Birth Certificate Law

8/10/2019 Birth Certificate Law

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ORIGINAL

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 01110

STATE OF OHIO,Plaintiff Appellee CASE NUMBER:

vs.

M ic h a e l T u r n er W h i te , C O U RT O F A P P E A L S C A S E N U M B E R

A U T I IO R I Z E D A G E N T O F : C - 0 9 0 3 80 a n d c -0 9 0 3 7 9MICHAEL TURNER WHITE STRAWMAN

Defendant Appellant,

RAFFIC COURT CASE: :(In The MatterO M/09/TRD/1945A and M/09/TRD/1945B

^ORWOOD MAYOR'S COURT CASEUMBER: 09-TRD-00494

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JURISDICTIONOF Michael Turner White AUTHORIZED AGENT OF

: MICHAEL TURNER WIIITE STRAWMAN

Michael'1'urner White Authorized Representative of: (COUNSEL OF RECORD)MICHAEL TURNER WHITE STRAWAfAN3756 READING ROADAPARTMENT #307CINCINNATI, OHIO 45229

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT, Michael Turner White, PROPIA PERSONA

OHIO ATTORNEY GENERALRICHARD CORDRAY

;COUNTY PROSECUTORCIIRISTOPHER BROW NNORWOOD MAYOR'S COURT4645 MONTGOMERY ROADNORWOOD, OHIO 45212

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, ATTORNEY FOR STATE OF OHIO

I

GLi r i } ` ( i 1 Gi ) UR

UUPF i(:11E :;WUfi ( OF ()Fil


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TABEL OF CONTENTS

EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS CASE IS A CASEOF PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND GREAT GENERAL INTERESTAND INVOLVES A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL

QUESTION FOR WANT OF JURISICTION

P GE

5-6

STATEMENT OF CASE STAEMENT OF FACTS 7-10

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSITIONS 10-17

PROPOSITION OF LAW ITHE TRAFFIC COURT COMMITED PLAIN ERROR B1'REFUSING TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE APPELLANT'S

RESERVE RIGHTS PURSUANT TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIALCODE 1-207, 1-308 AND THE RIGHT TO CONTRACT PURSUANTTO THE CONSTITUTION, IN ARTICLE I, SECTION 10.

PROPOSITION OF LAW HTHE JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT HAS BEEN ABORTED BYTHE TRAFFIC COURT'SREFUSAL TO ACKNOWLEDGE FEDERALJURISDICTION AS DEFINED BY ARTICLE I,SECTION 8, CLAUSE17 OF TITE CONSTITUTON.

PROPISITION OF LAW IIITHE TRAFFIC COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY REFUSINGTO ACKNOW-LEDGE THE APPELLANT'S DUTY TO TRAVEL THEHIGHWAYS FREELY AND W ITHOUT RESTRICTION

PROPOSITION OF LAW IVTHE CREATION OF A SECUITY EXCIIANGE CUTS AGAINST THEDICTATES OF THE BANKRUPTCY THAT WAS ESTABLISHED IN

1933 AN'D IS IN DIRECT OPPOSITION TO JEROME DALY , JUDGEMAHONY & THE CREDIT RIVER DECISION.

CONCLUSIONPROOF OF SERVICF.APPENDIXNotice of AppealAppeal scheduling orderEntry Overruling Motion for TranscriptsEntry overruling Reconsideration niotionEntry Dismissing Appeal as UntimelyAffidavit of Indigency

10-12

12-14

14-15

15-18

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APPX. PAGEi-6789

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EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS CASE IS A CASE OF PUBLLC PRIVATE ANDGREAT GENERAL INTEREST AND 1NVOLVES A SUBSTANTIAL

CONSTITUTIONAL OUESTION FOR WANT OF JURISICTION

FEDERAL JURISDICTION

It is further refevant to this Mem orandum In S upport of Jurisdiction that any

violation of the appellant's Rights, Freedom, or Property by the U.S. federal government,

or any agent thereof, would be an illegal and unlawful excess, clearly outside the limited

boundaries of federal jurisdiction. The appellant's standings is that the jurisdiction of the

U.S. federal governm ent is defined by Article L, Section 8, Clause 17 of the U.S.

Constitution, quoted as follows:

The Congress shall have the power . . . To exercise exclusive legislation inall cases whatsoever, over such district (NOT EXCEEDING TEN MILESSQUARE) as may, by cession of particular states and the acceptance ofCongress, beconre the seat of the Government o f the United States, [Districtof Columbia] and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by theconsent of the legislature of the state in which the sam e shall be, for theErection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock yards and other needfulBuildings; And - To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper forcarrying into Execution the foregoing Powers... [eniphasis added]

aszd Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2:

The Congress shall have the Power to dispose of and make all needful Rulesand Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to theUnited States; and no thing fn this Constitution shall be so construed as toPrejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.

The definiition of the United States being used here, then, is limited to its territories:

1 The Dis t ric t o f Colu inb ia 6 Northern M a r i a n a I sl a n d s2) Commonwealth of Puerto R i c o 7 ) Tr u s t Te r r i t o r y of the Pacific Islands

3 U.S. Virgin Islands 8 M ilitary bases within the several s tates

4 Guam 9) Federal agencies within the several states

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and to the territory, of which Alabaana o r any of the new States were

formed...

fBiecause, the United States have no constitutional capacity to exerciseniunicipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eniinent dom ain, within the liniits of aState or elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is expressly granted...

Alabama is therefore entitled to the sovereignty and jurisdiction over a ll theterritory within her limits, subject to the common law, Pollard v. HaQan, 44U.S. 221, 223, 228, 229.

Likewise, Title 18 of the United States Code at 7 specif ies that the terr itor ial

jurisdiction of the United States extends only outside the boundaries of lands belonging to

any of the several States.

Therefore, in addition to the fact that no unrevealed federal con tract can obligate nie to

perforni in any mann er withoutiny fully infornied and uncoerce d consent, likewise, no

federal statutes or regulations apply to me or have any jurisdictiou over me. I hereby

affirm that I do not reside or work in any federal territory of the District United States,

and that therefore no U.S. federal government statutes or regulations have any authority

over me.

POWERS AND CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS OFUNITED STATES AND STATE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

All United States and State governme nt officials are hereby put on notice that I expect

them to have recorded valid Oaths of Office in accordance witti the U.S. Constitution,

Article VI:

The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the inembers ofthe several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both ofthe United States and of the several States, shall be bound by oath oraffirmation to support this Co nstitution...

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I understand that by thcir Oaths of O ffice all U.S. and State government officials arecontractually bound by the U .S. Constitution as formulated by its framers, and not as interpreted, subverted, or corrupted by the U.S. Supreme Court or other courts.

According to the Ninth Ainendment to the U.S. Constitution:

The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construedto deny or disparage others retained by the people.

and the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitntion, norprohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to thepeople.

Thus, appellant's understanding from these Amendnients is that the powers of all

U.S. and State government officials are limited to those specifically granted by the U.S.

Constitution. And,

further understand that any laws, statutes, ordinances, regulations, rules, and procedures

contrary to the U.S. Constitution, as written by its framers, are null and void, as expressed

in the Sixteenth Anierican Jurisprudence Second Edition, Sectiou 177:

The general misconception is that any statute passed by legislators bearing the

appearance of law constitutes the law of the land. The U.S. Constitution isthe supreme law of the land, and any statute, to be valid, must be inagreement. It is impossible for both the Constitution and a law violating it tobe valid; one must prevail. This is succinctly stated as follows:

'The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute, though having the formand name of law, is in reality no law, but is wholly void, and ineffective forany purpose; since unconstitutionality dates from the time of its enactnient,and not m erely from the date of the decision so brand ing i t . An

unconstitutional law in leval contemplation is as inoperative as if it hadnever been passed. Such a statute leaves the question that it purports to settlejust as it would be had the statute not been enacted.'

'Since an unconstitutional law is void, the general principles follow that itimposes no duties confers no right creates no office, bestows no power orauthority on anyone affords no protection and iustifies no acts performedunder it...'

'A void act caimot be legally consistent with a valid one. An unconstitutionallaw cannot opera te to supersede any existing valid law. Indeed , insofar as a

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statute runs countcr to the fundamental law of the land, it is supersededthereby.'

'No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no courts are bound toenforce it. ' [emphasis added]

and as expressed once again in the U.S. Constitution, Article VI:

This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made inpursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under theauthority of the United States, shall be the supreine law of the land; and thejudges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution orlaws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

All U.S. and State government officials are therefore hereby put on notice that any

violations of their contractual obligations to act in accordance with their U.S. Constitution,

may result in prosecution to the full extent of the law, as well as the application of all

available legal remedies to recover damages suffered by any parties damaged by any

actions of U.S. and State government officials in violation of the U.S. Constitution.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

On March 20, 2009 a police officer badge number 130 for the Norwood Police

Department, Unft 23 and Post 3128, issued a speedhig ticket on form B28 102726-2 for a

matter of jurisdiction under case number 09TRD00494. This states a violation of the Ohio

Revised Code 333.03B, which is a speeding contract. The speed was 43 MPH in a 25 MPH

zone. The summons to appear at the Norwood Mayor's Court was scheduled for March 20,

2009 and a trial was scheduled for April 13, 2009. Upon the appellant stating this to be an

Adniiralty Marititne Court summons the Norwood Mayor's Court judge refused to hear

the case. That judge transferred this matter to the Hamilton Comity Courthouse 100 Main

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Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 for April 29, 2009. The Mnnicipal Court is Magistrate Jay

G. Littner and Judge Brad Greenberg hearing the matter of 112-09-TRD-1945 (A) and (B).

Greenberg Court denied the appellant's restricted appearance notice as we ll as any

and all case law sanctioned to the states by the United States Supreme C ourt. This Supreine

Court sanction the appellant's liberty interest to travel the lughways without restriction as

a Sovereign American Citizen. And, vehemently announced that the appellant does not

need to possess a driver's license, nor license plates to travel the highways. The Suprenie

Court further enshrined this right as guaranteed ; and, if this right is mutilated that

retaliation can be compensated as a violation of the United Sates Constitution and the

Separation of Powers Doctrine. The Greenberg Court decreed the appellant to be in

violation of the Ohio revised Code and sanction a fine of $197.00, which is Federal Reserve

notes that have been sanctioned as counterfeit in State of Minnesota Coirnty of Scott, First

National bank of Montgomery, Planitff vs Jerome Daly defendant. The Justice Martin V.

Mahone,y ruled the Federal Reserve notes are comiterfeit.

Furthermore, the Greenberg strictly ignored the bankruptcy of 1993 and executive

order declared so by President Roosevelt by Executive Orders 6073, 6102 , 611.1 and

Executive Order 6260. This information can be retrieved from the following resources:

Bankruptcy of U.S in 1933 & State of EmerQency, War Powers &TradinIZ with the Enemy Act of 1917

Bankruptcy of 1933

The United States went bankrupt in 1933. [President Roosevelt Executive Order 6073,6102, 6111, 6260;

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Senate Report 93-549, pgs. 187 594, 19731

In 1950, declared bankruptcy and reorganization .Secretary of Treasury appointer receiver in the bankruptcy [Reorganization Plan, No. 26,

5 U.S.C.A. 903; Public Law 94-564; Legislative History, Pg. 59671

The Secretary of the Treasury is the Governor of the International Monetary Fund, Inc.of theU.N. [Public Law 94-564, supra, pg. 5942; U.S. Government Manua11990/91, pgs. 480-81;26 U.S.C.A. 7701(a)(11); Treasury Delegation Order No 150-10]

On Oct. 28th 1977, the United States as aCorporator and State declared insolvancy.Statebaiil


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Martial Law, seize and control and transportation and conimunication, regulate operationof privateenterprise, restrict travel, and in a plethora of particu lar ways, control the lives of allAmericancitizens . -- Senate Report 93-549; Senate Resolution 9, 93d Congress, l st. Session (I11)1973

See: Chapter 1, Title 1, Section 48, Statute 1, March 9, 1933; Proclamation 2038; Title 12U.S.C 95(b)

Currently, permanent state of national emergency. -- 22 U.S.C.A. 286d. 1977

See: Executive Order 12919 signed by President ClintonTrading with the Enemy Act of 1917 & 1933 People Declared the Enemy)

Oct. 6, 1917, under the Trading with the F,neniy Act, Section 2, subdivision c), Chapter

106-Eneiny defined other than citizens of the United States...

March 9, 1933, Chapter 106, Section 5, subdivision (b) of the Trading with the Ene my

Act of

Oct.6 1917 40 Stat. L. 411) amended as follows ...any person within the United States..Sce H.R. 1491 Public No.l

As a direct result of this bankruptcy, the Greenberg Court is action is de facto and

in violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine, all of which, suspend administering

jurisdiction to the United States of America and its Sovereign Ainerican Citizens as

Michael Turner White, authorized agent of: MICHAEL TURNER WHITE -

STRAWMAN .

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSITIONS OF LAW

PROPOSITION OF LAW ITHE TRAFFIC COURT COMMITED PLAIN ERROR B Y REFUSING TOACKNOWLED GE THE APPELLANT'S RESERVE RIGHTS PURSUANT TO THEUNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1-207, 1-308 AND THE RIGHT TO CONTRACTPURSUANT TO THE CON STITUTION, IN ARTICLE I, SECTION 10.

Every system of civilized law must have two characteristics: Remedy and Recourse.

Reniedy is a way to get out froin under that law. The Recourse is if you have been damaged

under the law, you can recover your loss. The Coinmon Law, the L aw of Merchants, and


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even the Uniform Coinniercial Code all have reinedy and recourse. The remedy and

recourse are found in the UCC. They are found right in the first volume, at 1-207 and 1-

103. The making of a valid Reservation of Rights preserves whatever rights the person then

possesses, and prevents the loss of such rights by application of concepts of waiver or

estoppel. (UCC 1-207.7)

In the case sub judice, the appellant his constitutional rights by signing the traffic

citation with UCC-1-207. This same i-ight was fiu-ther demanded when the appellant

appeared in traffic court made a reservation of rights under the UCC 1-207 which goes on

to say, When a waivable right or claim is involved, the failure to make a reservation

thereof, causes a loss of the right, and bars its assertion at a later date. (UCC 1-207.9).

further, any expression indicating an intention to reserve rights, is sufficient, such as

without prejudice . (UCC 1-207.4). thus and therefore, the signing of the traffic citation

and the proffering of this right in the traffic court and in the `connection with the

appellant's autograph, this clearly states a reserve and the right not to be compelled to

perform under any contract or commercial agreexncnt that the appellant did not enter

Icnowingly, voluntarily and intentionally. And fnrthermore, the appellant does not accept

the liability of the compelled benefit of any unrevealed contract or commercial agreement.'

The Recourse appears in the Uniform Conunercial Code at 1-103.6, which says: The

Code is complimentary to the Common Law , which remains in force, except where

displaced by the code. A statute should be construed in harmony with the Com mon Law,

unless there is a clear legislative intent to abrogate the Common Law. The Code recognizes

the Common Law. If it did not recognize the Common Law, the government would have

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had to admit that the United States is bankrupt, and is completely owned by its creditors.

'Therefore, the explicit reservation at 1-207 and insist that the statutes be construed in

harmony with the Conunon Law. In furtherance to the traffic citation, the appellant

requisitions this court to produce the injured person who has filed a verified complaint. To

further cement this deniand the last sentence of 1-103.6, which states: The Code cannot be

read to preclude a Common Law action. Further, the appellant understand that the traffic

court has made a legal determination that the sections 1-207 and 1-103 of the Uniform

Commercial Code, which is the system oi'law you are operating under, are not valid law

before this court?' if, the answer to this is affirmative the appellant places this court on

notice that an appeal will ensue regarding this legal determination.

PROPOSITION OF LAW IITI3E JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT HAS BEEN ABORTED BY THE TRAFFICCOURT'S REFUSAL TO ACKNOWLEDGE FED ERAL JURISDICTION AS DEFINEDBY ARTICLE I, SECTION 8, CLAUSE 17 OF THE C ONSTITUTON.

LAW AND ARGUMENT

Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the U.S. Constitution, is quoted as follows:

The Congress shall have the power ... To exercise exclusive legislation inall cases whatsoever, over such district (NOT EXCEEDING TEN MILESSQUARE) as inay, by cession of particular states and the acceptance ofCongress, become the seat of the Government of the United States, [Districtof Colunibia] and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by theconsent of the legislature of the state in which the sam e shall be, for theErection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock yards and other needfulBuildings; And - To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper forcarrying into Execution the foregoing Powers... [eniphasis added]

arad Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2:

The Congress shall have the Power to dispose of and make all needful Rulesand Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the

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United States; an d nothing in this Constitution shall be so cotistrued as toPrejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.

The (lefinition of the United States being used here, then, is limited to its territories:

1 ) T h e Dist r ic t of C olumbia2) Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

3 U.S. Virgin Islands

4)Guain5) American Samoa

6 ) N o r t h e r n M ari an a I s lan d s7) Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands8) Military bases within the several states9) Federal agencies witlwi the several states

It does not include the several states themselves, as is confirmed by the following cites:

We have in our political system a Government of the United States and agovernment of each of the several States. Each one of these governments isdistinct froin the others, and each has citizens of its own w ho ow e itallegiance, and whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it must protect. The sameperson may be at the same time a citizen of the United States and a Citizen ofa State, but his rights of citizenship under one of these governments will bedifferent from those he has under the other. Slaughter House Cases UnitedStates vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).

T H E U N I T E D S TAT E S G O V E R N M E N ' I' I S A F O R E I G NCORPORATION W 1TI3 RESPECT TO A STATE. [emphasis added]Volume 20: Corpus Juris Sec. 1785: NY re: Merriam 36 N.E. 505 1441S.Ct.1973, 41 L.Ed.287.

This mater has further been decided by the U.S. Supreme Court as follows;

The laws of Congress in respect to those matters do not extend into theterritorial limits of the states, but have force only in the District of Columbia,and other places that are w ithin the exclusive jurisdiction of the nationalgovernment, Caha v. United States, 152 U.S., at 215.

We think a proper exaniination of this subject will show that the UnitedStates never held any municipal sovereignty, jurisdiction, or right of soil inand to the terri tory, of which Alabama or any of the new States were

formed...

[B]ecause, the United States have n o constitutional capacity to exercisemunicipal jurisdictiou, sovereignty, or eniinent domain, within the liniits of aState or elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is expressly granted...

Alabama is therefo re entitled to the sovereignty and jurisdiction over a ll theterritory within her limits, subject to the common law, Pollard v. Hagan, 44U.S. 221, 223, 228, 229.

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Lilcewise, Title 18 of the United States Code at 7 specifies that the territorial

jurisdiction of the United States extends only outside the boundaries of lands belonging to

any of the seve ra l Sta tes. Therefore , in addi t ion to the fac t tha t no unrevea led federa l

contrac t can obl iga te the appel lant to perform in any ma nner w i thout hini be ing ful ly

informed a nd uncocrc ed consent, l ikewise, ito federal s tatutes or regulations apply to the

appellant or have any,jurisdiction over the appellant. And, the appellant hereby affirm that

he does not reside or work in any federal territory of the District United States, and that

therefore no U.S. federal governm ent statutes or regulations have any authority over the

appellant..

PROPISITION OF L AW IiITHE TRAFFIC COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY REFUSING TO ACKNOW-LEDGE THE APPELLANT'S DUTY TO TRAVEL THE HIGHWAYS FREELY ANDWITHOUT RESTRICTION

LAW AND ARGUMENTThe right to travel is vehemently announced as a secured liberty interest guaranteed

under the first and fifth amendment. The U.S. supreme Court addressd this matter in

Shapiro v Thompson, 394 U .S. 618 encompasses all legal cases for the right to travel.

Therefore, the appe llant has a right to travel freely and incumbent, which is the right to

life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Further, the Snpreme Co urt announced the

Constitution is th supreme law of the land. See, Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S. 137, (19430 and

can the state convert the r ight to travel to a priviledge? The answer is negative. No state

can convert a secured right to a pr iviledge. And, no state can convert ant secured liberty

into a priviledge and issue a license and a fee. Il; any state d oes such it is unconstitutional,

because no state can pass a law that ta kes away this secured right.

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Can a state require the appellant to have a license? The answer is negativc. No state

can require the appellant to possess a license. See, Shuttlesworth v Birminghani Alabama,

373 U.S. 262, (1962). If a state does convert the appellant's right into a priviledge and

issues a license for it, the appellant can ignore the license and a fee and engage in the right

with impunity.

In regards to evillfuhzess: as an evil intent or notion to avoid a known duty or task

under law with a inoral certainty, is the definition of the Supreme court in U.S. v Bishop at

412 U.S. 346. Here, the appellant has re lied upon the Constitution and United States

Supreme Court decision to enforce his right to travel freely. This is not the appellant's

interpretation; rather, the interpretation of Byres v U.S., 273 U.S. 28 says it is to he

interpreted in favor of the appellant. See, 16 Am.Jurp.2i, section 97 states:

then a constitution should receive literal interpretation in favor of the Citizen, is especiallytrue, with respect to those provision whieh were designed to safeguard the liberty andsecurity of the Citizen in regard to person and property . Bary v U.s., 273 128. And, anyconstitutional provision intended to confer a benefit should be liberally construed in favorof the clearly intended and expressedly designated beneficiary . The appellant is tbebeneficiary of the United States Constitution.

Thus and therefore, pursuant to Boyd v U.S., 116 U.S. 616, ( 1886), this court is to

protect against any constitutional infringement. And, pursuant to Norton v Shelby County,

118 U.S. 425, ( 1886) an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no

duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is legal contemplation as inoperative

as though it had never been passed.

PROPOSITION OF LAW IVTHE CREATION OF A SECUITY EXCHANGE CUTS AGAINST THE DICTATES OFTHE BANKRUPTCY TI3AT W AS ESTABLISHED IN 1933 AND IS IN DIRECTOPPOSITION TO JEROME DALY, JiJDGE MAHONY & THE CRED IT RIVERDECISION.

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LAW AND ARGUMENT

THE BANKRUPTCY OF THE UNITED STATES

The United States Congressional Record, March 17, 1993 Vol. 33, page H-I303

enshrines the bankruptcy of the UNITED STATES is a 38 part docuinent. It is an

established fact that the United States Federal Government has been dissolved by the

Emergency Banking Act, March 9, 1933, 48 Stat. 1, Public Law 89-719; declared by

President Roosevelt, being bankrupt and insolvent. H.J.R. 192, 73rd Congress m session

June 5,1933 - Joint Resolution To Suspend The Gold Standard and Abrogate The Gold

Clause dissolved the Sovereign Authority of the United States and the official capacities of

all United States Governmental Offices, Officers, and Departments and is furtlier evidence

that the United States Federal Government exists today in name only. This created a

federal contractual relationship pursuant to this presidential executive order and U.S.

Const. Article I Sect. X , Cl.t with the states and the Office of the Person. The traffic

citation is a security, exchange and violates the presidential executive order, U.S. Const.

Article X, Cl.1.Sectimi. 10.

Clause l: No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters ofMarque and Reprisal; coin Money; eniit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold andsilver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, orLaw impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of N obility.

Clause 2: No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties onImports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspectionLaws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports orExports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shallbe subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.

Clause 3: No S tate shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay an,y Duty of Tonnage, keepTroops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with

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another State, or with a forcign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or insach iinniincnt Danger as will uot adniit of delay

The security of exchange is the underwriting of insurance for the corporate

UNITED STATES mauitenance is the criniinai penalty of $130.00 (one hundred and thirty

dollars) are federal reserve notes, which is explained by the Jeronie Daly, Judge Mahon,y &

The Credit Rivet Decision. In the decision a Minnesota Trial Court's decision holding the

Federal Reserve Act unconstitutional and VOID; holding the National Banking Act

unconstitutional and VOID; declaring a mortgage acquired by the First National Bank of

Montgomery, Minnesota in the regular course of its business, along with the foreclosure

and the sheriff's sale, to be VOID. Meaning, the Federal Reserve uotes are counterfeit and

uncoustitutional. See, First National Bank of Montgomery vs. Jerome D aly, State of

Minnesota, County of Scott, Township of Credit River and Justice Martin v Mahoney,

Credit River township, Scott County, Minnesota, December 9, 1968. W herefore, the

appellant invokes the United States Constitution Article 7 Section 101ega1 tender that only

gold and silver can originate to pay a debt. Considering the State of Ohio does not provide

gold and silver to the appellant the traffic criminal offence must be absolved. Most

iinportantly, the failure to present the charging instrument is constitutional grounds for a

disniissal with prejudice in this matter, as well as, releasing the order of the court to the

appellant.

PROPOSITION OF LAW VITHE SEPERATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE

SOVEREIGN CITIZEN WAS SENTENCED IN AN ADMIRALTY COURT OF AFOREIGN GOVERNMENT IS IN WANT OF JURISIDCTION.

LAW AND ARGUMENT

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The State of Ohio is in violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine, which says

the United States cannot pass legislation mi to the United States of America. Is this true ?

Yes, this is true. The United States Supreme Court opined the following:

...the Constitutioti divides authority[legislative jurisdiction] between federal and stategoveniments for the protection of individuals. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself:Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion ofsovereign power. Coleinan v Thompson, 501 U.s. 722, 759 (1991)(BL ACKMAN, j.,DISSEMTINGO. Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branehes ofthe federal government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any onebranch, a healthy balance of power between the States and federal Government will reducethe risk of tyranny and abuse from either front. Gregory v, 1505 U.S. 144, ] 82] Ashcroft,501 U.S. at 458. See the federalist No. 51, p. 323 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) [New York v unitedSates, 505 U.S. 144, (1992)].The federal government has no legislative power outside of itsterritory. And, this very same law is spoken of by Judge Story, in his treatise on the

Conflicts of law.

CONCLUSION

Wherefore, for want of jurisdiction, the herein Propositions of Law ought to be

within the spirit of the ancient veils of justice that are crevices of sacred wrinldes that guide

the ageless wisdom of C onimon Law. Most iniportantly, injustice is a threat to justice

everywhere in the universe and the cancer that is spread by injustice ought to be extricated

froni this memorandum In Support of Jurisdiction.

graph of:ael Turner White Au orized Representative of:

HITE STRAWMANHAEL TURNFR W3756 READING ROADAPARTMENT #307CINCINNATI, OHIO 45229

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEThe Sovei-eign Citizen, Michael Turner White, an American Citizen, certify that on

this 5th day of Octobcr , 2009, a true and exact copy of the aforesaid Appellant's notice ofappeal is submitted to clerk of court of the Ohio supreme C ourt, at 30 East broad Street,State Office Tower, Columbns, Ohio 43226-0419 with a return receipt pursuant to the OhioCriminal Rule 55. And, a receipt is requested by the sovereign appellant as filed and timed

stamped, per Ohio Criininal Rule 55. And, a copy is sent to Norwood County Prosecutor,Christopher brown, Norwood Mayor's Court, 4645 Montgomery Road, Norwood, Ohio45212. This Certificate of Service is sanctioned pursuant to Houston v Lack, 487 U.S. 266,108 S.Ct. 2379, (1988) and sanctioned to 28 U.S.C. 1746. And, is prepared outside of theUNITED STATES, INCORPORATED.

AVRights RescrveC d-207 and UC

ograph of:

Authorized Representative of:MICHAEL TURNER WHITE- STRAWMAN

hael Turner Vylti'fe, Ainerican Sovereign

19


20/24


21/24

JUDGES: COURT OF APP EAI.,s

LEE H. HILDEBRANDT JR. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT MARK E. COMBSCOURT AnMINISTRATORMARK PHILIP PAINTER WILLTAM HOWARD TAFTLAW CENTER

J. HOWARD SUNDERMANN JR. 230 EAST NINTH STREET MOLLY LEONARDSYLVIA SIEVE HENDON CINCINNATI, OHio 45202-2138 ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR

PENELOPE R. CUNNINGHAM 513,946.3500 FAx 513.946.3412 CHRISTOPHER P. DIETZPATRICK DINKELACKER

www.hamilton-co.org/appealscourt CUtLror ST FF

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff- Appellee,

vs.

MICHAEL TURNER WHITE,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL NO S. Co9o379Co9o38o

TRIAL NOS.Mo9TRDr9aSiA.Mo9TRDi9451B

ACCELERATED CALENDAR SCHEDULING ORDER AND CONSOLIDATING APPEALS

Having reviewed the notice of appeal and docket statement filed herein, and pursuant to Local Rule12(2), it is the Order of this C ourt that this cause be placed on the Court's accelerated calendar.

It is Ordered that the complete record of this action be filed on or before o7/24/200 1).(See paragraphs one and two of the enclosed.)

The appellants brief shall be filed on or before o8/26/2oon.The appellee's brief shall be filed on or before 09/29/2009 .(See paragraph four of the enclosed.)

Counsel who w ish to submit the appeal to the Court without oral argument should submit a writtenrequest to the court at least three working days prior to the hearing.

Further, the Court hereby sua sponte consolidates the above causes for the purpose of appeal underthe case number C-o9o379

NOTE: Enclosed with this Order are several admonitions. These admonitions should be reviewed.

To The Clerk:^ . \ . P

e .Enter upon the Journal of the Court on June i2. 2ooq per order df'the Court.

yP r e s i d in J u d g e ^ ^

(Copy sent to counsel)


22/24

IN THE COURT OF APPF,ALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, APPEAL NO. C-o9o379

Appellee,

vs . ENTRY SU SPONTE STRIKINGSTATEMENT PRAECIPE ANDAGREED STATEMENT FILED ONJULY 15, 2009

MICHAEL TURNER WHITE

Appellant.

This cause came on to be considered upon the appellant's statement,

praecipe, and agreed statement filed on July 15, 2009.

The Court sua sponte strikes the filing as not being in compliance with the

Court's entry of July 7, 2009.

The Court's scheduling order of June 16, 2009 obligates the Clerk of Courts to

prepare and certify the docket and journal entries, thus making appellant's statement

and praecipe moot. The docket and journal entries are to be filed by July 24, 2009.

As stated in this Court's entry of July 7, 2009, the transcript of proceedings

or, in lieu of a transcript, an agreed statement, shall be filed by July 24, 2oo9. The

agreed statement portion of appellant's filing dated July 15, 2009 fails to comport

with Appellate Rule 9(D). Appellate Rule 9(D) requires that the appellant present

his statement to the trial court for its review. The failure of appellant to file the

transcript of proceedings or a properly filed agreed statement by July 24, 2009 mayresult in this appeal being dismissed.

To The Clerk:

Enter ug0n ;& Journal of the Court on JUL 1`6 2Q09per order of the Court.

(Copies sent to all counsel)


23/24

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COTJNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO APPEAL NO.C-o9o379C-o9o380

TRIAL NO. Mo9TRD19451-A B

Appellee,

vs.

MICHAEL TURNER WHITE

Appellant.

ENTRY OF DISMISSAL

This cause came on to be considered upon the appeal from the trial court.

'Phe Court sua sponte dismisses the appeal for failure of the appellant to

comply with the O hio Rules of Appellate Procedure to wit: the transcript of

proceedings or an agreed statement under Appellate Rule 9(D) was not timely filedIt is further ordered that a certified copy of this judgment shall constitute the

mandate to the trial court puisuant to Rule 27, Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.

To The Clerk:

Enter upon tjieJournal of the Court onlUL 2 9 2009 per order of the Court.

B y : C o p y s e n t to counsel)Presiding Judge


24/24

IN TI-IE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELILATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO APPEAL NO. C-o9o379C 0903 80

Appellee,

v ENTRY OVERRULING MOTIONFOR RECONSIDERATION

M:ICI-IAL'L TURNER WHITE,

Appellant.

This cause came on to be considered upon the appellant's motion for

reconsideration.

The Court finds that the motion is not well taken and is overruled.

To The Clerk:

Enter uponAe Aournal of the Court onAU6 2 62009 per order of the Court.

B y : ^ ^ ^ Copies sent to all counsel)Presiding Judge

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