Between Compliance Strategies & Enforcement Mechanisms The Case of Paid Domestic Work in Argentina The 4 th Conference of the Regulating for Decent Work

Between Compliance Strategies & Enforcement MechanismsThe Case of Paid Domestic Work in Argentina

The 4th Conference of the Regulating for Decent Work NetworkJuly 8 - 10, 2015 International Labour Organization, Geneva

Lorena PobleteCIS-CONICET/IDES - PIIRS, Princeton University

Fung Global Fellow Program

1. Introduction Caracterization of Domestic Work in Argentina Presentation of the 2013 Law on Domestic Work

2. Challenges of implementation

Obstacles of implementation: • naturalization of informality • trivialization of non compliance • employers’ perception of their position

Innovative enforcement mechanisms:• simplification of registration procedures• incentive through tax deductions• coertion through tax collection

3. Conclusion

outline

New strategies for compliance and enforcement

Paid Domestic Work in Argentinacaracterizatio

n

7% all workers

17% working women

23% women employees

Aged: 56.6% over 40 years old

Origins: 31% internal migration / 14% international migration

Working time: 19.6% over 40 weekly hours

39.6% between16-39 weekly hours

32.4% between 6-15 weekly hours

9.3% less than 6 hours weekly hours

Employers: 70% work for 1 employer 17% work for 2 employers 13% work for more than 3


n









n

42%









n

42%

30%

2013 Law on Domestic Work

all domestic workers regardless working hours weekly rest

compensation payment in unjustified dismissals

minimum wage

overtime & annual mandatory bonus

leaves: sick leave, special leaves (marriage, death of a relative, study, maternity leave)

Labor Risks Insurance (1995)

Family Benefits: “Universal Child Allowance” (2009)

Social Security Special Regime for Domestic Workers (1999)

caracterization

all domestic workers regardless of the worked hours

weekly rest


minimum wage

overtime & mandatory bonus

leaves: sick leave, special leave (marriage, for death of a relative, study) & maternity leave




improvement on domestic

work regulation

implementation

challenge

challenges of implementation



weekly rest


minimum wage







work regulation

implementation

challenge

formalization


1st

step



weekly rest


minimum wage







work regulation

implementation

challenge

formalization


1st

step

95%


Legal framework

FORMALIZATIONlabor policy : main goal

2004

Law 25.877Labor Regime

2004

Resolution 231 of

Ministry of LaborLabor

formalization

2008

Law 26.476Declared

work protection

regime

2014

Law 26.940Promotion of enregistered

work and prevention of labor fraude


Non Compliance with the Law

formalization

acces to

labor and social rights

obstacles

Naturalization of informality

Trivialization of non compliance

Employers’ perception of their own position


Regulation Category not covered

1956Special Regime

4 hours/ 4 days for 1 employer

47.2%

1999Social Security Special Regime for DW

at least 6 weekly hours

for 1 employer

9.4%

2006Single-Tax Regime

less than 6 weekly hours

for 1 employer

0%


Legal Exclusion 1956 - 2013



Regulation Category not covered

1956Special Regime

4 hours/ 4 days for 1 employer

47.2%

1999Social Security Special Regime for DW

at least 6 weekly hours

for 1 employer

9.4%

2006Single-Tax Regime

less than 6 weekly hours

for 1 employer

0%


Legal Exclusion 1956 - 2013



95%


• tolerance of high levels of informality• Invisibility of partial or temporary informality• Involuntary informality • absence of fraud penalty

• not a real job but a “help” • “the employer is someone else”

Trivialization of non compliance

The employers’ position


New strategies for compliance and enforcement enforcement

mechanisms

INNOVATION

new combination of mechanismsalready used

SIMPLIFICATION INCENTIVES COERCION


• Modes of registration: web, free call, home banking system• Payment of employer’s contribution: home banking, on-line tax payement

Regulatory background: Single-tax Regime (1998) – self-registration

• Deduction of income tax: 30% of all mandatory contributions & salaries

Regulatory background: Tax Benefices for Domestic Services (2006)

enforcement mechanisms

SIMPLIFICATION OF REGISTRATION PROCEDURES

TAX BENEFITS INCENTIVES


• constrained registration base on ex officio determination

Determination of the debt with the social security system when:• there have been no records or if the records are deficient • the state has no the possibily to verify the declared information

Regulatory background:

Social Security Resources Law (1970 & 2006)National Tax Agency Resolution 2927/2010


COERCION: MAID’S PRESUMPTION


• Definition of Minimum Worker Indicator

Calculation of the minimum number of workers needed to performed an specific task or activity

- 2010: MWI for construction sector & textile industry- 2013: MWI for domestic work

annual incomes + property = one domestic worker

National Tax Agency Resolution 3492/2013


COERCITIVE ACTIONS: MAID’S PRESUMPTION

2003 2006 2008 2012 2013 20150%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%


mechanisms

INFORMAL DOMESTIC WORK

2003 2006 2008 2012 2013 20150%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%


mechanisms

INFORMAL DOMESTIC WORK

95%

58%

Between compliance and enforcementconclusion

formalization

acces to labor and social rights

Partial compliance with labor rights: non labor inspection

Limited acces to social rights - multi-employers workers30%

THANKS

MERCI

Documents

Between Compliance Strategies & Enforcement Mechanisms The Case of Paid Domestic Work in Argentina The 4 th Conference of the Regulating for Decent Work