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Environmental policy reform on north-eastern Brazilsagricultural frontier

Christian Brannstrom

Department of Geography, Texas A&M University, 815 Eller O&M Building, 3147 TAMU, College Station, TX 77843-3147, USA

Received 11 August 2003; received in revised form 2 May 2004

Abstract

The expansion of modern agriculture in developing countries presents numerous challenges for environmental policy makers.

Environmental policies for agriculture in north-eastern Brazils soybean belt are analyzed, with emphasis on the role of a non-state

actor in leading policy reforms. An organization representing large farmers is leading policy reforms to reduce the environmental

impacts of modern agriculture. By contrast, state agencies are relatively weak and ineffective. The analysis situates this question con-

ceptually in literatures stressing the political and structural causes of corporate environmentalism and literatures explaining the

increasingly strong role of non-state actors in environmental governance. The case study focuses on the content of reforms, reasons

why the non-state actor is so prominent, and the implications of policy reforms. State agencies face major challenges in environ-

mentagriculture policy debates in places where environmental subsidies are unlikely, environmental information is poor, and

organized private interests are influential.

2004 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Keywords: Agriculture; Environment; Savanna; Policy; Brazil

1. Introduction

Agricultural systems dependent on petroleum, chem-

icals, and large areas of land damage the environment

by destroying native flora and fauna, polluting water,

and degrading soil. With global cereal production ex-

pected to double by 2050, the policy challenges of reduc-

ing or eliminating the harmful environmental effects of

agriculture are numerous and complex (Tilman et al.,

2002). Toward this end, scholars have estimated theexternalities of modern agriculture (Pretty et al.,

2001) and argued persuasively for part of the OECDs

US$283billion in agricultural subsidies (1999) to be di-

rected to sustainable farming practices (Tilman et

al., 2002, p. 675) in the form of agri-environmental pol-

icy. For Potter (1998, p. 103), these policies indicate a

profound public reassessment of farmers and the rela-

tionship between agriculture and the environment.

Others note the deep crisis of industrial agriculture,

which is perceived as a detached, oversubsidized and

unattractive sector in the eyes of most of the public, as

well as many policy-makers (Marsden et al., 2001, p.

75).

As the policy debate on modern agriculture develops

in North America and Europe, in other world regions,

where policy challenges are no less complex or difficult,neither the terms of debate nor the key actors is known.

Brazilian agriculture, for example, is set to exceed a 125-

million-ton grain (mainly soybeans and maize) and cot-

ton harvest, while outpacing average US soybean yield

and leading world production in sugarcane, citrus, and

coffee. However, agriculture in Brazil faces a series of

environmental challenges, especially in the areas of bio-

technology, organic crops, carbon dioxide emissions,

and bio-fuels, in addition to traditional concerns for soil

0016-7185/$ - see front matter 2004 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2004.06.002

E-mail address: [email protected] (C. Brannstrom).

www.elsevier.com/locate/geoforum

Geoforum xxx (2004) xxxxxx

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mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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conservation, agro-chemical use, and suitable crop vari-

eties. State agencies and non-state actors are increas-

ingly demanding an end to deforestation, less agro-

chemical pollution, and reduced biomass burning.

Although these concerns may form part of national-level debates (May, 1999; Neder, 1996), the locus of

cutting-edge environmental policies often is at sub-na-

tional scales, within Brazilian states or municipalities

(Ames and Keck, 1997; Brannstrom, 2001; Guivant,

2002; Fearnside, 2003; Jepson, 2002; Keck, 2002;

Lemos, 1998; Lemos, 2003; May et al., 2002; Nepstad

et al., 2002;Tendler, 1997).

This paper explores environmental policy reforms in

western Bahia state, a region of modern agriculture

prominent in Brazils expanding soybean belt (Fig.

1). 1 In this region, a powerful non-state actor, the farm-

er group Associacao de Agricultores e Irrigantes do

Oeste da Bahia (AIBA), is leading environmental policy

reforms, overshadowing state agencies and other

non-state actors. Why has a non-state actor taken a

leadership role? What are the broader implications of

non-state leadership in environmental policy reforms

for agriculture? These closely related research questions

are situated at the intersection of two literatures in envi-

ronmental politics and policy sciences: the greening of

corporations and the influence of non-state actors in

environmental public policies. The research is based on

qualitative semi-structured interviews of key actors dur-

ing April 2001, JulyAugust 2001, and July 2002.

Informants were asked to explain and justify policies,

evaluate other agencies or actors, and explain the re-gions environmental problems. Interviews were supple-

mented by analysis of newsletters and unpublished

documents, which are cited as fully as possible to aid

future researchers; however, informants are referred to

by their institutional position rather than by name.

The paper begins by situating the research problem in

literatures on the greening of corporations and the

growth of non-state actors in environmental public pol-

icies. I then describe relevant aspects of the study region,

where modern agriculture has existed only during the

past two decades. This is followed by sections outlining

the actors and organizations involved in policy formula-

tion and their main initiatives, focusing on the environ-

mental policies of one private agricultural organization.

These policies include voluntary restrictions on

conversion of native savanna (cerrado) vegetation to

agriculture, establishment of a recycling center for

agro-chemical containers, and active participation in

water resources governance and research. By contrast,

state agencies have developed weak initiatives and suf-

fered from poor coordination. One state agency, the

Public Attorneys Office (Ministerio Publico), is high-

lighted as a potentially strong actor but ultimately relies

on other agencies for information. The discussion raises

three broader implications from the case study: the lim-its (and opportunities) of policy reform in regions pla-

gued by poor environmental information; how private

groups may thrive in cases of extreme power imbalances

among actors; and the contradictions of private-sector

leadership with regard to forming public policies.

2. Non-state actors in environmental policy reforms

The case of a non-state actor leading environmental

policy reforms in agriculture may be better understood

by situating the issue at the intersection of two litera-

tures: the greening of industries and the growth of

non-state actors in environmental public policies.

Policies to reduce the negative environmental impacts

of agriculture may be placed into three categories (Pret-

ty et al., 2001, pp. 270274). Regulatory schemes, often

based on command-control models, prohibit or man-

date land-use practices by setting standards for agro-

chemical use, imposing farm-based habitat protection,

and regulating practices such as burning of crop resi-

dues. States also may initiate advisory schemes that cre-

ate codes or standards that farmers follow voluntarily.

These policies are most effective when farmers work in

SP

0 600 km

Savanna (Cerrado)

RS

PR

MS

MT

GOMG

BATO

MA

PI

Soybean area (1999)

Fig. 1. Distribution of Brazilian soybean production (1999) and

savanna (Cerrado) vegetation (data from Fearnside, 2001; Thery,

2000). Abbreviations indicate states of Bahia (BA), Goias (GO),

Maranhao (MA), Mato Grosso (MT), Mato Grosso do Sul (MS),

Minas Gerais (MG), Parana(PR), Piau(PI), Rio Grande do Sul (RS),

Sao Paulo (SP), and Tocantins (TO).

1 Following several authors (Pretty et al., 2001;Tilman et al., 2002),

the term modern agriculture is used here to describe systems capable

of producing high yields, but reliant on fossil fuels and notorious for

many negative environmental and human health effects.

2 C. Brannstrom / Geoforum xxx (2004) xxxxxx

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groups organized for tasks such as conservation tillage

or use of irrigation water (Pretty and Ward, 2001).

Finally, economic instruments (taxes, grants, and loans)

encourage farmers to reduce the use of chemical inputs,

abandon damaging land uses or marginal lands, and

adopt conservation practices. 2 In the European Union,

agricultural multifunctionality recognizes that the sec-tor produces rural landscapes, biodiversity, employ-

ment, and the overall viability of rural areas that

should be protected from the full effects of trade liberal-

ization (Potter and Burney, 2002, p. 35; Hollander,

2004).

Many of these policies could be described as green-

ing, but the literature on environmental governance is

focused on large industrial corporations, not agricul-

ture, that adopt environmental policies, pollution con-

trols, or similar strategies. The World Business

Council for Sustainable Development has been espe-

cially vocal in publicizing corporate greening while

simultaneously arguing for self-regulation rather than

top-down command-control policies (Schmidheiny,

1992; Holliday et al., 2002). Andrews (1998, pp. 183

184) has surveyed several types of environmental self-

regulatory schemes for industries, including sectoral

guidelines and covenants developed by trade associa-

tions that most approximate the case study in this paper.

ButAndrews (1998, p. 195)cautions that self-regulation

is not a promising strategy for improving the [environ-

mental] performance of relatively unorganized or politi-

cally powerful and recalcitrant sectors such as

agriculture.

A useful approach to agricultural greening may beobtained from a critical survey of corporate environ-

mentalism in developing countries that warns against

the excessively simple characterization of both green-

ing and greenwash. ForUtting (2002, p. 285), cor-

porate environmentalism is more than simply

greenwashor accommodationstrategy, or a defensive

reaction to civil society pressure. From this critique

emerges the suggestion that scholars focus on the polit-

ical and structural factors encouraging corporate envi-

ronmentalism. Prominent among the political aspects

are the pressures that state agencies and civil society

organizations apply to corporations. Structural factors

include the phenomenon whereby consumers in export

markets pressure corporations to adopt environmental

policies. Further points emerging from the political

structural approach include the need to characterize

the content of corporate environmentalism and the geo-graphical scale of the environmental initiatives (Utting,

2002, pp. 278288). Brazilian pulp and steel industries

have been analyzed by from a similar structuralpoliti-

cal approach that emphasizes how firm respond differ-

ently to pressures applied by export markets (Barton,

2000; Carrere, 2002; Dalcomuni, 2000). Although

Uttings comments have very little to say about agricul-

tural organizations, his approach may be brought to

bear on the analysis of AIBAs relationships not only

to state agencies and non-state actors, but also to its ex-

port markets.

A second literature follows on this theme, highlight-

ing the interactions between non-state actors and state

agencies in policymaking. In a recent paper, Hajer

(2003, p. 175) argued that policy analysis must reflect

the fact that state power has weakened, non-state actors

have increased in strength, and, overall, there are no

clear rules and norms according to which politics is to

be conducted and policy measures are to be agreed

upon. Hajer (2003, p. 176) believes that this institu-

tional void encourages actors to negotiate new institu-

tional rules, develop new norms of appropriate behavior

and devise new conceptions of legitimate political inter-

ventions in what he calls deliberative policymaking.

Prominent in Hajers view of policymaking is how the

deliberative process creates new spatial boundaries

or policy territories, even though they may not be recog-

nized formally by states. Hajers specific point on the

institutional void as the new terrain of policymaking

helps focus analysis on how non-state actors are chang-

ing the nature of policymaking.

With reference only to South American cases, numer-

ous scholars have noted the influence of non-govern-

mental organizations (NGOs) in setting agendas and

framing issues in environmental policy debates for bio-

technology (Jepson, 2002;Guivant, 2002), the Hidrovia

project (Hochstetler, 2002), industrial pollution reduc-

tion (Lemos, 1998), the Brazilian Amazon (Fearnside,

2003; Rodrigues, 2000), agricultural technology (Bebb-

ington, 1996), forestry (Silva, 1997, 1999), and opposi-

tion to dam construction (Rothman, 2001). Numerous

transnational advocacy coalitions have formed

between local and international NGOs to leverage

policy reform from central governments (Keck and

Sikkink, 1998;Keck, 1998; Hochstetler, 2002).

As important as NGOs are, other actors in the

institutional void that Hajer describes also merit

attention. Although environmental NGOs were strongly

influential shaping new institutions linked to the North

2

There are numerous Brazilian examples of each of these policytypes. Command-control policies are represented in a 1965 law

required rural landholdings in the savanna (cerrado) region to

maintain native vegetation on 20% of area (Legal Reserve) and

ecologically sensitive areas (Permanent Protection) such as river

courses. Recent changes provisionally increased the Legal Reserve to

35% of farm area and created provisions whereby several landowners

could create a single Legal Reserve that would satisfy individual

obligations. A successful voluntary initiative is the case of farmer

organizations that have disseminated no-tillage technologies (Smith et

al., 1999;Landers et al., 2003). Economic instruments do not include

environment-based payments to Brazilian farmers; but the new

ecological sales tax in Brazil has positively influenced the establish-

ment of conservation areas in agricultural landscapes (May et al.,

2002).

C. Brannstrom / Geoforum xxx (2004) xxxxxx 3

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American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Liverman

et al., 1999), market actors such as large corporations

benefiting from trade liberalization have strongly in-

creased in influence as NGO interest has declined (San-

chez, 2002). The networks formed between state

technicians and non-state actors (mainly NGOs), are

as important to understanding water policy in Sao Paulocity as they are industrial pollution control in nearby

Cubatao (Keck, 2002; Lemos, 1998). Finally, the state

itself has not become irrelevant, even in policies for

decentralization. AsTendler (1997)has argued, the suc-

cess of decentralization reforms in Ceara, north-eastern

Brazil, relied on the strong role of the state government;

a similar argument has been made for early phases of

Brazils water policy decentralization (Brannstrom,

2004).

Returning to the research question driving this paper,

we may now understand the environmental policies of a

private agricultural organization as well outside Euro-

pean multifunctionality debates, yet certainly a part

of the greening trend reported among industries.

Also, the role of business organizations operating in

the institutional void has not yet been explored fully

in Latin America, especially in the agricultural sector.

Far more analysis has been directed to NGOs in envi-

ronmental policy making than other non-state actors,

such as business organizations. The idea that business

interests are limited to transnational corporations and

local business (Bryant and Bailey, 1997, pp. 103

129) excludes a vast and complex range of non-state

actors.

3. Environment and agriculture in western Bahia state,Brazil

Western Bahia (approximately 120,000 km2) is the

leading region of an expanding agricultural frontier in

north-eastern Brazil (Fig. 2). Modern farming, based

primarily on soybean cultivation, has transformed the

savanna (Cerrado) of not only western Bahia, but also

the southern areas of neighboring Piau and Maranhao

states (Warnken, 1999;USDA, 2003). Government pol-

icies for land acquisition, low interest rates, and supply

of suitable soybean cultivars attracted farmers from

southern Brazil (Kaimowitz and Smith, 2001; Smith

et al., 1998).

During the last 20 years, farmers converted approxi-

mately 1.35 million hectares of savanna into farmland,

allocated primarily to soybean (850,000 ha), maize

(180,000 ha), cotton (141,000 ha), and irrigated coffee

(13,000 ha) (Carneiro, 2003;AIBA, 2003e, p. 5). Large

farms are dominant. Although they account for only

4.7% of the regions farms, operations larger than 500

0 50 km

Municipality

Microcatchment project (EBDA)

Hydroelectricity plant

Stream-gauge site (m3/s)

Central-pivot irrigation

All-weather road

Agrochemical recycling plant

CatolndiaBaianpolis

Cristpolis

So Desidrio8.12

17.2

20.8 57.3

117.0

36.2

50.3

Riacho das Neves

46 15' W

13 30' S

46 15' W

11 30' S

44 30' W

11 30' S

44 30' W

13 00' S

BAHIA

Ondas

Pedras

Bor

Fmeas

Roda

Velha

Estiva

RioGr

ande

Porco

s

RiodeJaneir

o Bra

nco

SoDesidrio

Porto

Alegre

Tamandu

LEMa

galhes

Salvador

Barreiras

C

h

a

p

a

d

o

Fig. 2. The Grande River Valley (32,200 km2) (data fromSRH, 1993;AIBA, 1991; field work, 2001, 2002).


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ha claim 77% of western Bahias owner-occupied farm-

land (IBGE, 2003). Journalistic accounts suggest that

US farmers, taking advantage of the low cost of land,

are purchasing soybean farms in western Bahia (Rom-

ero, 2002). Recently the region received major invest-

ment in a poultry processing plant (Carneiro, 2002)

located in western Bahias main city, Barreiras (popula-

tion 115,000), to take advantage of abundant grain.

Since 1980 Barreiras attracted southern migrants, sup-

pliers of agricultural inputs, and poor migrants from

rural north-eastern Brazil, often in an uneasy context

of rapid urbanization, limited upward mobility, and

uneven distribution of amenities (Haesbaert, 1997).

Some agronomists claim that western Bahia is the

worst region in the Brazilian savanna for soybean

production, because of very low presence of clay in

soils and frequent growing-season drought (author

interview, EMBRAPA official, 11 April 2001, Planal-

tina). Agricultural officials quip that the regions soils

only provide the physical support for cropsall nec-

essary nutrients must be imported and distributed on

fields. Indeed, soybean yields are lower than other re-

gions, and farms normally must exceed 500 ha;

1000 ha is the standard area for modern farms. How-

ever, the low cost of land, high solar insolation, flat

topography, and proximity to population centers in

north-eastern Brazil make western Bahia lucrative for

agricultural production.

Prime farmland is in the uplands or Chapadao, an

area of approximately 24,600 km2 in the far west, where

elevation reaches 1000 m above sea level. There, precip-

itation may reach 1600 mm annually (concentrated inthe NovemberApril rainy season), with rainfall

decreasing rapidly to the east. Topography is flat be-

tween streams and soils (Oxisols) are well-drained but

very low in nutrients and high in aluminum (Romano

and Garcia, 1998; Simpson, 1998; SRH, 1993). In the

Grande River Valley (Fig. 2), modern agriculture is lo-

cated in the western third, with central-pivot irrigation

concentrated along major rivers to take advantage of

stream water.

Against this regional environmental background, sev-

eral challenges for policy may be outlined. First, exces-

sive clearing of native savanna has been observed,

especially in the Chapadao, where elevation is highest

and precipitation most reliable. Native savanna vegeta-

tion found on the Chapadaos wide (2530 km) interflu-

ves has been nearly completely removed. Savanna

destruction probably continues at a rate of 8% annually,

or approximately 50,00060,000 ha, and at least one-

fourth of all farms in the productive uplands are virtu-

ally 100 percent cleared for agriculture or pasture, in

violation of federal law (author interview, IBAMA offi-

cial, 20 July 2001, Barreiras). Replacement of savanna

with cropland probably has reduced the amount of rain-

fall reaching groundwater, and thus higher peak stream

flows in the wet season and lower flows during the dry

season are reported anecdotally (author interviews,

SRH official #1, 27 July 2001, Salvador; IBAMA offi-

cial, 20 July 2001, Barreiras). Savanna clearing is

thought to reduce significantly groundwater recharge

in the region (Pimentel et al., 1999); however, these stud-

ies have not been peer reviewed, nor are they based onfield data. Similarly, no published, peer-reviewed studies

on the related issues of animal or plant extinction and

land-cover change exist.

Second, most irrigation in western Bahia uses surface

water, but critics allege that use is excessive, with stream

flow diminishing markedly as a result. As with savanna

removal, there is no peer-reviewed study of this prob-

lem. What is known is that irrigated crops are most

demanding of water during the dry season, when river

levels are relatively low. At present, approximately 600

central-pivots are in operationa dramatic increase

from 35 in 1989 and 182 in 1991 (AIBA, 1991; author

interview, SPA official, 16 April 2001, Barreiras). 3 Crit-

ics assert that this has reduced river volume; conse-

quently, the state water agency (SRH; see below) has

closed several rivers to irrigation licenses (author inter-

view, SRH official #2, 25 July 2002, Salvador). Farmers,

in turn, have begun drilling for groundwater, taking

advantage of vague licensing procedures and poor regu-

lation. Groundwater use would allow farmers to locate

irrigated fields on flatter land away from streams and

avoid reliance on stream water. Water officials predict

increasing irrigation demand for groundwater, warning

that groundwater pumping will cause unknown impacts

on streams (author interview, SRH official #4, 30 July2001, Salvador).

Third, agriculture may threaten soil resources. The

regions Oxisols naturally have very low presence of

clay-sized particles, and are easily degraded by conven-

tional soil preparation practices that leave soil exposed

during much of the MayOctober dry season. The Bra-

zilian governments agricultural research enterprise

(EMBRAPA) has issued guidelines that would severely

restrict the area of annual crops in western Bahia, warn-

ing of desertification risk because organic matter and

clay content rapidly decline under mechanized cultiva-

tion (Spera et al., 1999, pp. 2224). Loss of organic mat-

ter is a key factor in decline of agricultural productivity

and encourages soil erosion by wind and water (Silva

et al., 1994). One agricultural official has reported dra-

matic decline in yield in Chapadao locations farmed

for only 20 years (author interview, EBDA official, 31

August 2001).

3 Irrigation is a notoriously intensive use of water. One central-

pivot irrigating 100 ha consumes between 7000 and 8000 cubic meters

of water daily; this is enough to supply approximately 42,000 urban

inhabitants in Bahia (author interviews, SRH official #2, 25 July 2002,

Salvador, and SRH official #3, 25 July 2002, Salvador).


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4. Actors and organizations

What state and non-state actors and organizations

are in position to develop policies that would reduce

or eliminate the impact of agriculture on western Bahia s

environment? Several state agencies have potential and

actual policy roles (Table 1). First, the states water

agency (Superintendencia de Recursos Hdricos; SRH)

has responsibility for licensing and monitoring the re-

gions surface and groundwater, eventually establishing

tariffs for water use. The SRH recently benefited from

a US$85 million project supported by the World Bank.

Part of the funds have been used to build natural re-

source centers in various municipalities, including Barre-

iras, that house its decentralized office and Bahias

environmental agency (Centro de Recursos Ambientais;

CRA). The CRA licenses construction projects, dams,

and irrigation schemes, in addition to managing the re-

gions sole protected area in the Rio de Janeiro River

Valley (350,000 ha) (Fig. 2). 4 Sharing responsibility

with the CRA is the federal environmental agency (Insti-

tuto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Nat-

urais Renovaveis; IBAMA), which, until recently, had

a very weak presence in the region. IBAMA is responsi-

ble for authorizing savanna removal and fighting illegal

animal and wood trafficking.

Agricultural policies are divided among three agen-

cies. Bahias agricultural extension agency (Empresa

Baiana de Desenvolvimento Agrcola; EBDA), attends

to small farmers but is implementing a soil conservation

program that will reach the regions modern farms in the

Chapadao (Fig. 2). The more powerful agribusinessagency (Superintendencia de Poltica de Agronegocio;

SPA) coordinates private investment and subsidies to

targeted crops, such as cotton and coffee. The weakest

of the three agricultural agencies is the state s forestry

service (Departamento de Desenvolvimento Florestal;

DDF). Although responsible for authorizing savanna

clearance, the DDF did not even have an office in west-

ern Bahia until August 2001. Finally, the states Public

Attorneys Office (Ministerio Publico) responds to vari-

ous citizen complaints, including environmental dam-

age, and may initiate legal action against alleged

environmental crimes reported by the SRH, CRA,

DDF, or IBAMA.

The most influential non-state actor in environmental

policy is AIBA, a powerful association of approximately

1200 irrigation and dryland farmers. Since the early

1990s, AIBA has lobbied state and federal governments

for improved infrastructure, increased subsidies, restruc-

tured farm debt, reductions in the value-added tax on

diesel fuel, and reduced environmental licensing fees.

Its board of directors include presidents of several other

important non-state agencies, such as a private research

institute, marketing board, and cooperative. Overall,

AIBA claims to represent modern farming interests in

a region of 1.35 million hectares of farmland producing

four million tons of crops and requiring at leastR$1.5billion (US$500 million) in annual investment

for crop production (Santa Cruz Filho, 2002). In 1999

AIBA established an environmental office led by an

agronomist who has developed policies to reduce nega-

tive impacts of agriculture on western Bahias water,

soil, and vegetation. AIBA overshadows the regions

poorly developed civil society network, which is led by

a NGO (Amigos da Natureza; AMINA), led by nine

directors based in Barreiras. Although lacking staff or

rented accommodation, AMINAs leaders have devel-

oped a vocal environmental critique of the regions agri-

culture, occasionally echoed by political elites, that

questions the entire idea of modern farming in western

Bahia.

5. Greening agriculture or greenwashing crisis?

AIBA, western Bahias powerful non-state organiza-

tion, launched its environmental policies in 1999.

Although its initiatives may be interpreted as responses

to state command-control policies, such as the federal

Legal Reserve requirement of 20% native savanna area

on farms, its policies also may be understood as advi-sory-institutional, in that they encourage farmers to

practice better environmental management and improve

resource governance. Three sets of policies are especially

salient.

First, AIBA has proposed a land-occupation and sa-

vanna conservation policy (AIBA, 2001b, 2002b). This

policy has several components, but among the most sig-

nificant are plans for new farms to conserve native veg-

etation and to make existing farms compliant with the

20% Legal Reserve requirement. Significantly, AIBA

proposed working through new municipal councils, re-

cently established as a decentralization policy of the

states environmental agency (CRA). Future farmland

would have native vegetation distributed in swathes

throughout the property, while farms with no Legal Re-

serve would receive unspecified incentives to plant native

savanna species; both initiatives would have to be ap-

proved by state agencies. In addition, AIBA would lead

long-term planning, working with state agencies to

implement much needed research and monitoring of cli-

mate, land cover, stream flow, and soil erosion. Key ele-

ments of long-term planning include establishment of a

nursery producing savanna seedlings (inaugurated in

June 2003) and a cartographic division that would assist

4 Until January 2003, the SRH and CRA were subordinated to

different secretariats. The DDF, formerly within the agriculture

secretariat, was moved to the new environment secretariat, which also

has the SRH and CRA.


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Table 1

Actors and organizations in environmental policy for modern agriculture in western Bahia state, Brazil

Name Acronym Type Field

Superintendencia de Recursos Hdricos SRH Bahia water-resources agency Issue water licenses for irrigation

Assess and collect fees for irrigation water u

Surface and groundwater research with AIB

Centro de Rec ursos Ambientais CRA Bahia environme ntal agenc y Management of protected area

Issue environmental licenses for irrigation an

Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos

Recursos Naturais Renovaveis

IBAMA Federal environmental agency Monitor landowner compliance with 20% Le

Authorize deforestation

Empresa Baiana de Desenvolvimento Agrcola EBDA Bahia agricultural development agency Microcatchment soil conservation program

Superintendencia de Poltica de Agronegocio SPA Bahia agribusiness agency Promote investment in agriculture

Coordinate state subsidies for coffee and cot

Departamento de Desenvolvimento Florestal DDF Bahia forestry agency Same as IBAMA

Associacao de Agricultores e Irrigantes do

Oeste da Bahia

AIBA Western Bahia farmer organization Land-conversion controls

Recycling center for agro-chemical containe

Water-resources governance and research

Amigos da Natureza AMINA Western Bahia NGO Discourse: agriculture as disaster in weste

Ministerio Publico Public Attorneys Office Investigate citizen complaints with cooperat


8/15

farmers in planning Legal Reserve areas and presenting

documents to state agencies for approval. A further step

took place in August 2003 when AIBA sponsored a sem-

inar on legal and practical aspects of their Legal Reserve

policy.

Toward this initiative, AIBA already has funded a

reconnaissance of soil erosion. Although lacking in sci-entific rigor, the study recognizes that the regions

land-occupation model must be changed because land

clearance left minimal native vegetation to serve as

windbreaks, habitat for fauna, and control of soil ero-

sion (Lopes, 2001). AIBA has justified its nursery by

admitting that many properties in the region lacked

the 20% Legal Reserve of savanna, recognizing that

legislation obliges reforestation, and then claiming

that farmers have not yet reforested Legal Reserve areas

because they lacked seedlings for planting (AIBA,

2003b, p. 10). In public discussion of the absence of

Legal Reserve on many farms, AIBA tried to shield

non-compliant farmers by arguing that in earlier times

environmental issues were relegated to secondary con-

cern and farmers were not required to comply with exist-

ing legislation (AIBA, 2003c, p. 11).

A second environmental policy AIBA has imple-

mented is construction of a recycling center for agro-

chemical containers, known as Campo Limpo or

Clean Field, which began operation in July 2001

(Fig. 2). Federal law passed in 2000 established proto-

cols for mandatory recycling of used agro-chemical con-

tainers, which previously were discarded, buried, or

burned. AIBA anticipated the federal mandate by estab-

lishing an alliance with state agencies to obtain funding,while retaining management responsibility for the facil-

ity. Significantly, the recycling center was one of Brazils

first to receive empty agro-chemical containers. By Sep-

tember 2003 the center had processed one million

containers.

AIBAs third policy intervention is in water-

resources management, where it has pursued two sepa-

rate activities. First, AIBA helped fund a study of the

aquifer beneath western Bahias modern farms. Joining

forces with the states water agency (SRH), AIBAs

funding and logistical support were essential for neces-

sary field work that would monitor the aquifers char-

acteristics. The study will be the first to provide basic

data, which is essential for the state to license deep-well

irrigation (author interviews, SRH official #4, 30 July

2001, Salvador, and SRH official #2, 25 July 2002,

Salvador).

A second policy in AIBAs water initiative is to shape

debate in participatory forums as a representative of the

irrigated agriculture sector. Although AIBA sits on a

national-level committee that is charged with developing

a water-tariff scheme for industrial and agricultural

users, it has been more influential in state-level policy

debates. Recently, AIBA aimed public criticism at the

state water agency (SRH), which in January 2002 ex-

cluded non-state actors from the state water council that

would develop water tariff protocols. 5 Armed with the

fact that western Bahia accounts for approximately

70% of the states licensed water volume (author inter-

view, SRH official #3, 25 July 2002, Salvador), AIBA

questioned the constitutional basis of exclusion, arguingthat it was contradictory to federal water law, and op-

posed the idea that water tariffs would be another tax,

even threatening to lead mass refusal to pay. In AIBAs

view, water tariffs should be reinvested in the river basin

from which they originated, rather than pay for sewage

projects in Salvador, the distant state capital (AIBA,

2002a; author interviews, AIBA official, 20 July 2001

and 29 July 2002, Barreiras). For proper water manage-

ment, AIBA demands the formation of a stakeholder

committee for the Grande River Valley, over which,

presumably, it would exert significant authority. A

stakeholder committee has long been one of AIBAs

demands (AIBA, 1991), but SRH officials are reluctant

to cede power to a decentralized authority that would

set water tariffs. 6 When asked whether AIBA influenced

the SRHs policies, a high-ranking advisor to the

agencys director exclaimed AIBA is policy! (author

interview, SRH official #3, 25 July 2002).

To justify its environmental policies, AIBA stressed

market demands. AIBAs understanding of environmen-

tal problems stresses how, in the late 1990s, their direc-

tors became concerned that the organization was too

focused on crop commercialization while the world

was demanding quality in agricultural production

(author interview, AIBA official, 20 July 2001, Barre-iras). In its newsletters, AIBA warns farmers that in

the near future they will face marketing difficulties

if they are not in compliance with Brazil s environmental

laws (AIBA, 2001b, 2002b). A simple environmental

argument also justifies their policies: changes are neces-

sary to correct the distortions of land occupation that

is obviously incompatible with environmental equilib-

rium (AIBA, 2001b).

However, suspicions that AIBA is merely interested

in greenwashing the destructive effects of modern

agricultureand, in particular, an assault on the re-

gions remaining savannaare well founded. AIBAs

officers and supporters readily admit that western Bahia

still offers huge area for agricultural expansion. The pre-

sent 1.35 million hectares are just the beginning, as there

are 3 million hectares of savanna left to clear (Santa

Cruz Filho, 2002; author interviews, AIBA official, 16

April 2001, Barreiras, and SPA official, 16 April 2001,

Barreiras). Recently AIBA predicted an expansion of

5 In January 2003 AIBAs president was named to Bahias water

council as a representative of farmers using irrigation.6 For further discussion of Bahias water-management decentrali-

zation, see Brannstrom (2004)andBrannstrom et al. (in press).


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cropland to 2.05 million hectares by 2008 (AIBA, 2003e,

p. 5). AIBAs own promotional materials proclaim that

it participated directly in the extraordinary transforma-

tion of the then-infertile lands of Bahias savannas into

infinitely productive agricultural fields (AIBA,

2001a). Thus, its environmental policies would soften

environmental opposition to further expansion ofagriculture.

AIBA has quickly become the dominant actor in

western Bahias institutional void. Their policies con-

form well to Uttings (2002) idea of how political and

structural factors influence business environmentalism.

AIBAs environmental agenda is partially a result of

concern for marketing of its agricultural output. AIBA

has supported the creation of a new policy territory,

the Grande River Valley (Fig. 2), in opposition to the

Bahias water agency (SRH). Using its knowledge of

federal legislation, AIBA is using this new territory to

bring its influence to bear more directly on water man-

agementespecially setting water tariffsin conflict

with the SRH. AIBAs past research (AIBA, 1991;

Lopes, 2001) and future monitoring policies represent

make inroads into the states traditional role in produc-

ing policy-relevant information. This quest for informa-

tion is intended to keep AIBA at the forefront of policy

debates.

Political factors are also important in determining

AIBAs environmental policies. 7 As I discuss below,

there are strong criticisms against farming in western

Bahia. AIBAs policies for land occupation and reforest-

ation not only accept federal mandates that require 20%

of farmland in Legal Reserve, but they also respond toheated national-level debates on the requirement of Le-

gal Reserves on private property (Brannstrom, 2001, pp.

13481349). 8 But AIBA wants to comply on its own

terms, making it clear that its members are not at fault,

and setting terms of the regions reforestation policy.

Similar to other agricultural organizations in Brazil,

AIBA believes that eventually its members will be called

to account by government or consumers for neglecting

Legal Reserve obligations. Overall, AIBA sets the terms

for the regional policy debate, challenged only by critics

who argue that the environmental damage of agriculture

is grossly understated.

6. Exposing environmental crisis

If AIBA advances the idea that its policies can avoidfuture crisis, then AIBAs main opponents emphasize

the severe present environmental crisis. Some arguments

go so far as to charge that modern agriculture in western

Bahia is a colossal error, because of the poor fit between

the regions environmental characteristics and cultiva-

tion practices. Consequently, attempts at management

simply delay crisis. While AIBA admits that environ-

mental problems resulted from initially poor regulation

and guidance, its opponents either question the entire

agricultural project that transformed western Bahia, or

allege that regional policies are inadequate. In accepting

that an environmental problem exists, however, two dis-

tinct views have emerged.

First, critics allege that savanna clearing and soil ero-

sion have caused an environmental disaster for west-

ern Bahia. Annual cropland in the region was an

experiment that never should have taken place because

of the regions fragile environment. State institutions

are blamed for encouraging agricultural settlement

(author interview, AMINA representative, 31 July

2001, Barreiras). Proof or evidence of a disaster in-

clude peer-reviewed studies of how agriculture causes

substantial decline in soil organic matter (Silva et al.,

1994) and how soils may lose clay-sized particles,

becoming desertified (Spera et al., 1999, pp. 2224),in addition to anecdotal reports of yield crashes. The

disaster interpretation is most closely associated with

AMINA, the regions main NGO for environmental

issues. 9 Although some key actors dismissed AMINA

as irrelevant, poorly informed, and unwilling to carry

out environmental projects, others praised its petitions

that initiated judicial investigations into alleged environ-

mental crimes (see below). AMINA itself is divided on

the issue of whether to participate in municipal politics

or remain independent (author interviews, CRA official,

25 July 2001, Barreiras; official of Public Attorneys Of-

fice, 23 August 2001, Barreiras; AMINA representative,

31 July 2001, Barreiras; SPA official, 20 July 2001, Bar-

reiras; AIBA official, 16 April 2001, Barreiras; IBAMA

official, 20 July 2001, Barreiras).

Some critics have developed a cultural explanation,

blaming the thousands of southern Brazilian farmers

who migrated to western Bahia, often antagonizing

7 In addition to its environmental policies, AIBA has developed a

social program. In parallel with Brazils anti-hunger policies, AIBA

initiated a four-year anti-hunger campaign in January 2003. Its More

Life initiative aims to distribute annually three million kilograms of

donated rice, beans, and other foods collected from western Bahias

farmers among 100,000 families in Bahia (AIBA, 2003a). And, shortly

after detention of two of AIBAs members on charges of enslaving

workers, AIBA held a seminar on agricultural labor relations to

confront the negative image of the region portrayed internationally

(AIBA, 2003d).8 Chase (2003, p. 46)describes how an agricultural cooperative in

Goias state argued for reducing the legal requirement in the 1965 forest

code.

9 Adherents to the disaster idea attach some of their claims on

Geraldo Rocha (1940), who allegedly warned that western Bahias

rivers were essential to the health of the Sao Francisco River. Yet

Rochas writings are strongly supportive of irrigation in the Sao

Francisco River Valley.


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native residents (Haesbaert, 1997). Arguing that mi-

grants are never friends of nature, this position singles

out southern farmers known as Gauchos 10 for hav-

ing devastated the regions best agricultural lands, after

they wiped out forests in their southern Brazilian home-

lands (author interview, IBAMA official, 20 July 2001,

Barreiras). The cultural argument supports jokes suchas Conserve nature, kill a Gaucho but also can be

turned against north-eastern Brazilians. An official of

Luis Eduardo Magalhaes, a new municipality carved

from Barreiras (Fig. 2), who is related by marriage to

one of the first Gauchos to establish modern agriculture

in the region, argued that native Bahian residents incor-

rectly blame southern farmers for having caused reduc-

tion in stream discharge. In fact, he argued that most

damage to streams results from urbanization of stream

banks well downstream of agricultural areas, in Barre-

iras (author interview, municipal official, 23 July 2001,

Luis Eduardo Magalhaes). 11

A second view, promoted by AIBA and its support-

ers, such as the states agribusiness agency (SPA), pre-

sents a different understanding of the regions recent

past. After an initial period of neglect, farmers and pol-

icy makers are beginning to transform the present situa-

tion into sustainable development. In the early 1980s,

farmers had no guidance or regulation by state envi-

ronmental authorities, which encouraged disorganized

land occupation (AIBA, 2002a,b, p. 2). The adventur-

ers, farmers who truly exploited the environment, have

since moved to other frontiers, while those who

remained have a growing environmental concern and

respond well to AIBAs initiatives (author interview,

AIBA official, 20 July 2001, Barreiras). In part, the re-

gions soils are a significant part of the environmental

problem. The razor-thin difference between agricul-

tural production and environmental aggression is

practically nil, turning the smallest farming mistake

into fatal error. This situation was worsened because

the state failed to defend public patrimony and al-

lowed farmers to clear vast stretches of savanna (author

interview, SPA official, 20 July 2001, Barreiras). While

arguing that it is public knowledge that western Ba-

hias agriculture is not suited to the natural conditions,

especially soil and water resources, an IBAMA official

claims that there is still time to undo errors previously

committed, in part by establishing a large national

park in the region and changing cultural attitudes

(Bo, 2000).

7. Side-lined state agencies?

While the non-state actor AIBA has taken the leading

role in developing environmental policies for modern

agriculture, what policies have state agencies promoted?

State agencies have weak command-control policies.

They pursue neither advisory initiatives nor offer eco-nomic incentives. Leading critics of western Bahias

environmental crisis argue that state agencies have failed

to enforce Brazils existing environmental laws. In

response, they have petitioned the Public Attorneys

Office with allegations of infractions of environmental

laws (author interview, AMINA representative, 31 July

2001, Barreiras;Bo, 2000). Two lawsuits reveal benefits

and limitations of using the Public Attorneys Office for

advancing environmental policy.

In one case, the Public Attorneys Office received an

anonymous complaint in December 1998 alleging that

stretches of the Cachorros Stream, a tributary of the

Grande (Fig. 2), had ceased flowing because of excessive

irrigation and omission by the states environmental

agencies. The Barreiras Public Attorneys Office found

that irrigation had begun without proper licensing from

the state. In addition, the local geomorphology encour-

aged the stream to flow exclusively underground during

the dry season (Promotoria de Justica de Barreiras,

2000a). The second case began with another anonymous

complaint, in September 1999, alleging that 60 farms in

western Bahia had implemented illegal central-pivot irri-

gationwith full acquiescence of state agencies (Pro-

motoria de Justica de Barreiras, 2000b, p. 17).

Although neither case has been resolved, both revealthe contradictory nature of the Public Attorney as an

instrument for advancing environmental policy. On the

one hand, the Public Attorney is a robust state agency.

It is relatively independent from municipal and state

politics and is staffed by relatively well paid attorneys

committed to the Public Attorneys office as an institu-

tion of Brazilian democracy. Although initial allegations

are necessarily narrow, investigation may broaden the

subsequent charges considerably. Farmers under investi-

gation were found to lack Legal Reserve areas in savan-

na and licensing of irrigation projects; this gave the cases

momentum and encouraged landowners to reach settle-

ment with the prosecutor (Promotoria de Justica de

Barreiras, 2000a,b). On the other hand, the Public

Attorneys Office is weak in that its investigations rely

on other state agencies for information. In Barreiras,

there are no resources for an independent investigation,

so the Public Attorney must request information from

the SRH and CRA, whose responses are tardy and

incomplete. Both cases suffered from lack of progress

because of personal battles of responsibility between

state agencies and generalized foot-dragging (author

interview, Public Attorneys Office official, 23 August

2001, Barreiras).

10 The noun Gaucho refers to a native of Brazils southernmost

state, Rio Grande do Sul. In north-eastern Brazil (and, indeed, outside

of southern Brazil), however, Gaucho is used to describe natives of

any of the three southern states.11 Gauchos have a negative environmental image, yet they were

leaders in the spread of zero-tillage in Brazil (Landers et al., 2003,

p. 80).


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The nature of bureaucratic conflict is apparent in

considering the case of the Cachorros Stream. Both

water and environment agencies identified problems

and causes precisely outside their institutional mandate.

Officials from the environment agency (CRA) reported

that western Bahias considerable water resources were

close to collapse because of poorly regulated use (Pro-motoria de Justica de Barreiras, 2000a, p. 61). The water

agency (SRH), however, confidently asserted that

properly authorized center-pivot irrigation systems

do not degrade the environment. Instead, they

blamed the CRA and forest service (DDF) for permit-

ting illegal clearing of savanna and riparian vegetation.

In their view, dryland agriculture, subsidized by the

Bahian government, was the real culprit in reducing

the water in the regions streams. The visible degrada-

tion of the Cachorros River resulted not from irrigation,

according to the SRH, but from inappropriate and

poor soil management and the destruction of riparian

vegetation, similar to what has happened in all of west-

ern Bahias rivers (Promotoria de Justica de Barreiras,

2000a, p. 165, 138).

If water and environment agencies blame each other,

what is their own record? In spite of material support

in form of a US$85 million project, the SRH faces con-

siderable problems in licensing stream water use be-

cause basic hydrological data are extremely poor,

with only a handful of stream gauges in the entire

Grande (Fig. 2). In the Femeas Valley (6000 km2), a

tributary of the Grande, the SRH over-licensed irriga-

tion water to some 200 central-pivots, causing reduced

flow that forced a downstream hydroelectricity plant toshut turbines during the dry season. Eventually, the

conflict was resolved by order of the state governor

(Genz and Cardoso, 1998). In addition, Bahias, 1995

water reforms required the SRH to know the volume

of rivers to issue water licenses. Confronted with poor

hydrological data, the SRH developed an equation for

interpolation (Santana et al., 2001). But officials

acknowledge that the quality of the initial data encour-

aged over-estimated stream flow at excessively small

cartographic scale (large area). For example, a rela-

tively small over-estimation of stream flow in Barreiras,

on the Grande River, at 1:250,000 scale could mean

that dozens of upstream central-pivot irrigation might

be cancelled for over-using water (author interview,

SRH official #2, 25 July 2002, Salvador). The SRH

also has delayed the formation of stakeholder commit-

tees. SRH officials in the Barreiras office admitted that

the headquarters in Salvador provided little support for

committee formation, and was hostile to the very idea

of committees (author interviews, SRH official #5, 28

August 2001, Barreiras; SRH official #6, 30 July

2002, Barreiras). Overall, the SRHs policies are re-

duced to identifying water users and issuing licenses,

preparing the way for the collection of water tariffs

a necessary source of funding after the World Bank

funds are spent.

Western Bahias other state agencies are largely inef-

fectual in developing policies to regulate or monitor the

environmental impacts of agriculture. The environment

agency (CRA), for example, is charged with managing

a 350,000 ha protected area in the Rio de Janeiro Val-ley with four staff who have other responsibilities else-

where in the region. Established ten years ago, the

protected area was due to receive a planning document

in 2002, but CRA staff have no data on how much of

the protected area is savanna and how much is agricul-

ture. Management is reduced to keeping the Rio de

Janeiros existing farms (which include that of AIBAs

president) in environmental compliance and seeking

partners who will pay for infrastructure in the pro-

tected area (author interviews, CRA official, 25 July

2001, Barreiras, and 31 July 2002, Barreiras). The

CRA also has transferred environmental licensing to

the municipal government as part of its most recent

decentralization policy; central-pivot schemes now

would be licensed by municipal officials, and munici-

palities would collect fees (author interview, Barreiras

environmental official, 31 July 2002, Barreiras). Over-

all, the CRAs environmental policies are reduced to

occasional monitoring of the protected area and licens-

ing of projects. 12

Even weaker is the states forestry agency (DDF),

which had no officials in western Bahia until July

2001. One year later, its officials had received some oper-

ational funds from a federal project for the San Fran-

cisco River Valley, but were only beginning to surveythe deforested upper reaches of the region. Officials as-

serted that the DDF was obtaining satellite remote sens-

ing data to determine farms devoid of the 20% Legal

Reserve requirement, but in July 2002 the agency had

not yet determined which farms were not in compliance

(author interviews, DDF official #1, 30 August 2001,

Barreiras, and DDF official #2, 29 July 2002). Finally,

Brazils federal environmental agency (IBAMA) has an

extremely poor regional reputation for regulating agri-

cultural land uses. Charges of corruption and incompe-

tence abound, and its own officials complain that until

July 2002 only three technicians (who frequently did

not have access to transport for field visits) covered a

massive jurisdiction of approximately 120,000 km2

(author interviews, IBAMA official, 20 July 2001 and

30 July 2002, Barreiras; AMINA representative, 31 July

2001, Barreiras; DDF official #1, 30 August 2001,

Barreiras).

12 Oliveira (2002)assessed the creation of protected areas in Bahia

as part of the CRAs decentralization policies; he did not focus on

management.


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8. Discussion

Three broader lessons and insights may be drawn

from the case of environmental policy debates for agri-

culture in western Bahia. First is the dilemma of policy

reform in the context of both poor environmental infor-

mation and an institutional void. AsHajer (2003, p.186)argues, knowledge deliberation is now a regular

part of policymaking; yet environmental data and

assessment in agricultural landscapes are still essential

for policy interventions (Viglizzo et al., 2003, p. 170).

The case of western Bahia shows how a non-state actor

plays a key role in knowledge deliberation about facts

that guide its policies. An important aspect of the delib-

erative process is the divergence in explanations about

environmental problems; moreover, fragmentary exist-

ing information encourages divergent views among

actors. But AIBA has capitalized on this deliberative

process by making a quick study of soil erosion and then

proposing its own solutions as the natural leader in

the ensuing policy debates. This is possible, in part, be-

cause of AIBAs support among large farmers who facil-

itate the logistics of approved field research.

The fact that state agencies lack stream flow data and

land cover dataindeed, they have been remiss in serving

the public interest in this regardopens a wide field in the

deliberative policy process for AIBA to monitor vari-

ables and initiate debates when their interests are at stake.

AIBA already has deployed this strategy with regard to

irrigation and soil erosion surveys (AIBA, 1991;Lopes,

2001). There is every indication that present and future

research is motivated by a similar desire. For example,the lack of data on the extent of non-compliance with Le-

gal Reserve requirements allows AIBA to admit that

many farms are in violation, then quickly move to pro-

pose a framework that farmers might follow. In the

meantime, quantitative data on savanna destruction is

not available to set more precise terms for the reforesta-

tion debate. This deliberative knowledge process suggests

a dilemma for technicians and scientists conducting re-

search in the region: their research relies on cooperation

with AIBA, yet AIBA will make every attempt to use

their findings to further its own class-based interests.

Second, the case study points to the issue of power

imbalances among actors in deliberative environmen-

tal policy making. One the one hand, mechanized, large-

scale farmers, who are well integrated into national and

global commodity markets, support a strong private

organization, AIBA. On the other hand, weak state

agencies are unable to implement their own poorly artic-

ulated and reductionist policies. In spite of decentraliza-

tion policies, for example, neither the water (SRH) nor

environmental agency (CRA) motivates staff to conduct

the many field visits necessary in such a large region.

Although several studies have pointed to authoritarian

state behavior in environmental policies (Peluso, 1993;

Robbins, 1998), this case shows how a non-state actor

is setting the terms of the debate, with most state agen-

cies following its lead. Similar non-state actors in other

contexts should come under careful scrutiny. AsBarton

(1997)indicated in his study of Chilean salmon fisheries,

the state initially pursued a middle road between indus-

try self-regulation and command-control strategies. Butthe industrys rapid growth since the early 1980s resulted

in the state adapting to industrial change in a reactive

rather than proactive manner (Barton, 1997, p. 324). In

western Bahia, state agencies only respond to the

AIBAs initiatives. Only considerable investment in hu-

man and physical resources will reverse the observed

trend among state agencies.

The power of non-state actors raises a third dilemma:

does the class-based nature of AIBAs environmental

policy agenda inevitably conflict with the public inter-

est of state agencies? If state agencies exclude AIBA,

they might pursue ineffectual policies that lead to inevi-

table conflict with the targeted users of resources, the

farmers who are the de facto managers (Tilman

et al., 2002, p. 676) of western Bahias land and water re-

sources. However, if state agencies support AIBA, they

may legitimize its green marketing strategy designed

to benefit AIBAs members. Thus, we return to the ques-

tion of whether AIBA is greening agriculture or

greenwashing crisis. With poor environmental data

at present, it is impossible to know. Indeed, following

Uttings (2002)argument, analysis of political and struc-

tural factors encouraging or limiting environmental re-

forms is preferred to quick categorization. These

political and structural factors are moderately strongand show no signs of weakening. AIBA aims to reverse

the publicized claims that agriculture is an environmen-

tal disaster for western Bahia. The organization is simi-

larly focused on the idea that a green policy will help

its agricultural marketing. But in the institutional

void of policymaking, weak state agencies are in a

bind. To address the regions environmental issues, they

must be careful to pursue policies that do not encourage

mass resistance among the regions farmers, yet one also

expects that they will pursue a truly public policy,

rather than rubber-stamping AIBAs initiatives.

Although state agencies may have their own biases, they

will face special challenges as they engage with AIBAs

policy initiatives. Certainly, organized business inter-

estsnot just transnational corporations or local

business (Bryant and Bailey, 1997, pp. 103129)are

significant actors in environmental policy debates, and

their policies should attract close scrutiny before the full

implications of their initiatives become evident. In Bra-

zil, scholarly research on the pulp and steel industries

has indicated wide variation in corporate environmen-

talism (Barton, 2000; Carrere, 2002; Dalcomuni, 2000);

further research on agriculture greening may reveal

similarly broad adoption of environmental policies.


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9. Conclusion

Modern agriculture in developing countries such as

Brazil will be the focus of increasingly sophisticated

environmental policy debates, just as in North America

and Europe. However, these debates probably will occur

without the possibility of environment-based subsidiessupporting multifunctionality. If the case of western

Bahia is instructive, non-state actors such as groups rep-

resenting economic sectors will play an increasingly

important role in creating and implementing environ-

mental policies, perhaps well ahead of state agencies.

This may be especially true in agriculture, where com-

mand-control models fare poorly (Pretty et al., 2001,

p. 271). Thus, state agencies will face a profound dilem-

ma. Will they cooperate with class-based organizations,

such as AIBA, and potentially undermine their public

mandate by supporting a greenwashing marketing

campaign? Or, will they remain aloof from business

interests, isolated in relatively weak institutions bent

on implementing ineffectual policies? The contradiction

presented in the case of western Bahia is that, appar-

ently, the most holistic environmental policies are being

developed by a private organization, perhaps for ulti-

mate greenwashing objectives of relatively well-off

farmers. If state agencies and grassroots activists ignore

private initiatives, they may be doomed to irrelevance.

But to support a non-state actor is also to be aligned

to a particular economic interest that, ultimately, is in-

tent on expanding agricultural land uses.

Acknowledgement

Research for this paper was supported by the Water-

mark Project with funding from the Hewlett Foundation

and the MacArthur Foundation, and grants from the

Hewlett Foundation and Central Research Fund (Uni-

versity of London) to the Institute of Latin American

Studies (London, UK), where I was affiliated while all

field work was carried out. During field work I also ben-

efited from my status as Associate Researcher at the

Instituto Sociedade, Populacao e Natureza in Braslia,

DF. Rebecca Abers and Margaret Keck supported re-

search logistics. The paper benefited from comments

on previous drafts by three anonymous reviewers, Jody

Emel, and Wendy Jepson.

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