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Bibliography of ETHICS

1. The Paper

2. Basic Reading

o Introductory Texts

o Collections

3. Central Historical Texts

o Ancient

Plato

Aristotle

Hellenistic Ethics

o Medieval Ethics

o Modern Moral Philosophy

Thomas Hobbes

David Hume

Immanuel Kant

J.S. Mill and J. Bentham

Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Ethics

Recent Approaches to Ethics—Overviews

4. Contemporary Problems

o Central Themes

Egoism and Altruism

The Goldern Rule

Theories of Normativity and Impartiality

Respect and Dignity

Maximisation and the Good

Act vs. Rule

Integrity & the Demands of Morality

Theories of the Good

Morality and Truth

o Further Themes

Authority and Excellence

Moral Law & Duty

Virtue & Well-Being

Action and Accountability

Moral Resposibility

Act, Motive & Consequence

Deliberation and Decision

Reason, Desire and Decision

Moral Dilemmas

Weakness of Will

Standards and Agreement in Values

Moral Relativism

Plurality of Values

Incommensurability

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o Practical Ethics

Anthologies

Killing and Letting Die

The Sacredness of Life

Humans and Other Animals

Environmental Ethics

1. The Paper

Ethics is the study of theories of how we ought to live, and what is of value or concern in life.

These theories form a tradition going back to Plato and Aristotle leading up to the (in some ways

very different) concerns of recent philosophy. It is important to realise that the general form that

these theories have taken has varied greatly over the last 2,000 years, so one cannot approach the

general questions posed within ethics without an appreciation of that history.

Amongst the problems considered are the relation between the happiness of the individual and

concern for others or the common good; the relation between rationality and the claims of

morality; to what extent morality requires impartiality of us, and what form that impartiality

should take; what is the nature of the good, and what is the relation between the good and the

right; whether there are ethical truths, and whether facts of value obtain independently of us and

our feelings.

To what extent do ethical theories do justice to, or provide convincing critiques of, our natural

moral thinking? These questions have arisen for ethical theories throughout history, and

sometimes past ethical theories may appear to do more justice to common sense practical

thinking than any contemporary school of thought.

In this area of philosophy there is a particular concern with its practical application or

consequences. In recent years, issues in applied or practical ethics have come more to the fore,

including the issues of abortion, euthanasia, concern for other animals and for the environment.

2. Basic Reading

Introductory Texts

Reading a few introductory texts, particularly towards the beginning of the course, will greatly

help you in getting a view of the areas of concern and in orienting yourself in relation to more

central material. Here are some suggestions

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Harman, G. 1977. The Nature of Morality: an introduction to ethics. New York: Oxford

University Press .

Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Norman, R. 1983. The Moral Philosophers: an introduction to ethics. Oxford: Clarendon

Press.

Williams, B. 1976. Morality: An Introduction to Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Collections

Singer, P. ed. 1994. Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Feinberg, J. ed. 1969. Moral Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Foot, P. ed. 1967. Theories of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Raz, J. ed. 1978. Practical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Taylor, P. W. ed. 1967. Problems of Moral Philosophy: an introduction to ethics.

Belmont, California: Dickenson.

3. Central Historical Texts

Ancient

Greek philosophy looks at the problems of ethics in terms of how one can lead a happy life, or

living well. Questions that arise include, ‘What role do the virtues play in an admirable life?',

‘How far is a good life subject to luck?', ‘What role does reason play in living well?', and

particularly in Stoicism, ‘Does living well involve conforming to some form of law?'

Plato

Euthyphro, Gorgias, Republic.

Republic , I, II, X. Use the new translation of Republic by Robin Waterfield, (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1993); otherwise Clarendon Plato for canonical edition of Gorgias , translated

by Terence Irwin, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).

Commentaries

Annas, J. 1981. An Introduction to Plato's Republic . Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Pappas, N. 1995. Plato and the Republic . London: Routledge.

Kraut, R. ed. 1992. The Cambridge Companion to Plato . Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press. Includes an exhaustive bibliography.

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Irwin, T. 1995. Plato's Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nussbaum, M. 1986. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and

Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pt.1.

Price, A. W. 1989. Love & Friendship in Plato and Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Aristotle

Nicomachean Ethics (& Eudaemian Ethics ). N 1, 3, 5, 6; for the Nicomachean translation by

Irwin, Hackett with useful glossary; also Ross Oxford translation; for Eudaemian Clarendon

Aristotle trans. with commentary Woods.

Commentaries

Rorty, A. O. ed. 1980. Essays on Aristotle's Ethics. Berkeley: University of California

Press.

Broadie, S. 1991. Ethics with Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kraut, R. 1989. Aristotle on the Human Good . Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University

Press.

Cooper, J. 1986. Reason and Human Good in Aristotle . Indianapolis: Hackett.

Hutchinson, D. S. 1986. The Virtues of Aristotle . London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Nussbaum, M. 1986. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and

Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pt.2.

Hellenistic Ethics

Long, A. A. 1974. Hellenistic philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics. London: Duckworth. (2

nd ed. 1986). See section 1 on Stoic and Epicurean ethics.

Commentaries

Annas, J. 1993. The Morality of Happiness . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nussbaum, M. 1994. The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics.

Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.

Sorabji, R. 1993. Animal Minds and Human Morals: the Origins of the Western Debate.

Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.

Inwood, B. 1995. Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Price, A. W. 1995. Mental Conflict. London: Routledge.

Striker, Gisela. 1996. Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology & Ethics. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

Bobzien, Susanne. 1998. Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy. Oxford:

Clarendon Press.

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Medieval Ethics

Medieval ethics combines elements of Pagan thought from antiquity with the particular concerns

of the three monotheistic traditions of the West: Judaism, Islam and Christianity. Central themes

in Medieval thought concern: the role of free choice in ethical life; how this individual freedom

is best to be understood; the connection between free choice and rationality. Medieval ethics

strives to adapt models of ethical life as involving the practice of the virtues, which they derive

from Greek thought, to the ideas central to Western monotheism, in particular that we arrive at

moral worth and salvation through obedience to the law that comes from God.

Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will . Translated by Thomas Williams. Indianapolis:

Hackett, 1993.

Abelard, Ethical writings: his Ethics or „Know yourself' and his Dialogue between a

philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian . Translated by Paul Vincent Spade. Indianapolis:

Hackett, 1995.

Aquinas, On law, Morality, and Politics . Edited by William P. Baumgarth and Richard J.

Regan. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988.

Aquinas, Treatise on the Virtues . Translated by John A. Oesterle. Notre Dame, Ind.:

University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.

Aquinas, The Treatise of Law , 1a, 2a, Questions 94-97.

Duns Scotus, Scotus on Will and Morality . Selected and translated with an introduction

by Allan B. Wolter Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 1986.

Commentaries

On Augustine

Rist, J. M. 1994. Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press. Ch.5.

On Abelard

Marilyn McCord Adams introduction to Hackett edition of Abelard, Ethics.

On Aquinas

McInerny, Ralph, M. 1982. Ethica Thomistica: the Moral Philosophy of Thomas

Aquinas. Washington, DC.: Catholic University of America Press.

Westberg, D. 1994. Right Practical Reason: Aristotle, Action, and Prudence in Aquinas.

Oxford: Clarendon Press.

On Ockham

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Adams, M. M. 1995. ‘Ockham's Moral Theory'. In James F. Keenan, and Thomas A.

Shannon, eds., The Context of Casuistry. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University

Press.

Spade, P. V. 1999. The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press. See the essays by M. M. Adams, P. King and A. S. McGrade.

On Scotus

Scotus, Duns. ca. 1266-1308. On the Will and Morality . Selected and translated with an

introduction by Allan B. Wolter Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press,

1986. See Wolter's introduction.

Other Themes

Kent, B. 1995. The Virtues of the Will: the Transformation of Ethics in the Late

Thirteenth Century . Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press.

Pink, T. ‘Suarez, Hobbes and the scholastic tradition in action theory'. In The Will and

Human Action: from Antiquity to the Present Day, eds. T. Pink and M. Stone. London:

Routledge, 2004.

Pink, T. 'Action, will and law in late scholasticism'. In Moral Philosophy on the

Threshold of Modernity , eds. J. Kraye and R. Saarinen. Dordrecht: Springer, 2005

Modern Moral Philosophy

Modern moral philosophy has gradually detached ethical thought from specifically religious

traditions, giving increasing attention to the role played in ethical life of rationality or, by

reaction to this, human sentiments. In this period we see formed, though not always very clearly,

the outlines of many of the general positions examined by contemporary moral philosophers,

such as: in Hobbes, an ethics developed out of rational self-interest; in the Utilitarian movement,

consequentialism; in Hume, non-cognitivism concerning moral judgement; and in Kant, a

reason-based non-consequentialist ethics. Despite the continuities in these traditions, it is

important to realise, nevertheless, that many of these philosophers had interests very different

from those of their self-proclaimed modern disciples.

Collections

Raphael, D. D. ed. 1969. The British Moralists from Hobbes to Bentham . 2 Vols.

Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Schneewind, J. B. ed. 1990. Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant: an Anthology . 2

Vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

General Commentaries

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Darwall, S. 1995. The British Moralists and the Internal “Ought”: 1640-1740.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Taylor, C. 1989. Sources of the Self: the Making of the Modern Identity . Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

MacIntyre, A. 1981. After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory . London: Duckworth.

Haakonssen, K. 1996. Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: from Grotius to the Scottish

Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thomas Hobbes

Leviathan . See the Curley edition; or the Tuck edition:

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan: with selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668.

Edited, with introduction and notes by Edwin Curley. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Edited by Richard Tuck. Rev. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1996.

Hobbes, Thomas. Of Liberty and Necessity. L. Pt.1, Chs.5-16, reprinted in D. D. Raphael,

ed., The British Moralists from Hobbes to Bentham . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.

Vol.1.

Commentaries

Tuck, R. 1989. Hobbes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kavka, G. S. 1986. Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton

University Press.

Oakeshott, M. 1962. ‘Introduction to Hobbes's Leviathan'. In Rationalism in Politics and

other essays . London: Methuen.

Sorrel, T. ed. 1996. The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Pink, T. 1996. The Psychology of Freedom . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chs. 2 & 3.

David Hume

A Treatise of Human Nature , edited, with an analytical index, by L. A. Selby-Bigge. 2 nd

ed. revised by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. Bk.3 (plus Bk.2).

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals

, edited, with an analytical index by L. A. Selby-Bigge 3 rd ed. revised by P. H. Nidditch.

Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

Commentaries

Norton, D. F. 1993. ‘Hume, Human Nature and the Foundations of Morality'. In D. F.

Norton, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hume. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

Baier, A. 1991. The Progress of the Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise.

Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

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Mackie, J. L. 1980. Hume's Moral Theory . London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Livingston, D. 1984. Hume's Philosophy of Common Life. Chicago: University of

Chicago Press.

Baillie, J. 2000. Hume on Morality. London: Routledge.

Immanuel Kant

Critique of Practical Reason, and other Writings in Moral Philosophy. Translated and

edited with an introduction by Lewis White Beck. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1949.

Critique of Practical Reason. Translated and edited by Mary Gregor; with an

introduction by Andrews Reath Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals . In L. W. Beck, ed., and trans., Critique of

Practical Reason, and other Writings in Moral Philosophy . Chicago: University of

Chicago Press, 1949.

The Metaphysics of Morals . Translated and edited by Mary Gregor, with an introduction

by Roger J. Sullivan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

All three can also to be found in:

Practical philosophy. Translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor, with a general

introduction by Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Lectures on Ethics . Edited by Peter Heath and J. B. Schneewind; translated by Peter

Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone . In Allen Wood and George diGiovanni,

eds., Religion & Rational Theology . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Commentaries

Guyer, P. ed. 1992. The Cambridge Companion to Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Korsgaard, C. 1996. Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.

Herman, B. 1993. The Practice of Moral Judgement. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard

Univsrsity Press.

Allison, H. 1990. Kant's Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

O'Neill, O. 1989. The Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical

Philosophy . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Beck, L. W. 1960. A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason. Chicago:

University of Chicago Press.

J. S. Mill & J. Bentham

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Mill, J. S., and Jeremy Bentham. Utilitarianism & Other Essays . Edited by Alan Ryan.

Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987.

Commentaries

Harrison, R. 1983. Bentham. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Skorupski, J. 1989. Mill. London: Routledge.

Berger, F. 1984. Happiness, Justice and Freedom: the Moral and Political Philosophy of

John Stuart Mill. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lyons, D. 1994. Rights, Welfare and Mill's Moral Theory. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.

Crisp, R. 1997. Mill on Utilitarianism. London: Routledge.

Late Nineteenth & Early Twentieth Century Ethics

In these writers we see the development of a recognisably academic form of ethics—Sidgwick

and Moore were both professors in Cambridge, Bradley was a life fellow at Merton College,

Oxford, Ross professor in Oxford. Like us, they had an interest in the existence of competing

ethical theories, and consequently in the relation between ethical theory and everyday ethical

thinking.

Sidgwick, H. 1922. The Methods of Ethics. London: Macmillan.

Bradley, F. H. 1927. Ethical Studies. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Moore, G. E. 1903. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ross, W. D. 1930. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Commentaries

Schneewind, J. B. 1977. Sidgwick's Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy. Oxford:

Clarendon Press.

Nicholson, P. 1990. The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists: Selected Studies.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.1.

Baldwin, T. 1990. G. E. Moore. London: Routledge.

Recent Approaches to Ethics—Overviews

Various authors have been inspired, often in a critical frame of mind, to attempt to frame an

historical overview of recent developments within ethics.

Hampshire, S. 1949. ‘Fallacies in Moral Philosophy'. Mind 58: 466-482.

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Anscombe, G. E. M. 1958. ‘Modern Moral Philosophy'. Philosophy 33: 1-19. Reprinted

in >From Parmenides to Wittgenstein: Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol.1 . Oxford:

Blackwell, 1981.

Darwall, Stephen, Allan Gibbard and Peter Railton. 1992. ‘Toward Fin de Siècle Ethics:

Some Trends'. Philosophical Review 101: 115-189.

MacIntyre, A. 1981. After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory . London: Duckworth.

Williams, B. A. O. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Fontana.

4. Contemporary Problems

Central Themes

Egoism & Altruism

Can ethical action be justified in terms of the rational pursuit of one's own interests, and does it

need to be? Do we have special reason to be concerned with our own interests as opposed to

those of others?

Plato, Republic , Bk.II.

Hume, D. Treatise concerning Human Nature . Bk.III, Pt.2.

—. An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals . Sec. 3, Appendices 2 & 3.

Williams, B. A. O. 1973. ‘Egoism & Altruism'. In Problems of Self: Philosophical

Papers 1956-1972. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Further Reading

Nagel, T. 1970. The Possibility of Altruism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pt.II.

Gauthier, D. 1967. ‘Morality & Advantage'. Philosophical Review 76: 460-475.

Reprinted in J. Raz, ed., Practical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.

Griffin, J. 1986. Well-Being: its Meaning, Measurement and Moral . Oxford: Clarendon

Press. Ch.8.

Parfit, D. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.1, secs.1-9, 20; Ch.2,

secs. 32-5.

Paul, E. F., Fred Miller Jr., and Jeffrey Paul. eds. 1993. Altruism. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

The Golden Rule

‘Do unto others only what you would have them do unto you.' In this form the principle is

closely associated with Christian ethics, although equivalent formulations of the principle can be

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found in Confucius. What does this principle really involve? Can it be used to provide a rational

basis for ethics?

Essential Reading

Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals . In L. W. Beck, ed., and

trans., Critique of Practical Reason, and other Writings in Moral Philosophy , Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1949. Also to be found in Practical philosophy. Translated

and edited by Mary J. Gregor, with a general introduction by Allen Wood. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right & Wrong . Harmondsworth: Penguin. Ch.4.

Wiggins, D. 1987. ‘Universalizability, Impartiality, Truth'. In Needs, Values, Truth:

Essays in the Philosophy of Value. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (3 rd edn. Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1998.)

—. 1987. ‘Truth as Predicated of Moral Judgements'. In Needs, Values, Truth.

Further Reading

Kolnai, A. 1970. ‘Moral Consensus', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 70: 93-120

Reprinted in Ethics, Value & Reality: Selected Papers of Aurel Kolnai. London: Athlone

Press, 1977.

Winch, P. 1965. ‘The Universalizability of Moral Judgements'. Monist 49: 196-214.

Reprinted in Ethics and Action. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972.

Korsgaard, C. 1993. ‘The Reasons We Can Share: An Attack on the Distinction between

Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values'. Social Philosophy and Policy 10: 24-51.

Reprinted in Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1996.

—. 1985. ‘Kant's Formula of Universal Law'. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66: 24-47.

Reprinted in Creating the Kingdom of Ends.

Hare, R. 1981. Moral Thinking: its Levels, Method, and Point . Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Ch.4.

Gibbard, A. 1988. ‘Hare's Analysis of Ought and its Implications'. In D. Seanor and N.

Fotion, eds., Hare and Critics.

Theories of Normativity & Impartiality

It is often claimed that morality involves impartiality. There are two main competing conceptions

of impartiality. One says that impartiality involves showing all persons the same respect, treating

them, in some sense, as ends in themselves. The other tradition says that impartiality involves

maximising good—whether conceived of as happiness or in other terms—over a whole

population, the happiness of each person to count equally with the happiness of any other.

Respect & Dignity

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Essential Reading

Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals , in L. W. Beck, ed., and

trans., Critique of Practical Reason, and other writings in moral philosophy , Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1949. Also to be found in Practical philosophy. Translated

and edited by Mary J. Gregor, with a general introduction by Allen Wood. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Scanlon, T. 1982. ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism'. In A. Sen and B. Williams, eds.,

Utilitarianism & Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hill, T. 1973. ‘Servility & Self-Respect'. Monist 57: 87-104. Reprinted in Autonomy &

Self-Respect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Further Reading

Scanlon, T. M. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of

Harvard University Press.

Kamm, F. M. 1993. Morality, Mortality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Volume 2,

part 3.

Darwall, S. L. 1983. Impartial Reason. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Railton, P. 1984. ‘Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality'.

Philosophy and Public Affairs 13: 134-171. Reprinted in S. Scheffler, ed.,

Consequentialism and its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.

Korsgaard, C. 1992. ‘Creating the Kingdom of Ends'. Reprinted in her Creating the

Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Maximisation & the Good

Mill, J. S. Utilitarianism , Chs.4 & 5.

Sidgwick, H. 1922. The Methods of Ethics . London: Macmillan. Bk.IV.

Williams, B. and J. J. C. Smart. 1973. Utilitarianism: For & Against. Cambridge

University Press.

Foot, P. 1985. ‘Utilitarianism & the Virtues'. Mind 94: 196-209. Reprinted in S.

Scheffler, ed., Consequentialism & its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.

Sen, A., and B. Williams. eds. 1982. Utilitarianism & Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press. Introduction.

Scheffler, S. ed. 1988. Consequentialism and its Critics. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.

Act vs. Rule

If impartiality does involve maximising good, how do we maximise it? In the performance of

particular actions, as act-utilitarians recommend? Or, as rule-utilitarians claim, in the moral rules

or principles that we adopt or seek to follow?

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Glover, J. ed. 1990. Utilitarianism & its Critics . London: Collier Macmillan.

Williams, B. and J. J. C. Smart. 1973. Utilitarianism: For & Against. Cambridge

University Press. See the section by Smart.

Mackie, J. L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Ch.6,

secs.1-4.

Rawls, J. 1955. ‘Two Concepts of Rules'. Philosophical Review 64: 3-32. Reprinted in P.

Foot, ed., Theories of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Integrity & the Demands of Morality

The demand to maximise good, or similarly impersonal moral demands can conflict with the

projects and principles and feelings to which individuals are deeply committed. What are the

implications of such conflict?

Williams, B. and J. J. C. Smart. 1973. Utilitarianism: For & Against. Cambridge

University Press. See the section by Williams.

Williams, B. A. O. 1981. ‘Persons, Character and Morality'. In Moral Luck:

Philosophical Papers 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Williams, B. A. O. 1995. ‘Moral Incapacity'. In his The Making Sense of Humanity: and

other Philosophical Papers 1982-1993. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Scheffler, S. 1982. The Rejection of Consequentialism: a Philosophical Investigation of

the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions . Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Kagan, S. 1989. The Limits of Morality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Wolf, S. 1997. ‘Meaning & Morality'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97: 299-

315.

Theories of the Good

The nature of goodness is a central concern in most ethical theories, but such theories differ both

in what they conceive goodness to be, and how they take goodness to be related to notions such

as duty and right. Is goodness to be explained prior to the notions of duty and virtue, and then to

be used in their explanation; or is its explanation to be derived from an account of them? Is

goodness an irreducible and ‘non-natural' property; or is it to be identified with properties

naturally possessed by good things? Can we explain goodness by reference to the desires of

people? Is there an irreducible variety of kinds of good, or is there only one kind of good?

Essential Reading

Kant, Foundations of Morals.

Mill, J. S. Utilitarianism , Chs.1 & 2.

Moore, G. E. 1903. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Korsgaard, C. 1983. ‘Two Distinctions in Goodness'. Philosophical Review 2: 169-196.

Reprinted in Creating the Kingdom Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

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Geach, P. 1956. ‘Good and Evil'. Analysis 17: 33-42. Reprinted in P. Foot, ed., Theories

of Ethics . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Parfit, D. 1984. Reasons and Persons . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Appendix: ‘What

Makes Life go Best?'

Further Reading

Griffin, J. 1986. Well-Being: its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance . Oxford:

Clarendon Press.

Paul, E. F., F. Miller Jr., and J. Paul, eds. 1992. The Good Life and the Human Good.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Annas, J. 1993. The Morality of Happiness . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ch.2.

Williams, B. A. O. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Fontana. Ch.4.

Finnis, J. 1980. Natural Law and Natural Rights . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.2.

Scanlon, T. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of

Harvard University Press. Chapters 1-3.

Foot, P. 2002. Natural Goodness . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Morality & Truth

Is morality a matter of belief or feeling? If it is a matter of belief, are there moral properties in

the world entirely independent of our sentiments; or do values depend on the feelings and

responses of particular individuals or groups. Subjectivists claim that there is such a dependency,

while moral objectivists deny this.

How does this issue connect with questions about the nature and function of moral judgement

and moral language? Cognitivists claim that such judgements are apt for assessment as true or

false, non-cognitivists deny this. Ethical nihilists or ‘error theorists' are cognitivists who claim

that because there are no moral properties, all moral claims are false. Some theorists maintain

cognitivism by endorsing only a minimal conception of truth or truth-aptness. (For further

reading about issues concerning truth and realism in general see the relevant sections under

Logic & Metaphysics.)

Further Themes

Authority & Excellence

Moral Law & Duty

How far does morality involve obeying laws and fulfilling duties? And what is the source of

these laws and duties?

Essential Reading

Kant, I. The Metaphysics of Morals , Pt. II, The Doctrine of Virtue.

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Wiggins, D. 1991. ‘Categorical Requirements: Kant and Hume on the Idea of Duty'. The

Monist 83-106.

Anscombe, G. E. M. 1958. ‘Modern Moral Philosophy'. Philosophy 33: 1-19. Reprinted

in From Parmenides to Wittgenstein: Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol.1 . Oxford:

Blackwell, 1981.

Pink, 'Moral obligation'. In Modern Moral Philosophy , ed. Anthony O'Hear. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2004

Further Reading

Wolf, S. 1982. ‘Moral Saints'. Journal of Philosophy 79: 419-439.

MacIntyre, A. 1981. After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory . London: Duckworth.

Williams, B. A. O. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Fontana. Ch.10.

Virtue & Well-Being

Is the point of a worthwhile life that the individual achieves virtue or moral goodness?

Essential Reading

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , Bks.8 & 9.

Hume, D. An Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals . Appendix 4.

Hutchinson, D. 1986. The Virtues of Aristotle . London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Chs.1

& 2.

Crisp, R., and M. Slote. eds. 1997. Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Foot, P. 1978. ‘Virtues and Vices'. In Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral

Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Further Reading

Crisp, R. ed. 1996. How Should One Live?: Essays on the Virtues. Oxford: Clarendon

Press.

Slote, M. 1992. From Morality to Virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

MacIntyre, A. 1981. After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory . London: Duckworth.

McDowell, J. 1979. ‘Virtue and Reason'. The Monist 62: 331-350. Reprinted in Mind,

Value, and Reality. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998.

Griffin, J. 1986. Well-Being: its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance . Oxford:

Clarendon Press. Pt.I.

Hurka, T. 1993. Perfectionism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Action & Accountability

Moral Responsibility

16

Does participating in ethical life involve a special moral responsibility for one's actions and if it

does what does this responsibility come to: does it involve a capacity for rationality; for self-

determination; or an independence from external determination?

Essential Reading

Nagel, T. 1976. ‘Moral Luck'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary

Volume 50: 137-152. Reprinted in Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1979.

Williams, B. A. O. 1976. ‘Moral Luck'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society

Supplementary Volume 50: 115-136. Reprinted in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers

1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Strawson, P. F. 1962. ‘Freedom and Resentment'. Proceedings of the British Academy 48.

Reprinted in Freedom and Resentement and Other Essays . London: Methuen, 1974; and

in G. Watson, ed., Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.

Frankfurt, H. 1969. ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility'. Journal of

Philosophy 66: 829-839. Reprinted in The Importance of What We Care About:

Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Further Reading

Fischer, J. M. ed. 1986. Moral Responsibility. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Statman, D. ed. 1993. Moral Luck. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Adams, R. M. 1985. ‘Involuntary Sins'. Philosophical Review 94: 3-31.

Wallace, R. J. 1994. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Cambridge, Mass.:

Harvard University Press.

Schoemann, F. ed. 1987. Responsibility, Character and Emotions: New Essays in Moral

Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Widerker D. and McKenna M. eds 2003. Moral Responsibility and Alternative

Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities . Aldershot: Ashgate.

Pink T. 2004. Free Will: A Very Short Introduction , Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Act, Motive & Consequence

Does the rightness of an action depend solely on its consequences, or on the way those

consequences are produced: whether by doing or allowing (killing or letting die); whether as

intended or as merely foreseen?

Essential Reading

Bennett, J. 1966. ‘Whatever the Consequences'. Analysis 26: 83-102; reprinted in James

Rachels, ed., Moral Problems : a Collection of Philosophical Essays. New York: Harper

and Row, 1971.

Foot, P. 1978. ‘The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect'. In Virtues

and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

17

Quinn, W. 1989. ‘Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: the Doctrine of Double Effect'.

Philosophy and Public Affairs 18: 334-351; reprinted in Morality and Action. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1993.

—. 1989. ‘Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing'.

Philosophical Review 98: 287-312; reprinted in Morality and Action. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Further Reading

Kagan, S. 1989. The Limits of Morality . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pt.II.

Kamm, F. 1993. Morality, Mortality . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Vol.II, Chs.1-5.

Bratman, M. 1987. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard

University Press. Last chapter.

Kenny, A. 1995. ‘Philippa Foot on Double Effect'. In R. Hursthouse, G. Lawrence, and

W. Quinn, eds., Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory . Oxford:

Clarendon Press.

Bennett, J. 1995. The Act Itself. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Thomson, J. J. 1996. ‘The Trolley Problem'. In Rights, Restitution and Risk: Essays in

Moral Theory , edited by William Parent. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Scanlon, T. 2000. ‘Intention and Permissibility.' Supplement to the Proceedings of The

Aristotelian Society, 74: 301-317

Deliberation & Decision

Reason, Desire & Decision

How, if at all, does reason govern our actions? Are there rational justifications for performing

one action rather than another? And, if so, where do these justifications come from? Do they take

the form of codifiable rules? Do they depend on our desires and motivations, or are they quite

independent of what we might happen to want? What form does deliberation about how to act

take? Is it merely concerned with means or also with ends?

Essential Reading

Nagel, T. 1970. The Possibility of Altruism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Williams, B. A. O. 1981. ‘Practical Necessity'. Reprinted in Moral Luck: Philosophical

Papers 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

——. 1981. ‘Internal and External Reasons'. Reprinted in Moral Luck.

——. 1981. ‘Ought and Moral Obligation'. Reprinted in Moral Luck.

Wiggins, D. 1987. ‘Deliberation and Practical Reason'. In Needs, Values, Truth: Essays

in the Philosophy of Value. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (3 rd edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1998.)

Further Reading

18

Dancy, J. 1993. Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell.

Millgram, E. 1997. Practical Induction. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Smith, M. 1994. The Moral Problem. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kolnai, A. 1962. ‘Deliberation is of Ends'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62:

195-218; reprinted in Ethics, Value & Reality: Selected Papers of Aurel Kolnai . London:

Athlone Press, 1977.

McDowell, J. 1979. ‘Virtue and Reason'. The Monist 62: 331-350. Reprinted in Mind,

Value, and Reality. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998.

Richardson, H. S. 1995. Practical Reasoning About Final Ends . Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Cullity G. and Gaut B. eds. 1997. Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford

University Press.

Shafer-Landau, R. 1997 Moral Rules. Ethics 107: 584-611

Dancy, J. 2004. Ethics without Principles . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Moral Dilemmas

Can there be situations in which one must act, but whichever way in which one acts, one acts

wrongly? If so, what is the significance of this—e.g. for the nature of good or for moral truth?

Gowans, C. W. ed. 1995. Moral Dilemmas. New York: Oxford Uiversity Press. Papers by

Ross, Williams, Foot, Marcus, Donagan, and Nagel.

Mason, H. E. ed. 1996. Moral Dilemmas & Moral Theory. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.

Gowans, C. W. 1994. Innocence Lost: an Examination of Inescapable Moral

Wrongdoing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hurley, S. L. 1989. Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity. Oxford: Oxford University

Press. Ch.7.

Foot, P. 2002. Moral Dilemmas and Other Topics in Moral Philosophy . Oxford: Oxford

University Press.

Weakness of Will

Can our capacity to apply reason in action go wrong because of internal weakness affecting

either a.) our capacity to act as we think we ought (in which case we deliberately perform an

action despite thinking that we shouldn't) or b.) our capacity to stick to our decisions and carry

them out over time (in which case our own desires lead us to abandon deliberately a decision for

no good reason).

Essential Reading

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , Bk.7.

Davidson, D. 1980. ‘How is Weakness of the Will Possible?'. Reprinted in Essays on

Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

19

Elster, J. 1979. Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ch.2.

Further Reading

Wiggins, D. 1987. ‘Weakness, Commensurability and Desire'. In Needs, Values, Truth:

Essays in the Philosophy of Value. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (3 rd edn. Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1998.)

Hare, R. 1963 Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pt.1, Ch.5.

Hurley, S. L. 1989. Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity. Oxford: Oxford University

Press. Ch.8.

Schelling, T. C. 1984. Choice and Consequence. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University

Press.

Standards and Agreement in Values

There are moral conflicts about what is valuable and what ought to be done which appear to be

irresoluble. These conflicts can occur between whole societies and between individuals within a

given society (indeed, even within a single individual, see ‘Moral Dilemmas'). Are such conflicts

really irresoluble, and if so what explains this? Moral relativists claim that moral judgements are

relative to an individual or society. Note that there are different ways of developing the idea of

relativism, both the manner in which judgements may be relative and to what they relate. Value

pluralists explain the conflict in terms of there being a variety of incommensurable and

conflicting goods that societies or individuals can respond or aspire to.

Moral Relativism

Essential Reading

Williams, B. A. O. 1972. Morality: An Introduction to Ethics . Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press. Chapter on ‘Relativism'.

Meiland, Jack W. and M. Krausz, eds. 1982. Relativism: Cognitive and Moral. Notre

Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Harman, G. 1977. The Nature of Morality: an Introduction to Ethics. New York: Oxford

University Press . Chs.8 & 9.

Further Reading

Williams, B. A. O. 1981. ‘The Truth in Relativism'. Reprinted in Moral Luck:

Philosophical Papers 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

—. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London: Fontana. Ch.9.

Harman, G. 1975. ‘Moral Relativism Defended'. Philosophical Review 84: 3-22.

Gibbard, A. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: a Theory of Normative Judgment. Oxford:

Clarendon Press. Pt.III, Ch.13.

20

Plurality of Values

Essential Reading

Berlin, I. 1969. Four Essays on Liberty . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Introduction.

Nagel, T. 1979. ‘Fragmentation of Value'. Reprinted in Mortal Questions. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

Stocker, M. 1990. Plural & Conflicting Values . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs.3-7.

Further Reading

Williams, B. A. O. 1981. ‘Conflicts of Value'. Reprinted in Moral Luck: Philosophical

Papers 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Finnis, J. 1980. Natural Law, Natural Rights . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pt.1.

Nussbaum, M. 1986. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and

Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pt.3.

Incommensurability

Raz, J. 1986. The Morality of Freedom . Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs.7 & 8.

Griffin, J. 1986. Well-Being: its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance . Oxford:

Clarendon Press. Ch.5.

Williams, B. A. O. 1981. ‘Conflicts of Value'. Reprinted in Moral Luck: Philosophical

Papers 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chang, R. ed. 1997. Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reasoning.

Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Practical Ethics

Anthologies

Singer, P. ed. 1986. Applied Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Winkler, E., and J. R. Coombs, eds. 1983. Applied Ethics: A Reader. Oxford: Blackwell.

Killing and Letting Die

Does the rightness of an action ever depend on whether it counts as a doing or as an allowing?

What bearing does this question have on the permissibility of various kinds of euthanasia?

Essential Reading

21

Kant, Immanuel. Lectures on Ethics . Edited by Peter Heath and J. B. Schneewind;

translated by Peter Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Lecture on

duties towards the body in regard to life.

Foot, P. 1978. ‘The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect'. In Virtues

and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell .

Bennett, J. 1966. ‘Whatever the Consequences'. Analysis 26: 83-102; reprinted in James

Rachels, ed., Moral Problems : a Collection of Philosophical Essays. New York: Harper

and Row, 1971.

Quinn, W. 1989. ‘Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: the Doctrine of Double Effect'.

Philosophy and Public Affairs 18: 334-351; reprinted in Morality and Action. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Further Reading

Uniacke, S. 1994. Permissible Killing: the Self-defence Justification of Homicide .

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McMahan, J. 1993. ‘Killing, Letting Die, and Withdrawing Aid'. Ethics 103: 250-279.

Steinbock, B. ed. 1980. Killing and Letting Die. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

The Sacredness of Life

How in general should we conceive of the debate about the rights and wrongs of abortion? Does

the issue depend on the moral status of the foetus, and how is that status to be determined? What

role do the rights and interests of the woman bearing the foetus have in settling this issue?

Essential Reading

Thomson, J. J. 1971. ‘A Defense of Abortion'. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1: 47-66;

reprinted in P. Singer, ed., Applied Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Feinberg, J. ed. 1973. The Problem of Abortion. 2 nd ed. Wadsworth: Belmont.

Finnis, J. 1973. ‘The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: A Reply to J. J. Thomson'.

Philosophy & Public Affairs 2: 117-145.

Further Reading

Kamm, F. M. 1992. Creation and Abortion: a Study in Moral and Legal Philosophy.

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dworkin, R. 1993. Life's Dominion: an Argument about Abortion and Euthanasia.

London: Harper Collins.

Sumner, L. W. 1981. Abortion and Moral Theory. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University

Press.

\

22

Humans and Other Animals

Do we have duty of care towards other animals? Do non-human animals have rights? Do humans

have a special moral status simply as humans?

Singer, P. 1976. Animal Liberation. London: Cape.

Regan, T. 1983. The Case for Animal Rights. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Carruthers, P. 1992. The Animals Issue : Moral Theory in Practice. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

Environmental Ethics

What responsibility do we have to care for the environment? Does the environment have a value

independent of human interests and concerns?

Essential Reading

Elliot, R. ed. 1995. Environmental Ethics. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press.

Winkler, E., and J. R. Coombs, eds. 1983. Applied Ethics: A Reader. Oxford: Blackwell.

Section on Environmental Ethics.

Further Reading

Taylor, P. W. 1986. Respect for Nature: a Theory of Environmental Ethics . Princeton, N.

J.: Princeton University Press.

Attfield, R. 1991. The Ethics of Environmental Concern. Athens, Ga.: University of

Georgia Press.

Johnson, L. E. 1991. A Morally Deep World: an Essay on Moral Significance and

Environmental Ethics . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.