Behavioural Safety at the Carrington Site From a plateau to an iceberg, trying to avoid a few...
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Behavioural Safety at the Carrington Behavioural Safety at the Carrington Site Site From a plateau to an iceberg, trying to avoid a few crevasses Peter Webb, HSEQ Manager, Basell Polyolefins Carrington Site
Behavioural Safety at the Carrington Site From a plateau to an iceberg, trying to avoid a few crevasses Peter Webb, HSEQ Manager, Basell Polyolefins Carrington
Behavioural Safety at the Carrington Site From a plateau to an
iceberg, trying to avoid a few crevasses Peter Webb, HSEQ Manager,
Basell Polyolefins Carrington Site
Slide 2
Outline What is behavioural safety How we implemented a
behavioural programme Some key learning points
Slide 3
Safety . A potted history TIME Human Factors Technological
Improvements INCIDENTS Management Systems We are here!
Slide 4
Why Behavioural Safety? Its just another tool in the human
factors tool box
Slide 5
What does a Behavioural Approach Comprise? All behavioural
safety programmes have a system of OBSERVATION and FEEDBACK The
observations can be done by anybody on anybody Its all about people
talking to each other about safety
Slide 6
The Observation Process Stop and observe Put the person being
observed at ease Explain what you are doing and why Discuss the job
being carried out Observe the work activity for a few minutes
Praise safe behaviours Discuss any at risk behaviours What Why
Discuss what the worst consequences could have been Ask what
corrective action is required Get commitment to act Finally record
the observation - but no names! Observation On the spot
Feedback
Slide 7
Why do we behave the way we do? Values Attitudes Behaviours Our
behaviour is driven by our attitudes and values
Slide 8
What Are Behaviours? Attitude: Im going to use the right tools
for the job Behaviour: *$%^&!!! Ive brought the wrong tool out
with me. But Im not going to use it, because that would be unsafe.
Im going to walk back to the workshop and get the right one. Our
behaviour is driven by our attitudes and values Value: I think
safetys important
Slide 9
How can you modify At Risk Behaviours? At risk behaviours are
driven by attitudes and values But you cant modify peoples values
and attitudes directly . They are too deep within us. So you use a
system of observations which address the at risk behaviours. If you
work on modifying the at risk behaviours, eventually the at risk
attitudes and values change too. We used to feel it was safe to
ride in a car without a seat belt.
Slide 10
Modify the behaviour and the value will follow Value: I feel
safe in my car without a seat belt Attitude: Wearing seat belts is
unnecessary Behaviour: I dont wear my seat belt in my car.
Behaviour: I wear my seat belt in my car. Attitude: Wearing seat
belts is a responsible thing to do Value: I feel uncomfortable and
exposed in my car without a seat belt Value: I feel uncomfortable
and exposed in my car without a seat belt Behaviour modification:
You must wear your seat belt, its the law!
Slide 11
Carrington Site
Slide 12
How did we come to BBS 1980s Systems initiatives in HSE. Total
recordable injury rate reduced from ~18 to ~10 injuries per million
hours worked. Mid 1990s Safety performance had plateaued 1996
became aware of behavioural programmes Decision was taken to pilot
it on one plant (Styrocell) Engaged BS provider to assist in
implementation Started with observations in January 1997.
BBS Programme Some specifics of our implementation: List of
critical behaviours Developed by reviewing near miss reports.
Follow up We dont wait for trends to develop. We follow up on the
individual at risks - prioritised short list. Facilities vs
behaviour We dont limit the at risks to behaviour related We allow
at risks which are related to the facilities as well The most
important thing is that people are doing the observations face to
face
Slide 15
BBS Programme Styrocell programme was a great success. Great
enthusiasm amongst (most/enough) technicians. Programme was rolled
out to rest of site in 1997/8. Steering groups set up in each dept
Separate list of critical behaviours in each dept Cross site
facilitators group Approx 10 - 15% of workforce were observers (now
its 100% plus contractors) A lot of creativity and energy put into
it
Slide 16
Slide 17
> 18 Before 1990 Total Recordable Injury Rate (per 10 6 hrs)
BBS introduced
Slide 18
In 1999 it was clear there were problems Fall off in
observations Technicians were saying: The same observations are
being done on the same tasks People cant be bothered Its the same
people being observed all the time Observation process is too
formal Carrington is already safe, so why bother? Whats coming out
of it? Data input to database is difficult Resuscitation
Slide 19
Resuscitation Managers were saying the same as the technicians,
and Theres not enough visible output. We need more performance
metrics contact rate, observation quality Vision is that everybody
needs to be an observer. Whole process needs to become part of the
existing HSE system. We need to move on from the original concept
and make BBS our own.
Slide 20
Resuscitation It was not delivering to its full potential But
we thought the approach was fundamentally sound So we launched a
resuscitation Decision to work without the original BS provider ..
A representative team identified 4 issues
Slide 21
Resuscitiation Issue 1: Organisation Issue Need to make line
supervisors part of the process. Need to integrate BBS into the
site HSE systems.
Slide 22
Resuscitiation Issue 1: Organisation Made up of Managers and
technicians Only Technicians The BBS organisation we started
with
Slide 23
Resuscitiation Issue 1: Organisation Managers supervisors and
technicians Subgroup made up of Improvement Leader and cell focal
points Site divided into cells of 6 - 8 people Everybody is an
observer, including contractors And the organisation we changed to
. Its fully integrated! Key person
Slide 24
Resuscitiation Issue 2: Perceptions Issue Overcome the
complacency Its already safe at Carrington People dont see the
value. Response At the end of the observation, during the feedback,
if there are at risks to discuss, jointly agree what was the worst
consequence which could have happened. Jointly agree a ranking (L,
M, H) for the potential outcome on a defined scale ranging from
slight injury (first aid), through to fatality. Gets people to
visualise what could go wrong
Slide 25
Resuscitation Issue 3: Reporting Issue Need to pull out
learning points. Need to give feedback to observers. Integrate into
the business link with near miss reporting. Response Every month ..
Overall KPIs reviewed by site HSE Council (chaired by Site Manager)
Department HSE committees review performance against KPIs Cell
members receive a report showing status of the at risks
Slide 26
Resuscitation Issue 4: Observations Issue People should want to
carry out observations. Need to simplify the observation process.
Need to make recording simpler. Response Original programme design
comprised a different list of critical behaviours in each
department Created a generic list to be used by everybody Allows
any observer to carry out observations anywhere on site The generic
list is quite short, observation time can be as short as 5 minutes
Some people even do it without the checklist!
Slide 27
Other things weve learned! Key Performance Indicators Currently
have 3 KPIs: Number of observations, 1 per person per month (all
employees and contractors) Quality, Percent of observations for
which the what and the why are filled out > 80% Close-out of
High at risks, 100% in < 3 months Number of observations forms
part of bonus scheme 1800 observations in 2001, 2400 in 2002 . We
dont have a KPI on % safe! If you get 100% safe, does that mean
youve finally made it? A safe work place at last? Or does it mean
people arent looking hard enough? With our generic list of critical
behaviours, its hard to imagine we could reach 100% safe.
Slide 28
Other things weve learned! Management Commitment Everybody
knows its important, but what can they do to show it By taking an
active interest Management team must be active observers Use
managers to coach in the observer training
Slide 29
Other things weve learned! Hold an away day in a nice hotel!
Organised by the BBS department focal points Attended by site
management team, cell focal points, term contractors Generated
several action items for enhancing the programme Demonstrates
management commitment, generates good ideas, gets buy in.
Slide 30
Other things weve learned! Organisational readiness
Implementing BBS is a big commitment - you dont want it to fail!
Organisational readiness (climate/culture) is a key factor which
influences likelihood of success. HSE CRR 430/2002 - of 8 providers
interviewed, 3 said they would proceed regardless of readiness. To
avoid a costly failure, discuss up front, or conduct independent
culture survey.
Slide 31
Other things weve learned! Can be extended to other areas e.g.
We have now included environmentally critical behaviours in the
programme Is environmental protection equipment available Is
pollution prevention achieved Releases controlled Waste disposed of
appropriately Energy used efficiently
Slide 32
Other things weve learned! Major Accident Hazards Behavioural
safety has been driven by injury frequency Our inventory of
critical behaviours was developed by reviewing near miss/incident
reports -> focus on workplace safety It doesnt follow that a
reduction in the risks due to major accident hazards will occur It
depends on the list of critical behaviours Heres an example of how
BBS added to the major accident hazard risk!
Slide 33
Major Accident Hazards Manlid was not only used for process
reasons, but was also a relief device Handle had been fitted to
solve a manual handling at risk after a BBS observation. Plant
change procedure was not followed Bolts interfered with sealing
surface Pentane vapour leakage Completely lost sight of the MAH
risks Handle Bolts
Slide 34
Major Accident Hazards Incident investigations indicated
Procedures were often a root cause Procedures often relate to
controlling major accident hazards (plant change, safe operation,
permit to work etc.) Weve added procedures to our inventory of
critical behaviours
Slide 35
Was there a procedure for the activity? Was the procedure
appropriate? Was the procedure followed? Safe NO At risk NO At risk
NO At risk Yes Major Accident Hazards You can substitute the word
Training for Procedure Procedures: permit to work safe operation
plant change control of contractors etc
Slide 36
References Health & Safety Executive (2002). Strategies to
promote safe behaviour as part of a health and safety management
system, Contract Research Report 430/2002, www.hse.gov.uk PRISM
(2002). Behavioural Safety Application Guide,
www.prism-network.org
Slide 37
Summary The organisation must be ready for it Management
commitment is essential It needs to be easy to carry out the
observations Needs to be integrated into the HSE MS Need at least a
few enthusiastic people to keep things going in their departments
People need to see some output Make sure the programme addresses
all the issues which are important for your organisation - Dont
forget about major accident hazards We think BBS works, but its not
easy The End!
