Between Flaming and Laudation: Political Websites, Social Media, and Democratic Participation in Niger

The International Journal of Internet Trolling and Online Participation 1(1)

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Between Flaming and Laudation: Political Websites, Social Media, and Democratic

Participation in Niger Gado Alzouma1

Abstract: In Africa, like elsewhere in the world, political actors are now increasingly using websites, blogs, online discussion forums, interactive newspapers, and online television and radio to foster civic participation in communities. Social media recently played a central role in what came to be known as the Arab Spring and is also being used by modern African political actors in order to contribute to democratic change. This paper analyses the contributions of information and communication technologies (ICTs) to democratic participation and online political discussions in Niger and particularly focuses on the use of ICTs for political mobilization and related strategies that actors (parties, rebel organizations, Diasporas, and citizens) are deploying on various digital platforms. The paper argues that traditional notions of power relations and political communication, as well as the nature of the digital tools used, are determinant in conferring (or not conferring) a democratic character to online discussions and political participation.

Keywords: Political participation; Social media; Political websites; Facebook; Niger Republic; ICTs; Online forums.

Introduction The use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) for political activities is sustained and enhanced worldwide by the current rapid pace of adoption of computers and the Internet. For example, between 2005 and 2011, the number of Internet users more than doubled to reach two billion

1 American University of Nigeria, Yola, Nigeria

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globally (International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 2011). More importantly, while the use of some technologies was until recently confined to certain societies or to specific segments of society for either economic or social reasons, or because of their (the technologies) functionalities, ICTs today are used on all continents by all strata of society. The spread of ICTs is particularly remarkable on such continents as Africa that has been traditionally left outside the global trend toward economic development and technological innovation. According to Internet World Statistics, although the Internet penetration rate in Africa is still low, standing at only 15% of the population in 2012, it is growing rapidly.

In view of such growth in Africa, numerous authors (Freeman, 1995; Davison, Vogel, Harris, and Jones, 2000; Steinmueller, 2001; Fleming, 2003; Polikanov & Abramova, 2003) and international organizations like the World Bank (2001) and the United Nations (UN) agencies (African Development Forum, 1999; UNDP, 2001) have associated the spread of ICTs with important implications for economic development and social change. Other authors (Grossman, 1995; Browning & Weitzner, 1996; Ott, 1998; Norris, 2001; Clift, 2002) have argued that this use of ICTs will foster democratic participation, weaken state control over media and citizens, and expand civic engagement, particularly in the African countries. However, only a few authors (Alzouma, 2006; 2008; Donner, 2007; Hahn & Kibora, 2008; Sey, 2010; de Bruijn, Nyamjoh, & Brinkman, 2009; Chneau-Loquay, 2002; 2010) have thus far addressed the everyday lived experience of Africans with ICTs. In terms of that everyday lived experience of sub-Saharan Africans use of ICTs in relation to political activities, with a few notable exceptions (Abdi & Deane, 2008; Lefko-Everett, 2009; Ekine et al., 2010; Crossland & Chigona, 2010), those studies have mostly addressed the potential of ICTs for enhancing democratic participation and civic engagement, but have not indicated the ways that ICTs are specifically being used by political parties and grassroots citizens to fulfil this goal and how effective such ICT uses are.

This paper proposes to analyse how ICTs are affecting everyday political discussions and political participation in the Republic of Niger. It will particularly focus on strategies for political mobilization and the deliberation tools and techniques that actors (parties, rebel organizations, the diaspora, and citizens) are deploying online. The paper argues that the pre-existing social conceptions of power relations between groups and actors are what determine the nature of digital political participation and the debates. It shows that ICTs are not used as dynamic and democratic tools for political mobilization and participation in Niger, but rather to prolong traditional information control and information dissemination patterns and practices among political leaders and organizations. In this context, website activities


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are essentially characterized by a downward approach to political communication (i.e., from the upper positions in the political hierarchy toward the lower positions). As such, the websites and related digital tools have limited empowerment effects for promoting democratic participation and democratic discussions.

However, while the websites and social media used by political leaders and organizations function as an authoritarian and unidirectional traditional model of political communication, mainly characterized by the laudation of leaders, online forums actually allow debates that could be defined as democratic with the existence of a significant number of disagreeing positions and flaming which earlier researchers defined as the expression of strong and inflammatory opinions (See Moor, 2008, p.7), a frequent and common attitude. Some authors have explained these notable differences between online forums and political websites. For instance, the fact that anonymity on online forums ensures that participants are not personally identifiable and therefore cannot be held accountable for what they write has been highlighted (Streck, 1998; Davis, 1999). They can also avoid, to some extent, potential retaliation or punishment, even in the context of an authoritarian regime. With the recent occurrence of Facebook, members profiles, including pictures and full names, are displayed, a characteristic that may affect discourse in this unique space (Kushin & Kitchener, 2009, p. 4), particularly in countries like Niger, which has been historically characterized by dictatorship and political abuses and where the discussion of certain issues, such as ethnicity, still remains very sensitive. Thus, although ICTs do enhance political actors and citizens capacities for activism and political participation and discussions, the tools do so in only a limited way that also depends on the nature of each digital network.

This paper is divided into three parts. The first part discusses how various authors have traditionally analysed ICTs as new working tools for political activism and participation and what in their (ICTs) features offers transformative implications in that regard. The second part analyses the structural constraints that currently affect access to ICTs in Niger, the Nigerien political websites' designs, and whether the digital platforms currently used take into account Nigers cultural and social realities, and the direction of information flow on those websites. The intent here is to try and assess their (the websites) democratic and participatory character. In the last part, arguing that the current patterns of political use of ICTs in Niger actually prolong previous forms of social and political control and thus do not result in more empowerment or democratic participation for ordinary citizens concludes the discussion.

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Background In recent years, the political implications of ICTs have been particularly illustrated by events that took place in various North African countries. Those events are now known as the Arab Spring (Ben Moussa, 2010; Chokoshvili, 2011; Spier, 2012). However, even before the fall of Mubarak (former president of Egypt) and the demise of Ben Ali (former president of Tunisia), the use of ICTs for political activity had sparked a vast literature that sought to demonstrate the potential of these technologies for mobilization, participation, and civic engagement. That literature first focused on the features of new ICTs compared to previous instruments of political communication. From this perspective, the authors argued that the main difference between the Internet and previous communication technologies, such as radio, television, cassettes, and compact discs, lay in the fact that the Internet enables users to have access to existing information at a scale never attained before. More importantly, users are not just passive receivers of information but can also be creators and disseminators. They can transmit, exchange, and process unlimited information, a living book in effect that can be continuously nourished and enriched. Thus, according to Ward and Gibson (2000), the key properties of ICTs, and particularly the Internet, offer five distinctive ways to change the nature of communication ( p. 394). These are (a) the (unlimited) volume or quantity of information that can be transmitted and exchanged between users, (b) the speed or almost simultaneous transmission and reception of all information, (c) a format that can be displayed in a written form, as well as video or as audio, (d) the direction or interactive and synchronous character of the information exchanged, and (e) the individual control or decentralized character of what is being communicated.

Some other authors (Mueller, 1999; Rheingold, 2000) have noted that we should add to those five characteristics of ICTs, the fact that the lines between particular ICT devices are being blurred, owing to the increasing technological convergence that allows mobile phones and the Internet to perform similar tasks. Today, a mobile phone user no longer necessarily needs a radio, a TV, or a computer to perform any single functionality of those devices. The technologies are rapidly evolving, shifting authors attention from one aspect or device to another often at different periods of time. For example, while social media (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube) and mobile phones are increasingly becoming the preferred objects of inquiry in the second decade of the 21st century, in the 1990s and 2000s, most analyses focused on the website activities of political parties, political leaders, and candidates during the electoral process or on rebellious movements and civil society digital activism in general. Those authors who


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analysed the structure of the political system in the network society (van Dijk, 1999) or political website activities (Ward & Gibson, 2000; Dartnell, 2006) particularly highlighted the functions ICTs and the sites played in relation to distributing political information and the communication needs of political organizations and governments. Ward and Gibson summarise these functions as information provision, campaigning, resource generation, networking, and promoting participation (2000, pp. 306-307). It should also be noted that in the use of these concepts and corresponding analytical tools, attention is now more and more being shifted toward the developing countries, particularly Africa. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), grassroots organizations, and civil societies, as well as international development organizations and all kinds of activists, are today using those concepts as operational ideas and guiding principles in their everyday struggles for democracy and political participation.

Thus, more literature is now being devoted to the potential of ICTs to foster political change and active citizenship in Africa (Bohler-Muller & van der Merwe, 2011). This literature is characterized by a broad range of ideas and views on how ICTs can (or cannot) contribute to transforming society and politics in Africa. From this perspective, the theoretical positions and epistemological orientations taken by the various authors have usually manifested a kind of binary opposition where utopian views are opposed to dystopian ones; technological determinism confronts sociological determinism; optimistic stances run counter to pessimistic approaches; and the power of agency contrasts with the effects of structures.

Authors like Rheingold (1993), Schwartz (1996), or Barber (1998) have usually been associated with the cyber-optimistic orientation due to their tendency to view digital technologies as a mechanism that facilitates alternative channels of civic engagement, [as] exemplified by political chat-rooms, remote electronic voting in elections, referenda, and plebiscites, and the mobilization of virtual communities, thereby revitalizing levels of mass participation in public affairs (Norris, 2006, p. 2). Such views were particularly defended during the early days of digital activism, namely, in the 1990s. However, even then, authors usually presented as optimistic or utopian were more cautious than often inferred. For example, in the tenth chapter of his 1993 book, Virtual Community, titled Disinformocracy, Rheingold (1993) stated that [virtual] communities could help citizens revitalize democracy, or they could be luring us into an attractively packaged substitute for democratic discourse (p. 276). Schwartz (1996) for his part explained that the potential exists for telecommunications to become a powerful tool for political organization, but that success depends on how we choose to use it.

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These calls for caution, however, have not overlapped the overenthusiastic accounts of the Internet potential for political participation that these authors associated with the spread of ICTs in contrast to the dystopian approaches that emphasize social inequalities and the potential impact of the digital world on the distribution of power and influence in political systems (Norris, 2001, p. 12). Political systems should be understood here in the larger sense of that term because governments as well as private corporations (two entities whose interests are often intertwined) may share a common goal, namely, the invasive control of individuals and societies for political as well as economic reasons (Ragnedda, 2011). In Africa for example, this last view, the pessimistic view, contends that ICTs are new tools for economic and cultural imperialism and powerful instruments of control, surveillance, and persecution in the hands of dictatorial regimes. As suggested by Yau (2004), Africa is poorly positioned in the cyberspace as to benefit from globalization. Instead, the continent faces the challenges of imperialism anew, this time represented by knowledge dependence (p. 12). In the same way, Nyabuga and Mudhai (2009), contend that while new media may have some potential to help monitor and mobilize political activity, and possibly encourage political engagement, they can also reinforce the positions of those in power not only due to their limitations but also by their manipulability by scheming human agents (p. 41). Indeed, ICTs and particularly mobile phones have even been blamed for having contributed to the eruption of violence that swept Kenya in the aftermath of the 2007 elections (Abdi & Deane, 2008). The irenic view of technology has, therefore, always been counter-balanced by sceptical and even gloomy accounts of the misdeeds caused by the growing use of ICTs.

Several other research approaches have tried to overcome these mutually exclusive theories by providing a justification for a third alternative. One of those approaches is the persistent position Joyce (2010) presented, that argues that ICTs are neither salvation, nor damnation and that networked technology only signals a change in the degreethough not the inherent natureof activism practice. It simply makes existing offline tactics like mobilization, organization, and message dissemination more effective. (pp. 12-13). Persistent authors believe that ICTs can only enhance our political capacities but they do so all across the political spectrum, thus empowering both heroes and villains with none having any advantage whatsoever because ICT devices do not in the long run change existing power structures.

Another alternative to examine is the structuralist-constructivist approach devised by Bourdieu (1989), which is adopted in this paper. It tries to overcome the opposition of technological determinism to sociological determinism. Technological determinism attributes to technology the


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capacity to change society and sees this power to change in the properties of the technological devices themselves, their configurations, and functionalities. From this perspective, computers, for example, can carry a vision of the world in the sense that Ong (2002) said that technology is attuned to societies that have a literary tradition as opposed to non-literate societies. This vision of the world is also constraining. It can have effects; it can change society in terms of its structures. Thus, for technological determinism, once a particular technology is introduced in a society it changes the organization, structures, and dynamics of that society. To the contrary, sociological determinism insists on the effects of social and external economic factors as well as the relationships between groups and social classes or the overall social environment to explain how technologies are embedded in societies, are the object of negotiations and instrumentalised, or are constructed by the actors. While for sociological determinism, ICTs are built by agents and deployed under structural constraints, for technological determinism, ICTs are objectified forms of particular ways of thinking that will constrain agents to act in particular directions.

To bypass this opposition, structuralism-constructivism contends that ICTs are not just instruments, nor are they an autonomous reality totally detached from society. There is an interplay between technology and society, although technological instruments have no agency of their own, as attributed to them by the actor-network theory, which Latour (1996) said does not limit itself to human individual actors but extend[s] the word actor -or actant- to non-human, non-individual entities (p. 369). For structuralist-constructivists, local and national structural constraints, such as availability and access to ICTs at a national level, unequal access to ICTs between users (economic capital), unequal capacities to use ICTs (social and cultural capitals), as well as their cultural, historical, and political contexts are all factors that can interact with ICTs features and functionalities to determine varying patterns of use.

Within this framework, the paper seeks to show how local political actors in Niger are using ICTs for political mobilization and participation in everyday activities; how effective those uses are in light of the websites designs, and their functionalities and local conceptions of political support and communication. The paper argues that the mere existence and use of websites and other digital instruments of political mobilization do not necessarily translate into effective and democratic political participation and free discussion. It is not enough that ICTs are introduced and political websites and social media are both used by local actors to ensure democratic participation and discussion. The historical and socio-political context, along with the local conceptions of political communication, are factors that

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interplay with the features of the digital instrument to either expand or limit the citizens capacity to assert themselves politically through online discussion.

Methodology To assess digital political activity in Niger, a web survey was used to establish a list of the political parties, a list of other political organizations (such as the rebel movements in Niger), and the different online communities (Nigerien online forums) that are engaging in significant digital activity in the country. Two criteria, in accordance with the studys main objectives, were used to determine what was termed significant digital activity: (a) are considered significantly active those parties, organizations, and online communities that are manifesting their presence online first through existing websites, online forums, and/or the use of social media, particularly Facebook, established either under the name of a political party or the organization itself or under the name of the corresponding political leader; and (b) to be considered active the website, online forum, or Facebook page of the party, organization, or leader should contain existing posts and comments for the last three years and/or the current year (2013). Using these criteria, it was determined that 30 political parties were officially registered in Niger of which four had significant digital activity. Also, using the same criteria, two rebellious movements and two online communities (online forums) were considered to be active.

The study then measured the effectiveness and character (democratic or authoritarian) of digital activities in Niger based on two criteria, namely, the information provision function of the website, its direction (downward, upward, lateral (inward and outward), or interactive) as proposed by Ward and Gibson (2000) and the democratic nature of the online discussions, the posts, and comments through the existence and importance of disagreeing positions that were taken. It should be noted that all discussions, posts, and comments referred to in this study have been translated from French to English by the author. The existence on the website of effective digital tools for interactive discussions (e.g., email addresses, forums, blogs), whether the website was cantered on the person of the leader (the illustration of his deeds and sayings) or the discussion of the partys program, the leaders political ideas, or the values of the party, was also an important indication of the democratic nature of the digital activity being undertaken on the corresponding website or social media.

This assessment was done through qualitative observations and the description of the website or social media being analysed with no numerical value or score assigned to assess functionality, design, or the democratic


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character of any website. The analysis was interpretative and critical and used Ward and Gibsons framework for political website analysis (2000), and Herrings (2004) computer-mediated discourse analysis. The approach focused on counting the number of messages and responses and message and thread length (Herring, 2004, p. 358). As such, the research primarily focused on website design and content, the postings content, the number of comments made, and the number of disagreeing positions in order to draw inferences on the nature of the parties and/or organizations political communication in Niger. For Facebook and online forums analysis, the most debated topic or thread was first identified, with the number of comments and posts becoming an indication of the extent to which that topic provoked interest and disagreeing positions. The content of the posts was assessed to determine and categorize the nature of the views expressed as (1) opposing those views such as expressed by either political leaders or the government, (2) supporting these views, or (3) taking a neutral position. However, before analysing the digital political activities in Niger, it is first important to highlight the status of ICTs in that country and situate Niger within the global digital divide as compared to other countries.

Niger and the Global Digital Divide: Access to Computers, Internet, Mobile Phones, and Social Media According to the 2011 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) human development report, Niger ranked 186 out of 193 countries. Niger is, therefore, one of the poorest countries in the world and one where living standards are the lowest. For example, the gross national income (GNI) per capita in Niger stands at $641, life expectancy is 54.7 years, and the poverty rate (percentage of people living with less than 2 dollars a day) is 64%. With the notable exception of the mobile phone penetration rate, which stood at 24.5 mobile phone subscriptions for 100 inhabitants, the ICT indicators for Niger are similarly low. The ITUs 2011 report on ICT development ranked Niger between the two last countries in the world with an ICT development index (IDI) of 0.92 (ITU, 2011, p.26). In 2010, only 1.2% of Nigers households had computers, and only 0.2% of households had access to the Internet.

Use of social media is also very low. Thus, according to Internet World Statistics, for a population of roughly 16.5 million, Niger counted only 128,749 Internet users corresponding to 0.8% of its population as of December 2011, among which there were but 44,580 Facebook users corresponding to a 0.3% penetration rate by that same date. Most Facebook users are young, educated, and urbanized with a good number being

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members of the Nigerien diaspora. The same is true for Twitter users. In a study conducted in 2011, Portland Communications (2012) found that Niger counted 7,052 tweeters and ranked 14 out of 20 countries ranked by volume of use in Africa.

However, this low access to ICTs at the general population level does not preclude the fact that digital activism is one of the strategies used by a number of Nigerien political organizations and political agents for mobilization purposes and, admittedly, also for democratic participation. Those organizations and users are identified in the next section.

Pol i t i ca l use o f ICTs in Niger : Who are the users?

The first users of digital tools for political activism in Niger are political parties. Niger currently counts 30 political parties (Institut dEtudes Politiques de Bordeaux, n.d.). Six of those parties have websites, but only four of them have regular and significant online activities. These are also the most important political organizations in the country. Similarly, the government and various governmental branches also have websites. However, for the purpose of this paper, this analysis focused only on the four most important political parties (Table 1).

Table 1. Most important political parties.

Party (Translation) Description and website

the PNDS-Tarayya (Parti Nigrien pour la Dmocratie et le Socialisme- Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism),

The party of the current incumbent president, which is also the most important party in the country and can be found at: http://pnds-tarayya.net/

The MNSD-Nassara (Mouvement National pour la Socit de Dveloppement- National Movement for a Development Society),

The most important opposition party, found at www.mnsdnassara.org

The CDS-Rahama (Convention Dmocratique et Sociale - Democratic and Social Convention),

Another opposition party that can be found at www.cdsrahama.org;

The MODEN-Lumana (Mouvement Dmocratique Nigrien pour une Fdration Africaine - Nigerien Democratic Movement for an African Federation)

A political party allied with the government and with a website at www.mdnlumana.com


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In Niger, acronyms of political parties are usually followed by a word that reflects the core values of that party in the Hausa local language. For example tarraya means rally, nassara means victory, and rahama means prosperity.

Apart from the political parties, since 2007, two rebellious movements, the MNJ (Mouvement des Nigriens pour la Justice-Nigerien Movement for Justice) and the FFR (Front des Forces de Redressement-Rectification Forces Front), both led by Tuareg insurgents, have asserted their presence on the Internet through virtual networks like discussion forums and online media websites. They have also created their own websites. Since 2010, following a political accord with the government, these movements have ceased their political activities and consequently also their online activities. However, Nigerien Tuareg irredentist activities are still on-going in various forms online, particularly on the pan-Berber movement political websites, such as Issikta.com (www.issikta.com) and Temoust.org (www.temoust.org), a website created by a Nigerien Tuareg living in France, and also numerous other digital platforms.

The most active segment of the Nigerien population online is the Nigerien diaspora, which is mainly composed of students, migrant workers, political dissidents, and refugees (particularly the Tuareg disapora) who are living in Europe and the US where they have easy access to the new tools for digital activities. They have created multiple websites and are mostly using online forums and social media to foster political participation and/or dissident political activism in Niger. By interacting daily with those who stayed at home, they have formed a new deterritorialized, globalized, and transnational community the activities of which do indirectly affect national debates and policies. The most important online forums they are using are in Figure 1, namely www.tamtaminfo.com (left) www.Nigerdiaspora.net (middle) and www.Agadez-Niger.com (right).

Figure 1: Online forums in Niger

Finally, civil society organizations, such as the organization for the defence of human rights are in Figure 2. Namely, www.annddh-niger.org (left) for organizations fostering civic engagement, such as the various organizational members of the Network of Organizations for Transparency and Budget Analysis (http://www.rotabniger.org/en/organization.htm (right) also have

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a presence online. To these, we should add all grassroots citizens who take part in daily digital activism, either in an organized manner or not.

Figure 2: Civil society organizations websites in Niger

Although all those actors are important for the study of digital political participation and discussion in Niger, this study primarily focuses on political parties and rebellious movements websites and online forums to analyse digital politics in Niger. From this perspective, a particular emphasis was put on political website design as it relates to Nigers social and cultural realities and the effectiveness of digital political communication in Niger in terms of promoting democratic participation on the political websites, through social media (Facebook), and in the online forums.

Analyzing the Nigerien political websites: Designs, colours, symbols, and language Colours and Symbols

There are very strong similarities between all the political websites in Niger, including those of the rebellious movements. At the top, in the header, is usually found the logo of the party, the full party name, and a picture (photograph) of the partys leader. This format is true for the PNDS and also for the MNSD and the other political parties. The backgrounds of the headers are usually the parties colours (e.g., pink for the PNDS, green for the CDS, white for the MNSD). The formal and obvious standardized characteristics of the websites designs show that the designers probably lacked precise understanding of the Nigerien cultural context and were more focused on the expectations of the political leaders. This trait is apparent in the fact that the signifiers focus on the leaders images and the parties logos and colours with no emotional appeal to any of the natural, geographic, historical, or cultural signifiers that symbolize Niger as a country or Nigers population as a people. The intended message obviously focuses on the party or the leader. Only the way the leaders images are displayed in the headers (all images feature the political leaders dressed in Nigerien traditional attires) give an indication that the cultural context was taken into


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account and that the targeted population may in that way identify with their political leaders. Figure 3 below displays respectively, from left to right and up to down, the website of the CDS-Rahama, the website of the PNDS-Tarraya, the website of the MNSD-Nassara, and the website of the Lumana.

Figure 3: Political parties websites in Niger

However, in a country where the intended goal of the political leaders and the government is to strengthen national cohesion and curb ethnic conflict, it is indeed curious to note that no signifier that symbolizes a shared value or some common aspect of the country is presented. For example, it is well known that both blue and red colours are overwhelmingly present on American political websites. In Niger, the only colours that are emphasized are those of the political parties, which, with the exception of the MNSD, have no historical appeal or anchorage either nationally or internationally. For example the PNDS has adopted pink, the symbolic colour for European social-democratic parties; but this has no significance in the Nigerien cultural context. The colours used by the political parties were chosen at the creation of those parties, but without any historical reference. The only intended goal of those choices was to make the party recognized at a single glance in a country where the people are mostly illiterate.

However, it should be noted that the green of the CDS-Rahama, is historically part of the century-old pan-African movements flag. The intended goal of the pan-African movement is to unite all people of African descent and all African countries as one federal nation. The green historically symbolizes the natural resources of the African continent. Also the orange colour is common to the MNSD and the Nigerien flag. It symbolizes the Sahara and the Sahel regions that cover the entire country.

Unlike the political parties websites, the rebellious movements websites have symbols that clearly relate to the Tuareg people and the Berber people of North Africa of which the Tuaregs are considered a sub-group (See Alzouma, 2009). The website of the MNJ (Figure 4: first website on the left

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side below), for example, features the flag of the movement, a traditional Tuareg warrior shield, where on the upper side is the Tifinagh (a traditional Tuareg writing system) letter for Z, called the Ezza letter. The Ezza letter symbolizes the Tuareg people of Berber origins. The colours used on the website are those traditionally related to the Tuaregs as a people: the blue, the green, and the yellow colours are painted in reverse order by the MNJ (yellow, blue, green) and is also highlighted the red, the associated colour for the Ezza letter. A kalashkinov, an assault rifle often associated with liberation movements, is drawn on the down side of the shield, with a Tuareg sword crossing it. For its part, the FFR as in Figure 4 (right) has chosen a round yellow emblem surmounted by the words Front des Forces de Redressement with the red Ezza letter written in the middle. Both the MNJ and the FFR sites feature current and former Tuareg rebellion leaders pictures.

Figure 4: Rebellious movements websites in Niger

Language

French is the language used on all the websites although less than 40% of the Nigerien population can read French. Although Hausa, which is spoken by 75% of the Nigerien population, is a written language with both European alphabet and Arabic characters, none of the websites features any text in Hausa. In the same way, even the Tuareg rebellious movements do not use Tifinagh, which is a traditional and centuries-old Tuareg writing system. It can, therefore, be concluded that for the Nigerien population, which is the intended target of online political activities, the effectiveness of all the websites is impeded by two important factors, namely, the low percentage of people who are able to read French and the even lower percentage of people who have access to the Internet even through cybercafs. However, the FFR website does offer audio functionalities, which make it possible, particularly for illiterate people, to listen to political speeches and political statements. Also, all the websites display a profusion of photographs related to their activities and leaders. There are also links to visual functionalities (such as YouTube) on some of the parties websites. This is particularly true for the PNDS whose website seems to be the most visited and the most active based on figures indicating the number of visits on the different political websites. For example, on October 13, 2013, the last day the author visited those websites, the total number of visitors since the creation of the


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PNDS website in 2009 was 91,382, with 22 visitors on that single day. However, the author was unable to find the number of visitors on any one of the three other websites analysed: the Moden Lumana, the CDS-Rahama, and finally the MNSD-Nassara.

Table 2. Websites examined

Website Permalink

PNDS website http://pnds-tarayya.net/news/news.php

Moden Lumana http://www.mdnlumana.com/#ACCUEIL

CDS-Rahama http://www.cdsrahama.org/

MNSD-Nassara http://mnsdnassara.org/

However, the most important shortcoming of digital political communication in Niger is related to the unidirectional and downward character of the information provision function of these political websites and the social media sites. Political communication, such as understood by the parties and their leaders reproduces traditional vertical power relations structures based on the model of traditional political support networks. That aspect of the political communication also appears to be an impediment to consistent and effective democratic exchanges between the citizens of Niger.

Websi tes and soc ia l media as po l i t i ca l communicat ion too ls in Niger

One of the main distinctive characteristics of political websites is what Ward and Gibson (2000) called the direction of information and communication flow (p. 306), or their downward, upward, lateral (inward or outward), or interactive character. The predominant direction taken by a political communication inside an organization gives an indication of not only the respective positions held by the agents who are members of that organization, but also the internal power structure inside the organization, and the democratic or authoritarian nature of its functionality. It tells us much about the capacity of the different agents and how they will orient political debates, political activities, and political participation. For example, a website that has interactive tools will allow more for political participation than a website that is characterized by a unidirectional circulation of information, particularly when that circulation is top-down. As Ward and Gibson (2000) suggested:

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interactive ICFs (Information and Communication Flows) are distinguished as two-way or multidirectional substantive contacts between organizations and individuals whereby input from one side (usually the user) has a strong expectation of producing a response from the other side....Therefore, a search engine was considered an asynchronous interactive mode of communication because a response follows user input after a certain time interval and cannot then be subject to modification. Chat rooms, however, allow for free-flowing communication in which both input and responses are subject to continuous modification. (p. 306)

The importance thus given by website designers to interactive links is a clear indication of the intended functions that are likely assigned to that website. In the case of Niger, the PNDS, the other political parties, and the rebellious movements all share a common approach in the way they designed and implemented their websites. Among the functions of these websites, a disproportionate place is given to the information provision function with the direction of information and communication flow being essentially downward. Democratic participation seems to be of little concern as far as site content is concerned. Table 3 presents the only kinds of information one will find on these websites, as well as descriptions of them.

Table 3. Content on political party websites

Information factor Description

News concerning the current activities of the party

Such as the latest activities of the political parties, and the policies they wish to promote.

The partys leaders at central and regional levels

Such as to provide increased engagement with the public.

The partys values Such as to communicate what the parties stand for.

The partys history Such as to show the partys experience

The partys constitutional documents

Such as to say how the party governs itself.

The partys address Such as to allow the public and others know where they are based.

How to contact the party Such as to allow public and journalists to


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contact them.

The lack of interactive functions is obvious. Although the parties addresses and emails are indicated on all the websites, only the CDS-Rahama and the MDN give links (one each) that lead visitors to forums where they supposedly can discuss political ideas. However, when one clicks these links, no page is displayed, indicating that the forums have never been used or are not in operation.

This static use of websites is even more striking with regard to the absence of any political debate on them; there are not even critiques of political rivals. In an early analysis of political websites in the US, Foot and Schneider (2002) noted that online political web activities include what they called carnival with elements that include jests and insults directed toward political actors, satire and parody, the transgression of social mores, and the inversion or suspension of hierarchical norms (p. 231). None of these aspects is used on the Nigerien political websites to depreciate, engage, or challenge rival candidates. Caricatures, cartoons, and humour, which abound on political websites elsewhere, are nowhere to be seen here. What the websites thus lack is dynamism and interactivity.

It seems that the main motivation for the creation of these political websites was not to ensure political participation, but to show how the different parties are not only up to date, but also fully modern (and, as such, supposedly advocating for new and advanced ways of doing politics; ways that, such as digital platforms, are attuned to current times). The websites are in effect some kind of fashion statement. This is particularly true for the PNDS, which is credited as being the party of the intellectuals, the party of the educated, and the party of young people with a modernist mind-set and geared toward technological solutions to development problems. The PNDS always presents its main political rival, the MNSD as the party of the past, an aggregate of traditional and conservative leaders who have no idea how the globalized modern world works and, therefore, cannot pretend to lead the country in that new context. It is, therefore, not surprising that the PNDS was the first political party to create a website, followed in a kind of mimetic behaviour by the other political parties that went so far as to actually copy the PNDS web design.

Like the websites of the political parties, the websites of the rebellious movements give little opportunity for interaction. However, these two websites both display email addresses to contact the respective organizations and, judging by the broad media and international attention that the rebellions received before the agreement signed with the government (Alzouma, 2009), these email addresses must have played an important role

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for foreign journalists seeking information about the rebels. In Niger, it was well known that the two websites were the main sources of information and documentation about the Tuareg rebellious organizations and that the rebels with news and political literature constantly updated them. Still, the fact remains that the websites were designed in the spirit of delivering information and not to be interactive platforms capable of providing dynamic exchanges between citizens in Niger.

As will be seen below, the use of social media by political organizations and political leaders is also conceived in the spirit of delivering information in a top-down approach. The social media seen as networks, like Facebook, do share many similarities with traditional Nigerian sociability and political support groups and seem to play, where they do not offer anonymity, the same role as those traditional social networks with little opportunity for political participation.

Social Media and Democratic Participation: Political Laudation and Flaming In Niger, political allegiances have traditionally been experienced as personal relationships of dependence. Political activists and party members are clients and the dependent relationship is maintained through all sorts of gifts and services (See Charlick, Gellar, West, Fox, and Robinson, 1994). These gifts and services in turn suppose moral obligations on the part of beneficiaries. To earn the trust of others and gain their allegiance, the political leader must pay with their person through symbolic and material investments from which benefits are expected in the form of party membership and vote casting. It is the leaders generosity, selflessness, caring, and attention paid to others that ensure them political militants who are not really political activists in the traditional sense of the term, but more precisely are followers. As stated by Charlick et al. (1994):

[In Niger] strategies for mobilizing support historically depended on two interrelated processes: the recognition of personal distinction and the development of loyal followers. By and large, the right to exercise authority and to hold a position of power always involved a competition (the search for title, or neman sarauta in Hausa). But, while such resources as social status and specific lineage were important, the decisive factor was usually the ability to mobilize people. Campaigning for office meant building networks of supporters based on promises of personal reward. Loyalty of followers depended to a large degree on instrumental factors, such as the perception that the leader could deliver the promised reward and protection. Maintenance of this network depended on the leader's


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ability to control access to benefits which potential followers wanted, and to make certain that these followers could not obtain them at a lower cost elsewhere. (p. 17)

Thus, traditionally, political representativeness, including that of one a leader, was much more an affective representativeness in the sense that one says of someone one trusts that he/she is one of ours (i.e., a member of our family). Also, organizational forms of political support were based on affective ties of the family, the clan, the lineage, and the tribe, as well as micro-level social networks, such as the fadas, the equivalent of which in the Western world were at one time royal courts and courtiers. The fadas were places of sociability, a kind of debate community, and places for political discussions.

Virtual social networks, such as Facebook, are strangely similar to the fadas that existed both as loose political support networks at royal courts and sociability networks, such as ones network of friends or networks of traditional hira groups (debate communities) that gather groups of peers for chat purposes. Fadas are still a phenomenon that is alive and well and widespread in contemporary Niger.

Another similarity between Facebook and traditional Nigerien fadas is how Nigerien political leaders conceived of the use of social networks. Facebook is used as a kind of allegiance affirmation network built around the personality of the political leader where what is discussed (actually, I should say what is lauded) is not so much either political ideas or a program but rather the deeds and the personality of the political leader. As stated above, the search for personal distinction and the gathering of loyal followers is the driving force of political activities in Niger. It is, therefore, not surprising that the most important political leaders are indeed asserting their presence on the Internet through the creation of their own Facebook pages (Figure 5). Such is the case for Mahamadou Issoufou (middle), leader of the PNDS-Tarrraya; Hama Amadou (left), leader of the MODEN-Lumana; and Mahamane Ousmane (right), leader of the CDS-Rahama. It should be noted as well that all three Facebook groups have been set to open, meaning that anyone can join any of them and the groups posting content is available for viewing to anyone with a Facebook account worldwide.

Figure 5: Niger Political leaders Facebook pages

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Source: http://www.facebook.com/MahamadouIssoufouPNDS, (left) http://www.facebook.com/pages/Hama-Amadou/181880503136 (middle) http://www.facebook.com/pages/Mahamane-Ousmane/108160212539356 (right)

However, in all the three cases, the supporters and posters are mostly the members of the respective political parties, also essentially characterized by the absence of any significant political or ideological disagreement. While online social networks are supposed to serve as locations for online political discussions (Kushin, 2009, p. 2), it appears that the Nigerien political leaders Facebook pages have been set up in the top-down spirit to provide endless illustrations of the leaders deeds and sayings.

Table 4 Example comments from Mahamadou Issoufous Facebook page.

Person (Date/Time) Comment

Harouna Hassaou

(February 1, 2012, 2:29 a.m.)

Its a good thing. Continue like that Mister President!

Abdou sani Ibrahim

(February 1, 2012, 2:48 a.m.)

Thank you Mister President! Courage!

Tunde Onibode

(February 1, 2012, 3:48 a.m.)

Wish you all the best Mr. President! Improve on trans-border security.

Moussa Mouskorita, Le Saoudien (February 1, 2012, 3:02 a.m.)

Only one word. Congratulations!

Source: http://www.facebook.com/MahamadouIssoufouPNDS.

A recent post on Mahamadou Issoufous Facebook page reads: The 2011 report on freedom of press put Niger ahead of France and the United States. The like, comment, share section shows 106 people liked this, 51 commented on the post, and 7 shared it. However, of the 51 comments, not even one was negative or discussed any aspect of the post through March 5, 2012. Some of the representative comments are in Table 4. These were accessed on 5 March 2012 from Mahamadou Issoufous Facebook page.

Table 5. Example comments



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Fernado Sucres

(23 September 2011, 18:54)

Today, in Niger, Hama is the only person one can wish see become president.

Illias Aboubacar

(11 October 2011, 15:55)

Hello Mr chairman! My wish is that you help Niger out this famine crisis and also help the president of the Republic in his difficult task. Thank you for your understanding.

Bouffari Mamane

(15 October 2011, 21:17)

Excellency, may God accompany you in all your endeavours!

Nassirou Toure

(19 October 2011, 10:29)

Hama I hope you will be president in 2016.

Ibrahim Oumarou

(20 October 2011, 14:51)

Good luck your Excellency.

Source: http://www.facebook.com/pages/Hama-Amadou/181880503136

Table 6. Example comments on Hama Hamadous Facebook page


Bana Wally

(February 5, 2012, 5:53a.m.).

Dont forget that he is also a billionaire!

Abdou Issoufou

(November 14, 2011, 3:03 p.m.).

He is also the meanest man on the political arena in Niger.

Abdou Issoufou

(November 14, 2011, 3:04 p.m.).

Ethnocentrist and regionalist!

Source: http://www.facebook.com/pages/Hama-Amadou/181880503136

Almost identical attitudes and comments can be found on Hama Hamadous Facebook page. This page displays 1,927 likes and 189 comments and those comments are similar to the ones found on the PNDS Mahamadou Issoufou Facebook page. One could easily simply interchange the photographs of the two leaders and leave the comments on each page, and nobody would notice any difference. The similarity between the two

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pages and the respective comments on each one is close to perfect. Here are a few of the first comments on Hama Hamadous page. They can easily be applied to Mahamadou Issoufou or any one of the Nigerien political leaders Facebook as can be seen in Table 6. These were accessed from Hama Hamadous Facebook page on 5 March 2012, which is accessible from this link:

These straightforward laudations may seem childish and even ridiculous to the external observer. However, they are part of the everyday life of the Niger people. Laudation is a deeply rooted literary tradition among all of Nigers ethnic groups, especially among the Hausa people. All traditional chiefs and prominent persons have always had praise singers, griots (story tellers and keepers of oral tradition), and oral poets attached to their courts or their persons. As stated by Saidu (1994), in todays modern world, it is the electronic media that are giving a new dimension to praises and praise songs in all of the Hausa cultural areas in Niger as well as in Nigeria:

Such artists, thanks to the electronic media, have become very popular and have acquired new patrons who, in their lust for power and fame, pay them handsomely to sing their praises. Politicians.military generalscivilian governors. businessmen all had or have praise-songs sung in their honor. (p. 226)

All Nigerien political leaders also have praise singers attached to their persons and nicknames to reflect the qualities their followers see in them. For example, Mahamadou Issoufou, the leader of the PNDS-Tarraya and incumbent president of the country, is known as Zaki in Niger, which means the lion and one of the most famous praise songs in Niger is sung in his honour at the opening ceremonies of every one of the meetings of the party, during electoral campaigns, and when he appears in public. It is a song that accompanies him wherever he goes, and it is sung loudly over speakers to announce the procession of cars that go with him. Mahamane Ousmane, the leader of the CDS-Rahama, is nicknamed Nafarko, meaning the First because he was the first democratically elected president of Niger. Hama Hamadou is known as the enfant terrible of Youri, his native village, for his supposed temerity, political talents, and unconventional behaviour. The laudatory comments on Facebook about these political leaders reflect this mind-set of praise singing because that is the way that allegiance to the party and its leader is reaffirmed by the members of that organization.

Indeed, the function these political leaders have assigned to their Facebook pages (the object of judgment is the person of the leader, not his political program or ideas), the direction of the information, as well as the composition of the body of supporters and posters (mostly members of the


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corresponding party and like-minded participants) all work to inhibit the expression of diverse viewpoints. Of the 189 comments on Hama Hamadous Facebook page, the author only could find four negative comments with two of them coming from the same person. Comments from Hama Hamadous Facebook page can be seen in Table 3, which was retrieved on 5 March 5 2012)

These negative comments did not provoke any reaction from any one of the other Facebook posters. Disagreeing viewpoints are ignored, not discussed. Indeed, the very nature of Facebook as a social network seems perverted because there seems to exist no connection between the individual posters who almost never address each other.

This absence of democratic discussion on the Niger political leaders Facebook pages can be partially explained by the fact that Niger has a long history of dictatorship and political abuses. Since Facebook does not allow anonymity, those who post are known by their names and profiles. That situation does not allow for disagreeing viewpoints in a political environment such as Nigers. It will more likely lead to laudation in an effort to show allegiance and even submission.

This characteristic appears clearly when one compares political debates such as those carried out on Facebook to political debates carried out on online forums where discussions are more vigorous and flaming or bashing is a frequent and common attitude because users are protected by anonymity; it shows the control that the Internet offers to modulate information (Shapiro, 1999). It also shows that the Internets decentralized character is less or more effective depending on the socio-political context and the nature of the specific media used. Both historical context and the offline environment also play an important role in the direction and the character of the discussions again based on the kind of media used. An analysis of the Tamtaminfo.com forum compared to Facebook illustrates this aspect clearly.

Online forums and democratic participation in Niger The Tamtaminfo forum comprises several links to topics of discussion such as news of the diaspora, politics, economy, society, culture and arts, religions, sports, and sciences and technologies, among others. Of all those items, the most active and the most visited is the politics, economy, and society link. By March 6, 2012, the politics, economy, and society link registered 3,720 related messages. Compared to it, the second most visited link was news of the diaspora, with35 messages! None of the other topics had more than 20 messages. The 3,720 figure alone, compared

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to the insignificant number of messages for other topics, indicates the importance of political debate among Tamtaminfo.coms visitors.

The politics, economy, and society topic has had 468 different political sub-topics discussed since the creation of its latest version in 2007 (several other versions of the forum existed between 2000 and 2007), extending to more than 18 pages. The most debated issue, Libya and us, has 133 related messages and was viewed 13,308 times between February 28, 2011, and November 6, 2011, which roughly corresponds to 54 daily views.

The second most debated issue was the Tazarce questioned. Tazarce means continuity in the Hausa language, and the topic relates to the refusal by the then incumbent president, Tandja Mamadou, to leave office at the end of his second term as dictated by the Constitution. He intended to suspend that Constitution to create a new one more in line with his aspirations and to organize new elections that would permit him to continue occupying his office. Between May 15, 2009, and June 20, 2009, the Tazarce questioned issue registered 115 messages and was viewed 2,512 times. An example of the exchanges that shows how conflictual the discussions on Tamtaminfo.com were, as opposed to those on Facebook, is the following text, concerning the first issue, Libya and us:

Termit: Libya is going through a refreshing revolution these days, after those of Tunisia and Egypt. We Nigeriens, we can only rejoice in the downfall of the dictator Gaddafi who has been in power for 41 years. Gaddafi and his gang have always had contempt for Niger. (Termit, February 28. 2011, 3:32 p.m.).

Soufiani: Gaddafis regime is not that of Tandja that a small group of soldiers overthrew and captured like a common thug rat he is and in fifteen minutes. The war in Libya will take a long time. The time necessary to see if Issoufou, once elected, will in turn perpetuate the same policy of marginalization and segregation that dares not speak its name; marginalization and segregation this country has always shown towards certain ethnic groups such as the


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Tuaregs and the Tubus. Be reassured for the moment because we do not intend to walk on Niamey before we see the true intentions of Zaki (Issoufou) and his team (not to say his pack, hoping that he will be wise). (Soufiani, March 2, 2011, 1:03 p.m.).

The above was retrieved on 20 March 2012 from Tamtaminfo.coms forum, http://www.tamtaminfo.com/tamforum/viewtopic.php?f=4&t=1192

If we compare these disagreeing positions on Tamtaminfo.com, where postings are anonymous, to positions taken by participants on Facebook, where identities can be traced, it appears that the offline social and political environment in Niger that, although now democratic, has been historically characterized by dictatorship plays an important role in the capacity of discussants to openly assert their political opinions. The political affiliations of the main participants on Tamtamoinfo.com are claimed by themselves. Their disagreements are voiced in all manners possible, while on Facebook the posters are cautious not to appear as a dissenting voice inside the party or to appear as an outsider trying to create trouble.

The main debaters on Tamtainfo.com include, for example, Termit, a militant of the PNDS Tarraya who frequently takes Islamist positions. Another is Sammy, a staunch militant of the MNSD, who vigorously opposes the current government of the PNDS on all issues. His main respondent is Soufiani, a Tuareg militant and supporter of Gaddafi and the Turaeg rebellious movements, or Le Hableur, an intellectual and a member of the ruling apparatus of the PNDS and the government. Another is Dodo, an independent intellectual and member of the diaspora who criticizes African politicians of all stripes. Flaming and insults, although prohibited, are very common on Tamtaminfo.com. So are discussions that relate to ethnicity, a subject that is almost never publicly discussed in Niger.

Indeed, ethnicity in Niger is a very sensitive issue. Article 13 of the Code of Conduct for political parties and independent candidates in an election period (Cabinet du Premier Ministre, 2011) makes it an obligation for political parties and citizens to avoid any campaigning that may have a regionalist, ethnic, racial, gendered, or religious character. For its part, the Nigerien Constitution prohibits the politicization of ethnic identities in the country for reasons of national cohesion and fights against all forms of incitement of ethnic hatred.

Many participants on the online forums while never addressed on the political websites or the Facebook pages nevertheless openly discuss

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ethnicity. While ethnicity in Niger is a political taboo as far as the public sphere is concerned, ethnicity-related topics and statements are nevertheless one of the main aspects of Nigerien online forums. Still, there is a difference in that respect between Tamtaminfo.com where participants are regularly suspended for having evoked ethnicity-related topics and Agadez-Niger.com where almost all discussions focus on ethnicity, which also one of the main reasons for the creation of that website. Agadez-Niger.com is a Tuareg-leaning forum where ethnic issues in Niger are openly debated and where Tuareg aspirations for autonomy and independence are constantly voiced.

For example, by March 8, 2012, the political section of the Agadez-Niger.com forum titled Politics and Economy in Niger, counted 1,943 subjects that were discussed by participants and a total of 15,130 messages since the first was posted on October 4, 2008. The most debated topic, titled Niger: Offensive against the Tuaregs, registered 163 messages since the first message was posted on April 1, 2008. As of March 9, 2012, the last message was posted on April 24, 2008. These discussions were engaged when the following information was posted by Baddak, an anonymous participant to the forum: The Nigerien army said last night it led a major offensive against the bases of Tuareg rebels in the heart of the vast northern Niger desert, for ten days during which five soldiers and ten rebels were killed. Then 28 persons took part in the discussion and posted various numbers of messages. Of the 28 participants, 18 were located outside of Niger in countries such as France (5), Mali (1), Burkina Faso (1), Chad (1), Netherlands (1), Morocco (1), Spain (1), Oman (1), and Nigeria (1). Of these, 5 participants indicated they were outside of Niger without giving the specific location, and 6 participants indicated no location at all. Only 4 participants were living in Niger, Niamey (3), and Agadez (1). Therefore, most participants were located outside Niger, which suggests important implications when it comes to the nature of the discussion and the number of disagreeing positions. Thus, unlike the Facebook pages, clear-cut positions here could be identified on Agadez-Niger.com on this issue as well as on all others. For example, on this topic, the positions taken by the 28 participants can be divided in 3 categories for more clarity: (a) against the government and favourable to the MNJ; (b) against the MNJ and favourable to the government; and (c) neutral or no specified position.

In respect of the data in Table 7, a total of 14 participants could be clearly identified as taking political positions against the government and favourable to the MNJ; 9 participants stood against the MNJ and were favourable to the government, and 5 participants manifested neutral positions.


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Table 7. Example comments from Agadez-Niger.com

Person (Date/Time)

Comment

Trez 14 (1 April 2008, 16:27)

This press release of the army is ridiculousThe point is simply that the army committed the same acts of atrocity on the poor citizens of Agadez like in Gougaramto later affirm that they were complicit with the MNJ.

Oumarou (1 April 2008, 16:34)

This news sends shivers up the back. I am afraid many innocent civilians have been massacred by the army.

Tarha (1April 2008, 16:49)

If the army is able to do anything but killing civilians, it should attack the base of the MNJ. They dont need a guide for thatContrary to what is said, it is the army that uses civilians as human shields. This is really cowardly for a so-called national army.

Izerghanet (2 April 2008, 10:22)

I am shocked how Tarha speaks like a true extremist he is. I wonder what you really want in advocating these lies. You want the war between us Nigeriens in order to bring Europeans to complain about your case on a false basis. Me, I am a Tuareg and I know that nobody massacred us in Agadez. You should be ashamed because ultimately youre even not credible given the level of your relentless hatred. Stop lying about us and our country because nobody has delegated you to be our spokesman.

Balacho Bacho (3 April 2008, 12:50).

We must condemn violence wherever it comes from and especially when it is directed against civilians. In the case of what happened in Gougaram, only an independent investigation can determine accurately whether the army killed civilians or not.

Source: http://www.agadez-niger.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=2573&highlight=offensive+touaregs

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Therefore, it could be concluded that the democratic nature of the discussions on Agadez-Niger.com was the result of participants being located outside of the country and also the anonymity that such a forum provides to all participants. Because the space of confrontation was deterritorialized, the Internet thus circumvents the once-direct state regulation of telegraphs, radio, and television (Dartnell, 2006, p. 9). The states ability to exercise its control is thus reduced because of its incapability to monitor these online communities. When these conditions are not met, the political participation and democratic discussion that the social networks and political websites are said to be promoting are strongly impeded.

Discussion The advent of new information and communication technologies (especially the Internet and its associated networks) has brought about new tools for political activism and political participation. Many authors and international organizations have associated the spread of ICTs with important implications for democratic participation and political discussions.

In Africa, numerous studies have also presented ICTs as tools for enhancing democratic participation and civic engagement. Based on the features of new ICTs, as compared to previous instruments of political communication, authors have argued that the interactive and decentralized character of the Internet is a mechanism that is facilitating civic engagement.

This paper took a more cautious position and sought to show how political actors are using ICTs for political mobilization and for citizens participation in their everyday activities in Niger. It argued that the mere existence and use of websites and other digital instruments of political mobilization used by organizations and leaders do not translate into effective and democratic participation and discussion. It shows that a disproportionate place is given to the information provision function on Nigerien political websites with the direction of information and communication flow being essentially downward.

The websites as well as the Facebook pages are essentially characterized by the absence of any significant political or ideological disagreement between participants. In this context, online exchanges are characterized by laudation, a political attitude deeply rooted in Nigerien social and cultural traditions. Expressions of diverse viewpoints are thus inhibited by the traditional model of political communication in Niger, as well as because of its long history of dictatorial regimes and political abuses. However, compared to political websites and Facebook pages, online forums, which make possible anonymity for discussants, appear to be offering the


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opportunity for more open and free democratic space when it comes to those who want to voice their disagreement, political opinions, and ethnic dissidence.

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Documents

Between Flaming and Laudation: Political Websites, Social Media, and Democratic Participation in Niger