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When Two Become One: Internal and external

securitisations in Europe

Didier Bigo

Threats, Internal Security and Defence: some entanglements

Society is undergoing fundamental transformations through the rise of new forms of

governmentality in the Western world. The transnational is blurring the distinction

between the internal and external, and destabilising related concepts: sovereignty,

territoriality, security (Badie 1995). Sovereignty is meaningless and must be adjusted to

the processes of European construction and economic globalization. The notion of

borders is fading away and giving rise of the old notion of lines or fronts and regions,

(NAFTA, “Schengenland”) and the concept of security must be adapted accordingly to

take account of these changes. The transnationalisation of security opposes national

(and societal) security. It creates, as in a Möbius ribbon, a situation where one never

knows whether one is inside or outside (Bigo 1999, Walker 1993).

This relation of inside and outside is central and more important than the need to

distinguish between state and societal security (Waever et al. 1993). The process of

‘securitisation’ is not only enlarging towards identity, it involves a more profound

move. Internal and external security are merging and de-differentiating after a period of

strong differentiation where the two worlds of policing and war had little in common

(Bayley 1975). Now, especially after the end of bipolarity, external security agencies

(the army, the secret service) are looking inside the borders in search of an enemy from

outside. They analyse ‘transversal threats’ (supposedly coming from immigrant, second

generation of citizens of foreign origin, people from some inner cities or from the

populous and disadvantaged suburbs). Internal security agencies (national police forces,

police with military status, border guards, customs) are looking to find their internal

enemies beyond the borders and speak of networks of crime (migrants, asylum seekers,

diasporas, Islamic people who supposedly have links with crime, terrorism, drug

trafficking, transnational organised crime). This so-called convergence towards new

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threats and risks is considered the main justification for new structures and more co-

operation between the agencies (internal as well as external) as well as a rationalizing of

their budgets in a period of financial crisis for security affairs. The core of this new

securitization is related to transnational flows and to the surveillance of boundaries

(physical, social, and of identity), and can be seen as attempts to re-draw a border

between an inside and an outside, a border different from the state frontiers.

Beyond the borders: policing today

Discussing the move of internal security agencies beyond their borders, numerous

works have described the transformation affecting the national police forces of all

Member States of the EU, even if we have fewer treatments concerning customs and

police with military status (Anderson and Den Boer 1994; Anderson and Den Boer et al.

1996; Bayley 1985; Bigo 1992; Brogden 1990; Busch 1991; Fijnaut and Hermans 1991;

Mawby 1990; Nayer et al. 1995; Reiner 1992; Van Outrive et al 1996). They have

highlighted how the Europeanisation process interferes with purely national logics and

invalidates analyses of internal security as an isolated phenomenon. The international is

now both a constitutive and explicative dimension of internal security and police work,

even if intellectual traditions and academic separation between internal and external

tend to make one forget this. These works have shown that within the European area,

national police forces from the different countries are driven toward closer collaboration

and exchanges of knowledge. This is particularly the case for special police forces

(against drug trafficking, organised crime, terrorism, hooliganism and illegal

immigration). Information exchange (Interpol, Schengen Information System, Europol)

has intensified, and new technologies (computers, telesurveillance) as well as new

administrative personnel (liaison officers, officials from the Ministry of the Interior and

the Ministry of Justice, security attachés within the embassies) have been set up in

parallel with an exacerbated development of private activities in what has become an

internal security market (Milipol). Poles of European groupings such as Schengen,

Trevi - then the Third pillar of Maastricht, or Europol have emerged. In these areas of

high policing, police work is not carried out simply at local or national level, but on a

European or even international scale.

This wider scope of internal security goes beyond the frontiers of the State and

obliges a change in the notion of sovereignty (at the intellectual and constitutional

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levels). Internal security will include undertaking activities such as surveillance of

clandestine immigration, surveillance of cultural, religious and social influences from

the country of origin of migrants and even on their offspring, surveillance and

maintenance of order in so called problem districts, and control of transborder flows.

The maintenance and restoration of order without opening fire, even in situations

involving hostile foreign populations, are also connected to the first activities: they use

almost identical knowledge, but in different contexts. Some French policemen or

gendarmes explain that their knowledge gained in African riots or even in Sarajevo is

relevant to the management of the riots in French suburbs. This crossing of the borders

is not only territorial. The connection is also about identity: not the minority versus

majority, but cross border activities and transboundary problems, including that of

transgressing boundaries of identity with mixed marriage. Internal security thus implies

collaboration with foreign countries and dissatisfaction with clear lines or borders

between inside and outside, state and society, sovereignty and identity.

Internal security activities block the possibility of distinguishing between an

outside, state, sovereign security and an inside, societal, identity security. They are

always entrenched and cannot be isolated from foreign policy or considered simply as

‘the protection of national territory against internal threats by using national means’.

Internal security is not an ‘internal problem between communities in a public sphere

about the definition of national identity’, internal security is a transversal vision of some

knowledge about public order and surveillance inside or outside the territory, associated

with specific devices of control.

Convergence towards the same enemy?

If internal security is not only from the ‘inside’, if it goes beyond the border, if it is

transversal, is it because of the change in the nature of the threats? Is the inside

adversary coming from outside? It could be an explanation and the transformation of

violence in the last decades are an incentive for the de-differentiation of security, but it

is not as a direct answer to violence that security is changing. It is through this

connection between the devices of control and the management of fear and unease that

links are made between military and police forces. The enlargement of the concept of

internal security now links these two different ‘universes’. Military forces want to be in

charge of the surveillance of the borders and to look for ‘infiltrating enemies’.

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Although the ‘street corner criminal’ and the ‘soviet enemy’ used to belong to two

separate worlds, the idea that police officers, customs officers, gendarmes, intelligence

agencies and the army, all share the same enemies (terrorists and the countries that

support them, organized crime and drugs trafficking, corruption and Mafiosi, the risk of

urban riots of an ethnic nature and their implications for international politics with the

immigration countries) is gaining more and more support inside different agencies. A

‘common’ list of threats is being drawn up. A field of struggle and domination is

emerging, as well as interests in cooperation. This field reacts on the socialisation of the

agents and they act themselves as if a new situation constrains them to act now in a

different way.

So, security, and in particular internal security, must be understood as a process of

securitisation/insecuritisation of the borders, of the identities and of the conception of

orders. Securitisation is, in this sense, not an answer to insecuritisation, but a capacity to

manage (and create) insecurity. When securitisation enlarges, so insecuritisation

enlarges also, as metaphorically, it is the envelope of the sphere of security. More than

that, sometimes security creates unwanted side effects towards other groups of people

and as well as one having a security dilemma at the external and state level, one has a

security dilemma at the internal and the community level. This dilemma creates

insecuritisation due to self-fulfilling prophecy of security discourses, for example

between migrants and border police, or between citizens of foreign origins and

policemen controlling the suburbs.

Internal (in)security must be analysed in connection with institutional knowledge

and knowledge of the agencies, their devices and practices, including their discursive

practices, as these are determinant factors in understanding how definitions of those

who provoke fear, the adversary and the enemy are socially constructed. We need to

understand the social construction of fears. And why they are now converging towards

the figure of the migrant, as the key point inside a continuum of threats.

In order to analyse the above phenomenon, it is possible to speak of a field of

security where the different security agencies (police, gendarmeries, custom officers,

army and information services, private security agencies and more marginally local

security agencies, pro and anti-immigration agencies) participate de facto in the global

redefinition of their respective attributions. This hypothesis of a security field where the

border between internal and external security can hardly be detected (like on a Möbius

ribbon), has the advantage of linking what is too often disconnected: namely defence

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studies and studies on police. Such an approach enables one to understand that internal

security extends beyond organisational questions of territorial defence on which the

agencies focus. Consideration of internal security questions calls us to think about

security issues in general, the relations between the State and individual as well as the

relation to democracy in the contemporary age. They require us to retrace the structural

evolutions and emergence of a risk society, which transforms the actual conception of

security. They lead to questions beyond security needs, concerning not only the interests

of social groups pushing for securitisation but also collective behaviour and cultural

norms which form the framework of what we will call security and internal security in a

given society. It needs to take into consideration who are the producers of the social

construction of threats and how these fears are connected with (in)securitisation. So,

even if we agree with some of the descriptions concerning the convergence of threats,

they need to be analysed as a social construct which is not independent from the

security agencies and whose legitimacy to declare the truth of the threats needs to be put

in question.

Such an analysis implies the articulation between a foucaldian approach and Pierre

Bourdieu’s theory of field. The methodology which underpins this research is discussed

in two other articles (Bigo forthcoming). Here I want only to illustrate what could be the

transformation of this epistemological stance into specific research concerning the

merging of the internal and external security. I want to explain why, at some points, the

two dimensions of security become one.

The framing of the security question

It is difficult to find an article on societal security or about the enlargement of the scope

of security which avoids a lengthy description of the transformation of threats, and

which assesses that the government’s ‘reaction’ to these ‘new’ dangers. Some demand

global solutions and military involvements. Others refuse this ‘militarisation’ of security

and demand more police activities. Others want more prevention and less coercive

measures to struggle against the threats. But they all agree that the threats come from

the social world and that a government has the responsability to answer them. The

notion of the ‘survival’ of states, nations, collective identities continues to be at the core

of these descriptions. But despite their claim to ‘neutrality’, these descriptions, are

embedded with moral judgements, with ‘préjugés’ concerning the legitimacy of fighting

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against ‘crime, the Mafias, the terrorists’, or ‘the Europeanisation, the

cosmopolitanism...’. They claim that, so long as they are ‘well balanced’ between right

and left, they have some truth. Have they?

At the political level, for different governments, the legitimacy of ‘reacting’ acts as

a ‘purification ritual’ where everything is legitimate against these new threats where

exceptional measures are ‘normal’ in front of such dangers. The lines between security

and liberty blur. Liberty is not the limit of security but the condition of security, so

security has no limits. Security is unlimited (Waever 1997). Security needs to be

‘global’. At that point, governments want to take account of all the different security

agencies and to co-ordinate their activities without creating the problem of duplication

of tasks which would disrupt their normal operation and raise the budget.

Politicians at the national, European and sometimes western level want to say that

they can answer these ‘new threats’. They ask for advice and many academics want to

be ‘councillors to the Prince’. Notions circulate between political labellisation,

administrative registrations and academic conceptualisations. Academics want to

propose new definitions and new solutions for security, but often they begin with

statistics coming from political labels or registrations of bureaucracies and they forget

this point. So, they analyse security as a by-product of fears which come from ‘society’

and which are legitimate even if they are without substances, because they are registered

by state authorities. Discussions about the fear of crime or feelings of insecurity are

good examples of this problem. Thus, a large number of academics are trying to help

the government find an ‘answer’ to a problem without recognising that they are framing

some events as a political or security problem, and have part of the responsibility for

how ‘security’ problems become framed – not of the events but of the aggregation of

different events under the same category.

Politicians’ and agencies’ uncertainty about where to draw the boundaries of

security issues has had a marked influence on the way works on international relations

were undertaken, if only as a result of the role of foundations and the financial structure

of social science research programs. Some studies claim to be direct operational

responses and flood institutions with contradictory recommendations explaining why

NATO or the UN should or should not intervene to re-establish law and order, or why

French or American soldiers should or should not intervene in urban riots. The available

military and police means to combat the ‘risk’ of migration are discussed without

stopping a moment, just to think about the legitimacy of such a question. Other studies

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avoid being so directly influenced by the interests of the different agencies and propose

new concepts, but the knowledge stakes cannot be analysed independently from the

power stakes. The redefining of security questions is not just a simple point of learning

within the small world of internationalists. Disregard of this rule in the social game in

favour of an idealistic epistemology sometimes leads international relations scholars to

discuss the relationship between security, borders and identity as if they were ‘pure’

concepts and as though their symbolic power were not drawn from the existence of

institutions, which moreover are the same institutions that manage the government’s

claim to a monopoly on legitimate physical violence. The articulation of relations of

knowledge, ranking and limits between concepts is thus also the articulation of the

power struggle between the security agencies, a relation with the truth on what security

means.

To overcome the ‘idealisation’ of security, the ‘essentialisation’ of a meaning of

security, one of the best approaches seems to be to analyse ‘security’ as a ‘device’, as a

‘technique of government’ - to use a foucaldian framework. But security does not

emerge from everywhere, it is connected with special ‘agents’, with ‘professionals’

(military agencies, secret services, customs, police forces). And it is only if we follow in

detail how they manage to control people, to put them under surveillance, that we will

understand how they frame security discourses. If we refuse to do this sociological

work, if we try only to analyse the inter-discursive practices (which has the ‘advantage’

of leaving the researcher alone, far from these ‘bad guys’), we will ‘intellectualise’ the

securitisation in a way that is correlated with the habitus of the researcher which does

not fit with the habitus and practices of the security agencies. To analyse these

processes fully requires spending time with the people of the agencies, understanding

how and why they use these techniques, and their legitimation of the routines of

coercion, control and surveillance.

Analysing securisation/insecurisation practices

Too often, analyses of security are far too inattentive to the social practices of security

professionals. In many cases they are the product of secondary rationalisations which

reduce security or identity to natural objects. These are discussed as if they were

‘things’. There is an attempt to define security or identity by reifying their

objectifications as natural objects. As Paul Veyne puts it:

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We are taking the spot that a projectile is going to land of its own accord as an

intentionally aimed target. We apply a philosophy of the object as end or cause

rather than a philosophy of relation which approaches the problem not from both

ends, but from the middle, from practice or discourse.’

(Veyne 1971:97)

The evolution of security and its various forms throughout history is explained either as

an anthropological need (ontological security or security desire), as a legitimate demand

from citizens (safety), or as a speech act which varies according to the moment (security

discourses), rather than analysing the practices of securisation/insecurisation and the set

up of the social power balance that enables them to be applied. This neglect of

practices, of the actions of security agents, is a result of an inversion that would have us

believe that ‘what is done determines the doing, when in fact the opposite is true’.

The illusion of a natural object (the governed throughout history [or societal

security]) conceals the heterogeneous nature of practices. The governed are

neither one nor a multiple, any more than repression is, for the simple reason

that it does not exist: there are just multiple objectifications which are

correlative to heterogeneous practices. The relationship of this multiplicity of

practices to a unit only becomes an issue if one tries to ascribe a unity that they

do not have ; a gold watch, lemon zest and a racoon are also a multiplicity and

do not seem to suffer from the fact that they do not have either origin, object or

principle in common. Only the illusion of a natural object creates a vague

impression of unity...there is no subconscious, no repression.. just the eternal

teleological illusion and we are wrong to imagine that the doing, or practice,

can be explained based on what is done, as on the contrary, what is done is

explained by what the doing was at any point in history. Things, objects, are

simply the correlate of practices.’

(ibid.: 99)

Thus we should not reflect on the right definition of security and the diverse forms that

it takes according to the ‘sectors’, but on the securisation/insecurisation practices which

run through the internal sphere as much as the external sphere. We need to analyse the

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heterogeneity of practices and we should remember that practices are interspersed with

empty spaces, that they are few and far between and that objectifications fill the space

by updating the potential left in the hollow. If the neighbouring practices change, if the

limits move, then practice will update the new potentials and it will no longer be the

same. A genealogy of practices is necessary.

And we need to ask in each case: what exactly are the practices of coercion, of

protection, of pacification, of fixed guard, of control, of surveillance, of information

gathering and sorting, of information management, of covering areas, of calming, of

dissuasion, of locking up, of turning back, of removal from the territory, all techniques

which are used by security agents, and through what technology? Each has its own

repertoire of actions, its own knowledge, its own technology. Practices are

heterogeneous and dispersed, but are they not the response to political rationality? And

if so, how should we envisage that rationality? As François Ewald points out, either it is

examined from the point of view

of the practices that it orders or forbids, of the way in which it problematises its

objects, and it is a programmatic rationality, or it is examined as a diagram

rationality by looking at the practices and trying to identify what the plan for

their set up, what the ideal of their adapted function, may have been.

(1996: 17)

This diagram rationality crosses the whole of society and can be found in the most basic

representation of immigrants. Nevertheless, it originates in the practices of security

professionals and we can certainly evoke the field that these security professionals

constitute, one of whose aims it is to ‘manage and control life through concrete

organizations such as schools, hospitals, the police and the army.’

Delimiting the problem of internal security - the perspective of security

agencies

Security on an internal level: from police to internal security

Security is no longer an issue which can be solely assimilated with the collective

security of a state, it also, and increasingly so, concerns the individual security of each

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one of us - whether the individual is threatened by criminal acts or from attacks from

abroad. The contemporary state is no longer only held responsible for assuring the

institutional survival of the collectivity, it must also guarantee the personal survival of

each of its constitutive members, regardless of where they are. An attack which occurs

thousands of kilometres away from the national territory, but which involves French

citizens will be considered as an unacceptable threat to security. It’s the same concern

that is expressed when as stating that too many people voluntarily use drugs and

endanger their lives. Similarly, concern is expressed with regard to religious

conversions (Islam, for fear of radical proselytism; sects for health reasons). The semi-

settled foreigner, even when he has citizenship, is suspected of disrespecting the host

society’s norms and of disturbing the notion of public space.

The State thus wants to take charge of individual security and widen the notion of

public order. It aims to realise the truth programme, that it has been trying to assert for a

long time with contract theories, but lacked the means to carry out. Control and

surveillance technologies and new knowledge in the social sciences reinforce this push

towards maximising security, to implement a body politics, to have a ‘life’ policy where

the production of life is more important for the government than the right to deliver

death. At the same time, the practical realisation of such a truth programme involves an

ever increasing delegation of responsibilities to the private commercial sphere. This

gives rise to important contradictions. The illusion of mastering life disappears under

the pressure of commercial and capitalist approaches. Class logic is resurfacing and the

private sector tends to objectify security through selling goods and advice about the

good and secure life. So, the state has perhaps less impact than ever about the social

practices of securitisation even if those responsible say the contrary. They are more and

more interdependent with social and commercial interactions. They cannot escape this

privatisation of security issues and they cannot continue to distinguish between state and

non-state security.

This change in attitude of the state, the will to master individual security, must not

of course be exaggerated. It has been a slow metamorphosis during which the

citizens’ points of view have been gradually taken into consideration. It is the progress

of democratization and state making that has taken place over centuries (Bayley 1975;

Elias 1993; Lacroix 1985). We will not develop here - as it is not the aim of the paper-

how the state progressively affirmed its claim to assuring and gained an effective

monopoly over crime control in its territory, nor will we expose how this latter function

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has been increasingly contested as the state has acquired the means to control the

coming and goings over its borders, the movement of people within its territory, and

delinquent populations (Foucault 1975; Reiner 1992; Tilly 1990). Possible illegalities

have indeed been reduced through the multiplication of laws, legislative and

administrative networking, control technologies (identity cards, passports) (Noiriel

1991; Torpey 1996) and although they have always been taken care of, it has not been

without provoking near revolts and, in each instance, installing great fear in the leaders

(vagabonds, anarchists, working class as dangerous class, lumpenproletariat, long-

haired youths, and now youths from the ghettos) (Cesari 1997; Delumeau 1989;

Duhamel 1993; Rey 1996). By reinforcing surveillance over a specific group, the state

has been able to consolidate its hold over territory and guarantee the security of other

strata of the population, but at the same moment securisation has created insecurisation,

fears and the myth that the full implementation of the public order, of tranquillity, of the

peace of the public space is always endangered by revolts, or even by hunger strikes of

the people excluded or under surveillance.

So, as Norbert Elias has pointed out, the pacification of customs and the reduction

in murderous crime over a long period, in parallel with the strengthening of both self-

constraint and state power have not diminished the feeling of insecurity. The immense

fear of losing one’s life and soul (in the course of one’s travels) while travelling the

highways and byways has instead been replaced by the multiplication of trivial fears

concerning one’s property (Elias 1993). The population could all the more easily change

their concerns with regard to security because the essential was no longer endangered. It

is only in times of social peace that we feel threatened by uncivil actions of our

neighbours (Roché 1993). The feeling of insecurity experienced by the individual is

always relative to and conditioned by a particular context of global security.

The role of the police and the discourse on their role has evolved and become more

complex. The massive transformations of the construction of the parliamentary State

and its legitimation have been followed by the progressive demilitarisation of the police.

The state police also wanted to be society’s police. Intelligence is but one of the tasks of

the police, whose functions also include providing emergency aid, crime control,

assuring public order i.e. peace. The ‘police’ organisation brings together very diverse

professions and duties (Berliere 1991; Buisson 1949; Buttner 1987). With the

development of a parliamentary system, the state learned to look after its populations

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and no longer to treat them as enemies, even during uprisings (, Rabinow 1991; Veyne

1971). The individual’s security has become an increasingly important issue and the

populations’ expectations in this area have been reinforced to the present point where

public organisations fall far short of being able to satisfy the massive ‘demands’ for

security. The privatisation of security was created by the will of the state to implement

its own program. The focus on identity, on personal security, falls into the private

sector. Politicians try to disengage themselves from individual security but too many

links were created between public administrations and private agencies (recruitment,

money, personal links with politicians). This short genealogy enables us to reposition

what is at stake in internal security (cahiers de la sécurité intérieure no. 3 and 24).

For centuries crime has been treated in an ordinary way without major implications

for politicians. Even if the latter were aware of threats of revolutionary subversion, they

were not concerned with individual security. Now, however, police issues have become

political issues in the sense that they incite public debate (Edelman 1964). If one were to

exaggerate somewhat one could say that whereas before police only had to do their

work and the state had only to provide them with the means for doing so, now governers

are asked for explanations: explanations concerning both crime and police (Robert and

Sack 1985). With regard to this change James Rosenau (1990) speaks of a

transformation in the allegiance system and an obligation on the part of the state to get

results in security matters whereas before the state was obeyed and no one questioned

its competence. The widening of internal security is due to the fact that the security of

individuals, their personal feeling of insecurity and the link between this type of security

and collective security has progressively been taken into account via security of citizens

and society and no longer via the state and national security. This heavy structural

tendency towards management of individual security and taking care of the individual

by way of all conduits of the state: societal security, civilian security, road security is

part of the development that François Ewald has termed an insurance society (société

assurantielle) where risks are minimised. Numerous liberal thinkers have quite wrongly

viewed this phenomenon as a suffocation of individuals by the state. On the contrary,

individualisation only becomes possible when a state exerts its control in this domain.

The two phenomena - individualisation and state control - are in fact two different side

of the same process.

For a long time individual security was considered in terms of a given territory

delimited by state borders. This was the scope of the state’s responsibility. Beyond

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national boundaries, one could only rely on other states (Chapus 1997). Now the

security of nationals abroad has become a constant concern for western nations.

Numerous military operations have been carried out in the name of such a priority, even

if this were to conceal other priorities. One evoked a secret return to a canon policy, or

inversely the humanitarian dimension alone was stressed, or otherwise one spoke of an

appeal for imperial intervention (Rufin 1996; Salame 1996). However, it seems that

what was at stake in all cases was above all a transplantation of internal security

operations to foreign territory (Cultures et Conflits 1993:11). The techniques used in

these operations transformed them into international police operations for maintenance

of order, and not armed conflicts. The mobilisable knowledge in conjunction with this

vision of things was often poorly understood by public opinion and the media.

International mobility, movement of populations, especially tourists, has rendered one’s

relationship with the territory more complex. The notion of citizenship has supplanted a

purely territorial logic. Security can no longer be conceived as protection behind state

borders: borders that they have tried to make as impermeable as possible. Although

numerous texts uphold this vision of a ‘fortified castle’ or a fortress nation or Europe, it

is undeniable that the security of individuals has become deterritorialised. It now

depends on networks, agreements between countries and security agencies and private

insurance mechanisms. (Bigo 1996a).

What are the present consequences of such social global transformations? The

notions of internal security, individual security and the security of citizens have become

politically important issues, surpassing in this respect police and crime issues. There has

been a tendency towards assimilating the police with the public service, despite

resistance from those with monarchic views. Police issues have been politicised by

placing them under the banner of internal security in the sense that what was before a

little police matter is becoming an important stake in political struggles, especially as it

seems to be a decisive factor in determining undecided votes, particularly at the local

level. The ‘politicisation’ of internal security issues has gone through cycles of secrecy

and public exposure. There is nothing radically new about that. But, what concerns us,

one could say that it was in the 1980s and 1990s that questions about police become the

subject of public debate, at the same time as discourses on urban insecurity and the city

on the one hand, and discourses about stopping immigration of salaried manual workers,

on the other, appeared (Ackerman et al.1983).

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It is in fact possible to consider that the real turning point was when questions about

urban insecurity became important (in the mid 70's, first in the USA and Canada, then in

Great Britain and Germany and after in the beginning of the 80s in Italy and France). At

that time, these questions were approached from the angles of destructuration of citizen

identity, anomie, loss of values, and geographical and social exclusion. Confidence in

the city and civilisation had been lost. A declinist discourse had emerged. In connection

with the latter there was a progressive transition between discourses on the working

class (a loss of meaning in the workers’ movement, a loss of coherence), the role of

immigrants (different values and religions) and a discourse on problem districts (inner

cities or suburbs) as well as delinquency (the informal drug economy). The existence of

extremist parties with anti-immigration rhetoric and their relative electoral success in

certain countries reinforced the belief that public opinion was largely security orientated

and sensitive to arguments for a greater use of coercion. Politicians were quick to

‘ethnicise’ the urban problem and numerous discourses revolved around the merits and

drawbacks of multiculturalism. The mid 1980s saw the increase in political violence by

clandestine organisations on European soil. This, in conjunction with the Iranian

Revolution and the Middle East situation, served to reinforce this climate of anxiety and

turn the focus not towards all immigrants, but on those coming from Islamic countries

swept up in the wave of re-Islamisation, or countries in the middle of civil war. Islam,

especially when it reached the Maghreb, was seen as a direct threat not only for these

countries but for Europe too, and particularly for France. A durable connection had been

made.

There is no doubt that politicians’ fears concerning political violence of Islamic

radicalism, discourses on urban insecurity and the transformation of migration flows,

play a decisive role in the progressive politicisation of crime, insecurity and

immigration. Internal security emerged at the time when economic and social questions

started being approached from a security and cultural angle and when this latter

perspective became important in determining institutional replies to these questions.

There emerges a dialectical tension between internal security and national territory:

as the latter appears to define the scope of so called internal security, the security

agencies themselves are more concerned with what is going on beyond the national

territory. They are more interested in security beyond the border than in focusing on

identity inside the border, on multiculturalism problems. Local and practical problems

are now under privatisation and they move from that to transversal security. Politisation

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and public debate, consideration of individuals’ feelings of insecurity, the connection

between territorial protection and border crossing, the necessary collaboration with

foreign countries: put together all these points form a polyhedron through which internal

security is rendered intelligible (polyèdre d’intelligibilité, quoted by Foucault in Dits et

Ecrits (1994:vol.II).

Internal security thus implies, inconsistent with the traditional activities of the

national police, a widening of the geographical sphere of activities. In other articles and

books lengthy descriptions have been given as to why the establishment of a common

enemy enabled the idea of police collaboration, how the CIPC and then Interpol

developed, and why it was that Europe, first on an informal basis in the 1970s and then

formally in the 1980s, was chosen as the platform for negotiation between police of the

EU countries. It is crucial to understand that internal security cannot be reduced to the

national territory. As it has been shown in both debates and actual practice (including

the formulation of legislative norms), internal security has developed on a European

scale.

The number of countries participating in these forums has increased - the Nordic

countries including Norway and Iceland have joined and the central and eastern

European countries and even Russia are interested; USA and Canada have a role in

these forums as does Switzerland - to the point of diluting the notion of Europe. Judicial

norms have been constituted (Articles K1-K9 of the Maastricht treaty, recommendations

from JAI Council, Conventions including Europol, the Amsterdam treaty which places

further constraints on national governments, the Schengen requirements). The sphere of

security activities has extended to include migration flows and transfrontier flows.

Europeanisation had the effect of allowing a logic of confidentiality to come to the

forefront. It meant that administrations and experts from each country had to confront

each other, but it also allowed them to avoid dialogues with other sectors in their own

society. Not only were associations excluded from the game, but so were local actors

and parliamentarians. Even local police were progressively marginalised and replaced

by European specialists. The technicality of the matter served to justify their absence

from the debate. Paradoxically, Europeanisation thus served to reinforce the tendency

towards secrecy and confidential reports. This was all the more so because the

procedures that were chosen excluded the Commission from playing its role. There are

endless examples. All these phenomena prove that internal security is a way of labelling

the transformation of professional practices and not simply an ideological discourse.

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I have shown elsewhere (Bigo 1996a) that police forces are not to simply

responding to the developments in crime; as crime is now organized at European or

international level, it is not a kind of functional spill over that has now reached police

functions. We have analysed the semi-autonomy of the security agencies by

highlighting the transformations within the world of security without regarding these

transformations as a pure reflection of and reaction to the evolution in violence and

crime. We have shown that it would be inconsistent not to analyse these developments

in violence, but that the main point lies in the way that the social structure of the threat

induces the police not only to rise to these threats but also to take part in their definition.

These games of defining what is and what is not threatening can mostly be explained

away by inter-agency rivalry and by the politicization of matters of public security.

Thus, to sum up, it could be said that internal security has experienced a double

widening process. It extends beyond the national territory and is directly linked to

European and international issues. In no instance is it autonomous and independent

from the collaboration of security agencies (police, customs, gendarmerie) on an

international scale. On the contrary, its existence is almost wholly dependent upon such

collaboration. This widening of the network of contacts which the agencies judge as

necessary to combat terrorism, drug trafficking and organised crime raises the questions

of levels of trust and confidentiality as well as that of the autonomy of an internal

security (and immigration) policy of each EU state with respect to the whole of Europe.

We will return to this later. Internal security is also connected with the emergence or not

of a feeling of European citizenship which overflows national frontiers, and reactions

from different social groups with respect to practical consequences of European

citizenship on national life. If internal security extends beyond the national territory, we

have insisted that it also extends beyond the usual activities of the police and

gendarmerie. The connections which are made between terrorism, drugs, crime,

delinquency, border surveillance, fighting against major drug trafficking, and

controlling clandestine immigration widen the spectrum of public security towards

different activities: information and military activities to fight against clandestine

organisations coming from abroad (from a government, community or diaspora) who

use political violence against citizens or use the national territory as a transit site or for

sale of drugs, and have an effect on the usual activities of custom officers (border

controls, the fight against drug trafficking, economic intelligence) who find themselves

drawn into internal security, surveillance activities which are increasingly delegated to

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private operators on a local scale. The connection is stronger when the different

agencies use the same technologies and knowledge (fingerprints, unforgeable ID,

computerised tracking of entrance, residence, accommodation and exit, setting up expert

IT systems, satellite surveillance, widespread data-stocking). Policing is now carried out

using networks: networks of administrative bodies in which customs officers,

immigration offices, consulates and even private transport companies and private

security companies join forces with the national police forces and gendarmes; networks

of information technology with the creation of national or European data files on

wanted or missing persons, on those who have been denied residence, expelled, turned

back at the frontier or refused asylum (FNE – file on foreigners, FPR – file on wanted

persons, OFPRA -files on refugees, SIS – Schengen file, Interpol and Europol files);

networks of liaison officers that have been sent abroad to represent their governments

and enable information exchange; networks of semantics in which new doctrines and

new concepts on conflict and political violence are developed. Remote policing is ever

more frequent with work outside the national territory and the help of technology.

Security checks are no longer necessarily done at the border on a systematic and

egalitarian basis, but can be carried out further downstream, within the territory, within

the border zone or even upstream with police collaboration in the home country of the

immigrants, through visa-granting systems and through readmission agreements.

There is a change in the categories of police action (from national police forces

controlling national crime to internal European security, tracking world-wide organized

crime, migration flows and refugee movements), a change in security-check targets

(from the control of and hunt for individual criminals to the policing of foreigners or to

the surveillance of so-called risk groups that have been defined using criminology and

statistics that, according to circumstances, bring them to focus on extra-community

immigration and those diaspora that are the origin of the most frequent and most serious

of threats to security), an alteration in the time frame of security-checks (from

systematic, generally slow intermittent checks to virtually permanent surveillance that

focuses on a few target groups and reacts with maximum rapidity). Thus systematic

control of the territory has been marginalised, although it still exists, in comparison to

the surveillance of certain populations. New practices are emerging. New posts such as

liaison officers and police attachés in embassies are being created. A result of these new

forms of control is that face to face relations are decreasing in favour of a proactive

mentality where one tries to determine which populations are likely to commit an

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infraction before they even do so. These methods are applied to crime as much as to

immigration. Target categories are identified through the statistical analysis of

information produced by the networks, and they become the object of increased

surveillance. The idea is to anticipate the flows and movements of particular groups

rather than to follow individuals after the fact. This is done by ‘morphing’, where a

scenario is reconstructed from just a few fragments.

The very term policing loses its sense when it is widened outside crime control to

such an extent (Bigo 1996a). Indeed, the term internal security takes into account this

extension of police activities to cover a wide variety of fears and insecurities. This

widening of internal security leads to its interpenetration with external security which is

itself undergoing complete change and restructuring due to the questioning of realists

and neo-realists theses on security (associated with Defence) and the emergence of a

transnational view of security. It is becoming difficult to differentiate between internal

and external security and divide them into distinct sectors. The Vigipirate plan against

terrorism in France is one example of the ambiguous relationship between Ministries of

internal and external affairs. They are both in fact merging so as to end up constituting

the one and same security field.

Security in the external arena: from defence to internal security

The military no longer know what their duties are. Honour and sacrifice associated with

death in combat are exaggerated by some who fear that these values will become

folklore and are condemned to disappear. The socialisation of the soldier’s profession

and learning about ‘the licence to kill’ have been replaced by a muscled maintenance of

peace. The rules of engaging in combat have been modified. In certain extreme

conditions, soldiers in their role of surveillance become targets for the enemy (blue and

white helmets) and do not have the authorisation to engage in fire. This provokes much

questioning which is only partially masked by political obedience and discipline. So far,

studies on humanitarian interventions have been more focused on motivations and

legitimacy than on the practical knowledge that is mobilised. Should one send the

military or the gendarmerie to carry out these operations? What should be thought of

the establishment of Civil Affairs to accompany certain so-called humanitarian peace-

restoring operations? What should the military be used for?

As politicians see it, war is indeed an external projection but this justification alone

calls upon the global legitimacy of the army. The military are returning to the national

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territory and emphasising the role of protection. The military are thus returning to the

interior at a time when war beyond national borders has become a rare occurrence.

If war and the state, war making and state making, have been closely linked in the

history of European state formation, if the army has defended the collective security of

the group from aggression by other groups or communities, enabling the distinction to

be drawn between combatants and non-combatants, the front and behind the front, if

behaviour was for a long time determined by the protecting function of borders, now we

question the role of war and predict the end of the military order.

If all threats stemmed from the Soviet enemy, did its disappearance mean that we

were then moving towards global peace and the end of conflicts? If this was the case,

another painful question arose: what should be done with the military, with defence

industries? What was to become of defence after the Soviet enemy had disappeared?

Without taking the same view of numerous NGOs that were demanding ‘peace

dividends’, governments took advantage of this wave of ideas to cut spending during a

period of economic and financial crisis. Entire sectors of activity are being questioned.

Arms and research programs are being cancelled. In some countries the format of the

army is being altered. In France it is being made professional, despite the long tradition

of a citizen’s army. Defence industries have been caught unprepared and in certain

countries reconversion programs using high technology for border surveillance and

immigration control have been developed. An additional link has been woven between

internal and external security. Economic and financial interests have emerged inciting

translation of the spectrum of threats and the rediscovery of local conflicts and their so-

called damaging effects.

By the mid 1990s a sort of global configuration of convergent representations had

emerged which joined internal and external security, integrating the former into the

latter. Crime, borders, immigration, threat to national identity and the ideology of the

Fifth Column became inextricably intermingled and were taken up again in a matrix

which owes practically everything to defence research in which the habits of the actors

had been formed. The potential power of terrorist activities and their effectiveness

against democracies have largely been overestimated, as this enable a link to be made

between ‘exotic’ conflicts and national territory. In the same step a link has been

established between terrorism, drugs, organised crime and immigration through the

terms grey zone and urban savages. The recent debates on the threat from the South and

the clash of civilisations have shown exactly how these shifts in positions have come

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about and why, trapped as they are between the hammer of the benefits of peace and the

anvil of the threat from the South, those who never really believed in this threat but

have budgets and interests to defend have adopted a standpoint in which terrorists and

Mafia groups are their new enemies. The ‘end of military rule’ referred to by Maurice

Bertrand (1996) implies reconversions that are not simply of equipment. The

strategisation of the ‘threats’ to internal security is self-justifying. This strategisation has

some practical consequences. It more or less redefines the tasks allotted to the different

services. The Italian Minister for Defence points to Islamism as the threat that replaces

the threat of communism and proposes the use of the army in immigration control. In

Germany, Helmut Kohl considers the PKK an exclusively terrorist party and a threat to

national security. In France, the bomb attacks of 1995 relaunched the surveillance of all

immigrant associations and the strengthening of legislation concerning not only

terrorism but immigration and political asylum. Apart from Islamism considered as

subversive terrorism, all countries talk of a grey zone, of global Mafia organisations and

of changing forms of criminality (Raufer 1993). Intelligence services turned towards

counter-espionage have found new missions with the infiltration of Mafia networks and

economic intelligence but still use the same procedures.

On the other hand, the vision in terms of an external projection of humanitarian

operations has concealed the meaning of missions carried out and cleared questions of

projection from internal security, whereas they should undoubtedly be linked. Thus an

important link between internal and external security has been neglected, because it

functioned in the other direction and brought military activities closer to police

activities.

Thus far from being an extension as some rhetorics argue, external security is in

full retraction or at least, redeployment. In certain countries, the army format has been

transformed. Everywhere budgets are cut. This situation is very different from ten years

ago. This change in such a short time frame has destabilised the most deep-set beliefs.

As war has been replaced by international police operations, operation for restoring

peace, which mobilises a different knowledge, the military find themselves in situations

of international collaboration where they have to take care of restoring peace, in the

same way as police and gendarmes. Consequently, they transfer internal security

beyond the national borders. Should one then consider sending police and gendarmes

instead of the military? Such chassé-croisés (mix-ups) whereby the military would

operate internally and the police externally are destabilising.

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As in the case of the police, internal security appears here a priori as a means of

labelling practical transformations within the profession. Indeed, it is a more delicate

matter when demonstrating this same transformation with the military. Studies need to

be done on the Europeanisation of defence forces and the networks that have been

constituted by the WEU and Eurocorps, both within and outside the NATO framework.

Nevertheless, the same thing is at stake: internal security does not mark out the same

universe of practices, as territorial security, it marks out what is in the process of

changing within police, gendarme, customs and military activities.

Internal security and the ‘intermediate’ agencies: from marginal to central roles?

The uncertainty surrounding the missions and limits between the social universes of the

police and the military affects in particular the organisations and agencies, such as the

gendarmerie, or a number of border police, which find themselves positioned in the

interface between these two social universes. It is these bodies at the interface which

consider this uncertainty an attack on their professional identity, and which are anxious

about their future (customs, certain information services), or who on the contrary, such

as the police with a military status (gendarmerie, bundesgrenzschutz, carabinieri,

guarda civil), consider these transformations of violence as an opportunity to occupy a

recognised position amongst the agencies specialised in safeguarding public order and

those specialising in combat and dissuasion. These agencies are thus the first ones to

insist on the interpenetration of the internal and the external, on the transversal

dimensions of the ‘new threats’, and on their specific knowledge. They do not see

themselves as marginal to these two worlds, as devalorised intermediaries in the two

social universes, but as central in the face of one and the same universe in constitution.

This is so to the extent that a large spectrum of their activities allows them to be present

where the police dare not go (restoration of order in a crisis situation), and where the

military do not want to, or do not know how to intervene (not to kill the enemy, but to

control the opponent). Thus the French gendarmerie considers that it has been prepared

for centuries for these missions of internal security, pretending that it possesses an

advantage over all other corps due to its role as soldiers of the law, to its power to use

military means which it masters in a civilian context, while knowing not to transform its

opponent into an enemy to be eradicated. The gendarmerie favours, they say, ‘the

unbroken passage from the normal period to the crisis period, or even war. Well adapted

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to low intensity conflicts, whose extent exceeds the regular bounds of national police

actions, but which do not justify the intervention of other armed forces, it is essential’.

It is able to respond better than other institutions to the continuum of peace, crisis,

and war and can deal with ‘prolonged crisis’. Its structure, being of variable geometry,

allows it to closely accompany the rise of violence without a brutal change of position

and without breaching the public opinion threshold. Moreover, what it has learnt on

French terrain, it will be able to apply at the other end of the world, or so it is believed.

The transfers of knowledge between the interior and the exterior, the intimate

knowledge of crisis management, could be important assets. Exploiting the fact that it is

both ‘civilian due to its missions, but military due to its statutes and missions in times of

crisis’, the gendarmerie considers itself ready to be the kingpin of internal security

missions, missions in France or abroad.

The customs agencies, in their reorganization, tend also to modify their design of

security. Previously focusing on considerations of public health, of hygiene, of

transport, there was little place for questions of the drug traffickers or infiltrations of

organised crime. The border was for them the place to work on. Now they think in term

of zone, infiltration of networks of traffickers, information by collaboration with their

foreign colleagues. They paradoxically are more influenced by the American methods

of the DEA in the USA.

For these agencies the concept of internal security cannot be reducible to the

security of a closed territory protected by insuperable borders. This concept of interior

security is rarely used. They are the first to favour an analysis in term of transborder

networks, of securisation of the human networks, of monitoring of flows. Security at the

borders is necessarily transborder and is ensured by international collaboration of the

security agencies. Their vision of security seems the most influenced by the

transnational approach and this is undoubtedly because they listen more than other

agencies to their economic partners. They also differentiate explicitly between threat

and risk. Unfortunately these agencies are one of the least studied as security agents.

There are many other examples of the de-differentiation between matters of internal

and external security. For example, the intelligence and counter-espionage services

(MI5, DGSE, CIA) have only about one third of their staff working on espionage, and

as the rest focus on international terrorism, economic intelligence and issues such as the

laundering of drugs money. Thus they enter into competition with the drugs squads of

Europol and Interpol. On the other hand, Europol wants to deal with ‘nuclear crime’ and

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follows the transfer of fissile material from one country to another, but in so doing it is

poaching on counter-espionage’s and the army’s hunting ground of nuclear

proliferation. The German border police (BGS) has undergone reforms that nearly

doubled their number and altered their mission, thus provoking intense debate over the

nature of their military status, particularly when they were invited to take part in

missions outside the NATO area.

Thus if one wants to summarise the positions taken by the different agencies, one

can distinguish two different visions of internal security in relation to their structural

positions inside the field of security. The first type of discourse is based on the

traditional concepts of territory, national sovereignty and objective threats to collective

security. In France this is the positions of the army (terrestrial as well as aerial

headquarters) and of the urban police. It assumes there to be a difference in nature

between internal and external security, the activities of police forces and military

activities. In this traditional view of security, coordination is necessarily minimal: it is

limited to periods of crisis when national territory is attacked by foreign forces.

Otherwise, interior security falls within the competence of the police forces and it is

dangerous for soldiers to intervene as this would be to risk drifting towards the national

security doctrine. This vision is structured around the concepts of physical borders of

the state, territorial security and military defence. The aim of security is protection from

threats, it is an established fact.

The second conception which is more the vision of the gendarmerie nationale, the

customs, and the UCLAT (the anti-terrorist squad of the police) is founded upon a

transnational approach to security. In this view, internal security always has an extra-

territorial dimension and the opposition between internal and external security is a

pretence. There is, indeed, dedifferentiation between the internal and external. What

occurs in one affects the other and vice versa. The same analytical frameworks and

same repertoires of activities can be applied to both. Cultural norms relativise the

separation between an internal policed order and an anarchic international order:

missions of maintenance of law and order, both internal and external, take the life of the

individuals into consideration and war tends to become a disqualified mode of action.

The agencies which have the knowledge to prepare for violence without entering into

war are privileged. Furthermore, internal security has a geographical dimension which

extends beyond national borders. It is European, Western, or international in the sense

that it is based on networks of collaboration between security agencies. Whereas before

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there was a clear and simple division between administrations based on border

demarcations, there now reigns a complex overlapping of activities. Whereas before it

was possible to clearly distinguish between the police and the army activities, now a

field of the security has emerged whose central knowledge is located at the interface

between the police and military.

The interest in studying the vision of the agencies of internal security lies precisely

in the fact that it cannot be reduced to traditional questions of security in the way they

are treated by realists and neo-realists. Internal security is not the opposite of external

security. Instead, internal security questions destabilise the border between the internal

and external, as well as between the state and the individual. It is indeed from here that

both their complexity and their interest stem.

Internal security and societal security as seen by the international

relations theorists

Internal and societal security

All these transformations force us to reconsider, not only internal security, but the

concept of security itself, its link with the notion of defence, and the role which armies

can play with regard to overall or sectoral security (military, civil, economic,

environmental, internal or societal). This brings us back to the debate between analysts

and their influence on politicians and security agencies (Bigo 1996a).

Even in the 1980s, the immense majority of IR scholars and strategists did not

consider internal security to constitute a legitimate part of security studies. For them, the

latter was related to the agenda of Defence policies. In the Anglo-American debate

defence and external security were considered as synonymous. Defence always referred

back to the military component alone, and security was assimilated with the collective

security of the nation. To speak about security ‘seriously’ was to envisage developments

of defence systems and policies. ‘True’ security was that which concerned the physical

survival of the nation, and its protection from potential armed aggression (Walt 1991).

Beyond this acceptance of security as existential survival, security lost its purpose.

Security was a strategic affair of the state. Resistance to any intrusion in this field, or

attempts to draw parallels between civil and military security was savage. It was

claimed that the values of sacrifice to the safety of the nation made all the difference

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and that it was scandalous to compare the missions requested from the army for civil

security and its proper military missions. French people, very often generals, in some

rare exceptions, tried to put forward their originality insisting that in the design of

French defence (the organic law of 1959), it was impossible to reduce military affairs to

defence; that defence was global and included military, civil and economic components.

But they were too little involved in this debate. Thus, it was necessary to wait for the

pioneering work of Barry Buzan to rediscover these questions. Buzan in his first edition

of People, State and Fear (1993), lets us know of his irritation at being confined in

strategic studies, discussing SDI, technology, disarmament, without any thought about

the concepts. He noted the shift between the concerns of the analysts of defence and

security and that of politicians asking always for more studies on terrorism, drugs,

immigration. Thus, he proposed to study the specific logics of security. According to

him, security went well beyond defence and affected the sectors of environment, the

economy, politics and society (Buzan 1991). He noted a broadening of the spectrum of

security to new objects, and to new sectors.

By delinking studies of security from studies of defence, he re-established a real

theoretical dimension to the question of security. First, he insisted on the fact that,

contrary to the realist approach, it is impossible to reduce security to national security.

Nevertheless Buzan did not cut all the bridges with the traditional vision of security.

While proposing to define security in terms of survival or as freedom from threats, he

continues to declare himself a structural realist. From these theories he picks up the idea

that security is a fundamental human need for individuals as well as for communities,

and at the level of the states, security was analysed as the absence of threat against the

survival of the nation. One could thus, according to him, ‘possess’ a certain dose of

security, one can analyse objectively the probabilities that security is threatened and

react consequently (new system of weapons, reinforcement of alliances). Within this

conception, even if the purpose of security affects varied sectors, one can continue to

distinguish each sector clearly: the strategic stakes remain independent of the ecological

or societal stakes. There is no confusion or superposition or merging between the

various sectors and each one has its own logic. As Jef Huysmans noted, it seems that

each author preferred to add an adjective to characterize security (global, economic,

environmental, etc.) without taking the trouble to define the object of security, other

than by its opposite: the threat, and without explaining this latter concept (Huysmans

1996b).

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Thus the real innovation came later, in 1990 and in 1991 when, in their common

works, Buzan and Ole Waever proposed aggregating these five sectors in two

categories: national security, having sovereignty and the survival of the regime as its

main concern; and societal security having the identity and the survival of society as its

main preoccupation. The distinction between threats to sovereignty and threats to

identity was their main contribution to research on the subject. The concept of societal

security had been born and was designed to release security matters from the narrow

sector of military defence. It was typically American, forged by the distinction created

by the Posse Comitatus that internal and external matters were clearly separated. It was

very different from the French, but also Spanish, Greek visions that defence includes

civil matters. In those countries constitutions create a hierarchy (in the sense of Louis

Dumont’s inclusion of the contrary) between defence (as a whole), including defence

(as military matters) and civil affairs (as coordination between civil and military

peoples). But who cares about exotic countries?

Nevertheless, the semantic innovation of societal security had a real success. The

term of societal security was immediately adopted by other IR scholars as well as by

American officials in charge of State Department (even if they mainly use the term

internal security and not societal security in their administrative documents). The

category of societal security was more or less used to discuss the so-called ‘new threats’

coming from society itself and migrants. It was used as a semantic equivalent of internal

security or non-military threats.

This ambiguity was also present in the first book by Waever and Buzan et al.

(1993). According to them, societal insecurity is on the increase with the end of

bipolarity, it is Society more than the state which is threatened, they claim. The

perception of a threat to identity comes, on the one hand, from cosmopolitanism, from a

standardisation, and, on the other hand, from the flow of immigrants and from ethnic

fragmentations. By way of supporting their claims, they refer to the rejection of

Maastricht by Denmark, the xenophobic attacks against asylum seekers in Germany,

and the policy of ethnic purification in Yugoslavia (Waever et al. 1993). According to

them, the notion of security must therefore be enlarged since from a moral point of view

in order to find a solution to the problem, one has to feel concerned by all threats

whether they are aimed at the state or at society.

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These sentiments were the foundation of the success in the American military circles of

the notion of societal security. But, paradoxically, societal security was also

overwhelming successful in peace research centres in the Scandinavian countries for

other reasons. First of all, the terminology has different ideological significance. If on

the American side, one saw societal security as a means of extending security and

allowing the military to turn their knowledge to other fields than defence, as a

reactivation of the concept of global defence, of total strategy leading to a maximal

security, on the Scandinavian side, people understand societal security as a means of

describing the practices of the soldiers and of the other agencies of security. They add

for the better a constructivist posture, a critical framework to the label societal security.

Of course the promoters of the concept of societal security are not responsible for

the social and political effects they have, and the initial ambiguity does not exist in the

latest book. On the contrary, they try to use the concept to criticise these culturalist and

essentialist visions. They understand that the narratives of security after the bipolar

period are often the result of an ignorance of the real stakes of police collaboration and

of their ‘encryption’ within a narrative structured by the traditional stakes of defence.

They understand that they are used by some military people to enlarge the role of

military in internal affairs, to reintroduce their own interests of budget and legitimacy

and symbolic power ‘inside’. They understand that threats from below could lead to the

construction of an ‘internal enemy’. They understand that the interests of the

professionals of security are strengthened by the enlargement of the notion of security

and by the interconnections between internal and external security. But criticising the

notion of societal security as it is used by those who have the symbolic power (the

security professionals) is necessary. Even if I agree a lot with the constructivist vision

and with a very large part of the work of Ole Waever, we need to continue to

deconstruct the notion of security and of societal security as Campbell, Dillon, Williams

and Der Derian have done.

Even if we distinguish societal security from these instrumental and culturalist

visions, I have further reservations about the use of this concept because it creates some

misleading understandings of the transformation of the global order and the evolution of

the field of security. First of all, it risks focusing the analysis on the person who is

speaking instead of analysing the conflicts which oppose several definitions of the same

situation and the conflicts which may have as object the imposition of a particular

definition, as well as the interdependence between several distinct definitions, as Michel

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Dobry underlines. Indeed, the labelling is always the product (often in the form of a

compromise) of power struggles between groups about legitimate statement. It does not

belong to a person or to a group, it is the product (often in the form of compromise) of

this power struggle for the legitimate use of a term. It is the result of the struggle for

symbolic power, and nobody possesses a monopoly on this symbolic power. There is

not a plot by a group, even a dominant group, it is a field effect. This distance from one

actor-narrative is important for it allows us to avoid reversing the conspiracy theory

where the conspirators become those who produce the security norms, somewhat akin to

the way in which Chomsky analyses these phenomena in ‘manufacturing the

consensus’. It is not certain that Ole Waever (as opposed to Michael Williams 1997) has

always clearly seen this. His approach in terms of enunciation may push him to analyse

exclusively one side of the relationship - a strategy of actors - to the detriment of

symbolic power struggles. By stressing only language, this type of analysis omits all

that is of semiotic interest, such as gestures, manoeuvres, the rituals of demonstration of

force which are of course fundamental in the economy of securitisation. It is possible to

securitise certain problems without speech or discourse and the military and the police

have known this for a long time. The practical work, discipline, and expertise are as

important as all forms of discourse.

Not everything is securitisable either, even when one holds a position of authority.

Securitisation is not simply rhetoric, an ideology that imposes itself (to which one could

oppose an alternative ideology, that of reciprocal confidence for example). It is the

product of a considerable work of mobilisation. Securitisation rests on the capacity of

actors to constitute statistics about their aim and under their own categories, to put them

in series, to be able to submit them to examinations, to protocols of research, with

empirical checks, in short, to produce ‘a truth’ on these statements. Truth which needs

to be congruent with what is the current knowledge about the world. This of course is

given only to the security professionals. Only they may impose a hierarchy of threats,

rendering certain phenomena not only dangerous but more dangerous than others. The

young, of course, hooligans a little more so, coloured immigrants, young ‘Beurs’,

members of a diaspora crossing borders (Neumann 1998). The strength of the police in

this regard is its capacity to find illegal activities when looking among the targets that

the police choose themselves. They do not necessarily discover the illegal activities they

are looking for (for example the trafficking of heroine among the diaspora from Asia

and the South East) but they find the trafficking of clandestine labour, the smuggling of

348

cigarettes which reinforces the statistical correlations and ‘proves the truth’ created by

this tendency to focus on the immigrant or some diaspora or another. The intelligence

services have also shown their capacity to constitute, via the mediatisation of a few

isolated cases of which they themselves were willing parties, well-founded fears with

regard to nuclear proliferation in the Soviet Union.

Thus not everyone has the ability (social or political) to enunciate a security

statement even though they may have it linguistically. The real principle of the magic of

performative statements resides in the ‘mystery of the minister’, that is to say in the

delegation of the term about which an agent is authorized to speak and act in the name

of the group. A position of authority recognised by the group in one area of knowledge

or another is necessary, and in particular in the domain of political professionals or that

of the professionals who manage threats, in order to securitise a problem. A security

statement, even if articulated within a specific discourse, does not in itself have

illocutionary power. Delivered by any citizen or by a militant or even a politician in an

individual capacity, the securitisation of an object (asylum seekers for example) will

have no force. It depends on the social position of those who produce these statements

concerning insecurity and threats as well as the recognition by the other social actors of

their legitimacy to enunciate what causes the particular fear, for example, in the case of

a Home Office minister, a minister of the Ministry of Justice, or a minister for Defence,

or a senior police officer speaking in the name of the relevant institutional group, or a

‘recognized’ expert or a ‘specialist’ journalist speaking in the name of public opinion.

So, there is no process of securitisation independent of a field of security constituted by

groups and institutions that authorize themselves and that are authorize) to state what

security is.

To question who produces the narratives on the threat makes it possible to analyse

the standpoint of each actor of the field of security and to analyse the correspondence

between this standpoint and the objective position of each one of these actors in the

field (position determined by seniority and knowledge). That makes it possible to

understand that actors who appeared marginal in the universes of defence and the police

force can, if there is de-differentiation, find themselves in key positions of the field of

security, if this is in process of unification. That changes the power struggle between the

actors. All those who are located at the interface between territorial internal security and

external security benefit from the merging of the field to improve their position and

their capacity, whereas those who were originally dominant are in defensive positions.

349

The notion of the field of security allows us to understand the dynamic of the

transformations affecting police and military cooperation in Europe. It allows us to

analyse the latter as a ‘social space’ transcending the break internal/external,

national/international. This social space is constructed from the differentiated positions

of the agents of security (national and local police forces, customs officers, border

police forces, intelligence agents and armies). It is defined by the place that the different

agencies occupy with respect to the national interests and to the international networks

of relationships that they have developed. It is closely dependent on the forms taken by

the political conflicts surrounding Europeanisation but it is not a by-product of this. It

anticipates changes in the Schengen relationships with the Nordic Union and

Switzerland or of Europol with the ex-communist countries or yet again, of Eurocorps

with NATO. It results from the internal competition between the agencies and their

strategies of searching out alliances beyond Europe in the strict sense. Securitisation and

its statements are thus still dependent on power struggles and not on the single strategy

of an actor.

This social space functions as a field of power whose necessity imposes itself on the

agents who find themselves engaged therein and it leads to a certain homogeneity which

expresses itself by the same bureaucratic interests, the same kinds of definitions of the

enemy, and the same types of knowledge of the latter. It tends to ‘homogenize’ the ways

of looking at a problem, to define a ‘focus’ shared by everyone. If the immigrant has a

tendency to become the common enemy, it is not because he is defined globally by

everyone, in a consensual manner as this enemy, but rather because different

insecuritisations converge on him (the police with crime, terrorism, drugs; the military

with subversion, grey zones, the Fifth Column; the economic actors with the crisis,

unemployment; the demographic actors with natality and the fear of racial mixing, of

interbreeding). The discourse on integration, moreover, has itself become a line of

securitisation when it is a question of integrating, not in order to develop but in order to

protect against future revolts.

It functions also as a field of struggles within which agents confront each other with

the means and the differentiated ends according to their position. If struggles exist

between these actors, if there is competition, it is precisely because they have the same

interests, the same sense of the game and of what is at stake. It is also because all action

undertaken by one of the agencies to modify the economy of power in his favour has

repercussions on the rest of the actors. These struggles are fundamental to

350

understanding the internal economy of the field and the processes of constitution and

extension of the latter. The positions of the actors and even more their trajectories tend

to determine their ‘prises de positions’, the types of discursive register that they will

use, the statements that they will mobilise for their combat, thus blinding them to their

similarities. This field is determined, not so much by the possibility of the use of force

such as classical sociology accords it in Hobbes or Weber, making of force a property of

coercive moments, but by the capacity for a production of statements on the image of

the enemy and the polarisation between us and them (Bigo 1996b).

It functions finally as a field of domination in relation to other social fields and

tends to monopolise the definition of legitimately recognised threats; that is to say, that

the agents who are involved fight for the ability to impose their authority on the

definition of what frightens, and fight also to exclude from the field other actors (the

Church, human rights organisations). It is essentially a field encompassing public

bureaucracies but it also includes political and associative links aiming to ‘develop a

security way of thinking’ in society. These associative links may be organisations

having interests in selling certain technologies, associations of senior former military or

police leaders, anti-immigrant associations, newspapers or television. All these

communication links spread or at times compete over, the production of security

‘truths’.

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