $318,000 in legal fees and other costs.60 Even though an Illinois ban

would have little chance of surviving a legal challenge and losing would result in state liability for legal

fees, Blagojevich still pursued this legislation.

As soon as the legislation was signed, a lawsuit ensued and a federal judge declared the law violated the

First Amendment, and ordered the state to pay almost $500,000 in plaintiff ’s legal fees. But the state

was so lax in paying the fees that the judge eventually required the state to outline a payment plan. The

state ended up paying $520,000, including interest from late payment, in unspent money from various

state agencies.61

This fool’s errand was a way for Blagojevich to make a political statement at taxpayer expense.

This fool’s

errand was

a way for

Blagojevichto make

a political

statement

at taxpaye

expense.

Page 23 of 28



No.10.:.Tollway.road.signs$480,000

Policy:.

Putting the governor’s name on tollway signs

Problem:.

Taxpayers shouldn’t be on the hook for signs promoting a politician on public

areas, especially if the signs egregiously are expensive.

Program.cost:.

$480,000

In 2004, the Illinois Tollway underwent signicant renovations including the construction of open

road tolling, which allows drivers to pay tolls with their I-PASS devices without slowing down to go

through toll booths. As part of the renovation, the Illinois Tollway Authority put up 32 signs announc-

ing “Open Road Tolling | Rod R. Blagojevich, Governor” at a total cost of $480,000.62 Blagojevich

held news media events at the inauguration of multiple open road tolling lanes, which he considered

to be one of his major initiatives.63, 64

The signs came under criticism in 2006 because, at an average cost of $15,000, the signs signicantly

were more expensive than the usual $200 tollway signs.65 The Tollway Authority chairman, a Blagojev-

ich appointee, claimed that no one in an oversight position at the tollway or the governor’s ofce knew

about the signs, but he was “proud to have the governor’s name on those signs.” 66 A spokesperson

for the governor said that the signs were the tollway’s project, but “we were ne with the decision.”67

The tollway signs were removed after Blagojevich’s impeachment in December 2008, and in June

2011, Illinois banned state signs with the names of public ofcials or candidates for public ofce.68, 69

The signs came

nder criticism

n 2006

ecause, at an

verage cost

f $15,000,he signs

ignicantly

were more

xpensive

han the usual

200 tollway

igns.

Page 24 of 28



Conclusion

Repairing the damage from Blagojevich’s tenure as governor will take more than ending unaffordable

programs and replacing tollway signs. Many of his policies will inuence Illinois for years to come.

He came into ofce at a time when Illinois residents didn’t trust their government because the state

was the corrupt laughingstock of the nation. His administration did not heal those wounds, but made

them worse.

This report is not only about Blagojevich. It is meant to remind Illinois why leadership matters . Poor

leadership can lead to weak governance, corruption and scal irresponsibility. Sound leadership also

can be the driving force to return Illinois to greatness and economic prosperity.

As important as governors are, they aren’t the only party responsible for good or bad policies. It’s nec-

essary to remember that Blagojevich was not alone in many of the policy ideas he promoted. He had

a General Assembly behind him, and some of those lawmakers remain in ofce.

The irresponsible policies of Quinn and legislative leaders are evidence that Springeld has not

changed. Although Blagojevich is gone, overspending and borrowing continue, and taxpayers mustbear the burden of an unsustainable state government.

A repudiation of Blagojevich is not enough. Illinoisans must rise together and repudiate all govern-

ment ofcials who continue to support Blagojevich’s culture of scal ruin.

In order to turn the state around, the era of corruption and pay-for-play has to end. Transparency and

accountability need to be expanded at all levels of government to allow citizens to see where every

dollar goes and why. Only then will citizens regain their trust in public ofcials.

Illinois has limitless potential, and Illinoisans know they deserve better than what they have been re-

ceiving. With good leadership, Illinois can turn the pages on Blagojevich’s legacy and look forward to

a brighter future.

Blagojevich

came into

ofce at a t

when Illinoresidents d

trust their

governmen

because the

state was

the corrupt

laughingstoof the

nation. Hi

administra

did not hea

those woun

but made t

worse.

Page 25 of 28



Endnotes

1 “The Blagojevich trials,” Chicago Tribune, 11 July 2010, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-07-11/news/ct-edit- blago-20100709_1_rod-blagojevich-senate-seat-criminal-trial .

2 State of Illinois, “Gov. Blagojevich’s plan to provide comprehensive health coverage for every child in Illinois earns key endorsements” Ofce of the Governor, 13 October 2005,

http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=4389

3 State of Illinois, “A Report on the Financial Condition of the Illinois State Retirement Systems,” Commission on Government Forecasting and Accountability, March 2011, http://www.ilga.gov/commission/cgfa2006/Upload/

FinCondILStateRetirementSysMarch2011.pdf . This link did not work for me.

4 State of Illinois, “Budget cuts more than $1.3 billion in waste and inefciency, creates rainy day fund,” Ofce of the Governor, 1 June 2003, http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=2147 .

5 State of Illinois, “Comprehensive Annual Financial Report 2010,” Ofce of the Illinois Comptroller, 30 June 2011, http://www.ioc.state.il.us/index.cfm/linkservid/083E57BA-1CC1-DE6E-2F48783E3F984EF7/showMeta/0/.

6 State of Illinois, “Statewide Financial Statement Audit For the Year Ended June 30, 2010,” Ofce of the Auditor General, 21 July

2011 http://www.ioc.state.il.us/index.cfm/linkservid/083E57BA-1CC1-DE6E-2F48783E3F984EF7/showMeta/0/.

7 Collin Hitt, “Budget FAIL,” Illinois Policy Institute, 21 June 2011, http://www.illinoispolicy.org/budgetFAIL.

8 State of Illinois, “State Races to Pay Medicaid Bills,” Ofce of the Comptroller, July 2011, http://www.ioc.state.il.us/index.cfm/

linkservid/66EE26E3-1CC1-DE6E-2F489DF0E5686654/showMeta/0/.

9 State of Illinois, “About All Kids,” All Kids, http://www.allkids.com/hfs8269.html .

10 State of Illinois, “Covering All Kids Health Insurance Program Audit,” Ofce of the Auditor General, May 2010, http://www.

auditor.illinois.gov/Audit-Reports/Performance-Special-Multi/Performance-Audits/10-All-Kids-Hlth-Ins-Pgm-digest.htm .

11 State of Illinois, “Answers to Your Questions about All Kids,” Department of Healthcare and Family Services, 2010, http://www.

allkids.com/assets/hfs8269.pdf . This link did not work for me.

12 “State Watch: Chicago Tribune Examines Concerns over Illinois All Kids Program,” Kaiser Daily Health Policy Report, Henry

K. Kaiser Family Foundation, October 24, 2005, http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/daily-reports/2005/october/24/dr00033287.aspx?referrer=search .

13 Cost per child based on Kaiser State Watch article on former-Governor Blagojevich’s prediction of 204,000 in enrollment at $96 million in costs by 2011.

14 Kristina Rasmussen, “Testimony Submitted to the Illinois House of Representatives

Special Committee on Medicaid Reform,” Illinois Policy Institute, December 13, 2010, http://illinoispolicy.org/uploads/les/10.12.13%20

Kristina%20Rasmussen%20Medicaid%20Testimony.pdf . This link did not work for me.

15 U.S. Census Bureau, “Health Insurance Coverage Status by State (Children under 18),” http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/

data/historical/index.html .

16 State of Illinois “Public Act 096-1501,” 96th General Assembly, http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/fulltext.asp?DocName=&SessionI d=76&GA=96&DocTypeId=HB&DocNum=5420&GAID=10&LegID=50456&SpecSess=&Session=.

17 Joanna Bisgaier & Karin V. Rhodes, Auditing Access to Specialty Care for Children with Public Insurance, 364 N. Eng. J. Med.2324 (2011), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsa1013285 .

18 Illinois Policy Institute, “2011 - 2012 Illinois Legislators’ Guide to the Issues,” 27 April 2011, http://illinoispolicy.org/news/article.

asp?ArticleSource=4029 .

19 State of Illinois, “Gov. Blagojevich signs ‘No Senior Left Behind’ law,” Ofce of the Governor, 29 June 2005, http://www.illinois.

gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=4107 .

20 State of Illinois, “Public Act 094-0086,” 94th General Assembly, 29 June 2005, http://ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/94/

PDF/094-0086.pdf .

21 State of Illinois, “Illinois Cares Rx Changes,” Department of Healthcare and Family Services, June 2011, http://www.hfs.illinois. gov/assets/icrxfactsheet.pdf .

22 Civic Federation, “State of Illinois FY2012 Recommended Operating and Capital Budget: Analysis and Recommendations,” 9 May

2011, http://www.civicfed.org/sites/default/les/FY2012%20State%20of%20Illinois%20Budget%20Analysis.pdf .

Page 26 of 28

http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-07-11/news/ct-edit-blago-20100709_1_rod-blagojevich-senate-seat-criminal-trial


http://www.ilga.gov/commission/cgfa2006/Upload/FinCondILStateRetirementSysMarch2011.pdf



http://www.ioc.state.il.us/index.cfm/linkservid/083E57BA-1CC1-DE6E-2F48783E3F984EF7/showMeta/0/



http://www.ioc.state.il.us/index.cfm/linkservid/66EE26E3-1CC1-DE6E-2F489DF0E5686654/showMeta/0/


http://www.allkids.com/hfs8269.html

http://www.auditor.illinois.gov/Audit-Reports/Performance-Special-Multi/Performance-Audits/10-All-Kids-Hlth-Ins-Pgm-digest.htm


http://www.allkids.com/assets/hfs8269.pdf


http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/daily-reports/2005/october/24/dr00033287.aspx?referrer=search


http://illinoispolicy.org/uploads/files/10.12.13%20Kristina%20Rasmussen%20Medicaid%20Testimony.pdf


http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/data/historical/index.html


http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/fulltext.asp?DocName=&SessionId=76&GA=96&DocTypeId=HB&DocNum=5420&GAID=10&LegID=50456&SpecSess=&Session=


http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsa1013285

http://illinoispolicy.org/news/article.asp?ArticleSource=4029




http://ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/94/PDF/094-0086.pdf


http://www.hfs.illinois.gov/assets/icrxfactsheet.pdf


http://www.civicfed.org/sites/default/files/FY2012%20State%20of%20Illinois%20Budget%20Analysis.pdf

http://www.civicfed.org/sites/default/files/FY2012%20State%20of%20Illinois%20Budget%20Analysis.pdf









http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsa1013285













http://www.allkids.com/hfs8269.html













Page 27 of 28

23 Doug Finke, “Illinois Cares Rx participants being notied of cutback,” State Journal-Register, 14 July 2011, http://www.behealthyspringeld.com/sections/local-news/illinois-cares-rx-participants-being-notied-of-cutbacks .

24 State of Illinois, “Copayments and Cost-Sharing,” Illinois Cares Rx, http://www.illinoiscaresrx.com/copayments.html .

25 State of Illinois, “Gov. Blagojevich unveils landmark plan to give every 3 and 4 year - old in Illinois access to preschool” Ofce of the Governor, 12 February 2006, http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=4660 .

26 State of Illinois, “Governor Blagojevich joins parents and early education experts to celebrate major preschool expansion,” Ofce of the

Governor, 7 May 2006, http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=4834 .

27 “Preschool for All Endorsers,” Early Learning Illinois, http://www.earlylearningillinois.org/p4aendorsers.html .

28 State of Illinois, “Governor Blagojevich joins parents and early education experts to celebrate major preschool expansion,” Ofce of the


29 State of Illinois, “Governor Blagojevich’s Preschool for All plan and college tuition relief plan win legislative approval,” Ofce of the


30 State of Illinois, “SB1497,” 94th General Assembly, 25 July 2006, http://ilga.gov/legislation/fulltext.asp?DocName=&SessionId=50&GA=94&DocTypeId=SB&DocNum=1497&GAID=8&LegID=19547&SpecSess=&Session=.

31 State of Illinois, “Gov. Blagojevich signs groundbreaking Preschool for All legislation,” Ofce of the Governor, 25 July 2006, http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=5108 .

32 State of Illinois, “Gov. Blagojevich signs groundbreaking Preschool for All legislation,” Ofce of the Governor, 25 July 2006, http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=5108 .

33 Susanna Loeb, et al, “How Much is Too Much? The Inuence of Preschool Centers on Children’s Development Nationwide,” Policy

Analyses for California Education, 4 November 2005, http://gse.berkeley.edu/research/pace/reports/Stanford_Berkeley_pr23DA13.pdf.

34 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families “Head Start Impact Study,” January

2010, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/opre/hs/impact_study/reports/impact_study/executive_summary_nal.pdf .

35 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families “Head Start Impact Study,” January 2010, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/opre/hs/impact_study/reports/impact_study/executive_summary_nal.pdf .

36 Robert Holland and Don Soifer, “How Sound An Investment? An Analysis of Federal Preschool Proposals,” Lexington Institute, 5 March 2008, http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Education/how-sound-an-investment.pdf .

37 The Illinois Policy Institute requested Preschool for All expenditures from the Illinois State Board of Education. The Illinois State

Board of Education responded that it would be unable to provide expenditure information in a timely manner, but it could provide allocation information.

38 Illinois State Board of Education, Response to follow-up question to Freedom of Information Act Request from the Illinois Policy Institute, 9 September 2011.

39 State of Illinois, “Gov. Blagojevich, Rev. Meeks, urge General Assembly to approve Governor’s plan to provide free public transportation

to seniors,” Ofce of the Governor, 13 January 2008, http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=6545 .

40 Joseph DiJohn, Paul Metaxatos, Ashish Sen, Mike Pagano, Lise Dirks and Valbona Kokoshi, “Analysis of the RTA Seniors and

People with Disabilities Ride Free Programs,” University of Illinois at Chicago College of Urban Planning and Public Affairs, November 2010, http://www.utc.uic.edu/research/reports/RTARideFreePrograms.pdf .

41 Joseph DiJohn, Paul Metaxatos, Ashish Sen, Mike Pagano, Lise Dirks and Valbona Kokoshi, “Analysis of the RTA Seniors and People with Disabilities Ride Free Programs,” University of Illinois at Chicago College of Urban Planning and Public Affairs, November

2010, http://www.utc.uic.edu/research/reports/RTARideFreePrograms.pdf .

42 Joseph DiJohn, Paul Metaxatos, Ashish Sen, Mike Pagano, Lise Dirks and Valbona Kokoshi, “Analysis of the RTA Seniors and

People with Disabilities Ride Free Programs,” University of Illinois at Chicago College of Urban Planning and Public Affairs, November 2010, http://www.utc.uic.edu/research/reports/RTARideFreePrograms.pdf .

43 Jon Hilkevitch, “Free rides for most seniors to end Sept. 1,” Chicago Tribune, 1 June 2011, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-

06-01/news/ct-met-transit-senior-rides-0602-20110601_1_free-rides-program-free-rides-seniors .

44 State of Illinois, “Governor Quinn Signs Legislation to Reform Statewide Transit,” Ofce of the Governor, 14 February 2011, http://

www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=9218 .

45 State of Illinois 95th General Assembly house of Representatives Special Investigative Committee, “Final Report of the Special Investigative Committee,” 8 January 2009, http://ilga.gov/house/committees/95Documents/Final%20Report%20of%20the%20

Special%20Investigative%20Committee.pdf . This link did not work for me.

http://www.behealthyspringfield.com/sections/local-news/illinois-cares-rx-participants-being-notified-of-cutbacks


http://www.illinoiscaresrx.com/copayments.html



http://www.earlylearningillinois.org/p4aendorsers.html



http://ilga.gov/legislation/fulltext.asp?DocName=&SessionId=50&GA=94&DocTypeId=SB&DocNum=1497&GAID=8&LegID=19547&SpecSess=&Session=






http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/opre/hs/impact_study/reports/impact_study/executive_summary_final.pdf


http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Education/how-sound-an-investment.pdf


http://www.utc.uic.edu/research/reports/RTARideFreePrograms.pdf



http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-06-01/news/ct-met-transit-senior-rides-0602-20110601_1_free-rides-program-free-rides-seniors




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46 http://www.auditor.illinois.gov/Audit-Reports/Performance-Special-Multi/Performance-Audits/FY06-Flu-Vaccine-ISaveRX- MGMT-digest.pdf .

47 State of Illinois 95th General Assembly house of Representatives Special Investigative Committee, “Final Report of the Special Investigative Committee,” 8 January 2009, http://ilga.gov/house/committees/95Documents/Final%20Report%20of%20the%20

Special%20Investigative%20Committee.pdf .

48 John Chase, Kim Barker and David Kidwell, “How Illinois u vaccine vanished in Pakistan,” Chicago Tribune, 5 August 2007,

http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2007-08-05/news/0708040385_1_vaccine-pakistan-u-shots .

49 State of Illinois, “Flu Vaccine Procurement and the I-SaveRx Program,” Ofce of the Auditor General, September 2006, http://www.auditor.illinois.gov/Audit-Reports/Performance-Special-Multi/Performance-Audits/FY06-Flu-Vaccine-ISaveRX-MGMT-digest.pdf .

50 State of Illinois, “Flu Vaccine Procurement and the I-SaveRx Program,” Ofce of the Auditor General, September 2006, http://

www.auditor.illinois.gov/Audit-Reports/Performance-Special-Multi/Performance-Audits/FY06-Flu-Vaccine-ISaveRX-MGMT-digest.pdf .

51 John Chase, “English rm sues Illinois over u vaccine contract,” Chicago Tribune, 1 April 2005, http://articles.chicagotribune.

com/2005-04-01/news/0504010217_1_u-vaccine-comptroller-dan-hynes-illinois .

52 State of Illinois, “Blagojevich releases much-anticipated report on feasibility and savings of prescription drug importation,” Ofce of the

Governor, 27 October 2003, http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=2346 .



55 http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=3440


57 John Chase and Christi Parsons, “U.S. blocks drugs sent from Canada,” Chicago Tribune, 10 March 2005, http://articles.

chicagotribune.com/2005-03-10/news/0503100295_1_drug-imports-fda-cholesterol-lowering .

58 State of Illinois, “I-Save Rx Information Memoranda,” Department of Human Services, 17 February 2009, http://www.dhs.state.

il.us/page.aspx?item=42489 .

59 Declan McCullagh, “Illinois video game law challenged in court,” CNET News, 25 July 2005, http://news.cnet.com/Illinois-video- game-law-challenged-in-court/2100-1043_3-5803988.html .

60 James Kimberly, “Law bars violent game sales to children,” Chicago Tribune, 26 July 2005, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2005- 07-26/news/0507260222_1_video-games-illinois-retail-merchants-association-video-software-dealers-association .

61 “State: Video victors in lawsuit will get legal fees by January,” Associated Press, 18 December 2006, http://mywebtimes.com/archives/

ottawa/display.php?id=288821.

62 Richard Wronski, “Rod Blagojevich’s name coming off tollway signs,” Chicago Tribune, 2 February 2009, http://www.chicagotribune.

com/news/local/chi-tollway-signs-30jan30,0,1316658.story .

63 Jon Hilkevitch, “Open-road toll lanes wait for Blagojevich,” Chicago Tribune, 21 November 2005, http://articles.chicagotribune.

com/2005-11-21/news/0511210061_1_open-road-tolling-toll-plaza-interstate-highway .

64 Jon Hilkevitch, “Tollway board says it missed some big signs,” Chicago Tribune, 28 July 2006, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-07-28/news/0607280291_1_tollway-open-road-tolling-rod-r-blagojevich .

65 “Illinois: Governor Campaigns Through $15k Highway Signs,” http://www.thenewspaper.com/news/11/1191.asp .

66 Jon Hilkevitch, “Tollway board says it missed some big signs,” Chicago Tribune, 28 July 2006, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-07-28/news/0607280291_1_tollway-open-road-tolling-rod-r-blagojevich .

67 Jon Hilkevitch, “Tollway board says it missed some big signs,” Chicago Tribune, 28 July 2006, http://articles.chicagotribune.

com/2006-07-28/news/0607280291_1_tollway-open-road-tolling-rod-r-blagojevich .

68 “New sign of the times: No Blagojevich,” Chicago Tribune, 20 January 2009, http://archive.chicagobreakingnews.com/2009/01/

new-sign-of-the-times-no-blagojevich.html .

69 Monique Garcia, “Illinois politicians can no longer put names on road signs,” Chicago Tribune, 16 June 2011, http://www.

chicagotribune com/news/politics/clout/chi illinois politicians can no longer put names on road signs 20110616 0 5393130 story

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