Letter from the Executive Board Dear Delegates, WelcometotheEconomicandSocialCouncilof RotaryModelUnitedNations 2015.ImhumbledtobeChairingonyourExecutiveBoardforthiscommittee, andhopetoprovideathought-provoking,substantivelyengaging,andimmersive competitive experience for you all. Theguideyouareabouttoreadwaswrittentoprovideyouaprimeronthe agendasandserveasacrediblesourceof information.Yourrealresearchliesin identifyingkeyareasforaddressingwithinsaidagendas,andusingfactual proficiency, policy and diplomacy to find answers to pressing problems.Further,preparationfortheagendasnotonlyneedsextensiveresearchbutmore importantlyabilitytoanalyzetheeconomicviabilityandlong-termsustainability of policyproposals.Atthesametime,thepoliticalconsiderationsduetothe sensitivity ofthe topics cant be neglected.Thiscommitteewillbedealingwithsomechallengingandinterestingtopics. However, we are most looking forward to seeing what you, the delegates, can bring tothetable,bothintermsof yourideasincommitteeandyourcreativityin craftingsolutions.Wefullyexpectimpressivelevelsof effort,enthusiasm,and engagement from you all. I hope youre looking forward to this committee as much as your Executive Board and I are, and that youll go back satisfied with the learning experience you pick up. Please do not hesitate to contact me or your Director in case ofqueries pertaining to the agenda or the guide. Karan ChowdharyPresident Economic and Social Council Raghav GaurVice President Economic and Social CouncilNature ofProof/Evidence Allowed in the CouncilGovernment Reports pertaining to the respective countryReuters ReportsReports ofOrgans ofUN, Specialized Agencies, Affiliated Bodies and any subsidiary organsEstablishedMacroandMicroEconomicPrinciplesandwidelyacceptedEconomic Theories The United Nations Economic and Social Council The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) serves as the central forum for discussing internationaleconomicandsocialissues,andforformulatingpolicyrecommendations addressedtoMemberStatesandtheUnitedNationssystem.Itisresponsiblefor promotinghigherstandardsof living,fullemployment,andeconomicandsocial progress;identifyingsolutionstointernationaleconomic,socialandhealthproblems; facilitating international cultural and educational cooperation; and encouraging universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It has the power to make or initiate studies and reports on these issues. It also has the power to assist the preparations and organization ofmajor international conferences in the economic and social and related fieldsandtofacilitateacoordinatedfollow-uptotheseconferences.Withitsbroad mandate the Council's purview extends to over 70 per cent ofthe human and financial resources ofthe entire UN system.The ECOSOC was established under the United Nations Charter as the principal organ to coordinate economic, social, and related work ofthe 14 UN specialized agencies, 10 functionalcommissionsandfiveregionalcommissions.TheCouncilalsoreceives reports from 11 UN funds and programmes. Mandate ofthe Economic and Social Council Chapter X ofthe Charter ofthe United Nations Article 62The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and reports with respect tointernationaleconomic,social,cultural,educational,health,andrelatedmattersand may make recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly to the Members ofthe United Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned.

Itmaymakerecommendationsforthepurposeof promotingrespectfor,and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.ItmaypreparedraftconventionsforsubmissiontotheGeneralAssembly,with respect to matters falling within its competence.Itmaycall,inaccordancewiththerulesprescribedbytheUnitedNations, international conferences on matters falling within its competence.Article 63The Economic and Social Council may enter into agreements with any ofthe agencies referredtoinArticle57,definingthetermsonwhichtheagencyconcernedshallbe broughtintorelationshipwiththeUnitedNations.Suchagreementsshallbesubjectto approval by the General Assembly.It may co-ordinate the activities ofthe specialized agencies through consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Members ofthe United Nations.Article 64The Economic and Social Council may take appropriate steps to obtain regular reports fromthespecializedagencies.ItmaymakearrangementswiththeMembersof the United Nations and with the specialized agencies to obtain reports on the steps taken to giveeffecttoitsownrecommendationsandtorecommendationsonmattersfalling within its competence made by the General Assembly.It may communicate its observations on these reports to the General Assembly. Article 65The Economic and Social Council may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the Security Council upon its request.Article 66 TheEconomicandSocialCouncilshallperformsuchfunctionsasfallwithinits competenceinconnectionwiththecarryingoutof therecommendationsof the General Assembly.It may, with the approval ofthe General Assembly, perform services at the request ofMembers ofthe United Nations and at the request ofspecialized agencies.It shall perform such other functions as are specified elsewhere in the present Charter or as may be assigned to it by the General Assembly.Economic Reconstruction inpost-Dayton eraBosnia & HerzegovinaIntroduction Bosnia and Herzegovina is a nation that is truly unique in both its history and its current styleof governance.In2015,almostafull20yearssincethesigningof theDayton accords,Bosniaisanationwithalotof potentialforeconomicgrowthand improvement, but few believe that this will be easy. The country and its leaders are rife withcorruptionandinefficiency,afactthattheBosnianpeoplearebecoming increasinglyawareof.Furthermore,therecenteconomiccrisishasaffectedBosnia greatly, bringing inflation and unemployment to incredibly high levels.Additionally, while the ethnic violence may have died down, ethnic divisions still remain salient. Bosnia and Herzegovina is effectively divided into two semi-autonomous entities, theFederationof BosniaandHerzegovinaandRepublikaSrpska,theformerbeing dominated by ethnic Bosnians, and the latter dominated by ethnic Serbs. The Federation has a slightly larger population, and a slightly larger landmass, but both entities have their ownpresidentandrepresentativeassemblies.Furthermore,in2000,theBr!koDistrict wascreatedasanothersemi-autonomousself-governingregionwithinBosniaand Herzegovina. It was originally disputed land bordering the Federation, Republika Srpska, andCroatia,andisveryethnicallydiverse,withnosingleethnicgroupclaiminga majority. The combination ofan economy in dire straits and a widely-mistrusted government led to massive popular protests and riots in early 2014. While these riots eventually abated, theproblemsthatsparkedthemdidnot.However,nodecisiveactionwastakenbythe Bosniangovernment,perhapslargelybecausethenextpresidentialelectionsinBosnia were due to be held in October of2014, and no incumbent wanted to draw attention to the massive problems oftheir leadership. BosniaspresidentialelectionsareuniqueinthatBosniaelectsnotone,butthree membersof itsnationspresidency.Likemanycountrieswithseriousethnicdivisions, BosniaandHerzegovinausesaconsociationalpoliticalsystem,alegacyof theDayton peace accords that ended the countrys civil war in 1995. This special type ofdemocracy seekstopreserveabalancebetweenthecountrysdifferentethnicgroups,through constitutionalprovisionsastotheethnicmakeupof themainseatsof politicalpower. Everyconsociationaldemocracyisslightlydifferentinthisregard,andtheyworkwith mixed success. As was mentioned, Bosnias presidency is particularly interesting in that it hasthreemembers,oneethnicBosnian,oneethnicSerb,andoneethnicCroat,who rotateaschairmanof thepresidency(effectivelythedefactoheadof state)every8 months. This is different from most consociational systems, which usually have only one President,buthaveaseparatePrimeMinisterandSpeakerof theAssembly,andthese key positions are divided up between the major ethic groups. Bosniascouncilof MinistersisappointedbythePresidencyaftereachpresidential election, and usually consists ofmembers ofdifferent ethnic groups that roughly reflect the proportional ethnic populations in the country. However, these ministerial positions are often subject to frequent change, as each time the presidency rotates and a new co-presidenttakesholdof thechairmanshipof thepresidencytheymightusetheir newfoundpowertoappointnewministers.TheofficialHeadof Governmentisthe Chairman ofthe Council ofMinisters, who leads and directs the Council ofMinisters. Oneof thelargestchallengesfacingthiscommitteewillbeaddressingthestaggering Bosnianeconomyandtheimplementationmarketreforms.Marketliberalizationhas occurred steadily but slowly since the Dayton accords, but there is still substantial room for progress. However, the question ofthe direction that economic reform should take has become especially salient and urgent in recent years, as the country is still recovering from the 2009 economic crisis and Bosnias economy actually contracted substantially in 2012.Unemploymentisincrediblyhighinthecountry,althoughinflationisreasonably low. Thanks to the countrys ethnic divisions, Bosnia has a very decentralized governance structure, which makes national macroeconomic policy both very difficult to implement andoftenineffective.Widespreadcorruptionandageneralmistrustinthegovernment furtherhandicapsanypoliciesthatareembracedbythewidelydispersedgovernment, andthelargeinfluenceof foreignbanksandcorporationscanoftenaffectdecision-making.Fixingthesemyriadproblemsmaybeanessentialstepinsolidifyingthe recovery ofthe Bosnian economy and providing for its long-term growth. Anotherimportantchallengefacingthecommittee,whichwillrequirethecoordinated actionof allof BosniaandHerzegovina,isthenationsentrancetotheEuropean Union. Not only will this step open up the Bosnian economy to the worlds largest free market, but it will also be useful in terms ofpolitical clout and for future socioeconomic stability.However,BosniasentrancetotheEuropeanUnionwillhardlyprovetobean easytask.Initscurrentstate,theEUisinnomoodtoallowadmittancetoanother strugglingeconomythatfurtherburdensthealreadyunder-performingEuropean economy.Furthermore,entrancetotheEuropeanUnionrequiresapplicantstomeet certainstandardsintheircountries,withcorruptionlimitationandsocialstabilitybeing keytenetsof theserequirements.BosniaandHerzegovinaisonlyoneof several EuropeannationstryingtojointheEU,andiseffectivelyincompetitionwithallofthem to be the next nation admitted. It stands to reason that the European Union would only admit new members one at a time and slowly, to allow their integration process to besmoothandeffective.MakingBosniasEuropeanintegrationviableassoonas possiblewillhaveatremendousimpactonhowquicklyandwellBosniacanrecover from its current economic slump, and proceed towards actionable economic growth. All these objectives will be part ofsolving the wider problem ofthe high levels ofsocial unrest in the country, which manifested themselves in the aforementioned 2014 protests. As the memories ofbitter ethnic conflict and civil war fade further in the minds ofthe Bosnian people, they are beginning to expect more economic progress and improvement of livingstandardsintheircountry.Whileethnicdivisionsandtensionsremain prevalent,thedaysof debilitatingethnicconflicthavebeguntogivewaytoaspirations of betterlivelihoodandsustainabilityproppedupbyarobustfutureeconomy,and people ofall ethnicities in Bosnia and Herzegovina are beginning to expect better.The Economic History ofBosnia and Herzegovina End ofWorld War II, rise ofTito AttheTehranConferenceinNovemberof 1943,Churchill,Roosevelt,andStalin recognised the Partisans, a movement led by Yugoslav statesman Josip Broz Tito as the leadingandtrueYugoslavresistancemovementinthenation.Thankstothemilitary assistance and aid provided by the allies, German forces were completely driven out ofYugoslavia by 1945, and by the time the hostilities ended, the Partisans commanded an armyof around800,000inadditionto140,000communistpartymembers.Thisput Titoinanimmenselypowerfulpositiontoemergeasaleaderinpost-warYugoslavia, although it was initially unclear as to what post-war Yugoslavia would look like.TheNovember1945electionsusheredinanewageinYugoslavhistory,butfroma geopolitical standpoint, much still had to be resolved in the region in the coming years. Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchills now famous percentages agreement made near the end ofthe Second World War to establish spheres ofinfluence in liberated Europe, had Yugoslavia as being split 50/50 between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in terms ofinfluence in the country. Yugoslavia was to become a communist nation, but acommunistnationthatwasnotfirmlyunderthethumbof JosephStalinandthe USSR, unlike most nations behind the Iron Curtain. Atthesametime,TitosYugoslaviaalsoflewinthefaceof theWesterndemocracies, effectivelydoingitsbesttocastitself asneutralintheColdWar,which,forthemost part, would serve it well.Oncetheeuphoriaof thepost-warstatebuildinghaddieddown,Titomovedto consolidate his power and the dominance ofhis Communist party as they began to turn Yugoslavia into a truly socialist state. Tito recognized, to an extent, the fractious nature ofthe new federalized Yugoslavia, and believed that a degree oftotalitarianism would be required to ensure the countrys stability. One ofthe first items ofbusiness for Tito was toeradicatethelasttracesof theUstaseregimeandtheChetnikrebels.TheChetnik leader, Mihailovic was captured in early 1946, brought before a show trial, and executed afewmonthslateralongwithafewotherChetnikleaders.Thousandsmorewere interrogatedandimprisoned,includingthosewhoformallyheldhighpositionsinthe former royal government, as well as just about anyone believed to have cooperated with the Ustase regime. The Transition to Yugoslav Socialism Oncehewasmoreassuredinhispowerbase,Titobegantheprocessof transforming Yugoslavia into a truly socialist state, with an increased emphasis on heavy industry, and the importance ofthe worker in society. In 1947, Tito launched Yugoslavias first Five Year Plan, a standard economic planning model ofcommand economies, while simultaneously rejecting aid offered by the West in the form ofthe Marshall plan. The rejection ofthe Marshall Plan aid, coupled with the nearcompletenationalizationof theeconomysignalledstronglytotheWestthat YugoslaviawasandwouldremainaCommunistnation,andwasnotlookingtofall undertheirsphereof influence.Titoseconomicplanning,whichincludedmassive industrialgrowthtargets,andlargeagriculturalcollectivizationwasveryreminiscentofearlyStalinistpolicies,andYugoslavialookedoncoursetobecomeacommuniststate very much in the Stalinist mould. Tito was making massive efforts to convert what was formerly a largely agrarian society to one dominated by the industrial proletariat. However,in1948,asignificantchangeoccurred.Titodidtheunthinkableandbroke withJosephStalinandtheUSSR,puttinghisrelativelysmallBalkannationintoalmost directconflictwiththesuperpowerwhoseinfluencespreadrightuptotheYugoslav border. The Cominform, the spiritual successor ofthe Comintern, was formed in early 1947, to act as an international committee for the leading communist parties in Europe. Yugoslavia was an original member and the organization actually had its headquarters in Belgrade.However,overthecomingmonthsYugoslaviaandtheUSSRbegantobutt heads over disagreements about their policy in a number ofareas, including Titos new Five Year Plan and Soviet influence on Yugoslavias armed forces. Tensions escalated as Tito failed to cave to Soviet pressure, and the USSRs criticism ofTitos regime became increasinglyfrequentandscathing.ThingscametoaheadinMay1948whenTito refusedtosendaYugoslavdelegationtoameetingof theCominform,inprotestat SovietdemandsforYugoslavianrestructuring.Infuriated,atthatmeetinginJune1948, theCominformofficiallyexpelledtheCommunistPartyof Yugoslaviafromitsranks, setting alarm bells ringing around the world for potential conflict that might soon occur in the Balkans.Therewereseveralconsequencesof TitosbreakwithStalinandtheCominform.One ofthe most immediate was that Tito decided to begin ridding his ranks ofStalinist and Soviet loyalists, by sending them to prison or forced labor camps that were beginning to springuparoundthecountry. However,Titocontinuedwiththemajorityof his economicpolicies,althoughhisideologybegantodrawawayfromthatof theUSSR, andtakeonacharacterof itsown,whichwouldbecomeknownasTitoism.Titoalso begantoverygraduallymovetheadministrativestructureof theYugoslavstatetobe more centralist, operating with more authority at the federal level, and less autonomy for therepublics,althoughthiswouldbereversedinthe1960s. Titowasabletoprevent outrightconflictwiththeUSSRpartlybyappeasingthemwithtraditional,well recognizedsocialistpolicies,butalsobyallowingYugoslaviatobeusedtoanextentin the United States containment policy for the Soviet Union, by signing trade agreements andacceptingsomelimitedaidfromtheUSatthebeginningof the1950s. ThisUS rapprochement allowed Tito to play the two superpowers offagainst one another quite successfully for most ofthe Cold War.Yugoslavia, 1950s-1980s Economic progress in Yugoslavia was initially slow, especially after the break with Stalin, as Yugoslavia saw its trade with the Eastern Bloc suffer greatly. However, it did sustain a periodof rapidindustrialgrowthandprogressinthesecondhalf of the1950s,which sawindustrialgrowthratesashighas12.6%. Yetthegrowthwasunsustainable,and economic progress stalled. Socialist Yugoslavia began to suffer from many ofthe same problemseconomicallyasothersocialistcommandeconomiesaroundtheworld.Its inflexible plans made it slow to adapt to changing international circumstances, and it also facedalackof innovationandtechnologicalprogress. Furthermore,itseconomywas plagued by widespread inefficiency, which was largely caused by the ideological barriers to wide-scale economic restructuring. However despite the progress made and the relative liberalism ofthe late 1960s and 70s, ethnicfractiousnesswasneverfarfromthesurface.DespiteTitoscentralistmandate, nationalistgroupscontinuedtoexistandagitateforseparatism,creatingconflictand sometimesviolenceinYugoslavia,bothof whichsetthecountrysdevelopmentand progress back considerably. One pertinent example was Titos crushing ofthe so-called Croatian Spring in the early 1970s.Additionally,particularlywithinBosnia-Herzegovinaitself,ethnictensionneverreally dissipatedcompletely,particularlyoverissuesrelatedtonationalidentity.Forexample, someMuslimintellectualsdemandedseparateinstitutionstoprotectMuslimculture, while interpretations ofBosnian history differed wildly between ethnic groups, and was usuallytaughtthatwaywithinethniccommunities. Itisimportanttorecognizethat whileTitodiddoagreatdealtounifyYugoslaviainmorethanjustname,theethnic conflictthatoccurredafterhisdeathwasnotsomethingcompletelynew.Different theoriesexistastotheimportanceof Titosdeathinultimatelyleadingtothecivilwar and genocide in the 1990s, but one must appreciate that Titos regime was far from free of ethnicconflict,whichpresenteditself asarguablythegreatestmenacetothe countrys economic and social advancement, and does to this day. The Death ofTito, and ofSocialist Yugoslavia The death ofJosip Broz Tito in May 1980 did not immediately lead to a rapid breakup ofYugoslavia and the beginning ofa financial slump. As one ofhis last acts as leader, Titoappointedan8-manstatepresidencyforYugoslavia,comprisedof membersofdifferentethnicgroupsandnationalorigins.Thesenewleaders,whoactedasheadsofstatefor1-yeartermsonarotatingbasis,werelargelymembersof Titosinnercircle whilehewasinpower,andwerecommittedtoupholdinghisobjectiveof aunited Yugoslavia. AfterTitosdeath,Yugoslaviawasplungedintoadamagingeconomiccrisis,whichthe ratherweakcentralizedfederalinstitutionswereunabletotackleeffectively.Although the1980seconomiccrisiswaslargelytriggeredbythe1979oilshock,Yugoslaviawas exposedtoagreatdealof foreigndebt,whichdeepenedthecrisissubstantially. There weremajorshortagesof manycommonconsumergoods,whichhadbecome increasingly available over the past two decades, and the sudden shortages led to unrest. Meanwhile,thewarmingof relationsbetweenMoscowandWashingtonamid Gorbachevspoliciesof GlasnostandPerestroika,decreasedthegeo-political significanceof Yugoslavia,andhencefarlessforeignaidwasofferedtoitbyeither superpower. Furthermore, the economic turmoil caused the republics to co-operate less and seek to benefit their own regions instead ofthe country as a whole. However, more significant than the economic crisis itselfwas the political fragmentation thatitbegantocause.Thericherandlesscrisis-afflictedrepublicsof Yugoslavialike Sloveniasoughttodistancethemselvesfromtheunitedfederation,whileSerbia,the largest and most powerful ofthe republics sought to maintain a level ofcentralization, which it viewed as a projection ofits own power. Furthermore, Serbia was attempting to bring the autonomous provinces ofKosovo and Vojvodina into a unitary Serbia, citing thelargeethnicSerbianpopulationsintherespectiveprovinces,andtheadministrative streamlining it might allow. Kosovo in particular proved to be a breeding ground for unrest. Unequal development andeconomicdiscriminationagainstethnicAlbaniansinKosovo,ledtoamassive student protest that called for a separate republic. Primarily Serbian forces moved in to quellthestudentuprisingenmasse,buttheirheavyhandedactionshadtheeffectofignitingfargreaterAlbanianresistance,leadingtoevenfurtherrepression.Serbiaalso usedthethreatof IslamicextremismtojustifyinterventioninBosnianinternalaffairs, and sought to destabilize the Bosnian communist regime. Recent Circumstances and the Current Situation The Dayton Accords TheDaytonPeaceaccordsweresignedinDayton,Ohio,intheUSA,inNovember 1995, bringing several years ofbrutal war to an end and laying the foundations for the politicalorganization ofmodernBosnia and Herzegovina.Thesystemthey established inBosniaisdeeplycomplex,andhasseveraldifferentpowercenters.Italsoaimsto providerepresentationandproportionalpoliticalpowertoeachof theethnicgroups andmakesprovisionsforextensiveinternationalmonitoring.Theagreementdidnot truly satisfy any ofthe warring parties, (which could perhaps be viewed as a victory for compromise) and as such, tension continues to linger over the system. There are mixed opinions on the success ofthe Dayton accords, but given that they were only signed 20 years ago, the safest conclusion is perhaps that it is too early to tell. The Dayton agreement in Bosnia is largely recognized to be a consociational system, in whichthereisaconstitutionallyembeddedsystemof powersharingbetweenethnic groups.Belowisanoutlineexplainingeachof thelevelsanddivisionsof theBosnian politicalsystemasclearlyaspossible,demonstratingthedivisionandpartitionsthat attempt to strike a balance ofpower between the societys fractured ethnic groups. HighRepresentative:Thewholesystemisguidedbytheofficeof theHigh RepresentativeforBosniaandHerzegovina,aspeciallyappointedEUrepresentative withanAmericandeputy,whohasoversightovertheentireBosnianpolitical methodology. Theyhavethepowertoamendtheconstitutionandmakeimportant changes to the state structure. TwoEntities:WhilethestatethatemergedwascalledBosnia-Herzegovina,itwas comprisedof twoentitieseachwiththeirowngovernmentsandadministrative structure.TheFederationof Bosnia-HerzegovinawascomprisedalmosttotallyofMuslims and Croats, and covered 51% ofthe countrys territory. The Republika Srpska was almost totally Serb, and covered some 49% ofthe countrys territory.Br!ko District: The one exception to this division was the Br!ko (pronunciation: Birchko) district in northeastern Bosnia. This is a small region in which all three ethnic groups are prevalent and none holds a majority. It was established as a self-governing district within the Bosnian state, which was technically part ofboth entities.Three-partPresidency:Perhapsthekeyelementof Bosniasconsociationalsystemis itsthreepersonpresidency,withoneMuslim,oneSerb,andoneCroat,whoareall electedeveryfouryearstoserveasheadof stateonarotatingbasis.Thepresidency existsatthestatelevel,abovethetwoentities,andisthemostpowerfulofficeinthe country. ParliamentaryAssembly:Post-DaytonBosniawouldhaveatwochamberassembly, consistingof theHouseof PeoplesandtheHouseof Representatives.TheHouseofPeoples consists of15 members, five Muslims and five Croats, (from the federation) and fiveSerbs(fromRepublikaSrpska).TheHouseof Representativeshas42members, withtwothirdsfromthefederationandonethirdfromtheRepublika.Importantly,a majorityof anyof theethnicgroupsineitherhousecanvotedownanylegislationiftheyperceiveittothreatentheirnationsvitalinterest,givingeachethnicgroupan effectivevetopowerforwhentheirvitalinterestisthreatened. Thisvetopowerisan important element ofa consociational democracy. Councilof Ministers(statelevel):Thisiseffectivelythegovernmentof Bosnia-Herzegovina.Itiscomprisedof uptotwo-thirdsfromthefederationof Bosnia-Herzegovinaandone-thirdfromtheRepublikaSrpska(pronunciation:Serpska).The Council has a chair (who does not have his own specific portfolio), and two vice chairs, whoallhavetobefromdifferentethnicgroups,meaningthatthechairiseffectivelya primeministerandthecouncilishisorhercabinet,andtheyareoftenreferredtoas such.Whilethisbodywasweakatfirst,overtimeitbegantoemergeasthekey governing body for the State. The Federation ofBosnia-Herzegovina: The federation is comprised predominantly of ethnicMuslimsandCroats,andwasdefinedlargelybypre-warboundariesofBosniak (Bosnian Muslim) and Croat territories. It is divided into 10 cantons, three ofwhichweremainlyCroat,fiveweremainlyBosniak,andtwohadseenheavyfighting between the two nations and so were very mixed. It also has its own Presidency, House of Representatives,andCouncilof Ministersinadditiontoitscantonaladministrative structure.Allthisservestomakethefederationveryde-centralizedasanentity,within analreadyde-centralizedstate.Itevenincludesalevelof vetorightsjustwithinthe federation, and another on the Cantonal level, between Croats and Bosniaks. Having established how Bosnia and Herzegovina works in the above framework, we may sayitisverymuchaconsocionationaldemocracy,andnormativelyassesshowthis impacts the situation in the country today.Bosnias pre-Dayton command Economy While the Bosnian economy and many ofits primary institutions were devastated by the war, and almost had to be rebuilt from scratch, it is worth briefly examining the socialist command economy Bosnia had known for almost halfa century before the war. Indeed, itistheonlytypeof economythatmostBosnianshadexperiencedatthetimeofindependence,whichmakesthetransitiontofree-marketcapitalismallthemore challenging. Evenbeforetheascendanceof TitoandCommunistauthoritarianrule,development and economic initiatives for Bosnia-Herzegovina had always come from above. This was amplifiedbyCommunisttraditionof plannedeconomies,whereasmallpoliticalelite decidedhowandwheredevelopmentwouldtakeplace.Aswasthegoalof many communistregimes,particularlythoseinEurope,Titoscommunistssoughtto transformthepredominantlyagrarianpeasantsocietyof mostof Yugoslaviaintoa proletariat-dominatedindustrialone.Assuch,muchof Titosearlyplanning(usuallyin the form ofFive Year Plans), was centered on this transition to an industrial economy. After Titos break with Stalin, Bosnia was earmarked for much ofYugoslavias defense-basedindustrialization,thankstoitscentrallocationinYugoslavia(andhencedistance fromSovietcontrolledborder),andruggedgeography.Wherethegeographyand remotenessof centralBosniahadoncehindereddevelopment,now,Titoandhis economic planners saw it as an asset, and thus, according to the scholar Martina Fischer, pouredenormousresourcesintodefense-relatedprojectsacrossthemountainous center. ThismassiveinvestmentalsosawdevelopmentinBosniasminingandmetalworking sectors,aswellasmassin-migrationof skilledlabortomanthesenewprojects.This investmentinindustrialdevelopmentbegantoseedividendsinthe1970s.Inwhathas beendescribedasagoldenageof Bosniansocialism,livingstandardsrose significantly,massurbanizationoccurred,education,particularlyatthetertiarylevel, drasticallyimproved,andemploymentopportunitieswereabundantthankstothe development. However the Bosnian industrialization was not necessarily as successful as it might have seemed.Thelargelevelsof investmentinBosniasindustrygaveitthestatusof a developedrepublicwithinYugoslavia,whichmeantthatitscivilsectorwasvery underfundedandthateverydayBosnianswereactuallysubstantiallypoorerthanpeople inotherlessdevelopedrepublics. Furthermore,muchof Bosniasdevelopmenthad come from money outside ofthe region, from the central Yugoslav government, which was itselfborrowing heavily from the World Bank and other foreign lenders. As a result, whenthesecondoilshockoccurredin1979,thefundsdriedup,andtheBosnian economy began to go downhill. To make matters even worse for present day Bosnia, the defenseindustriesthathadbeenthefoundationof SocialistBosniaseconomywas plundered by the JNA when it left Bosnia, and was then ravaged by the war, leaving very little ofit remaining or even salvageable upon independence. Beyond the problems created by active planning ofthe Tito administration, the Bosnian economyinthiserawasriddledwithinefficiencyandcorruption,oftendueto substantialCommunistpartyinvolvementineconomicaffairs.Animportantpartofmaintainingtheirpowerbaseaspartyofficialswastoacquireandretaincontrolover publiccompanies,providingthemwithaccesstobothrevenueandcontrolofemployment opportunities. This obviously led to officials paying or being paid off, and misuseof publicfunds.Also,thecentralYugoslavplanners,didnotalwaysallocate funds in a way that made sense on the ground in Bosnia, meaning that many expensive projects lacked longevity, or involved needless complexity and expense. EvenwiththeflawsinBosniasSocialisteconomy,itdidpossessasetof foundations andinstitutionsforfutureeconomicgrowthanddevelopment,andperhapsevena smoothtransitiontoamarketeconomy.However,thewarprovedtobefarmore damagingtoBosniashopesfordevelopmentthananycommandeconomy mismanagementcouldhavebeen.Importantinstitutionswereincapacitated, infrastructureandagricultureweredevastated,andBosniaspromisingindustrialsector was plundered for all it was worth. The war also led to the rise ofa new type ofelites, who were able to enrich themselves during the war, through everything from arms sales to the smuggling ofplundered goods. These elites often emerged as powerful players in post- war Bosnia, with control over important public working, and dislodging them has proveddifficult.Asonescholarputsit,afterthesigningof theDaytonaccords, rebuildingBosniawasgoingtobesodifficultnotjustbecauseof theethnicdivisions, but because there was a requirement to simultaneously putting the country on the path tofree-marketcapitalismandliberaldemocracy,twoconditionswhichBosniahadnot previously known. Progress since Dayton Bosnias economic development since Dayton has been slow. 2002 was a landmark year because Bosnias per capita GDP reached up to halfofits pre-war figure, after years ofinternationalaid. Allthemoneyinvestedbytheinternationalcommunitycausedabig jumpinGDPinthelate1990s,buttheprogresswasunsustainable,aslittlestructural change was effected on the economy to make it more competitive. The early 2000s saw moresuccessandmoresustainedgrowthof BosniasGDP,butthiswasbroughttoa crushing halt with the onset ofthe 2008 crisis, which saw Bosnias GDP fall for the first timesincethewar.Whiletheeconomyhasrecoveredsomewhat,growthisstillquite slow and perhaps more importantly, inequitable. OnepotentialbrightspotinthepostwarerahasbeenBosniastourismsector.Tourist arrivalshavebeensteadilyincreasingsincethewar,aspeoplestopseeingBosniaasa conflict zone and the region becomes more accessible. Infrastructure is one area that has seensignificantimprovementsincethewar,thankstohighconcentrationsof foreign investment going into this area. AnotherstabilizinginfluenceontheBosnianeconomywasthedecisiontopegthe currency,calledtheconvertiblemark,totheeuro,whichhasatleasthelpedtomitigate thedevastatingeffectsthatinflationcouldhaveonatransitionaleconomy.Sarajevo itself,themediacenterpieceof theBosnianwar,hasbeenthefocusof themost investment, and as such has probably seen the most marked improvements. Challenges for the Bosnian Economy going forward It is difficult to identify success stories ofthe Bosnian economy since the war because therehavenotreallybeenmany.Agenerallevelof improvementhasbeenseeninall sectors,butthatistobeexpectedconsideringitwouldhavebeendifficultforthe economytohavegottenmuchworsesincethewar.However,theratioof foreignaid dollarsandloanstotangibleeconomicdevelopmentandimprovementshasbeenpoor, whichisinlargepartduetosubstantialstructuralproblemswithintheeconomy.Itis these issues that most dearly need to be addressed. The public sector dominated the Bosnian economy in the pre-war years, as it has tended todoincentralizedcommandeconomies.However,Bosniaisnowanincrediblyde-centralized country politically, while the public sector has retained a large portion ofits former clout. Operating what some scholars have called an orderly retreat ofthe state fromtheeconomyinfavourof competitiveprivateactorsshouldbeparamountto Bosniaseconomicreformstrategy.However,Bosniasrulingelitefacesaconflictofinterest that constantly stalls this process. For these political elites in this state dominated economy,givingupeconomicassetstotheprivatesectorisrelinquishingpartof their powertotheunwashedmasses.Evenif oneignorestheobviousmotivesforsocial, political,andfinancialgainfortheseelites,inastatethathasahistoryof horrific violence perpetrated by the masses, this is perhaps not a surprising reluctance. While steps have already been taken to try to liberalize and free up the Bosnia economy, mostof thesestepshavebeenfocusedonBosniasinteractionwithoutsideeconomies andinvestors,withlittleemphasisplacedontheinternaldevelopmentandreform. Bosniasliberalizationthusfarhasfacilitatedrelativelyhighlevelsof foreigndirect investment(FDI),leadingtoalargeinflowof foreigngoodsintoBosnia,butithas failed to stimulate the export ofBosnian goods abroad, leading to an unsustainably high tradedeficit. TheproblemisnotthatFDIandaninfluxof fundsintoBosniais necessarilydetrimentaltotheeconomy,butratherthattheBosniandomesticeconomy has not undergone the same liberalizations, and the private enterprises that do exist are operatinginaregulatoryenvironmentthatmakesitincrediblydifficultforthemto compete.ThisthenseemstoindicatethateconomicreformpoliciesinBosnianeedto focusonstimulatingthedomesticprivatesector,andpotentiallytryingtolevelthe playing field between it and the foreign investment. Oneimportantpartof tacklingBosniasstrugglingandstaticeconomywillbedealing withthecountrysrampantcorruption,andhighlyactivegreyeconomy(economic activitythatoperatesoutsideof thelaw).Regardlessof theappropriatenessof any economic liberalization framework that the international community and local politicians canprovide,itwillbeuselessunlessitcanbeenforced.Partof thereasonforthe prevalenceof organizedcrimeinBosniaistheconstrainingdomesticregulatory environmentthatmakeslegitimateenterpriseverydifficulttorunprofitably. Muchofthis crime revolves around smuggling ofsome sort, often weapons or cigarettes, but also manyothergoods,andtheabilitytogetgoodsacrossborderswithouthavingtopaya myriadof taxesandtariffshasbecomealucrativebusiness.Thisgreyorshadow economy is thought to be worth roughly 30% ofBosnias recorded GDP, demonstrating howprofitableitis,andhowdifficultitwillbetoremove. Obviouslytheorganized crime ofthe grey economy and the corruption in Bosnia are intrinsically linked, and the success ofthis crime is made possible by the compliance or even direct involvement ofmembersof Bosniaspoliticalelites.Itwouldprobablyalsobenavetothinkthatthis kind ofcorruption was limited to the lower municipality level administrative politicians and civil servants. The sheer size and scope ofthe problem necessitates the coercion or co-operation ofpoliticians at an elevated level. Perhaps the best way to combat this type of criminalactivityistotargetthosecorruptpoliticianswhomakeitpossible,which wouldalsogoalongwaytorestoringthefaithof theBosnianpeopleintheir government. Furthermore, the prevalence ofthis shadow economy is a further evidence ofthe need to make domestic enterprises more economically viable. Perhapsthebiggestchallengetoovercomeintheimplementationof substantial economicreforminBosniaispoliticaldeadlock,whichisinpartcreatedbythe massively de-centralized post-Dayton system. Beyond the central bank and the currency board,thereislittlecentralauthorityoneconomicpolicythatisnotplaguedbyethno- politicaldeadlock.Ashasbecomeincreasinglyobviousinthelastfewyears,itis impossibletoconsiderBosniaseconomicissueswithoutthinkingaboutitspolitics. Despite the seemingly extreme nature ofthe proposition, a unification ofthe Federation andtheRepublikamightgoalongwaytoallowingformorepracticalcentralized economicpolicy.Whilethismaybeapipedream,itishardtorefuteitslogic,asthe union would help to alleviate many layers ofcostly bureaucracy. What is clear, however, isthatBosniaseconomicproblemsgohandinhandwithitspoliticalproblems,andit will be next to impossible to address one ofthem without simultaneously addressing the other.EU Integration and Why it Matters Integration into the European Union has long been a goal ofthe Bosnian state, and it is alsoservinganincentiveforBosniatosupporttheinternationalcommunitysattempts toreformanddevelopBosnia,withthethreatof increasedforeigninterferenceand reduced autonomy being the stick. Entry into the European Union would provide a poor and relatively unstable country like Bosnia access to a large and relatively stable political andeconomicunion.Italsoprovidesexcellentaccesstotheworldsbiggestsingle consumermarket(intermsof purchasingpower),anditwouldserveasdefinitive recognition ofthe progress Bosnia as a country has made since Dayton. AnotheraspecttoconsideristhatBosniasneighboursandformerYugoslavrepublics haverecentlybeenmakingsubstantialstridestowardsEUmembership.Sloveniajoined in2004thankstoitssuperioreconomicdevelopmentandrelativelytrouble-freeexit fromYugoslavia.CroatiaisthemostrecentcountrytojointheEU,becomingafull memberin2013.EvenSerbia,acountrythatwasformerlyonverysimilarorlower economic pegging to Bosnia, became an official candidate for membership in 2002 and has begun discussion with the EU for its official entry. Bosnia risks being left behind in the Balkans. It is already one ofthe least economically developed, and failure to join in theEUsoonmayseeBosniafallfurtherbehindtherestof Europeanditsformer Yugoslav neighbours. Bosnias EU integration process so far TheEuropeanUnionhasasetof requirementsthatpotentialmemberstatesmust achievebeforeadmittance.Theprocessisalwaysslightlydifferentfordifferentstates. Bosnia, which was the site ofthe worst European conflict since World War II, and has hadheavyEuropeaninvolvementwithinitsborderssince1995,hasaparticularly stringent set ofrequirements. The European Union has a long history ofconditionality with Bosnia. In the immediate post-war period, aid was largely unconditional but by 1997, the EU began to use Bosnias great need for its reconstruction programs as leverage to push Bosnia towards meeting certaineconomicandpoliticalconditions.Thisbecameastandardpracticeforthe subsequent decade and has now manifested into leveraging conditions in return for EU membership.Thefirstmanifestationof thiswasthe StabilizationandAssociation Process(SAP),whichoutlinedacourseforstatereconstructionanddevelopmentthat would eventually lead to EU accession in the long run for a number ofstates. The EUs Thessaloniki summit in 2003 officially endorsed the SAP as the tool for bringing about Bosnian reform and eventual accession. The first step ofEU conditionality was established in 2000 with a roadmap for Bosnia-Herzegovinawhichoutlinedasetof short-termgoalsthatneededtobecompleted beforefurtherdiscussionscouldtakeplace.Thesepriorityreformstepswereinfour main areas: democracy, economy, the rule oflaw, and human rights. In 2003 a new set of16 goals were introduced as part ofthe Feasibility Study Reforms to assess ifBosnia could enter EU accession negotiations. These 16 priorities were: compliance with existing conditionality and international obligations, more effective governance, more effective public administration, European integration, effective human rights provisions, an effective judiciary, tackling organized crime, managing asylum and migration, customs and taxation reform, budget legislation, budget practice, reliable statistics, consistent trade policy, an integrated energy market, a Bosnia-Herzegovina single economic space, and public broadcastingIn2005,BosniawasjudgedtohavemadethenecessaryprogressontheFeasibility StudyReformstobeginnegotiationsforaStabilizationandAssociationAgreement whichwouldsetadefinitivecontractualsetof stagesforeventualBosnianAccession. Thesenegotiationscenteredaroundthevisionof theEUsEuropeanPartnershipin Bosnia, which would define the relationship between Bosnia and the EU and establish a systemtoevaluateBosniasprogressandupdatethenationsEuropeanpriorities.The StabilizationandAssociationagreementwasformallysignedin2008,butsincethat point, Bosnian progress towards fulfilling the goals outlined has stagnated, in part due to the financial crisis. Despite the confusing nomenclature and overlapping timelines, the priorities for Bosnia-HerzegovinainpursuingEuropeanUnionmembershipcanbesummarized,according to scholar Doga Uras Eralp, as follows: Thekeypriorities:Thereformof thepoliceforces;fullcooperationwiththe InternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslavia(ICTY);reformof public broadcasting;implementationof thepublicadministrationreformstrategyadoptedin 2006; reinforcement ofadministrative capacities in order to implement the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA); settlement ofbilateral issues; creation ofan internal singleeconomicspace;correctionof structuralrigiditiesimpedingthefunctioningofthelabourmarket;improvementof thefunctioningandviabilityof institutional structures;andrespectforhumanrightsandfundamentalfreedoms,including,ifnecessary, reform ofthe constitutional framework; Thepoliticalcriteria:democracyandtheruleof law(constitution,governance, electorallegislation,publicadministrationandservice,thejudicialsystemand anticorruptionpolicy),humanrightsandtheprotectionof minorities(repealof the deathpenaltyintheconstitutionof theRepublikaSrpska;compliancewiththe internationalstandardsandconventions,includingthoseof theCouncilof Europe; accesstojustice;reformof theprisonsystem;socialinclusion;andtherightsand protectionof minorities,includingtheRoma),regionalissues,andinternational obligations; Theeconomiccriteria:macroeconomicandfinancialstability,theaccelerationand completionof privatizations,budgetarysupervisionmechanisms,thequalityof public finances,thereconciliationof domesticclaims,greaterlegalcertaintyforeconomic operators,bettercorporategovernance,andabetter(legal,regulatory,tax,judicial,etc.) environmentforcompaniesandbusiness,andpreparationsformembershipof the World Trade Organization (WTO); European standards relating to the community acquis as regards the internal market, EU sectoral policies, and the area ofjustice, freedom, and security. Bosnia-Herzegovina must endeavor to bring its legislation into line with the Community acquis in these areas and ensure its implementation.This extensive list ofgoals and priorities are what the EU deems necessary for Bosnia to accomplish,inordertobringthecountrytoastandardsuchthatitwouldbeableto integratewiththeEU.MostBosnianpoliticianswouldbeinagreementastothe beneficial nature ofmany ofthese initiatives, but they may have vastly different visions abouthowtheyshouldbeimplemented.Thishasperhapsbeenwhytherehasbeenso little concrete progress, because politicians ofdifferent ethnic groups want to see reform implementedinthewaymostbeneficialtotheirgroup.Oneof theonlymajorsuccess stories since 2008 has been the visa liberalization agreement, which has made it easier for Bosnian citizens to get EU visas. This has made such rapid progress primarily because it isoneof thefewreformsthatwouldbeequallybeneficialtoallethnicgroups.166 In ordertoattainthisvisaliberalizationagreementwiththeEU,Bosniaupgradedthe managementof itsstatesborders,tookactionagainstcross-borderhumananddrug trafficking,andreformeditsreadmissionandasylumpoliciestobemorelikethoseoftheEU.Unfortunately,noteveryissuehasequalbenefitsforeachgroup,andso implementing reform in Bosnia has proved very difficult. From Here to Accession After years ofnegotiations and some substantial reforms, Bosnia does now have a clear path to accession, with clear goals and requirements along the way. However, efforts at reformhaveconsistentlybeenfoiledbygovernmentdeadlock,andtheverydifferent interpretations ofproposed reforms by different ethnic leaders. Eachgroupiswaryof theothers,andwilloftenusetheirvetotoblockanylegislation andreformthattheyfeelmightbenefitanothergroupmorethantheirown.Making mattersworse,the2008financialcrisishittheformerYugoslavstatesveryhard,with Bosniahitperhapsworstof allbecauseof itsdependencyonforeignaidand internationalloans.Politicalinstabilitypairedwitheconomicinstabilityinducedbythe financialcrisiscreatedanenvironmentthatwasfarfromconducivetopursuingthe reforms and developments necessary to accession. TheothersignificantblowtoBosniasaccessionhopeswastherecentSejdic-Finci verdict.TwoBosniancitizensof RomaandJewishethnicityrespectivelyappliedtorun for the Bosnian presidency in 2009, but were turned down by the electoral commission because ofBosnias strict ethnic quota system. The decision was successfully challenged at the European Court ofHuman Rights, and Bosnia was told to amend its constitution andelectoralprocesstocomplywiththedecision.Afailuretodowouldpotentially jeopardize their progress towards joining the EU. The debate over these reforms has had theBosnian-governmentindeadlockformanyyears,whichhasleftlittleroomfor discussion on economic reforms or European accession.Impedimentary Factors for further discussion Corruption A lack oftrust or investment in the political process by everyday Bosnians is one ofthe pervasive reasons for the failure to implement many initiatives that the countrys divided governmentdoesmanagetowriteintolaw.Thisisunderstandablewhenoneisfaced with the corruption and cronyism in the Bosnian government. Bosnia ranks joint 72nd onTransparencyInternationalscorruptionperceptionindex,oneof thelowestin Europe. Moreover, Transparency International observed that the independence ofthe Anti-CorruptionAgencyhasbeenquestioned,andthatauditrecommendationsare mostly ignored by the government. Furthermore, ifone considers the size ofBosnias public sector, and the large amount ofinfluence that it has in the economy and the large workforcethatitemploys,onemightbeabletounderstandjusthowmuchcorruption permeates Bosnia- Herzegovina. Perhaps most troubling is where this corruption money isgoing.ManyreportsfromwithinthecountryandfromindependentNGOshave claimed that corruption in Bosnias biggest industries and sectors is directly funding the activitiesof someof themainnationalistparties.Thisclearlyestablishesthelink between the political elites and corruption, while also raising the ominous possibility ofcorruption feeding nationalist sentiment. ReformingcorruptioninBosniacanalmostbeviewedasakindof Catch-22situation. In order to deal with corruption, one would have to reform the political system, but in order to reform Bosnian politics, one would have to first deal with corruption. However, one could also make the case that they are one and the same, in that perhaps rooting out corruptionmightseeareturntoaneffectivegovernment.Thiscertainlymakessense whenoneconsidersthattheremustbealevelof collusionbetweencriminalsand government officials for some ofthe large-scale corrupt activities. For example, in 2002 thereoccurredamassivecorruptionscandalthatembroiledtheRepublikaSrpskas financeminister,relatingtocustomsofficersreceivingbribestoundervalueincoming goods.TheEuropeanCommission-fundedCustomsandFiscalAssistanceOffice (CAFAO) reported that those running the scheme couldnothaveactedwithouttheknowledgeof seniorpoliticians. If Bosnias corruptiongoessofarupthepoliticalladder,howthendoesanyonegeneratethe political will to tackle it, when those most in a position to do so perhaps stand the most to lose? One way to do so is give these government officials something to lose by being corrupt. Increasing the transparency as to how government funds are spent could be one way to force those in charge ofthose funds to spend them responsibly, making them unable to hide embezzlement and bribery. Another potential strategy could be to both increase the numberof,andexpandthepurviewof,bothgovernmentalandnon-governmentanti-corruption organizations. Questions have already been raised about the effectiveness ofBosniasownAnti-CorruptionAgency,andcallsforsomesortof improvementinthe monitoring ofcorruption are growing. One important motivating factor in the fight against corruption in Bosnia- Herzegovina istheoutrageof theeverydaycitizenatcorruptpractices.Insomeplaces,corruption can become so institutionalized that citizens no longer see it as a damaging practice, and merelyapartof everydaylife.Fortunately,thisisnotthecaseinBosnia,asthe2014 protestsaptlydemonstrated.Whetherthispressurecantranslateintoactualchange, however,islessclear,asthoseprotestingcorruptionareoftenbeholdentothose practicingit.Perhapsthemostindependentforceavailableinthefightagainst corruptionisthepolice.However,thereformof theBosnianpoliceforceiswidely viewedasoneof thegreatestfailuresof Daytonthusfar,butthisdoesrepresentone possible avenue for reform. Inefficiency While government inefficiency and corruption in Bosnia are closely linked, they cannot be viewed as necessarily one and the same. Particularly in the Bosnian case, the two are morecloselylinkedwithdifferentareasof thegovernment.Whilecorruptionismost associatedwithlowerlevelofficialsmisusingpublicfundsfortheirownends, governmentinefficiencyismorecloselylinkedwiththeethnicallyrootedpolitical deadlock that plagues the higher levels ofBosnian Government. Ithasbecometheviewof manycommentators,bothwithinandwithoutBosnia,that while the political structure ofthe Dayton Agreement may have been initially successful intermsof endingtheviolenceandestablishingasystemof proportionalethnic representation,itisnowwhatisholdingthecountryback.Ashasbeendiscussed, Bosniaspoliticalsystemhasnumerouslayersanddivisions,andisoneof theworlds mostcomplexandintricate.Inanationof only3.8millionpeople,thereisone argument that suggests that Bosnia would be better offwith more centralized power and less massive political complexity with all their inbuilt checks and balances. As one BBC analyst put it, it is sometimes said that what Bosnia really needs is actually just a mayor. Whilethisargumentmaybeconvincingintermsof streamliningthestatedecision makingprocess,italsorisksover-concentratingpowerinthehandsof toofew individualswhichareoverlybeholdentoaparticularspecialinterest,ormorelikely ethnic, group. Theothersignificantcriticismoftenlevelledagainstthedesignof Daytonisthatitis simply not that democratic. The fundamental principal ofdemocracy is the rule ofthe majority,whateverthatmajoritymayvotefor.However,theDaytonpoliticalstructure was specifically designed to protect the rights ofthe minorities. The entails that the will of themajorityisbynomeansguaranteedtoprevail(whichintheimmediatepost-Dayton era was exactly the point) simply because often vulnerable minority groups were given political power that was not necessarily in proportion to the size or wealth ofthe group. Thisdisproportionatepoweroftenmanifestsitself intheformof themutual veto that is a component ofthe consociational system. While this veto protects minority groupsfrompopulistdiscriminatorypolicies,itisincreasinglybeingusedasapolitical tool.Theveto,orthethreatof theveto,canbeusedasanegotiatingmechanismto ensurethatthesideexercisingthevetoreceivesthemostfavourabletreatmentinany political action. It is this fear ofnot receiving the most favourable treatment possible as aminoritygroup,whichisdrivingsomuchdeadlock.Reformingthevetoisperhapsa viable strategy to alleviate inefficiency, but it also treads the fine line between improving democratic efficacy and endangering minority interests. Poor Living Standards Ultimately,thegreatestsourceof angerforthe2014protestswasthecontinuedpoor standards ofliving in Bosnia. Had the quality oflife for most Bosnians been higher, the protestswouldlikelyneverhaveoccurred,regardlessof Bosniasothersocialissues. Bosnias incredibly high unemployment is arguably the crux ofthe issue, as it highlights boththestrugglesof Bosnianpeopleandthedeeplyembeddedinstitutionalproblems ofthe government. Unemployment figures continue to hover around 40%, and it is even higher among younger Bosnians. A figure like this cannot fail to produce further unrest and turmoil should it stay at such a high level. Bosnia also lags behind its neighbours in most indicators ofdevelopment and quality oflife. It ranks 86th on the HDI index, with both Serbia and Croatia ahead ofit (the latter by some way). It also trails its neighbours substantially in terms ofGDP per capita, and consistentlyexhibitssomeof theworsteconomichealthintheregion,andindeedin Europeaswhole.IncomparisontoCroatiainparticular,Bosniaislaggingalongway behind,showcasingthepotentiallyverysignificantimpactthatEUmembershipcan have. Whileonecouldeasilylistanumberof otherstatistics,itisperhapsmorepertinentto considertheimplicationsandeffectsof thesedata.Bosniaseventualaccessiontothe EU also depends in part on its ability to close the gap economically and socially with the restof Europe.FailuretojointheEUinthelongrunwilllikelyspellonlyfurther negativeconsequencesforBosnia.Furthermore,continuedpoorlivingstandardswill inevitablyleadtofurtherunrestandpotentiallymoreprotestslateron,whichalways carry with them the latent possibility ofescalation. Suggestions for Further Research Books Donais, Timothy. The Political Economy ofPeacebuilding in Post-Dayton Bosnia. London: Routledge, 2005. Print.Eralp, Doga Ulas, Politics ofthe European Union in Bosnia- Herzegovina: Between Conflict and Democracy. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2012. Print. Fischer, Martina, ed. Peacebuilding and Civil Society in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ten Years after Dayton. Berlin: Lit, 2006. Print. 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