Bill of rightsTHE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appelleevs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA,accused-appellantG.R. No. 121777FACTS:O n t h e a f t e r n o o n o f J a n u a r y 3 0 , 1 9 9 4 , M a r i a L o u r d e s M o d e s t o a n d Nancy Araneta together with her friends Jennelyn Baez, and Sandra Aquino went to the house of Jasmine Alejandro, after having learned that a woman is t h e r e t o   r e c r u i t j o b a p p l i c a n t s f o r   S i n g a p o r e .   C a r o l d e l a P i e d r a w a s   a l r e a d y briefing some people when they arrived. Jasmine, on the other hand, welcomed and asked them to sit down. T h e y l i s t e n e d t o t h e   “ r e c r u i t e r ”   w h o   w a s   t h e n   t a l k i n g   a b o u t   t h e breakdown of the fees involved: P30,000 for the visa and the round trip ticket, and P5,000 as placement fee and for the processing of the papers.  The initial payment was P2,000, while P30,000 will be by salary deduction. The recruiter said that she was “recruiting” nurses for Singapore. Araneta, her friends and Lourdes then filled up bio-data forms and were r e q u i r e d   t o s u b m i t   p i c t u r e s   a n d a   t r a n s c r i p t o f r e c o r d s .   A f t e r t h e   i n t e r v i e w , Lourdes gave the initial payment of P2,000 to Jasmine, who assured her that she was authorized to receive the money. Meanwhile, in the morning of the said date, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from a n u n i d e n t i f i e d w o m a n   i n q u i r i n g   a b o u t   t h e   l e g i t i m a c y   o f   t h e   r e c r u i t m e n t conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa.Ramos, whose duties include the surveillance of suspected illegal recruiters, immediately contacted a friend, ac e r t a i n   M a y e t h   B e l l o t i n d o s ,   s o   t h e y   c o u l d   b o t h   g o   t h e   p l a c e   w h e r e  t h e recruitment was reportedly being undertakenU p o n a r r i v i n g a t t h e r e p o r t e d area at around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the house and pretended to be an applicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on the pavement, from where he w a s   a b l e t o   s e e   a r o u n d s i x ( 6 ) p e r s o n s   i n t h e   s a l a .   R a m o s e v e n   h e a r d a woman, identified as Carol Figueroa, talk about the possible employment she h a s t o p r o v i d e i n S i n g a p o r e a n d t h e d o c u m e n t s t h a t t h e a p p l i c a n t s h a v e t o comply with. Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos came out with a  bio-data form in hand. Thereafter, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged illegal recruiter. A surveillance team was then organized to confirm the report.  After which, a raid was executed.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,   C a r o l   w a s   c h a r g e d   a n d   c o n v i c t e d   b y   t h e   t r i a l   c o u r t   o f   illegal recruitment.Upon appeal, accused questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in l a r g e s c a l e a n d a s s a i l s , a s w e l l , t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f t h e l a w d e f i n i n g a n d penalizing said crime. First, a c c u s e d s u b m i t s t h a t A r t i c l e 1 3 ( b ) o f t h e L a b o r Code defining “recruitment and placement” is void for vagueness and, thus,violates the due process clause. The provision in question reads:ART. 13. Definitions.—(a) x x x.(b)“ R e c r u i t m e n t   a n d   p l a c e m e n t ”   r e f e r s   t o   a n y   a c t   o f   c a n v a s s i n g , enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, w h e t h e r   f o r   p r o f i t   o r   n o t :P r o v i d e d , T h a t   a n y   p e r s o n o r   e n t i t y   w h i c h ,   i n   a n y manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.ISSUES: (1)W h e t h e r o r n o t s e c . 1 3 ( b ) o f P . D . 4 4 2 , a s a m e n d e d , o t h e r w i s e known as the illegal recruitment law is unconstitutional as it violates the due process clause.(2)Whether or not accused was denied equal protection and therefore should be exculpatedHELD:(1)For the First issue, dela Piedra submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining “recruitment and placement” is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause.D u e p r o c e s s r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e t e r m s o f a p e n a l s t a t u t e m u s t b e sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. In support of her submission, dela Piedra invokes People vs. Panis, where the Supreme Court “criticized” the definition of “recruitment and placement.” The Court ruled, however, that her reliance on the said case was misplaced. The issue in Panis was whether, under the proviso of Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal recruitment could be committed only “whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee.” In this case, the Court merely bemoaned the lack of records that w o u l d h e l p s h e d l i g h t o n t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e p r o v i s o .   T h e a b s e n c e o f s u c h r e c o r d s n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g ,   t h e   C o u r t   w a s   a b l e   t o   a r r i v e   a t   a reasonable interpretation of the

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Bill of rightsproviso by applying principles in criminal law and drawing from the language and intent of the law itself. Section 13(b), therefore, is not a “perfectly vague act” whose obscurity is evident on its face.  If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise l a n g u a g e   t h a t w a s   s a l v a g e d b y   p r o p e r c o n s t r u c t i o n .   I t i s   n o t v o i d   f o r vagueness. D e l a   P i e d r a   f u r t h e r   a r g u e s   t h a t   t h e   a c t s   t h a t   c o n s t i t u t e “recruitment and placement” suffer from overbreadth since by merely “referring” a person for employment, a person may be convicted of illegal recruitment. That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and harmless acts such as “labor or employment referral” (“referring” an applicant, according to appellant, for employment to a prospective employer) does not render the law  overbroad. Evidently, Dela Piedra misapprehends concept of overbreadth.A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the e x e r c i s e o f i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m s a f f i r m a t i v e l y   g u a r a n t e e d   b y   t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n ,   s u c h   a s   t h e   f r e e d o m   o f   s p e e c h   o r  r e l i g i o n .   A   g e n e r a l l y w o r d e d s t a t u t e , w h e n c o n s t r u e d t o p u n i s h c o n d u c t w h i c h c a n n o t b e constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it f a i l s t o g i v e a d e q u a t e w a r n i n g   o f   t h e   b o u n d a r y   b e t w e e n   t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y   p e r m i s s i b l e   a n d  t h e   c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y   i m p e r m i s s i b l e applications of the statute.(2)A n e n t   t h e   s e c o n d   i s s u e ,   D e l a   P i e d r a   i n v o k e s   t h e   e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n  c l a u s e   i n   h e r   d e f e n s e .S h e   p o i n t s   o u t   t h a t   a l t h o u g h   t h e e v i d e n c e   p u r p o r t e d l y   s h o w s   t h a t   J a s m i n e   A l e j a n d r o  h a n d e d   o u t   a p p l i c a t i o n forms and even received Lourdes Modesto’s payment, appellant was the only o n e c r i m i n a l l y c h a r g e d . A l e j a n d r o ,   o n   t h e   o t h e r   h a n d ,   r e m a i n e d   s c o t - f r e e . F r o m t h i s , s h e c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t i o n d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t h e r o n g r o u n d s o f r e g i o n a l o r i g i n s .   A p p e l l a n t i s a   C e b u a n a w h i l e A l e j a n d r o i s   a Zamboangueña, and the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga City. The Supreme Court held that the argument has no merit. The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of  the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in  its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. But a  discriminatory purpose is not  presumed, there must be a showing of “clear and intentional discrimination. ”In the case at bar, Dela Piedra has failed to show that, in charging her, there was a “clear and intentional discrimination” on the part of the prosecuting officials. F u r t h e r m o r e ,   t h e   p r e s u m p t i o n   i s   t h a t   t h e   p r o s e c u t i n g   o f f i c e r s regularly performed their duties, and this presumption can be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation. As said earlier, accused has not presented any evidence to overcome this presumption. The mere allegation that dela Piedra, a Cebuana, was charged with thec o m m i s s i o n   o f   a   c r i m e ,   w h i l e   a   Z a m b o a n g u e ñ a ,   t h e   g u i l t y   p a r t y   i n appellant’s eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of the laws.

Republic v. Pilipinas ShellPetroleum Corp. SUMMARY:The OEA informed Pilipinas Shell that the latter’scontributions to the OPSF were insufficient. As a consequence, a surcharge was imposed upon Pilipinas Shell. The surcharge was imposed pursuant to a Department of Finance Circular. Pilipinas Shell challenged this and refused to pay the surcharges, claiming the payments it made were based on a valid interpretation of a Department of Finance Order and Department of Energy Circular. However, the DOE only reiterated its demand for Pilipinas Shell to settle the surcharges due. The Office of the President affirmed the DOE. CA reversed, ruling that the Department of Finance Circular was ineffective for failure to comply with the requirement to file with ONAR. SC affirmed CA.DOCTRINE:The requirements of publication and filing were put in place as safeguards against abuses on the part of lawmakers, and as guarantees to the constitutional right to due process and information on matters of public concerns, and therefore, require strict compliance. Strict compliance with the requirements of publication cannot be annulled by a mere allegation that parties were notified of the existence of the implementing rules

PEFIANCO V. MORALFacts:  D filed a mandamus and injunction case seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a decision which had already become final. P filed a Motion to Dismiss. The judge denied the motion without stating the basis why P’s motion should be denied.Issue:  Whether the judge’s denial of the motion was properHeld:   No. Rule 16 mandatorily requires that the resolution of a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor. The rule proscribes the common practice of perfunctorily denying motions to dismiss “for lack of merit.” The challenged order of the trial court falls short of the requirements stated in Rule 16.

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Bill of rights Office of the Court Administrator v. PascualFacts: Sometime in February, 1993, a certain Ceferino Tigas wrote a letter, addressed to Hon. Reynaldo Suarez of the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court, charging that irregularities andcorruption were being committed by the respondent Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan. On March 10, 1993, the letter was referred to the National Bureau of Investigation in order that an investigation on the alleged illegal and corrupt practices of the respondent may be conducted. Ordered toconduct a “discreet investigation” bythe then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco were: SA Edward Villarta, team leader, SI Reynaldo Olazo, HA Teofilo Galang, SI Florino Javier and SI Jose Icasiano. They proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, in order to look for Ceferino Tigas, the letter writer. Tigas, the NBI teamrealized was a fictitious character. In view of their failure to find Tigas, they proceeded to the residence of Candido Cruz, an accused in respondent‟s sala. In his affidavit executed on March 23, 1993 before SA Edward Villarta, Cruz declared that he was the accused in Criminal Case No. 2154, charged with the crime of Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge, after conducting the preliminary investigation of the case, decided that the crime he committed was only physical injuries and so, respondent judge assumed jurisdiction over the case. Cruz believed that he was made to understand by the respondent that, in view of his favorable action, Cruz was to give to respondent the sum ofP2,000.00. Respondent judge is believed to be a drunkard and, in all probability, would need money to serve his vice. In view of this statement, the NBI agents assigned to the case caused respondent judge to be entrapped, for which reason, the judge was thought to have been caught in flagrante delicto. NBI agents Villarta and Olazo filed the following report: “On 25 March 1993, at about 4:00 in the afternoon, CANDIDO CRUZ met with Judge PASCUAL at the Colegio de Sta. Monica, near the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan, where Subject is attending the graduation of his daughter. CANDIDO CRUZ told Judge PASCUAL that he already had the P2,000.00 which he (Judge PASCUAL) is asking him. However, Judge PASCUAL did not receive the money because according to him there were plenty of people around. He then instructed CANDIDO CRUZ to see him(Judge PASCUAL) at his office the following day. At about 8:30 in the morning of the following day (26 March 1993), CANDIDO CRUZ proceeded to the office of Judge PASCUAL at the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, and thereat handed to him four(4) pieces of P500.00 bills contained in a white mailing envelope previously marked and glazed with fluorescent powder. In the meantime, the Undersigned stayed outside the court room and after about 15 minutes, CANDIDOCRUZ came out of the room and signaled to the Undersigned that Judge PASCUAL had already received the marked money. The Undersigned immediately entered the room and informed Subject about the entrapment. Subject denied having received anything from CANDIDO CRUZ, but after a thorough search, the marked money was found inserted between the pages of a blue book on top of his table. Subject was invited to the Office of the NBI-NCR, Manila wherein he was subjected to ultra violet light examination. After finding Subject’s right hand for the presence of fluorescent powder, he was booked, photographed and fingerprinted in accordance with our Standard Operating Procedure (S.O.P.).On even date, the results of our investigation together with the person of Judge FILOMENO PASCUAL was referred to the Inquest Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Ombudsman, with the recommendation that he be charged and prosecuted for Bribery as defined and penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines.” Issue:Whether or not the evidences presented against Judge Filomeno Pascual were strong enough to convict him. Held:We find that the evidence on record does not warrant conviction. We note that the only bases for the Report and Recommendation submitted by Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon consist of: The Complaint, the Answer, the Memorandum of the respondent, and the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing of the bribery case of respondent judge at the Sandiganbayan. The respondent was, therefore, not afforded the right to open trial wherein respondent can confront the witnesses against him and present evidence in his defense. This lapse in due process is unfortunate. The Rules, even in an administrative cases, demand that, if the respondent judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge. The Judiciary to which respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members could be faulted, it should be only after due investigation and after presentation of competent evidence, especially since the charge is penal in character.[7] The above-quoted Report and Recommendation of the investigating judge had fallen short of the requirements of due process. The evidence aforesaid admits of irreconcilable inconsistencies in the testimonies of principal witness, Candido Cruz, and NBI Agent SI Reynaldo Olazo on several material points. It will be remembered that the charge was intimated by someone who must have had an ax to grind against the respondent judge but who, by reason of cowardice or lack of evidence to put up a righteous case, did not come out in the open and instead wrote an anonymous letter. The letter-writer, naming himself as Ceferino Tigas, did not specify crimes committed or illegal acts perpetrated but charged respondent with anomalies in general terms. Respondent judge could not have been expected to make a valid answer or to otherwise defend himself from such vague accusations. While then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco, upon being apprised of the Tigas letter, ordered the NBI investigating team to make a “discreet investigation” of respondent, the NBI team had instead caused

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Bill of rightsan instigation or the entrapment of respondent judge. Not having found letter-writer Tigas and concluding that no such person exists, they sought out an accused before respondent‟s court who could possibly be respondent judge‟s virtual victim. Approached by the NBI team was Candido Cruz, a person who had been  brought before the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, for preliminary investigation on the charge of Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge gave judgment to the effect that the crime committed by Candido Cruz was that of physical injuries merely. He declared then that he had original jurisdiction to try the case. But, respondent‟s action in this regard was perpetrated some time before Candido Cruz was “persuaded to participate in what they (the NBI agents) called „entrapment operation.‟” The opportune time to bribe the respondent should have been before he acted in reducing Cruz‟ criminal liability from Frustrated Murder to Physical Injuries. No bribe was asked then. It was unlikely that respondent would ask for it on the date of the entrapment on March 26, 1993, the favorable verdict having been rendered already. It is significant to note that NBI Agent Olazo admitted[8] that, despite the fact that he “scoured” the table of the respondent in search of the envelope, with marked money in it, no envelope was found and so he had to call Candido Cruz who was already outside so that Cruz can locate the envelope. In view of these antecedents, we find reason to favorably consider the allegations of respondent judge in his defense that, at around 9:30 o‟clock in the morning of March 26, 1993, Candido Cruz, along with the NBI agents, went to the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan. Candido Cruz, alone, went inside respondent judge‟s chambers, located thereat, and placed before respondent judge an envelope containing marked money. Respondent judge thought that what was placed before him was a pleading for filing and so, he told Candido Cruz to file it with the Office of the Clerk of Court, that is, in a room adjacent to his chambers. Candido Cruz replied that it was the money the judge was asking for. Upon hearing this reply, respondent judge suddenly erupted in anger. He grabbed the envelope on the desk and hurled it at Candido Cruz. The envelope fell on the floor. Respondent judge then picked it up and inserted it inside the pocket of Cruz‟ polo shirt and drove him out of his chambers. NBI Agents Villarta and Olazo immediately entered the door of the judge‟s chambers, introduced themselves, and told respondent judge that the money that Cruz gave him was marked. Respondent judge told them that he did not receive or accept money from Candido Cruz. After respondent judge said this, the NBI Agents nevertheless proceeded to search the room, examined tables, drawers, and every nook and cranny of respondent‟s chambers, and the pockets of the pants of respondent judge. Even after rigid search of the chambers of respondent, the NBI Agents failed to find the envelope containing marked money allegedly given by Candido Cruz to respondent judge

Valenzuela vs Bellosillo Case DigestFacts: Respondent Judge is being charged with gross violation of the constitutional right of subject accused to assistance by counsel of her own choice, gross misconduct, oppression, partiality and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics. In a BP 22 case, Judge allegedly granted bail to the accused despite not being accompanied and represented by her counsel at that time. It appears that Judge granted bail without the assistance of the counsel of record, Atty. Valenzuela and he even suggested that the latter should be replaced by another counsel. Aghast by such decision, Atty. V filed his Notice of Withdrawal, in conformity with his client’s decision, Meriam Colapo. Subsequently, he filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent Judge. To support his position, he attached an Affidavit allegedly executed by his client Colapo. However, during the hearing of the case, he failed to present Colapo as Witness as she was allegedly out of the country although she was willing to testify at that time. Held: NOT GUILTY. On the issue of granting bail without the assistance of counsel, the Court held that it was valid and sufficiently based on the Manifestation filed by Atty. Valenzuela. With regard to the alleged act of respondent Judge suggesting to the accused that she should change her counsel (complainant Atty. V) and recommending a different lawyer, the Court found that the evidence adduced by the complainant was insufficient to substantiate the charges against him. The only evidence offered by complainant was the Affidavit of his client Meriam Colapo, and it cannot be the basis of a finding of guilt even in an administrative case. The complainant’s failure to present his principal witness, in the absence of other evidence to prove his charges was fatal and said Affidavit cannot be given credence and is inadmissible without the said affiant being placed on the witness stand. The employment or profession of a person is a property right within the constitutional guaranty of due process of law. This applies also to Judges. Respondent judge cannot therefore be adjudged guilty of the charges against him without affording him a chance to confront the said witness, Meriam Colapo. Otherwise, his right to due process would be infringed.

Lumiqued vs exevea Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by Zamudio, the Regional Cashier, for dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses under his office. It was alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and that he had an unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00. Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the two complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. The Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal  of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued.ISSUE: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry?

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Bill of rightsHELD: The SC ruled against Lumiqued. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative  inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him.   The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law.“. . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.”In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side. Whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee was cured by Lumiqued’s appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration.

Govn. Of hk vs. olaliaFactsPrivate respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high “flight risk”. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge subject to the following conditions:1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition. IssueWON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail Ruling A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the same being available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the following trends in international law:(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.

Acad disciplineNON VS. DAMES [185 SCRA 523; G.R. NO. 89317; 20 MAY 1990]

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Bill of rightsFacts: Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of the protests is not, however, made clear in the pleadings.Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition. They now petition the court to reverse its ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA1, which was also applied in the case. The court said that petitioners waived their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester ofschool year 1988-89, which states that: The Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of students whose scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the institution and/or whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college. Students, therefore, are required to behave in accord with the Mabini College code of conduct and discipline. Issue: Whether or Not the students’ right to freedom of speech and assembly infringed.Held: Yes. The protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Constitution is similarly available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction. However there are limitations. The permissible limitation on Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights within the school presupposes that conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior should not materially disrupt classwork or must not involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.

Admu vs, capulongOn February 8, 9, and 10 of 1991, a fraternity in Ateneo Law School named Aquila Legis conducted its initiation rites upon neophytes. Unfortunately, one neophyte died as a result thereof and one was hospitalized due to serious physical injuries. In a resolution dated March 9, 1991, the Disciplinary Board formed by Ateneo found seven students guilty of violating Rule 3 of the Rules on Discipline. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, then president of Ateneo, on the basis of the findings, ordered the expulsion  of the seven students. However, on May 17, 1991, Judge Ignacio Capulong of the Makati RTC, upon the students’ petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, ordered Ateneo to reverse its decision and reinstate the said students.ISSUE: Whether or not the Ateneo Law School has competence to issue an order dismissing such students pursuant to its rules.HELD: Yes, Ateneo has the competence and the power to dismiss its erring students and therefore it had validly exercised such power. The students do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution such as Ateneo as their own a minute longer for they may forseeably  cast a  malevolent influence on students currently enrolled as well as those who come after them. This is academic freedom on the part of the school which includes:a. freedom to determine who may teach;b. freedom to determine what may be taught;c. freedom to determine how it shall be taught;d. freedom to determine who may be admitted to study.

Fixing ratesGlobe Telecom, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission [G.R. No.143964. July 26, 2004]FACTSPrivate respondent Smart Communications, Inc (Smart) filed with the NTC a Complaint to effect the interconnection of their SMS or texting services with petitioner Globe Telecom, Inc. (Globe). Globe pointed out procedural defects in Smarts complaints and moved to dismiss the case. I also pointed out that another network, Islacom, was allowed to provide such service without prior NTC approval. The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) ruled that both Smart and Globe were “equally blameworthy” and issued an Order penalizing both on the ground of providing SMS under Value Added Services (VAS) without prior approval from the NTC. The Court of Appeals sustained the NTC Order.ISSUESWhether or not:(1) Globe may be required to secure prior NTC approval before providing SMS or texting services;(2)  SMS is a VAS under Public telecommunications Act (PTA) of 1995;RULING(1) NO. The NTC may not legally require Globe to secure its approval for Globe to continue providing SMS. This does not imply though that NTC lacks authority to regulate SMS or to classify it as VAS.  However, the move should be implemented properly, through unequivocal regulations applicable to all entities that are similarly situated, and in an even-handed manner. This should not be interpreted, however, as removing SMS from the ambit of jurisdiction and review by the NTC. The NTC will continue to exercise, by way of its broad grant, jurisdiction over Globe and Smart’s SMS offerings, including questions of rates and customer complaints. Yet caution must be had. Much complication could have been avoided had the NTC adopted a proactive position, promulgating the necessary rules and regulations to cope up with the advent of the technologies it superintends.  With the persistent advent of new offerings in the telecommunications industry, the NTC’s role will become more crucial than at any time before.

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Bill of rights(2) NO. There is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum circulars promulgated by the NTC to denominate SMS as VAS, and any subsequent determination by the NTC on whether SMS is VAS should be made with proper regard for due process and in conformity with the PTA. The Court realizes that the PTA is not intended to constrain the industry within a cumbersome regulatory regime. The policy as pre-ordained by legislative fiat renders the traditionally regimented business in an elementary free state to make business decisions, avowing that it is under this atmosphere that the industry would prosper.   It is disappointing at least if the deregulation thrust of the law is skirted deliberately.  But it is ignominious if the spirit is defeated through a crazy quilt of vague, overlapping rules that are implemented haphazardly.

Closure proceedingsCentral Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 88353, May 8, 1992The following requisites must be present before the order of conservatorship may be set aside by a court: (1) The appropriate pleading must be filed by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock of the bank in the proper court; (2) Said pleading must be filed within ten (10) days from receipt of notice by said majority stockholders of the order placing the bank under conservatorship; and (3) There must be convincing proof, after hearing, that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. Issue:    Whether or not the trial court erred in not dismissing the case for lack of cause of action and declaring the MB resolutions as arbitrary.Held:    The following requisites must be present before the order of conservatorship may be set aside by a court: (1) The appropriate pleading must be filed by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock of the bank in the proper court; (2) Said pleading must be filed within ten (10) days from receipt of notice by said majority stockholders of the order placing the bank under conservatorship; and (3) There must be convincing proof, after hearing, that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith.In the instant case, the original complaint was filed more than 3 years after PBP was placed under conservator, long after the expiration of the 10-day period deferred to above. It is also beyond question that the complaint and the amended complaint were not initiated by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock. 

Agabon vs. NLRC Case DigestFacts: Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work. Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims and on December 28, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissals illegal and ordered private respondent to pay the monetary claims. Issue: Whether or not respondent’s dismissal is illegal and if not, entitles them benefits. Ruling: The Court ruled that the dismissal is legal and entitles them of payment of benefits. Dismissals based on just causes contemplate acts or omissions attributable to the employee while dismissals based on authorized causes involve grounds under the Labor Code which allow the employer to terminate employees. A termination for an authorized cause requires payment of separation pay. When the termination of employment is declared illegal, reinstatement and full back wages are mandated under Article 279. If reinstatement is no longer possible where the dismissal was unjust, separation pay may be granted. Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation. From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be derived: (1) the dismissal is for a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code, for an authorized cause under Article 283, or for health reasons under Article 284, and due process was observed; (2) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause but due process was observed; (3) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause and there was no due process; and (4) the dismissal is for just or authorized cause but due process was not observed. In the fourth situation, the dismissal should be upheld. While the procedural infirmity cannot be cured, it should not invalidate the dismissal. However, the employer should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process. The present case squarely falls under the fourth situation. The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have been useless because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employee’s last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process. 

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Bill of rightsThe Court ruled that respondent is liable for petitioners’ holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay without deductions. The evident intention of Presidential Decree No. 851 is to grant an additional income in the form of the 13th month pay to employees not already receiving the same so as “to further protect the level of real wages from the ravages of world-wide inflation.” Clearly, as additional income, the 13th month pay is included in the definition of wage under Article 97(f) of the Labor Code. An employer is prohibited under Article 113 of the same Code from making any deductions without the employee’s knowledge and consent

Substantive due processUS v. ToribioFacts:The appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption the carabao described in the information, without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle.It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was slaughtered there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure.Issue:Whether or not the proper construction of the language of these provisions limit the prohibition contained in Section 30 and the penalty imposed in Section 33 to cases:(1) of slaughter of large cattles for human consumption in a municipal slaughter house without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and(2) cases of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal slaughter-house without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer.Held:The prohibition contained in section 30 refers (1) to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) expressly and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit; and that the penalty provided in section 33 applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit.Sections 30 and 33 prohibit and penalize the slaughter for human consumption or killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse of such animals without a permit issued by the municipal treasurer, and section 32 provides for the keeping of detailed records of all such permits in the office of the municipal and also of the provincial treasurer.Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment. Therefore, sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in section 30.

Velasco vs. villegas

FERNANDO, C.J.:This is an appeal from an order of the lower court dismissing a suit for declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, the contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of their means of livelihood without due process of law. The assailed ordinance is worded thus: “It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person.”  1 As noted in the appealed order, petitioners-appellants admitted that criminal cases for the violation of this ordinance had been previously filed and decided. The lower court, therefore, held that a petition for declaratory relief did not lie, its availability being dependent on there being as yet no case involving such issue having been filed. 2

Even if such were not the case, the attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the brief of respondents-appellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: “(1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers.” 3This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision, this Court through Justice Malcolm made clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which “delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality. As above stated, this clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities and has

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Bill of rightsin its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence.” 5 As it was then, so it has continued to be. 6There is no showing, therefore, of the unconstitutionality of such ordinance.WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the lower court is affirmed. No costs.

 VELASCO v. VILLEGASFacts:The petitioners filed a declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality based on Ordinance No.4964 of the City of Manila, the contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of property of their meansof livelihood without due process of law.The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shopto conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of saidbarber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as longas the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person."The lower court ruled in favor of the constitutionality of the assailed ordinance. Hence, the appeal.Issue:Whether or not Ordinance No. 4964 is unconstitutionalHeld:NOIt is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: "(1) To be able to imposepayment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 asamended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers."The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clausebecause it "delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality; this clause has been given wideapplication by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case beenliberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence."The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

City of manila vs. judge laguioOn 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City.ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribedby law, it  must also conform to the following substantive requirements:(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and(6) must not be unreasonable.The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.

White light corp. vs. city of manilaPolice Power – Not Validly Exercised – Infringement of Private Rights

On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled “An Ordinance” prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator ofmini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,

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Bill of rightshotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.

Ynot vs. iacPolice Power – Not Validly Exercised

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC  found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

Lupangco vs CA Case DigestLupangco vs Court of Appeals G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988 Facts: PRC issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy, filed with the RTC a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional. Issue: Can the Professional Regulation Commission lawfully prohibit the examiness from attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the like 3 days before the date of the examination? Ruling: We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions. 

The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the examination period. It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their

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Bill of rightsambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors

Balacuit v CFI G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988Facts:Petitioners, theater owners, assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969. This called for a reduction to ½ of the ticket price given to minors from 7-12 years old. There was a fine from 200-600 pesos or a 2-6 month imprisonmentThe complaint was issued in the trial court. A TRO was then issued to prevent the law from being enforced.  The respondent court entered its decision declaring the law valid.Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power. Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not within the power of' the Municipal Board to enact as provided for in Section 15(n) of Republic Act No. 523 where it states that the Muncipal board can only fix license fees for theaters and notadmission rates.The respondent attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by invoking the general welfare clause embodied in Section 15 (nn) of the cited law.Issue:Does this power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the fixing of prices of admission to these places of exhibition and amusement whether under its general grant of power or under the general welfare clause as invoked by the City?Held: The ordinance is under neither and thus unconstitutional. Petition granted.1. Kwong Sing v. City of Manila- the word "regulate" was interpreted to include the power to control, to govern and to restrain, it would seem that under its power to regulate places of exhibitions and amusement, the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan could make proper policeregulations as to the mode in which the business shall be exercised.In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power by the local government.People v. Chan- an ordinance of the City of Manila prohibiting first run cinematographs fromselling tickets beyond their seating capacity was upheld as constitutional for being a valid exercise of police power.The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority to enact the ordinance in question under its power to regulate embodied in Section 15(n), now invokes the police power as delegated to it under the general welfare clause to justify the enactment of said ordinanceTo invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.Petitioners maintain that Ordinance No. 640 violates the due process clause of the Constitution for being oppressive, unfair, unjust, confiscatory, and an undue restraint of trade, and violative of the right of persons to enter into contracts, considering that the theater owners are bound under a contract with the film owners for just admission prices for general admission, balcony and lodge.Homeowners Association- the exercise of police power is necessarily subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the regard, the respect and the obedience due to the prescriptions of the fundamental lawThe court agreed with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means.The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who have to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children, as they would for themselves. A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. The ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as petitioners point out, there will be difficulty in its implementation because as already experienced by petitioners since the effectivity of the ordinance, children over 12 years of age tried to pass off their age as below 12 years in order to avail of the benefit of the ordinance. The ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this undesirable practice and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the age of children. This is, however, not at all practicable. We can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare.Respondent further alleges that by charging the full price, the children are being exploited by movie house operators. We fail to see how the children are exploited if they pay the full price ofadmission. They are treated with the same quality of entertainment as the adults.

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Bill of rightsMoreover, as a logical consequence of the ordinance, movie house and theater operators will be discouraged from exhibiting wholesome movies for general patronage, much less children's pictures if only to avoid compliance with the ordinance and still earn profits for themselves.A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license, revocable at the will of the proprietor of the theater or it may be evidence of a contract whereby, for a valuable consideration, the purchaser has acquired the right to enter the theater and observe the performance on condition that he behaves properly.  Such ticket, therefore, represents a right, Positive or conditional, as the case may be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale. This right is clearly a right of property. The ticket which represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of property. As such, the owner thereof, in the absence of any condition to the contrary in the contract by which he obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he pleases and at such price as he can obtain.In no sense could theaters be considered public utilities. The State has not found it appropriate as a national policy to interfere with the admission prices to these performances. This does not mean however, that theaters and exhibitions are not affected with public interest even to a certain degree. Motion pictures have been considered important both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perceptions by our people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits are considerable.While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power.A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. 34 The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause.Although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence

Agustin vs. eduGenerally Accepted Principles of International Law – Police Power

Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of “reflectorized triangular early warning devices”. Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) ‘blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,’ 2) ‘battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles,’ 3) ‘built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles,’ or 4) ‘well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision.On Police PowerThe Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as “nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty”   was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: “Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus ‘be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.

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Bill of rightsShortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as ‘the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.’ The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as ‘that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.’ In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, ‘the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable powers,’ extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out ‘to all the great public needs.’ Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: ‘Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.’ The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.”It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the fact that the particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law,   an enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: “To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads . . .”   As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act,   with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.

Equal protectionPeople vs. cayat

In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any other liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his right to  equal protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them with discrimination or “mark them as inferior or less capable race and less entitled” will meet with their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and classify native non-Christians from Christians.ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.HELD: The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable classification. The SC emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the characteristics that distinguish them from others. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon “accident of birth or parentage.” The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as “an inferior or less capable race.” On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.

Ichong vs. hernandezLao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute

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Bill of rightsequality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong  can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

Villegas vs. hiu chiong tsuiFACTS: This case involves an ordinance prohibiting aliens from being employed or engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00. Private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition to stop the enforcement of such ordinance as well as to declare the same null and void. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, hence this case.

ISSUE: WON said Ordinance violates due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.

HELD: Yes. The Ordinance The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor who may withhold or refuse it at his will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

Tiu v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 278 (1999)posted in CONLAW2 cases by katcobingThe constitutionality and validity of EO 97-A, that provides that the grant and enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives authorized under RA 7227 were limited to the business enterprises and residents within the fenced-in area of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), was questioned.Nature of the case: A petition for review to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals which upheld the constitutionality and validity of the E.O. 97-A. Facts of the case: The petitioners assail the constitutionality of the said Order claiming that they are excluded from the benefits provided by RA 7227 without any reasonable standards and thus violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The Court of Appeals upheld the validity and constitutionality and denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition was filed. Issue: WON E.O. 97-A violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution Arguments: Petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses (1) the City of Olongapo, (2) the Municipality of Subic in Zambales, and (3) the area formerly occupied by the Subic Naval Base.  However, EO 97-A, according to them, narrowed down the area within which the special privileges granted to the entire zone would apply to the present “fenced-in former Subic Naval Base” only.  It has thereby excluded the residents of the first two components of the zone from enjoying the benefits granted by the law.  It has effectively discriminated against them, without reasonable or valid standards, in contravention of the equal protection guarantee.The solicitor general defends the validity of EO 97-A, arguing that Section 12 of RA 7227 clearly vests in the President the authority to delineate the metes and bounds of the SSEZ.  He adds that the issuance fully complies with the requirements of a valid classification.Decision: Panganiban J., The Court held that the classification was based on valid and reasonable standards and does not violate the equal protection clause.The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification.  If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. Ruling: Petition denied. The challenge decision and resolution were affirmed.

Isae v. quisimbingFACTS: Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The decree authorizes the School to

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Bill of rightsemploy its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local-hires.When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the NCMB, the matter reached the DOLE which favored the School. Hence this petition. ISSUE:Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local- hires. RULING:NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is entitled to “humane conditions of work.” These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace – the factory, the office or the field – but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.The Constitution enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare, In Section 18, Article II of the constitution mandates “to afford labor full protection”. The State has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees’ interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances. These benefits are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.

PT&T vs. NLRC272 SCRA 596

FACTS:

PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as “Supernumerary Project Worker”, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave.  She was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991. 

On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where probationary period will cover 150 days.  She indicated in the portion of the job application form under civil status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier.  When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy.  Included in the memorandum, was a

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Bill of rightsreminder about the company’s policy of not accepting married women for employment.  She was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992.  Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular employee.  Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company policies.

ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of an employee.

HELD:

Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee.  It is recognized that company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.

PT&T’s policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution.  The record discloses clearly that de Guzman’s ties with PT&T were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T.  As stated in the labor code: 

“ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. — It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.”

The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and inalienable right.  The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation.  Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order but also imperatively required.

Dumlao vs. comelecDumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to the same office for the 1980 local elections.   On the other hand, BP 52 was passed (par 1 thereof) providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. His petition was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.ISSUE: Whether or not the there is cause of action.HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would never have been merged. Dumlao’s cause is different from Igot’s. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that it’d be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met. The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void.The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the

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Bill of rightsSolicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.

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