Beyond the Battlefield: Institutional Army Transformation Following Victory in Iraq

7/29/2019 Beyond the Battlefield: Institutional Army Transformation Following Victory in Iraq

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Strategic Studies Institute

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA

BEYOND THE BATTLEFIELD:

INSTITUTIONAL ARMY TRANSFORMATION

FOLLOWING VICTORY IN IRAQ

G. Scott Taylor

LetortThe

Papers

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

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TheLetort Papers

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Letort Paper

BEYOND THE BATTLEFIELD:INSTITUTIONAL ARMY TRANSFORMATION


G. Scott Taylor

November 2012

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FOREWORD

The American militarys mission in Iraq requiredthe Army at large and units and Soldiers across theforce to apply a variety of creative problem-solvingskills and resourcefulness as the Army adapted to theharsh conditions of a counterinsurgency campaign inOperation Iraqi Freedom. Out of the necessity to adaptin order to defeat the insurgents in Iraq, our Armyevolved continuously on the battleeld, effecting radi-cal changes in doctrine, organizations, training, andmateriel, while achieving a synergistic effect greatlyenabling our success. Scanning to determine the Ar-mys proper role as part of the future force has been apopular subject of discussion among think tanks, mili-tary strategists, and pundits in recent months. The au-thor outlines several of the popular schools of thought

and articulates cogent arguments as to why the Armyof the future must be prepared to ght our nationswars across the entire spectrum of conict. As we lookto the role the Army will play in the future, it is essen-tial that we look back to that adaptation in the sandsof Iraq to determine what contributed to the success-ful conclusion of our mission there. American militaryhistory is fraught with examples of failing to applythe lessons of the previous ght to guide adaptationof the institutional Army so that the hard earned les-sons of the past war are applied to minimize futurecosts in terms of men and materiel. Especially as theArmy faces signicant budgetary cuts in light of thescal austerity of the present, it is vital that we ana-lyze the success of efforts to defeat the insurgents in

Iraq utilizing all of the instruments of national power;and to make recommendations for competencies and


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capabilities necessary in the institutional Army alongthe problem-solving construct of Doctrine, Organiza-

tion, Training, Materials, Leadership, Personnel, andFacilities. In doing so we will help to ensure that theadaptations made to win in Iraq are not lost and thatthe Army will be better prepared for victory in futurecounterinsurgency campaigns.

This Paper takes a vital rst step in analyzing someof the most important adaptations that the Army un-dertook over the past 10 years of conict. As such, itendeavors to recommend how these changeswhilestill ghting a tenacious and vicious enemycan andshould inform future adaptations in the institutionalArmy in order to preclude the necessity of relearn-ing these same lessons 10 or 20 years down the road.Acknowledging the scal constraints of the currentbudget crisis, the author makes sound recommenda-

tions on changes to doctrine, education, and train-ing to better preserve the experience and knowledgeearned through sweat and blood in the sands of Iraq.The Paper includes recommendations for overhaulingour defense acquisition processes, including preserva-tion of existing equipment so vital in the prosecutionof the counterinsurgent campaign in Iraq, and makesrecommendations for organizational changes to retainthe strength of the whole of government expertise de-veloped in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The research behind this Paper is, in part, theproduct of the authors personal experience in Iraqwhile deployed on three tours of duty in OperationsIraqi Freedom and New Dawn. Additional researchwas conducted under the auspices of the Strategic

Research Paper requirement as part of the authorscompletion of studies at the U.S. Army War College.


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It is an example of the expertise and insight our eldgrade military leaders can offer the defense commu-

nity through the Strategic Studies Institute.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

G. SCOTT TAYLOR serves on the Army Staff at thePentagon in G3/5/7 in the Current Operations Divi-sion. Lieutenant Colonel Taylor has extensive experi-ence in training and leading troops from the platoonto the battalion level and saw rsthand the evolutionof counterinsurgency strategy at the tactical and oper-ational levels in Iraq, serving three tours in combat inOperations IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and NEW DAWN.He served as a combined arms battalion operations of-cer in OIF II, as a member of the 1st Cavalry Divisionstaff in OIF 6-8 during the Surge, and most recentlycommanded 1-68 Armor (Silver Lions) in Basra,Iraq, in OIF 10/OND. Through these experiences, hehas had the opportunity to witness the adaptationundertaken by the Army when rst embracing coun-

terinsurgency strategy in Baghdad in 2004 and 2005to the height of the Surge in the bloodiest days ofghting in Baghdad in 2006 and 2007, and culminat-ing with his experience in southern Iraq in 2010 and2011. In southern Iraq, Lieutenant Colonel Taylor wit-nessed rsthand how the Army needed to continuallylearn and adapt while commanding the Silver Lionsand serving alongside the 14th Iraqi Army Division,the Basra Police, and the 4th Regional Directorate ofBorder Enforcement as part of the advise and assistmission of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 4th InfantryDivision.


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SUMMARY

The U.S. Army goes to great lengths to capturelessons learned and preserve these lessons for cur-rent practitioners and future generations. Though theArmy is one of the most self-critical organizationsfound in American society, a well-deserved reputationhas also been earned for failing to inculcate those les-sons by transforming the institutional Army. Changeis achieved through a continuous cycle of adaptiveinnovation, experimentation, and experience. In Iraq,out of necessity while in contact with a dynamic en-emy, the Army transformed on the battleeld withradical changes in doctrine, organization, training,and materiel, which signicantly enabled battleeldsuccess.

Writing as forces were withdrawing from Iraq at

the end of 2011, the author analyzes the success ofthe militarys counterinsurgency strategy and nation-building efforts, examines the future of combat whichthe Army may face in order to recommend a suitableforce posture, and makes recommendations for futurecompetencies and capabilities utilizing the problem-solving construct of Doctrine, Organizations, Train-ing, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel,and Facilities in order to ensure future victories in thisrelevant component of the full spectrum of conict.


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BEYOND THE BATTLEFIELD:INSTITUTIONAL ARMY TRANSFORMATION


Following its successful execution of counterinsur-gency strategy and nation-building in Iraq, the U.S.Armed Forces have valuable lessons to capture andapply to the institutional army in order to enable vic-tory in similar future conicts. The U.S. military, par-ticularly the general purpose forces, historically havepaid scant attention to stability operations and coun-terinsurgency strategy, often viewing these as beyondthe scope of their primary responsibilities, a less de-sirable form of conict, or a lesser included subset ofmajor conventional warfare. The militarys experienceand unique challenges in Iraq revealed otherwise. Op-eration IRAQI FREEDOM demonstrated that stability

operations, by their very nature, are complex, messy,require signicant resolve and adaptability, and ne-cessitate a whole of government approach to leverageall of the instruments of national power toward thecommon goal. Adhering to the aphorism that thosewho fail to learn from history are doomed to repeatit, this paper rst assesses the probability that theArmy will face a counterinsurgency and requirementfor nation-building again in the future and, based onthis assessment, discusses the four prevalent schoolsof thought on the appropriate force posture for theArmy. Second, this paper highlights the shift to coun-terinsurgency strategy during the conict in Iraq andthe primary conclusions to be garnered from successthere, with particular emphasis on the importance

of applying all of the instruments of national powerto attack the root causes of the insurgency and bol-ster governmental legitimacy. Finally, accepting that


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one cannot rule out stability operations as a probableand difcult form of conict in the future, this paper

makes recommendations for taking the next step toinstitutionalize lessons learned from the Iraqi experi-ence by transforming the institutional Army, along theproblem-solving construct of Doctrine, Organizations,Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Per-sonnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF), in order to ensurethat stability operations and counterinsurgency war-fare retain their rightful place in the full spectrum ofconict, and that the Army remains ready and trainedto defend the nation and its interests as directed by thenational command authority.1

ARMY ADAPTATION

Recognizing that as a learning organization, it must

critically analyze the lessons from its successes andfailures in Iraq, the Army has undergone signicantreviews and analyses over the last few years. Withthe objective of ensuring that the hard-earned lessonsof the battleeld in Iraq are not lost, the Army mustdetermine how these lessons inform change in the in-stitutional Army. Unconventional warfare in the formof counterinsurgencies, terrorism, and guerilla war-fare is here to stay and nostalgia for simpler forms ofconventional war will not place the Army in the bestposition for what will most likely be the next conict.2As military professionals, one must look to the futureand properly assess the emerging character of war. Ina speech to the Corps of Cadets at West Point, NewYork, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said We

cant know with absolute certainty what the future ofwarfare will hold, but we do know it will be exceed-ingly complex, unpredictable, and unstructured.3


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Currently, few, if any, potential peer competitorsexist in the world which can match the U.S. Army con-

ventionally on the battleeld; furthermore, the rise ofa peer competitor in land warfare remains unlikely inthe next couple of decades. Just as the Army drawslessons from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, so doAmericas adversaries. The key admonition from the100-hour war in Operation DESERT STORM and theinitial ground invasion in Iraq in 2003 is that no onecan match the U.S. Army in a conventional groundwar. The technological overmatch combined withlightning fast tactics and prociency in maneuver war-fare, complemented by responsive and overwhelmingair power, leave virtually any antagonist consideringa conventional war with the United States in doubtas to their chances of victory. The type of long warsseen in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last decade

have, however, taught Americas adversaries thatthe United States can be challenged and potentiallydefeated in what Mao Tse-Tung dubbed protractedwarfare. The American people do not have patiencefor long wars. Indeed, the endurance that the UnitedStates has shown over the last decade is very atypi-cal of the American record in support for wars and isunlikely to be repeated in the future. Consequently,warfare in the future is far more likely to be irregular.4Enemies will seek to match strength against weaknessand will try to draw the United States into a protract-ed war they know the American people are less likelyto support than shorter conventional conict, and thatthe current military structure and institutions are lessprepared to dominate.

The Armys remarkable adaptation to conductcounterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghani-stan over the last several years has successfully pulled


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victory from the jaws of defeat.5 As Gates aptly stated,the Armys ability to learn and adapt in recent years

allowed us to pull Iraq from the brink of chaos in2007, and over the past year, to roll back the Talibanfrom their strongholds in Afghanistan.6 The wealthof experience and the lessons of conducting stabilityoperations and successful counterinsurgency strat-egy in these two countries have embedded in theArmys collective psyche the skills necessary to mas-ter this difcult form of warfare. As the Army with-draws all major combat troops from Iraq at the end of2011, declaring success and turning over the ght tocapable and well-trained Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),the Army must analyze its successes and failures anddraw conclusions about the effectiveness of the cam-paign.7 The adaptation on the ground in Iraq againsta dynamic threat succeeded but required the use of

all of the elements of national power, something thatrequired great effort and adaptation for the Army onthe ground to fully embrace.

In the introduction to his paper on nding bal-ance in U.S. military strategy, William Flavin cites twohistorical examples of successful adaptation by landforces in contact with an enemy they did not expect toght: the British Army ghting the French and Indi-ans in North America in the mid-18th century, and theU.S. Army ghting the Viet-Cong and North Vietnam-ese Army in Vietnam in the late 1960s. In both cases, hepraises the successful transformation of these armiesin evolving their doctrine, tactics, training, organiza-tions, and equipment to win tactically on the eld ofbattle against an asymmetric enemy. However, the

more pertinent lesson to be drawn from these histori-cal examples is evident in how both of these Armiesdriven by ideological, scal and political necessity,


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reverted back to default standards of doctrine, organi-zation, equipping, and training its forces in the years

following the conicts.8

In order to codify recent, crucial adaptations, the

Army must properly assess the lessons from the ghtsof the last decade, commit to maintain this full spec-trum capability and ensure that appropriate changesin the institutional Army occur to avoid repeating themistakes previously described. A necessary precursorto any effort to transform the institutional Army re-quires a determination of future threats, requirementsand capabilities and what is economically feasible inan era of scal austerity.

THE FOUR SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT ONPOSTURING THE FUTURE FORCE

In an Armed Forces Journal article, Frank G. Hoff-man outlined four competing schools of thoughton the future of armed conict and how the Armyshould be structured to handle that conict.9 Theseschools of thought are pertinent to the discussion ofhow to transform the institutional Army because theanticipated operating environment should drive therequirements, capabilities sought, and requisite adap-tation.10

Proponents of the rst school of thought, dubbedthe Counterinsurgents, believe that the ght theArmy nds itself engaged in today in Iraq and Afghan-istan, represent(s) far more than a passing blip in theevolution of conict . . . [and] contend that massed for-mations comprised of traditional arms and large-scale

conict between conventional powers is not a realis-tic planning scenario.11 Counterinsurgents contendthat the likely challenges of the future will be failed


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or failing states, transnational threats, and radicalizedextremists.12 Insightfully, advocates of this school of

thought argue that the purpose of a military is not toperpetuate preferred paradigms, [but instead] . . . toprepar[e] for likely contingencies and secur[e] Amer-icas interests.13 Counterinsurgents fear that much asit did following the Vietnam War, the Army will likelyrevert to the default position of preparing for majorcombat operations (MCO) to the exclusion of stabil-ity operations, or as it is now known, Stability, Secu-rity, Transition and Reconstruction operations (SSTR).Though possible, a return to an exclusive focus onmajor combat operations is improbable, at least in thenear future, as there are stark differences between theaftermath of Vietnam and Iraq. First and foremost,most acknowledge that following the withdrawal ofU.S. Forces from Vietnam, though having never suf-

fered any major tactical defeats, the Army did leavedefeated at the strategic level. Distraught over the lossof a hitherto undefeated record on the eld of battle,the Army sought to distance itself from the painfulmemories of Vietnam. Rationalizing the strategic de-feat in Vietnam, Army leadership ostensibly attribut-ed the loss to political causes and vowed to never ghta protracted insurgency war again, instead preferringto prepare its forces for more traditional, conventionalwarfare against peer competitors that presented exis-tential threats to the United States.14 There are manydifferences between the Army after the Vietnam Warand the Army leaving Iraq, not the least of which isthat the Army leaving Iraq has returned home con-dent in their tactical victory and to a lesser extent of

strategic success of their mission in Iraq. Clearly, onlytime will tell whether the established representativedemocracy and stability in Iraq will last and history


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will have to judge whether the sacrices were worththe costs. In the immediate aftermath of the war in

Iraq, though, the perception is that Operation IRAQIFREEDOM was a success. In addition, as suggestedabove, the U.S. Army faces no immediate peer com-petitor in conventional warfare who is likely to contestthe U.S. Army on the eld of battle. Though the sheersize and growing technological advancements of theChinese Army could present a threat to U.S. forces,nuclear deterrence, strategic imbalance in naval andair forces, and economic interdependence make theprobability of such conict unlikely in the near future.Finally, though directives can change with the transi-tion of political and military leadership, Departmentof Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05 published on No-vember 28, 2005, directs that:

[S]tability operations are a core U.S. military missionthat the Department of Defense shall be preparedto conduct and support and that they shall be givenpriority comparable to combat operations and explic-itly addressed. . . . across all DoD activities includingdoctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises,materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities and plan-ning.15

Having learned from the mistakes in the post-Vietnam era and wanting to ensure that the adapta-tion resulting from the Armys experience in Iraq andAfghanistan endures, SSTR operations have been el-evated in joint and Army doctrine and planning to thesame level as major combat operations.

Proponents of the second school of thought out-

lined by Frank Hoffman, called the Traditionalists,represent the other end of the spectrum of conict.Traditionalists seek to re-establish the traditional fo-


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cus of the armed forces on ghting and winning thenations wars, warning against restructuring or reori-

enting ground forces away from their traditional em-phasis on large-scale, industrial-age warfare againststates or an alliance of states.16 Traditionalists do notdeny that irregular warfare occurs commonly in themodern era, but they argue that these small wars donot represent an existential threat to the nation. Theyargue that armed forces prepared to ght major com-bat operations in large-scale industrial warfare canhandle the challenges presented by counterinsurgen-cy missions and fear that the newfound embrace ofmessy, protracted counterinsurgencies tends to de-grade the combat skills of the nations land forces dueto the high operations tempo of these long wars.17 Tobe sure, the Armys core competencies in ghting con-ventional wars have eroded over the last decade.18 In

truth, very few of the majors and sergeants rst classand below in the Army can remember, much less skill-fully execute, combined arms maneuver integratingarmor, infantry, aviation, and artillery on the battle-eld. The Army desperately needs an opportunity toreturn to these basics of conventional warfare in orderto be prepared to match a conventional force on theeld of battle. However, merely focusing on conven-tional ghts and wishing away the types of wars theArmy does not want to ghtthe messy and protract-ed counterinsurgency ghtsis potentially nave andirresponsible. First and foremost, the historical recordshows that Americas political leaders will send theArmy into harms way whether or not prepared.Se-nior military leaders when facing budgetary and force

reductions have testied before Congress on the needto be judicious when reducing the force, lest the na-tion be left with a hollow force, unprepared to meet


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the call when again sent to war.19 Likewise, as seniorArmy leaders have also asserted, the Chief of Staff

of the Army does not have the luxury of telling thePresident of the United States that the Army cannot orwill not accomplish a mission assigned when called.The Army must be prepared to accomplish any mis-sion along the full spectrum of conict. Second, seniorleaders of the Army have a moral obligation to thenation and to the families of these great Soldiers toprepare them for the types of conicts that the nationwill face. At the outset of the wars in Iraq and Afghan-istan, an unpreparedness to ght protracted stabilityoperations and a desire to utilize conventional war-fare strategy versus counterinsurgency strategy led tounnecessary deaths of countless Soldiers. Traditional-ists argue that only conventional, large-scale wars canthreaten the existence of the United States and that

lesser forms of conict along the full spectrum of op-erations are simpler, lesser included cases that can behandled by a conventionally trained and structuredforce.20 Though there is some truth in this assertion,the lives lost while trying to relearn lessons of coun-terinsurgency warfare in a conventionally trainedforce are tragic, especially when integration of theselessons into the institutional Army following the cur-rent wars may have spared those lives. Finally, thougharguments that only massed conventional forces candirectly threaten the sovereignty of the United Statesappears at face value to be true, this discounts the lossof prestige and inuence that America would likelyendure if it seeks to abstain from all small wars outof a desire to focus exclusively on domestic issues

and only large-scale industrial war. As Clausewitzasserted centuries ago, war remains an extension ofpolicy by other means. The Army must be prepared to


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respond when called on by the nations political lead-ers. Failed states and transnational threats can directly

threaten the stability of the country if those threatslead to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction(WMD). The capability to intervene in failing states orto put a stop to state-sponsored terrorism is necessaryto provide for the territorial and economic securityof the country. In addition, though rogue states andtransnational actors are unlikely to pose an existentialthreat to the nation, their actions can drive the UnitedStates to a posture of isolationism or detachment fromthe world, thus diminishing U.S. capacity to protectAmerican interests abroad. The United States, as theworlds leading superpower, provides much of thestability that secures the opportunities for commerceand peaceful international relations to solve differenc-es. The Armed Forces must be prepared to intervene

when called upon by the national command authorityacross the full spectrum of conict in order to main-tain the ability to inuence national interests world-wide and to remain a relevant world leader.

The third and fourth schools of thought outlinedby Frank Hoffman include the Utility Inelder andthe Division of Labor schools. In both schools ofthought, advocates recognize the need to be preparedfor both conventional warfare and counterinsurgen-cies and advocate different ways to provide thesecapabilities. The Division of Labor proponents arguethat because of the complexity and markedly differ-ent skill sets necessary to successfully prosecute ei-ther major combat operations or a counterinsurgencycampaign, the best strategy for preparedness along

the entire spectrum of conict is to design forces withthe appropriate structure, equipment, and training tospecialize in each respective mode of conict.21 These


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advocates place a greater emphasis on deterrence andconict avoidance prior to escalation of hostilities.

Most argue for a roughly 65/35 mix of conventionalforce focused and stability operations focused brigadecombat teams. According to Hoffman, Division ofLabor advocates tend to believe that by specializingforces, the Army and Marines can maintain the forcestrained and procient in handling small wars whileshifting some of the burden for deterring and defeat-ing large-scale aggression to air and naval forces.22Hoffman points out that the most likely threats fac-ing the military in the future will involve Iran, China,or North Korea, that all three of these scenarios arevulnerable to stand-off precision warfare, and that inthese instances U.S. political interests can be guaran-teed or obtained reliably without ground forces.23 Thisassumes that the government can accurately predict

where the next conict will occur, that accurate pre-diction of how other state or nonstate actors may actbased on a presumption of Americas own paradigmof rationality is even possible, and that other currentlystable areas will not become destabilized through un-foreseen actions in the near future. None of these aresafe assumptions. In truth, the sheer impact on theconventional force over the last decade of ghting twosimultaneous stability operations has taken its toll onthe morale, readiness, and training of the force.24 Thesetwo wars required the commitment of every BrigadeCombat Team in the active Army and equivalent unitin the Marines at the pace of being deployed at least 1out of every 3 years, often at a ratio of 1 out of every2 years. In the late 1990s, no one in the Army antici-

pated such a high pace of operational deployments.To specialize only 35 percent of the force for commit-ment to stability operations is, at best, a risky venture


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and potentially will make it impossible for the U.S.Armed Forces to win a sustained counterinsurgency

ght. The size of the force necessary for commitmentin the next stability operation is unknown, thereforethe total force must remain prepared to ght the na-tions battles, no matter where these battles fall withinthe full spectrum of conict. Consequently, the thirdschool of thought described by Frank Hoffman re-mains the most prevalent among military leaders andthe best option for the future force.

Utility Inelders seek a balance between the coun-terinsurgent and traditionalist approaches by adapt-ing the force structure slightly to embrace the lessonslearned in Iraq but yet retaining the Armys advantagesand preparedness to ght conventional warfare. Theyadvocate a return to basics in order to address the muchatrophied skill sets of conducting major combat opera-

tions, which the Army has not seen on the scale that ittrained for in the 1980s and 1990s, and last experiencedin Operation DESERT STORM, albeit briey. UtilityInelders argue that reduced budgets and unknownsin the scope and magnitude of future conict as wellas the category of conict America will face necessitatethat the entire Army be trained and ready to handle allforms of conict across the full spectrum. This schoolseeks to cover the entire spectrum of conict andavoid the risk of being optimized at either extreme . . .[and] spreads the risk by investing in quality forces,educating its ofcers for agility in complex problems,and creating tough but exible training programs.25

Many experts, to include senior military ofcials,recognize that the greatest current threat to U.S. na-

tional security in an age of soaring decits and do-mestic economic challenges is economic recession, orworse, collapse.26 Recent efforts to reverse the trend of


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drastically rising decit spending have captured theattention of all and guarantee that the military can ex-

pect much smaller budgets.27

In this age of scal aus-terity, Army leadership continues to emphasize theimportance of balanced and prudent force restructur-ing, continued modernization where necessary, anddogmatic insistence on maintaining force readiness.Utility Inelders believe that the Army can cover theentire spectrum of conict by investing in top qualityforces, trained, and educated in being agile, adaptive,and knowledgeable in all aspects of the full spectrumof conict. In the words of the former Chief of Staffof the Army and new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, General Martin Dempsey,

Despite the changing character of conict and in-creased capability of potential adversaries, the chal-lenge of conducting military operations on landremains fundamentally unchanged. Actions havemeaning on the ground because of the interaction ofpeople and as a result of the interdependence of so-cietal factors . . . humanitarian relief, peacekeeping,counterinsurgency and major combat operations areall part of the spectrum of conict and therefore equalclaimants to a position along the full spectrum of op-erations... [We must be able to accomplish] maneuver

and security against whatever threat presents itself.28

The Utility Inelder school of thought is not with-out its aws. Detractors of this school of thought arguethat the complexity of conventional warfare and stabil-ity operations almost guarantee that efforts to ensurethat the Army is structured and trained to do bothensures that they will master neither. Though theseadmonitions are well founded, Utility Inelders arguethat the Army has long demonstrated its resourceful-


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ness and immense ability to master many skills andthat the future force is up to the challenge. Detractors

of the Utility Inelder school of thought also arguethat in an age of scal austerity, the costs of maintain-ing readiness through training and education, and ofmodernizing equipment suitable for the entire spec-trum of conict are too great.29 In truth, some modern-ization may need to be postponed until the economyrecovers fully; however, the costs of losing a conict forwhich the nation is wholly unprepared or the loss ofinuence and prestige for the United States as a worldleader could, and in all probability would, be muchgreater.30 Some costs will be necessary to ensure thatthe equipment already acquired, which has enabledsuccess on the eld of battle in Iraq and Afghanistan,is maintained and refurbished because it can be usefulin future environments. As the analysis of the insti-

tutional Army will show below, much of the equip-ment whether designed for conventional warfare orfor stability operations of recent years remains someof the best in the world and merely requires revital-ization costs and limited modernization. There willbe costs incurred in the sustainment of training andeducation in the full spectrum of operations; however,these costs are necessary when facing the reality of theuncertainty of future conicts and the moral impera-tive to ensure the land forces are prepared for militaryoperations across the entire spectrum of conict. Few,if any, predicted the Arab Spring in early 2011 andthe dust has yet to settle from this signicant evolu-tion bordering on revolution in the Middle East. Theworld does not yet know what the impact of a truly

democratic Egypt will be and may not like what itgets. If a democratic Egypt results in a marginalizationor dumping of the Camp David Accords and a return


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to hostilities between Israel and Egypt, U.S. militaryintervention may be necessary to preserve Americas

ally, Israel, and more importantly, to maintain stabil-ity in this very volatile and strategically vital regionof the world.31 That intervention could be limited tomilitary advisors or could range to major conven-tional force commitment. The inuence of the Jewishlobby and conservative Christian right in Americanpolitics has long swayed American foreign policy inthe region and the Armed Forces must be prepared torespond where politics dictate. Some may believe thatthe prevalence of domestic economic concerns maypreclude involvement or commitment of forces in re-gional disputes, but in most cases, such assumptionshave proven wrong. One only needs to consider theenvironment in the days following the collapse of theSoviet Union with the Cold War concluded in favor

of the United States and the assumption that with thispeace dividend, the United States could signicantlydraw down its forces. In reality, the period followingthe end of the Cold War has seen far more commit-ment of land forces than ever before across the entirespectrum of conict in times of both economic afu-ence and recession. Whether committing forces to thesupport of humanitarian missions in Haiti or Somaliaon the lower end of the spectrum, to commitment ofmedium-sized forces on long-term peacekeeping mis-sions in Bosnia and Kosovo, to large-scale commit-ment of conventional forces in long-term stability op-erations and the initial ground offensives in Iraq andAfghanistan, the nation will call upon the land forcesto ght whether or not the Army is prepared. Assum-

ing a peace dividend based on domestic economicconcerns as a deterrent to committing land forces orthe absence of a current peer competitor capable of


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threatening U.S. sovereignty is dangerous and histori-cally inconsistent. Americas leaders have a tendency

to send the Army into harms way, condent that itcan accomplish any mission because of its track recordas a can-do, learning organization.

Consequently, the Army must ensure that the ad-aptation achieved in the war in Iraq is not lost, andthat the Army does not revert back to focusing on themode of warfare which it nds most comfortable anddecisive. The military professionals solemn oath de-mands that the Army extend the transformation thatit undertook in the sands of Iraq and apply it to theinstitutional Army, ensuring the integration of theselessons where appropriate across the Armys DOT-MLPF. Assuming that counterinsurgency strategywill remain relevant in future conict, it is imperativethat military professionals strive to inculcate the les-

sons from the hard earned experiences in Iraq. Theinstitutional Army must preserve these hard-earnedlessons and implement appropriate changes based onthe enduring and relevant aspects of the national se-curity environment, which are not merely unique toIraq, but which can better inform the strategies of fu-ture stability operations. The remainder of this Paperwill highlight some of those lessons and make recom-mendations for change that appear most signicant toensure that the general purpose forces, assuming theUtility Inelder approach, are prepared to ght andwin across the full spectrum of warfare.

THE TURNING POINT IN IRAQ

By the end of 2006, the security situation in Iraqwas rapidly deteriorating as sectarian violence raged,faith and trust in the Iraqi government waned, andmuch of the educated citizenry needed for the recon-


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struction of Iraq ed out of fear that they could no lon-ger contribute to the rebuilding of Iraq while ensuring

the safety of their families. The two-fold strategy oftargeting terrorists and extremists while transitioningsecurity to the ISF met countless failures as the ISFoften proved ill-equipped or inadequately trained toassume the lead in holding cleared terrain or worse,unwilling to perform and intimidated by both sides ofa growing sectarian ght to either passively or active-ly take part in the violence on one side or the other;this violence was oft described as the harbinger of anall-out civil war. The previous strategy simply did notwork and needed to change to the more populationcentric approach advocated in conventional counter-insurgency theory. As captured in the research studyoutlining the successful integrated counterinsurgencyapproach taken against Sunni and Shia insurgents in

2007 and 2008, the strategy had to change from justkilling the enemy, . . .just spending money on recon-struction projects, . . .and just putting the Iraqis incharge.32 Operations TOGETHER FORWARD I andII achieved dismal results because the Iraqis were notready to assume responsibility and the Armys focuswas not on the center of gravitythe population.Seeking unprecedented cooperation, civil and mili-tary partners employed a new strategy based on thefollowing principles.

(1) Make the population and its security the center-piece of the effort allowing time for economic andpolitical progress; (2) Establish a detailed understand-ing of the operational environment; (3) Engage in andwin a battle of the ideas. Help the population see that

supporting the government of Iraq was the best wayforward; (4) Walk the walk. Require every coalitioncivilian and soldier to become a counterinsurgencywarrior.33


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Beyond the addition of the ve brigade combat

teams with what came to be known as the Surge,a change in mindset across three key areas made thedifference. The strategy shifted to a population-centricfocus centered on protecting the people so as to iso-late the insurgents from the people, ensuring that theycould no longer intimidate nor coerce passive or ac-tive support. In addition, the provision of additionalforces in Baghdad, Mosul, and Al Anbar allowed U.S.and Coalition Forces to push out into Joint SecurityStations (JSSs) and Combat Outposts (COPs) to becloser to the people and gain their trust and coop-eration. Finally, the change in mindset required U.S.Forces to step outside of a western understandingof honor and justice.34 It was imperative to break thecycle of violence. Many insurgents were weary of the

violence and sought peace for their tribes and familiesbut remained compelled by their denition of honorand justice to exact retribution on the U.S. Forces andISF when members of their family were harmed orkilled. A western mindset of justice which sought tokill or capture all who conducted attacks on securityforces merely perpetuated the cycle of violence. Anemphasis on distinguishing the reconciliables fromthe irreconciliables yielded opportunities to break thecycle of violence and brought to the table many of thebattle-weary Shia militants who wanted to protecttheir own people and sought peace. This led to thefamous Anbar Awakening and reconciliation effortsthat led U.S. Forces to accept and embrace as partnersin security, former insurgents who weeks and months

earlier killed American servicemen.One of the most signicant ndings of the case

study of successful counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq


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was the absolute necessity for unity of effort betweencivil and military authorities, both American and Iraqi.

The integration of civilian and military staffs couldnot be achieved simply by setting policy. Staffs havemarkedly different cultures and approaches . . . [there-fore] integration took an active and constant effort toensure that frictions were overcome.35 Partnering hadto occur at all levels from senior level leaders and staffdown to Brigade Combat Teams and Battalions pairedwith Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Through thispartnership alignment of the instruments of nationalpower could occur to achieve a common purpose.36

THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

One of the most important lessons of the successin Iraq is the indispensable role of applying all instru-

ments of national power to succeed in a counterinsur-gency campaign. Though this Paper does not strive toexhaustively outline how each of these instrumentsought to be leveraged as a component of a strategy towin irregular warfare, an understanding of what onemeans when discussing the instruments of nationalpower is necessary. This understanding helps guidethe absolutely crucial efforts to achieve a whole ofgovernment approach which serves as a prerequisiteto defeating insurgents. As aptly covered in the Armydoctrinal publication on counterinsurgency strategy,Field Manual (FM) 3-24,

Political power is the central issue in insurgencies andcounterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the peopleto accept its governance or authority as legitimate.Insurgents use all available toolspolitical (includ-ing diplomatic), informational (including appeals toreligious, ethnic, or ideological beliefs), military, and


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economicto overthrow the existing authority. Thisauthority may be an established government or aninterim governing body. Counterinsurgents, in turn,use all instruments of national power to sustain theestablished or emerging government and reduce thelikelihood of another crisis emerging.37

By virtue of its training and exhaustive doctri-nal foundation, the Army is adept at leveraging themilitary instrument of national power to prosecute its

strategy to win decisively on the battleeld. However,the lessons of the last decade in Iraq make it clear thatleveraging the other instruments of national power areimperative to success in defeating insurgents. Sincepublication of FM 3-24, the instruments of nationalpower have been expanded by most scholars andstrategists to include more than just the diplomatic,informational, military, and economic tools but also

include nancial, intelligence, and law enforcement.38The military may not take the lead in applying thediplomatic, informational, economic, nancial, intel-ligence, and law enforcement instruments of nationalpower, but by virtue of its role in providing security toa war-ravaged environment and its hierarchy and ca-pacity for large-scale operations, the military must ab-

solutely understand the important role of applying allof the instruments of national power. The Army mustrecognize that a blind, Draconian application of onlythe military instrument can undermine the ultimatesuccess of the strategic goals and merely prolong theconict rather than resolve it. In this context, instru-ments of national power refer to the means and meth-ods employed by a state to exert its inuence or power

over another state or, on occasion, nonstate actors.Diplomacy is the art of communicating inten-

tions and exerting, inuencing, and building asso-ciations with other actors in the international arena,


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most frequently employing tools such as negotiations,recognition, treaties, and alliances. Insurgent groups

pursue these tools, much like states do, striving togarner popular and external support for their cause tolegitimize their ideals while undermining the regime.Through diplomatic negotiations, insurgents strikedeals with state and nonstate actors external to theircountry to assist them in their cause, seeking to garnersupport and safe havens, and to add to their legitima-cy and the populaces perception of their viability as areplacement for the current regime. The State Depart-ment typically takes the lead in U.S. efforts in the dip-lomatic arena but the Army must understand its rolein complementing State Department efforts to combatthe insurgents.39

The power of ideas and information cannot beunderstated. Insurgents typically wage an aggressive

information campaign to win the hearts and mindsof the people and add to the perception not only thattheir cause is just but also that they represent a bet-ter alternative to the existing regime. As highlightedabove, political power is at stake. Information cam-paigns, combined with actions to supplant the govern-ments efforts to provide for its people, are the mosteffective way to erode the perception of the legitimacyof the existing regime. Governments typically havethe advantage in this area, as they often control accessto the media. However, insurgents also have accessto means to spread their message. Tools available in-clude fomenting revolutionary ideas under the guiseof academic or religious freedom and expression ofideas. In addition, they often utilize propaganda tools

such as the internet, leaets, and multimedia discs,without which an insurgency is less likely to succeedat winning popular support. The insurgents in Iraq


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have proven particularly adroit in this area, and thissingle instrument of national power warrants signi-

cant attention in the aftermath of the war in Iraq; a bet-ter whole of government approach, one that is moreproactive and responsive, is necessary. Again, the De-partment of State typically takes the lead in this area,however, a review of the tools available to the StateDepartment and how the Army should complementthose efforts is necessary.

When one thinks of insurgents, what comes tomind most readily is the military arm. Often the mostcostly portion of an insurgencys campaign againstthe regime, the military instrument typically receivesthe most attention by both insurgent forces and thegovernment. Insurgents may seek external supportfor their military campaign in the form of training,weapons, advisors, or actual combat forces. This sup-

port can come from state actors or other insurgentsor terrorists either inside or outside the country. Themilitary of the regime often has both numerical andtechnological advantages over the insurgents, neces-sitating unique and unconventional strategies. Underthese circumstances, insurgents employ their forces onthe asymmetrical battleeld to counter governmentalstrengths. Insurgents often employ terror tactics to in-timidate the masses who do not support them, seekingto coerce passive or active support from the masses.

One of the most overlooked instruments of na-tional power, the economic instrument is vital tosuccess in a counterinsurgency ght or any stabilityoperation. The government uses economic power toexert its inuence abroad and foster prosperity. One

of the key lessons from Iraq has been that economicefforts with a short-term perspective can often bedetrimental to long-term success. Efforts to target the


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root causes of insurgencyand the popular supportfor insurgentswith economic measures which yield

ephemeral gains often end up further nancing theinsurgency, thus perpetuating it in the long run. TheState Department and the U.S. Agency for Interna-tional Development (USAID) typically take the leadin guiding economic strategies to undermine the in-surgency and conduct nation-building efforts seekingto guide a failed state or failing state to a more stableenvironment. However, with signicantly larger re-sources at their disposal through such programs asthe Commanders Emergency Response Fund (CERP)and with doctrine guiding its employment under theconcept of Money As a Weapon System (MAWS), mil-itary professionals must study the indispensable roleof economic development in undermining insurgencyand the potentially deleterious effects of misguided

economic efforts without an eye to longer-term eco-nomic and civil capacity development.40

The nancial instrument of national power, in thecontext of counterinsurgency strategy, typically ad-dresses efforts by a government to undermine andinterdict funding streams for insurgents. This ofteninvolves freezing or seizing assets held by insurgentsor their sponsors, especially when linkages can bedemonstrated. As the military often lacks the tools tobe directly involved in these efforts, military profes-sionals often fail to recognize and pass on invaluableintelligence that may assist the whole of governmentefforts to target insurgent income sources.41

As a critical war ghting function for militarystrategy, the intelligence instrument of national pow-

er appears to be a key component of the military ele-ment of national power. However, Army leaders mustrecognize that military intelligence is merely a small


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component of the total resources and capacity of thenational level intelligence. Strategic level intelligence

complements on site intelligence and the ability to l-ter raw data and transform that into knowledge andunderstanding about the adversary is vital to defeat-ing insurgents. Unlike traditional military intelligencein a conventional battle where the enemy acts alongdoctrinal orders of battle and conventions, intelligencein the counterinsurgency ght necessitates collating avast amount of information, working closely with co-alition partners, integrating human and technical in-telligence and leveraging a plethora of tools and assetsin order to optimally target threat groups.42

Finally, the war in Iraq has taught us that anycounterinsurgency campaign clearly must includepartnerships with both U.S. and host nation law en-forcement agencies. Hybrid threats merging criminal,

terrorist, and insurgent activities continue to hamperlaw enforcement professionals, military engaged incounterinsurgency ghts, and political leaders world-wide. In addition, one must advance the rule of law inorder to succeed at nation-building and civil capacitydevelopment in a state plagued by insurgency. Thisnecessitates relying on law enforcement and judiciaryexperts and the willingness to subordinate military ef-ciency and often effectiveness for the sake of achiev-ing the long-term stability achieved in a state that ad-heres to the rule of law.43 One of the most signicantchallenges in any counterinsurgency ght, however,lies in preventing, eliminating, and when not possiblemitigating corruption. Different standards and expec-tations exist in each culture for levels of acceptable

corruption. Insurgents often point to corruption ineconomic programs, law enforcement, and favoritismas justication for the overthrow of the government.


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Any strategy that seeks to apply the elements of na-tional power must address corruption within a cultur-

al context, seeking to remedy perceptions of relativedeprivation among the population, while recognizingthat, in many cases, one must accept nominal levels offavoritism and even some limited corruption becausezero defect approaches to such things are unrealisticand often are counterintuitive within certain culturalsettings, especially in developing nations.44

DOTMLPF RECOMMENDATIONS

Learning has occurred in the Army over the lastdecade; however, these lessons will be wasted unlessinstitutional adaptation occurs. As David Ucko assert-ed, a military organizations learning can occur ontwo levels: through bottom-up adaptation in the eld

and through top-down innovation at the institutionallevel.45 As adaptation in Iraq showed, the Army hasdeftly achieved the former in contact with the enemyin the sands of Iraq; however, as U.S. Forces departIraq, one must identify the changes that the Armycan afford and that the future of conict necessitates.In fact, some have aptly asserted that change imple-mented in Iraq actually dees industrial-age modelsfor organizational change in that it resulted not solelythrough top-down or bottom-up models but insteadoccurred at all levels almost simultaneously. As aresult of information-age technology enabling com-munities of practice like Company Commander.com andthe near real-time capacity for reach-back to subjectmatter expertise in the United States resulting from re-

lationships struck between many Division Headquar-ters and their partner domestic cities municipal gov-ernments, the Army accelerated its learning curve and


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improved its adaptation at all levels. Complementedby an insatiable thirst by military professionals to nd

new ways to solve complex problems, Army profes-sionals at all levels went to great lengths to shareexperiences across the force and sought knowledgeoutside normal subject matter expertise of the militaryprofession by linking in with domestic civilian experts.As a result, a whole new model for organizationalchange has been born, resulting from the advantagesprovided by technology to adapt at all levels nearlysimultaneously. This adaptation, however, is at greatrisk of being lost without an initiative to capture thesetechniques for enhancing critical reasoning and prob-lem solving by capitalizing on technology, inculcatinghow to learn and adapt in our institutional Army, andensuring that the experiential knowledge of how toenhance knowledge management is integrated into

the Armys professional education system. Strikingthat balance between resources available in a scallyaustere environment and the moral obligation to keepthe Army prepared and ready for the full spectrum ofoperations in which it will be employed necessitates abalanced approach to making evolutionary changes tothe Armys DOTMLPF in the years ahead.

Doctrine.

In order to defeat an enemy, one must understandthe enemy he faces. A fundamental principle of Armydoctrine lies in the axiom that one must see oneself,see the terrain, and see the enemythis truism is es-pecially salient at the strategic level when combating

an insurgency. In May 2009, Michele Flournoy, Un-der Secretary of Defense for Policy, stated that suc-cess against asymmetric threats will rest heavily on


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the nations ability to institutionalize, in doctrine, theknowledge that the force gained in Iraq.46 One of the

most signicant long-term adaptations resulting fromthe wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was the develop-ment of Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency,dated December 15, 2006. This doctrinal update aptlycaptures the principles and guidelines for conduct-ing counterinsurgency operations, rooted in histori-cal examples, informed by well-organized academicscholarly writings and updated in contemporary ex-periences. This doctrinal foundation formed the basisfor the successful strategy in Iraq and served as oneof the principal reasons why President George Bushselected General David Petraeus to become the newMultinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Commander as hesought to adopt a counterinsurgency strategy in 2007to turn back the tide of successive failures and setbacks

in 2006. Bard ONeills text, Insurgency and Terrorism,served as the foundation to the new doctrines meth-odology of analyzing and classifying an insurgency inorder to achieve the best strategy to defeat it.47

This textprovides a superb foundation for seeing the enemyand provides one of the most comprehensive, system-atic and straight-forward formats for analyzing andunderstanding the type of insurgency that one faces.

The nations success in Iraq is directly attributableto adopting the counterinsurgency strategy found inthe new doctrine of FM 3-24 and the principles of amore integrated civil-military cooperative effort lever-aging all the instruments of national power to achievecomplementary effects in undermining root causes ofthe insurgency, while enhancing the perception and

reality of legitimacy for the host nation government.As discovered by General (Ret.) Leon LaPortes re-search team and captured in The Comprehensive Ap-


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proach: An Iraq Case Study, every coalition civilian andSoldier had to become a counterinsurgency warrior.48

In practical application, this required military leadersfrom the squad to theater level to recognize that mili-tary objectives must be nested with long-term politi-cal goals. Soldiers had to look beyond the immediategoals of a military strategy and look to the long-termsecond- and third-order effects.49

As for counterinsurgency doctrine, the Army hasa solid foundation in FM 3-24. There are however,two recommended areas of further improvement nec-essary to ensure that the lessons of this war are notlost as the experienced practitioners of this success-ful strategy in Iraq move to the cadre of nonpracticingprofessionals. First, the Army must capture the tech-niques, tactics, and procedures that made the appli-cation of counterinsurgency strategy successful. The

foreword of FM 3-24 acknowledges that the doctrinetakes a general approach to counterinsurgency op-erations.50 The doctrine found in FM 3-24 deftly cap-tures the essence of understanding ones enemy, pro-tecting the population, and targeting the root causesof insurgency through cooperative and integratedefforts that capitalize on complementary effects of allof the instruments of national power, but it lacks guid-ance on how this might occur in practice. Though FM3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, provides a usefulsupplement to FM 3-24, facilitating understanding ofcounterinsurgency tactical operations at the company,battalion and brigade levels based on adaptation to ef-fectively conduct stability operations in Iraq, a gap inthe doctrine exists in better explaining what role the

tactical and operational leaders play in leveraging allof the instruments of national power to achieve strate-gic goals.51 An opportunity exists for a comprehensive


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study that helps to explain how leaders at every levelsupport the overall integrated counterinsurgency

strategy in a whole of government approach.Secondly, though in practice on the ground under

the leadership rst of Ambassador Ryan Crocker andGeneral Petraeus followed by each of their successors,desired civil-military cooperation was achieved to fa-cilitate greater unity of effort, the doctrine explainingthe roles and responsibilities for the application of allof the instruments of national power is lacking.52 Thenature of the hybrid threat and the fact that U.S. powercould be challenged for so long in Iraq, very narrowlyavoiding defeat, all but guarantees that future enemieswill challenge us asymmetrically seeking protractedconict over decisive battles and insurgent strategiesover conventional ones. The Armys doctrine and ex-perience demonstrate that a whole of government ap-

proach is necessary to achieve success. As averred byEdward Marks, the so-called nexus of security chal-lengesterrorism, narcotics, smuggling, internationalcriminal networks, etc.can no longer be managed assingle agency programs but must be integrated intowhole of government programs.53 As such, the U.S.Government needs to capture doctrine that delineatesresponsibilities for each aspect of a whole of govern-ment approach. This doctrine can and must be revisedbased on the unique circumstances of each environ-ment but a foundational document is necessary thatcan guide this critical component to an integrated civ-il-military approach to defeat insurgencies. The DoDand the Department of the Army can play a role inhelping to guide and craft recommendations for this

doctrine as doctrinal development remains one of themilitarys traditional strengths.


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Organization.

For the most part, the Armys force structure hasremained optimized for major combat operations.Organizationally, the Army made short-term modi-cations to enable security force assistance by initiallymobilizing tens of thousands of advisors to serve asMilitary Transition Teams (MiTT) and later by creat-ing Security Transition Teams (STTs) to augment eachbrigade deploying after the summer of 2009, thuscompleting the transformation of the Brigade Com-bat Team (BCT) into the Advise and Assist Brigade(AAB). These organizational changes were temporaryin nature and brought together teams and units for thediscrete period of the deployment to enable the mili-tary to succeed at one of its principal roles of SecurityForce Assistance (SFA). These efforts sought to enable

the military instrument of national power to contrib-ute to long-term stability in Iraq by directly facilitat-ing the enhanced capacity and capability of the ISFthrough advise, train, and assist functions. Thoughsome members of the counterinsurgent school ofthought may advocate reorganizing the basic build-ing block of deployable combat troops, tossing out themodular BCT, this approach is fraught with risks. Asarticulated above, the Army must remain prepared forall levels of conict along the full spectrum of opera-tions, and it is improbable that a redesigned brigadeformation optimized for counterinsurgency opera-tions would be well-suited for major combat opera-tions. Consequently, the modular BCT should retainits current organization with perhaps greater integra-

tion of subordinate civil affairs units or skill sets cov-ered in greater detail under the category of Personnelbelow. Recent initiatives to consider subtle changes to


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the modular BCT, while regionally aligning brigadesnot currently slated for deployment to Army Service

Component Commands (ASCCs), hold great promisefor helping to prepare forces for possible contingencyoperations and to facilitate greater understanding ofthe regional operating environment while preparingfor the full spectrum of operations.

Other capabilities have proven invaluable to thesuccess of the mission in Iraq. Small teams of expertswith unique skill sets have been added to BCTs in Iraqin order to provide capability uniquely needed andespecially critical in stability operations. These skillsmust be codied in some manner to ensure that theyare retained for future conicts. To name a few, theexpertise provided by Weapons Intelligence Teams(WITs) in exploitation of improvised explosive de-vices (IEDs) and unique unconventional weaponry;

Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) skilled in providinginsight into the population and how they may reactin order to enhance operational effectiveness, savelives, and reduce military and civilian conict; andLaw Enforcement Professionals (LEPs) who provideinsights to military commanders in how to developprosecutable cases based on evidence vice intelligencewhen targeting insurgents were proved invaluable inIraq. In the current budgetary environment, addingthese organizations to the BCT table of organizationand equipment is improbable; however, the Army canseek to train some similar skills and expertise in thoseorganizations that have more limited roles in stabilityoperations. For instance, on a recent deployment toIraq, the 3rd BCT of 4th Infantry Divisions (ID) chem-

ical reconnaissance platoon received training so thatit could perform the WIT mission for the brigade insouthern Iraq. Though unlikely to be able to build the


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depth of anthropological, sociological, and linguisticexpertise in the active force found in the HTTs recent-

ly deployed to Iraq, a serious look at creating this ca-pacity within the reserve components merits consid-eration. The reserves should also consider developingorganizations to train and maintain LEP expertise forfuture requirements.

Nonetheless, recommendations for change tothe organizational structure within the institutionalArmy and generating force are warranted. Criticismsabound against the generating forces ability to pro-vide replacement personnel in a timely manner underthe Army Forces Generation (ARFORGEN) model.Occasionally, the equipping and training cycles ofthe ARFORGEN process were horribly out of synchwith the manning cycle, resulting in units preparingfor tours in combat at far less than their authorized

manning until weeks or months before the units de-ploy date.54 Organizational and policy changes arewarranted to ensure that these ARFORGEN cycles arebetter alignedlives often depend on it. Additionally,though the operating tempo (OPTEMPO) will likelydecrease in the coming years as U.S. Forces withdrawrst from Iraq and then Afghanistan, the need to keepthe general purpose forces prepared to respond acrossthe full spectrum of conict will necessitate creativestrategies in addressing periodic major combat op-erations focused training and counterinsurgency andstability operations focused training. This, combinedwith declining resources in light of reduced defensebudgets for the near future, will necessitate that theArmy strike the right balance between live, virtual,

and constructive training. Though addressed in great-er detail below under the Training and Facilities head-ings, the institutional Army, particularly under the


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Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), mustlook to redesign itself to maximize use of virtual train-

ing technology to allow units at company, battalion,and ideally up to brigade level to train using simula-tions in stability operations.55

Finally, though outside the direct authority of thesenior leadership of the Army, the realization that theonly path to success in stability operations, especiallyin the counterinsurgency ght, lies in a whole of gov-ernment approach, necessitates a relook at the DoDsground combatant commands (GCCs) to better inte-grate civilian and military assets and ensure continu-ous interagency cooperation. If the Army is sincereabout its desire to better enable a whole of governmentapproach to resolve conicts in the future, change isneeded not just in the wartime organizations designedto handle conict but also in peace-time organizations

to better foster interagency cooperation. Much likethe need for the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act whichforced greater joint force cooperation, redesign ofthe governments approach to regional interagencycooperation will likely require legislative action byCongress. In their article, Death of the CombatantCommand? Toward a Joint Interagency Approach,authors Brigadier General Jeffery Buchanan, CaptainMaxie Davis and Colonel Lee Wright advocate thereplacement of geographical combatant commandswith Joint Interagency Commands (JIACOM), led byhighly credentialed civilians in permanent standing.These civilian-led interagency organizations couldbring all of the instruments of national power to bearin either peace or conict. They aptly assess that the

greatest impediment to such progress lies in over-coming the resistance to dogmatic defense of ricebowls, particularly in the DoD and a requirement for


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a signicant funding increase for other major federalgovernment agencies that would play a role in these

new JIACOMs. The benets of this approach are thatit could truly foster unity of effort across all of the in-struments of national power through all phases of theoperation, and could ease angst in some regions byminimizing the overt appearance of military domi-nance particularly in those areas that are sensitive tomilitary presence.56

At echelons below the GCC, military echelonsin Iraq partnered with U.S. regional embassy ofces(REOs), and developed provincial reconstructionteams (PRTs) in order to pursue whole of governmentsolutions to winning the counterinsurgency. Initially,PRTs were paired at the Brigade level and above, butas the responsible drawdown of forces occurred inIraq, PRTs began to pair with battalions responsible for

whole provinces. This often left a gap in partnership atthe Brigade level, responsible for four to six provinceswith multiple PRT partners each paired with a sub-ordinate battalion and each with competing prioritiesand desires for the Brigade Commanders attention.In Iraq, these challenges were met without adding aDepartment of State regional authority. However, inAfghanistan, a Sub-National and Regional echelon,led by the Department of State, was created to bet-ter partner with the DoD and the Government of theIslamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). From theCenter for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook,11-16, one can nd,

To ensure all U.S. PRT efforts are synchronized, the

ambassador established the PRT Sub-National Gov-ernment Ofce, which in August 2009 became theInteragency Provincial Affairs (IPA) Ofce. The new


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name increased the emphasis on unity of effort amongU.S. Government agencies and to indicate that thescope would be beyond just the PRTs. The IPAs or-ganizational structure parallels military commandand control structure. It has regional platforms (RPs)that mirror the regional commands (RC), each with asenior civilian representative (SCR), who is the coun-terpart to the military commander in each RC. TheSCRs main task is to foster civil-military integrationthrough the civilians working under them at the taskforce, PRT, and district support team (DST) levels.57

Though the IPA, RPs, and PRTs were created forthe specic applications of Operation ENDURINGFREEDOM in the extremely decentralized operationsin Afghanistan, valuable lessons can be drawn andshould be retained for ensuring mirrored partnershipand cooperation occurs at every level to ensure unity

of effort and a true whole of government approach infuture stability operations.

Training.

The Utility Inelder approach outlined above ne-cessitates periodic training in both major combat op-erations and stability operations to ensure that general

purpose forces are prepared for the entire spectrum ofconict. Large-scale conventional warfare representsthe only existential threat to the nation and there-fore, though improbable, must receive emphasis toboth deter a conventional attack on U.S. interests orsoil and to enable the U.S. military to ght and wina conventional ght. Because of the greater probabil-

ity that the Army will face hybrid threats challengingthe United States through a combination of irregularwarfare, terrorism, and transnational crime, the Army


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must also be prepared to conduct counterinsurgencyoperations. Based in part on the turbulence in the

Army resulting from frequent personnel moves andcommand cycles which are typically 2 years long, arotational cycle alternating between 1 year focused onmajor combat operations and the next year on stabil-ity operations appears to offer the best solution to abalanced approach for full spectrum training. Tradi-tionally, combat training center (CTC) rotations haveserved as the capstone event to any units training forcombat operations or combat readiness. Because ofthe realism and focus that the CTCs bring to training,these centers must be protected from elimination inDoD belt-tightening. To save money, there will neces-sarily be cutbacks. Redundancy and frivolous expen-ditures are rampant in training budgets but the qual-ity of the U.S. Army and its adaptability and success

in the wars in the Middle East are in no small part aresult of the CTCs. Creating exportable packages forthe stability operations training cycles that can movefrom installation to installation to facilitate counterin-surgency training will likely prove more cost effectivethan dedicating a CTC to stability operations or creat-ing an altogether new CTC. Potential also exists in un-tapped possibilities resulting from simulations train-ing which might realistically create scenarios to traingeneral purpose forces to better understand the natureof the counterinsurgency environment. A tremendouscost in current efforts to create realistic environmentsat the CTCs includes hiring thousands of Iraqi-Amer-icans to simulate environments in which U.S. Forceswill serve. In light of defense budget cuts ahead and

the ambiguity of which environments U.S. Forces arelikely to deploy to in the future, the Army needs tocapitalize on savings achievable through greater reli-


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ance on virtual and constructive training.58 The insti-tutional Army should take the lead in development of

these training scenarios and capabilities. Finally, theChief of Staff recently directed a study to align bri-gades regionally with ASCCs. Through this strategy,BCTs not programmed for operational deploymentswould focus their future scanning efforts, intelligenceanalysis, and training scenarios on real-world possi-bilities in environments in which they might deploy.This concept may ultimately allow these forces to trainfor and achieve counterinsurgency and stability op-erations readiness at a training center located in a na-tion within the respective GCC or Regionally AlignedBrigade (RAB) areas of operation.

As frequently identied in critiques of militarystrategy in the early part of the Iraq war, one of thefundamental aws of U.S. strategy in Iraq included a

failure to truly understand both Americas adversar-ies and partners in the counterinsurgency and nation-building efforts. The change to a population-centricstrategy, and more importantly the realization that thecycle of violence was being perpetuated by the veryefforts to stop the violence, led U.S. military leader-ship to expend signicant efforts in training deploy-ing units about Iraqi culture. This aided U.S. Forcesat all levels to consider the second- and third-ordereffects of their choices and to better embrace both theISF with whom they were partnered and the peoplewhom they were responsible to protect. The Armymust never again underestimate the critical role ofunderstanding cultural differences, especially whenconducting counterinsurgency operations. Cultural

training goes beyond mere cultural awareness ofthe language, artifacts, or symbols of a culture; onemust gain a true understanding of the underlying as-sumptions of another culture. A two-fold approach


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would facilitate greater cultural sensitivity. First, pre-deployment training must include extensive cultural

trainingthis is as important as inoculations, weap-ons training, or preparation of equipment. Second,the Army should invest in cultural expertise in areaswhere conict remains probable. Prior to escalationof hostilities and an order to deploy, this subject mat-ter expertise could reside with the ASCCs but wouldregularly be included in recurrent training opportuni-ties with the regionally aligned brigades as part of theASCCs Security Cooperation Plan (SCP).

As a nal point for training, the PRTs proved in-valuable in aligning efforts of the Department of Stateand the DoD in each province in Iraq. With the mili-tary withdrawal from Iraq and scaling down of themission in Baghdad, the Department of State, throughthe formation of the Civil Response Corps (CRC), has

already begun initiatives to ensure that organization-ally State is at least partially restructured to provideresponsive interagency expertise ready to deployon short notice to serve in austere environments toprevent conict. The CRC is comprised of speciallytrained civilians from across the U.S. Governmentwho deploy rapidly to help countries mitigate con-ict providing a surge in civilian power consistingof diplomats, development specialists, public healthofcials, law enforcement and corrections ofcers, en-gineers, economists, lawyers, and others who helpfragile states restore stability and achieve economicrecovery.59 There remains, however, a tremendouspotential for military and other agency professionalsto lose the experience at achieving integrated civil-

military cooperation to achieve decisive results. Thecultures, experiences, and jargon of the military pro-fessional and that of other federal agencies are vastly


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different. The creation of the CRC represents the rststep towards enabling State Department and other

federal agencies to rapidly deploy and respond tocontingencies; however, training is the necessary nextstep. This training would help prevent atrophy of thenecessary cooperation between federal agencies andthe military in providing for regional stability in frag-ile or failed states, and could help ensure common un-derstanding and appreciation for the talents and skillseach agency brings to the civil-military integrated ap-proach to conict resolution. We must strive to inte-grate CRC members and other members of the variousfederal agencies responsible for elements of nationalpower into training designed to sustain in the Armythe experience and understanding of civilian agencycompetencies and capabilities. As the Army tends to-ward the Utility Inelder approach, training Soldiers

in alternating cycles of MCO and counterinsurgencywill place the Army in the best position to facilitatethis cooperative civil-military training opportunity.The State Department and others should be encour-aged to eagerly participate in and support these train-ing opportunities.

Materiel.

Materiel requirements for stability operations vicea large-scale conventional battle are vastly different.Some have argued that reliance on the tools of con-ventional warfare, namely heavy combat vehicles likeAbrams tanks and Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles,long after the end of the conventional ght, exacerbat-

ed the conditions that expanded the support for the in-surgency. There may be some truth to these assertionsas the difculty of maneuver in an urban environment


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with such vehicles inevitably leads to unintendeddamages. On the other hand, with the innovation by

insurgents in using Explosively Formed Projectiles(EFPs), the Army lacked the platforms necessary toprotect its Soldiers while still minimizing the impacton the populace. Protection of the populace must re-main the foremost goal in any counterinsurgency ghtin order to isolate the insurgent from the populace.Gains secured in protecting the population, however,will be pyrrhic at best if these efforts are not balancedwith accepting only prudent risks and ensuring betterforce protection measures for the Soldiers executingthe counterinsurgency strategy. The M1 tank couldbe decisive in any set-piece battle against the insur-gents but the insurgents rarely, if ever, contested theArmy in this way. A better platform for the day-to-day Clear-Build-Hold strategy of counterinsurgency

warfare and to facilitate nation-building was neces-sary. The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)vehicles provided this enhancement that, though stilltoo big for some of the more densely populated areas,greatly enabled U.S. Forces to conduct their missions.Countless other innovations developed over the lastdecade, including biometric identication technology,robotic enhancements for IED interrogation, jammingtechnology for IED defeat, and other protective equip-ment enhancements, greatly facilitated force protec-tion and U.S. Forces ability to target the insurgents.Materiel advancements attained over the last decadeto protect U.S. Forces and target elusive enemies wereessential to success in Iraq. The Army must ret andrecapitalize this major investment in its capability to

conduct stability operations and must continue totrain on this equipment. In addition, the Army has op-erated essentially under a shadow Modied Table


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of Organization and Equipment (MTO&E) in Iraq andAfghanistan, leaving behind much of the heavy com-

bat vehicles at home station and receiving the eetof MRAPs as well as other state of the art technologyand off-the-shelf material solutions to accomplish themission in theater. A thorough look at the impact ofthis vital equipment to discern what should be addedto unit MTO&Es is necessary to retain specialty equip-ment useful for anticipated future combat scenarioswhile phasing out that equipment that merely metproblems which were short-term and unique to theIraq and Afghanistan situations. In some cases, lim-ited personnel subject matter expertise or additionalskill identiers (ASIs) and training should b

Documents

Beyond the Battlefield: Institutional Army Transformation Following Victory in Iraq