Being, Time, Bios (Capitalism and Ontology)

8/14/2019 Being, Time, Bios (Capitalism and Ontology)

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Be g, T e, B


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B i g, Tim , BiosCapitalism and Ontolo

A. K AR NA K ELA

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de a, Aglaia Kia ina, 963Being, time, bios : capitalism and ontology . iarina Kor ela.

p. m. - (S NY se ies, Insinuations: p ilosop , psyc oanal sis, lite atu e)ncludes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.SB 978 4384 4589 2 (har cover : alk. paper)Biopolitics- ilosop y. I. Ti e.

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Is the task ahead of us to advance towards a mode of thought, unknownit erto in our c lture t at will a e it possib e to r ect at the sa e

time, without discontinuity or contradiction, upon man's being andt e being of language?

-Miche Foucau t 1e O er of 1in :An Archaeolo of the Human Sciences

Unti a new and coherent onto o of potentia ity (beyo d the stepst at ave been ade in this dir ction by Spino Sc elling Nietzsc e,and Heidegger) has replaced the onto o founded on the primacy ofactuality and its relation to potentiality, a po itical t eory freed fromthe aporias of sovereignty remains unt inkable.

Giorgio Aga ben Homo Sacer: Sove ig Power and BaL

O e thi ks of the perverse arguments of the so ca ed Capita og cia s:t at w at Hege in t e process o a i g his exaustive inventoryof it, called Absolute Spirit, is now from our perspective rather to beidenti ed as Capita itself, whose study is now our true ontology. Itis indeed t e new world system the t ir stage of capit ism w ic

is for us the absent tota ity, Spinoza's God or Nature the u timate(inde d per aps t on y) r fer nt t e true ground o B ing o ourown t me. On y by way of ts t co temp at on can ts tu , andour ow be so e o disclosed.

-Fredric Jameso , 1e Geopolitical esthetic:Cnema and S ace in the Wor System


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Co te ts

Acknowled ents x

Pr ce x

RT N ST T H N M N G C NT G

Be ng and T me

Mon st Be ng and e sm

Val e Be ng S r lus

Ma er

H s or cal T me

Me a P enomenolog ca Fact

H s or ogra cal Projec

H s or cal and Trans stor ca As ec s of Be ng

r s ot e's D sco rsesO V a versusXp aT

W ence t e Need for a Me a P enomenolog cal Onto ogy?

Reca lat on n O er Words

3

9

1 3

3

43

49

55

63

3

8 9


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cknow egments

o ld l ke o ank e S a e Un vers y of Ne York Press, a es ec a y he ed or of he series nsin a ons Ph oso h sycho s s, L era re, C arles S e erdson, for t e r n aver ng tr s n a en s as c s or of my ork. am eq a y ankf o e revie ers of he resen or for engag ng i and o er ng me t o g tf l and m c a rec ated feedback.

My gra de also goes o al of my co leag es and fr ends a De ar ment of German St dies and R ss an, as el as severa colleag es

and fr ends n var o s de ar men s a Macales er Col ege, e Un ver of M nneso a, and o er n vers es and co leges bo n s co and abroad, of h ch o d e to name n ar c ar he Wri ing aSoc ety Researc Center at e Sc oo of H man t es and Lang ages,Un vers y of Wes ern Sydney, s ra a. am al he more han for t e fact t at, beyond genero sly s ort ng t e romot on of my

ork and career, et er as a sc olar or teac er or bot , many of yo

ave been an ns ra on, as ell as a so rce of comfor and leas re n my l fe. Regard ng ne or cont n ed s ort s ec ca ly d r ng years of e com os on of e resen ork, o ld ke to ex r my gra t de ar c larly o L n anonsen, Fran dler, Karyn Ba

r st d s Baltas, S ar e B are s yk, ndre Benjam n, Dav d B anErnes o Ca e o, Cesare Casar no, Dan e C o, Jason C r s enson, J in C emens, Pa a Cooey, Joan Co jec, S an ey Corngold, Er k Dav s

Sean Dem se Mladen Do ar, Ton Dor a, E s Dye, Geo Gor am,Heiko Feldner, Pe er Fenves, Mo ra Ga ens, m von Geldern, R ann Godol e , Chris ian Haines, G ta Hammarberg, Dan Hornbach,Rember H eser, Joanna nglot, Jan Jagodz nsk , Eleanor Ka fman,

nna Kornb , S e a K nkle, Joy and J m La ne, Dav d Mar yn, Tra


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x cknow edgmen s

e Ma ik, Ma he S. May, Mark Mazu o, Todd McGo an, DianeM c elfe der, J. D. M n nger, Dav d C on Moore, Jo n MowKa h yn Murray, Lara N elsen, Mo ly O sen, Kos as Pagondio is, Jason

M. Peck, Robert Pfal er, Brad Prager, ngelo Res ivo, Gerhard Rich er, Raymond Rober son, Br an Rosenberg, n hony Uhlmann, r nSaldanha, Kha do n Samman, hmed Sama ar, Jochen Sch e Sasse,Linda Sch e Sasse, Simona Sawhney, Ross Shie ds, Hoon Song, YannisS avrakakis, S zanne S ewar S e n erg, Henry S ssman, Brynnar and

is in Swenson, Temen ga Trifonova, Craig U righ , Dimi ris Vardo akis, Jo le V iel o, Pe er We sense , Carol ne W l ams, and Jack

am a so dee y han u o my s den s, as and resen , heir en h s as c s or and, above a l, for heir ins iring zea earning and ques on ng. n he con ex of h s work, my gra tude g ar ic ar y o he s uden s who ar ici a ed in my seminars GermanFrench Dia ogues Phenomeno ogy and Psychoanalysis, and Bio oli ics.

F na ly, am ankf l o Greece for av ng ns led a cer a n m al y in me ha , as come o real ze, is l ke y des ined o become ex if he wor d of sec ar ca i a is moderni y con inues in he curre d rec on. Do sub races n genera share h s or s m lar men al h s as i may, my ho gh is wi h hem. Of all my Greek friends wan o acknow edge this ime E ias Konstan o ou os for not having had an im ac , easan or n easan , on my ife and for having uniq ely s cceeded already in a very young and im ressionab e age in being r ly no hing o her han ha a friend.


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Preface

In Nutshell

e resen work is concerned wi h being in o r era of sec lar ca i al is moderni y. A rs sigh , framing being wi hin a concre e his orica con ex migh seem o con radic he f ndamen al os a e of on ol ha being is ranshis orical. B , as we sha l see in he co rse of resen work, being is bo ranshis orical and is orica , insofar as his orical is always a concre e manifes a ion of ranshis orical rela ions

j s as e ranshis orica i self is a ways a re roac ive forma ion e ec by is orica ly given e oc s. e e och of sec ar ca i alis moderni y is governed by wo remises regarding i s is orically concre e manifes a ion of being. e rs follows from he fac a he mode of ca i a is rod c ion commodi es every hing, ha is, i bes ows on any concre being a do ble on o ogical q ali y, as bo h a ma erial objec of ili and an abs rac exchange val e ha re resen s i o all o her beings

he meas re de ermining i s exc angeabili y wi h hem. is means, as ienne Ba ibar s ccinc y s i , a a commodi y . . . is ree nen ly bo h a re resen a ion and, a he same ime, an objec ; i is a objec a ways already given in he form of re resen a ion ( 007, 67)

n shor , he rs on ologica remise of o r e och is ha being doe no cons i e he d alis ic o osi e of a earance. Moreover, insofar a being is life being is in rinsic o he o i ics of o r is orical era

in ways ha are again de ermined by he mode of ca i a is rod c ione la er is based on he commodi ca ion of labor and, hence, of e iving beings ca able of labor. follows ha he second on o ogic remise of o r epoch is ha being does no cons i e e d a is o osi e of o i ics and, hence, ha on ology incl des in i self as i indis ensable branch biopoli ics.

i


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xii I Preface

Predicated on he foregoing premises, the theory developed in he p esen wo k adheres o e p enomenologica thes s at appearance i no wha concea s but what revea s eing Other di e ences no wi h

standing, his thesis de nes any phenomenologica theo f om EdmundH sser! o Jean Pau Sar e even when appearance, as is the case ofMar in Hei egger, is reconcep ua ized as not he aggregation of pure or formal sensations given to perception regarding the mat er and form of an e ti y but as some ng tha s e ermine by its "equ pmen a c a ac er[das Zeugha e des Zeuges ," s "usefu ness[Dienlichkeit ,"hich is" e basic feature from whic this enti y regards us, at is, ashes at s an thereby is presen an hus is this en ity

ener Grundzug aus demher dies Seiende u anblickt d h anbli t und mit anwest und so Seiende ist]( 008a, 348 and 347 960, 5 and ) e reason fo Hei degger why " sef ness m s ake precedence o er sensa ion in g aspin being is at "we never rea y rst perceive a hrong of sensations, e g tones a oises, t e appeara ce of gs ra e we ear three motore ane or " he door sh t in the house, an we "ne er hear acoustical sensations or even mere so nds ( 008a, 346) Beca se umans a e preocc ie w th e usefu ness of things, usef lness must be he gro n of being, j s as in Sar re, as we sha ater see, consciousne is the gro nd of be ng beca se it is he gro nd of h mans n extan accoun s of phenomeno ogica on ology, being, owe e annihi a ed i" hingness may be, remains trappe within both he pres pposition of act a i and anthropomorphic conceptions e resent wor turns toSa tre n o de to tease o t these limita ons of phenomeno ogy and to revise it thro gh he ine of ho gh of Baruch Spinoza, Kar Marx, an

acq es Lacan f of a henomenologists i is Sa tre who is feat e p ominen ly in my ine of arg ment, his owes part y o his irec , and pa hbreak ng, i en i ca ion of he body as the gaze an insigh which, in the second part of the p esen wo k, becomes instr mental in for m lating a me a p enomeno og ca /psychoana y ic eory of biopoli i

According y, the presen on o ogy can be charac erized as "meta p enomeno ogica Of co se, s nce acan's nte ention, psyc oanaly is a ge y a cri ical response o phenomeno ogy, an , as s ch, a guab a eady meta phenomenologica At the same time, howe er, my read ing of Lacan and my use of psychoana y ic erms can be seen as either orthodox Lacanian or as a "re rn to Lacan, not un ike acan's own" northodo return to Fre d e present theory cou d, therefore, be escr be as "meta p e omenolo cal/ps c oana c, w h a l


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reface I x ii

ambiva ence of this syntagma, as it can mean either or, possib y, both:"me a phenomenologica , i e , psychoana ytic or/and "meta phenome nological and meta psychoana y ic

e rst part of this work arg es that onto ogy necessari y invo ves and is inseparable from three o her branches of tho ght ha radi ional y are assumed o constit e separate e ds of know edge: a theory of time, a theory of the sign, and a theory of va e e necessity for inter acing hese e ds res s from he p rely relationa (and, hence, no act a b virt a ) character of being, which, a bei being's transhis orica constit tion, is partic larly pronounced in the era of sec lar capitalist modernity

e second par foc ses on the on o ogica eld of biopo i ics, ha is, the po itica f nc ion of bios an A istote ian term that, since MicheFoucault's introduction of the concept of biopolitics, has been increas ingly res sci a ed in m ch con emporary heory My disc ssion of bios revea s that an ana y is of biopo itics entai s as its intrinsic coro lary, a d as a fur er nd spensab e part of e eld of on o ogy, a t eor of e hics e third par presen s an analysis of a brief lm seq ence, as an e amp e of the possib e wor ings of biopo itic in cinema, and draws some log cal consequences of the present theory for rac sm in he in erna iona and m l icu ra wor d of g obal capi a ism

Altho gh it is very ike y that at this point it wil so nd nclear or even mys i ing, one point of he entire work is that, if beyond appear ance here is nothing, here is s rp and i is beca se of his and his a one that we can be ethica , b t a so hoodwinked by the i lusion of immor a ity is on y by succ mbing to the atter tha we a low Be(Spinoza s God or Nature) o coincide with Capi a

In Cont t

is projec began o of a sense that, general y, he con emporaryZeitgeist or disco rse or s bolic order or whatever one may want to ca it remains enthra ed by the dom nant pres pposition hat being equals m e ma er d this in spite of the by now more than three cen ries old Spinozian concept alization of being (or s bstance) as a sheerpower(of self act a ization) and in spite of Marx's persistence in his analysis of he politica economy of capi a ism, one and a half cen ries ago, h(abstract) value is an aspect of being and in spite of Sartre's attempts, d rin Wor d War , tomaterialize be hrou o h n ness or ack


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xi I Preface

and, na l in spite of Lacan's (avo ed y indebted to both Heidegger and Sa tre) equation of being with the rea as a oid to mention just a fe of he os eminen in er entions tha shou d ong ago ha e

incited a di erent di ection in ou onto ogica assumptions Concomi tan ly, this project is a so moti a e by a sense that extan accounts of biopolitics a e predicated on the same, so far t iumphan , naturalis p emise rega ding being, as they treat bios in an essentia ist materialist way which, soone or a e , as if in a twist of a Moebius band, yiel s to its underside, here bios beco es a pure y discursi e construction

n esponse to this theo etical paradigm, the itine ary indicated in the ti le and pu sued in the p esen o k, from on o ogy hrough a heory of time and history, to biopo itics, constitutes an atte pt to fo mu ate a systematicmonistic ontolo and, as its co ol a aMarxian-psychoana tictheory of biopolitics, for hich body an hough are neither opposites nor supplementary a ternatives, but t o expressions of being that, to reca l Georg Simme 's wo ds, "are as alien to each other as are thought an extension for Spinoza, "precise y because they ha e the same forma re ation to, and "e press[,] the same abso ute substance (Simme , 6 )

t this point should pause to st ess that, in spite of se e al a nities, by being monist, this Marxian sychoana ytic theory is funda menta y distinct f om SlavojZ i ek's theo ization of Lacanian Marxism, which is informed by Hege ianism e er he ess, beyond my extensi e refe ence o Sartre, whose hought is in many ays Hegelian, in this

ork also often dra on Z i ek's ork, insofar as it faci itates the de e opment o formu ation of certain ines of my a gumentation Yet, in roposing a onist ontology and theory of biopo itics, ake distance f om Hegelian dia ectica thought and, hen app opriate, de ineate its rele ance o my wo k, o its imi ations

Mo eo er, this p oject endea o s to a conspicuous ga in con temporary discussions of bios and its relation to po er is b each is exemp i ed in the bilate a isregard or strife between, on the one han , the biopo itica ap roach based on discourse ana is, as introduced byFoucault, and further e abo ations of biopo itics by thinkers usua y asso ciated ith Spinoza (e g , Gilles De euze, Antonio Neg i, Michae Ha dt,Giorgio Aga ben) , and, on the other hand, Lacanian psychoana ysis

lthough both sides examine the ays in hich ife and the body a e inscribed by po e , here has been no a empt to bring these o bodies of kno ledge into a producti e dia ogue that ou d eveal their intrin sic e ation and woul a low them to enhance mutua y their insights


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Preface I

maintain that a productive dialogue among these major heoretical camps is indispensab e o any ana ysis of biopolitics, and propose o this e ec a psychoanaly ic heory of biopolitics, which moreover, as wi l

argue, alone can justify the necessity of a biopo itica theory and analysis in the rs place, beyond extan theories an analyses of i eo ogy and insti tional, social, an in ivid al prac ices and behaviors

will concl de this section with a few introd ctory remar s regard ing the de ciency of Foucau 's account of biopoli ics n he 970s,Foucaul in ed bios to po itica powe to indicate a transfo ma ion in

power's mechanisms since the seventeenth cent ry, whereby political con ro over "j ridica ma ters exten e o inclu e and focus primari y on"the administration of bodies and he ca c ated managemen of ife,

that is, the "bio ogica body and "existence of a pop ation (Fouca lt990, 37 and 40) n an in eres ing wis , however, Fo cault's innova

tive rn wi hin his disc ssion of power's shift from he egislative evel to he physica or biologica body brings about the opposi e e ect, as e permea ion of he body by power leads to he to a e organization of he body (in he sense of biological organs), and its concomi ant comp e e organization (in the sense of its discursive cons itution and regu a ion)Even al y, Fouca 's concep ion of power as biopower en ai s a s ippa from the traditional, nat ra ist or essentia ist, treatment of the body as a physica fact tha precedes culture o he his oricis conceptua ization of he body as yet ano her his orica cons ruc ion ha , i e clo hing a other cultural norms, can change according to fashion and circ mstancesBut if nothing escapes his ory an c re nder Fo cau t's his oricist and cons ructivist view, hen, as Char es Shepherdson p ts it, we are led back to the o d "humanistic (narcissistic) notion that man is the ma er of a hings' ( 63)

Psychoana ysis objec s to his historicist re c ion of he bo y o disco rse not on the basis of the c aim that the body is a natura fact, bu by arguing that, although he body is in ee no hing bu an e ect of his ory and c ture, it is a surp us e ect, an e ec that is not rea ized in, and hence canno be reduced o, them Psychoana ysis concurs with his oricism hat the body, far from being given, must be cons ruc ed and "cannot a e form wi hout ndergoing his subjection to represen tation which is thoroughly historica , b t, going beyond historicism, psychoana ysis rejec s the otal s bjection of the subjec and he body to the contro of representation (Shepherdson, 70) Or, to p t it in t e eide erian idiom, he body consti tes i se f around a ack or


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x i I Preface

oid for ei her erm, ac or e cess, simp y signi es ha he ody an represen a ion ne er coincide e s ar ing poin for grasping he r e wor ings of iopoli ics is he ody as a s rp s or excess by prod c o

his ory psychoanaly ic heory of biopo i ics, herefore, req i es hFo ca l 's acco n of biopoli ics be re ised h ough a reconcep a iza io of he ody and ios as he excess o, or lac in, d scursi e cons r c ion

nd a rief pos scrip o "s rpl s s is indica ed in he pre io s paragraph, his erm can designa e ei her more or less han he e e men s req ired for a sy em o sus ain i s eq i i ium a he bod and represen a ion ne er coincide means ha here is ad sequilibrium in epresen a ion i self whe he eca se i is more or ess ha is sa a o he ody so ha he body is ei her ac ing in or s pe n me a o represen a ion e erm "surp us, herefo e, is emp oyed in his wo o designa e his diseq i i ri m, rega dless of whe her he a er manife i se f as lac or excess, so ha hese wo concep s hemsel es, lac excess, become in erc a gea e in is co ex a d, hence, sy on ms o s rp s Of co rse, h s indis inc ness be ween ack and excess is on y of he on o ogica e e , whereas on he on ic (emp rica ) e we s al see in e con ex of enjoymenouissance), e dis ribu ion of enjoymen be ween s jec and he O her, and he fac ha he s je m s lac enjoymen in order for he O her o har es i as surp us a e crucia f nc ions in he e a ion of s bjec i i y o powe in sec capi a is moderni y

In Pa s

Par 1 of he presen wor shows ha he ey o ridging he rie ween eing and hough ha con in es o domina e sec ar hough

is a his orica on o ogy ha acco n s for he changed cha ac er of ei nder he condi ions of sec lar capi alism, while, ne er heless, emaining fai hf o he primary on o ogica pr ncip e ha e ng s ranshi cal For a his orica on o ogy does no compromise he ranshis o i and immu a e charac er of eing, which is indeed he objec of any on o ogy wor h i s name Ra he , a his orical on ology is capa e discerning being as a anshis orica en i y in and hrough i s ario speci c his orical manifes a ions, which alone can pro ide on o ogy wi h i s s ar ing poin


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Preface I x ii

Such a histor ca onto ogy entai s as an indispensab e part of itse f a t eory of time For, contrary bot to the Kantian paradigm, for whic time is a pure a priori category of percept on (appearance), not of being

in itse and to the ater historicist in ersion of Kantianism, for which time is an a posterior category of pure percept on (appearance) a non dua ist c conception of being and appearance (tho ght) recognizes time as intrinsic to both being and appearance, and postu ates according y that onto ogy be inseparable from a theory of tempora ity f we nder stand proper y the consequences of Sartre's statement that "the essence of the appearance is an appearing' w ic is no onger opposed to any

being," then the categories through which we perce e appearances m st

be intrinsic to be ng itse f (Sartre, 7) By the same to en, if eing and appearance/representation are not se ered, an onto ogy is a ways a so a theory of representation (and ice ersa) And s nce representat on con sists a way of a ues, whether ing istic (signs) or economic (exchange a es), t en our ontology is a so inseparab e from a t eory of a ue exp ains w y the present wor positions centra ly and ntertwines fo r major modern schoo s of thought for which be ng and appearance are not concei ed d a istically: Spinozian mon sm, Marx's theory of a e, phenomeno ogy, and psychoana ys s

t is important to note ere that the aforementioned monistic con cept a ization of being and representation entails a radica re sion of t e concept of representation tse f e term can no onger designate e ther phenomenon (appearance) or anguage, as as tradit ona y been the case, but rat er it now comes to stan forvalue, bot exchange a e on t e econom c e e , and semant c a ue (sign) on the inguistic e e bot of w ich aresystems of arbitrary d rential relations opposed to se a e and the (phenomeno ogica ) in tse f that s, this aspect of being that is not determined through arbitrary di erentia re ations wherebyboth value or representation and the in-itse are the two equivalent aspof being

By insert ng among my fo r primary nter ocutors Spinoza,Marx, Sartre, acan Pao o Virno, part shows the histor ca y speci c mode n which being emerges as a biopo it ca object n secu ar capita is modernity My meta phenomeno ogica /psychoana ytic reconcept a iza tion of bios eads to the thesis that, contrary to what c rrent biopo itical theor es ma nta n, the object of biopo tics is not the regu ation of body and ife as b o ogica cong omerations b t rather the human being's


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x iii I Preface

relationship to a speci ca y modern (i e , secu ar) i usion of immorta i y is re a ion, in rn, is liab e to biopo i ica adminis ra ion t roug disc rsi e cons ruc ions and decons r c ion of gazes Moreover, whi e

phenomeno ogy operates on the axis nitude in ni y, the present meta phenomeno ogica /psychoanaly ic biopoli ical heory argues tha a hird ca egory of time wha Spinoza refers o as he "species of e ernity is required in order to acco nt for being t is nder this species of eternity(sub specie aeternitatis) t at Spinoza's "third kind of knowledge occurs,

as the sole nowledge tha gives us access to ruth and oy, and which cons it tes the c lmination of his theory of ethics By di erentiating between the species of e erni y and in ni y, and by in ng he former to the ethica dimension and the a er to the i l sion of immor a i yunderstood not as the belief in after ife but as a fe ishistic disavowa of

one's mor a i y, which we cou d call properly "sec ar immortality advance the fo owing hesis regarding he biopo i ical administration of t e subjec 's rela io to mor ali y and immortality e str c ural similarity and slippery con ation between in ni y (the dimension of immortality) and the species of eternity (the ethica dimension) enab es the biopo i ica mechanism roug w ich human subjects gi e up eir ethica mode for he sake of (the il usion of) immortality or, to p i in the Lacanian idiom, the mechanism by which s bjects give p their enjoymen (Spinoza's oy) for the sake of he enjoyment of the O er

Par 3 demonstra es ha this monist me a phenomeno ogica /psy choana ytic theory of onto ogy and bio o itics has portento s signi cance for the analysis of cu ture and po i ics e rst c apter of this par turns to lm, and speci ca y o Pau Verhoeven'stal Reca ( 990), to examine the function of cinema as a major biopolitica apparat s d e to its irect dependence on he gaze (camera) e chap er ad ances a theory of "biocinema ha addresses he cinema ic capacity of (de)con structing gazes as a means of administering the il sion of immorta i yMy disc ssion of biopo i ics and i s mechanisms conc udes, in he las chapter, by e amining he rami ca ions of he insight that biopo i ics adminis ers (the i sion of) immor a ity for Fouca t's t esis tha a biopoli ical sta es are necessari y racis A brief comparison of the media representations of vio en dea h occ rring in the West and its "other after 9/ re ea s the necessity to reconcep ua ize radica ly o r notion of "race in pos modern capitalism in erms of wha ca l "biorace

e bioracia theory deve oped here remains predicated on the racist di ision be ween, in Fouca t's words, "w a mus li e an w a m s


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Preface I x

die (Fo ca 003, 54) ye , going beyond o ei her e hnica y(Fo ca 's) bio og cal y based modes of discr m na ion, his d s n

is now shown o re ec he s r gg e be ween he super race of he (se

perceived) mmor a s and wha perce ves as i s o her, the s b race he mor a s Since heymust die, he s b race consis s no of hose who bear mor a i y as he inevi ab e conc sion of ife, bu of h whose mission, destin andraison d tre is o die s, heir vio en dea does no cons e, of en even n e mos h man ar an ey he Wes ern super biorace, a crime


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P

M M -P GO GY


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Bei g d Time

Phenomeno ogy is the most eminent mo ernist schoo of thought that attempted to pro uce a sy tematic ontology in hich being is not opposed to its appearances Mainly responding to t o of the most in u ential gures of phenomeno ogica thought, E mun H sser an Mar tin Hei egger, ean Paul Sartre a opted as his starting point their shared princip e that there is no "dua ism of appearance an essence, that is, that the "appearance oes not hi e the essence Rather, the "essence of an e istent is the manifest la hich presi es over the succession of its appearances e "being of the phenomenon (as opposed to the"phenomenon of being ) is nothing other than this "principle of the series of its appearances though Sartre's phenomenologica evo tion initia ly tempte him to assert that "essence, as t e princip e of the series, is e nite y only the concatenation of appearances, an hence"itself an appearance, he soon ha to recognize that essence spil s out from the contained " el connecte series of its manifestations ue to

nothing less than something hich cannot ever appear For"the e istent cannot be re uced to a nite series of manifestations since each one of them is a re ation to a subject constant y changing

lthough "an object may disclose itse f on y thro gh a sing eAbschattun ' a single adumbration, sha ing, aspect, or pro e "the sole fact of t ere being a subject implies the possibi ity of multiplying the points of vie on that Abschattung," and " t his su ces to multip y to

in nity the Abschattungun er consi eration us, Sartre conc u es,hat the phenomenologica enterprise has s ccee e in oing is not"overcoming a dua isms that op ose "interior to e terior or "being to "appearance, but rather "converting them all into a ne dua ism: that of nite an in nite (Sartre, 3, 5, an 7) n short, one rst thing

3


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4 I Being, Time, Bios

that phenomeno ogy sho s is, in acques Lacan's summarizing phrase, that "w ere the e is being, in nity is requi ed ( 998, 0)

f it ere creeping into our phenomenologica immanence from

some out o d y heaven it ould be fai y easy fo secu a thought to ge rid of in ni y b this is no the case n nity is stubbornly wedded to phenomeno ogica experience as such, insofar as he appearance presup poses a perceiving subject, and hence a theoretical y in nite mu tiplicity of "points of view from one of w ich any given subject may perceive the appearing object Of course, as the fact that this in nite mu tip icity of gazes is posited on y "t eoretical y indicates,in ni emains also ithin phenomeno ogy a

tra cendent ca egory, hat is, a category hat is never

given empirica y there can never be empirica y an in ni e number of peop e pe ceiving an object yet, this transcendence is enfolded in immanence, insofar as it does not emanate from some extra empirical beyond but is rather the e ect of empirical experience itself isening of transcen nce within the p ne of immanence is constitutive of w at can properly e ca edsecular tho ght

ventua l Sartre conc udes this section ofBeing and Nothingness by ackno ledging that, even thoug "there is not ing be ind the appearance, never heless, the being or "the essence of the appearance is an appea ing' hich is no onger opposed to anyb ing "Well, then, as he subsequently wonders, "there arises a legitimate prob em concerningthe being of this appearin '(Sartre, 6-7) e ans er to this ques ion is arguably summa ized in Lacan's statement: "if beyond appearance there is nothing in itsel there is the gaze ( 98 , 03) by whic emp ati cal y invite us to understand the gaze "of the Ot er, the capita Ot er,[ hic is a ready the e in eve y opening of the unconscious ( 30)

is "capita Other is no simply the symbolic order, understood as a given socie i h its ideo ogical sys ems, a s, and so forth, as in many of S avojZ i ek's o nesto La au and Chanta Mou e's, and others' writings True, no socie is ever given in its totality as an object o be perceived by an empirica subject, and, by that to en, e can say that empirica ly " society' is impossib e as a w o e and is, ence, transcen dent to expe ience (inc uding seve a ot e inferences that Laclau andMou e dra from this, such as that society consis s of "pure y relational identities, something that, as i eventual y become clear th ough the ine of argument presented here, resu s from the fact that being itself is relationa ) (Laclau and Mou e, 4) But hat is often missed in this a too easy reductio of Lacan's "capita Ot er to society a p e omenon


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and speci ca y in erms of se heory, eing is no a , ha is, a o a izable se insofar as w a s s pposed o e enc osed w n is a so o side i As Sar re proceeds o wri e:

Wha appears in fac is on y anspect of he o jec , and he o jec is a oge herin ha aspec and a oge her o side of s a ogetherwithin, n ha man fes s selfin ha aspec shows i se f as he s r c re of he appearance, which is a he same ime he princip e of he series is a oge her o s de, fo he ser es i se f wil never appear nor can appear

us he o side is oppose in a new way o he inside, and he being which does no appear, o he appearance (6)

ere is no hing ehind appearance, b he appearance o ers i se f in o ays: on e one hand, as appearance in s n ude, and, on he o e and, as be ng w ch does no appear, e se es self of appearances an heir poin s of view, which "will never appear an which a ows for any concre e appearance ha , y simp y appearing, f nct ons as e p nc ple of e series On e one and, we ave ude, appearance, an he concre e poin of view from which i appears on he o her hand, we have in n he a see ng gaze nder which en ire series of appearances wo appear, u never oes Hence Lacan's wo o her s ccinc form la ions: " here is no O her of he O her and" he gaze enco nter s no a seen gaze, u a gaze magined y me in e e d of e O her ( 998, 8 98 , 8 4) " ere is no O er he O her is ano her way for saying " here is no gaze of he O her, fo he gaze of e O her (i e , e gaze of he en re ser es of appearan is he in ni y of a possi e poin s of view as far as experience is co cerned, herefore, here is no s ch gaze, since he in ni y of all possi e poin s of v ew co d neve de erm ne me o perce ve he appearance f any ni e poin of view On he o her han , o never heless perceiv appearances on y from a nite perspec ive, and if am ca a e of doing so is on y ecause mag ne a speci c ( n e) gaze on he par ofO er is y mag n ng a spec c gaze ere w ere e e s on in ni y of gazes ha he objec can appear a a and ha he series appea ances is s j ga ed o a pr nc ple and o tains e s r c e spe ed y his appearance e gaze, herefore, is al oge herwithin, in ha i manifes s i selfin he aspec of he n e gaze magine in he eld of e O er b i a so s a oge eroutside, for e gaze self, as ei i i f i i f i


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Being an Time I 7

e us a so no e a f r her poin abo he gaze tha i ecom c uc a n he sc ss on of b opol ics n pa f can mag ci c gaze in he e of he O her i is precise y beca se no such gaze i

g ven o ex er ence, fo n ru h he gaze s he non appea ng n of gazes e ni e gaze eme ges e o i s reference o he in ni y o gazes, hich is i se f en ai e h o gh i s reference o he ni e gaze one or , the gaze is the cause of itsean such it is both se r rentialand the power or potentiali of actualizing itsen fac , ha he gaze is he po en ia of se f ac a iza ion en ai s he (Spinozian) p incip e he essence of he ho e or d (s bs ance, n Sp noza's e ms) s he o er of se f ac a iza ion o , as Sar e i es, he bo y as "a of vie s pposes a do b e re a ion: a e a ion i h he hingson whichthe body is a po n of vie an a e a on th he obse verr whomthe body is a poin of vie (Sa re, 433) n o he o s, "my being in he o d, by he so e fac ha realizes a o d, causes i se f o be n ca e o self as a being n e m ds of he wo by

hich i ealizes (4 9) n ea izing he o which, a he same is ha rea izes ("causes ) my bo y as a being in he mi s of he o my bo y an he o d a e one an he same " esh h ch s bo h h cause an he e ec of i se f

Turning no o he empora y of eing, once e a e beyond he a ism of eing an appearance, and we conceive of being in monis ic e ms accor ing o hich being "is a oge herin ha aspec of appear ance an a oge her ou si e of it hen e are force to ac no e ge ha being pertai to two distinct spatio-temporalities:n u e,qua appearance, an in ni yqua gaze of he en ire series of appearances or be ng h ch oes no appear

is on o ogica hesis is far emove from he basic Kan ian premise ha ime and space a e ranscenden a ca egor es of pe cep(appea ance), no of being o he th ng n i se f ( he a te s andKan in a d a is ic opposi ion o appea ance) Kan 's premise ha "spa an ime, oge her i h he appearances in hem are "no hing ex s in in hemse ves an o s e my epresen a ons, s he og ca conc eriving f om he ua ism ha opposes epresen a ion (appea ance) being in i se f ( 977, 8 , 5 c) Since his ua ism has no co aps

e can no onger ma n a n hat the ca ego ies of appearance a e not a so ca egories of he being in i se f Ra her, if appea ance invo ves spa a ies an empo a ies, i is on y because be ng i se f invo

nitu inso r it appears and in ni i o r as it does notGo ngf h b h K h (P i ) hi h i hi h


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is inferior to being co apses, as the appearance cannot be considered an adu terated sim acr m of the being which does not appear or of the series to hich i be ongs, since he given appearance and the en ire

series of appearances pres ppose one anotherOur pre iminary conc sion therefore is hat the (Kantian)a prioricategories of thought through which we perceive appearances are in truthint nsic to being itse t is being in itse f that appears and does not appear Being is the appearance and the series of appearances that can never appear Finitude and in ni , therefore, are being's own tempora attributes

Sartre arrived at the same conc sion: "tempora ity can be on y a re ation of being at the heart of this same being Tempora i isnot.On y a being of a certain str ct re of being can be tempora in theunity of its being ( 94 95) Yet, as we sha have the chance to see thro gho t part , Sartre's conception of tempora ity is imited by and is phenomeno ogical onto ogy after all fails to grasp entirely t e rela tion between time and being part y ue to the fact that he reduces the "being of a certain structure of being to the being of a for itse f exc sive y conceived as h man consciousness


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Mo ist Beig the sm

Given he his o i al eme gen e o phenomeno ogi al ho gh in mode n ism, many wo d end o a rib e he possibi i y o a monis i on ion o being o ir ums an es anging om he massive ind s ia iza o api a is p odu ion and he on omi an u baniza ion o he brea o wo World Wars Undo b ed y, his asso ia ion is e regar ing many as e s o phenomenologi al ho gh , and pa i ula ly Sa exis en ia ism, b we do a so now ha he s sys ema i a i o a monis i on ology da es a o he seven een h en u y, spe i

in he philosophy o Baru h (Benedi de) Spinozae p ima y phenomeno ogi al pos u a e rega ding he on ologi

al eq a i y be ween being and i s appearan es is exp essed in Spinoza' monis i on ep ua iza ion o s bs an e (and i s a ib es) and i s m ha is, he way s bs an e appears in i s empi i al a a iza ions Spinoza, s bs an eis bo h i s a rib esand i s modes, even as he e is a on ep ual di e en e in hei on ologi a s a us is o his reaso

Spinoza an in e ha Gois he wo d, and ha here is on y one s b s an e, whi h isDeus seu Natura"God, orNa e] , o ha "in Na e he e is on y one s bs an e, andcept God no substance can be or bconceive '(1 990, 436; 985, 544;Ethics, par I pre and 4 0;Ethics, par , prop 4 and or ) is par i ular y in proposi ions - he s pa o heEthics ha Spinoza s esses ha he e is an abso u nivo i y be ween he a ib es o s bs an e and i s empi i a m

be a se o whi h ( n i e bo h Pla onism and J deo Ch is iani y) o me anno be mo e pe e han he la e As Gi les Deleuze p

T] he a rib es are s i y he same o he ex en ha he ons i e he essen e o s bs an e and o he ex en ha hey are involved in, and on ain, he essen es o mode For

9


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10 I Bei g, ime, Bios

examp e, t is i the same form that bodies imp y exte sioa d that exte s o is a attr bute of d v e substa ce I tse se, Go [i.e., substa ce] does ot possess the perfectio s

implied by the "creatures [modes i a form i ere t om thathich these perfectio s have i the creatures themselves: thusSp oza rad cally rejects the otio s of emi e ce, equivocitya d eve a a og ( ot o s accordi g to h ch God oupossess the perfect o s i a other form, a super or form . .) .Te Spi ozia imma e ce s therefore o ess opposed toema atio tha to creatio . A mma e ce s g es rof a the u ivocit of the attributes: the same attributes area rmed of the substa ce they compose a d of the modesthey co tai ( 988, 52)

Spi oza explicitly opposed creatio ism by stat g that: "God i ma e t, ot the tra s t ve, cause of a l th gs( 985, 428; Ethics,partI, prop.18) .Tat is, rather tha bei g a cause that precedes ts e ec(creatio ) i li ear or diachro c t me, God is a cause that is itse ect of its o e ects. o ther ords, bei g both its cause a d ethe tra sce de t (Go or substa ce) is i a di ere tial relatio the empirical a d, thus, pertai s to the same pla e of imma e ce

Troughout the prese t ork, the term "tra sce de ce ill bused i this mo ist c se se, as co ceptual y d st ct from empiriity a d, yet, as perta g to the same p a e of mma e ce as erealit , for it is at o ce ts cause a d e ect a d has posit ve o tostatus ow ere e se but i ts e ects, the mo es of empirical rMoreover, sofar as the tra sce de t al ays ecessari y e ta ls its e ect a d cause) that i relatio to hich it s tra sce de t, i

o o ger be di ere t ated from the tra sce de tal Tis disti ctiocrucia to Ka t, precise y because he a ted to sustai tra sce desomethi g that escapes the pla e of i ma e ce, a he ce he ea furt er term (the tra sce de ta ) i order to desig ate the or metaphys ca preco d tio s of the empirical oma Give mo ism God s these ogica or metaphys ca preco d tio s (aof emp rical reality (modes), the tra sce de t a d the tra sce dover ap e t re y fact, i mo ist c terms, the tra sce de tatra sce de ce ca mea .

Tis o -creatio ist co cept of God as the imma e t cause of or d ( h ch s a other a of asserting the de tit of Go a


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Mo ist Bei g a d AtheismI 1 1

world) fol ows ecessarily from a y mo istic co ceptio of beias Sartre argued, if God is co ceived as a "divi e subjectivit caof a "creat oex nihilo,"the "[s]uch subjectivity ca ot have eve

the representationof a objectivit , a d co seque tly it ca ot evea ected b thewi to create the objective. He ce, Sartre co cludes

bei g, if it is sudde ly p aced outside the subjective . . .cao a rm itse f as disti ct from a d opposed to its creator;otherwise t disso ves i him . . . .f be g ex sts as over aga stGod, it is its ow support; it does ot preserve the east traceof divi e creatio . a word, eve f it had bee created,bei g-i -itself would beinexplicablei terms of creatio ; forit assumes its bei g beyo d the creatio .(26 27)

A creatio ist co ceptio of divi ity e ta s God's subjectivizatiothereb re ders (objective) bei g i explicable. Tere remai , thereft o optio s for a o tology: either, fo o i g the Nietzschea atof "God s dead, to ig ore the co cept of God altogether the so-cdeath of metaphysics or, follo i g the Spi ozia path, to equate Gw th ature by co ceivi g of God ot as the (subjective) creator bthe (objective) imma e t ca se of ature the e foldi g of metaphics or tra sce de ce withi the p a e of imma e ce. Tis di erdoes ot i the least mp y that Spi oza was a ess a atheiNiet che; o the co trary, it i dicates that he was more proper y mandatheist tha the latter. or to ig ore God mea s othi g other tto be bli ded by appeara ces to the po t of g ori g the seriesof a appeara ces, the bei g-that-does- ot-appear. hich is why Li sisted that "the true formu a of atheism is otGod is dead. . . [but]God is unco cious,"that is, God s the e t re series of appeara ces thoughts) that wil ever appear(198 1, 59).Like the i ite gaze, theu co scious is a other term for the e tire series of appeara ces.

Atheism s the i c usio of i ty withi the pla e of e ce, somethi g which is possible o ly through a mo istic co ce

of bei g. T s s why such a o to ogy s particu ar y apposite toof secu ar (a d capita ist) moder ity, si ce the seve tee th ce tusay so, however, amou ts to the claim that the re atio bet ee ba d appeara ce is historically determi ed a d, yet, as s the postof a y proper o tolog th s historica re atio must accou t foralso tra shistoricall . e shall retur to this poi t.


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V ue Bei g Surp us

No e shall see h beyo d bei g a theory of time, a mo istic oogy is al ays a so a theory of va ue, a d he ce of the sig . A"he ce i dicates, there is a i tri sic re atio bet ee va ue a

hich e must approach rst.As Michel Foucault has exte sive y argued, "[e ver si ce the

the system of sig s i he ester orld has bee a ter ary o e,it as recog ized as co tai i g the sig i ca t, the sig i ed, aco ju cture. Tis state of a airs prevai ed also over the e tire peof theocracy, up o a d i cludi g the "Re aissa ce, i sofar as Gthe Creator or tra sitive cause of the or d, as the guara tor of co ju ctures, that is, "the simi itudes that li k the marks [sig ito the thi gs desig ated by them [sig i eds , so that the li k bethe "mark a d the "thi g as "orga ic. It is this orga ic, divgrou ded bo d that raised the status of the ord to that of the ord ais i dicated i the fact that i this paradigm the sig i e is take

bei g direct y thethingdesig ated by the sig i ca t "From the sevetee th ce tury, ho ever, "the arra geme t of the sig s as to becbi ar si ce it as to be de ed . . .as the co ectio of a sig i ca ta d a sig i ed, ithout a y orga ic li k bet ee the t o, herthe relatio bet ee sig i ca t a d sig i ed became, as Ferdi aSaussure ould put it i the co text of structural i guistics, "arbit(Foucault 970, 42;Saussure,120 2 ) .e ceforth, sig i ers a d sig

i eds "are purely di ere tial a d egative he co sidered separathat is, each is determi ed ithi its o sy chro ic system throits di ere ces from all other e eme ts (sig i ersor sig i eds) of thesy tem, a d i itse f, i hout this di ere tiatio , it ou d be (Saussure, 8 2 ) .By the same toke , he ceforth, far from e joyithe status of the ord, the ord becomes hat e k o as the sig i

3


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14 IBei g, ime, Bios

hich i "moder thought as to become the object of "the a a ymea i g a d sig i catio , as opposed to the object of o to ogy ( oucau t,1970, 43). Te co apse of the orga c divi e bo d e tai

that he ceforth represe tatio as to be co sidered as separated fbei g by hat eve tua ly became a u bridgeab e abyss.Tis moder object k o as the (arbitrary) sig i er emerged

the seve tee th ce tur that is, at the same time at hich, ith Soza, the discourse became capable of co ceivi g of God as o

the tra s tive but the mma e t cause of the orld. If the orld iscreated, the there is o divi e i k bet ee "marks a d "thi gshe ce the ord is a arbitrary sig er. Te o -creatio st co ceof God e ta s the destruct o of the "orga c li k bet ee othi gs, or, i oucau t's ords, that "[t]hi gs a d ords ere tseparated from o e a other, so that the "profou d k ship of la g

i th the orld as . . .dissolved ( oucau t970, 43) .o ever, as i l present y argue, this co c usio is correct o

i sofar as it accurately describesthe major error of mo rn epistemolo and ontolo ,accordi g to h ch, the sig i er (represe tat o ) i deed to beco e a se f-refere tia system, severed fro bei g a eraised to the i disputab e pri cip e of phi osophy si ce Ka t, hcisely, reduced space a d time to thea prioricategories of represe tatio ,a d ot of bei g. o be sure, it ou d be a preposterous epistemofal acy ithi moder thought to co sider the sig i er, as o e usdo ith regard to the ord, as "a stigma upo thi gs, a mark impri tacross the orld, as "part of its most i e aceab e forms, a d as s"u que a d abso ute ( oucau t1970, 42). oucau t admo ishes us,right after havi g raised the questio cited earlier as o e of the epigrof this ork: "If that is so, that is, if the task at ha d is to "re ethe same time, ithout disco ti uity or co trad ct o , upo ma 'sa d the bei g of la guage, the : " e must take the very greatest prtio s to avoid a ythi g that might be a a ve retur to past theordiscourse, be they "the Classical theory of discourse or the theoc

(1970, 338).Te crucial poi t, ho ever, is that the discursive co lapof the orga ic li bet ee thi gs a d ords,pace oucault and thevast major ty of moder epistemo og amou ts to somethi g moreitself. Tat is, its true e ect is ot the severa ce of the thi g from t

ord but, rather, a radical a d u foreseerecon ration of the re tionbetween the thing and the word or being and appearancethat KarMarx as the rst phi osopher to represe t syste atical y.


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Va ue Bei g SurplusI 15

o e ter Marx s li e of thought we eed rst to return brieSpi oza a d hat is k o as his "pa theism which is the rst phsophica mode that grasped, even before Marx, this ew co gu

of the relatio betwee thi g a word. Laca s succi ct fortio , Spi oza s "pa theism mea s othi g other tha "the reducthe eld of God to the u iversa it of the sig i er(1 98 , 275).or,to co ceive of Go as the imma e t cause of the world amou tco ceivi g of the orld as a s stem of di ere tia relatio s, i there is o cause tra sitive y precedi g a d determini g them. Texactly what the sig i er is: a system of di ere tial relatio s. othat God is Nature e tails that aturea system of sig i ers. Tis isthe so e possib e mea i g of "pa theism o ce God is the immcause of the world.

Ho ever, to equate God or ature ith the u iversa it of the i er does ot i the least mea , as i some u expected idea ist

of ha d, to reduce the or d to thought or ideas, thereb de imateria it . Rather, it mea s thatnature is thinking mat er,that is, thatthought the ex ste ce of a sy tem of sig i ers is ot the exclusprerogative or disti ctive characteristic of the huma bei g. f thisalways so easi y bee assumed to be the case it is due to a persreductio of thought to co scious ess. d, a though it is abov

reud ho is k ow for havi g i troduced the idea of "u co scthought, e d o e of its earliest a d quite exte sive prese tain Marx s pa theism, as prese ted iCapita lume other words,Marx i ve ted not o , as SlavojZi ek has argued, the s mptom, butalso the u co scious, a d he did so i a way that makes amp y that o reductio of the wor d to ideas is i vo ved i the co cpa theism.

But before we tur i deed to Marx, et us ote pare theticaSpi oza s pa theism a so e tails that there is o room for a y pte eo og i the or , i accord ith the abse ce of a tra sitivcause. or if there is o rst cause, there ca be o al cause eTis is a poi t to which we shall retur i the co text of the a aof historical time.

f Marx, u like his co temporary eco omists, grasped the meism of capital, it is because he replicated the Spi ozia reductio

the orld to the u iversality of the sig i er o the leve of ecohe subjected all (commo i ed) ature to (excha ge-)value, whe

ature i cludi g huma s a d their abor as "objecti ed, "co ge


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1 6 IBei g, ime, Bios

or "abstract huma abor is ot o ly the vast ock of "objects ofity (use-value, i.e., o abstract value but a co crete physical, mth g) but a so the aggregat o of "se suous thi gs hich are at th

time suprase sible or social, that is, "va ues . . .as their [me 's aguage (Marx1990, 150, 165,a d 67).Te tra sformatio of objectsi to commodities e tai s that they o lo ger are o ly material tbut a so sig i ers, by di t of the fact that they o become absexcha ge-va ues. Marx is emphatic about the o tologica di ebet ee the realm of excha ge-va ue a d that of use-va ue:

Not a atom of matter e ters i to the objectivity of commodit es as va ues; i this it is the d rect opposite of thecoarsely se suous objectivity of commodities as physicalobjects . . . .he . . . e said i the customary ma er thata commodity is both a use-value a d a excha ge-value, th s

as, strict y spea i g, ro g. A commodit is a use-value orobject of uti ity, a d a "value.(1990, 138a d 152)

E pirica rea ity, Marx argues, co sists of t o disti ct u iverses: o e there is o room for eve "a atom of matter this is the u vof the circu atio of excha ge-va ues, ith its o category of sy chtime (circu atio -time); the other is the u iverse of materia objectis, the u iverse of the productio of physica objects by speci c, spized, abor, a d as subject to material decay i the li ear tempoof physica life (productio -time).Circu atio -ti e reig s i the " oisysphere of circu at o a d self-va or zat o , " here everythi g,the productio of surp us-value, "takes place o the surface a d ivie of everyo e, hereas productio -time marks "the hidde abof product o , i hich "the secret of pro t-maki g remai s hfrom the pub ic vie , just ike the thi g-i -itself is traditio al y asto remai vei ed u der its represe tatio( 990, 279 280).

Commodit esqua excha ge-va ues become "suprase sible or " a guage of huma s si ce both excha ge-values a d sig i ers armi ed purely d ere tia ly ithi the r sy chro c systems, i there is ot "a atom of matter. By bei g eco omic va ues, comties become also sig s,lin isticor semanticva ues, si ce both obey thesame a s.

But Marx's po t about eco omic value (a d imp icitly semvalue, si ce values are " e 's la guage ) is that these t o u iv


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(excha ge-)va ue a material objects, are the preco itio for aer ki of va ue: surp us-va ue. or surplus-value must "have gi . . . circu atio a ot circu atio , excha ge-va

its s chro ic circulatio -time, a ot i it, that is, the reathe productio of materia objects ith co crete a i here t phpropert es, hich are subject to the l ear a d ite productio(1 990, 268 . A rtiori:

the mo e [excha ge-va ue a the commo ity [use-value]fu ctio o l as i ere t mo es o existe ce of value itse f[surp us-value], the mo e as its ge eral mo e o existe cethe commo ity as its particular or, so to speak, d sgu semo e.(1990, 255

Excha ge-va ue a use-value are the "mo es i hich "value (surp us-va ue) ma ifests itself empirica l . other ords, thereone substance or being-in-itse value itse/ hose attributes ca ot ma

fest themse ves empirica y as such, but rather appear i t o imodes, as excha ge-value a as objects of uti it .

Here e see that Marx a opted ot o Spi oza's pa thebut a so his mo ism regar i g bei g-i -itself or substa ce, accoto hich "i Nature there is o o e substa ce that has t o butes, "thought a d "exte sio , hich appear i the empirical mof "a exte ed thi g use-value] a "a thi k g thi g [excvalue] ( 985, 420a d 448 449; Ethics,part I, prop.14,cor. 1 ,a dpart II, prop.1 a d2 .I ee , empirica both objects of uti it excha ge-values or sig s areven, for eve if the latter are abstracts mbols, s mbo s too make their appeara ce i rea it (as moletters a d sou s). B co trast, surplus-value is a purelmetaphysicalcategor , somethi g that ca ot ever be give i empirical reasuch. Marx stresses this poi t b riti g that "[a t the e of thecess of "bu i g or er to sell for more mo e " e do ot ro o e ha d the origi a100,a o the other the surp us-value of 0. hat emerges is rather a value of1 10, here the origi a la va ce excha ge-va ue( 00a the surplus-va ue( 0 it y eldedare empirica i isti guishable both " he e a the begithe process bei g the same, mo e or excha ge-value so that

a 1 0"is i exactl the same form, appropriate for comme cithe valorizatio process [a e ], as the origi al100, the "va ue of the


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1 8 IBei g, ime, Bios

1 0ha v g] the same eed for valorizat o as the value of the 00,s ce both are excha ge-va ues(1990, 252 253).I other ords, icap talism surplus-value ma ages to appropriate the fu ct o of th

substa ce of h ch everyth g the or d is a mode of ma ifesWe sha retur agai to this poi tor o let us rephrase Marx's o to ogy i terms of Sartre's

ome o ogical o tology, a process h ch wi l also revea the fu dshortcomi g of phe ome ology Use-value correspo s to thephenomenolo calbe g-i - tself, about hich Sartre, fol o i g Hege , writeit is what it is t issolid (mass the sy thesis of tself thitself, ithout havi g a

withinhich is opposed to a

without" (28).Use-va ue is a mater al object hich, u ike sig s or excha ge-does ot ee d ere tial relat o s to awithout" order to co stituteitself, a thus seems to be give i its ple itu e Excha ge-valthe other ha d, correspo ds to what Sartre calls the "for-itsel hi"perpetually determ n g tselfnot to bethe i - tse f, that s, ot to bmatter, o t to allo eve a atom o f matter to e ter itself(134).Te

r-itse s de ed as bei g hat it s ot a d ot be g hat s, just as both the excha ge-value a d the co cept of th s apple

table are de ed as be g hat the apple s ot a d as ot bei gthe apple is(28).Closer scrut ho ever, u dermi es the i -itsep e itude by reveali g that i truth the i -itse f is posited as suthe for-itse f's ihilatio , or, as Hege puts it: "thisin-itse tur s out tobe a mode i hich the object is o y for a other (Hege1977, 104; 66).I Sartre's o ords: "the for- tse f cludes ith tsthe bei g of the object hich t s ot asmuch as the for-itselfits o bei g to quest o as ot bei g the bei g of the object(244).

ut eve more stro gly: "Te for-itself is the othi g by hichthereare things" (555).It s the hi atio of the for- tself co scious essboth Hegel a d Sartre that br gs about the bei g- -itself

Here e begi to see ho Marx parts ay fro the Hege iatradit o o be sure, Marx asserts that f there are mater al comties (the - tse f) t is because they are the "part cular or, so td sguised ode of m aterial value But, cruc a ly, he asserts ta so about excha ge-va ue (the for-itself), h ch too is a "mode ote ce of va ue, albeit ot the "part cular but the "ge eral

ords, u like Hege a Sartre, i Marx the i -itself (be g ovalue) a d the for-itself (co scious ess or excha ge-va ue) are moa th rd: surplus-value Trough Marx e u derstand that, h e


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value a d excha ge-value are the phe ome ologica in-itself a ditse f, respectivel , value-i -itself (surp us) is themeta-phenomenolo calor metaphysicalbei g-i -itse f-for-itse the substa ce hose attribu

are expressed empirical i the phe ome ologica bei g-i -itsebei g-for-itse f. d si ce both use-values or the phe ome o ogicaitse f a d excha ge-values or the phe ome o ogical for-itself are thmodes i hich surplus or the meta-phe ome ologica i -itse f-forma ifests itself empirica l , it is more accurate to sa ot that thitse f is posited through the nihi atio of the for-itself but that bin-itself a d for-itse are posited through a primar ihilatio his simulta eous a actualization of the meta-phe ome ologicaitse f-for-itse f.Phenomenolo cannot a p the proper relation of beingand appearance because it i ores precise this meta-phenomenolobeing-in-itse r-itsel

At this poi t a subt e, et crucial disti ctio must be made expTis bei g-i -itse f-for-itse f isnot hat Marx calls "value i itse f orsurp us-valueper se;rather, it is its adu terated equivale t i sofar as, me tio ed ear ier, i capita ism surplus-va ue succeeds i approthe role a d fu ctio of the meta-phe ome ologica bei g-i -itseitse f. Te atter, like Spi oza's substa ce, is the cause of itsehe ce, it is thepow of se actualizationB co trast, surplus-va ue is afu ctio ithi a speci c historical formatio that is itself the e ecexter al causes u less e a t to c aim that the cause of the emergeof the capita ist mode of productio as capita ism itse f, as is c aimed i the ideo ogical arrative of "a primitive accumu atio ,"the previous accumulatio ' of Adam Smith, to hich e shall rein the chapter " istorical ime (Marx990, 873).I other ords,surp us-value is the actua izatio of o e historica appeara ce, the meta-phe ome ological bei g-i -itself-for-itse f is the po er oseries of all appeara ces to actua ize itse f. o disti guishsubstance orbein the bei g-i -itself-for-itse f from surplus-value, I il emp ofor the former the term "surp us.

Tere i l be further opportu ities to approach the di ere cbet ee surplus-va ue a d surplus i more detail throughout this but as an i troductor remarkould ike to refer to aca 's comme tin 970,that: "It's ot because o e atio a izes the mea s of produat the evel of socia ism i o e cou tr that o e has thereb do

ith surplus value, if o e does 't o hat it is(2007, 08).aca 'sco te tio i this semi ar is that Marx discovered somethi g m


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profou d a d ider tha hat he, i a rather reductio ist approaca led surp us-value a d de ed as a purel eco omic categor to cap talism.Surplus-value is on the spec c modu tion of surplus or th

being-in-itse r-itse under the capitalist economic organization. otherords, o e ca ot get rid of surplus, but this does ot mea thamust b a o tologica ecessit take the form of the capital st sval e. Retur i g to redric ameso 's ords cited i o e of the epigof the prese t ork, i order to fathom the or d order of "Capi

e must rst u dersta d that the object of "our true o tology capital but surp us, a d that capital is o l o e o f its historical pmodu atio s. hat is o to ogica ecessar (a d, he ce, traca ) is surp us, a d this, as e sha l see i the chapter "Histori

ra shistorica Aspects of Bei g, ca e tail historical rea ities asas the a cie t Greek democrac ith its s aves, theocratic feudaa d capita ism, so that it ould be both arroga t a d arro -mito assume that o e could a ticipate bei g's future historical odulaa d, he ce, socio-po itico-eco o ic orga izatio s.

Recapitulati g, surp us, therefore, is our th rd term, ext togaze a d the u co scio s, for bei g, hich is the e tire series of apa ces i sofar as it is the cause of itself, or, hich is the po er of series of all appeara ce to actualize itse f.

the speci c capitalist modu atio of surp us as surp us-vau co scio s of capita becomes surplus-value. O e might objectis 't capita 's most co sc ous i te tio the accum atio of surpNo: capitalis 's co scious i te tio is the i crease of excha ge-vTe t o stateme ts ma be take as sayi g the same thi gpractical ,but, as e sa Marx emphaticall i sist, the do otontolo cal ,si cesurplus-value is ot somethi g I ca ever have i m ha d, uexcha ge-va ue (mo e ) hich ca . Te "cu i g of capital, cisel the Hegelia se se, is that, hile it sees its esse ce a d solpose of existe ce i the perpetua accr al of excha ge-value, i a d ge era thout k o g it, t serves the perpetual acc mof somethi g tra sce de t to its empirica realit , surplus-va ue.re ai s u co scious i capitalism is that its support is metaph sicabei g- - tself-for- tself or surp us, a beit o ly a d s guratio thtrue formula of materia ism, as el as of pragmatism, is ot "trade ce is dead, there is o l matter or "pro t, but, quite the comatter and pro t are the empirical man stations of transcendent surplu

hether the atter is distorted or ot.


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i a l this homo ogy amo g bei g, sig , a d va ue the o tcal, sema tic, a d eco omic series o es to the fact that the semaa d eco omic series are historical modu atio s of the tra shist

bei g, surplus, hich il al ays already have emerged as the e ecthe t o historical series. History is a ame for the modulatio s of surin the eco omic a d sema tic elds, hich is i tur re ected ihistorica ly co crete o tological accou s. Te economic modu atthe o tological surp us as surplus-va ue ithi capitalis e tails simi ar distortion must occur also i the sema tic e d a d, by extin huma subjectivity, i sofar as the huma "subject is the subjecthe sig i er (Laca

198 1 , 67).s ill become evide t i part

2here,

graspi g the speci c historica modu atio s of surplus i secular camoder ity is i strume tal i fathomi g t o i ersecti g, ye raddiverge t fu ctio s of huma subjectivity, ethics a d biopolitics.

ow, et us co ti ue o exami e fur her bei g a d time, a d to o this project of expa sio a d revisio of phe ome o ogy thrSpi oza, Marx, a d Laca .


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Matter

ost-Ka tia philosophy has bee domi ated by the assumptio bei g i itse f is matter i its self-ple itude. Co scious ess, accordhas bee co ceived as the age t of a co tagious lack that i fests mitse f by merel perceivi g it Tis e duri g illusio , everthe ess,to the truth. t is beca se bei g is the po er of its se f-actua izabsolute potentiali ,the overlap of lack (of actual materiality) a d exce(of po er of actua izatio ), or, rather, ack o y i sofar as it is that the mome t it is actua ized i its empirica modes it splits i to the t o empirical give s of irrecoverable ack ( hought, co cas co scious ess) a d u mitigated ple itude (thought ess materi

other ords, the truth poi ted to by the i lusio is that the divbet ee matter a d value is modal or empirica i the substa ce itthese t o attributes are i separable so that a y o to ogica co ceof matter as severed from va ue is doomed to be i lusory. Neveless, to the exte t that e also eed to accou t for the fact that

our empirical rea ity matter a d value co stitute t o disti ct moe must d appropriate co cepts to express this disti ctio ithcompromisi g o r mo istic o tology Te developme t of both scia d capita ist eco omy i dicate that chemica co siste cy ca oprovide a te ab e criterio for de i g matter o to ogica y. f, ato the relativity theory, matter is e ergy, a d if, as e see i everylate capitalism, all possible forms of i formatio are so d and bo

like other material commodi ies, e have to revise our co cepts ofvalue a d excha ge-value so that the disti ctio bet ee materialityimmateriality becomes a derivative of the object's fu ctio .

e have to rep ace the disti ctio o f use-valuequamateria objectof uti ity, hich correspo ds to the phe ome ological i -itse meta-phe ome o ogica i -itse f a d co ceptio of matter, de

23


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24 I Being, ime, Bios

anything insofar as t funct ons as a use-va ue, that s, as t existor d of production time ho ever i materia (in the canonica se

of the ord) this object may be, from pure energ quanta, MBs,

ords and images Objects of uti ity may sometimes appear as "imrial as the signi er, e ectricity, and information eaving aside thethat, chemica y speaking, even these presumably immater a entiinvo ve matter But this does not change by a farthing the eternaof the commodity to have a double empirica manifestation, as value ( n-itself) and as exchange-value (for- tse f), both of whicthe empirica manifestations of surp us-va ue, the capita ist odof surp us, hich is undi erentiated immaterial-matter Kojin Karr ght y stresses that the assumption that the stage of informat zed cism renders Marx's analysis obso ete is entire y misled and misKaratani's reason for arguing th s is that information, "as the fathecybernetics, Robert iener, suggested, is "origina ly noth ng budrence,"and capita "lives on by the di erence, that is, "surp us v

regardless of " hether it gets it] from so id objects or uid informaConsequentl "the nature of capital is consistent even before and aftedominant production branch shifted from heavy industry to the infortion industry (2003, 267).But e should add to Karatani's argumentthat just as any product, "solid or " uid, is in its essence al ays (di erence or surp us-value), taken as an empirica use-value it is tially a ays "solid, ho ever " uid it may be chem cally, insofarprecise y a use-value an in-itself ( n our meta-phenomeno ogical sConcomitant y, hatever functions as exchange-value i l constitutmeta-phenomeno og cal immateria for-itse f In short, regard esphysica qualities, all use-values are materia , and a exchange-vimmaterial, hile surplus is the doublet material-i materia or in-itfor-itself, of hich they are the t o empirica manifestations

n more tangible economic terms, the distinction between use-vor the in-itself and exchange-value or the for-itself corresponds to distinct on between the inab ity and ab lity of procur ng surp u

nformation, for instance, taken as use-value consists of symbols (i ages, etc ) that express se antic values (signi eds or concepts),

s not in this qual ty that they can contr bute to the accumu atisurp us Te function of the symbo to express a concept is mereuse-va ue: signi ers are things hose use-va ue is to evoke conceorder for information to procure surplus-va ue, the additional quis required that al these se antic values expressed through the in


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MatterI 25

ma o al ma erial ca a d mus be expressed as a fur her vaexcha ge-value proper of hese sema ic values, hose circu a

he marke a o e ca procure surp us-value.e shall see la er, the

same dis i c o ca be made i hi he sema ic e d sea y recourse o eco om c surplus-value. I add t o o he ro sig co cepts, ords, oo, have he addi o al qual ty

represe e by a fur her value hich alo e ca procure ha Laca alogy o Marx's surp us-value, cal s surplus-e joyme somethwh ch we sha l re ur la er chap ers.


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Historic T me

n order to speci the historica and transhistorica aspects of the bin-itse f-for-itse f or surp us e rst need to specify hat is histotime and hat is subject to i t or no t. mentioned in passing that hisdesignates the modu ations of surp us in the semantic and econ

e ds. But if such modu ations can occur in the rst p ace, therebe an attribute in surp us (substance) hose empirica manifestatihistorica time. Te question becomes, therefore: hat are the tempoattributes of surp us?

Let me frame the question ithin extant debates. hen speaking of speci ca yh storicaltime, the rst question that poses itse f is

hether this time is supposed to have a directiona i atelosto ardhich historica events are supposed to converge. Tis is another ay

posing the question about the e stence or not of a meaning in histoto hich, as is amp y kno n, Hege responds a rmative y by aniing history as the time that unfo s under the guidance and for

sake of its notorious Spirit. Dra ing on ierre Macherey's expositiothe di erence bet een Spinoza's and Hege 's conceptions of histortime, Eugene Ho and conc udes that " na y, an most importSpinozian-Marxist po itics ou d reject a forms of te eo ogism(27).Such a "Spinozian-Marxist conception o f history presupposes an unstan ing of tempora ity other than the Hege iandialecticalstrugg eof the positive and the negative "in the te eo ogica sense . . .i.e., as

destined for synthesis/reso ution at some shining moment in the fut(28).Te reason hy the Spinozian theoretica edi ce prec udes forms of te eo ogism ies in the very conception of substance asca y non-te eo ogica . As Spinoza states of substance, hich is another ord for God or Nature: "Nature has no end set before an . . .a na causes are nothing but human ctions. Referri

27


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those who believe i God's w , Spi oza writes, ot without sthat the thi that:

[ ]f God acts for the sa e of a e d, he ecessaril wa tssomethi g hich he ac s . . . . or examp e, if a sto e hasfal e from a roof o to someo e's head a d killed him, the["the ol owers of this doctri e ] wil show . . . that the stofel i order to ill the ma . or if it did ot fa l to thate d, God willing t, how cou d so ma c rcumsta ces haveco curred b cha ce . . .? . . .A d so the will ot stopas i g for the causes of causes u t ou take refuge thewil of God, i.e. , the sa ctuar of ig ora ce.( 985, 442 443;Ethics,part , prop.36,appe dix)

Te rst postu ate of mo ism regardi g historica time is that it bete eo ogical.

Te ext questio is the whether historical time must be co ceivn i ear or other terms. a g the cap ta ist modulatio of surp

surp us-value as our lea , we see that it ma ifests itse f e pirica lmodes, as excha ge-va ue a d as use-value, of which the former is mi ed di ere tia l withi the sy chro icity of circulatio -time, alatter is subject to deca withi the diachro of linear productio -Te evide t i fere ce wou d be that the historical time of secular cta ist moder ity must a so co sist of these two modes of tempora

have prese ted e se here a more exte sive expositio as tosecu ar h storical time must be co ceived i s nchronic terms, soo recapitulate the releva t poi ts here, whi e a so expa di gdiachro ic aspect of historica t me.

Te shift from the presecular to the secular mode of histor ctime is re ected i , amo g others, the shift fromm hosto logosas the

arrative form capable of represe ti g historical truth.Myths, hosediachron c arrat ves had for ce turies, from biblical t me throua tiquit a d theocrac , remai ed the u challe ged purve or of tlose the r epistemo og ca leg timac w thi secu ar reaso athe realm of ctio . Te egitimate source of truth becomes owlogos,that is, logical deductio , which the secu ar discourse has tra itioassumed to co sist of a seque ce of causes a d e ects i a transco ectio withi diachro ic time, where A s the cause of B, Bcause of C, a d so o , ithout reversibi it . truth, ho ever,


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Historica i eI 29

th nking s a i erent al ode of thought that takes place ith nchronic ti e: if A necessari e tails B, then B a so ecessariA as its presuppos tio . As Kenneth Burke puts it, "though there

sense the ph sical or bio ogica sense "in hich a ather preceSon, there is also a sense the ogical sense "in hich the t o staare si ultaneous,' since "parents can be parents on insofar ahave o spring, an in this sense the o spri g akes' the parent(32).Te realm of logic is not that of bio ogica diachron but that of signi er, h ch s also to say, the real of the la , as is ev ent fact that in lega a option the son and the father are iterasi ultaneous . S nce

logos,like the signi er, operates in s nchron , i

can grasp an represent h stor on s nchronica l , consider ng hevents in their ogical si u taneit . Te fact that, as Hei egger r"an entit for hich . . .its Being s itself an issue, has, ontologicacircu ar structure, so that a l "interpretation operates in Being toa totalit of invo ve e ts hich is alread u derstoo , eans thaco cept o of h stor s al a s circular, and that, therefore, thcu ar t must be taken nto account, rather than enied(2008, 95an 88,an 90 1 9 ; 2006, 1 53an 149 150).Yet, historiographhas de ande throughout the secu ar era that h storical causationgenealo be presented in diachronic ter s.

But, one ght justi ab on er: oka , f logica de uct onoperates in the ode of s nchronic ti e, shouldn't then there be anot

nd of thought, operating n a i erent te poral o e that oul capab e of accounting for the fact that in histor certain facts preothers and can therefore be cons ered as the cause of the facts post ate the ? After a l, it is p ausible to argue, as an historiansthat, sa , as at east part cause b the faile1848revo ution,the dela ed constitut on of the Ger an state, an the Ger an defof W , but ouldn't t be utter absur to argue converse W as the cause of an of these prece ing events? Wel , the traor farce of h stor s that the latter s hat edo say, even if ost

ithout k o ing it. t is no accident that it as Marx ho expose proce ure through hich e cover the logica si ulta eit of histocauses and e ects under the fa a e of an ostens b e iachronic tio n ebunking the notorious "historica genea og of capthe "so-ca led pri itive accu u at on, Marx made obvious thah storica arrative meant to exp ain the generation of capita isS avojZi e 's ords, pure "fantas : "Lo g, long ago there [ as


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30 I Being, ime, Bios

diligent, ntelligent, and above al frugal agent " ho act[ed] cap tal st' pr or to the ex stence of cap tal sm, and " ho di ndiately consume his surp us but isely re nvested t in productio

thus gradua ly became a cap ta st Z

i ek 99 , 2 1 0 2 1 ;c t ng Marx1990, 873).Tis, in Marx's ords, "original sin of capita ism, far frobe ng a historical truth, is, inZi ek's ords, anideolo calmyth, a "fantasy, h ch "has, by de nit on, the structure of astoryto be narratedand is "produced by cap ta ism retroactive y to exp ain its o n and, at the same t me, to just present exploitation: the myth of

diligent saving orker ' (Marx1990, 873;Z ek1 99 1 , 2 1 ).So-calledhistorica causa ity s in truth expressed through the " ogic of

nt sy,"hich, a beit d sguised as a diachron c (and usua y progressivistoto be narrated, is "c rcular, s nce t "presupposes hat it purpexp ain (Zi ek 99 1 , 2 ).Hence, far from express ng the truth aboutthe inear genea ogy of any g ven h stor cal state, t on y reaa ternat vel , depend ng on ts polit ca agenda, cha lenges) thsustaining this state.

Te fact that the secu ar era raiseslogosto the so e epistemologica ylegit mate veh cle of truth renders secular thought ncapable of prodiachronic or transit ve causes. A secu ar causality, og cal anably) genealogical, is "circu ar, that is, synchronic. Tis is to say thans ers to genealogica historica questions are fundamentally impoor, di erently put, the necessity of a h storica epoch's genesis empurely contingent y. hich is h as Laclau and Mou e put t, "relations bet een necessity' an cont ngency' cannot be conceirelations bet een t o areas that are externa to each other . . .becausethe cont ngent on y exists th n the necessary(114) .

Te circu arity of historiography has t o crucial consequenceirst, that secular thought al ay arr ves there from here t start

conclus onis the prem se, or, n Lacan's famous ords, "the real is hich al ays returns to the same place (Lacan98 , 49) .Secon , if

truth emerges on y as a synchron c re nding of itself, then the empirical fantasy s the l us on that it emerges n a d achronicsion.Histo conceived s a diachronic narrative is an pirical ntasy

o "traverse the fundamenta fantasy ' of ideology means to get od achrony,to trans te diachrony into such synchronic terms that e in tpossibili of their own man station as the ven diachrony(Zi ek 9 9 ,27 1) Histo proper is real ntay that is, the synchronic fantasy thatunderl nes the fantasy of d achrony.


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T s conclus on, ho ever, does not ean that hatever presenitse f as a diachronic narrative shou d be dis issed as an episte ocally i legitimate mode of thought. Qu te the contrary, it means th

shou d be reduced to its synchronic logic so that the truth underits fantasy is revea ed. Te lesson of Marx's debun ng of cap talis"origina s n is not just that ostens bly diachronic genea ogicanations are ep ste ologica ly il egiti ate, but that they areideolo cal.Tat is to say, their truth-va ue lies not in hat they purport to explabut n thedesire animating their presumed exp natio .o traverse theideologica fantasy eans to revea the (rea ) desire that otivateostensib y diachronic genealogy.

Yet, the fact re ains that even as secular thought cannot produnarratives that indeed represent a diachronic exp anation of histofacts, historica factsdo nevertheless occur in a diachronic succession

ith irreversibil ty. Tere shou d therefore be a secu ar te poral that accounts for the succession of events in linear ti e, hile it shosi ultaneo us y be a ode of the attr butes of surp us. Ev dent y, s

rrevers b e d achrony of events that occur n succession of one must clude any causal i e genealo ca relationbet een the , since,

rst, the atter can be established on y through "logical deductthat is, in synchronic te porali and, second, if causali y is perentrance to diachrony it ill nevitably transfor itse f into te eoso ething hich, as e sa earlier, is inad iss ble ithin any onconceptualization of history. ndeed, e can nd accounts of such ncausa diachrony in secu ar capita ist odernity, both in the seand the econo c elds.

But pr or to exa ining these accounts of diachron c te porallet us turn once again to Sartre, to revisit his pheno eno ogical cont on of t e. n Sartre, there is no roo for diachrony, and a l tsynchronic. Sartre begins ith the accurate observation that the phenoenologica in-itself and the for-itse f cannot share the sa e te pora

n fact, the n-itse f, hat he a so ca s "facticity the being thitse f, in its o n plenitude, insofar as, as e have seen, it is positsuch through the nihi ation of the for-itse as that hich the for-icannot be ust pertain to a mode of tempora ity that the temporaof the for-itse f cannot be.Sartre argues, if the for-itse f is hat bein

hose "being is in question in so far as this being i plies a be ng othan itself hat is, the pheno enologica being-in-itse f then "evrevelation of a positive characteristic of being is the counterpart of


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32 I Bei g, ime, Bios

o tologica determ at o as pure egativit the be g of fo(Sartre,239a d 248).Sartre's ext step is Hegelia , that is, he i ferthat the temporal t of the i - tself, the "other or the "pure egat

of the temporal ty of the for-itse f, is o time hatsoever. Accordimo ism, this is impossible because if the temporalit of the for-itseto be im ted b someth g else, this somethi g e se must itsethe same ature, that is, some form of temporalit a d ot o t

hatsoever. Te "other of the temporalit of the for-itse f, the timethe phe ome ological i -itse ca ot be "pure egativ ' but the "other of s chro a d its imagi ar causes, iachro as causal successio . Tis, ho ever, is ot Sartre's reaso i g, hose stuiti erar i the chapter "Te O tology of emporalit ' deserves pui g closel . Tere he co c udes that there ca be o temporal relabet ee (phe ome o ogical) i -itselfs for the fo lo i g reaso :

f A is to be prior to B, it ust be, i its ver being,in B ass future. Co verse , B, if it is to be posterior to A, must

l ger behi d tself i A, hich ill co fer o B ts se se oposteriorit . f the e gra tp ioribei g i -itself to A a dto B, it is impossible to establish bet ee them the s ightestco ectio of successio .( 90)

or the prioribei g i -itse f is complete i its c ose ess a d cabe in a other i -itse either as ts o priority or posteriority. ehere that Sartre's co ceptio of priorit a d posteriorit is i tri so e of causal ty a d teleolog : f s prior i - tse f ere alreadi -itse f the A ould ecessari cause the emerge ce of B, ai -itse f i ge era ould be te eo ogical. It is because, for Sart

ecessar i vo ves causalit that he has to egate a temporali -itse lest ever thi g i the orld has a purpose.

Sartre the proceeds to dismiss "the possibilit that this relabefore-after ca exist o for a it ess ho estab shes t, bec

a ts to b pass Ka t's thesis that time is a categor of represe taa d ot of the thi g-i -itself, a d to argue i stea that "the relaof the rese t to the ast s a relatio of be g, ot of represe t( 90a d 207) Here o e might a t to object that i truth Sartreremai s ithi the Ka t a paradigm, i adverte tl reduci g timecategory of represe tatio , i sofar as time "is the i tra-structure obei g hich is its o a ihi atio that is, themo of bein peculiar


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to being-for-itself, hich for Sartre is nothing other than conscious(202).In his atte pt to pree pt this objection, Sartre fra es his thesthat " e porality exists only . . .as the intra-structure of a or-itself

ith the ad onition that: "Not that the or-itse f has an ontologipriority over te porality. But e pora ity is the being of the or-itin so far as the or-itse f has to be its being ecstatica ly. e pois not, but the or-itself te pora izes itself by existing( 95) .Sar reargues here that his ode di ers fro Kant's insofar as there is

rst a consciousness that posits tempora i y; rather, te porality itisthe being of consciousness, insofar as consciousness cannot e ergein the distance fro its in-itse in a " ay of projecting itse f vato ard its Se of being hat it is beyond a nothingness . . ., of beingthis fall of being, this frustration of being hich the or-itse f hasbe ( 96).Te for-itse f can long to be the Se f that it has to be on

ithin te pora i hich is thus presupposed for, rather than poseby, consciousness( 96).In other ords, in a so e hat ironic ay, itis only via consciousness that Sartre can clai that ti e is not juscategory of consciousness but an intra-structure of being. More specally, the in-itse f e erges through its intra-structure ith the for-itas the atter's past: "Te In-itse f is hat the or-itself asb re" ( 98).

Tis pheno enological explanation of ti e orks only insofar asthe for-itself (consciousness) is given abso ute priority over both thitse f and ti e. or, one ay ask: before, hen the for-itse f as ye the in-itsel ho as it possible for the for-itse f to delineate as a for-itself unless there as a ready an in-itse Tis cou d eadregression to a "bad in nit unless, of course, as Sartre does hen

rites that, to repeat, "the or-itse f te poralizes itse f by existingequates the for-itse f (consciousness) not ith

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Being, Time, Bios (Capitalism and Ontology)