Bibliography on Dumping and Antidumping

Bibliography on Dumping and Antidumping

I. Overviews of Dumping and Antidumping

A. Surveys of the Economics

Viner, Jacob (1923). Dumping: A Problem in International Trade. Chicago: University ofChicago Press.

Viner, Jacob (1931). “Dumping”. In Edwin Seligman and Alvin Johnson, eds. Encyclopaedia ofSocial Sciences. New York: Macmillan, pp. 275-278.

Haberler, Gottfried (1936). “Dumping Cartels, Monopolies and Export Bounties”. Chapter XVIIIin The Theory of International Trade with its Application to Commercial Policy. London:William Hodge and Company, pp. 296-333.

Corden, W. Max (1974). “Dumping”, Section VII of Chapter 8 in Trade Policy and EconomicWelfare. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 235-247.

Wares, William (1977). The Theory of Dumping and American Commercial Policy. Lexington:D.C. Heath.

Ethier, Wilfred (1987). “Dumping”. In The New Palgrave. New York: Stockton, pp. 937-938.

Deardorff, Alan (1989). “Economic Perspectives on Antidumping Law”. In John Jackson andEdwin Vermulst, eds. Antidumping Law and Practice: A Comparative Study. Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, pp. 23-39.

Balassa, Bela (1989). “Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Economic Considerations”.Journal of World Trade, V.23-#2, pp. 63-79. [also in Balassa (1993), Policy Choices for the1990s.]

Tharakan, P.K. Matthew ed. (1991). Policy Implications of Antidumping Measures. Amsterdam:North-Holland.

Hindley, Brian and Patrick Messerlin (1996). Antidumping Industrial Policy: LegalizedProtection in the WTO and What to do About It. Washington, DC: AEI.

Clarida, Richard (1996). “Dumping: In Theory, in Policy, and in Practice”. in J. Bhagwati and R.Hudec, eds. Fair Trade and Harmonization. V.1: Economic Analysis. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 357-389.

Niels, Gunnar (2000). “What is Antidumping Really About?”. Journal of Economic Surveys;V.14-#4, pp. 467-492.

Blonigen, Bruce and Thomas Prusa (2003). “Antidumping”. In E.K. Choi and J. Harrigan, eds.Handbook of International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 251-284.

B. Surveys of Legal Issues

Bello, Judith and Alan Holmer, eds. (1987). The Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Laws:Key Legal and Policy Issues. Washington, DC: American Bar Association.

Barshefsky, Charlene and N. Zucker (1988). “Amendments to the Antidumping andCountervailing Duty Laws under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988”. NorthCarolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation;

Horlick, Gary and Geoffrey Oliver (1989). “Antidumping and Countervailing Duty LawProvisions of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988”. Journal of World Trade;V23-#3, pp. 5-49.

Jackson, John (1989). “Unfair Trade and the Rules on Dumping”. Chapter 10 of The WorldTrading System: Law and Policy in International Economic Relations. Cambridge: MIT Press,pp. 217-247.

Jackson, John (1989). “The Perplexities of Subsidies in International Trade”. Chapter 11 of TheWorld Trading System: Law and Policy in International Economic Relations. Cambridge: MITPress, pp. 249-273.

Jackson, John and Edwin Vermlust, eds. (1989). Anti-Dumping Law and Practice: AComparative Study. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Barceló, John (1991). “A History of the Gatt Unfair Trade Remedy Law: Confusion ofPurposes”. World Economy; V.14-#?, pp. 311-333.

Barceló, John (1991). “An Analytical History of Gatt Unfair Trade Remedy Law”. In BrianHindley, ed. The Regulation of Trade. London: Trade Policy Research Centre.

Horlick, Gary and E.C. Shea (1995). “The World Trade Organization Antidumping Agreement”.Journal of World Trade; V.29-#1, pp. 5-31.

Palmeter, N. David (1995). “United States Implementation of the Uruguay Round AntidumpingCode”. Journal of World Trade; V.29-#?, pp. 39-82.

Miranda, Jorge (1996). “Should Antidumping Law be Dumped”. Law and Policy in InternationalBusiness; V.28-#1, pp. 255-288.

Salonen, E. (1997). “‘One Tomato, Two Tomato, ...’: Selection of Trade Remedy Laws in theFlorida-Mexico Tomato Conflict”. Florida Journal of International Law; V.11-#?, pp. 371-397.

Schoenbaum, Thomas (1997). “An Assessment of the Antidumping Laws After the UruguayRound Reforms”. Jahrbuch des Öffentlichen Rechts; V.45 (Neue Folge), pp. 137-144.

Cass, Ronald, Richard Boltuck, Seth Kaplan, and Michael Knoll (1998). “Antidumping”. PeterNewman, ed. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law. London: Macmillan.

Horlick, Gary and Steven Sugarman (1999). “Antidumping Policy as a System of Law”. InMiguel Mendoza, Patrick Low and Barbara Kotschwar, eds. Trade Rules in the Making:Challenges in Regional and Multilateral Negotiations. Washington, DC: Brookings/OAS, pp.341-364.

Clough, M. and F. Randolph (1996). “Recent Developments in EC Antidumping Practice and theGATT”. In N. Emiliou and D. O’Keeffe, eds. The European Union and World Law: After theGATT Uruguay Round. Chichester: Wiley, pp. 218-252.

Waer, Paul and Edwin Vermulst (1999). “EC Antisubsidy Law and Practice After the UruguayRound: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?”. Journal of World Trade; V.33-#3, pp. 19-43.

Komuro, N. (1997). “Evolution of Japan’s Antidumping Law and Practice”. World Competition;V.21-#1, pp. 5-49.

C. Broader Scope

Dale, Richard (1980). Antidumping Law in a Liberal Trade Order. New York: St. Martins.

Caine, Wesley (1981). “A Case for Repealing the Antidumping Provisions of the Tariff Act of1930”. Law and Policy in International Business; V.13-#3, pp. 681-725.

Stegemann, Klaus (1985). “Antidumping Policy and the Consumer”. Journal of World TradeLaw; V.19-#5, pp. 466-484.

Hoekman, Bernard and Michael Leidy (1989). “Dumping, Anti-dumping, and EmergencyProtection”. Journal of World Trade; V.23-#1, pp. 27-44.

Grinols, Earl (1989). “Procedural Protectionism: The New American Trade Bill and the NewInterventionist Mode”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.125-#3, pp. 501-521.

Cass, Ronald (1990). “Trade Subsidy Law: Can Foolish Inconsistency Be Good Enough forGovernment Work?” Law and Policy in International Business; V.21-#4, pp. 609-661.

Finger, J. Michael, ed. (1993). Antidumping: How it Works and Who Gets Hurt. Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press.

Hoekman, Bernard and Michael Leidy (1993). “Antidumping and Market Disruption: TheIncentive Effects of Antidumping Laws”. In Robert Stern, ed., The Multilateral Trading System:

Analysis and Options for Change. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 155-181.

Stiglitz, Joseph (1997). “Dumping on Free Trade: The U.S. Import Trade Laws”. SouthernEconomic Journal; V.64-#2, pp. 402-424.

Broude, Tomer (2003). “An Anti-dumping ‘To Be or Not To Be’ in Five Acts: A New Agendafor Research and Reform”. Journal of World Trade; V.37-#2, pp. 305-328.

Lowenfeld, Andreas (1980). “Fair or Unfair: Does it Matter?”. Cornell International LawJournal; V.13-#?, pp. 205-219.

Finger, J. Michael (1992). “Dumping and Antidumping: The Rhetoric and Reality of Protectionin Industrial Countries”. World Bank Research Observer; V.7-#2, pp. 121-143.

Lindsey, Brink (2000). “The US Antidumping Law: Rhetoric versus Reality”. Journal of WorldTrade; V.34-#1, pp. 1-38.

II. The Economic Analysis of Dumping

A. The Traditional Analysis: International Price Discrimination

1. On Price Discrimination: Characterization and Welfare

Phlips, Louis (1981). The Economics of Price Discrimination. Cambridge: CUP.

Tirole, Jean (1988). “Price Discrimination”. Chapter 3 In Theory of Industrial Organization.Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 133-168.

Varian, Hal (1989). “Price Discrimination”. In R. Schmalensee and R. Willig, eds. Handbook ofIndustrial Organization, V.I. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 597-654.

Pigou, Arthur (1928/2000). “Discriminating Monopoly”. Chapter XVII of The Economics ofWelfare. New Brunswick: Transaction, pp. 275-289. [also Appendix III, Section 8, pp. 810-812.]

Robinson, Joan (1933). “Price Discrimination”. Book V of The Economics of ImperfectCompetition. New York: St. Martins, pp. 179-208.

Simkin, C.G.F. (1947/8). “Some Aspects and Generalisations of the Theory of Discrimination”.Review of Economic Studies; V.15-#1, pp. 1-13.

Edwards, Edgar (1950). “The Analysis of Output under Discrimination”. Econometrica; V.18-#2,pp. 163-172.

Enke, Stephen (1964). “Some Notes on Price Discrimination”. Canadian Journal of Economicsand Political Science; V.30-#1, pp. 95-109.

Greenhut, M.L. and H. Ohta (1976). “Joan Robinson’s Criterion for Deciding Whether MarketDiscrimination Reduces Output”. Economic Journal; V.86-#341, pp. 96-97.

Schmalensee, Richard (1981). “Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third DegreePrice Discrimination”. American Economics Review; V.71-#1, pp. 242-247.

Varian, Hal (1985). “Price Discrimination and Social Welfare”. American Economics Review;V.75-#4, pp. 870-875.

Schwartz, Marius (1990). “Third Degree Price Discrimination and Output: Generalizing aWelfare Result”. American Economics Review; V.80-#5, pp. 1259-1262.

Malueg, David (1993). “Bounding the Effects of Third Degree Price Dispersion”. AmericanEconomics Review; V.83-#4, pp. 1011-1021.

Katz, Michael (1987). “The Welfare Effects of Third Degree Price Discrimination inIntermediate Good Markets”. American Economic Review; V.77-#1, pp. 154-167.

Hausman, Jerry and Jeffrey MacKie-Mason (1988). “Price Discrimination and Patent Policy”.RAND Journal of Economics; V.19-#2, pp. 253-265.

Nahata, Babu, Krzysztof Ostaszewski, and P.K. Sahoo (1990). “Direction of Price Changes inThird Degree Price Discrimination”. American Economics Review; V.80-#5, pp. 1254-1258.

DeGraba, Patrick (1987). “The Effects of Price Restrictions on Competition Between Local andNational Firms”. RAND Journal of Economics; V.18-#3, pp. 333-347.

2. On Predation

Brodley, Joseph and George Hay (1981). “Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories andthe Evolution of Legal Standards”. Cornell Law Review; V.66-#4, pp. 738-803.

Hay, George (1981). “A Confused Lawyer’s Guide to Predatory Pricing”. In Steven Salop, ed.Strategy, Predation and Antitrust Analysis. Washington, DC: Federal Trade Commission, pp.155-202.

Ordover, Janusz and Garth Saloner (1989). “Predation, Monopolization and Antitrust”. in R.Schmalensee and R. Willig, eds. Handbook of Industrial Organization--V.I. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp.537-596.

Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts (1990). “New Theories of Predatory Pricing”. in Bonanno andBrandolini, eds. Industrial Structure in the New Industrial Economics. New York: OxfordUniversity Press, pp. 112-137.

Phlips, Louis (1995). “Predatory Pricing”. Part IV of Competition Policy: A Game-Theoretic

Perspective. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 185-255.

Telser, Lester (1966). “Cutthroat Competition and the Long Purse”. Journal of Law &Economics; V.9-#2, pp. 81-94.

Areeda, Philip and Donald Turner (1975). “Predatory Pricing and Related Practices underSection 2 of the Sherman Act”. Harvard Law Review; V.88-#4, pp. 697-733.

Scherer, Frederick (1976). “Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment”. Harvard LawReview: V.89-#5, pp. 869-890. [A&T reply and Scherer responds, pp. 891-903.]

Williamson, Oliver (1977). “Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis”. Yale LawJournal; V.87-#2, pp. 284-340. [A&T comment, V.87-#7, pp. 1337-1352 , and Williamsonreplies 1353 and V.88-#6, pp. 1183-1201.]

Baumol, William (1979). “Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention ofPredatory Pricing”. Yale Law Journal; V.89-#1, pp. 1-26.

Joskow, Paul and Alvin Klevorik (1979). “A Framework for Analyzing Predatory PricingPolicy”. Yale Law Journal; V.89-#2, pp. 213-270.

McGee, John (1980). “Predatory Pricing Revisited”. Journal of Law & Economics; V.23-#2, pp.289-330.

Ordover, Janusz and Robert Willig (1981). “An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing andProduct Innovation”. Yale Law Journal; V.91-#1, pp. 8-53.

Easterbrook, Frank (1981). “Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies”. University of ChicagoLaw Review; V.48-#2, pp. 263-337.

Areeda, Philip and Herbert Hovenkamp (1987). Antitrust Law. Boston: Little Brown.

Schwartz, Marius (1989). “Investments in Oligopoly: Welfare Effects and Tests for Predation”.Oxford Economic Papers; V.41-#?, pp. 698-719.

Salop, Steven and David Scheffman (1983). “Raising Rivals Costs”. American EconomicsReview; V.73-#2, pp. 267-271.

Krattenmaker, Thomas and Steven Salop (1986). “Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’Costs to Achieve Power over Price”. Yale Law Journal; V.96-#2, pp. 209-293.

Salop, Steven and David Scheffman (1987). “Cost Raising Strategies”. Journal of IndustrialEconomics; V.36-#1, pp. 19-34.

Brennen, Timothy (1988). “Understanding Raising Rivals Costs”. Antitrust Bulletin; V.33-#1,

pp. 95-113.

Scheffman, David (1992). “The Application of Raising Rivals’ Costs Theory to Antitrust”.Antitrust Bulletin, 37-#1, pp. 187-206.

Depken, Craig and Jon Ford (1999). “NAFTA as a Means of Raising Rivals’ Costs”. Review ofIndustrial Organization; V.15-#2, pp. 103-113. [comment by Charles Sawyer, V.18-#1, pp. 127-131.]

3. Effect of Dumping on the Exporting Nation

a. Dumping and Welfare

Viner, Jacob (1923). “The Influence of Dumping on Prices in the Dumping Country”. Chapter VIof Viner (1923), pp. 94-109.

Graham, Frank (1924). “Review of Viner, Dumping: A Problem in International Trade”.American Economics Review; V.14-#2, pp. 321-324.

Yntema, Theodore O. (1928). “The Influence of Dumping on Monopoly Price”. Journal ofPolitical Economy; V.36-#6, pp. 686-698.

Lofgren, Karl-Gustaf (1977). “Dumping, Devaluation and Monopoly Prices: A Generalization ofYntema’s Results”. Revista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali; V.24-#8, pp.658-677.

Leontief, Wassily (1940). “The Theory of Limited and Unlimited Discrimination”. QuarterlyJournal of Economics; V.54-#3, pp. 490-501.

Enke, Stephen (1946). “Monopolistic Output and International Trade”. Quarterly Journal ofEconomics; V.60-#2, pp. 233-249.

Meade, James (1955). “The Second Best Argument for Trade Control: (4) Dumping as aComplex Case”. Chapter XV in Trade and Welfare. London: Oxford University Press/RIIA, pp.244-253. [also Section XV of the Mathematical Supplement.]

Cocks, R.A. and Harry Johnson (1972). “A Note on Dumping and Social Welfare”. CanadianJournal of Economics; V.5-#1, pp. 137-140.

Wares, William (1977). “The Effect of Dumping on Welfare in the Exporting Country”. Chapter2 of Wares (1977), pp. 27-55.

Rieber, William (1982), “Discriminating Monopoly and International Trade”, Economic Journal. V.92-#366; pp. 365-376.

Das, Satya and Aadwait Mohanty (1984). “Dumping in International Markets and Welfare: AGeneral Equilibrium Analysis”. Journal of International Economics; V.17-#1/2, pp. 149-157.

Das, Satya and Aadwait Mohanty (1987). “Welfare of the Dumping Country: A ComprehensiveRanking of Policies”. Journal of Quantitative Economics; V.3-#1, pp. 13-34.

b. Domestic Economic Conditions/Policy and Dumping

Pigou, Arthur (1904). “Pure Theory and the Fiscal Controversy”. Economic Journal; V.14-#53,pp. 29-33. [Problem 6, pp. 32-33].

Pigou, Arthur (1905). “Professor Dietzel on Dumping and Retaliation”. Economic Journal; V.15-#59; pp. 436-443.

Viner, Jacob (1923). “The Profitability of Dumping to the Dumper”. Chapter VII in Dumping: AProblem in International Trade. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 110-131.

Corden, W. Max (1967), “Monopoly, Tariffs and Subsidies”, Economica. V.34-#1; pp. 50-58.

Basevi, Giorgio (1970), “Domestic Demand and the Ability to Export”, Journal of PoliticalEconomy. V.78-#2; pp. 330-337.

Frenkel, Jacob (1971). “On Domestic Demand and the Ability to Export”. Journal of PoliticalEconomy; V.79-#3, pp. 668-672.

Pursell, Gary and Richard Snape (1973), “Economies of Scale, Price Discrimination andExporting”, Journal of International Economics. V.3-#1; pp. 85-92.

Snape, Richard (1977), “Trade Policy in the Presence of Economies of Scale and ProductVariety”, Economic Record; V.53-#144; pp. 525-534.

Curtis, Douglas (1983), “Trade Policy to Promote Entry with Scale Economies, Product Variety,and Export Potential”, Canadian Journal of Economics; V.16-#1; pp. 109-121.

Stegemann, Klaus (1984), “Trade Policy to Promote Entry with Scale Economies: OrthodoxyRestored”, Canadian Journal of Economics; V.17-#4; pp. 774-777.

Dutton, John (1990). “Targeted Export Subsidies as an Exercise of Monopoly Power”. CanadianJournal of Economics; V.23-#3, pp. 705-710.

Auquier, Antoine and Richard. Caves (1979), “Monopolistic Export Industries, Trade Taxes, andOptimal Competition Policy”, Economic Journal; V.89-#?; pp. 559-581.

Katrak, Homi (1980). “Multinational Monopolies and Monopoly Regulation”. Oxford EconomicPapers; V.32-#3, pp. 453-466.

Donnenfeld, Shabtai (1982). “Domestic Regulation and the Preservation of Monopoly Power inForeign Markets”. Southern Economic Journal; V.49-#4, pp. 954-965.

c. Market Entry Dumping where Consumers are Uncertain about Quality

Bond, Eric (1984). “International Trade with Uncertain Product Quality”. Southern EconomicJournal; V.51-#1, pp. 196-207.

Donnenfeld, Shabtai (1986). “Intra-Industry Trade and Imperfect Information about ProductQuality”. European Economic Review; V.30-#2, pp. 401-417.

Donnenfeld, Shabtai, Shlomo Weber and Uri Ben-Zion (1985). “Import Controls under ImperfectInformation”. Journal of International Economics; V.19-#3/4, pp. 341-354.

Donnenfeld, Shabtai and Wolfgang Mayer (1987). “The Quality of Export Products and OptimalTrade Policy”. International Economic Review; V.28-#1, pp. 159-174.

Chiang, Shih-Chen and Robert Masson (1988). Domestic Industrial Structure and ExportQuality”. International Economic Review; V.29-#2, pp. 261-270.

Mayer, Wolfgang (1984). “The Infant-Export Industry Argument”. Canadian Journal ofEconomics; V.17-#2, pp. 249-269.

Flamm, Harry (1987). “Reverse Dumping”. European Economic Review; V.31-#1/2, pp. 82-88.

Falvey, Rod (1989). “Trade, Quality Reputations and Commercial Policy”. InternationalEconomic Review; V.30-#3, pp. 607-622.

Grossman, Gene and Henrik Horn (1988). “Infant Industry Protection Reconsidered: The Case ofInformational Barriers to Entry”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.103-#4, pp.767-787.

Bagwell, Kyle and Robert Staiger (1989). “The Role of Export Subsidies when Product Qualityis Unknown”. Journal of International Economics; V.27-#1/2, pp. 69-89.

Bagwell, Kyle (1991). “Optimal Export Policy for an New Product Monopoly”. AmericanEconomic Review; V.81-#5, pp. 1156-1169.

Chen, Mah-Lih (1991). “The Role of R&D Subsidies when Incomplete Information is an Entry-barrier”. Journal of International Economics; V.31-#3/4, pp. 251-270.

Rodrik, Dani (1994). “Industrial Organization and Product Quality: Evidence from South Koreanand Taiwanese Exports”. in P. Krugman and A. Smith, eds. Empirical Studies of Strategic TradePolicy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 195-210.

Wojcik, Charlotte (2000). “Strategic Trade Policy in the Presence of Consumer Learning”.

Economica; V.67-#266, pp. 283-295.

4. Effect of Dumping on the Importing Country

Viner, Jacob (1923). “The Consequences of Dumping to the Importing Country”. Chapter VIII ofViner.

Yarrow, George (1987). “Economic Aspects of Antidumping Policies”. Oxford Review ofEconomic Policy; V.3-#1, pp. 66-79.

Boltuck, Richard (1987). “An Economic Analysis of Dumping”. Journal of World Trade Law;V.21-#5, pp. 45-54.

Boltuck, Richard (1991). “Assessing the Effects on the Domestic Industry of Price-Dumping”. InP.K.M. Tharakan, ed. Policy Implications of Antidumping Measures. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 99-141.

Murray, Tracy and Donald Rousslang (1989). “A Method for Estimating Injury Caused by UnfairTrade Practices”. International Review of Law and Economics; V.9-#2, pp. 149-164.

Monti, G. (1995). “When Does Dumping Cause Injury?”. World Competition; V.18-#3, pp. 97-114.

Kelly, Kenneth and Morris Morkre (1998). “Do Unfairly Trade Imports Injure DomesticIndustries?”. Review of International Economics; V.6-#2, pp. 321-332.

Kravis, Irving and Richard Lipsey (1977). “Export Prices and the Transmission of Inflation”.American Economics Review; V.67-#2, pp. 148-163.

B. Dumping under Perfect Competition: Intertemporal Linkage

Ethier, Wilfred (1982). “Dumping”. Journal of Political Economy; V.90-#3, pp. 487-506.

Anderson, James (1992). “Domino Dumping, I: Competitive Exporters”. American EconomicReview; V.82-#1, pp. 65-83.

Clarida, Richard (1993). “Entry, Dumping and Shakeout”. American Economics Review; V.83-#1, pp. 180-202.

C.Dumping with Market Uncertainty and Adjustment Costs: Cyclical dumping

Ethier, Wilfred (1982). “Dumping”. Journal of Political Economy; V.90-#3, pp. 487-506.

Davies, Stephen and Anthony McGuinness (1982). “Dumping at Less than Marginal Cost”. Journal of International Economics; V.12-#1/2, pp. 169-182.

Katz, E., J. Paroush and N. Kahana (1982). “Price Uncertainty and the Price Discriminating Firmin International Trade”. International Economic Review; V.23-#2, pp. 389-400.

Blair, Roger and Leonard Cheng (1984). “On Dumping”. Southern Economic Journal; V.50-#3,pp. 857-865.

Lahiri, Sajal and Jeffrey Sheen (1990). “On Optimal Dumping”. Economic Journal; V.100-#400, pp. 127-136.

Bernhardt, Dan (1984). “Dumping, Adjustment Costs and Uncertainty”. Journal of EconomicDynamics and Control; V.8-3, pp. 349-370.

Hillman, Arye and Eliakim Katz (1986). “Domestic Uncertainty and Foreign Dumping”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.19-#3, pp. 403-416.

Das, Satya (1992). “Market Uncertainties and Cyclical Dumping”. European Economic Review;V.36-#1, pp. 71-82.

Eldor, Rafael and Itzhak Zilcha (1987). “Discriminating Monopoly, Forward Markets andInternational Trade”. International Economic Review; V.28-#2, pp. 459-468.

Eldor, Rafael and Itzhak Zilcha (1990). “Oligopoly, Uncertain Demand and Forward Markets”.Journal of Economics and Business; V.42-#1, pp. 17-26.

Hartigan, James (1996). “Predatory Dumping”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.29-#1, pp.228-239.

Aizenman, Joshua (1996). “Foreign Direct Investment, Employment Volatility and CyclicalDumping”. International Journal of Finance and Economics; V.1-#2, pp. 117-131.

Tarr, David (1979). “Cyclical Dumping: The Case of Steel Products”. Journal of InternationalEconomics; V.9-#1, pp. 57-63.

Aspe, Pedro and Francesco Giavazzi (1982). “The Short Run Behavior of Prices and Output inthe Exportables Sector”. Journal of International Economics; V.12-#1/2, pp. 83-93.

Brannlund, Runar and Karl-Gustaf Lofgren (1995). “Cyclical Dumping and Correlated BusinessCycles in Imperfect Markets: Empirical Applications to the Canadian Pulp and Paper Industry”.Applied Economics; V.27-#11, pp. 1081-1091.

D. Oligopolistic Interaction and Dumping

1. Oligopolistic Interaction and Dumping

Helpman, Elhanan and Paul Krugman (1985). “Oligopoly”. Chapter 5 of Market Structure and

Foreign Trade: Increasing Returns, Imperfect Competition and the International Economy.Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 86-111.

Brander, James (1981). “Intra-Industry Trade in Identical Commodities”. Journal ofInternational Economics; V.11-#1, pp. 1-14.

Brander, James and Paul Krugman (1983). “A ‘Reciprocal Dumping’ Model of InternationalTrade”. Journal of International Economics; V.15-#3/4, pp. 313-321.

Pinto, Brian (1986). “Repeated Games and the ‘Reciprocal Dumping’ Model of Trade”. Journalof International Economics; V.20-#3/4, pp. 357-366.

Anderson, Simon and Ronald Fischer (1989). “Multi-Market Oligopoly with Production beforeSales”. Journal of Industrial Economics; V.38-#2, pp. 167-182.

Weinstein, David (1991). “Competition and Unilateral Dumping”. Journal of InternationalEconomics; V.32-#3/4, pp. 379-388.

Collie, David (1992). “International Trade and Cournot Equilibrium: Existence, Uniqueness andComparative Statics”. Bulletin of Economic Research; V.44-#1, pp. 55-66.

Dastidar, Krishnendu (1998). “Reciprocal Dumping and Trade Policy”. Journal of InternationalTrade and Economic Development; V.7-#4, pp. 439-449.

Murray, Tracy and Nurlan Turdaliev (1999). “Universal Dumping of Homogeneous Products”.Review of International Economics; V.7-#4, pp. 580-589.

Calmette, Marie-Francoise (2002). “A Two Way Trade Model without Reciprocal Dumping”.Economia Internazionale; V.55-#3, pp. 297-310.

Kong, Ying (2003). “Persistent Dumping, Competition, and Welfare”. Journal of InternationalTrade and Economic Development; V.12-#1, pp. 19-37.

Fung, K.C. (1991). “Collusive Intra-Industry Trade”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.24-#2,pp. 391-404.

Neven, Damien, George Norman and Jacques-Francois Thisse (1991). “Attitudes TowardForeign Products and International Price Competition”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.24-#1, pp. 1-11.

Baye, Michael and Casper de Vries (1992). “Mixed Strategy Trade Equilibrium”. CanadianJournal of Economics; V.25-#2, pp. 281-293.

Dei, Fumio (1990). “A Note on Multinational Corporations in a Reciprocal Dumping Model”.Journal of International Economics; V.29-#1/2, pp. 161-171.

Baldwin, Richard and Gianmarco Ottaviano (2001). “Multiproduct Monopolists and ReciprocalFDI Dumping”. Journal of International Economics; V.54-#2, pp. 429-448.

Coldwell, Daniel and John Reid (1994). “Some Evidence Regarding the Reciprocal DumpingHypothesis”. International Economic Journal; V.8-#3, pp. 11-18.

Bernhofen, Daniel (1998). “Intra-industry Trade and Strategic Interaction: Theory and Evidence”.Journal of International Economics; V.45-#1, pp. 77-96.

Bernhofen, Daniel and Zahid Hafeez (2001). “Oligopolistic Competition and Intra-IndustryTrade: Evidence from the OECD”. Australian Economic Papers; V.40-#1, pp. 77-90.

Feenstra, Robert, James Markusen, and Andrew Rose (2001). “Using the Gravity Equation toDifferentiate Among Alternative Theories of Trade”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.34-#2,pp. 430-447.

Goldberg, Pinelopi and Michael Knetter (1997). “Goods Prices and Exchange Rates: What HaveWe Learned?”. Journal of Economic Literature; V.35-#3, pp. 1243-1272.

Kirman, Alan and Louis Phlips (1996). “Exchange Rate Pass-through and Market Structures”.Journal of Economics; V.64-#2, pp. 129-154.

Hens, Thorsten, Eckart Jäger, Alan Kirman and Louis Phlips (1999). “Exchange Rates andOligopoly”. European Economic Review; V.43-#3, pp. 621-648.

Gil-Pareja, Salvador (2002). “Export Price Discrimination in Europe and Exchange Rates”.Review of International Economics; V.10-#2, pp. 299-312.

Gil-Pareja, Salvador (2003). “Pricing to Market Behaviour in European Car Markets”. EuropeanEconomic Review; V.47-#6, pp. 945-962.

2. International Competition with Vertical Industry Links

Bernhofen, Daniel (1995). “Price Dumping in Intermediate Goods Markets”. Journal ofInternational Economics; V.39-#1/2, pp. 159-173.

Bernhofen, Daniel (1996). “Vertical Integration and International Predation”. Review ofInternational Economics; V.4-#1, pp. 90-98.

Cheng, Leonard and Mordechai Kreinin (1996). “Supplier Preferences and Dumping: AnAnalysis of Japanese Corporate Groups”. Southern Economics Journal; V.63-#1, pp. 51-59.

Hamilton, Stephen and Kyle Stiegert (2000). “Vertical Coordination, Antitrust Law andInternational Trade”. Journal of Law & Economics; V.43-#1, pp. 143-156.

Roy, Santanu and Jean-Marie Viaene (1998). “On Strategic Vertical Foreign Investment”.Journal of International Economics; V.46-#2, pp. 253-279.

McLaren, John (2000). “Globalization and Vertical Structure”. American Economics Review;V.90-#5, pp. 1239-1254.

Perry, Martin (1989). “Vertical Integration: Determinants and Effects”. in R. Schmalensee and R.Willig, eds. Handbook of Industrial Organization--V.I. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 183-255.

Rey, Patrick and Jean Tirole (2003). “A Primer on Foreclosure”. In M. Armstrong and H.M.Porter, eds. Handbook of Industrial Organization. Amsterdam: Elsevier, forthcoming.

Rey, Patrick and Jean Tirole (1986). “The Logic of Vertical Restraints”. American EconomicReview; V.76-#5, pp. 921-939.

Salinger, Michael (1988). “Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure”. Quarterly Journal ofEconomics; V.103-#2, pp. 345-356.

Ordover, Janusz, Garth Saloner and Steven Salop (1990). “Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure”.American Economics Review; V.80-#1, pp. 127-142. [comment and reply, V.82-#3.]

Hart, Oliver and Jean Tirole (1990). “Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure”. BrookingsPapers on Economic Analysis; Microeconomics, pp. 205-286.

Bolton, Patrick and Michael Whinston (1991). “The ‘Foreclosure’ Effects of Vertical Mergers”.Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics; V.147-#1, pp. 207-226.

Riordan, Michael (1998). “Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm”. AmericanEconomic Review; V.88-#5, pp. 1232-1248.

Sibley, David and Dennis Weisman (1998). “Raising Rivals’ Costs: The Entry of an UpstreamMonopolist into Downstream Markets”. Information Economics and Policy; V.10-#4, pp. 451-470.

Kühn, Kai-Uwe and Xavier Vives (1999). “Excess Entry, Vertical Integration and Welfare”.RAND Journal of Economics; V.30-#4, pp. 575-603.

Linnemer, Laurent (2003). “Backward Integration by a Dominant Firm”. Journal of Economicsand Management Strategy; V.12-#2, pp. 231-259.

3. Incomplete Information and Dumping

Eaton, Jonathan and Leonard Mirman (1991). “Predatory Dumping as Signal Jamming”. in A.Takayama, et al. eds. Trade, Policy, and International Adjustments. San Diego: Academic Press,pp. 60-76.

Hartigan, James (1993). “Dumping and Signalling”. Journal of Economic Behavior andOrganization; V.23-#1, pp. 1-22.

Fischer, Ronald and Leonard Mirman (1994). “Learning about Enforcement: A Model ofDumping”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.9-#2, pp. 214-220.

4. Dumping with Learning and Dynamic Competition

Gruenspecht, Howard (1988). “Dumping and Dynamic Competition”. Journal of InternationalEconomics; V.25-#?, pp. 225-248.

Berck, Peter and Jeffrey Perloff (1990). “Dynamic Dumping”. International Journal of IndustrialOrganization; V.8-#2, pp. 225-243.

Finan, William and Chris Amundsen (1986). “Modelling US-Japan Competition inSemiconductors”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.8-#3, pp. 305-326.

Mody, Ashoka and David Wheeler (1987). “Prices, Costs, and Competition at the TechnologicalFrontier”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.9-#2, pp. 367-382.

Krugman, Paul (1987). “Market Access and Competition in High Technology Industries”. in H.Kierzkowski, ed. Protection and Competition in International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, pp.128-142.

Baldwin, Richard and Paul Krugman (1987). “Market Access and Imperfect Competition: ASimulation Study of 16K Random Access Memory”. in R. Feenstra, ed. Empirical Research inInternational Trade. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 171-197.

Dick, Andrew (1991). “Learning-by-doing and Dumping in the Semiconductor Industry”.Journal of Law and Economics; V.34-#1, pp. 133-159.

Flamm, Kenneth (1993). “Forward Pricing v. Fair Value: An Analytical Assessment of‘Dumping’ in DRAMs”. In T. Ito and A. Krueger, eds. Trade and Protectionism. Chicago:University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 47-93.

Irwin, Douglas and Peter Klenow (1994). “Learning by Doing Spillovers in the SemiconductorIndustry”. Journal of Political Economy; V.102-#6, pp. 1200-1227.

III. Law and Economics of Administered Protection

A. Analysis of Trade at Less than Fair Value

Brandt, J. and W. Zeitler (1980). “Unfair Trade Practice Jurisdiction: The Applicability ofSection 337 and the Countervailing Duty and Antidumping Laws”. Law and Policy inInternational Business; V.12-#1, pp. 95-116.

Holmer, A., S. Haggerty and W. Hunter (1984). “Identifying and Measuring Subsidies underCountervailing Duty Law: An Attempt at Synthesis”. The Commerce Department Speaks onImport Administration and Export Administration, 1984. Washington, DC: Practicing LawInstitute, pp. 301-460.

Goetz, C., L. Granet and W. Schwartz (1986). “The Meaning of ‘Subsidy’ and ‘Injury’ inCountervailing Duty Law”. International Review of Law and Economics; V.6-#?, pp. 17-32.

Diamond, R. (1989). “Economic Foundations of Countervailing Duty Law”. Virginia Journal ofInternational Law; V.29-#?, pp. 767-812.

Diamond, R., M. Trebilcock, and J. Jackson (1990). “A Search for Economic and FinancialPrinciples in the Administration of US Countervailing Duty Law”. Law and Policy inInternational Business. V.21-#4, pp. 507-607.

Sykes, Alan (1990). “Second Best Countervailing Duty Law: A Critique of the EntitlementApproach”. Law and Policy in International Business. V.21-#4, pp. 699-722.

Palmeter, N. David (1986). “Torquemada and the Tariff Act: The Inquisitor Rides Again”.International Lawyer; V.20-#?, pp. 641-657.

Palmeter, N. David (1988). “Exchange Rates and Anti-Dumping Determinations”. Journal ofWorld Trade Law; V.22-#?, pp. 73-80.

Coursey, M. and D. Binder (1989). “Hypothetical Calculations under the US Antidumping Law:Foreign Market Value, US Price and Weighted-Average Dumping Margins”. AmericanUniversity Journal of International Law and Policy; V.4-#?, pp. 537-553.

Bollom, W. and D. Simons (1990). “The Use of Accounting Data in Antidumping Cases: APublic Policy Perspective”. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy; V.9-#1, pp. 1-18.

Boltuck, Richard and Robert Litan, eds. (1992). Down in the Dumps: Administration of theUnfair Trade Laws. Washington, DC: Brookings.

Finger, J. Michael (1992). “The Meaning of ‘Unfair’ in US Import Policy”. Minnesota Journal ofGlobal Trade; V.1-#1, pp. 35-56.

Lindsey, Brink (2000). “The US Antidumping Law: Rhetoric versus Reality”. Journal of WorldTrade; V.34-#1, pp. 1-38.

Vandenbussche, Hylke (1996), “Is European Antidumping Protection Against Central EuropeToo High?”, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.132-#1, pp. 116-138.

B. Analysis of Injury

Perry, W. (1985). “Administration of Import Trade Laws by the US ITC”. Boston UniversityInternational Law Journal;

Jameson, P. (1986). “Recent ITC Practice Regarding the Material Injury Standard: A Critique”.Law and Policy in International Business; V.18-#3, pp. 517-577.

Grossman, Gene (1986). “Imports as a Cause of Injury: The Case of the US Steel Industry”.Journal of International Economics; V.20-#3/4, pp. 201-223.

Pindyck, Robert and Julio Rotemberg (1987). “Are Imports to Blame? Attribution of InjuryUnder the 1974 Act”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.30-#1, pp 101-122.

Kelly, Kenneth (1988). “The Analysis of Causality in Escape Clause Cases”. Journal ofIndustrial Economics; V.37-#2, pp. 187-207.

Rousslang, Donald (1988). “Import Injury in US Trade Law: An Economic View”. InternationalReview of Law and Economics; V.8-#1, pp. 117-122.

Morkre, Morris and H. Kruth (1989). “Determining Whether Dumped Or Subsidized ImportsInjure Domestic Industries: The ITC Approach”. Contemporary Policy Issues; V.7-#3, pp. 78-95.

Knoll, M. (1989). “Legal and Economic Framework for Analysis of Injury by the US ITC”.Journal of World Trade; V.23-#3, pp. 95-107.

Knoll, M. (1989). “An Economic Approach to the Determination of Injury under USAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Law”. NYU Journal of International Law and Policy;V.22-#?, pp. 37-116.

Palmeter, N. David (1987). “Injury Determinations in Anti-Dumping and Countervailing DutyCases--A Commentary on US Practice”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.21-#1, pp. 7-45.

Palmeter, N. David (1987). “Dumping Margins and Material Injury: The USITC is Free toChoose”. Journal of World Trade Law; V.21-#?, pp. 173-175.

Cass, Ronald and W. Schwartz (1990). “Causality, Coherence and Transparency in theImplementation of International Trade Laws”. in M. Trebilcock and R. York, eds. FairExchange: Reforming Trade Remedy Laws. Toronto: C.D. Howe, pp. 24-90.

Kaplan, Seth (1991). “Injury and Causation in USITC Antidumping Determinations: Five RecentApproaches”. in Tharakan, ed.

Sykes, Alan (1996). “The Economics of Injury in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases”.International Review of Law and Economics; V.16-#1, pp. 5-26.

Sykes, Alan (1997). “The Economics of Injury in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases”.In J. Bhandari and A. Sykes, eds. Economic Dimensions in International Law. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, pp. 83-125. [comment by R. Cass and M. Knoll, pp. 126-165.]

Boltuck, Richard (1997). “Innovations in Support of the Unitary Injury Test in U.S. Unfair TradeCases”. In J. Bhandari and A. Sykes, eds. Economic Dimensions in International Law.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 166-185.

Steen, B. (1987). “Economically Meaningful Markets: An Alternative to Defining ‘Like Product’and ‘Domestic Industry’ under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979”. Virginia Law Review;

Arguea, N. and R. Harper (1994). “Industry Definition and Less Than Fair Value Pricing: AnAnalysis of ITC Practice”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.9-#1, pp. 106-127.

Cladouhos, W.P. (1994). “The multi-purpose vehicle reclassification and minivan dumpingdisputes between the United States and Japan and their consistency with United Statesobligations under the GATT”. American University Journal of International Law and Policy;V.10-#?, pp. 1109-1166.

Mock, W. jr. (1986). “Cumulation of Import Statistics in Injury Investigations Before the ITC”.Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business; V.7-#3, pp. 433-479.

Hansen, Wendy and Thomas Prusa (1996). “Cumulation and ITC Decision-making: The Sum ofthe Parts is Greater than the Whole”. Economic Inquiry; V.34-#4, pp. 746-769.

Prusa, Thomas (1998). “Cumulation and Anti-dumping: A Challenge to Competition”. WorldEconomy; V.21-#8, pp. 1021-1033.

Tharakan, P.K. Matthew, David Greenaway, and Joseph Tharakan (1998). “Cumulation andInjury Determination of the European Community in Antidumping Cases”. WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv; V.134-#2, pp. 320-339.

Prusa, Thomas and D. Sharp (2001). “Simultaneous Equations in Antidumping Investigations”.Journal of Forensic Economics; V.14-#1, pp. 63-78.

C. Administrative/Sunset Reviews

DeVault, James (1996). “US Antidumping Administrative Reviews”. International TradeJournal; V.10-#2, pp. 247-267 .

Stewart, Terrence and Amy Dwyer (1998). “Sunset Reviews of Antidumping and CountervailingDuty Measures: US Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments”. Journal of World Trade;V32-#5, pp. 101-135.

Boltuck, Richard and Setu Kaplan (1998). “An Economic Approach to ITC Sunset Reviews”. in

R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 219-239.

Moore, Michael (2002). “Commerce Department Antidumping Sunset Reviews: A FirstAssessment”. Journal of World Trade; V.36-#2, pp. 675-698.

D. The Relationship between Antidumping and Anti-trust Law

Epstein, B. (1973). “The Illusionary Conflict Between Antidumping and Antitrust”. AntitrustBulletin; V.18-#?, pp. 1-22.

Applebaum, H. and D. Grace (1987). “US Antitrust Law and Antidumping Actions under TitleVII of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979”. Antitrust Law Journal; V.56-#2, pp. 497-518.

Elzinga, Kenneth (1987). “The Interface of Trade/Competition Law: An Economist'sPerspective”. Antitrust Law Journal; V.56-#2, pp. 439-

Davidow, Joel (1980). “Competition, Trade and the Antitrust Division”. Northwestern Journal ofInternational Law and Business; V.2-#2, pp.300-316.

Davidow, Joel (1982/83). “Cartels, Competition Law and the Regulation of International Trade”.New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, V.15-#2, pp. 351-376.

Victor, A. Paul (1982/3). “Antidumping and Antitrust: Can the Inconsistencies be Removed”.New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, V.15-#2, pp. 339-350.

Wood, D. (1989). “‘Unfair’ Trade Injury: A Competition-Based Approach”. Stanford LawReview; V.41-#5, pp. 1153-1200.

Davidow, Joel (1991). “The Relationship between Anti-Trust Laws and Trade Laws in the US”.World Economy; V.14-#1, pp. 37-52.

Feinberg, R. (1991). “Antitrust Policy and International Trade Liberalization”. WorldCompetition; V.14-#4, pp. 13-19.

Warner, P. (1992). “Canada-United States Free Trade: The Case for Replacing Antidumping withAntitrust”. Law and Policy in International Business; V.23-#4, pp. 791-890.

Cass, Ronald (1993). “Price Discrimination and Predation Analysis in Antitrust and InternationalTrade: A Comment”. University of Cincinnati Law Review; V.61-#3, pp. 877-888.

Kelly, Kenneth (1993). “Empirical Analysis for Antitrust and International Trade Law”.University of Cincinnati Law Review; V.61-#3, pp. 889-902.

Boltuck, Richard and Seth Kaplan (1993). “Conflicting Entitlements: Can Antidumping andAntitrust Regulation be Reconciled”. University of Cincinnati Law Review; V.61-#3, pp. 903-

917.

Morkre, Morris and K. Kelly (1993). “Perspectives on the Effects of Unfair Imports on DomesticIndustries”. University of Cincinnati Law Review; V.61-#3, pp. 919-944.

Messerlin, Patrick (1994). “Should Antidumping Rules Be Replaced by National or InternationalCompetition Rules?”. Aussenwirtschaft; V.49-#2/3 pp. 351-374.

Schoenbaum, T. (1994). “The International Trade Laws and the New Protectionism: The Needfor a Synthesis with Antitrust”. North Carolina Journal of International Law and CommercialRegulation; .V.19-#?, pp. 393-436.

Barbuto, C.M. (1994). “Towards Convergence of Antitrust and Trade Law: An InternationalTrade Analogue to Robinson-Patman”. Fordham Law Journal; V.62-#?, pp. 2047-2094.

Lloyd, Peter and Gary Sampson (1995). “Competition and Trade Policy: Identifying the IssuesAfter the Uruguay Round”. World Economy; V.18-#5, pp. 681-705.

Victor, A. Paul and M. Friedman (1995). “Antidumping and Antitrust: Pricing Schizophrenia?”.International Business Lawyer; V.23-#1, pp.

Hoekman, Bernard and Petros Mavroidis (1996). “Dumping, Antidumping and Antitrust”.Journal of World Trade; V.30-#?, pp. 27-52.

Trebilcock, M. (1996). “Competition Policy and Trade Policy–Mediating the Interface”. Journalof World Trade; V.30-#4, pp. 71-105.

Lipstein, R. (1997). “Using Antitrust Principles to Reform Antidumping Law”. In E.M. Grahamand J.D. Richardson, eds. Global Competition Policies. Washington, DC: IIE, pp. 405-438.

Niels, Gunnar and Adriaan ten Kate (1997). “Trusting Antitrust to Dump Antidumping:Abolishing Antidumping in Free Trade Agreements without Replacing it With AntidumpingLaw”. Journal of World Trade; V.31-#?, pp. 29-43.

Sykes, Alan (1998). “Antidumping and Antitrust: What Problems Does Each Address?”. in R.Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 1-43.

Sykes, Alan (1999). “Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade”. Universityof Chicago Law Review; V.66-#1, pp. 1-46.

Katsuyuki, Y. (1999). “Thirty Years of Being a Respondent in Antidumping Proceedings: Abuseof Economic Relief Can Have a Negative Impact on Competition Policy”. Journal of WorldTrade; V.33-#5, pp. 31-47.

Vandenbussche, Hylke (2000). “Trade Policy versus Competition Policy: Substitutes or

Complements”. De Economist; V.148-#5, pp. 625-642.

IV. Economic Consequences of Administered Protection

A. Basic Economic Analysis of Antidumping

Viner, Jacob (1923). “Ordinary Protective Tariffs as Safeguards against Dumping”. Chapter IXof Viner.

Viner, Jacob (1923). “Comparative Analysis of Antidumping Law”. Chapter XIV of Viner.

Wares, William (1977). “How the Importing Nation Should Regulate Dumping”. Chapter 3 ofThe Theory of Dumping and American Commercial Policy. Lexington: D.C. Heath, pp. 57-91.

Stegemann, Klaus (1982). “The Efficiency Rationale of Anti-Dumping Policy and otherMeasures of Contingency Protection”. In John Quinn and Philip Slayton, eds. Non-TariffBarriers After the Tokyo Round. Quebec: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, pp. 21-69.

Rousslang, Donald and John Suomela (1988). “Calculating the Welfare Costs of ImportRestrictions in the Imperfect Substitutes Model”. Applied Economics; V.20-#5, pp. 691-700.

Jones, Michael (1993). “The Geometry of Protectionism in the Imperfect Substitutes Model: AReminder”. Southern Economic Journal; V.60-#1, pp. 235-238.

Webb, Michael (1987). “Anti-Dumping Laws, Production Location and Prices”. Journal ofInternational Economics; V.22-#3/4, pp. 363-368.

Leidy, Michael and Bernard Hoekman (1990). “Production Effects of Price- and Cost- BasedAnti-dumping Laws Under Flexible Exchange Rates”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.23-#4,pp. 873-895.

Staiger, Robert and Frank Wolak (1992). “The Effect of Domestic Antidumping Law in thePresence of Foreign Monopoly”. Journal of International Economics; V.32-#3/4, pp. 265-287.

Willig, Robert (1998). “Economic Effects of Antidumping Policy”. in R. Lawrence ed.Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 57-79.

B. Antidumping Under Oligopoly

1. Basic Analysis

a. Homogeneous Products

Eichengreen, Barry and Hans van der Ven (1984). “US Antidumping Policies: The Case ofSteel”. in R. Baldwin and A. Krueger eds. The Structure and Evolution of Recent US. Trade

Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 67-109.

Webb, Michael (1992). “The Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-Dumping Laws”. EconomicInquiry; V.30-#3, pp. 437-448.

Ethier, Wilfred (1993). “An Antidumping Law with a Distorted Home Market”. in H. Herbergand N.V. Long, eds., Trade, Welfare and Economic Policies. Ann Arbor: University of MichiganPress, pp. 279-297.

Reitzes, James (1993). “Antidumping Policy”. International Economic Review; V.34-#4, pp.745-763.

b. Differentiated Products

Dixit, Avinash (1988). “Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties Under Oligopoly”. EuropeanEconomic Review; V.32-#1, pp. 55-68.

Prusa, Thomas (1994). “Pricing Behavior in the Presence of Antidumping Laws”. Journal ofEconomic Integration; V.9-#2, pp. 260-289.

Anderson, Simon, Nicholas Schmitt, and Jacques-Francois Thisse (1995). “Who Benefits fromAntidumping Legislation?”. Journal of International Economics; V.38-#3/4, pp. 321-337.

Bian, Jiang and Gerard Gaudet (1997). “Anti-dumping Laws and Oligopolistic Trade”. Journalof Economic Integration; V.12-#1, pp. 62-86.

Tivig, Thusnelda and Uwe Walz (2000). “Market Share, Cost-based Dumping and Anti-Dumping Policy”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.33-#1, pp. 69-86.

Pauwels, Wilfred, Hylke Vandenbussche, and Marcel Weverbergh (2001). “Strategic Behaviourunder European Antidumping Duties”. International Journal of Economics of Business; V.8-#1,pp. 101-122.

c. Spatial Models

Neven, Damien, George Norman and Jacques-Francois Thisse (1991). “Attitudes TowardForeign Products and International Price Competition”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.24-#1, pp. 1-11.


Barros, Pedro and Xavier Martinez-Giralt (1999). “On the Effects of Antidumping Legislation”.Regional Science and Urban Economics; V.29-#1, pp. 53-72.

Andaluz, Joaquin (2001). “The Effects of Antidumping Legislation on the Degree of ProductVariety and Social Welfare”. Annals of Regional Science; V.35-#4, pp. 561-575.

2. Antidumping and Collusion

Calvani, Terry and Randolph Tritell (1986). “Invocation of US Import Relief Laws as anAntitrust Violation”. Antitrust Bulletin; V.31-#?, pp. 527-550.

Krishna, Kala (1989). “Trade Restrictions as Facilitating Devices”. Journal of InternationalEconomics; V.26-#?, pp. 251-270.

Stegemann, Klaus (1990). “EC Anti-Dumping Policy: Are Price Undertakings a Legal Substitutefor Illegal Price Fixing?”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.126-#2, pp. 268-297.

Staiger, Robert and Frank Wolak (1991). “Strategic Use of Antidumping Law to Enforce TacitInternational Collusion”. ms: Stanford University.

Hartigan, James (1995). “Collusive Aspects of Cost Revelation Through AntidumpingComplaints”. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics; V.151-#3, pp. 478-489.

Veugelers, Reinhilde and Hylke Vandenbussche (1999). “European Anti-Dumping Policy andthe Profitability of National and International Collusion”. European Economic Review; V.43-#1,pp.1-28.

Pierce, Richard (2000). “Antidumping Law as a Means of Facilitating Cartelization”. AntitrustLaw Journal; V.67-#?, pp. 725-743.

Hartigan, James (2000). “An Antidumping Law Can Be Procompetitive”. Pacific EconomicReview; V.5-#1, pp. 5-14.

Zanardi, Maurizio (2004). “Antidumping Law as a Collusive Device”. Canadian Journal ofEconomics; V.37-#1, pp. 95-122.

Taylor, Christopher (2004). “The Economic Effects of Withdrawn Antidumping Investigations:Is there Evidence of Collusive Settlements?”. Journal of International Economics; V.62-#2, pp.295-312.

3. Antidumping with Vertical Market Structure

Hoekman, Bernard and Michael Leidy (1992). “Cascading Contingent Protection”. EuropeanEconomic Review; V.36-#4, pp. 883-892.

Feinberg, Richard and Seth Kaplan (1993). “Fishing Downstream: The Political Economy ofEffective Administered Protection”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.26-#1, pp. 150-158.

Sleuwaegen, Leo, Rene Belderbos, and Clive Jie-A-Joen (1997). “Cascading ContingentProtection and Vertical Market Structure”. International Journal of Industrial Organization;V.16-#6, pp. 697-718.

Bernhofen, Daniel (1995). “Price Dumping in Intermediate Goods Markets”. Journal ofInternational Economics; V.39-#1/2, pp. 159-173.

Bernhofen, Daniel (1996). “Vertical Integration and International Predation”. Review ofInternational Economics; V.4-#1, pp. 90-98.

Durling, James and Thomas Prusa (2003). “Using Safeguard Protection to Raise Rivals Costs”.Japan and the World Economy; V.15-#1, pp. 47-68.

Spencer, Barbara and Ronald Jones (1991). “Vertical Foreclosure and International TradePolicy”. Review of Economic Studies; V.58-#1, pp. 153-170.

Spencer, Barbara and Ronald Jones (1992). “Trade and Protection in Vertically RelatedMarkets”. Journal of International Economics; V.32-#1/2, pp. 31-55.

Rodrik, Dani and Chang-Ho Yoon (1995). “Strategic Trade Policy with Potential for ImportSubstitution”. Journal of Economic Development; V.20-#1, pp. 37-56.

Chang, Winston and Ki-Hong Park (1995). “Intermediate Input Dependency and Strategic TradePolicy”. in W. Chang and S. Katayama, eds. Imperfect Competition in International Trade.Boston: Kluwer, pp. 121-141.

Ziss, Steffen (1997). “Strategic Trade Policy and Vertical Structure”. Review of InternationalEconomics; V.5-#1, pp. 142-152.

Bernhofen, Daniel (1997). “Strategic Trade Policy in a Vertically Related Industry”. Review ofInternational Economics; V.5-#3, pp. 429-433.

Ishikawa, Jota and Ki-Dong Lee (1997). “Backfiring Tariffs in Vertically Related Markets”.Journal of International Economics; V.42-#3/4, pp. 395-423.

Ishikawa, Jota and Barbara Spencer (1999). “Rent-Shifting Export Subsidies with an ImportedIntermediate Good”. Journal of International Economics; V.48-#2, pp. 199-232.

Fargeix, Andre and Jeffrey Perloff (1989). “The Effect of Tariffs in Markets with VerticalRestraints”. Journal of International Economics; V.26-#1/2, pp. 99-117.

Nagaoka, Sadao and Akira Goto (1996). “Vertical Restraints and Market Access”. Empirica;V.24-#1/2, pp. 21-36.

Krishna, Kala and John Morgan (1998). “Implementing Results-Oriented Trade Policies: The

Case of the US-Japanese Auto Parts Dispute”. European Economic Review; V.42-#8, pp. 1443-1467.

C. Antidumping with FDI

1. Tariff Jumping in General

Smith, Alasdair (1987). “Strategic Investment, Multinational Corporations and Trade Policy”.European Economic Review; V.31-#1/2, pp. 89-96.

Brander, James and Barbara Spencer (1987). “Foreign Direct Investment with Unemploymentand Endogenous Taxes and Tariffs”. Journal of International Economics; V.22-#3/4, pp.257-279.

Horstmann, Ignatius and James Markusen (1991). “Endogenous Market Structures inInternational Trade (natura facit saltum)”. Journal of International Economics; V.32-#1/2, pp.109-129.

Rowthorn, Robert (1992). “Intra-industry Trade and Investment under Oligopoly: The Role ofMarket Size”. Economic Journal; V.102-#?, pp. 402-414.

Levy, Santiago and Sean Nolan (1992). “Trade and Foreign Investment Policy under ImperfectCompetition: Lessons for Developing Countries”. Journal of Development Economics; V.37-#1/2, pp. 31-62.

Motta, Massimo (1992). “Multinational Firms and the Tariff Jumping Argument: A GameTheoretic Analysis with Some Unconventional Conclusions”. European Economic Review;V.36-#8, pp. 1557-1771.

Flam, Harry (1994). “EC Members Fighting About Surplus: VERs, FDI and Japanese Cars”.Journal of International Economics; V.36-#1/2, pp. 117-131.

Sanna-Randaccio, Francesca (1996). New Protectionism and Multinational Companies”. Journalof International Economics; V.41-#1/2, pp. 29-51.

Horn, Henrik and Lars Persson (2001). “The Equilibrium Ownership of an InternationalOligopoly”. Journal of International Economics; V.53-#2, pp. 307-333.

Dehejia, Vivek and Alfons Weichenrieder (2001). “Tariff Jumping Foreign Investment andCapital Taxation”. Journal of International Economics; V.53-#1, pp. 223-230.

Xu, Yingfeng (2001). “Can Tariff-jumping Foreign Investment be Beneficial?”. Journal ofEconomic Development; V.26-#1, pp. 161-177.

Chaudhuri, Sarbajit and Ujjaini Mukherjee (2002). “Removal of Protectionism, Foreign

Investment and Welfare in a Model of Informal Sector”. Japan and the World Economy; V.14-#1, pp. 101-116.

Hwang, Hong and Chao-cheng Mai (2002). “The Tariff Jumping Argument and LocationTheory”. Review of International Economics; V.10-#2, pp. 361-368.

Neary, Peter (2002). “Foreign Direct Investment in the Single Market”. Manchester School;V.70-#3, pp. 291-314.

Neven, Damien and G. Siotis (1996). “Technology Sourcing and FDI in the EC: An EmpiricalEvaluation”. International Journal of Industrial Organization; V.14-#5, pp. 543-560.

2. Antidumping jumping

Blonigen, Bruce and Robert Feenstra (1997). “Protectionist Threats and Foreign DirectInvestment”. In R. Feenstra, ed. Effects of U.S. Trade Protection and Promotion Policies.Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 55-80.

Belderbos, Rene (1997). “Antidumping and Tariff Jumping: Japanese Firms’ DFI in theEuropean Union and the United States”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.133-#3, pp. 419-457.

Belderbos, Rene and Leo Sleuwaegen (1998). “Tariff Jumping DFI and Export Substitution:Japanese Electronics Firms in Europe”. International Journal of Industrial Organization; V.16-#5, pp. 601-638.

Haaland, Jan and Ian Wooton (1998). “Antidumping Jumping: Reciprocal Antidumping andIndustrial Location”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.134-#2, pp. 340-362.

Barrell, Ray and Nigel Pain (1999). “Trade Restraints and Japanese Direct Investment Flows”.European Economic Review; V.43-#1, pp. 29-45.

Girma, Sourafel, David Greenaway and Katherine Wakelin (2002). “Does AntidumpingStimulate FDI? Evidence from Japanese Firms in the UK”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.138-#3, pp. 414-436.

Blonigen, Bruce (2002). “Tariff Jumping Antidumping Duties”. Journal of InternationalEconomics; V.57-#1, pp. 31-49.

Belderbos, Rene (2003). “Antidumping and Foreign Divestment: Japanese ElectronicsMultinationals in the EU”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.139-#1, pp. 131-160.

Belderbos, Rene, Hylke Vandenbussche, and Reinhilde Veuglers (2004). “Price Undertakingsand Anti-Dumping Jumping in the European Union”. European Economic Review; V.48-#?, pp.429-453.

D. Antidumping under Incomplete/Asymmetric Information


Kohler, Philippe and Michael Moore (1998). “Design of an Antidumping Rule with incompleteInformation about Material Injury”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.13-#1, pp. 62-88.

Kohler, Philippe and Michael Moore (2001). “Injury-based Protection with Auditing underImperfect Information”. Southern Economic Journal; V.68-#1, pp. 42-59.

Kohler, Philippe and Michael Moore (2004). “The Safeguard Clause, Asymmetric Informationand Endogenous Protection”. Review of International Economics; forth.

Kolev, Dobrin and Thomas Prusa (2002). “Dumping and Double Crossing: The (In)Effectivenessof Cost-based Trade Policy under Incomplete Information”. International Economic Review;V.43-#3, pp. 895-918.

Cheng, Leonard, Larry Qiu, and Kit Pong Wong (2002). “Antidumping Measures as a Tool ofProtectionism: A Mechanism Design Approach”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.34-#3, pp.639-660.

E. Economic Analysis of Countervailing Duties

1. Basic Analysis with Competitive Markets

Viner, Jacob (1923). “Countervailing Measures against Official Export Subsidies”. Chapter X inDumping: A Problem in International Trade. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 163-191.

Sykes, Alan (1989). “Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective”. Columbia LawReview; V.89-#2, pp. 199-263.

Francois, Joseph (1992). “Countervailing the Effects of Subsidies: An Economic Analysis”.Journal of World Trade; V.26-#1, pp. 5-13.

Morkre, Morris (1993). “The Effect of Subsidized Imports on Domestic Industry: A Comparisonof Market Structures”. Journal of Policy Modeling; V.15-#1, pp. 49-61.

2. Oligopolistic Markets

Dixit, Avinash (1988). “Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties Under Oligopoly”. EuropeanEconomic Review; V.32-#1, pp. 55-68. [Comment by Collie, 1991, V.35-#5, pp. 1185-87.]

Spencer, Barbara (1988). “Countervailing Duty Laws and Subsidies to Imperfectly CompetitiveIndustries”. in Baldwin, et al., eds. Issues in US-EC Trade Relations. Chicago: University of

Chicago Press/NBER; pp. 313-334.

Spencer, Barbara (1988). “Capital Subsidies and Countervailing Duties in OligopolisticIndustries”. Journal of International Economics; V.25-#1/2, pp. 45-69.

Gasiorek, M., Alasdair Smith and Anthony Venables (1989). “Tariffs, Subsidies andRetaliation”. European Economic Review; V.33-#2/3, pp. 480-489.

Collie, David (1991). “Export Subsidies and Countervailing Tariffs”. Journal of InternationalEconomics; V.31-#3/4, pp. 309-324.

Collie, David (1992). “Export Subsidies, Entry Deterrence and Countervailing Tariffs”.Manchester School; V.60-#2, pp. 136-151.

Collie, David (1994). “Strategic Trade Policy and Retaliation”. Japan and the World Economy;v.6-#1, pp. 75-88.

Collie, David (1994). “Endogenous Timing in Trade Policy Games: Should Governments UseCountervailing Duties?”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.130-#1, pp. 191-209.

Qiu, Larry (1995). “Why Can’t Countervailing Duties Deter Export Subsidization?”. Journal ofInternational Economics; V.39-#3/4, pp. 249-272.

F. Empirical Research on Scope and Consequences of ADD/CVD

1. Scope

Gard, Linda and James Riedel (1980). “Safeguard Protection of Industry in Developed Countries:Assessment of Implications for Developing Countries”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.116-#3,pp. 471-492.

Finger, J. Michael (1981). “The Industry-Country Incidence of Less-than-Fair-Value Cases in USImport Trade”. Quarterly Review of Economics and Business; V.21-#5, pp. 260-279.

Hansen, Wendy and Thomas Prusa (1995). “The Road Most Taken: The Rise of Title VIIProtection”. World Economy; V.18-#2, pp. 295-313.

Nagaoka, Sadao (1996). “Antidumping Policy and Competition”. Private Sector DevelopmentDepartment Occasional Paper; #13, Washington D.C.: World Bank.

Miranda, Jorge, Raul Torres, and Mario Ruiz (1998). “The International Use of Antidumping,1987-1997”. Journal of World Trade; V.32-#1, pp. 5-71.

Finger, J. Michael, Frances Ng, and Sonam Wangchuk (2000). “Antidumping As SafeguardPolicy”. Ms: The World Bank.

Bown, Chad, Bernard Hoekman and Caglar Ozden (2003). “The Pattern of U.S. Antidumping:The Path from Initial Filing to WTO Dispute Settlement”. World Trade Review; V.2-#3, pp. 349-371.

Zanardi, Maurizio (2004). “Antidumping: What Are the Numbers to Discuss at Doha?”. WorldEconomy; V.27-#3, pp.403-433.

Niels, Gunnar and Adriaan Ten Kate (2004). “Antidumping Protection in a Liberalising Country:Mexico’s Antidumping Policy and Practice”. World Economy; forthcoming.

2. Consequences for home firm/industry

a. Multi-Sector

Hartigan, James, Philip Perry and Sreenivas Kamma (1986). “The Value of AdministeredProtection: A Capital Market Approach”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.68-#4, pp. 610-617.

Hartigan, James, Sreenivas Kamma and Philip Perry (1989). “The Injury Determination Categoryand the Value of Relief from Dumping”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.71-#1, pp. 183-186.

Hansen, Wendy and Thomas Prusa (1993). “Does Administrative Protection Protect? AReexamination of the US Title VII and Escape Clause Statutes”. Regulation; V.16, pp. 35-43.

Shin, Hyun Ja (1998). “Possible Instances of Predatory Pricing in Recent U.S. AntidumpingCases”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 81-97.

Nieberding, James (1999). “The Effect of US Antidumping Law on Firms’ Market Power: AnEmpirical Test”. Review of Industrial Organization; V.14-#1, pp. 65-84.

Asche, Frank (2001). “Testing the Effect of an Antidumping Duty: The US Salmon Market”.Empirical Economics; V.26-#?, pp. 343-355.

Messerlin, Patrick (1989). “The EC Antidumping Regulations: A First Economic Appraisal”.Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.125-#3, pp. 562-587.

Bourgeois, Jacques and Patrick Messerlin (1998). “The European Community’s Experience”. inR. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 127-145.

Konings, Jozef and Hylke Vandenbussche (2005). “Antidumping Protection and the Markups ofDomestic Firms”. Journal of International Economics; V.65-#1, pp. 151-165.

Dutz, Mark (1998). “Economic Impact of Canadian Antidumping Law”. in R. Lawrence ed.

Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 99-125.

b. Steel

Adams, Walter and Joel Dirlam (1979). “Unfair Competition in International Trade”. in Tariffs,Quotas and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism. San Francisco: ICS, pp. 95-107.

Dirlam, Joel and Hans Mueller (1982). “Import Restraints and Reindustrialization: The Case ofthe US Steel Industry”. Journal of International Law; V.14-#3, pp. 419-446.

Cline, William (1986). “US Trade and Industrial Policy: The Experience of Textiles, Steel andAutomobiles”. in P. Krugman, ed. Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics.Cambridge: MIT, pp. 211-239.

Hartigan, James, Sreenivas Kamma and Philip Perry (1990). “Bifurcated vs. Single InjuryDetermination in USITC Antidumping Investigations”. Journal of International EconomicIntegration; V.5-#1, pp. 47-63.

Hartigan, James, Sreenivas Kamma and Philip Perry (1994). “Are Subsidies More Dangerousthan Dumping: Evidence From the Wealth Effects for the Steel Industry”. Journal of EconomicIntegration; V.9-#1, pp. 45-61.

Lenway, Stefanie, Kathleen Rehbein and Laura Starks (1990). “The Impact of Protectionism onFirm Wealth: The Experience of the Steel Industry”. Southern Economic Journal; V.56-#4, pp.1079-1093.

Lenway, Stefanie, Randall Morck, and Bernard Yeung (1996). “Rent Seeking, Protectionism andInnovation in the American Steel Industry”. Economic Journal; V.106-#435, pp. 410-421.

Chung, Jae (1998). “Effects of U.S. Trade Remedy Law Enforcement under Uncertainty: TheCase of Steel”. Southern Economic Journal; V.65-#1, pp. 151-159.

Prusa, Thomas and David Sharp (2001). “Simultaneous Equations in AntidumpingInvestigations”. Journal of Forensic Economics; V.14-#1, pp. 63-78.

c. Chemicals

Krupp, Corinne and Patricia Pollard (1996). “Market Responses to Antidumping Laws: SomeEvidence from the US Chemical Industry”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.29-#1, pp. 199-227.

d. Semiconductors

Flamm, Kenneth (1992). “Strategic Arguments for Semiconductor Trade Policy”. Review ofIndustrial Organization; V.7-#3/4, pp. 295-325.

Flamm, Kenneth (1996). Mismanaged Trade? Strategic Policy and The Semiconductor Industry.Washington, DC: Brookings.

Mahdavi, Mahnaz and Amala Bhagwati (1994). “Stock Market Data and Trade Policy: Dumpingin the Semiconductor Industry”. International Trade Journal; V.8-#2, pp. 207-221.

Hughes, John, Judy Rayburn and Stefanie Lenway (1997). “Stock Price Effects of US TradePolicy Responses to Japanese Practices in Semiconductors”. Canadian Journal of Economics;V.30-#4, pp. 922-942..

Messerlin, Patrick and Yoshiyuki Noguchi (1998). “Antidumping Policies in ElectronicProducts”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings Trade Forum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp.147-171.

Gruber, Harald (1998). “Antidumping Actions in High Technology Industries: The Case ofSemiconductors”. In Gary Cook, ed. Freedom and Trade, V.II: The Economics and Politics ofInternational Trade. New York: Routledge, pp. 169-184.

Irwin, Douglas (1998). “The Semiconductor Industry”. in R. Lawrence ed. Brookings TradeForum 1998. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 173-200.

3. Consequences for the home economy

Finger, J. Michael and Tracy Murray (1990). “Policing Unfair Imports: The US Example”.Journal of World Trade; V.24-#4, pp. 39-53.

DeVault, James (1990). “The Administration of US Antidumping Duties: Some EmpiricalObservations”. World Economy; V.13-#1, pp. 75-88.

Anderson, Keith (1993). “Antidumping Laws in the United States–Use and WelfareConsequences”. Journal of World Trade; V.27-#2, pp. 99-117.

DeVault, James (1993). “The Impact of US Unfair Trade Laws: A Preliminary Assessment”.Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.129-#4, pp. 735-751.

Lichtenberg, Frank and Hong Tan (1994). “An Industry Level Analysis of Import Relief PetitionsFiled by US Manufacturers, 1958-1985”. In Hong Tan and Haru Shimada, eds. TroubledIndustries in the United States and Japan. New York, St. Martins, pp. 161-188.

Staiger, Robert and Frank Wolak (1994). “The Trade Effects of Antidumping Law: Theory andEvidence”. in A. Deardorff and R. Stern, eds. Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the GlobalTrading System. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 231-261.

DeVault, James (1996). “The Welfare Effects of US Antidumping Duties”. Open EconomiesReview; V.7-#1, pp. 19-33.

Marvel, Howard and Edward Ray (1995). “Countervailing Duties”. Economic Journal; V.105-#433, pp. 1576-1593.

Messerlin, Patrick and Geoffrey Reed (1995). “Antidumping Policies in the US and the EC”.Economic Journal; V.105-#433, pp. 1565-1575.

Prusa, Thomas (1997). “The Trade Effects of U.S. Antidumping Actions”. In R. Feenstra, ed.The Effects of US Trade Protection and Promotion Policies. Chicago: University of ChicagoPress/NBER, pp. 191-213.

Lloyd, Tim, Oliver Morrissey, and Geoffrey Reed (1998). “Estimating the Impact of Anti-Dumping and Anti-Cartel Actions using Intervention Analysis”. Economic Journal; V.108-#448,pp. 458-476.

Konings, Josef, Hylke Vandenbussche, and Linda Springael (2001). “Import Diversion underEuropean Antidumping Policy”. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade; V.1-#3, pp. 283-299.

Lasagni, A. (2000). “Does Country Targeted Antidumping Policy by the EU Create TradeDiversion?”. Journal of World Trade. V.34-#4, pp. 137-159.

Brenton, Paul (2001). “Anti-dumping Policies in the EU and Trade Diversion”. EuropeanJournal of Political Economy; V.17-#?, pp. 593-607.

Vandenbussche. Hylke and Xavier Wauthy (2001),”Inflicting Injury Through Product Quality:How EU Antidumping Policy Disadvantages European Producers”, European Journal ofPolitical Economy, V.17-#?, pp. 101-116.

Vandenbussche, Hylke, Reinhilde Veuglers, and Jozef Konings (2001). “Union Wage Bargainingand EU Antidumping Policy”. Oxford Economic Papers; V.53-#2, pp. 297-317.

Conway, Patrick and Sumana Dhar (1994). “The Economic Effects of Widespread Application ofAnti-dumping Duties to Import Pricing”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.9-#2, pp. 172-197.

Gallaway, Michael, Bruce Blonigen, and Joseph Flynn (1999). “Welfare Cost of the USAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Law”. Journal of International Economics; V.49-#2, pp.211-244. [erratum in V.52-#1.]

Prusa, Thomas (2001). “On the Spread and Impact of Antidumping”. Canadian Journal ofEconomics; V.34-#3, pp. 591-611.

Blonigen, Bruce and Thomas Prusa (2003). “The Cost of Antidumping: The Devil is in theDetails”. Journal of Policy Reform; V.6-#4, pp. 233-245.

4. Consequences for foreign firms

Herander, Mark and J. Brad Schwartz (1984). “An Empirical Test of the Impact of the Threat ofUS Trade Policy: The Case of Antidumping Duties”. Southern Economic Journal; V.51-#1, pp.59-79.

Tarr, David (1987). “Effects of Restraining Steel Exports from the Republic of Korea and OtherCountries to the US and the EEC”. World Bank Economic Review; V.1-#3, pp. 397-418.

Rehbein, Kathleen and Laura Starks (1995). “Changes in US Trade Policies: The Wealth Effectson Japanese Steel Firms”. Japan and the World Economy; v.7-#3, pp. 309-327.

Melvin, Michael and Qian Sun (1997). “U.S. protectionist policy and stock prices of U.S. import-competing and Korean and Taiwanese export-oriented firms”. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,V.5-#1, pp. 1-23.

Blonigen, Bruce and Stephen Haynes (2002). “Antidumping Investigations and the Pass-Throughof Antidumping Duties and Exchange Rates”. American Economic Review; V.92-#4, pp. 144-1061.

Blonigen, Bruce and Jee-Hyeong Park (2004). “Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of AntidumpingPolicy: Theory and Evidence”. American Economics Review; V.94-#1, pp. 134-154.

V. Political Economy of Administered Protection

A. Lobbying for Administered Protection

1. Indirect Lobbying

Leidy, Michael (1994). “Trade Policy and Indirect Rent Seeking: A Synthesis of Recent Work”.Economics & Politics; V.6-#2, pp. 97-118.

Hoekman, Bernard and Michael Leidy (1990). “Policy Responses to Shifting ComparativeAdvantage: Designing a System of Emergency Protection”. Kyklos; V.43-#1, pp. 25-51.

Hillman, Arye, Eliakim Katz and Jacob Rosenberg (1987). “Workers as Insurance: AnticipatedGovernment Assistance and Factor Demand”. Oxford Economic Papers; V.39-#4, 813-820.

Leidy, Michael and Bernard Hoekman (1991). “Spurious Injury as Indirect Rent-Seeking: FreeTrade under the Prospect of Protection”. Economics & Politics; V.3-#2, pp. 111-137.

Ethier, Wilfred and Ronald Fischer (1987). “The New Protectionism”. Journal of InternationalEconomic Integration; V.2-#2, pp. 1-11.

Fischer, Ronald (1992). “Endogenous Probability of Protection and Firm Behavior”. Journal ofInternational Economics; V.32-#1/2, pp. 149-163.


Anderson, James (1992). “Domino Dumping I: Competitive Exporters”. American EconomicReview; V.82-#1, pp. 65-83.

Reitzes, James (1993). “Antidumping Policy”. International Economic Review; V.34-#4, pp.745-763.

Cassing, James (1994). “Strategic Responses to Antidumping Laws and Legal Interpretations:Producing for Export Markets using Lawyers and Other Factors of Production”. Journal ofEconomic Integration; V.9-#2, pp. 156-171.

Leidy, Michael (1994). “Quid Pro Quo Restraint and Spurious Injury: Subsidies and the Prospectof CVDs”. In Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern, eds. Analytical and Negotiating Issues in theGlobal Trading System. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 263-305.

Prusa, Thomas (1994). “Pricing Behavior in the Presence of Antidumping Laws”. Journal ofEconomic Integration; V.9-#2, pp. 260-289.

Blonigen, Bruce and Yuka Ohno (1998). “Endogenous Protection, Foreign Direct Investment andProtection Building Trade”. Journal of International Economics; V.46-#2, pp. 205-227.

2. Direct Lobbying

a. Basic Theory

Das, Satya (1990). “Foreign Lobbying and the Political Economy of Protection”. Japan and theWorld Economy; V.2-#2, pp. 169-179.

A.L. Hillman and H. Ursprung (1988). “Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and InternationalTrade Policy”. AER; V.78-#4, pp. 729-745. [comment by Hofer/Woodruf, AER; V.84-#5, pp.1474-1475.]

Steagall, Jeffrey (1995). Strategic Behavior and the United States Unfair Trade Statutes. NewYork: Garland.

Cassing, James and Ted To (2003). “Antidumping, Signaling and Cheap Talk”. Ms: US-BLS.

Kohler, Philippe and Michael Moore (2004). “The Safeguard Clause, Asymmetric Informationand Endogenous Protection”. Review of International Economics; forth.

b. Lobbying with VER

Anderson, James (1993). “Domino Dumping II: Anti-dumping”. Journal of International

Economics; V.35-#1/2, pp. 133-150.

Anderson, James (1994). “Strategic Lobbying and Antidumping”. Journal of EconomicIntegration; V.9-#2, pp. 129-155.

Moore, Michael and Steven Suranovic (1992). “Lobbying vs. Administered Protection:Endogenous Industry Choice and National Welfare”. Journal of International Economics; V.32-#3/4, pp. 289-303.

Moore, Michael and Steven Suranovic (1994). “Welfare Effects of Introducing AntidumpingProcedures in a Trade-Liberalizing Country”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.9-#2, pp. 241-229.

Schuknecht, Ludger and Joerg Stephan (1994). “EC Trade Protection Law: Produmping orAntidumping?”. Public Choice; V.80-#1/2, pp. 143-156.

Rosendorff, B. Peter (1996). “Voluntary Export Restraints, Antidumping Procedure andDomestic Politics”. American Economics Review; V.86-#3, pp. 544-561.

c. Lobbying with settlement

Prusa, Thomas (1991). “The Selection of Antidumping Cases for ITC Determination”. in R.Baldwin, ed. Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy. Chicago: University of ChicagoPress/NBER, pp. 47-71.

Prusa, Thomas (1992). “Why are So Many Antidumping Petitions Withdrawn”. Journal ofInternational Economics; V.33-#1/2, pp. 1-20.

Panagariya, Arvind and Poonam Gupta (1998). “Anti-Dumping versus Price Negotiation”. WorldEconomy; V.21-#8, pp. 1003-1019.

Gupta, Poonam (1999). “Why Do Firms Pay Antidumping Duty?”. IMF Working Paper;WP/99/166.

3. Empirics on Filing

a. Macroeconomic Determinants

(1) Escape Clause Cases

Takacs, Wendy (1981). “Pressures for Protectionism: An Empirical Analysis”. EconomicInquiry; V.19-#4, pp. 687-693.

Feigenbaum, Susan, Henry Ortiz and Thomas Willett (1985). “Protectionist Pressures andAggregate Economic Conditions: Comment on Takacs”. Economic Inquiry; V.23-#1, pp. 175-

182. [Response by Takacs, V.23-#1, pp. 183-184.]

Feigenbaum, Susan and Thomas Willett (1985). “Domestic versus International Influences onProtectionist Pressures in the US”. in S. Arndt, R. Sweeney and T. Willett, eds. Exchange Rates,Trade and The US Economy. Cambridge: Ballinger, pp. 181-190.

Shughart, William and Robert Tollison (1985). “The Cyclical Character of Regulatory Activity”.Public Choice; V.45-#3, pp. 303-311.

Salvatore, Dominick (1987). “Import Penetration, Exchange Rates, and Protectionism in the US”.Journal of Policy Modelling; V.9-#1, pp. 125-141.

Grilli, Enzo (1988). “Macro-economic Determinants of Trade Protection”. World Economy;V.11-#3, pp. 313-326.

Grilli, Enzo (1991). “Contemporary Protectionism in an Unstable World Economy”. In GerhardFels and George Sutija, eds. Protectionism and International Banking. London: Macmillan, pp.144-172.

Coughlin, Cletus, Joseph Terza and Noor Kahlifah (1989). “The Determinants of Escape ClausePetitions”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.71-#2, pp. 341-347.

(2) Antidumping Cases

Feinberg, Robert (1989). “Exchange Rates and ‘Unfair Trade’”. Review of Economics andStatistics; V.71-#4, pp. 704-707.

Salvatore, Dominick (1989). “A Model of Dumping and Protectionism in the United States”.Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.125-#4, pp. 763-781.

Leidy, Michael (1997). “Macroeconomic Conditions and Pressures for Protection underAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws: Empirical Evidence from the US”. IMF StaffPapers; V.44-#1, pp. 132-144.

Knetter, Michael and Thomas Prusa (2003). “Macroeconomic Factors and Antidumping Filings:Evidence from Four Countries”. Journal of International Economics; V.61-#1, pp. 1-17.

Francois, Joseph and Gunnar Niels (2003). “Business Cycles, the Current Account, andAdministered Protection in Mexico”. Review of Development Economics; forth.

b. Micro determinants

(1) Correlates of Filing

Feinberg, Richard and Barry Hirsch (1989). “Industry Rent-Seeking and the Filing of ‘Unfair’

Trade Complaints”. International Journal of Industrial Organization; V.7-#3, pp. 325-340.

Lenway, Stefanie and Kathleen Rehbein (1989). “Rent Seekers in the U.S. International TradeCommission Escape Clause Investigations”. International Trade Journal; V.4-#2, pp. 119-142.

Hansen, Wendy (1990). “The International Trade Commission and the Politics of Protection”.American Political Science Review; V.84-#1, pp. 21-46.

Lichtenberg, Frank and Hong Tan (1994). “An Industry-Level Analysis of Import Relief PetitionsFiled by US Manufacturers, 1958-1985”. In Hong Tan and Haru Shimada, eds. TroubledIndustries in the United States and Japan. New York: St. Martins Press, pp. 161-188.

Sabry, Faten (2000). “An Analysis of the Decision to File, the Dumping Estimates, and theOutcome of Antidumping Petitions”. International Trade Journal; V.14-#2, pp. 109-145.

Gilligan, Michael (1997). “Lobbying as a Private Good with Intra-Industry Trade”. InternationalStudies Quarterly; V.41-#3, pp. 455-474.

Olson, Kara (2004). “Free Riders Among Rent-Seekers: A Model of Firm Participation inAntidumping Petitions”. Ms: American University.

Krupp, Corinne (1994). “Antidumping Cases in the US Chemical Industry: A Panel DataApproach”. Journal of Industrial Economics; V.42-#?, pp. 299-311.

Chung, Jae (1999). “Insights into Trade Protection under U.S. Trade Remedy Laws”. Journal ofPolicy Modeling; V.21-#3, pp. 375-387. [steel]

Lenway, Stefanie and Douglas Schuler (1991). “The Determinants of Corporate PoliticalInvolvement in Trade Protection: The Case of the Steel Industry”. In R. Baldwin, ed. EmpiricalStudies of Commercial Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 75-105.

Morck, Randall, Jungsywan Sepanski, and Bernard Yeung (2001). “Habitual and OccasionalLobbyers in the U.S. Steel Industry: An EM Algorithm Pooling Approach” Economic Inquiry;V.39-#3, pp. 365-78.

(2) Process filing v. outcome filing



Staiger, Robert and Frank Wolak (1994). “Measuring Industry-specific Protection: Antidumping

in the US”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity; 1994: Microeconomics, pp. 51-118.

Staiger, Robert and Frank Wolak (1996). “Differences in Uses and Effects of Antidumping LawAcross Import Sources”. in A. Krueger, ed. The Political Economy of American Trade Policy.Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 385-415.

4. Empirics on Final Outcomes

a. The ITA’s LTFV Decision

Finger, J. Michael, H. Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982). “The Political Economy ofAdministered Protection”. American Economics Review; V.72-#3, pp. 452-466.


Baldwin, Robert and Michael Moore (1992). “Political Aspects of the Administration of theTrade Remedy Law”. in R. Boltuck and R. Litan, eds. Down in the Dumps: Administration of theUnfair Trade Laws. Washington, DC: Brookings, pp. 253-280.

Hansen, Wendy and K. O. Park (1995). Nation-state and pluralistic decision making in tradepolicy: The case of the international trade administration. International Studies Quarterly; V.39-#2, pp. 181-211.

Sabry, Faten (2000). “An Analysis of the Decision to File, the Dumping Estimates, and theOutcome of Antidumping Petitions”. International Trade Journal; V.14-#2, pp. 109-145.

Moore, Michael (2004). “An Econometric Analysis of U.S. Sunset Reviews”. Ms: GeorgeWashington University.

b. The ITC’s Injury Decision

(1) Final decision

(a) Regulation Theoretic Framework


Finger, J. Michael, H. Keith Hall and Douglas Nelson (1982). “The Political Economy ofAdministered Protection”. American Economics Review; V.72-#3, pp. 452-466.

Herander, Mark and J. Brad Schwartz (1984). “An Empirical Test of the Impact of the Threat ofUS Trade Policy: The Case of Antidumping Duties”. Southern Economic Journal; V.51-#1, pp.

59-79.

Baldwin, Robert (1985). The Political Economy of US Import Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Hansen, Wendy (1990). Regulatory Theory and Its Application to Trade Policy: A Study of ITCDecision Making, 1975-1985. New York: Garland Press.

Rehbein, Kathleen and Stefanie Lenway (1993). “Industry Structure or Managerial Discretion:The Determinants of Industry Political Success in the U.S. International Trade Commission’sEscape Clause Investigations”. In J. Post, ed. Research in corporate social performance andpolicy. Volume 14. Greenwich, Conn: JAI press, pp. 3-18.

Czinkota, Michael and Masaki Kotabe (1997). “A Marketing Perspective on the US ITC’sAntidumping Actions: An Empirical Inquiry”. Journal of World Business; V32-#2, pp. 169-187.

(b) Congressional dominance framework

Lenway, Stefanie, Carol Jacobson, and Judith Goldstein (1989). “To Lobby or to Petition: ThePolitical Environment of U.S. Trade Policy”. Journal of Management; V.16-#1, pp. 119-134.

Goldstein, Judith and Stefanie Lenway (1989). “Interests or Institutions: An Inquiry intoCongressional-ITC Relations”. International Studies Quarterly; V.33-#3, pp. 303-327.

Hansen, Wendy (1990). “The International Trade Commission and the Poltics of Protection”.American Political Science Review; V.84-#1, pp. 21-46.

Prusa, Thomas (1991). “The Selection of Antidumping Cases for ITC Determination”. in R.Baldwin, ed. Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy. Chicago: University of ChicagoPress/NBER, pp. 47-71.

Anderson, Keith (1993). “Agency Discretion or Statutory Direction: Decision Making at the USITC”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.36-#2, pp. 915-935.

Rowley, Charles and Willem Thorbecke (1996). “Congressional Influence over Decision-Makingat the ITC”. In F. Schneider and J. Casas Pardo, eds. Current Issues in Public Choice.Cheltenham: Elgar, pp. 189-199.

Hansen, Wendy and Thomas Prusa (1996). “Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum ofthe Parts is Greater than the Whole”. Economic Inquiry; V.34-#4, pp. 746-769.

Hansen, Wendy and Thomas Prusa (1997). “The Economics and Politics of Trade Policy: AnEmpirical Analysis of ITC Decision Making”. Review of International Economics; V.5-#2, pp.230-245.

Gasmi, Farid, Wendy Hansen, and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1997). “Une analyse empirique des

décisions en matière d’antidumping aux États-Unis”. L’Actualite Economique; V.73-#1/2/3, pp.423-456.

Drope, Jeffrey and Wendy Hansen (2004). “Purchasing Protection? The Effect of PoliticalSpending on US Trade Policy”. Political Research Quarterly; V.57-#1, pp. 27-37.

Magee, Stephen and Leslie Young (1987). “Endogenous Protection in the United States, 1900-1984”. In R. Stern, ed. U.S. Trade Policy in a Changing World Economy. Cambridge: MIT Press,pp. 145-195. [section 4.7, pp. 183-185.]

Goldstein, Judith (1986). “The Political Economy of Trade: Institutions of Protection”. AmericanPolitical Science Review; V.80-#1, pp. 161-184.

Cumby, Robert and Theodore Moran (1997). “Testing Models of the Trade Policy Process:Antidumping and the ‘New Issues’”. In R. Feenstra, ed. The Effect of U.S. Trade Protection andPromotion Policies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 161-190.

(2) Commissioner votes

Moore, Michael (1992). “Rules or Politics? An Empirical Analysis of Antidumping Decisions”.Economic Inquiry; V.30-#3, pp. 449-466.

Baldwin, Robert and Jeffrey Steagall (1994). “An Analysis of Factors Influencing ITC Decisionsin Antidumping, Countervailing Duty and Safeguards Cases”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv;V.130-#2, pp. 290-307.

DeVault, James (1993). “Economics and the International Trade Commission”. SouthernEconomic Journal; V60-#2, pp. 463-478.

DeVault, James (2002). “Congressional Dominance and the International Trade Commission”.Public Choice; V.110-#1/2, pp. 1-22.

Butler, David (1995). Does ‘Independent’ Mean ‘Free From Influence’?: Escape ClauseDecision Making at the U.S. International Trade Commission. New York: Garland Press.

Liebman, Benjamin (2004). “ITC Voting Behavior on Sunset Cases”. WeltwirtschaftlichesArchiv; V.140-#3, pp. 446-475.

Mah, Jai (2000). “Antidumping Decisions and Macroeconomic Variables in the USA”. AppliedEconomics; V.32-#13, pp. 1701-1709.

Mah, Jai (2000). “The United States’ Antidumping Decisions Against the Northeast AsianDynamic Economies”. World Economy; V.23-#5, pp. 721-732.

Lee, Kyung-Ho and Jai Mah (2003). “Institutional Changes and Antidumping Decisions in the

United States”. Journal of Policy Modelling; V.25-#6/7, pp. 555-565.

c. Presidential Preferences and Discretion

Baldwin, Robert (1981). “US Political Pressures Against Adjustment to Greater Imports”. in W.Hong and L. Krause, eds. Trade and Growth in the Advanced Developing Countries of thePacific Basin. Seoul: Korea Development Institute.

Boadu, Fred, Fred Ruppel and Amy Angel (1992). “An Empirical Model of PresidentialPopularity and Presidential Discretion in Trade Restrictions”. European Journal of PoliticalEconomy; V.8-#2, pp. 281-293.

d. Case Studies of High Track Politics

Nelson, Douglas (1989). “On the High Track to Protection: The US Automobile Industry, 1979-1981”. in S. Haggard and C. Moon, eds. Pacific Dynamics. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 97-128.

Hamilton, Carl (1989). “The Political Economy of Transient ‘New’ Protectionism”.Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.125-#3, pp. 522-546.

Krueger, Anne, ed. (1995). The Political Economy of American Trade Policy. Chicago:University of Chicago Press/NBER.

Baron, David (1997). “Integrated Strategy and International Trade Disputes: The Kodak-FujifilmCase”. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy; V.6-#2, pp. 291-346.

Brook, Douglas (2003). “Trade Policy Strategies and Enforcement Choices: An Examination ofthe 1992 Steel Antidumping Cases”. International Trade Journal; V.17-#1, pp. 81-100.

e. Comparative Analysis

Messerlin, Patrick (1990). “The EC Antidumping Regulations: A First Economic Appraisal”.Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.126-#3, pp. 562-587.

Thrakan, P.K. Matthew (1991). “The Poltical Economy of Antidumping Undertakings in theEuropean Communities”. European Economic Review; V.35-#6, pp. 1341-1359.

Thrakan, P.K. Matthew and Jean Waelbroeck (1994). “Antidumping and Countervailing DutyDecisions in the EC and in the US: An Experiment in Comparative Political Economy”.European Economic Review; V.38-#1, pp. 171-193.

Thrakan, P.K. Matthew and Jean Waelbroeck (1994). “Determinants of Antidumping andCountervailing Duty Decisions in the European Communities”. In M. Dewatripont and V.Ginsburgh, eds. European Economic Integration: A Challenge to a Changing World.

Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 181-199.

Eymann, Angelika and Ludger Schuknecht (1996). “Antidumping Policy in the EuropeanCommunity: Political Discretion or Technical Determination”. Economics & Politics; V.8-#2,pp. 111-131.

Feaver, Donald (1997). “A Regulatory Analysis of Australia’s Anti-Dumping Law and Policy:Statutory Failure or Regulatory Capture?”. Australian Journal of Public Administration; V.56-#4, pp. 67-77.

Feaver, Donald and Kenneth Wilson (1998). “Unlocking Australia’s Contingent Protection BlackBox”. Economic Record; V.74-#224, pp. 62-73.

Feaver, Donald and Kenneth Wilson (1999). “Unravelling Causation: An Empirical Analysis ofContingent Protection in Australia”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.135-#4, pp. 692-708.

Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka (2001). “Trade Policy in Transition? The Political Economy ofAntidumping in Japan”. Journal of Asian Pacific Economy; V.6-#1, pp. 22-46.

Francois, Joseph and Gunnar Niels (2004). “Political Influence in a New Antidumping Regime:Evidence from Mexico”. MS: Tinbergen Institute.

B. Explaining the Existence and Aggregate Effects of Antidumping Law

1. Citizen Centered Models: Domestic Political Economy

Hall, H. Keith and Douglas Nelson (1989). “Institutional Structure and Time Horizon in a SimplePolitical-Economy Model: The Lowi Effect”. International Spectator; V.24-#3/4, pp.153-173.

Hall, H. Keith and Douglas Nelson (1992). “Institutional Structure in the Political Economy ofProtection: Legislated versus Administered Protection”. Economics & Politics; V.4-#1, pp. 61-77.

Mayer, Wolfgang (1999). “The Political Economy of Administering Trade Laws”. in J. Piggottand A. Woodland, eds. International Trade Policy and the Pacific Rim. London: Macmillan, pp.245-262.

Moore, Michael (1992). “Bureaucratic Trade Policy Decisions as a Repeated Game”. Journal ofInstitutional and Theoretical Economics; V.148-#4, pp. 607-627.

Anderson, James and Maurizio Zanardi (2004). “Political Pressure Deflection”. NBER WorkingPaper; #10439.

Hoekman, Bernard and Michael Leidy (1990). “Policy Responses to Shifting ComparativeAdvantage: Designing a System of Emergency Protection”. Kyklos; V.43-#1, pp. 25-51. [also in

Robert Stern, ed., The Multilateral Trading System: Analysis and Options for Change. AnnArbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 255-275.]

2. State Centered Models

a. Fairness and the Conservative Social Welfare Function

Corden, W. Max (1974). Trade Policy and Economic Welfare. Oxford: OUP. pp. 104-112.

Corden, W. Max (1986). “Policies Towards Market Disturbance”. In Richard Snape, ed. Issues inWorld Trade Policy. London: Macmillan.

Deardorff, Alan (1993). “Safeguards and the Conservative Social Welfare Function”. In HenrykKierzkowski, ed. Protection and Competition in International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 22-40. [also in Robert Stern, ed., The Multilateral Trading System: Analysis and Options forChange. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 233-254.]

Fischer, Ronald and Thomas Prusa (2003). “WTO Exceptions as Insurance”. Review ofInternational Economics; V.11-#5, pp. 745-757.

b. Liberalization centered models

Bagwell, Kyle and Robert Staiger (1990). “A Theory of Managed Trade”. American EconomicReview; V.80-#4, pp.779-795.

Hansen, Wendy and K. O. Park (1995). Nation-state and Pluralistic Decision Making in TradePolicy: The Case of the International Trade Administration. International Studies Quarterly;V.39-#2, pp. 181-211.

Anderson, Simon and Nicolas Schmitt (2003). “Nontariff Barriers and Trade Liberalization”.Economic Inquiry; V.41-#1, pp. 80-97.

c. Retaliation centered models


Bian, Jiang and Gerard Gaudet (1997). “Anti-dumping Laws and Oligopolistic Trade”. Journalof Economic Integration; V.12-#1, pp. 62-86.

Furusawa, Taiji and Thomas Prusa (1996). “Antidumping Enforcement in a Reciprocal Model ofDumping: Theory and Evidence”. Ms: Rutgers.

Gawande, Kishore (1995). “Are U.S. Nontariff Barriers Retaliatory? An Application of ExtremeBounds Analysis in the Tobit Model”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.77-#4, pp. 677-

688.

Gawande, Kishore (1997). “A Test of a Theory of Strategically Retaliatory Trade Barriers”.Southern Economic Journal; V.64-#2, pp. 425-449.

Gawande, Kishore and Wendy Hansen (1999). “Retaliation, Bargaining and the Pursuit of ‘Freeand Fair’ Trade”. International Organization; V.53-#1, pp. 117-159.

Prusa, Thomas and Susan Skeath (2002). “The Economic and Strategic Motives for AntidumpingFilings”. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv; V.138-#3, pp. 389-413.

Blonigen, Bruce and Chad Bown (2003). “Antidumping and Retaliation Threats”. Journal ofInternational Economics; V.60-#2, pp. 249-273.

Bown, Chad (2004). “Trade Disputes and the Implementation of Protection under the GATT: AnEmpirical Assessment”. Journal of International Economics; V.62-#2, pp. 263-294.

Prusa, Thomas and Susan Skeath (2004). “Modern Commercial Policy: Managed Trade orRetaliation?”. in E. Kwan Choi and James Hartigan, ed. Handbook of International Trade, II:Economic and Legal Analyses of Trade Policy Institutions. London: Blackwell, forthcoming.

Feinberg, Robert and Kara Olson (2004). “The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the Role ofRetaliation in Filings”. Ms: American University.

C. The GATT/WTO and Antidumping

Baldwin, Robert (1998). “Imposing Multilateral Discipline on Administered Protection”. in A.Krueger, ed. The WTO as an International Organization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,pp. 297-327.

Finger, J. Michael and K.C. Fung (1994). “Will GATT Enforcement Control Antidumping”.Journal of Economic Integration; V.9-#2, pp. 198-213.

Finger, J. Michael and Sumana Dhar (1994). “Do Rules Control Power? GATT Articles andArrangements in the Uruguay Round”. In Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern, eds. Analytical andNegotiating Issues in the Global Trading System. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp.195-226.

Prusa, Thomas (2001). “On the Spread and Impact of Antidumping”. Canadian Journal ofEconomics; V.34-#3, pp. 591-611.

Bown, Chad (2004). “On the Economic Success of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement”. Review ofEconomics and Statistics; V.86-#3, pp. 811-823.

Bown, Chad (2002). “Antidumping Against the Backdrop of Disputes in the GATT/WTO

System”. Ms: Brandeis.

Documents

Bibliography on Dumping and Antidumping