BelfastHarbour Police

An Inspection of theBelfast Harbour Police

May 2008

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Belfast Harbour PoliceAn Inspection of the Belfast Harbour Police

May 2008

Presented to the Houses of Parliament by the Secretaryof State for Northern Ireland under Section 49(2) of theJustice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002.

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List of abbreviations iv

Chief Inspector’s Foreword v

Executive Summary vii

Recommendations ix

SECTION 1: Inspection Report

Chapter 1 Introduction 3

Chapter 2 Openness 5

Chapter 3 Partnership and Results 9

Chapter 4 Equality and Learning 15

SECTION 2: Appendices

Appendix 1 Methodology 21

Contents

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List of abbreviations

ACPO Association of Chief Police Officers

ANPR Automatic Number Plate Recognition

BHC Belfast Harbour Commissioners

BHP Belfast Harbour Police

BSAA Belfast Shipping Agents Association

CJI Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland

CJS Criminal Justice System

COP Chief Officer of Police

DVA Driver Vehicle Agency

HMRC Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs

HO Home Office

HR Human Resources

IRIMS BHP Incident Recording and Management System

ISPS International Ship and Port Facility Security Code

MCA Maritime Coastguard Agency

NIM National Intelligence Model

OPONI Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland

PPS Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland

PSNI Police Service of Northern Ireland

TQ Titanic Quarter

TRANSEC Transport Security and Contingencies Directorate

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Belfast Harbour Police (BHP) is a small organisation delivering a policing service in aspecialised environment that geographically represents around 20% of the area of the cityof Belfast. The force has been undergoing substantial change following an internal reviewand this was an opportune time to look at the organisation to consider its future plans todeliver policing services in the harbour estate and to see whether it was achieving itsobjectives.

The Inspection looked at BHP using the five main elements of our common core; Openness,Partnership, Equality, Learning and Results, along with key activities such as tackling crime,roads policing, port security, and other areas.

The appointment of a permanent chief officer in April 2007 to implement the agreed modelof policing and security for the harbour estate has been a positive development. Permanentstaff numbers had increased in line with the adopted model of policing for the estate andInspectors found that the change process had been positively managed and that the focuswas beginning to move to a review of processes and structures.

Partnerships were being re-forged following a period of inactivity due mainly to lownumbers of staff. However, the critical partner for BHP is the Police Service of NorthernIreland (PSNI) and work should continue to develop and agree a wide ranging protocolwith them to further develop that particular partnership.

The force was developing its use of technology to enable it to deliver policing and securityin the most effective way and had aspirations to move to a more customer focused servicedelivery model of policing.

Inspectors will re-visit BHP a year following publication of this report to assess progressagainst recommendations.

This inspection was led for CJI by Bill Priestley. I would like on his behalf to thank all thosewhom he contacted in the course of the work, and in particular the staff and managers ofBHP and the Belfast Harbour Commissioners, who gave Inspectors every assistance.

Kit ChiversChief Inspector of Criminal Justice in Northern IrelandMay 2008

Chief Inspector’s Foreword

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Executive Summary

This inspection looked at the operation of the Belfast Harbour Police (BHP) assessing theservice using the five main headings of Criminal Justice Inspection’s core matrix: Openness,Partnership, Equality, Learning and Results, but also incorporating aspects such as tacklingcrime, roads policing, critical incidents, port security, and opportunities for entrepreneurialactivities. There had been an internal fundamental review of policing in the harbour estatewhich had reported to Belfast Harbour Commissioners (BHC) in 2006. There followed adecision to implement a recommendation that retained and further developed BHPresulting in a major change programme and the appointment of a new, permanent ChiefOfficer in April 2007.

Inspectors found that BHP was still undergoing major change at the time of the inspectionfieldwork. Leaders had addressed staffing issues in line with BHC’s decision to develop theexisting police service. The type of skills required to take BHP forward had been identifiedand staff had been recruited on the basis of those skills. Leaders had begun to move on toidentifying areas for change in processes and structures. BHP had aspirations to form awider stakeholder’s forum in line with its desire to develop a more community orientedstyle of policing for the harbour estate.

Incident and crime recording had previously not been as robust as it could have been.Inspectors found that BHP had identified this as an area for improvement and had investedin improving their incident recording and management system (IRIMS) as well as deliveringtraining on the subject to officers. Implementing national incident recording and crimeclearing standards would enable BHP to report accurately on their performance and to settargets for further development.

Inspectors found that some partnerships such as those with The Odyssey and TitanicQuarter (TQ) had developed well and that operational relationships with their criticalpartner, the PSNI, were very good. Work had been continuing on a draft protocol with thePSNI and Inspectors recommend that this should be agreed and ratified at ACPO levelwithin six months of publication of this report. The protocol should cover issues such asinformation and intelligence sharing, handling of incidents on the harbour estate by PSNIofficers, communication systems, and access to legal updates.

Communication between operational officers of BHP and the PSNI could be betterespecially when undertaking joint operations. BHP officers rely on the use of mobiletelephones for direct contact with the PSNI as radio systems are not compatible.

Relationships with other stakeholders were beginning to be revived after a period ofinactivity due mainly to low numbers of BHP staff. Inspectors found that BHP wererepresented on multi-agency groups such as those established through Belfast Resilience.Critical incident handling and contingency planning had been dealt with by these groups.Further and on-going commitment is necessary to ensure that plans remain effectiveand current.

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Inspectors found that BHP had identified areas where technology could be used to enhancetheir crime prevention and detection activities. Automatic number plate recognition(ANPR) was being used as well as an extensive closed circuit television (CCTV) system.Updating the ANPR system relied on information being transferred manually and althoughwork had begun on exploring how this could be done better it was at a very early stage.

Changes in PSNI structures had meant that BHP officers had occasionally to requestassistance when escorting detainees to custody suites situated outside the one mile zonearound the harbour estate. Legislation restricting BHP officers to using their powers withina one mile zone around the estate had been framed many years before the requirement tolodge detainees only at designated custody suites. Inspectors recommend that legislation isbrought forward which enables BHP officers to use their powers outside the one mile zonein certain circumstances.

The very recent increase in permanent staff had been handled well and communicationduring the period of change had been good. Inspectors recommend that the internalcommunication framework established during the recruitment process is further developedto establish officers’ continuing needs and to keep them updated on issues such aslegislation, policy, and performance.

Recommendations

• Inspectors recommend that within a year BHP widens its existingstakeholder’s forum established with the BSAA to include other keystakeholders to improve openness and accountability (paragraph 2.8).

• Inspectors recommend that to improve openness BHP should report itsactivities in an annual report that should be published on the BHC websiteand distributed to all of its key stakeholders (paragraph 2.10).

• To improve internal communication and to provide reassurance, Inspectorsrecommend that the practice of regular dialogue with staff implementedduring the recruitment process should be continued and further developed(paragraph 2.12).

• Inspectors recommend that BHP continues its work to develop a protocolwith the PSNI. The protocol should be finalised and agreed at ACPO levelwithin six months of publication of this report (paragraph 3.2).

• Inspectors recommend that establishing effective communications betweenBHP and the PSNI should be pursued as part of an agreed protocol(paragraph 3.3).

• Inspectors recommend that a scoping study as to how to further developthe use of ANPR on the harbour estate is carried out and that sharing ofinformation and intelligence should form part of any protocol between BHPand partner agencies (paragraph 3.7).

• Inspectors recommend that BHP continues to work closely with its partnersto enable it to move to a community policing model of delivery (paragraph3.11).

• Inspectors recommend that BHP continues to work towards implementingstandardised incident reporting and crime recording processes to enable it todeliver effective policing services based on analysis of accurate data(paragraph 3.16).

• Inspectors recommend that during the forthcoming year data collected usingIRIMS is monitored and analysed and from that data targets are set to enableBHP to actively evaluate its performance (paragraph 3.17).

• Inspectors recommend that the processes for development and promotionare clearly articulated to officers during any training and induction and thatthe information should be published on the BHP intranet (paragraph 4.5).

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• Inspectors recommend that BHP surveys its officers to identify areas ofuncertainty in their knowledge of legislation. Results of the survey shouldform the basis for provision of legal guidance notes which should be madeavailable to every BHP officer (paragraph 4.9).

• Inspectors recommend that a formal development programme for officersshould be designed and implemented to ensure that officers remain effectivein the discharge of their duties (paragraph 4.10).

• Inspectors recommend that legislation is brought forward that enables BHPto operate with full constabulary powers, in certain circumstances, outside thecurrent geographical area (paragraph 4.12).

Inspection Report

Section 1

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Introduction

CHAPTER 1:

1.1 Belfast Harbour Police (BHP) is one ofonly nine Home Office (HO) approvedindependent police forces in theUnited Kingdom and has fullconstabulary powers supplemented bypowers granted under the HarbourCommissioners by-laws. In 1847BHP was established following theenactment of the Harbours, Docks andPiers Clauses Act 1847, making it oneof the oldest organised police forces inthe UK and Ireland. Funding comesdirectly from the Belfast HarbourCommissioners (BHC) and in the lastfinancial year was set at £1.3m net ofrevenue received from the currentpolicing contract with the GeorgeBest Belfast City Airport. The areapoliced by BHP amounts toapproximately 20% of the area ofBelfast with a population at any onetime of around 17,000 and a dailyfootfall of about 25,000.

1.2 BHP operates from purpose builtfacilities in the Port Operations Centreat Milewater Basin. The OperationsRoom is equipped with a closed circuittelevision (CCTV) system giving BHPthe capability to monitor and recordimages from strategically positionedcameras throughout the estateincluding all entrances to and exitsfrom the estate. BHP has plans to

expand and update the police facilitieson this existing site.

1.3 The unit consisted of uniformed policeofficers and a small investigative (CID)section providing 24-hour cover,responding to incidents and requestsfor assistance across the 2000 acrearea of the Harbour Estate. BHP’sstated aim is to provide an effectiveand efficient policing service for theBelfast Harbour Estate and Portcommunity. The total number of staffemployed by BHP is 40 includingsupport staff.

1.4 BHP stated that it adopts a HumanRights based approach to policing.All BHP Officers had received trainingin the fundamental principles andstandards of Human Rights and hadbeen issued with personal aide-memoire of the Human Rights Act1998 highlighting the Articles of theEuropean Convention on HumanRights and considerations relevant totheir application.

1.5 The biggest impact on BHP in recentyears had been the implementationof the International Ship and PortFacility Security Code (ISPS)1 and theinvestment in security required tocomply with it and with the Transport

1 A comprehensive set of measures to enhance the security of ships and port facilities developed in response to the perceived threats toships and port facilities following the attacks in the United States in 2001.

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Security and ContingenciesDirectorate (TRANSEC). Security islikely to become even more of anissue in the future with the passagethrough the European Parliament ofnew regulations on port security.

1.6 A review of the policing arrangementsfor the Belfast Harbour Estate hadbeen completed and agreed by BHCin December 2006. Followingconsideration of this strategic review,the BHC Board decided to retain apolice force for the Belfast HarbourEstate and “enhance it to a service ofexcellence”. The added value identifiedby retaining and strengthening theexisting police service was that:• there would be better policing

services on BHC land; and• there would also be better

commercial outcomes in the formof stakeholder satisfaction.

1.7 CJI in consultation with BHP agreed toconduct a baseline inspection of theforce based on the five main criteria ofthe ‘Common Core Matrix’:• Openness;• Partnership;• Equality;• Learning; and• Results.

Baseline assessment represents ameasure against which the service’sfuture performance would be gauged.It was agreed that application of thefive main criteria of the common corewould be assessed across the followingareas of operation:• managing and planning in respect of

critical incidents;• tackling criminality through

prosecution;• crime prevention;

• management of port traffic, security,and roads;

• compliance with regulatoryrequirements;and

• maximising entrepreneurialopportunities.

1.8 Prior to the inspection fieldworktaking place BHP completed a self-assessment using the common coreas the main assessment tool andmeasuring performance against thesix areas of operation outlined inparagraph 1.7. BHP identifiedstrengths and areas for developmentand incorporated prioritised areas fordevelopment within their existingrange of projects designed to furtherdevelop the service.

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Openness

CHAPTER 2:

2.1 Inspectors found that there wasstrategic commitment by BHC topolicing services for the harbour areabeing delivered by the BHP. Thatcommitment was demonstratedthrough the decision to retain andenhance the existing BHP andfurther by the appointment of a newChief Officer of Police (COP) andimplementation of a reportingstructure through the Directorof Operations, an appointed sub-committeee and the BHC board.

2.2 Governance of BHP is deliveredby a layered reporting strata:-i. Board of the Belfast Harbour

Commissioners;ii. An appointed Board Sub-

Committee – the Safety,Environmental and SecurityCommittee;

iii. BHC Director of Operations.

The BHC Board is constituted toinclude internal and externalstakeholders including members ofBelfast City Council. Members areappointed for a three year term withan option to extend for a furtherthree years. There are typically eightmeetings of the Board per annum andeach meeting receives a policing andsecurity report and may also chooseto discuss policing or securitymatters of materiality.

The Safety, Environmental andSecurity Committee receive regularreports from the COP on policing,performance and ISPS security issues.Police issues are formally monitoredmonthly by report to the Head ofOperations and then reportedthrough the governance structure tothe Board and relevant sub-committees.

2.3 BHP is funded entirely from the portauthority budget as a business. Nofunding is received by BHC directfrom the taxpayer but the authoritycould if it wished apply for grants.Management of the BHP budget isvisible only in the internalmanagement accounting system andnot in the BHC annual report. TheBHP budget is managed by the COPof BHP who reports directly to theBHC operations manager.

2.4 The overall business of BHC issubject to a range of audit activities.There has never been an audit purelyfocused on BHP though with a staffcomplement of 40 out of a total BHCstaff of 130 they featured to an extentin a recent payroll audit with noadverse comment being made.

2.5 The BHC remuneration committeeoversees any issues pertaining toBHP only if there are concerns or

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particular issues to address. Theremuneration committee consideredthe options paper presented aspart of the review of policingarrangements in the harbour estatebefore recommending to theCommissioners the currentarrangements. BHP finance mattersalso come before the remunerationcommittee and there have been norecent issues over the handling of theBHP budget.

2.6 Performance with regard to diversityis monitored and relevant statisticsare collected. A return is made tothe Equality Commission in Januaryeach year which normally comes intothe public domain by May.

2.7 Whilst BHP cannot be comparedwith the PSNI in terms of itsaccountability to all the public ofNorthern Ireland it neverthelessneeds to have robust accountabilitymechanisms to enable it to retainthe trust of its customers andstakeholders. Complaints againstmembers of the BHP are investigatedby the Office of the PoliceOmbudsman (OPONI). All officersand staff that Inspectors spoke withwere very aware of theirresponsibilities with regard tocomplaints. Only three complaintsabout BHP officers have been madeto OPONI, two of which had beeninformally resolved.

2.8 Independent governance andaccountability is achieved throughthe BHC board sub-committee.However, there are aspirations toimprove openness and accountabilityin tandem with a move to a morecommunity oriented policing style by

further developing the existing forumestablished with the Belfast ShippingAgents Association (BSAA) toinclude other key stakeholders.This approach is encouraging andInspectors recommend thatarrangements to put such amechanism in place are expedited.Some stakeholders that Inspectorsspoke with were not fully aware ofthese aspirations but indicated strongsupport for them. Inspectorsrecommend that within a yearBHP widens its existingstakeholder’s forum establishedwith the BSAA to include otherkey stakeholders to improveopenness and accountability.

2.9 The recording of much informationhad previously been done on anad-hoc basis and Inspectors foundthat the BHC board members hadpreviously had what was described as,‘an uncomfortable feeling among seniormanagers about BHP’. For example,crime figures had not beensystematically collected or analysedand had not been managed inaccordance with the National CrimeRecording Standards. Crime andincident recording had only recentlybeen addressed through theupgrading of the BHP incidentrecording and management system(IRIMS) and the roll out of trainingfor officers in its use.

2.10 Inspectors found much evidenceof work being undertaken toprofessionalise the work of the BHP.The COP had identified skillsavailable to him within his workforceand had allocated projects toindividuals based on those skills.Inspectors found that knowledge of

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these activities were well knownamongst BHP staff but thatstakeholders, in many cases werenot aware of them. A short annualreport had been produced in 2006but partly due to the lack ofsystematic recording mechanisms andprocesses it lacked detail. Followingthe full deployment of properincident and crime recording andmanagement it should be possible toreport more fully in any furtherannual reports. Inspectorsrecommend that to improveopenness BHP should report itsactivities in an annual reportthat should be published on theBHC website and distributed toall of its key stakeholders.

2.11 Inspectors found that leaders andmanagers had been open with staff.Given the context of moving awayfrom a situation of very fewpermanent staff and a lack of clarityof purpose, Inspectors found thatleaders had demonstrated awarenessof the need to reassure officers andto demonstrate support for thefuture continuance of BHP. Seniormanagement of BHC had visited thenewly recruited officers during theirtraining and this received favourablecomments from those officers.However, the existing complementof officers felt less secure andInspectors found that more workneeded to be done to providereassurance to them.

2.12 The COP had engaged staff inworkshops to communicate thevision for BHP to them and toexplain the recruitment and selectionprocedures implemented in May2007. Although staff expressed

reservations about the recruitmentprocedures they did tell Inspectorsthat in most cases they felt that theyhad been kept well informedthroughout the process. Recruitmenthad been undertaken whilst stillproviding a policing service to theharbour estate and this had resultedin longer working days and overtimefor many staff. At the time ofinspection fieldwork officers still hadbeen unable to take much of the timeoff that was owed to them but, it wasanticipated that this situation wouldease with the deployment of newlytrained officers in January 2008.To improve internalcommunication and to providereassurance, Inspectorsrecommend that the practiceof regular dialogue with staffimplemented during therecruitment process should becontinued and furtherdeveloped.

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Partnership and Results

CHAPTER 3:

3.1 The most critical partnership forBHP is with the PSNI. To ensure thatthe policing service experienced byusers of the harbour estate is of ahigh standard communicationbetween the PSNI and BHP must beclear. This partnership clearly has amajor impact on the performance ofBHP in preventing and detectingcrime.

3.2 At the time of inspection fieldworkan agreed overarching protocolbetween the PSNI and BHP did notexist. In the operational environmentofficers had found ways to deal withthe lack of protocol. For example, aproblem with logging BHP officersinto the PSNI electronic custodysystem when they presenteddetainees to custody officers hadbeen resolved informally. Work hadcommenced on a draft protocolbetween BHP and the PSNI but atthe time of inspection fieldwork thishad not been ratified. Developingand agreeing a wide ranging protocolshould be regarded as a matter ofurgency. Inspectors recommendthat BHP continues its work todevelop a protocol with thePSNI. The protocol should befinalised and agreed at ACPOlevel within six months ofpublication of this report.

3.3 Inspectors found that relationshipswith the PSNI at the operational levelwere very good and BHP officers feltthat they got good crime sceneinvestigation and other support whenrequired from the PSNI. Officers inboth services told Inspectors thatthere could be better sharing ofinformation such as easier access tocriminal record checks and thatformal communication channelsbetween the PSNI and BHP could bebetter. Previously there had beendirect radio contact between thePSNI and BHP operations centre butInspectors found that this was nolonger the case. There was also noeffective radio contact betweenofficers of both organisations forspecific joint PSNI/BHP operationssuch as the Hallowe’en fireworksdisplay. Establishing effectivecommunications between the twoorganisations could be pursued underan agreed protocol as recommendedin paragraph 3.2. Inspectorsrecommend that establishingeffective communicationsbetween BHP and the PSNIshould be pursued as part of anagreed protocol.

3.4 In the past BHP received a regularcrime bulletin from the PSNIregarding crime relevant to BHPoperations. This had been supplied to

BHP in hard copy. However, since thePSNI had moved to an electronicversion of the crime bulletin, BHP nolonger received a copy. There was nosecure e-mail link between the BHPand PSNI to enable transmission ofthis valuable information and whilstofficers had used their own initiativeto obtain crime information therewas no longer a formal process forinformation sharing. Intelligence andinformation had previously beenhandled through a personal link withthe PSNI but since the advent ofelectronic briefings, this had stopped.Inspectors found that information andintelligence sharing had recently beenrevived by the attendance of a BHPSergeant at PSNI tasking andcoordinating meetings as part of theNational Intelligence Model (NIM)process. Inspectors found that thesystem was still being refined as notall BHP staff were fully aware ofhow intelligence and informationshould be managed. The furtherdevelopment of IRIMS should help toresolve these matters early in 2008.

3.5 Criminals do not recogniseboundaries, whether country bordersor police division boundaries.It is essential that police officers inthe harbour estate have access torelevant information on crime toensure that the boundary doesnot become a barrier to effectiveprevention and detection of crime.Matters of intelligence andinformation sharing could be dealtwith in a detailed protocol such asthat envisaged in paragraph 3.2.

3.6 Whilst BHP deliver policing to theharbour estate the PSNI deal withany serious incidents that may occur,

for example, murder, terrorism or amajor armed robbery. However,Inspectors found that there were nodefinitive criteria to enable BHPofficers to identify when the PSNIshould be involved. This had notcaused any major problems as officershad in the past used their ownjudgement, supervisory advice, andpersonal contacts with the PSNI toresolve any issues. However, suchcriteria should be included in anyprotocol as envisaged in paragraph3.2. On an informal level Inspectorsfound that officers from the BHP andPSNI had worked well together indealing with recent high value carcrime committed on the harbourestate.

3.7 BHP had automatic number platerecognition (ANPR) deployed withinthe harbour estate. This systemprovided BHP with goodopportunities for the detection andprevention of crime. However,updating of the system relied oninformation being transferredmanually onto it and upon relevantinformation being forwarded regularlyfrom the PSNI to BHP. There was nosystem of automatic updating of theBHP ANPR system with relevantinformation from the PSNI.Inspectors were told that this may bepossible but that it would require adetailed information sharing protocoland some software development.Systems linking ANPR withinformation available from theDriver Vehicle Agency had alsoyet to be developed. Inspectorsrecommend that a scoping studyas to how to further develop theuse of ANPR on the harbourestate is carried out and that

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sharing of information andintelligence should form part ofany protocol between BHP andpartner agencies.

3.8 BHP and the PSNI had worked wellin partnership with management ofThe Odyssey to provide anappropriate policing service at events.The Odyssey is within the boundariesof the harbour estate and thesurrounding roads are not publicroads. BHP therefore has greaterpower as to their regulation than thePSNI would have. Generally thearrangement for events involves theBHP delivering the roads policingfunction whilst the PSNI deals withany public order situations. Bothpolice services are represented atregular Odyssey traffic and securityforums and communication betweenThe Odyssey and BHP is good. Onoccasion BHP officers have usedpowers under harbour estate by-lawsto prevent and deter the sale ofillegal merchandise around theOdyssey.

3.9 Inspectors found that work wascontinuing to develop furtherpartnerships along the lines of thatalready established with the GeorgeBest Belfast City Airport. Thedevelopment of the Titanic Quarter(TQ) represents a major opportunityfor BHP in terms of delivering someaspects of policing. To do so willrequire close partnership with thePSNI and with the TQ development.Work had already begun inestablishing partnerships with bothorganisations and BHP hadrecognised at an early stage that withits access to high quality CCTVsystems and the possibility of

delivering a police monitored alarmservice, there were entrepreneurialopportunities for them. Draftprotocols had been developed atthe time of inspection though thesehad not as yet been widely shared.

3.10 New technology and smarterperimeter security were all beingdeveloped with BHP as the operatorand this should mean that theharbour estate is well positionedto meet any additional futureinternational security demands.Inspectors found that the skillsidentified as required by BHP duringthe recruitment process had beenlinked with future plans such that theservice had recruited some officerswith existing crime prevention skillsand qualifications.

3.11 Other relationships, especially thosewith tenants of the harbour estateneeded to be rebuilt. There had beenan erosion of those relationships inthe past due to a combination of lackof continuity of BHP staff and lowstaff numbers. BHP had aspirations todevelop a community style policingservice for the estate. This willrequire strong partnerships to bebuilt. Work had begun on developingsome of these relationships and asystem of monthly multi-agencymeetings had been agreed with HerMajesty’s Revenue and Customs(HMRC), the Driver Vehicle Agency(DVA), and PSNI Roads Policing. Theaspiration to move to a communitypolice based model of policing forthe harbour estate had wide supportwithin the tenants and stakeholdersspoken to by Inspectors. Inspectorsrecommend that BHP continuesto work closely with its partners

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to enable it to move to acommunity policing model ofdelivery.

3.12 BHP dealt with a relatively smallnumber of prosecutions. Indicationsfor the year 2007-08 were thataround 60 prosecution cases wouldbe opened. Files were dealt with inhard copy format only. Inspectorsfound there was an informal thougheffective communication processbetween the Public ProsecutionService (PPS) and BHP. Case filesgenerally had been delivered byhand to the PPS and these had beenrecorded and processed by themin the normal manner. Inspectorsfound that feedback on the qualityof BHP files was very good andthat communication between theorganisations on file quality and itsfurther development, althoughinformal had been effective.Inspectors found examples whereerrors had been made in some filesbut following communication thesame issue had not arisen again.

3.13 BHP dealt with incidents on thelandward side of the harbour estatebut those on the seaward side hadbeen dealt with by the MaritimeCoastguard Agency (MCA).The Harbourmasters Office hadmaintained a good relationshipwith BHP and had reported issuesdirectly to them regardinginvestigation of crime and ship issuesunder the Railway Act. BHP had beenalerted in the past to meet shipswhen they docked to deal withrowdy or fighting football fans.

3.14 There had been work on contingencyplanning that involved partneragencies through Belfast Resilience.There were 12 working groups in allincluding the Risk AssessmentWorking Group and ReceptionCentresWorking Group which BHChad direct inputs into. The BelfastHarbourWorking Group is a multi-agency group created to formulateplans and emergency procedures todeal with critical incidents in theharbour estate area. There had beenjoint exercises and implementation ofaction plans arising. Continued effortand commitment from all participantsof Belfast Resilience is needed toensure that emergency and criticalincident planning remains high on theagenda, plans are properly exercisedby the involvement of all relevantagencies, and they remain current andeffective.

3.15 Because of previous methods of datacollection and incident recording,accurate figures for the amount ofcrime committed and detected in theharbour estate were not available.Statistics reported in the BHP annualreport of 2006 showed that therehad been 134 recorded crimes ofwhich 18% had been shown ascleared, but national recording,handling and clearance guidelines hadnot been applied. The PPS indicatedthat they had in the past received onaverage around 30 prosecution files ayear from BHP.

3.16 Crime recorded by BHP is forwardedto be placed on the PSNI Commandand Control system. BHP hadinteracted with three PSNI districts,

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North, East and South Belfast. Thiswill change to just one district andalong with the development of IRIMSshould enable easier and better crimemanagement. Stakeholders toldInspectors that they suspected thatsome crime was going unreportedbut the extent of this was unclear.BHP need to establish a baseline ofreported incidents and recordedcrime in their area during theforthcoming year using nationalguidelines on incident handling, crimerecording and clearing. Inspectorsfound that work had already begun toaddress these issues. Inspectorsrecommend that BHP continuesto work towards implementingstandardised incident reportingand crime recording processesto enable it to deliver effectivepolicing services based onanalysis of accurate data.

3.17 To move the emphasis of BHP ontoperformance, customer focus, andmeasurement of delivery requires anability to accurately record incidentsand crimes so that targets can be setand monitored based on accuratedata. That process of accurateaccounting through the furtherdevelopment of IRIMS had started atthe time of inspection but there wasinsufficient data on which to baselong term decisions. Inspectorsrecommend that during theforthcoming year data collectedusing IRIMS is monitored andanalysed and from that datatargets are set to enable BHP toactively evaluate itsperformance.

3.18 BHP provide a policing service to theGeorge Best Belfast City Airport andrevenue from this service had gonedirectly into the overall BHP budget.Charges had been billed on amonthly basis and netted back intothe BHP budget.

3.19 There had been some high valuevehicle thefts from the BHP area overthe past year. Using technologyavailable to them BHP were able todetect the crimes and make arrestsof suspected offenders working inpartnership with the PSNI. Most ofthe stolen property was recovered.This provided an example of goodresults being obtained throughmodern crime prevention anddetection methods as well as goodpartnership working. Inspectorsfound that leaders and managers inBHP had aspirations for improvingtheir performance in detecting andpreventing crime by the use of smarttechnology in the harbour estatearea.

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4.1 A resource plan had been drawn upby the COP, Head of HumanResources (HR) and the Director ofOperations. Based on this plan andwith the help of an independentpolice consultant from England acompetence-based assessmentprocess was designed to enable therecruitment of officers suited to thespecific role of policing the harbourestate at present and into the future.The approach had included an on-lineapplication facility which requiredmandatory fields including Section 75monitoring information to becompleted before applications couldbe submitted. During May 2007 1200application packs had been requestedand of those 725 people hadsubmitted applications. The processhad appeared to be fair to allapplicants and there had been nosuccessful legal challenge to theprocess on the grounds ofdiscrimination.

4.2 Inspectors found that the balanceof the BHP workforce and localcommunity statistics was goodin relation to RomanCatholic/Protestant ratios. Therecent recruitment process hadresulted in a ratio of 6 femaleConstables to 25 male Constableswhich represented a substantial

improvement on the previous ratio.At the time of Inspection fieldworkthe recruitment and selection processwas in the process of being equalityscreened and this should beconcluded and reported on duringearly 2008. All BHP staff had accessto a free Occupational Health Serviceand there was provision within thatsystem for staff to be referredonward to other specialist/expertsif required.

4.3 Salary scales for BHP were notdirectly comparable with PSNI butindicated the different range ofwork undertaken by BHP officers incomparison. Reward and recognitionhad been included as an essential partof the BHP HR strategy. Followingsuccessful completion of theirprobationary period (1 year) officers’salary is increased and thereafter it isincreased in line with performanceand cost of living.

4.4 The recruitment process had beendirectly linked with the future plansof policing for the harbour estateagreed by the BHC board inDecember 2006. The board hadidentified a policing solution as thebest way to deliver future securityand policing for the harbour.Subsequently, officers appointed had

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Equality and Learning

CHAPTER 4:

the range of skills identified as beingessential to the future of the service.Inspectors were told that any futureincrease in numbers of officers wouldbe dependant on port securityrequirements, the value case, andentrepreneurial opportunities.

4.5 Inspectors found that officersrecently recruited and those who hadbeen re-appointed were not aware ofthe existence of clear processes fordevelopment and promotion.BHP do not use the national policeassessment and examination structure(OSPRE) and in the past had used in-house promotion examinations.However, Constables were not clearwhat any current promotion processwould look like. There had been arecent selection procedure and twoofficers who had served previouslywith another police service had beenappointed as Sergeants. ExistingConstables need to be made aware ofthe promotion processes and skillscriteria so that they may takeresponsibility for their owndevelopment. Inspectorsrecommend that the processesfor development and promotionare clearly articulated to officersduring any training and inductionand that the information shouldbe published on the BHPintranet.

4.6 Newly appointed officers had beenstreamed according to previousexperience. Any officers identified as‘fast stream’ officers had attended aninduction week specifically focusedon local BHP issues and had thencommenced patrol duties. Therehad been no formal tutoring ormentoring of newly appointed officers

but Inspectors found that thosewho had not previously policed theharbour estate had generally beenpartnered with officers who had thatexperience. Even though this processhad been informal and dependant onoperational factors as to whether itwas always implemented itnevertheless received favourablecomment from officers.

4.7 Officers without previous policingexperience had been placed on atraining course which was due tocomplete at the end of 2007 thusenabling those officers to be fullydeployed from the start of January2008. The criteria for selectingofficers for the appropriate coursewas clear and had been communicatedto officers as they had gone throughthe recruitment and selectionprocess. The training programme hadbeen put in place by the COP basedon an analysis of skills requirements.The COP had involved the head ofHR for BHC with quality assurance ofthe detail of the course, accreditationarrangements, quality of trainers, andevaluation.

4.8 BHP work under existing legislationbut Inspectors found that there wereareas where some officers wereunsure of their powers. BHP had noaccess to any formal system oflegislative updates. PSNI used tosupply BHP with hard copy updatesbut since the PSNI had moved toelectronic law updates through thePoliceNet system, BHP could nolonger access those updates.Inspectors found that this gap hadbeen identified by BHP and at thetime of inspection fieldwork thatwork had started to try to address it.

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This issue could also be usefullyincluded in any protocol betweenBHP and the PSNI as envisaged inparagraph 3.2.

4.9 BHP officers may exercise their fullpowers as Constables up to a mileoutside the boundary of the harbourbut Inspectors found that the extentor circumstances in which they canuse any powers beyond that was notclear to all of them. Inspectors foundthat officers had access to somereference material, for example, theharbour by-laws and PSNI manuals.However, legislation and powers arenot always clear cut with regard toroads policing in the estate and theextension of powers of officersbeyond the harbour boundary.Inspectors found that BHP hadaccess to legal advice through BHC.Consideration should be given tosurveying officers to establish areaswhere they are less clear about theirpowers. Clear directions should thenbe formulated using existing access tothe BHC legal advisor if necessary sothat written guidance can be madeavailable to officers. These guidancenotes should be updated aslegislation changes. Inspectorsrecommend that BHP surveysits officers to identify areas ofuncertainty in their knowledgeof legislation. Results of thesurvey should form the basis forprovision of legal guidance noteswhich should be made availableto every BHP officer.

4.10 Whilst responsibility for maintainingprofessional competence andknowledge is shared betweenindividuals and their organisations, acontinuous development and training

process needs to be developed toenable officers to operate at fulleffectiveness. BHP had providedeffective structured initial training forits staff either through induction or thefull officer training programme. Intandem with the provision of legislativeguidance which would enable officersto take responsibility for their levelof knowledge a formal furtherdevelopment programme should bedesigned and implemented. This shouldinclude updates on legislation, scenepreservation, forensic awareness, andmethods of investigation/interviewing.Such a programme would not need tobe excessively time consuming orexpensive but should provide officerswith the basic updates they require toremain effective in the discharge oftheir duties. Inspectors recommendthat a formal developmentprogramme for officers shouldbe designed and implemented toensure that officers remaineffective in the discharge of theirduties.

4.11 BHP officers are armed whilst theyare on duty. In the past firearmstraining had been delivered byMinistry of Defence firearms trainers.Inspectors found that BHP had begunto make arrangements for theirtraining to be delivered by PSNIfirearms training officers atGarnerville. A risk assessmentexercise had been completed todetermine whether it remainednecessary for officers to continue tobe routinely armed whilst on dutyand there were plans for similarfuture reviews. The use of less lethaloptions, such as pepper spray, as analternative to firearms had also beeninvestigated.

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4.12 As the PSNI reorganises andcentralises its custody provision,consideration needs to be given toenacting legislation that would enableBHP to, in certain circumstances, usetheir full police powers outside ofthe one mile limit currentlymentioned in the Harbours, Docksand Piers Clauses Act 1847. Forexample, where BHP officers need totransport persons detained by themfor an offence to a PSNI custody suitemore than a mile outside the harbourestate area Inspectors found that theyhad to ask for assistance from thePSNI. BHP officers are fully attestedConstables and are trained to handledetained persons in compliance withexisting legislation. The law nolonger reflects the present situationof there being only a small number ofdesignated police stations availablefor BHP officers to convey detainedpersons to. Inspectorsrecommend that legislation isbrought forward that enablesBHP to operate with fullconstabulary powers, in certaincircumstances, outside thecurrent geographical area.

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Appendices

Section 2

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20

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This Inspection commenced in October 2007 and consisted of the following main elements:

1. Research and Organisational self-assessment

2. Stakeholder consultation

3. Fieldwork

4. Report refinement

Stakeholder consultationThe following individuals or organisations were consulted about their experiences of thework of the BHP:

• PSNI

• George Best Belfast City Airport

• The Odyssey

• PPS

• Ports Division; Department for Transport

• Belfast Harbourmasters Office

• Titanic Quarter

• Trainers delivering BHP initial training programme

FieldworkVisits to BHP and BHC took place during October and November 2007. Interviews wereconducted with staff from all levels in BHP. Interviews were conducted with:

• BHP Chief Officer;

• BHP Sergeants (x3);

• BHP Constables (x6);

• BHP trainee officers (x7)

• Administration officer;

• BHP Detective officers (x2)

• BHC Chief Executive

• BHC Operations Manager

• BHC HR Manager

• BHC Financial Director

• BHC PR and Communications Manager

Report refinementDraft reports were shared with BHP for factual accuracy checking prior to sharing thereport with interested organisations.

Appendix 1 Methodology

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