Beyond the Categories: Human Service Managers View the New Federal Aid

Beyond the Categories: Human Service Managers View the New Federal AidAuthor(s): Paul TerrellSource: Public Administration Review, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 1980), pp. 47-54Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public AdministrationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/976108 .

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MANAGERS VIEW THE NEW FEDERAL AID 47

Beyond the Categories: Human Service Managers View the New Federal Aid Paul Terrell, University of California, Berkeley

& e of the principal objectives embodied in Ameri- can domestic legislation since 1972-an objective advanced and supported by Republicans as well as Demo- crats-has been to reorganize the long-standing federal aid system in order to strengthen the ability of state and local governments to plan and execute policy. General Revenue Sharing, the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), the Housing and Community Development Act (HCDA), and Title XX (Social Ser- vices) of the Social Security Act-four major pieces of innovative, high-cost legislation-have all been explicitly framed to shift policy making from Washington, D.C. to local officials. These new aid forms, far less conditioned with regard both to subject matter and method of administration than their "categorical" predecessors, are viewed by their advocates as reforms that can add considerable flexibility and accountability to the aid system.

A less evident consequence of federal decentralization, but one of significant political and administrative potential, is the redistribution of authority from governmental administrators to elected officials. The old categorical system, built upon narrow and specialized grants-in-aid, put enormous program power in the hands of administrative functionalists. A given grant program- vocational rehabilitation, for example-was generally formulated by a narrow professional fraternity and its legislative, academic, and client allies and implemented through an intergovernmental system run by federal, state, and local specialists. Input from outsiders was generally nil, resulting in a policy-making system that effectively impoverished the power of elected executives. Instead of a "cooperative federalism" based on a genuine sharing of power among governing officials at all levels, categorical aid spawned a system of "cooperative feudalism," with program power isolated within "vertical functional hierarchies" of professional bureaucrats.' Instead of political leadership with jurisdiction-wide authority and responsibility, there developed a frag- mented assortment of departments and agencies, each functioning in its own separate bailiwick, each jealous of its prerogatives and autonomy. In many instances, mayors and governors were not even aware of the plethora of publicly financed activities serving their citizens. Though ultimately responsible for making state and local government work, elected officials had less and less actual authority to control public policy.

One goal of the recent alteration in the organization of federal aid has been to enable these governing

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1980

* Social agency chief executives in six program areas-welfare, health, mental health, community action, model cities, and community mental health centers-were surveyed to determine their reaction to the recent revenue sharing/block grant efforts to decentralize the federal aid system. Despite their strong belief that social initiatives and values were advanced principally by federal action, and that excessive reliance on state and local officials could severely jeopardize social programs with weak constituencies, agency executives also recognized major weaknesses in traditional categorical grant policy and, to varying degrees, supported revenue sharing and block grant alternatives. Those agencies largely dependent on federal support for their survival-model cities,. community action programs, and community mental health centers- tended to support the new aid efforts only reluctantly. Those agencies more fully integrated into the regular policy-making arrangements of local government-health, welfare, and mental health agencies-were considerably more positive in their endorsement of greater decentralization.

generalists-especially elected executives-to retrieve a measure of power from the administrative complex. General revenue sharing, for example, provides direct "no strings" transfers of some six billion dollars a year from the federal treasury to "general units" of government, chiefly cities, townships, counties, and states. The CETA, HCDA, and Title XX block grant programs similarly funnel aid to basic governmental units rather than to protected administrative agencies. In each program, federal criteria specifying program content and performance standards are broadly stated so as to allow wide discretion to elected officials to establish particular services and to organize and administer those services much as they wish.

The shift in power from functionalists to policy makers has a variety of implications. One of the foremost-a consideration that has been very much on the minds of many social policy observers-concerns the likely consequences of aid reform for human service programs and the poor. To a considerable degree, the infrastructure of America's social service network has been created on a grant-in-aid framework-on arrangements that mandated particular programs and granted

Paul Terrell, assistant professor, Department of Social Welfare, University of California, Berkeley, has been investigating the social aspects of general revenue sharing afd block grants since 1972. He received his advanced degrees in political science and social welfare at the University of California, Berkeley. He has published several articles as well as a book on the new federal aid forms.



48 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

them considerable autonomy and resources. Many of these endeavors, indeed, were: deliberately established independently of elected officials, the theory being that local governmental officials were simply not amenable to welfare objectives. Since autonomous human services have been viewed as the most efficient means to social improvement, it is not surprising that the recent reforms have generated a fair degree of apprehension.

Bureaucrats and Aid Reform: A Design for Study

What has been the consequence of the new "post- categorical" aid systems for human services? While program impact evidence is still sketchy,2 human service professionals and their allies have been vocal on the issues. The new programs, for example, have been criticized for failing to confront critical areas of national need. One writer has described the New Federalism-the Nixon-Ford slogan for revenue sharing and block grants-as a "domestic disaster," a "retreat from social reform, social justice, and redistribution. Others have decried the shift of powers to mayors and governors. According to Michael Harrington, for example, localities and states may be geographically "close to the people," but they are not politically so:

For the poor, the minorities, and the organized working people, federal power, however distant in miles, has been much more accessible than state government (until recently controlled by rural conservatism and now under the dominance of the suburbs) and city government (in which real estate interests usually prevail).4

Do these observations reflect the attitudes of human service officials? The answer, of course, is likely to depend in large part on the type of officials and the roles they play. General policy makers, administrative specialists, social workers on the line, and others are all affected differently by the changes in the federal aid system, and each group is likely to have its own reaction to what it all means. Program beneficiaries, moreover, are likely to have still a different slant on the value of "postcategorical" arrangements.5

In this paper the impact of the new federal aid will be assessed through the eyes of those key individuals actually responsible for managing human services at the local level. These administrative officials, authorized as they are to plan and deliver front line services, are a critical population for analysis, not only because of their high stakes in the character of grant organization, but also because of their significant power to affect policy. These officials, moreover, are the ones that would seem most likely to resist decategorization and general government control, since these changes appear to jeopardize their control over program definition and funding.

To determine the fashion in which local human service administrators are responding to revenue sharing, block grants, and the shifts in power accompanying federal aid reform, managers in key publicly-funded welfare and community development agencies were

surveyed using standard Likert techniques. The full universe of agency executive directors in six program areas in California-welfare, health, mental health, Com- munity Action, Community Mental Health Centers, and Model Cities-was involved. Of the 261 agencies con- tacted, 157 chief executives responded. This represents a 60 per cent rate of return.

Only agency chief executives were surveyed. The health, mental health, and welfare managers were all county officials, as all main line social functions in California operate on the county level. Community Action Program (CAP) officials, in most cases, also operate at the county level, but primarily as executives of nonprofit corporations. With one exception, Model City organizations represented municipalities. Communi- ty Mental Health Centers, organized on a catchment area basis and financed largely from National Institute of Mental Health dollars, function both as public and private entities. In both cases, however, they operate independently of regular city or county supervision.

Support for the Poor

It is generally recognized that the level of government activity critically affects the character and outcome of policy. Because units of government are financed and organized differently and are responsive to differing power groups, they generate different kinds of programs and serve different constituencies. The issue of decentralization, therefore, is far from academic. Rather, it vitally affects the "who gets what, where, and how" of politics.

Government administrators, because of their key role in policy development and implementation, have generally evidenced a keen interest in the structure of government organization. Not only is the issue relevant to their immediate bread and butter, it vitally concerns the welfare of those client populations that they are mandated to serve. To determine the administrative perspective on the issue of the social responsiveness of different government levels, therefore, agency chief executives were asked to specify the unit of government

TABLE 1 Government Level Most Likely to Support

Programs for the Poor

Federal State Local

Model Cities (N=7) 100% 0% 0% Welfare (N=42) 71.4 4.8 23.8 CAPs (N=20) 75.0 0 25.0 Health (N=26) 69.2 7.7 23.1 Mental Health (N=19) 63.2 15.8 21.1 Community Mental Health

Centers (N=21) 81.0 4.8 14.3

Total (N= 135) 73.3% 5.9% 20.7%

X2 not significant at .05.





TABLE 2 Response to Statement: "Federal System Is too Centralized...

Strongly Strongly Agree Agree Not Sure Disagree Disagree

Model Cities (N=8) 12.5% 12.5% 25.0% 37.5% 12.5% Welfare (N=49) 24.5 42.9 20.4 12.2 0 CAPs (N=25) 8.0 32.0 16.0 44.0 0 Health (N=32) 15.6 56.3 18.8 9.4 0 Mental Health (N=18) 16.7 44.4 22.2 16.7 0 Community Mental Health Centers (N=23) 8.7 30.4 26.1 30.4 4.3

Total (N=155) 16.1% 40.6% 20.6% 21.3% 1.3%

X2 significant at .05.

they considered most likely "to support programs for the poor." As Table 1 indicates, managers far and away view the federal level as the most responsive to the needs of the poor.

While agency heads, as a group, recognized the preeminent social responsiveness of national institutions, there is no statistical significance between these attitudes and the particular program sector managers represent. Nevertheless, even in program areas predominantly funded from state and local revenues (health and mental health departments, most notable), two-thirds of the executives queried felt the federal government was most likely to help those in poverty.

This general recognition, however, does not bring with it any lack of awareness of some of the pitfalls of big government. Indeed, there is a decided duality of views concerning the federal contribution. While the national government is overwhelmingly affirmed as the best source of social program support, for example, a majority of managers (56 per cent) acknowledge the contemporary policy system to be "too centralized in Washington, D.C." As Table 2 indicates, dissatisfaction with centralization is strongest among those agencies (health, mental health, welfare) benefitting from considerable local control and resources, and weakest among

those agencies (CAPs, Model Cities, Community Mental Health Centers) most dependent upon federal funding.

Policy Makers versus Administrators

Whereas categorical federalism funneled aid directly to state and local specialists, revenue sharing and block grants focus resources and authority on elected policy makers. To assess the fashion in which specialists address this shift, the following statement was presented for response:

In establishing grant programs, the federal government should place primary reliance on the expertise of state and local professionals in the program areas involved rather than on state and local elected officials.

As Table 3 indicates, a majority (57.8 per cent) of managers agreed that federal authorities should rely on professionals rather than on elected policy makers. Only 27.9 per cent favored a generalist strategy.

While there is no statistical significance in the relationship between these perspectives and the respon- dent's own program field, officials in health-related programs appear to be somewhat more defensive and protective in this regard. In the non-health agencies, by contrast, there is greater recognition of the legitimacy of

TABLE 3 Response to Statement: Rely on Professionals Not Elected Officials


Model Cities (N=8) 12.5% 12.5% 37.5% 25.0% 12.5% Welfare (N=49) 18.4 30.6 14.3 34.7 2.0 CAPs (N=23) 26.1 21.7 21.7 26.1 4.3 Health (N=3 1) 29.0 45.2 6.5 16.1 3.2 Mental Health (N=20) 25.0 35.0 10.0 30.0 0 Community Mental Health Centers (N=23) 21.7 52.2 13.0 13.0 0

Total (N=154) 22.7% 35.1% 14.3% 25.3% 2.6%

X' not significant at .05.





governmental participation in program formulation. Sup- port for professionals is smallest among the community- based organizations-CAPs and Model Cities-which are rarely dominated by social work or medical professionals. Together these findings suggest that bureaucrats may not be as uniformly opposed to, or suspicious of, political involvement as is frequently hypothesized.6

Revenue Sharing

At the present time, federal aid is provided to sub-national jurisdictions through three fiscal/administrative mechanisms: specific categorical grants, broad function block grants, and general revenue sharing.7 Of the three, revenue sharing marks a very clear break with the past history of federal aid, being virtually unconditioned in terms of its program purpose. Under the terms of the legislation, some 39,000 "entitlement" communities and states receive treasury checks auto- matically four times a year, checks they can use pretty much as they choose.

Much of the revenue sharing debate in Congress related to the legislation's social character-or lack of it. Critics of revenue sharing were especially concerned that "no strings" aid would find its way to benefit better-off populations, rather than confronting basic urban problems. Critics also objected to revenue sharing's "univer- sality," its availability to all units of general purpose government.' This was viewed as a waste of resources, a squandering of scarce funds on non-needy areas.

Where do agency heads stand on these issues? As Table 4 indicates, managers tend to see revenue sharing as an ineffective means of confronting urban problems, although only a few favor prohibiting wealthier communities from participation. Despite the recognition, therefore, that revenue sharing scarcely constitutes a "social" program, there is little sentiment for refocusing it on high-need jurisdictions. Even those agency officials most closely associated with the needs of poverty neighborhoods, indeed, fail to evidence the contrary perspective. While fully half of the CAP directors, for

example, disagree strongly with the opinion that revenue sharing is effective in meeting urban problems, only 26 per cent advocate restricting jurisdictional eligibility to needy areas. It should be noted, however, that the relationship between agency sector and attitude toward eligibility is not significant at the .05 level.

Federal Controls

The question of federal grant regulations ("controls" to critics, "guidelines" to advocates) is one that has generated perhaps the greatest amount of inter-governmental controversy this past decade. Whatever the vocabulary, the grant system, from its beginning, has placed restrictions on the fashion in which recipient governments can establish and execute aid programs. In order to advance the national interest, for example, Congress stipulated precise standards concerning person- nel, organizational structure, advance federal approval of plans, and audits. More recently, a variety of stipulations have been added to ensure civil rights and the participation of beneficiary populations in planning, coordination, and evaluation.

While revenue sharing and block grants limit the extent of federal control over local programs, they do not, by any means, eliminate the federal presence. There is no going back, for example, on fiscal monitoring or anti-discrimination regulations. The post-categorical programs do, however, significantly reduce federal specifica- tion with respect to program definition, the program formulation process, and citizen involvement. Because of this, mayors and governors have generally cheered the new arrangements and the significantly broadened program freedom it has given them. On the other hand, block grants and revenue sharing have also been criticized as major steps backward from the goals of democratic participation, rational program development, and social welfare for society's disadvantaged.

Table 5 shows quite clearly that social program managers support federal standards in aid programs. A full 60 per cent, for example, favored a federal mandate

TABLE 4 Response to Statements: (1) Revenue Sharing Effective for Urban Problems; and

(2) No Revenue Sharing- for Better-Off Communities

Effective for Urban Problems Prohibit to Better-Off Communities

Strongly Strongly Strongly Strongly Agree Agree Not Sure Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Not Sure Disagree Disagree

Model Cities (N=8) 12.5% 37.5% 0 12.5% 37.5% 0 12.5% 12.5% 62.5% 12.5%

Welfare (N=49) 4.1 30.6 34.7% 22.4 8.2 0 25.0 20.8 47.9 6.3

CAPs (N=24) 4.2 12.5 12.5 20.8 50.0 8.7% 17.4 26.1 43.5 4.3

Health (N=31) 3.2 29.0 45.2 12.9 9.7 6.7 23.3 6.7 53.3 10.0

Mental Health (N=19) 0 15.8 31.6 26.3 26.3 0 17.6 5.9 76.5 0

Community Mental Health Centers (N=23) 0 13.0 30.4 30.4 26.1 0 12.5 33.3 50.0 4.2

Total (N=154) 3.2% 23.4% 30.5% 21.4% 21.4% 2.7% 20.0% 18.7% 52.7% 6.0%

X2 significant at .01. X2 not significant at .05.





TABLE 5 Response to Statements: (1) Require Participation of the Poor; and

(2) Require Applications, Plans, and Assurances

Require Participation Require Plans, Applications, Assurances Strongly Strongly Strongly Strongly Agree Agree Not Sure Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Not Sure Disagree Disagree

Model Cities (N=8) 100.0% 0 0 0 0 50.0% 25.0% 0 12.5% 12.5% Welfare (N=49) 10.2 36.7% 18.4% 28.6% 6.1% 18.4 28.6 8.2% 28.6 16.3 CAPs (N=24) 79.2 16.7 4.2 0 0 33.3 50.0 8.3 4.2 4.2 Health (N=31) 25.8 12.9 25.8 29.0 6.5 12.5 28.1 9.4 34.4 15.6 Mental Health (N=19) 31.6 31.6 15.8 10.5 10.5 10.0 50.0 25.0 15.0 0 Community Mental Health

Centers (N=24) 33.3 29.2 33.3 4.2 0 37.5 33.3 4.2 25.0 0

Total (N=155) 34.8% 25.2% 18.7% 16.8% 4.5% 22.9% 35.0% 9.6% 22.9% 9.6%

X2 significant at .01. X2 significant at .01.

requiring participation by the poor in planning revenue sharing and block grants. This proportion, however, varied considerably by agency sector. Those programs built upon the participation ideology, not unexpectedly, were most in agreement with such requirements. All the Model City and 79.2 per cent of the CAP directors, for example, agreed strongly with the participation demand. Among welfare, health, mental health, and Community Mental Health Center executives, however, the figures were only 10.2 per cent, 25.8 per cent, 31.6 per cent, and 33.3 per cent, respectively.

Taken as a group, managers also evidence considerable support for federal administrative standards, i.e., requirements for grant applications, program plans, and assurances of proper use. Overall, 57.9 per cent agreed that federal funds should not be released until such standards were met; just 32.5 per cent disagreed. While community based programs, again, were most vehement in their support of federal standards, disparities among the other programs were not as dramatic as on the participation issue.

Block Grants

Block grant legislation, following the premise that federal aid can be improved by tipping intergovernmental power toward states and localities, has restricted the national role in manpower, community development, and social services to one of defining broad goals, setting minimum administrative procedures, and protect- ing civil rights.' 0 The task of actually creating programs and executing them is decentralized. To use the distinc- tion popularized by Daniel Moynihan, the establishment of overall "policy" remains in federal hands while "program" substance becomes the responsibility of recipient governments.' The intention, of course, is to establish programs more accountable to the desires of local residents.

While much of the controversy concerning the development of broad function grants has surrounded money issues-funding levels and distribution formulas, in parti-


cular-the greater discretion available to states and localities has generated considerable apprehension among human service interests. The fear, basically, is that already established people-oriented programs- programs created initially by federal mandate and largely dependent on federal-level support for funding-may suffer under the new arrangements. With authority vested in local officials and a dissolution of the direct money line between social agencies and their national sponsors, agencies might very well find themselves non grata among local priorities.

Is added power for local officials a step toward reducing the urgency of social objectives? Will decentralization change the character of policy making in a direction inimical to welfarist agencies? When asked if block consolidation would indeed "swallow up" existing programs serving "politically weak constituencies," a majority of the social agency managers agreed that this was likely. Compared to the 14 per cent that disagreed with the statement, a full 68.1 per cent agreed, while 17.8 per cent were not sure (Table 6).

Not surprisingly, those agencies facing the greatest difficulties in securing support from local policy makers perceived the greatest threat from block grants. 87.5 per cent of the Model City agencies, 84 per cent of the CAPs, and 75 per cent of the Community Mental Health Centers agreed that weak agencies would be "swallowed up." Even among those agencies traditionally an integral part of the local policy system-health, mental health, and welfare-a majority of managers (50 per cent, 70 per cent and 64.6 per cent, respectively) recognized block grants as a distinct danger-if not to their own programs, then to others.

Old Grants Versus New

To determine the overall attitude of agency managers concerning the "proper" character of the grant-in-aid system, respondents were asked whether "federal aid should go to states and localities as General Revenue Sharing and block grants rather than as categorical




TABLE 6 Response to Statement: Bloc Grants Will "Swallow Up" Valuable Programs


Model Cities (N=8) 50.0% 37.5% 0 0 12.5% Welfare (N=48) 22.9 41.7 14.6% 20.8% 0 CAPs (N=25) 56.0 28.0 8.0 4.0 4.0 Health (N=32) 12.5 37.5 21.9 21.9 6.3 Mental Health (N=20) 25.0 45.0 30.0 0 0 Community Mental Health Centers (N=24) 25.0 50.0 25.0 0 0

Total (N=157) 28.0% 40.1% 17.8% 11.5% 2.5%


grants." As Table 7 indicates, there was no general consensus on the issue. Indeed, the response curve is nearly symmetrical-almost identical proportions agreeing (41.7 per cent) and disagreeing (45.7 per cent) with the statement.

Among the agency sectors, the response pattern is equally mixed. CAP agencies, as we might expect, strongly oppose (73.9 per cent) the proposition. Model City agencies, however, are divided (37.5 per cent agreeing, 50 per cent disagreeing). While health departments are strongest in their revenue sharing and block grants support (71 per cent), their mental health colleagues are strongly negative (only 16.7 per cent supporting the new aid forms). Finally, though a majority of welfare officials (54 per cent) prefer block grants and revenue sharing to the categories, a majority of Community Mental Health Center managers (59.1 per cent) prefer the traditional grant-in-aid form.

In general, the figures in Table 7 reflect the lack of a "'party line" on the part of top human service officials. Federal aid reform, indeed, seems to elicit quite the same variety of responses among managers as it does among the public at large. The data, however, contrast markedly with recent findings by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations which indi- cate a great deal of support on the part of state program managers for additional federal decentralization. In the ACIR sample, 88 per cent of state welfare officials, 84 per cent of state health officials, and 88 per cent of all other state administrators agreed that "greater decentralization" was needed.' 2

Conclusions

The evidence presented reflects several powerful biases among grant program officials. While officials are far from being of one mind concerning many aspects of the contemporary aid system, for example, broad support is expressed both for the predominance of professional over elected officials in program establishment and for the maintenance of federal controls to ensure adequate planning and participation and organizational conduct by state, county, and local governments.

Grant officials, moreover, strong in their belief that social programs are advanced chiefly by federal action, express considerable fear that the delegation of program authority to local levels of government via broad purpose grants could severely jeopardize programs with weak constituencies. Officials, finally, largely reject the fundamental New Federalism contention that added reliance on elected policy makers, by strengthening the capacity of basic political institutions to plan and coordinate, will reduce program inefficiency and frag- mentation.

While recognizing a decided centralist bent among program officials and their suspicion of the social inclination of state and local policy makers, it is important also to note the considerable sensitivity of managers to some of the limitations of traditional grant practice. First, most agency executives recognize the liabilities of too much big government-a majority, for example, agree that American government has become overly centralized in Washington, D.C. Second, officials do not uniformly reject "post-categorical" aid alternatives. Rather, they differ strongly among themselves in assessing revenue sharing and block grants.

While general attitude clusters are always somewhat hazardous to construct on the basis of multiple survey responses, the aggregate data does strongly suggest the existence of distinct and basic positions. Specifically, two broad responses to revenue sharing and block grants can be distinguished-one reflecting the concerns and fears of federally sponsored program officials, the other reflecting the relative security of locally supported and directed health and welfare executives. The first position can be described in terms of categorical traditionalism. While its advocates represent programs which are rela- tively recent in origin, they strongly support the system of grant federalism constructed upon those financial, institutional, and administrative interrelationships that evolved-principally on federal initiative and in response to specific problems engaging the national interest-since the administration of Woodrow Wilson. The second position-we can label it "reformed federal- ist"-recognizes the continued need for federal aid for states and localities and the federal primacy in social





initiative, but strongly supports efforts to simplify grant procedures, reduce the degree of federal administrative control, and expand the authority of state and local elected officials to regulate the use of funds, within reasonable limits, in their own jurisdictions.

The categorical traditionalists represent agencies- CAPs, Model Cities, Community Mental Health Centers- that were established during the Great Society and that receive the great bulk of their support directly from the federal treasury. While the agencies vary in the degree to which they are a part of the local government system (Model Cities were city agencies, whereas CAPs and Community Mental Health Centers are, generally, independent of local government), they are all federal clients in the sense of having been created and nurtured by federal mandates and federal dollars. Fully supported by categorical aid, traditionalists have not been anxious to cultivate "horizontal" relationships with local government.

With the loosening of the categorical links, however, and the advent of decentralization, the organizational well-being of most of these categorical agencies has been severely jeopardized. Vertical allies in Washington have suddenly disappeared. Funding linkages have been en- dangered. Power balances have shifted locally, and a realistic contemplation of the local political scene is generally not reassuring. What can be expected from the governing generalists at the local level-officials likely to have their own particular preferences and commitments? Given the uncertainty of the radically altered balance of power, the categorical apprehension with revenue sharing and block grants is clearly understandable.

A less evident consequence of federal decentralization, but one of significant political and administrative potential, is the redistribution of authority from governmental administrators to elected officials.

Reformed federalists, by way of contrast, have generally been amenable to the prospect of grant system change. While health, mental health, and welfare officials

all depend to some degree on intergovernmental rules and funding, each operates "in-house," as an inherent part of local government, mandated by local law and charters and directly responsible to local elected officials. This provides an important measure of stability since front line local functions have an obvious inside track on securing local resources. Long experienced in dealing with local policy makers-executives and legisla- tors-and familiar with local budgetary routines, health, welfare, and mental health officials do not suffer the fear of the unknown facing their categorical brethren. As the agents and experts for local policy makers in their areas of expertise, in-house officials see political and managerial gains in decentralization. Feeling a sense of security in their relations with elected officials, such agency managers approach the new aid systems with considerable optimism.

The critical importance of the agency connection with local government is illustrated in the divergent grant and decentralization attitudes of mental health officials. In sharp contrast to mental health departments, which are core units of local government, Community Mental Health Centers operate with virtually complete autonomy from the governmental institutions surround- ing them. Created under national legislation (the Federal Community Mental Health Centers Act of 1962) and funded almost entirely with federal and state resources, Community Mental Health Centers have been quite as unfamiliar with local government and local politics as local officials have been with them. The centers, moreover, generally serve their own distinct constituencies-since their catchment area service base rarely coincides with regular city or county boundaries. Mental health departments, by contrast, are fundamental parts of county or city government in most jurisdictions throughout the nation. Operating under the auspices of local elected policy makers rather than independent boards, they reflect the values and priorities of those elected officials selected to speak for the local community.

Given these fundamental differences in federal and local connections, Community Mental Health Centers and mental health departments evidence sharply diver-

TABLE 7 Response to Statement: Revenue Sharing and Block Grants Instead of Categories


Model Cities (N=8) 25.0% 12.5% 12.5% 25.0% 25.0% Welfare (N=49) 22.4 30.6 12.2 24.5 10.2 CAPs (N=23) 8.7 13.0 4.3 43.5 30.4 Health (N=3 1) 38.7 32.3 6.5 12.9 9.7 Mental Health (N=18) 0 16.7 22.2 55.6 5.6 Community Mental Health Centers (N=22) 4.5 13.6 22.7 36.4 22.7

Total (N=151) 18.5% 23.2% 12.6% 30.5% 15.2%






gent perspectives on the validity and the propriety of aid reform. Uncertain of the future, afraid of losing their categorical protection, and pessimistic concerning the commitment of local governmental officials to the community mental health ideology, Community Mental Health Centers project a marked suspicion of block grants and revenue sharing. Like their CAP and Model City colleagues, Community Mental Health Center officials take a dim view of federal efforts to strengthen the role of local government officials in planning and decision making. Mental health departments, by contrast, safe in their own program domain, are far more optimistic regarding possible changes. Largely assured of local support, on good terms with local policy makers (who often appointed them), and not unappreciative of how local policy makers use their power to advance mental health programs (programs under their own aegis, of course), most departmental executives have adopted an accepting, even positive, outlook toward the potential demise of the categories.

In conclusion, human service organizations react differently to change. The shift in funding patterns inaugurated by the New Federalism is resisted by organizations who see in it only reduced resources and power. With few opportunities to participate in the

design of new local arrangements, community focused agencies have not unexpectedly expressed considerable misgivings with decentralization. On the other hand, the new aid system has been welcomed by organizations that perceive opportunities for advancing their own interests. Able to share in the formulation of new local policies and able, as insiders, to protect and advance their own turf, county human service departments have been far more supportive of changes in the status quo.

Human service managers, then, reflect many of the basic dilemmas confronting all citizens in evaluating our complex federal system and the merits and drawbacks of alternative procedures for organizing policy. As much today as 25, or even 125, years ago, American federalism must face the questions of dividing public powers between national, state, and local governments in a fashion that legitimately protects the interests of all.' 3 In working out this dilemma, we still must balance the overall needs of the nation as a collective enterprise-as channeled and given legislative expression by the federal government-with the desires and values of our basic state and local institutions. The task-mundane as it may often appear-is one of vital concern to all concerned with the future prospects of our welfare state.

Notes

1. "Cooperative Feudalism," a concept coined by Harold Seidman, is elaborated in Chapter 5 of his Politics, Position, and Power, Oxford University Press, New York, 1970.

2. Some evidence, however, is available. For revenue sharing impacts, see Richard P. Nathan, et al., Monitoring Revenue Sharing, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1975; Paul Terrell, The Social Impact of Revenue Sharing, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1976; and National Clearinghouse on Revenue Sharing, General Revenue Sharing in American Cities: First Impressions, Washington, 1974. For CETA consequences, see William Mirengoff, The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act: Impact on People, Places, Programs, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1976. For Title XX, see Paul Terrell, Planning for Social Services: Title XX in Action in Five Communities, Regional Research Institute in Social Welfare, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, 1976. For the Community Develop- ment Program, see Richard Nathan, et al., Block Grants for Community Development, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977.

3. Amatai Etzioni, "Revenue Sharing, The Next Domestic Disaster," The Nation, January 29, 1973, p. 141.

4. Michael Harrington, "Anatomy of Nixonism," Dissent, Fall 1972, pp. 756-757.

5. The attitudes of local elected officials have been extensively surveyed. See Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, The Intergovernmental Grant System as Seen by Local, State and Federal Officials, Washington, D.C., March 1977, pp. 3-82.

6. The hypothesis has been forcefully advanced by Charles Adrian. According to Adrian, major federal aid disputes do

not occur "vertically" between levels of government but rather "horizontally" between specialist administrators and elected politicians at the same governmental level. See his "State and Local Government Participation in the Design and Administration of Intergovernmental Programs," The Annals, Vol. 359, May 1965, pp. 35-43.

7. The new tripartite aid system is described by Elmer Staats, "The New Mix of Federal Assistance," Advisory Commis- sion on Intergovernmental Relations, American Federalism: Toward a More Effective Partnership, Washington, D.C., 1975.

8. General Revenue Sharing is available on a formula basis to all "general" governmental units. For many, it constitutes a first experience with federal aid. The formula, torturously complex, provides some modest degree of advantage for high-density, high-problem jurisdictions.

9. For a history of grant regulation, see W. Brooke Graves, American Intergovernmental Relations, Scribner's, New York, 1964; and James Sundquist, Making Federalism Work, The Brookings-Institution, Washington, D.C., 1969.

10. For an analysis of block grants and decentralization, see Staats, op. cit., and Advisory Commission on Intergovern- mental Relations, Block Grants: A Comparative Analysis, Washington, D.C., 1977.

11. Daniel Moynihan, "Policy versus Program in the 1970's," The Public Interest, No. 20, Summer 1970.

12. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, The Intergovernmental Grant System, pp. 137, 159.

13. For intergovernmental conflict and cooperation in the nineteenth century, see Daniel Elazar, The American Part- nership, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962.




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