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Course Wrapup Tyler Moore Computer Science & Engineering Department, SMU, Dallas, TX Last lecture (before project presentations) Big ideas from the course Policy options for improving security Final exam review Big ideas from the course 1 Computer science alone can’t fix information security 2 The best level of security is often not the most you can afford 3 Information security risk can be managed if (1) it can be measured and (2) responsibility for failures clearly assigned 4 Most “hard” security problems arise by failing to meet one or both of these conditions 3 / 31 Big ideas from the course Policy options for improving security Final exam review CS alone can’t fix security Attackers and defenders operate strategically As security engineers, we must design systems that follow the laws of human nature Profit-motivated adversaries can break systems in ways designers don’t consider Defenders don’t make decisions based on what will maximize security; instead they consider costs and their own interests 4 / 31 Big ideas from the course Policy options for improving security Final exam review War story: why CS alone can’t fix security 5 / 31 Notes Notes Notes Notes

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Course Wrapup

Tyler Moore

Computer Science & Engineering Department, SMU, Dallas, TX

Last lecture (before project presentations)

Big ideas from the coursePolicy options for improving security

Final exam review

Big ideas from the course

1 Computer science alone can’t fix information security

2 The best level of security is often not the most you can afford

3 Information security risk can be managed if (1) it can bemeasured and (2) responsibility for failures clearly assigned

4 Most “hard” security problems arise by failing to meet one orboth of these conditions

3 / 31

Big ideas from the coursePolicy options for improving security

Final exam review

CS alone can’t fix security

Attackers and defenders operate strategically

As security engineers, we must design systems that follow thelaws of human natureProfit-motivated adversaries can break systems in waysdesigners don’t considerDefenders don’t make decisions based on what will maximizesecurity; instead they consider costs and their own interests

4 / 31

Big ideas from the coursePolicy options for improving security

Final exam review

War story: why CS alone can’t fix security

5 / 31

Notes

Notes

Notes

Notes

Big ideas from the coursePolicy options for improving security

Final exam review

The best level of security is not always the most securityyou can afford

Security investment usually has decreasing marginal returns

0

λv

Security investment c

v

S(c , v)

EBIS

c1

∆c

∆EBIS1

c2

∆c

∆EBIS2

6 / 31

Big ideas from the coursePolicy options for improving security

Final exam review

The best level of security is not always the most securityyou can afford

Opportunity costs are chronically underestimated by securityengineers

“the true cost of something is what you give up to get it”(The Economist A-Z of Economics)

What’s the opportunity cost of requiring annual passwordchanges?

What’s the benefit of requiring annual password changes?

Is what we’re giving up worth the expected benefit?

7 / 31

Big ideas from the coursePolicy options for improving security

Final exam review

Conditions for managing information security risks

1 Can the cost and probability of incidents be measuredaccurately?

Are there information asymmetries?Do victims have an incentive to report?Does anyone have an incentive to hype threats?

2 Is responsibility for failures clearly assigned?

When things go wrong, is the insecure party the only oneaffected?Is fault shared across many parties, and if so, who decides whopays?

8 / 31

Big ideas from the coursePolicy options for improving security

Final exam review

Policy options for information security

If the reasons why security fails are not purely technical, itstands to reason that solutions must not be limited to thetechnical

Market failures (e.g., information asymmetries, externalities)motivate policy interventions

Options for intervention1 Ex ante safety regulation2 Ex post liability3 Information disclosure4 Intermediary liability

10 / 31

Notes

Notes

Notes

Notes

Big ideas from the coursePolicy options for improving security

Final exam review

Traditional regulatory intervention

Ex ante safety regulation

Compliance regimes designed to prevent harmOne way of dealing with difficulty of measuring outcomes

Ex post liability

Assign responsibility when something goes wrongHistorically a non-starter in software industry

Both approaches have significant drawbacks

Failed Cybersecurity Act of 2012 includes weak ex anteregulation coupled with liability exemptions for cooperation

11 / 31

Big ideas from the coursePolicy options for improving security

Final exam review

What about prosecuting cybercriminals?

Law enforcement efforts could be increased to catch morecriminals

But there are fundamental reasons why this will remain animperfect solution

Internationalization of crimeAttackers already shift to more favorable jurisdictionsProliferation of high-volume, low-margin automated crimesSignificant damage can be caused prior to arrest (high indirectcosts)

12 / 31

Big ideas from the coursePolicy options for improving security

Final exam review

Information disclosure

Louis Brandeis: “sunlight is saidto be the best of disinfectants”

Information security incidentsare often hidden from publicview, so one light-touchintervention is to mandatedisclosure

13 / 31

Big ideas from the coursePolicy options for improving security

Final exam review

Data breach legislation

California Civil Code 1798.82 (2002):

“Any person or business that conducts business

in California, and that owns or licenses

computerized data that includes personal

information, shall disclose any breach of the

security of the system following discovery or

notification of the breach in the security of the

data to any resident of California whose

unencrypted personal information was, or is

reasonably believed to have been, acquired by

an unauthorized person.”

Deirdre Mulligan

14 / 31

Notes

Notes

Notes

Notes

Big ideas from the coursePolicy options for improving security

Final exam review

Many high-profile breaches came to light

15 / 31

Big ideas from the coursePolicy options for improving security

Final exam review

Many high-profile breaches came to light

16 / 31

Big ideas from the coursePolicy options for improving security

Final exam review

Effect of data breach legislation

Recall big ideas 3 and 4:

Information security risk can be managed if (1) it can bemeasured and (2) responsibility for failures clearly assignedMost “hard” security problems arise by failing to meet one orboth of these conditions

Data breaches used to be a “hard” problem, but theinformation disclosure legislation corrected the limitations

17 / 31

Big ideas from the coursePolicy options for improving security

Final exam review

Indirect intermediary liability

Liability isnt always placed on the party responsible for harm

If bad actors beyond reach of law, and a 3rd party is in goodposition to detect/prevent bad acts, then indirect intermediaryliability attractive

18 / 31

Notes

Notes

Notes

Notes

Big ideas from the coursePolicy options for improving security

Final exam review

Intermediary liability and the Internet

Believe it or not, Congress has a history of intervening to stopInternet wickedness

CDA Sec. 230 exempts ISPs from liability for objectionablecontent posted by users, but also offered protection forvoluntary cleanup

DMCA obliges ISPs to remove copyrighted material posted byusers, grants exemption from liability in exchange

UIGEA obliges payment processors to block payment toInternet gambling sites

SOPA/PIPA tried and failed to compel intermediaries to cutoff entire websites deemed to be dedicated to copyrightinfringement

19 / 31

Big ideas from the coursePolicy options for improving security

Final exam review

In sum: policy options for improving security

Information security risk can be managed if (1) it can bemeasured and (2) responsibility for failures clearly assigned

Policies that make measurement easier (e.g., data breachlegislation laws) and clarify responsibility for failures (e.g.,intermediary liability assignment) could substantially improvesecurity

More prescriptive ex ante safety regulation carries risk ofcreating perverse incentives while fixing known incentivefailures

20 / 31

Big ideas from the coursePolicy options for improving security

Final exam review

Final exam

Takes place on Saturday December 14, 8-11am

Exam is comprehensive

You are allowed one page of hand-written notes on one side ofa sheet of letter-sized paper, otherwise closed-book,closed-notes, closed-Internet

Single-purpose calculators (i.e., not smartphone apps) areallowed

While you won’t be expected to write R code, you may beasked to interpret R output for the statistical tests covered inclass (similar to how you were asked to do so in Q1 of HW4)

Similarly you may be asked to interpret plots that werecovered in class (e.g., CDFs and survival plots)

You don’t need to memorize the equations used in theGordon-Loeb model

22 / 31

Big ideas from the coursePolicy options for improving security

Final exam review

Final exam: topics

1 Introduction

2 Security metrics and investment

3 Measuring cybercrime

4 Security games

Review your past homework assignments and the midterm

23 / 31

Notes

Notes

Notes

Notes

Big ideas from the coursePolicy options for improving security

Final exam review

Sample topics: introduction

Sample economics question

Q1a: Your computer is infected with malware and startssending email spam advertising Viagra. State which marketfailure characterizes this situation.

Q1b: Absent any policy intervention to address the marketfailure, will people under-invest or over-invest in antivirussoftware designed to block such malware from being installed?

24 / 31

Big ideas from the coursePolicy options for improving security

Final exam review

Sample topics: security metrics and investment

Q2: If your computer is hacked, then you suffer a loss of $500.Suppose that absent security investment, there is a 10%chance that your computer will be hacked. If you buy antivirussoftware for $30, then the probability is reduced to 5%.

a. What is the expected loss if you don’t buy the AV software(ALE0)?

b. What is the expected loss if you do buy AV software (ALES)?c. What is the expected net benefit of security (ENBIS)?d. Would you buy the AV software for $30? Why or why not?e. What is the most you would pay for AV software?

Q3: The Gordon-Loeb model assumes that there aredecreasing marginal returns to security investment. Give aplausible real-world example where this assumption is justified.

25 / 31

Big ideas from the coursePolicy options for improving security

Final exam review

Sample topics: cybercrime

0 50 100 150 200

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Survival function for search results (TLD)

t days source infection remains in search results

S(t

)

all95% CI.COM.ORG.EDU.NETother

Q4a: The figure plots the survivalprobability for infected websitesthat redirect to illicit pharmacies.Roughly what percentage ofinfected .EDU websites remaininfected after 150 days?

Q4b: Roughly what percentage of“other” (ie blue dotted line)domains are cleaned up within 50days?

26 / 31

Big ideas from the coursePolicy options for improving security

Final exam review

Sample topics: cybercrime

0 50 100 150 200

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Survival function for search results (TLD)

t days source infection remains in search results

S(t

)

all95% CI.COM.ORG.EDU.NETother

Q4a: The figure plots the survivalprobability for infected websitesthat redirect to illicit pharmacies.Roughly what percentage ofinfected .EDU websites remaininfected after 150 days?

Q4b: Roughly what percentage of“other” (ie blue dotted line)domains are cleaned up within 50days?

27 / 31

Notes

Notes

Notes

Notes

Big ideas from the coursePolicy options for improving security

Final exam review

Q5: Identify whether each variable is categorical ornumerical

Data format:Date Search Engine Search Term Pos. URL Domain Redirects? TLD

2011-11-03 Google 20 mg ambien overdose 1 http://products.sanofi.us/ambien/ambien.pdf sanofi.us False other2011-11-03 Google 20 mg ambien overdose 2 http://swift.sonoma.edu/education/newton/newtonsLaws/?20-mg-ambien-overdose sonoma.edu False .EDU2011-11-03 Google 20 mg ambien overdose 3 http://ambienoverdose.org/about-2/ ambienoverdose.org False .ORG2011-11-03 Google 20 mg ambien overdose 4 http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20090712025803AA10g8Z yahoo.com False .COM2011-11-03 Google 20 mg ambien overdose 5 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zolpidem wikipedia.org False .ORG2011-11-03 Google 20 mg ambien overdose 6 http://blocsonic.com/blog blocsonic.com False .COM2011-11-03 Google 20 mg ambien overdose 7 http://dinarvets.com/forums/index.php?/user/39154-ambien-side-effects/page dinarvets.com False .COM2011-11-03 Google 20 mg ambien overdose 8 http://nemo.mwd.hartford.edu/mwd08/images/?20-mg-ambien-overdose hartford.edu True .EDU2011-11-03 Google 20 mg ambien overdose 9 http://www.formspring.me/AmbienCheapOn formspring.me False other2011-11-03 Google 20 mg ambien overdose 11 http://www.drugs.com/pro/zolpidem.html drugs.com False .COM2011-11-03 Google 20 mg ambien overdose 12 http://www.engineer.tamuk.edu/departments/ieen/images/ambien.html tamuk.edu False .EDU2011-11-03 Bing 20 mg ambien overdose 1 http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20090712025803AA10g8Z yahoo.com False .COM2011-11-03 Bing 20 mg ambien overdose 2 http://www.healthcentral.com/sleep-disorders/h/20-mg-ambien-overdose.html healthcentral.com False .COM2011-11-03 Bing 20 mg ambien overdose 3 http://ambien20mg.com/ ambien20mg.com False .COM2011-11-03 bing 20 mg ambien overdose 4 http://www.chacha.com/question/will-20-mg-of-ambien-cr-get-you-high chacha.com True .COM2011-11-03 bing 20 mg ambien overdose 5 http://www.rxlist.com/ambien-drug.htm rxlist.com True .COM2011-11-03 Bing 20 mg ambien overdose 6 http://www.drugs.com/pro/zolpidem.html drugs.com False .COM2011-11-03 Bing 20 mg ambien overdose 7 http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20111024222432AARFvPB yahoo.com False .COM2011-11-03 Bing 20 mg ambien overdose 8 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zolpidem wikipedia.org False .ORG2011-11-03 Bing 20 mg ambien overdose 9 http://www.thefullwiki.org/Sertraline thefullwiki.org False .ORG2011-11-03 bing 20 mg ambien overdose 10 http://www.rxlist.com/edluar-drug.htm rxlist.com True .COM2011-11-03 Bing 20 mg ambien overdose 11 http://www.formspring.me/ambienpill formspring.me False other2011-11-03 Bing 20 mg ambien overdose 12 http://ambiendosage.net/ ambiendosage.net False .NET

28 / 31

Big ideas from the coursePolicy options for improving security

Final exam review

Guide to analyzing data

Type of Data Exploration Statistics RByEx

1 numerical variable

0 2 4 6 8

0.0

0.4

0.8

ecdf(br$logbreach)

x

Fn(

x)

0 2 4 6 8

log(#records breached)

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Wilcox test 6.3

1 categorical variable

CARD HACK PHYS STAT

040

080

0

– 3.1# categories=2 – prop.test 6.2

1 categorical, 1 numerical

●●

●●

●●●●●

BSF EDU

02

46

8

Organization Type

log(

#rec

ords

bre

ache

d)

0 2 4 6 8

FALS

ET

RU

E

log(#records breached)

Bre

ach

type

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2 categorical variables

TOH

BSF BSO BSR EDU GOV MED NGO

CA

RD

DIS

CH

AC

KIN

SD

PH

YS

PO

RT

STA

TU

NK

N

χ2 test 3.2–3.5 29 / 31

Big ideas from the coursePolicy options for improving security

Final exam review

Guide to analyzing data

After visual exploration and any descriptive statistics, you maywant to investigate relationships between variables moreclosely

In particular, you can investigate how one or more explanatory(aka independent) variables influences response (akadependent) variables

Statistical Method Response Variable Explanatory Variable

Odds ratios Binary (case/control) Categorical variables (1 at a time)Linear regression Numerical One or more variables (numerical or categorical)Logistic regression Binary One or more variables (numerical or categorical)Survival analysis Time to event One or more variables (numerical or categorical)

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Big ideas from the coursePolicy options for improving security

Final exam review

Q6: Game theory (Cyber arms race)

Russiarefrain build

USA refrain (4,4) (1,3)build (3,1) (2,2)

Q6a: Compute any pure Nash equilibria

Q6b: Identify any outcomes that are Pareto efficient

Q6c: Identify any outcomes that are socially optimal

Q6d: Identify any mixed strategy equilibria

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Notes

Notes

Notes

Notes