Binyamin Abrahamov 1993 Necessary Knowledge in Islamic Theology

British Society for Middle Eastern Studies

Necessary Knowledge in Islamic TheologyAuthor(s): Binyamin AbrahamovSource: British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1993), pp. 20-32Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/196077 .Accessed: 30/06/2014 01:00

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NECESSARY KNOWLEDGE IN ISLAMIC THEOLOGY Binyamin Abrahamov

Discussions of the theory of knowledge occupy a prominent position in Islamic theological manuals, which, as a rule, open by setting out the definition and meaning of knowledge, in its various kinds.1 Since knowledge of any sort is the foundation of every theological argument, it is natural to discuss at first the essence and kinds of knowledge. A specific kind of knowledge called necessary knowledge (ilm daruri) appears to be the basis of most of the theological arguments.2 However, what deserves consideration is the fact that this kind of knowledge serves not only as a source of knowledge and as the foundation of the speculative argument, but often as the theological argument itself. This phenomenon, I think, sheds light on one of the characteristics of Islamic theology. Thus, the present article will focus on and examine some examples of this kind of knowledge. In order to put these examples in their proper context, I shall deal briefly (confining myself to the doctrines of a few theologians mainly from the Mu'tazilite and the Ash'arite schools) with the following items: I. definitions of necessary knowledge; II. its kinds; III. the issues in which it occurs. Finally (IV), I shall attempt to assess the weight of necessary knowledge in Islamic theology.

Definitions of necessary knowledge Muslim theologians divided knowledge into two kinds: divine knowledge3 and human knowledge. The first kind is not relevant to our discussion. The second is divided in turn into two parts: necessary knowledge ('ilm darur),4 and acquired knowledge ('ilm muktasab). Regarding the difference between necessary and acquired knowledge according to the criterion of power or ability (qudra), al-Baghdadi (d. 1037) defines necessary knowledge as occurring

1 E.g. al-Baqillanl, Tamhfd; al-Baghdadi, Usul; Manakdim, Sharh; al-Ij?, Mawaqif. On al-Iji's theory of knowledge, see van Ess's monumental work Erkenntnislehre. On knowledge according to the early Mu'tazilites, see Bernard, 'La notion de 'ilm'.

2 al-Juwaynl, 'Aqida, p.9, 11.3-4. Weiss, p.100. According to Aristotle, all proofs are based on first premises which are necessarily known. Posterior Analytics, 74b, 5-6, et passim.

3 Theological discussions on God's knowledge were mainly centred on three issues: 1. God's knowledge as an attribute of His essence; 2. God's knowledge of the particulars; 3. God's knowledge as a determining factor of man's deeds.

4 Wensinck (p.252) renders this term as natural or primary knowledge which does not convey the basic ingredient of the term, namely, necessity. This note also applies to Hourani, who, referring to 'Abd al-Jabbar, prefers to translate 'ilm darura by the English 'immediate knowledge', for in philosophical English 'necessary' means 'logically implied' which is characteristic only of knowledge deriving from discursive reasoning ('ilm muktasab). Islamic Rationalism, p.20. His translation was accepted by R.M. Frank, Bior 29, p.355. However, some theologians regard knowledge obtained through speculation as darurf. (See below.)

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without man's having power to produce and prove it.5 The absence of power implies man's inability to prevent this knowledge from taking place in his mind. This conclusion is explicitly stated by al-Baghdadl's contemporary al-Baqillani (d. 1013) according to whom man is forced to accept necessary knowledge in such a way that he cannot doubt its existence.6 Like the Ash'arites al-Baghdadi and al- Baqillani, the Mu'tazilite Mutakallim 'Abd al-Jabbar (d. 1025) defines 'ilm daruri as knowledge which a man cannot repudiate through doubt,7 or as knowledge which occurs in man but not from himself.8 This last notion is expressed by al-Baydawi (d. 1286) as knowledge which occurs without speculation and thought.9 However, 'Abd al-Jabbar adds to his definition the notion that necessary knowledge is produced by God.10 Thus, according to the theologians mentioned above, there are five features of necessary knowledge: a. occurrence without one's power; b. necessity; c. production by God; d. absence of doubts; e. absence of speculation. It should be noted, notwithstanding, that a few theologians regard knowledge resulting from a process of speculation as necessary knowledge, and hence, as an object of man's power.11 Kinds of necessary knowledge Al-Baghdadi divides necessary knowledge into two main kinds: direct or a priori knowledge ('ilm badhl),12 and sense perception ('ilm hissi). The former is again divided into two parts: on the one hand, positive direct knowledge, such as man's self-consciousness13 and his feeling of pain, delight, hunger, thirst and the like; and, on the other hand, negative direct knowledge, such as the knowledge that something is inconceivable, that a thing cannot be eternal and come into being, that a person cannot be dead and alive at the same time, and that a knower of a thing cannot be ignorant of it when taking into account the same aspect of knowledge at the same time.14 The last three

5 al-Baghdadi, Usul, p.8, 11.10-12. Cf. al-Jawaynl, Irshdd, p.35, 1.7. Cf. Elder, p.26. Already Ja'd ibn Dirham (d.742 or 743) defined necessary knowledge as an act without an agent. Van Ess, Erkenntnislehre, p.114.

6 al-Baqillani, Tamhid, p.7, 1.9-p.8, 1.5, p.9, 11.13-14. al-Baqillanl, Insdf, p.14. Gimaret, al-Ash'ara, p.160f. Cf. Abu Sa'd al-Naysabuir, Ghunya, p.51. Ibn Taymiyya in his Bayan talbis (vol. I, p.266, 1.8) almost copies al-Baqillanl's definition. In another definition of al-Baqillani, which is irrelevant here, necessary knowledge is a knowledge which the knower needs, for from the point of view of language necessity means need. Ibid., p.8, 11.6-13.

7 'Abd al-Jabbar, Mughna, vol. XII, p.65. Cf. Manakdim, Sharh, p.48f. Van Ess, Erkenntnislehre, p.115. Cf. Tritton, p.617.

8 Manakdim, Sharh, p.48. 9 al-Baydawi, Tawali', p.55.

10 'Abd al-Karlm 'Uthman, Nazariyyat, pp.60, 62.

11 al-Juwayni, Shdmil, p.111. Saadia, Amandt, introduction, paragraph 5.

12 Following Aristotle, some theologians and philosophers call this kind of knowledge intellect ('aql). Al-Juwayni, Irshad, p.36f. al-Ash'ar, Maqladt, p.480, 1.7. Van Ess, al-Muhdasiba, p.71f. Idem, Erkenntnislehre, pp.118, 165. Efros, p.138, p.145, n.29.

13 On the significance of self-consciousness in theories of knowledge, see Heschel, p.273, n.43.

14 Al-Baghdadi, Usul, p.8, 1.13-p.9, 1.2. Wensinck, p. 252f.

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examples can be subsumed under the category of the knowledge that either of two alternatives is possible. Reliable report (khabar mutawdtir)15 is also considered by al-BaghdadT as a kind of necessary knowledge, for like the other two kinds there occurs no doubt in its existing.16 Through khabar mutawdtir one knows the Qur'an, the sunna and historical facts.17 Furthermore, al- Baghdadl asserts that every kind of speculative or secondary knowledge ('ilm nazari) may become direct knowledge through God's act.18

In general, al-Baqillanl's classification of the two kinds of necessary knowledge is the same as that of al-Baghdadl. However, the former uses different division, terms and examples. First, the ways leading to necessary knowledge are six, of which five are the senses. The sixth way (called by al-Baghdad? 'ilm bad?hi) is produced, according to al-Baqillani, in man's soul initially (ibtidd'an), without existing in any of the senses. The examples he sup- plies are like al-Baghdadl's, e.g. the knowledge that either of two alternatives is possible (a report on something is either true or false). But he adds the knowledge of another's intention, shame, fear and the like when seeing signs of these (mushahadat al-amdrdt). The last examples occur in other scholars in the category of knowledge obtained through customs and experience.19 Knowledge produced by khabar mutawdtir is also reckoned initial knowledge. Al-Baqillani states that it is possible for God to miraculously bring into being the knowledge otherwise produced by a report. Yet, he does not say, like al-Baghdadi, that every kind of speculative knowledge may be transferred to direct knowledge through God's act.20

The Mu'tazilite theologian 'Abd al-Jabbar divides necessary knowledge into three parts. The first is knowledge which initially occurs in man (ma yahsulu mubtada 'an) before the occurring of any other knowledge and without a means (bi-la wasita). It contains the following items: a. one's knowledge of his own states (e.g., his being willing, thinking); b. knowledge which is

15 Khabar mutawdtir is a tradition repeatedly transmitted by so many persons whose number and righteousness exclude any possibility of their prior agreement on a lie, e.g., Muhammad's claim for prophecy. Al-Jurjanl, pp.74, 102, 210. al-Tahanawi (Vol.II, p.187) states that according to custom the number of the transmitters itself makes their prior agreement on a lie impossible. Cf. Wensinck, p.255. According to al-Tahanawi (ibid.), since this kind of knowledge is like seeing, it is necessary knowledge. Cf. Zucker, introduction, p.13, n.9. For the view of al-Ghazali on Khabar mutawdtir, see Weiss, especially pp.88, 95, 99. On this issue the Muslim theologians followed the Greek empiricists who proved the existence of a country through hearsay from eyewitnesses and regarded this evidence as a reliable report. The theologians may also have been influenced by the empiricists concerning the conditions of this report, namely, absence of concord (muwdta'a) among the transmitters, the latter's righteousness, and their situation. Van den Bergh, vol.II, p.16.

16 al-Baghdadi, Usul, p.12.

17 Ibid., p.11, 11.14-16. Wensinck, p.256. Cf. Elder, pp.15, 19f. It is worth noting that the Stoics proved God's existence on the basis of the general agreement of the nations on the existence of divine beings. Walzer, p.477.

18 Al-Baghdadi, Usul, p.15, 11. 11-12. Wensinck, p.259f. See below. 19 Al-Baqillani, Tamhid, p.10. Idem, Insdf, p.14. For experience in al-Ghazali, see

Weiss, p.100. 20

al-Baqillanl, Tamhid, p.10.

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based on experience-the knowledge of the connection between the act and its agent and of the ethical judgment of acts; c. knowledge which is not based on experience and which states that either of two alternatives is possible: the knowledge that an essence is either existent or non-existent and that an existent is either eternal or temporal. ('Abd al-Jabbar differs from the preceding scholars in regarding the knowledge of the ethical judgment of acts as part of necessary knowledge.) The second is knowledge which takes place by a means . This is the knowledge of perceptibiles (mudrakat) which is produced by means of perception (idrdk) and which equals sense perception according to the previous authors. The third is knowledge which takes place through what resembles a means (ma yahsulu 'amma yajrz majrd al-tariq). An illustration of this kind is the knowledge of the state of a thing which derives from the knowledge of its essence, which is like a means; one cannot know that God is knowing unless one knows God's existence. The difference between the second and the third parts lies, according to 'Abd al-Jabbar, in that what occurs through a means (the second part) may continue to exist without the means leading to it, while it is impossible for the knowledge of the state to exist without the knowledge of the essence. God may create in man the knowledge of the perceptible without sense perception, but He may not create in man the knowledge of the state without the knowledge of the essence, for the knowledge of the essence is the basis of the knowledge of the state.21

A similar division of necessary knowledge appears in Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Tius (d. 1067), a Shl'ite Mutakallim who was influenced by the teaching of the Mu'tazila.22 According to him, 'ilm daruri has two parts: a. knowledge which initially occurs in the intelligent man, such as the knowledge that the existent either has a beginning or has not; b. knowledge which occurs when a cause (sabab) exists. This part corresponds to 'Abd al-Jabbar's knowledge which occurs through a means. Al-TusT regards the second part of necessary knowledge as of two kinds: a. knowledge which necessarily occurs, such as the perception of the senses (mushdhaddt),23 on the condition of the absence of disturbance (ma'a irtifd' al-labs); b. knowledge which usually (bi '- 'dda) occurs. The latter kind is divided in turn into two parts: knowledge which is based on a continuous custom, e.g. knowledge of countries and events; and knowledge which is based on a custom differing from person to another, e.g. knowledge of a craft when dealing with it.24 The example given for the

21 Manakdim, Sharh, p.50f. 'Abd al-Jabbar, Mughna, vol. XII, pp.59-76. Peters, p.54f. 'Abd al-Karim 'Uthman, p.60f. 22 For the Mu'tazilite influence on the Shi'a Imamiyya's theology, see e.g., W. Mandelung, 'Imamism and Mu'tazilite Theology', Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam, ed. W. Madelung, London, 1985 (Variorum Reprints). M.J. McDermott, The Theology of al-Shaikh al-Mufid, Beirut, 1978. Schmidtke, al- 'Allama al-Hilli.

23 Cf. 'ilm al-shdhid in Saadia. Heschel, p.274. 24

al-Tusi, p.156.

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first sub-category appears as an example of reliable report (khabar mutawatir) in al-Baghdadd, al-Baqillhni and 'Abd al-Jabbdr.25

Not all theologians accept the division between necessary knowledge and acquired knowledge ('ilm muktasab).26 Early Rdfidites27 consider all knowledge necessary knowledge, which is created by God, although they admit that such knowledge occurs only after a process of thinking, likening this to the creation of a child which takes place only after his parents have intercourse.28 A theologian named Salih29 goes even further claiming that all knowledge is necessary knowledge and created by God in the heart without man's previous speculation.30 He was a member of a group of theologians called 'the adher- ents of knowledge' (ashab al-ma'drif) whose foremost exponent was al-Jahiz (d. 868).31 According to al-Jdhiz, however, necessary knowledge comes to a man through a casual action of his nature.32

A slightly different notion of necessary knowledge is advanced by the Zahirite theologian Ibn Hazm (d. 1063). Ibn Hazm defines knowledge as the conviction that something is according to its real state (i'tiqdd al-shay' 'ald md huwa 'alayhi). This conviction means certainty and absence of doubts, hence it is well rooted in one's mind so that one cannot repudiate it.33 In other words, all kinds of knowledge are necessary knowledge (al-ma'arif kulluhd bi- idtirdr).34 According to Ibn Hazm, there are several paths which lead to the obtaining of necessary knowledge: a. immediate understanding or intuition (awwal al-'aql, awwal al- fahm),35 e.g., the perception that a body cannot be in two places; b. sense perception (shahddat al-hawdss);36 c. demonstration (which derives from the two previous ways);37 and finally d. a belief which God enjoins one to follow, such as the belief in Muhammad's prophecy and

25 See above. 'Abd al-Jabbdr, Mughnt, vol. XVI, pp.27-38. According to al- Juwayni (Irshdd, p.348), the continuation of custom is equal to khabar mutawdtir.

26 'Ilm muktasab is defined by al-Baghdadi as knowledge which occurs through man's ability and his speculation. Usul, p.8, 1.11. It is based on discursive reason ('aql) as well as on law (shar').

27 This term was usually applied to the Shi'a Imamiyya. For further details see my 'al-Kasim ibn Ibrahlm's Theory of the Imamate', Arabica, 34 (1987), p.94f, n.70.

28 al-Baghdadi, Usul, p.31, 1.16-p.32,1.2. al-Ash'ari, Maqdldt, p.52, 11.3-5. Van Ess, 'The Logical structure', p.44. Idem, 'Scepticism', p.9.

29 Very probably Salih here is Salih ibn 'Umar al-Salihi who appears elsewhere (Al-Baghdadi, Usul, p.155, 1.15) with al-Jahiz and Thumama as proponents of the notion that all knowledge is necessary knowledge. Cf. al-Shahrastani, Nihdyat, p.107.

30 al-Baghdadi, Usul, p.31, 11.13-15.

31 Amdli al-Murtadd, vol.1, p.195. Cf. M. Bernard, 'La notion de 'ilm', part II, p.41.

32 Van Ess, 'Early Islamic', p.73. al-Isfara'ini, p.49. For the Mu'tazilite criticism of al-Jahiz's doctrine, see Vajda, 'La Connaissance'.

33 Ibn Hazm, vol.V, p.109, p.113, 11.18-19. 34 Ibid., p.109, 1.5. 35 Ibid., p.108, 1.23, p.109, 1.11. 36 Ibid., p.109, 1.11. 37 Cf. Metaphysica, vol.5, 1015b, 7-8; 1015a, 33-35. Wolfson, pp.220f, 255.

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his miracles.38 Even a tradition based on the authority of one person (khabar al-wdhid) is subsumed under this category, let alone a reliable report (khabar mutawdtir).39 Finally, one has to note that necessity is created by God.40 To recapitulate, Ibn Hazm regards every kind of knowledge as necessary knowledge. Perception which involves doubts and uncertainty is not knowledge (i.e. necessary knowledge) but is only a presumption (zann).

The theologians whose views have been examined so far differ with regard to knowledge: the majority of them divide human knowledge into necessary knowledge and acquired knowledge, while a few of them regard every kind of knowledge as necessary knowledge. It is the first view which concerns us here. The question is: to what extent do the theologians who divide knowledge into two parts use necessary knowledge in dealing with theological issues? By necessary knowledge I mean here the use of this kind of knowledge as a proof on its own merit and not as a basis of proof, with which theology is replete. In the following I shall try to show that necessary knowledge in the capacity of proof occurs in basic issues of Islamic theology. The examples which will be given are not exhaustive, but rather, I believe, representative of the wide use of necessary knowledge as proof in Islamic theology. These examples deal with God, the world, man, and with the relationships between God and man and between God and the world.

Issues in which 'necessary knowledge' plays a part One of the theological issues which pertains to the discussion of anthropomor- phism (tashbih)41 is God's place in existence. The question is whether God is on the throne, as stated by the Ash'arite theologians on the basis of some Qur'anic verses, or in no specific place, a thesis put forth by the Mu'tazilites on the grounds that God's existence in a specific place would imply tashbih.42 Dealing with this question through setting forth speculative arguments as well as interpretations of verses and traditions,43 al-Ash'ari (d. 935) also brings as proof of God's sitting on the throne the fact that when Muslims pray they all raise their hands towards the heaven and he adds: 'If God were not on the throne, people would not raise their hands towards it'.44 At first sight, this argument seems odd and inappropriate for such an eminent theologian as al-Ash'ari, for one cannot understand its logical basis. However, the understanding of this argument may be found in the examination of an argument put forth by the Ash'arite Mutakallim Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 1209) in de- fence of the doctrine of God's knowledge of the particulars. This argument runs as follows: 'We observe that if the people of this world, the righteous and the wicked (zindfq), the Muslim and the unbeliever (mulhid), are afflicted by suffering they beseech God for mercy and ask Him to save them from this

38 Ibn Hazm, vol.V, p.109, 11.11-13, p.113f. 39 Ibid., p.114, 11.4-5, p.118, 1.23-p.119, 1.15. 40 Ibid., p.116, 1.23. 41 On this term, see Abrahamov, al-Kdasim on God's existence, p.25f, n.156. 42 Ibid., p.28f. 43 al-Ash'an, al-Ibdna, pp.31-35. 44 Ibid., p.32, 11.7-10, pp.34f.

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suffering even if they are the most extreme deniers of His knowing of the particulars. If this happens to someone, he will necessarily set about praying, beseeching mercy from God and submitting to Him. This proves that the basic disposition (al-fitra al-asliyya)45 attests that the Lord of the world has power over the things and knows the secret and the hidden things. It is known that the testimony of the fitra is more acceptable than these hidden disjunc- tions (taqsimdt khafiyya) and obscure proofs, which are to be sought for, and therefore one must definitely assert that the Lord of the world knows the particulars and is capable of supplying [man's] needs.'46 Three important points are stated here by one of the most erudite and sophisticated theologians of Islam: a. an act of all the people serves as proof of its truthfulness: b. the fact that many people behave in the same way shows that their behaviour goes back to their primordial nature which can be identified as producing necessary knowledge; c. knowledge obtained through fitra is preferable to knowledge obtained through speculative arguments.47 The argument of al-Ash'arl can be explained in the same way. One knows that God is in Heaven through one's fitra which produces necessary knowledge. What attests to this fitra is the behaviour of all the Muslims. Here a new element appears in Muslim theology. What we observe is not moral conventions adopted by all or most people, which is the outcome of experience,48 but theological conventions shared by all people on account of their fitra, for whose creation in man God is respon- sible. This general assent is not to be confused with khabar mutawatir which is produced by the people.

Ibn Taymiyya expresses the same opinion saying that the knowledge that God is above the world is necessary and primordial. This knowledge is accepted by all nations without previous approval.49 In case of contradiction between a speculative argument and an argument derived from necessary knowl-

45 Or primordial nature. On the term fitra, see El2, vol.II, p.931f. 46

al-Razl, Matdlib, vol.III, p.164, the fourth argument. Abrahamov, 'Fakhr al- Dmn al-Razi', p.22.

47 This reminds one of Aristotle's notion that 'in the human soul lies an intuition or immediate knowledge of those highest principles which are the source and premise of all scientific and mediate knowledge and which a student must posses before he can be taught. These axioms possess an even higher certainty than the knowledge deduced from them'. Heschel, p.278f. However, Aristotle refers to axioms, on the basis of which proofs are built, while for the Muslim theologians this innate knowledge serves as the argument itself. For the notion that necessary knowledge imparts to man more certainty than acquired knowledge, see also al-Shahrastanl, Nihayat, p.4.

48 See above. 49 Ibn Taymiyya, Dar' ta'drud, vol. VI, p.12f. Ibn Taymiyya sets forth a series of

issues which are known through necessary knowledge and which are refuted by the philosophers. Ibid., pp.268-70. For example, those who assert that God is living, knowing and having power (hayy, 'alim, qddir) without life, knowledge and power (hayat, 'ilm, qudra), contradict what is necessarily known (ma'lum bi'l-darura), namely, the notion of all scholars that God knows by virtue of His knowledge. Ibid., p.269, 11.12-13.

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edge, he, like Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, prefers the latter.50 Al-Shahrastani (d. 1153) also accepts the view that man's knowledge of God is based on fitra.51

Concerning the world and its structure, the Ghaylaniyya,52 a sub-sect of the Murji'a, claim that the knowledge that things are created and directed (muhdatha, mudabbara) is necessary knowledge.53 No explanation is given of this view. However, it can be explained either by one's perception-one sees that all things are made and directed-, or by fitra. Abu 'All al-Jubba'i (d. 912) holds that the modes of being, immobility, movement, combination, separation and composition,54 are perceived by seeing, i.e. necessarily. Ac- cording to al-Razi, the knowledge of the existence of time is direct (badiht), that is, does not require proof (Matalib, vol. V, p.21f).

Most of the examples found refer to man and his behaviour. As we have seen, man's knowledge of his own states is a part of necessary knowledge. Thus man's knowledge of his volition is necessary knowledge, since he feels this volition in himself.55 Even man's knowledge that the action of another is according to the latter's intention and motives is deemed necessary knowledge. This is so, because, as we have seen, experience also belongs to necessary knowledge.56 Man by necessity knows the difference between a being which can act and a being which cannot, e.g. an inanimate thing cannot act. And he also necessarily knows that Zayd can act while 'Amr cannot.57

The notion of God's imposing unattainable duties (taklif md la yutdqu)58 is also known through necessary knowledge derived from man's experience; every intelligent man knows through his completeness of intuition that it is evil to impose on the paralysed, for example, the duty to walk.59

According to some theologians, man's producing of his own acts is necessarily known.60

Al-Ash'ari proves the difference between involuntary movement (harakat idtirdr), e.g., shaking from palsy, and appropriated movement (harakat ik- tisdb), e.g., going and coming through necessary knowledge. Man necessarily

50 Ibn Taymiyya, Kitab al-imdan, p.117. 51 Madelung, 'Aspects of ', p.61. This was also the view of the Shi'ite scholar Ibn

Tawus (d.1266). Kohlberg, p.21. 52 On the Ghaylaniyya see Watt, index. 53 al-Ash'ari, Maqaldt, p.136, 1.11. 54 Peters, God's Created Speech, pp.128-134. 55 Al-Baqillanl, Tamhid, p.51, 1.21-p.52, 1.9. Manakdim, Sharh, p.433. According

to 'Abd al-Jabbar, the existence of will, its coming before the act, the distinc- tion between will and unwillingness and between will and other feelings, are necessarily known. 'Abd al-Karim 'Uthman, Nazariyyat, pp.354-356, 361. On the possibility of man's doubting his own will, see Ibn Taymiyya, Dar' ta'drud. vol. VII, p.424f.

56 'Abd al-Jabbar, Mughnf, vol. VIII, pp.6-8. See above.

57 Ibid., vol. XII, p.69, 11.12-19. 58 For this term, see Abrahamov, al-Kadsim on God's existence, p.38f. 5 Manakdim, Sharh, p.400. 60 Schmidtke, al-'Allama al-Hilli, p.125f. Al-Razi, Matdlib, vol. IX, p.255. As is

well known, this issue was extensively discussed by Muslim theologians through speculative arguments. Ibid., p.12, 1.2-p.13, 1.13.

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knows the difference between these two kinds of acts through his consciousness; he knows that he cannot prevent involuntary movements from occurring while the opposite is true concerning appropriated movements.61 On the basis of this knowledge al-Ash'ari builds his theory of kasb.

For al-Razi, the knowledge that a motive has efficacy on the preponder- ance of the act (tarjih)62 is necessary knowledge. We by necessity know that we give a coin to a poor man on account of our knowledge of his poverty, and that if we did not know this we would not give him a coin.63 Elsewhere, he states that necessary knowledge proves that a man chooses between two alternative ways of action according to a preponderator (murajjih).64

The knowledge of the principles of evil things and good things also derives from necessary knowledge; man by necessity knows that it is obligatory to show gratitude.65

Regarding the relationship between God and man, one can bring as an example an argument in al-Hasan al-Basri's epistle, which is one of the earliest theological works.66 Al-Hasan al-Basri (d. 728) argues that people cultivate their fields and defend their children although they believe in predestination, a belief that should have prevented them from being active. Hence it is in- admissible that they should blame predestination for their disbelief in God.67 He seems thus directly to deduce one's innate belief in free will through one's activity. Contrary to most of the theologians al-Jahiz and his followers, the ashdb al-ma'arif, claim that man's knowledge of God is necessary knowledge. 'Abd al-Jabbar, a representative of the majority, admits that only in the world to come will man necessarily know God.68

Concerning the proof that God is the creator of the world, some theologians agree that the inference of a creator from creation is self-evident and requires no proof.69 Some of them use the particularization argument as a basis of this inference claiming that according to direct intuition the world needed a particularizer who particularized its coming into being.70 In like manner, the Ash'arite Mutakallim al-Juwayni (d. 1085) states that one can necessarily learn about God's knowledge through the perfection of the world, which testifies to the knowledge of Him who did it perfectly.71

61 Abrahamov, 'A Re-examination of al-Ash'arl's Theory of kasb according to Kitab al-Luma", JRAS (1989), pp.210-221. 62 Gimaret, Theories, p.140f.

63 al-Razi, Matdlib, vol. III, p.51, 11.1-5. The knowledge of the poor's poverty is a motive which has efficacy on the decision to give money when there is another motive which urges man not to give it.

64 al-Razi, Matdlib, vol. IX, p.29.

65 Manakdim, Sharh, p.302. 66 For doubts concerning its dating and authenticity, see M. Cook, Early Muslim

Dogma, Cambridge, 1981, pp.117-123. 67 al-Hasan al-Basri, Risdla, p.75, 1.6-p.76, 1.2. Schwarz, 'Al-Hasan al-Basrl', p.21. 68 Manakdim, Sharh, p.271. 69 Davidson, pp.154-160. Some others defend this inference by analogy or induc-

tion. Ibid. 70 Ibid., p.161. 71

al-Juwayni, Irshad, p.210.

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Discussing the issue of the appointed time of death (ajal), 'Abd al-Jabbar points out that the fact that all intelligent people blame and reproach one who does a certain act is proof that the opinion on which this act is based is false.72

An assessment of the role of 'necessary knowledge' An assessment of the role of necessary knowledge in Islamic theology can be based not only on its use in a variety of subjects, as we have just seen, but also on the debate about use. This debate refers to the question of using acquired knowledge instead of necessary knowledge and vice versa. It is dealt with, e.g. by al-Juwayni, who refutes the Mu'tazilite views that a part of good and evil acts can be perceived by necessary knowledge and that God's and man's duties can be known by necessity.73 He employs some arguments of which I would like to pick out two: a. the Mu'tazilites themselves do not agree on this question so that necessary knowledge cannot be obtained; b. their opponents claim that the opposite view is necessarily known. In this case also, therefore, the Mu'tazilites cannot adhere to necessary knowledge which presupposes general assent.74 Thus al-Juwayni seems to lessen the im- portance of necessary knowledge as proof. However, one should note that his attitude may be derived from the polemics between the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites concerning how one knows ethical judgements. His disagree- ment with the Mu'tazilites on this issue does not express his general approach towards necessary knowledge. The fact that he bases his refutation of the philosophers' notion of natures on necessary knowledge proves his esteem for this device.75

This question is also exemplified by the controversy of the Basran Mu'tazilites against Abu al-Qasim al-Balkhl, the head of the Mu'tazilite school of Baghdad (d. 929/31),76 who holds the view that what is known through speculative proof (istidldlan) cannot be known otherwise and that the same holds true concerning what is known through necessary knowledge.77 Representing the Basran stand, al-Naysabuir states that all that is known through speculative proof may be known through necessary knowledge and that it is possible for part of what is known through necessary knowledge to be known through speculative proof.78 Thus, for example, the knowledge that Zayd is at home may be obtained through seeing, i.e., necessary knowledge, and also through a truthful report.79 The notion that all that is known through speculative proof can be known through necessary knowledge is borne out by the idea that God, who has power over all objects of actions (maqdurdt), including

72 'Abd al-Jabbar, Mughni, vol. XI, p.8. B. Abrahamov, 'The Appointed Time of Death (agal) according to 'Abd al-Gabbar, Annotated translation of al-Mughni, vol. XI, pp.3-26', Israel Oriental Studies (forthcoming 1992).

73 al-Juwaynl, Irshad, pp.228-234. 74 Ibid., p.229f. 75 Ibid., p.210. 76 See on him Watt, pp.300-302. 77 Manakdim, Sharh, p.57. Al-Naysabuir, Masd'il, p.330. 78 al-Naysabiur, ibid. 79 Manakdlm, Sharh, p.60.

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man's knowledge, can produce knowledge in man, and knowledge produced by God is necessary knowledge.80 To the supremacy attached by the Basran Mu'tazilites to necessary knowledge we should add the impression we have that necessary knowledge penetrates many theological issues, the wide use of khabar mutawdtir (which it is unnecessary to detail), and textual evidences which show that some theologians (Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, Ibn Taymiyya) pre- fer necessary knowledge to acquired knowledge. Necessary knowledge thus played an important role not only in the development of epistemological theories in Muslim theology,81 but also in the theological discussions. The high esteem for this kind of knowledge was common to most of the theologians in Islam without regard to their schools. This shows that, notwithstanding their fondness for using speculative arguments, they very probably, on account of their profound quest for certainty, employed necessary knowledge as proof and sometimes even preferred it to speculative arguments. Owing to the few examples given, this assessment is far from being conclusive. However, I hope that further research will continue to treat this issue and affirm the conclusion drawn here. In any case, it seems to me that the criterion of the measure of using necessary knowledge as proof should be applied in the examination of the ways of argumentation of any Islamic theological school in general as well as in the examination of any theologian in particular.

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Issue Table of ContentsBritish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1993), pp. 1-141Front Matter [pp. 1 - 2]Perennial Themes in Modern Arabic Literature [pp. 3 - 19]Necessary Knowledge in Islamic Theology [pp. 20 - 32]An Arabic Deed of Sale from Swahili Mombasa Dated 1292/1875 [pp. 33 - 41]Prophecy and Mahdism in the Upper Nile: An Examination of Local Experiences of the Mahdiyya in the Southern Sudan [pp. 42 - 56]Islamist Attitudes towards Democracy: A Review of the Ideas of al-Ghazali, al-Turabi and 'Amara [pp. 57 - 63]The Legitimation of the Clergy's Right to Rule in the Iranian Constitution of 1979 [pp. 64 - 82]The Evolution of the Iranian Presidency: From Bani Sadr to Rafsanjani [pp. 83 - 97]Bibliographical SectionBooks Received for Review (January-May 1993) [pp. 136 - 138]

Reviews: Generaluntitled [pp. 98 - 100]untitled [pp. 100 - 102]untitled [pp. 102 - 103]untitled [pp. 103 - 104]untitled [pp. 104 - 106]untitled [pp. 106 - 108]untitled [pp. 108 - 110]untitled [pp. 110 - 111]untitled [pp. 111 - 113]untitled [pp. 113 - 114]untitled [pp. 114 - 115]untitled [pp. 116 - 117]untitled [pp. 117 - 118]untitled [pp. 118 - 119]untitled [pp. 120 - 121]untitled [pp. 121 - 124]untitled [pp. 124 - 126]untitled [pp. 126 - 127]untitled [pp. 127 - 128]

Reviews and Notes: Bibliographies and Works of Referenceuntitled [pp. 129 - 130]untitled [pp. 130 - 131]untitled [pp. 131 - 132]untitled [pp. 132 - 133]untitled [p. 134]untitled [pp. 134 - 135]untitled [p. 135]

Albert Habib Hourani 1915-1993 [pp. 139 - 141]Back Matter

Documents

Binyamin Abrahamov 1993 Necessary Knowledge in Islamic Theology