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Bias in the TRNG of the Mifare Desfire EV1 Darren Hurley-Smith Julio Hernandez-Castro 07/11/2016

Bias in the TRNG of the Mifare Desfire EV1 - … · Introduction I We have been researching potential vulnerabilities in the Mifare DESFire EV1 I The DESFire EV1 is a Common Criteria

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Text of Bias in the TRNG of the Mifare Desfire EV1 - … · Introduction I We have been researching...

  • Bias in the TRNG of the Mifare Desfire EV1

    Darren Hurley-SmithJulio Hernandez-Castro

    07/11/2016

  • Outline

    Introduction

    Motivation

    Methodology

    Results

    Analysis

    Conclusion

    Future Work

    Acknowledgements

  • Introduction

    I We have been researching potential vulnerabilities in theMifare DESFire EV1

    I The DESFire EV1 is a Common Criteria EAL4+ certifiedsmart card used in transport, fare payment andmicro-payments, around the world [1]

  • Motivation: Background

    I The DESFire EV1 is very popular as a transit/fare-playingcard in many nations

    I It is also used in loyalty schemes and access controlapplications

    I Transport for London (TfL) issued approximately 8 millionDESFire EV1-based cards in the 2015/2016 period [2]

    I A weak PRNG and cryptographic algorithm (CRYPTO-1)contributed to dismantling the Mifare Classic [36]

  • Motivation: Rationale

    I As a cash-value bearing card, the DESFire EV1 has amonetary value to criminals

    I The Mifare DESFire EV1 has been successfully emulated [7],and its power characteristics have been analysed in depth [8]

    I This card has proven resilient to side-channel attacks (SCA),by implementing hardware countermeasures [9]

    I We believed that an in depth evaluation of the DESFire EV1sTRNG was necessary

  • Methodology: Data collection

    I 64 MB of data was retrieved from two DESFire EV1 cardsusing an ACR122U reader

    I Data collection took an average of 12 days per card to gather4 million AES-128 encrypted values

    I Each nonce (16-bytes long) was extracted from a differentauthentication session

    I The data was acquired from the protocol used to secure cardPICC and Application read/write functions

    I The values were decrypted using a default AES-128 key(initialised to zero) before analysis

  • Methodology: Lab Set-up

    (a) Laptop with readerand DESFire EV1 cards

    (b) ACR122Ureader with twoMifare DESFireEV1 cards

    Figure 1: Experimental set-up used to collect TRNG data

    I Toshiba Laptop Specification: i7 processor, 8GB RAM

    I Reader: ACR122U (CCID), Scripts: Python 2.7 and Bash

  • Methodology: Randomness Tests

    The collected data was subjected to three randomness testbatteries:

    I Dieharder

    I The NIST Statistical Test Suite v2.1.2

    I ENT

  • Results: Dieharder

    Table 1: Diehard results for 64MB of TRNG Output

    Diehard Test UID 04742c32 UID 04743732

    t-samples p-values p-values

    Birthday Spacings default 0.18194520 0.61105583Overlapping Permutations 125,000 0.38044164 0.58693289

    6x8 Binary Rank 25,000 0.31311490 0.32387215Bitstream default 0.97724174 0.18743536

    Count the 1s (stream) default 0.17108396 0.74984724Count the 1s (byte) default 0.86481241 0.92578024

    Parking Lot default 0.18078043 0.24200626Minimum Distance (2d sphere) default 0.76328000 0.950916353d sphere (minimum distance) default 0.23871272 0.20826216

    Squeeze default 0.62598919 0.08843989Runs default 0.63756836 0.80941394

    Craps 20,000 0.54077256 0.92769962

  • Results: NIST STS 2.1.2

    I Both cards passed the NIST STS 2.1.2 batteryI UID 04742C32 performs poorly in one of the non-overlapping

    template tests, but passed all other testsI This seems not to be statistically significant

    I UID 04743732 passes all tests with no weak results

    I A third card from a different batch passed all tests, again

  • Results: ENT

    Table 2: Mifare DESFire EV1 ENT results for 64MB of TRNG output

    ENT UID 04742c32 UID 04743732 Optimal/Expected

    Entropy 7.999969 7.999989 8Optimal Compress. 0 0 0

    chi-square 2709.10 973.07 255Arith. Mean 127.492921 127.500582 127.5

    Monte Carlo est. 3.14167 3.142019 3.14159S. Correlation 0.000008 0.000045 0.0

    I Both cards demonstrate very poor performance on thechi-square test

    I This indicates that there is a strong bias in the distribution ofbyte values throughout both data samples

  • Analysis: Bias

    (a) Mifare DESFire EV1 (b) Random Data

    Figure 2: Bias graph of two 64MB datasets

    I Only (a) shows a clear non-random trend

    I repetitive pattern, clear cycles, almost no values close tozero...

  • Analysis: Fourier Analysis of the Bias

    (a) UID 04742c32 (b) UID 04743732

    Figure 3: Fourier series for the biases from two 64MB TRNG samples

    I Both cards demonstrate a regular period of 32 biased values

    I Exactly half of the possible byte values occur more frequently

  • Conclusion

    I We have conducted a preliminary study of the Mifare DESFireEV1s true random number generator

    I Clear & consistent biases have been found in the dataI We have responsibly disclosed our findings to NXP

    I They have responded, confirming our findingsI They have a team looking into the root cause

    I A more detailed analysis suggests that there may be an XNORrelationship between the 4th and 5th bits of each byte

    I No practical attacks have been identified at this point

    I We have observed that some of the best known tests do notdetect this flaw, PRNG/TRNG evaluation is tricky!

  • Future Work

    I Testing other secure RFID cards, such as the DESFire EV2,to explore whether this bias occurs in similar products

    I Building an accurate model of the biasI R2 0.7981 (80%)

    I Testing collected data with other test batteries

    I Testing under variable environmental conditions

    I Developing hardware model that explains the observed bias

  • Acknowledgements

    I This work was funded by InnovateUK as part of theauthenticatedSelf project, under reference number 102050.

    I We would like to thank ECOST - Cryptacus for their valuableand insightful discussion of this work.

    I We would also like to thank NXP Semiconductors Ltd. fortheir timely and professional communication following theresponsible disclosure of our findings.

  • References1. NXP Semiconductors. MIFARE DESFire EV1 4K: MIFARE DESFire EV1 contactless

    multi-application IC. Retrieved 15:45 05/09/2016 from:http://www.nxp.com/products/identification-and-security/mifare-ics/mifare-desfire/.

    2. Transport for London. Adult Oyster Cards Issued 2015/16.http://content.tfl.gov.uk/oyster-card-sales.pdf, 2016.

    3. Gerhard de Koning Gans, Jaap-Henk Hoepman, and Flavio D Garcia. A practical attack on the mifareclassic. In Int. Conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications, pages 267282, 2008.

    4. Mohamad Merhi, Julio Hernandez-Castro, and Pedro Peris-Lopez. Studying the prng of a low-costrfid tag. In RFID-Tech. and Applications (RFID-TA), 2011 IEEE Int. Conference on, pages 381385.

    5. Flavio D Garcia, Peter Van Rossum, Roel Verdult, and Ronny Schreur. Wirelessly pickpocketing amifare classic card. In 30th IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy, pages 315, 2009.

    6. Yi-Hao Chiu, Wei-Chih Hong, Li-Ping Chou, Jintai Ding, Bo-Yin Yang, and Chen-Mou Cheng. Apractical attack on patched mifare classic. In assic, editor, Int. Conference on Information Securityand Cryptology, pages 150164. Springeron, 2013.

    7. Timo Kasper, Ingo Von Maurich, David Oswald, and Christof Paar. Chameleon: A versatile emulatorfor contactless smartcards. In International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, pages189206. Springer, 2010.

    8. Timo Kasper, David Oswald, and Christof Paar. Side-channel analysis of cryptographic rfids withanalog demodulation. In International Workshop on Radio Frequency Identification: Security andPrivacy Issues, pages 6177. Springer, 2011.

    9. Timo Kasper, Ingo von Maurich, David Oswald, and Christof Paar. Cloning cryptographic rfid cardsfor 25usd. In 5th Benelux workshop on information and system security. Nijmegen, Netherlands, 2010.

  • .

    Questions?

    IntroductionMotivationMethodologyResultsAnalysisConclusionFuture WorkAcknowledgements