Behaviour Ism vs Functionalism.final

8/3/2019 Behaviour Ism vs Functionalism.final

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Yaser GhoalmiZ3291637

8/29/2011


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Which one of Behaviourism and Functionalism can solve the body-mind problem?

There are many approaches to the mind-body problem, but none of the methods can claim

that they can completely solve this problem. There is also no strong evidence to prove that

any view of this dilemma can be concluding to non-physical properties. There is no direct

answer as to what the nature of mind is and we might never be able to reveal it. In this paper I

will assess and discuss each response to the mind-body problem.

Behaviourism and Functionalism are two theories that try to give an explanation tothe mind-body problem. They both try to make a framework that is capable to explain theinsidemechanism of the brain and from there assemble a model which could explain how our mind

mechanism works.

In general philosophies of mind have two main approaches including dualist and materialist

theories. In the dualist approach the mind is defined as a nonphysical substance whereas in

materialist theories the mental is not different from the physical and in fact all mental states,

characteristics, and all its actions essentially are identical with physical states. Behaviourists,

maintain that all talk of mental causes can be eliminated from the language of psychology in

favour of talk of environmental stimuli and behavioural responses. Moreover other

materialists such as the identity theorists state that there are mental causes and that they areidentical with neurophysiologic actions in the brain. In addition functionalism that is neither

dualist nor materialist has risen from philosophical reflection of artificial intelligence,

computational theory, linguistics which are in general known as the cognitive sciences and

have in common a specific level of abstraction and a concern with systems which process

information. Functionalism, which tries to offer a philosophical explanation of this level of

abstraction, identifies the option or possibility that systems are as varied as human beings and

calculating machines could all have mental states. From the functionalist view the

psychology of a system is not based on parts that it is made of (e.g. living cells, metal or

spiritual energy) but based on how the parts is put together. Functionalism is a difficult

concept, and one way of coming to grips with it, is to review the imperfection of the dualist

and materialist philosophies of mind.

Lets first discuss the failure of dualism:

The main problem of dualism is its failure to account sufficiently for mental causation. If the

mind is nonphysical therefore it has no position in physical space, so how a mental cause


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could emerge to a behavioural effect that has a position in space? Or how can the nonphysical

give rise to the physical without infringing the laws of the conservation of mass, energy and

of momentum?

The dualist maybe answer that the problem of how a non-material substance could cause

physical action is not much ambiguous than the problem of how one physical action could

cause another. Yet there is a significant difference as there are obvious cases of physical

causation but not a clear case of nonphysical causation.

Dualism is also contrary to the psychological systems. The psychologists regularly employ

the experimental approaches of the physical sciences to the study of the mind. If mental

processes were distinct from physical processes, there would be no reason to assume these

methods are feasible in the world of the mental. In order to adjust their experimental

approaches many psychologists directly required an alternative to dualism.

To some extend functionalism is against both the ideas of behaviourism and Physicalism.

Functionalism changes behaviourisms "sensory inputs" to sensory inputs and mental

states", it also changes behaviourisms "disposition to act" to disposition to act and have

certain mental states. Basically functionalism says that each kind of mental state is a state

included of a disposition to perform in certain ways and to have certain mental states, given

certain sensory inputs and certain mental states. In fact functionalism individuates mental

states moderately in terms of fundamental relations to other mental states; although

behaviourism refuses the existence of mental states. Also functionalisms ideas suggests that

it is not possible to have a first-order physical property in common to all and the only the

possible physical understandings of a given Turing-machine state.Moreover Physicalism is a

chauvinist theory which unfairly excludes brainless creatures who however have minds.

The entire idea of Physicalism is based on the fact that there cannot be anything more to the

mind which can beexplained in physical terms. Although this idea appears to be fairlyobvious and clear it becomes problematic when the issue of consciousness comes out.

Basically all animals including human beings are conscious. But it is quitechallenging todescribe theprecise meaning of our consciousness and to relate it to a physicalist framework.Thomas Nagel, in his article What Is It Like to Be a Bat? suggests that there is a subjectiveattribute to experience and consciousness that is not adequately expressed in the physicalistframeworks. His argument basically suggests that no matter how our knowledge gets deeper

about the bat anatomy, we will not beable to get the sense of what it feels like to be a bat.Although we might understand that echo-location works

as a sort of sixth sense, and work out

the neuronal paths in the bat brain that makes theecho-location and the other nervous


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systems. But scientific investigations, particularly factual facts that are deriving from

scientific observation, are not enough to convince us what it is feelto be like a bat or how abat experiences. This proves that there is a subjective property to experience that is not

imparted in the physicalist description of the mind.

This argument is relatively comparable to Jacksons Mary argument, where he tries to

prove thatthere are things that are qualia in our experience. Mary is a scientist and an experton the visualsystem and she has all the theoretical knowledge about the brain functioningfrom the optic systems point of view. Although that Mary knows a ll the details about the

brains optics, for somereason she is living in a black and white room. Also she only hasaccess to the outsideworld through a black and white television. While Mary knowseverything about human optical system she has never seen colour for herself. When Marycomes out of the room she sees colour for the first time. Jacksonargues this experience as anew one for Mary and in fact he believes that she has just learned something. However if she

already knew all the necessary knowledge about seeing, what could she possibly have learnt?

Thus there must be an extra property quale to experience colour that she was incapable to

grasp until she experiencedcolour for herself.While both the bat argument and the Mary argument try to show the same characteristic ofsubjective qualia that physicalism makes unfeasible, they are not equally protected from

criticism.I think the bat argument is more vulnerable, because it doesnt convince me that weneed atheory that makes us able to experience what it is like to feel like another organism.We do not know what it is feel to be a bat as a bat experiences the world. Also we do not

know if a bat even has such a feeling; what it is like to be a bat experience. Perhaps the

consciousness that a bat has does not impart for the essential introspection to give it a subjective quality to experience. It is probable, although unlikely, that a principle of what you

seeis what you get is in operation when it comes to a bats consciousness.But Colin McGill helps us to avoid the requirement that subjective experience should be

outside our physical description of the brain. McGill suggests that there is a direct relation

between the brain and the subjective quality of experience, so he is tightly against the notion

of any sort of dualism. However, the difference is that for McGill the design of the human

brain, and its cognitive ability and design, makes it incapable to conceptually grasp the nature

of this link. Actually what we are trying to discover is specifically something that our brains

are unable to comprehend. Basically his argument is that there is some type of function or


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property in the brain that is assigned to consciousness, and that the brain is totally closed off

from being able to comprehend this property. This has the suitable side effect of removing the

philosophical trouble from the mind-body problem, as it lets us to accept that there is some

link between the biological mechanism of the brain and the idea of consciousness without

having to specify what it is. This looks to impart a clear answer to why the mind-body

question is so elusive to answer, but I think it almost clarifies its capability to clear all of our

concerns.

So we might think that functionalism is the hero of mind-body problem but there is a clear

objection to functionalism that as a theory of mind the functionalist definition is not limited

to mental states and processes. Coke machines, pencil sharpeners, mousetraps and ministers

of finance are all concepts that are functionally described, but none is a mental concept such

as pain, belief and desire. What, then, typifies the mental? And can it be obtained in a

functionalist framework?

The usual view in the philosophy of mind is that mental states are differentiated by what are

called either qualitative content or intentional content. Here is an example to demonstrate this

concept; imagine you are looking at a blank wall through a red filter, now you change the

filter to a green one and leave everything else the way as it was. When you change the filters

something about the character of your experience changes, and this is qualitative content.

The reason for why qualitative content is a problem for functionalism is obvious.

Functionalism defines the mental states in terms of their causes and effects. Although two

mental states could have the same fundamental relations they could differ in terms of their

qualitative content. This idea can be illustrated through this classic puzzle of the inverted

spectrum. Imagine two observers who are similar in all relevant psychological views apart

from that experience, having the qualitative content of red for one observer would have the

qualitative content of green for the other. There is nothing needed about their behaviour to

show the difference because both of them see ripe tomatoes and flaming sunsets as being

similar in colour and both of them call that colour "red." In addition, the causal association

between their (qualitatively distinct) experiences and their other mental states could also be

identical. Probably they both think of Little Red Riding Hood when they observe ripe

tomatoes. Apparently if anything that could be included in the notion of the causal role of

their experiences could be shared by the observers and still the qualitative content of the

experiences could differ. If this is likely, then the functionalist account does not apply for


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mental states that have qualitative content. If someone is having a green experience while

another person is having a red one, then definitely they must be in different mental states.

The example of the spectrum which was mentioned above is more than a verbal puzzle.

Having qualitative content is thought to be a leading factor in what makes a mental state

conscious. Contrary to qualitative content, functionalism introduces the intentional content.

Intentional content is established on three basic ideas: Proposition, truth, and differentially. It

also accounts for intentionality of symbolism by use of language and the similar theory in

which the brain uses memory to recognize and visualize. However, we cannot have

computation without representation.

Overall functionalism is fairly the closest answer we have for the mind-body problem. It is

not the complete answer, but at least the closest we have as a complete answer.

List of Articles:

1. Colin McGinn, 1989 Can we solve the mind-body problem?

2. Thomas Nagel, 1974 what is it to be a bat?

3. Frank Jackson, 1986, Why Mary didnt know

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Behaviour Ism vs Functionalism.final