BECHWATI_&_MORRIN_2003_Outraged Consumers - Getting Even at the Expense of Getting a Good Deal

JOURNAL OF CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY, 13(4), 44W53 Copyright O 2003, Lawrence Erlbaurn Associates, Inc.

Outraged Consumers: Getting Even at the Expense of Getting a Good Deal

Nada Nasr Bechwati Department of Marketing

Bentley College

Maureen Morrin School of Business

Rutgers University, Camden

This article introduces the concept of desire for consumer vengeance. Desire for consumer vengeance (DCV) is conceptualized as the desire of a decision maker to "get even" with an entity, such as a firm, in response to a perceived wrongdoing. Drawing on research in psychology and organization behavior, a theoretical framework is proposed for understanding variables that in- fluence the extent to which the DCV is felt and the conditions under which one acts on such feelings. The results of 2 experiments show that, given sufficient desire for vengeance, some consumers will choose a suboptimal decision outcome to get even with a firm. We also find that it is the interpersonal factors of the redress experience, rather than its tangible outcomes, that drive consumers to exact revenge on firms after a dissatisfying experience.

It seems like outraged consumers are everywhere. They become furious when their flights are cancelled, their telephone bills contain unexpected charges, or the line they must wait in for service is excessively long (Appelman, 2001; Brady, 2000). What factors determine the level of outrage consumers feel in such situations and what types of marketplace behaviors do such consumers tend to exhibit? A key focus of this research concerns the nature of outraged consumers' subsequent brand choice (i.e., how the subsequent or replace- ment brand is chosen by extremely dissatisfied consumers). For example, if consumers become outraged with AT&T's long distance services, how do they next decide which long distance firm to deal with?

Prior researchers have implicitly assumed that the brand to which consumers switch after a negative product or service experience is chosen on the basis of wanting to maximize their utility function (e.g., obtain maximum product satisfaction at the lowest possible price). We challenge this assumption to propose, instead, that at extreme levels of dissatisfaction, some consumers will react to the negative experience in ways that may lead them to choose a suboptimal al-

Requests for reprints should be sent to Nada Nasr Bechwati, Bentley College, 175 Forest Street, Waltharn, MA 02452. E-mail: nnasr@

ternative (i.e., one that does not objectively maximize the value function). We further propose that the driving mechanism for such a choice is a negative feeling not yet examined in the consumer literature-the desire to exact revenge or "get even" with the firm. Exacting revenge through subsequent brand choice, we propose, may provide psychological utility to these consumers that partially substitutes for or offsets the loss of objective product utility.

We know from prior research that dissatisfied consumers are more likely to switch brands (i.e., leave one firm to join another; Hirschman, 1970; Richins, 1983). What we don't understand well is the process by which outraged consumers choose the next brand to purchase. A key question of interest in this research thus concerns what happens next (i.e., the process by which outraged consumers choose the next brand to purchase). Because previous research addressing responses to customer dissatisfaction has typically not gone beyond the brand exiting point, a key contribution of this research is its focus on postexit behavior-that is, on the nature of one's choices after the decision to switch to an alternative provider has been made.

This investigation's focus on consumers' feelings and their impact on subsequent choice behavior renders this a more consumer-centric article than most of the prior research

bentley.edu in the customer satisfaction/dissatisfaction stream, which to

date has been largely nlanagerially oriented. Rather than ask- ing the traditional question: "How is the firm harmed by dissatisfied customers'?" (see. e.g.. TARP. 1986), we ask "How is the consumer hanned by feelings of extreme dissatisfaction?" In effect, although previous research mainly focused on the impact of dissatisfaction to the firm in terms of negative image and reduced sales (e.g., Richins, 1983). we are concerned mainly with its impact on consumer well-being. as measured by their affective state and the optimality of their subsequent choice behavior (Bazerman, 2001 j.

Considerable research has examined consumer responses to dissatisfaction (detailed later) and researchers have reported the existence of outraged and highly frustrated consumers who want to get back at firrils (Blodgett, Hill, & Tax. 1997; Oliver. 1989; Richins, 1983). However. litlle or n o research has specitically examined the nature of consumers' feelings and the factors that determine how they behaviorally respond with their si~bsequent product choices when they are extremely dissatisfied with a purchase experience (i.e., dissatisfied to the point of feeling outraged). In this research, we focus on behavioral and affective processes that are not cov- ered by previous research and which are unique to outraged consumers.

Prior research has shown that when consumers aredissatis- tied with a product or senice provider, they typically exhibit one of three behaviors. namely they: (a) complain to the provider. (b) spread neptive word of mouth (WOM) to their friends and relatives, and/or (c) switch to an alternative provider and thus "exit" the firm (Blodgett. Granbois, & Walters. 1993: Hirschnian. 1970; Mittal & Kamakura. 2001; Richins. 1981. 1987; Singh. 1990a. 199Ob: Smith. Bolton. & Wagner 1999). All of these options have received fairly extensive research attention. Complaining and engaging in negative WOM behavior have been widely documented in the literature (Gilly & Gelb, 1982; Richins. 1983, 1987: Singh. 1990b). In regard to brand switching behavior. researchers have looked at numerous factors that increase the likelihood of switching brands or service providers when a consumer has a ncgative experience with :I firm (Mittal & Kamakura. 2001; Singli. 19903, 1990b). Studies in the area of service failure and recovery have also looked at how negative customer experiences in service context% can lead to switching behavior-that is. de- fection to alternative service providers (e.g.. S~nith & Bolton, 1998). Similar behavior has been examined in product contexts (Blodgett et al., 1993; Hirschman, 1970).

Despite the fact that consumers in prior studies have reported different levels of dissatisfaction ranging from mild dissatisfaction to outrage, researchers have treated this group unifornily as "dissatisfied" consumers. Behavioral reactions of all dissatisfied consumers were studied in the framework of the three traditional responses (exiting, complaining, and negative WOM). It has beenimplicitly assumed by priorresearch- ers that consumer satisfaction lies along a continuum in tern15 of its impact on behavior, with the more dissatisfied consumers simply exhibiting more of the specific measure of interest

(whether complaining, exiting, or negative WObl) depending on situational factors (see. e.g., Blodgett et al., 1993: Folkcs, Koletsky, &Graham. 1987). We argue here that some outraged colisumers will opt for behaviors that are ylltrlirc~tively different than these traditional options. Thus, this research, in con- trast to most prior research, proposes that not all dissatistied consulners arc alike. That is. we hypothesi~e not only that extreme dissatisfaction will rewlt in higher level\ of tradition;ll responses such as brand smitching behavior. but also that extreme levels of dissatisfaction can change the nature of the response. Namely. we expect that high levels of the desire to exact revenge on the tirm causing the dissatisfaction can lead to choosing a suboptimal brand allernative.

Researchers have studied negative ernotions that accotn- pany consumers' dissatisfying experiences (Oliver. 1989; Richins, 1997: Westbrook RL Oliver, 1991 ). The emotions reported \,ary not only in intensity but also in nature. For in- \tancc, Oliver (1989) suggested that the negatike ernotionh felt by dissatislicd consumers can vary in increasing intensity from tolerance to sadness to regret to agitation to outrage. 01- ivcr ;11so argued that these enlotions vary in type or n:lture. such as their being internally (31- cxtcmally orienfed. Extreme negative feelings sirnilsr to outrage, such as frustration, anger. hostility. and irritation. have also been documented in the consumer literature (Richinr, 1997: Westbrook & Oliver, I99 I ) , A negative affective response that h 3 not yet been ex- plicitly investigated in a consumer context is that of the desire for vengeance.

We define the desire fol.ion.surnrr vetigrunc,P (DCV) as the relaliatory feelings that consumers feel toward a firm, such as thc desire to exert some harm on the firm. typically following an extremely ncgative purchaseexperience. In the psychology literature, Gabriel and Monaco ( 1994. p. 165) defined vengeance more broadly as "the intense. cornpelling wish or i n - tention to get even. right a wrong. or avenge an injury.'. We adopt this concept to decision-making contexts. such as those that involve making product purchase decisions. Outraged consumers who want to "hurt a firm" (Folkes. 1984) or "get even withafinn"(B1odgettetal.. 1993) areexperiencing DCV. which differs from stiundard definitions of customer dissatisfaction in that it incorporates the hc~haviorul interztion fo act aguinst the c?f;f'endingjifinlr. Although there are a number of ways that consumers could potentially respond to extreme dissatisfaction, such a by boycotting a firm's products or spreading negative WOM, we limit our focus in this research to an individual's response in terms of subsequent product choice beh ;I\ .' lor,

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

To x\,cnge a perceived injury. decision makers might act irrationally (Elliot. Eccles. & Gournay. 1996; Seiders & Berry. 1998). Although the psychology literature on the topic of vcngcance is rather sparse. it suggests that feelings of ven-

442 NASR BECHWATI AND MORRIN

geance can impact decision makers' choice behavior. Studying the effect of intense negative emotions on decision making, Lowenstein (2000) found that people may act in ways that are not in their own self-interest as a result of those emotions. Elster (1998) identified cases of revenge and anger that can get to "the point of no return," a point where decision makers may act irrationally.

One reason for decision makers' irrational behavior is their desire to seek vengeance, or their inability to avoid seeking vengeance, even if vengeance comes at a cost (Seiders & Berry, 1998). Although it is not precisely clear how vengeance works, apparently it is seen as providing a certain satisfaction or relief and as a coping mechanism for problems (Gabriel & Monaco, 1994). The implication is that getting even can become a dominating objective of future actions. Several examples of irrational behavior performed to achieve vengeance have been reported in sports (Zillman, Bryant, & Sapolsky, 1979) and political elections (Abraham & Weiss, 2000). Similar responses are expected to occur in competitive consumer markets.

We propose that outraged consumers will tend to direct their anger toward the firm. The psychology literature in human emotions suggests that the object of an emotion is closely tied to its cognitive antecedent (Elster, 1998). Thus, anger and, consequently, revenge, tend to be object-specific (Elster, 1998; Oliver, 1989). The object of anger or target of revenge is the person or party who we believe has hurt us, either by damaging our self-identity or by violating our trust (Bies & Tripp, 1996). We refer to this entity in this research as the "perpetrator" of injustice. In business contexts, the perpetrator of injustice is the firm with which the problem occurred.

When consumers are dissatisfied with afirm, they typically face a numter of choice options. They could decide to simply stay with the firm and continue purchasing its products. This is referred to here as apassive response to a perceived injustice. Alternatively, they couldexit that firm and switch to acompeti- tor. If the consumer examines product offerings from among the remaining competitors and chooses the objectively optimal alternative (e.g., based on the lowest per-unit price for a commodity type item), thisis termedareactiveresponse. Such a choice is a fairly rational response and would be predicted by much of the economics and choice literature based on notions of utility maximization. However, consumers may instead, in the pursuit of vengeance, exit the original firm and make a choice that is not in their best interest but which they perceive may allow them to get even with the perpetrator. We refer to this as proactive response. Note that we use the term "proactive" merely to reflect the fact that the consumer is engaging in a deliberate behavioral response; it is not meant to suggest that such a response is a positive or desirable one.

We propose that some consumers experiencing intense dissatisfaction will respond in such a proactive manner. Out- raged consumers might not find it sufficiently satisfying to simply exit the firm as per Hirschman's (1970) framework. Exiting merely returns one to the no-relationship level. What

consumers often want is to hit the firm where it hurts the most-they want to "avenge an injury." The best exit, therefore, may be perceived to be one that involves shifting one's purchases specifically to that firm's fiercest competitor, regardless of whether it represents the optimal choice from the competitive set (e.g., even if its prices are higher than other competitors providing the same service). For example, in the past a consumer upset with MCI may have decided to switch to Sprint, its number one rival, rather than to other firms considered to be less of a threat to MCI, even if they offered a better deal. We propose that if an injustice is perceived as sufficiently severe in nature, consumers will generally be more motivated to exact revenge on the perpetrator with their subsequent choices. Based on this, we hypothesize that:

HI: As the DCV increases, consumers are more likely to move from a passive (loyalty) to a reactive (switch to optimal alternative) to a proactive (switch to suboptimal alternative) choice response.

Although H1 might look quite intuitive, the most interesting aspect of it is that it suggests that consumers who reach a sufficiently high level of dissatisfaction will, eventually, act proactively. That is, rather than rationally choosing the best alternative from among the remaining assortment of brands, after an extremely dissatisfying experience, some consumers will switch instead to the brand that allows them to elicit some sort of harm and thus exact revenge on the original product or service provider. They will do so even if it involves choosing the alternative that does not maximize their utility, at least in the traditional sense of the term (e.g., perceived value). This is because exacting revenge is a coping strategy that provides emotional value, which can, in a sense, substitute for product value. A similar phenomenon has been demonstrated in the regret literature, where researchers have shown that consumers are willing to trade off financial return to avoid possible feelings of regret (Bell, 1982; Inman, Dyer, & Jia, 1997; Zeelenberg, Beattie, Van Der Plight, & De Vries, 1996).

What leads to a high level of DCV and, consequently, the taking of revenge by consumers against firms? Much research attention has been devoted to investigating an array of moderating and mediating variables to better understand when dissatisfied consumers are likely to respond in a certain manner (e.g., complain rather than switch brands). For this purpose, researchers have drawn on attribution theory (Folkes, 1984; Folkes et al., 1987; Oliver, 1989), equity theory, and the related notion of perceived injustice (Blodgett et al., 1993; Huppertz, Arenson, & Evans, 1978). Overall, they have found that, given dissatisfaction, consumers' reaction is contingent on a number of situational and interpersonal factors. Those factors include, among others, inferences about who caused the failure and the extent of the firm's control of the situation that led to failure (Folkes, 1984; Folkes et al., 1987; Oliver, 1989), perceptions of the redress environment

OUTRAGED CONSUMERS 443

(Blodgett et al., 1993), and the consumer's level of social interaction (Richins, 1987).

We focus on perceived justice theory to outline the factors that result in high levels of DCV and vengeful behavior for several reasons. First, prior researchers have suggested that the concept of perceived injustice lies at the heart of vengeance (Bies & Tripp, 1996; Stuckless & Goranson, 1992). Second, the idea of perceived justice can usefully be applied to any stage of the entire conflict situation rather than to just one particular stage, such as the cause of the conflict. Al- though attribution theory has substantially advanced our understanding of consumers' reactions to dissatisfying experiences (Folkes, 1984; Folkes et al., 1987), it focuses only on the cause of the problem between consumers and firms (Folkes et al., 1987; Weiner, Russell, & Lerman, 1979). To fully understand the evolution of a conflict between consumers and firms, a framework is needed to study the entire process of the conflict, including all stages, such as the postcomplaint stage. The perceived justice concept is broad in nature and provides the necessary theoretical foundation for studying all such stages of conflict. Finally, the fact that previous researchers have already outlined the various dimensions of perceived justice (i.e., distributive, procedural, and interactional; see later) makes it possible to perform a more thorough diagnostic analysis of the factors that trigger DCV and vengeful responses.

The concept of perceived justice has its theoretical roots in the legal, organizational behavior, and political science lit- eratures (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibault & Walker, 1975). Building on the foundations of equity theory, researchers in those fields suggest that individuals who are involved in con- flicts or disputes act based on their perception of justicelin- justice in a particular situation (Blodgett et al., 1993; Finkel, Crystal, & Watanabe, 2001). Within this framework, justice is conceptualized in terms of three dimensions: (a) distributive justice, (b) procedural justice, and (c) interactional justice (Blodgett et al., 1997; Seiders & Berry, 1998). Distribu- tive justice is concerned with the perceived fairness of the tangible outcome (e.g., credit for excess billing charges). Procedural justice refers to the perceived fairness of the pro- cedures used in arriving at that outcome (e.g., policies and rules applied). Interactional justice is the perceived fairness of the manner in which individuals were treated throughout the conflict resolution process (e.g., courtesy of employees handling the complaint).

The concept of perceived justice has been previously applied in marketing contexts to study consumer response to dissatisfaction (see, e.g., Boldgett et al., 1993). These researchers have attempted to understand the roles played by the various components of perceived justice in dissatisfying experiences. Their findings have been mixed. In effect, Blodgett et al. (1997) found interactional justice to have the largest impact on consumer's subsequent behavior, but Goodwin and Ross (1992) found that interactional justice plays a role only when the outcome of a conflict was per-

ceived as good enough (i.e., when distributive justice was high). Interestingly, perceptions of different types of injustice led to different retaliatory behaviors (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997; Williams, 1999).

We argue that consumers' desire for vengeance and their tendency to react proactively after a dissatisfying experience will be determined primarily by how well they are treated during the redress process (i.e., on the level of interactional justice). Although the tangible outcome or redress of a dissatisfying experience with a firm has been found to be the main determinant of complaining, the lack of distributive justice is not expected to be the primary determinant of proactive consumer responses. We propose that a proactive response, that is, one that involves acting irrationally and suboptimally, requires the activation of "hot" cognitions (Bies & Tripp, 1996). Hot cognitions are acti- vated when consumers feel affected personally ("War Crimes of the Heart," 1992). Thus, if one has been treated rudely by a customer service representative, we propose that merely having the original product or service problem fixed will not be an adequate response on the part of a firm to ameliorate the negative affect felt by the customer.

Therefore, we expect that when treated appropriately (e.g., politely and with respect), consumers who do not obtain the outcome they desire or expect will tend to switch to another firm, but won't have enough desire for vengeance to choose a suboptimal brand alternative to get even with the of- fending firm. Although upset, they are not likely to feel a personal hurt. On the other hand, when treated inappropriately (e.g., rudely and with disrespect) in association with a dissatisfying experience, consumers will believe not only that they were wronged, but will experience a personal hurt and thus feel that they are owed an apology (Folkes, 1984). Being treated rudely and without respect, on top of the initial dissatisfying experience, comes as a strong surprise and opposite to what was expected. Indeed, the personal offense may be perceived by consumers as damaging to their self-identity. A damaged self-identity has been found in prior research to be a main antecedent to feelings of vengeance (Stikin & Roth, 1993). Hence, a perceived personal offense is likely to result in high levels of DCV and, thus, a tendency to act proactively (i.e., with revenge). To summarize, a proactive response is expected when low interactional justice occurs, regardless of how adequately the firm fixes the initial problem (i.e., regardless of the level of perceived distributive justice). More for- mally, we hypothesize the following:

H2a: Consumers who are treated rudely at the redress stage will experience a higher level of DCV than those who are treated politely, regardless of the outcome of the redress.

H2b: Consumers who are treated rudely at the redress stage will act more proactively than those who are treated politely, regardless of the outcome of the redress.


Issues addressed in H2a and H2b are important because to understand consumers' subsequent feelings and behaviors, one needs to understand consumers' perceptions of justice at the redress stage. Consumers who encounter a dissatisfying experience with a firm may feel that they were wronged (Stuckless & Goranson, 1992). Hoping that the firm will adjust its wrong-doing, consumers tend to complain when the problem is severe and they are angry with the firm (Folkes et al., 1987). Research has shown that, once they complain, consumers' future reactions to their dissatisfying experience are mainly determined by what happens at the postcomplaint stage (Blodgett et al., 1993).

Two studies were conducted to test the hypotheses. The purpose of Study 1 was to investigate whether, given a sufficiently negative product experience, some consumers would choose to act proactively to get even with a firm, and whether they would be more likely to do so as the DCV rises. Thus, Study 1 was designed to test H1. The purpose of Study 2 was to more precisely examine how two key aspects of perceived justice in a redress attempt by a firm trigger both the DCV and subsequent choice behavior. Study 2 was thus designed to test H2a and H2b.

STUDY 1

Method Participants and Design A total of 232 undergraduates participated in the study for

partial course credit. The mean age was 20.7 years; 59% were women. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three vengeance conditions: low (n = 55), moderate (n = 81), or high (n = 96). We deliberately over-sampled the higher vengeance conditions to have a sufficient number of proactive responses for analysis.

Procedure Each participant received a booklet concerning a scenario

regarding the purchase and use of long-distance telephone service. Participants first read a newspaper article describing the high level of competition in the telecommunications industry. This was used to convey to respondents that there exists a high level of competition in the market and that the two key rivals are 10-10-123 and 10-10-ABC. Then, they were asked to imagine a scenario in which they had a problem with a long distance carrier (10-10-123; i.e., the perpetrator of injustice). The three conditions differed in how severe the problem was and what happened at the redress stage when the consumer called the customer service department and complained about it (see Appendix A). These manipulations were based on the fact that prior research has shown that problem severity (Folkes, 1984) and level of problem resolution (Blodgett et al., 1993) affect the inflammation of a con-

flict situation. Consumers' likelihood to switch to another company was measured.

Next, participants were given details about product offers from two other firms, one of which was a main competitor to 10-10-123 (i.e., the perpetrator's "enemy"), as clearly stated in the newspaper article read at the very beginning. The offer by 10-10-123's largest rival was clearly inferior to the other offer in terms of pricing. Although both offers provided identical services, 10- 10- 123's largest rival charged the same fee on five services but charged more on two other services than the other firm (see Appendix B). A pretest conducted among 34 undergraduate participants had previously established that 10-10-ABC was perceived to be an inferior offer by 100% of the pretest participants.

Participants then decided whether they wanted to: (a) stay with 10-10-123, the original service provider; (b) switch to the competitor with the lowest prices; or (c) switch to 10- 10- 123's largest rival (i.e., the perpetrator's enemy) that provided identical services at a higher price. Having chosen, respondents reported satisfaction with their choice, perception of which offer provided better value for their money, and level of desire for vengeance toward 10-10- 123 (i.e., DCV). Then respondents were asked to name the major competitor to 10-10-123 as a check to see whether they had adequately comprehended this information, evaluate the realism of the scenario, answer a probe question regarding research purpose, and answer a few demographic questions.

Manipulation of Independent Variable As mentioned previously, DCV was manipulated using

problem severity and degree of problem resolution during the redress stage. Participants were provided with pricing expec- tations based on advertisements but then were told they received a bill with actual charges higher than expected (See Appendix A). Participants in the low-vengeance condition read a scenario in which they faced a minor problem with 10-10-123 that was fully resolved upon complaint. Partici- pants in the moderate vengeance condition had a more severe problem that was only partially resolved after complaining. Those in the high-vengeance condition read about a very severe problem that was not resolved at all upon complaint. Complaint handling in these manipulations took the form of the degree to which the customer service representative was willing to admit the company's error and to adjust the customer's bill.

Results Manipulation Check DCV: DCV was measured with a 5-item, Likert-type

scale. The DCV scale was modeled after the Stuckless and Goranson (1992) personality trait scale, designed to measure an individual's eagerness to avenge. Modifications were made to the scale items to reflect the fact that it measures a


state construct rather than a personality trait. The scale items are listed in Appendix C.

The five-item DCV scale had a coefficient alpha of 361. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) conducted on the DCV as a function of vengeance condition was significant, F(2, 229) = 25.78, p < .0001. As shown in Table 1, those in the low-vengeance condition felt less desire for vengeance (M = 2.68) than those in the moderate vengeance condition (M = 3.34, p < .005 vs. low vengeance) or high-vengeance condition (M = 4.18, p < .0001 vs. low vengeance). The difference in desire for vengeance between the moderate and high conditions was also significant (p < .0001).

Other Checks Scenario realism. We measured the degree of sce-

nario realism with two bipolar items (Realistic, Likely in real life; coefficient of correlation = .776, p < .001). An analysis of variance conducted on scenario realism as a function of vengeance condition was not significant, F(2,229) = 2.29, p > .lo. Thus, all groups of participants perceived the choice scenarios to be about equally realistic. This result helps to rule out a possible alternative explanation for the results obtained. The overall mean was 5.98 on a scale ranging from 1 to 7, with 7 being very realistic, implying that participants generally perceived the scenarios as fairly realistic.

Value for money Participants were asked which of the two alternative offers provide more value for their money and were given the options of choosing either offer or indicating that both offers provide equal value for money. Perceptions of value for the two switching options did not differ significantly among respondents by condition, x2(4) = 1 . 5 3 , ~ > .80. This result helps to rule out an alternative explanation for the main results. Most (77%) believed that the "better value" option provided better value for money than did the suboptimal choice alternative. This result confirms that of the pretest concerning the suboptimality of the perpetrator's enemy brand. Almost all other respondents (22%) believed the two switching alternatives provided about equal value for money. Because the pricing structures of these two options were not severely different (i.e., a relatively mild manipulation: pricing for the suboptimal option was slightly higher on just two of seven items), this is a reasonable result. Finally, participants who switched to the suboptimal alternative perceived it

as equally or less valuable than the other alternative, thus they did not choose it based on the perception of superior objective value.

Main Results Choice. We treated this dependent variable as an ordi-

nal measure in terms of the degree of action represented by the consumer's choice response. Specifically, a participant could, after exposure to the scenario, decide to simply keep using the current long-distance provider (i.e., a passive response). Alternatively, the participant could decide to switch to another provider. If participants decided to switch, they could switch to either the alternative supplier that provided better value for money (i.e., reactive response) or to the alternative supplier that provided less value for money (i.e., proactive response). The three possible responses were treated in an ordinal manner, although no assumptions were made regarding the equality of intervals between adjacent categories (Long, 1997).

An ordered logistic regression on the choice data was fit using a proportional odds model (McCullagh, 1980). Maxi- mum likelihood estimation was used to fit a model for the three-level ordinal dependent variable (0 = stay/do not switch, 1 = reactive/switch to better value, 2 = proactive/switch to suboptimal perpetrator's enemy) as a function of vengeance condition (1 = low, 2 = moderate, 3 = high). The score test for parallel lines was not significant, x2(1) = 1.73, p > .15, indicating that the assumption of proportional odds is a reasonable one for this data set (Stokes, Davis, & Koch, 1995). Model fit was assessed with the likelihood ratio test, x2(1) = 91.22, p < .0001, and the score test, x2(1) = 77.18, p < .0001, both of which indicated adequate model fit.

Vengeance condition emerged as a statistically significant predictor of choice behavior, Wald(1) = 55.82, p < .0001, as hypothesized in HI. Actual choice outcomes as a function of vengeance condition are presented in Table 2. Differences among mean proportions were tested with likelihood ratio chi-square tests. These data indicate that in the low-vengeance condition, the percentage of participants switching from the original service provider is relatively low (36.4%). Switching behavior rises markedly under conditions of either moderate (86.4%), x2(1) = 37.58, p < .001, or high (99%), x2(1) = 82.65, p < .001 vengeance. The choice patterns of

TABLE 1 Consumers' Feelings by Vengeance Condition: Study 1

-

Vengeance Condition

Consumers' Feelings Low (n = 55) Moderate (n = 81) High (n = 96) Desire for consumer vengence 2.68 3.34b 4.1 gc Choice satisfaction 5.40 4.70" 4.47

Note. Each mean is compared to the corresponding mean in the preceding column. $ < .05. bp

446 NASR BECHWATI AND MORRIN TABLE 2

Consumer Choice Outcome by Vengeance Condition: Study 1

Choice Outcome

Vengeance Condition Do Not Switch Switch to Optimal Alternative Switch to Nonoptimal Alternative Total

Low 63.6% 36.4% . 0% 100% Moderate 13.6% 82.7% 3.7% 100% High 1 .O% 86.5% 12.5% 100%

participants who decided to switch service providers were next examined. Although over a third of the low-vengeance participants decided to switch service providers, none of them (0.0%) decided to switch to the suboptimal alternative (i.e., the perpetrator's enemy). The likelihood of choosing the suboptimal alternative did not rise significantly among participants in the moderate vengeance condition (3.33% of those who switched), ~ 2 ( 1 ) = 1.54, ns. However, participants in the high-vengeance condition exhibited a significantly higher likelihood of switching to the suboptimal alternative (12.63% of those who switched), ~ 2 ( 1 ) = 4 . 8 7 , ~ c .05 versus the low-vengeance condition. Participants in the high-vengeance condition were also directionally more likely to choose the suboptimal alternative than were participants in the moderate vengeance condition, ~ 2 ( 1 ) = 3.69, p = .055.

We also looked at the level of DCV by choice outcome. Participants who switched to the suboptimal brand alternative reported a DCV (M = 4.08) higher than those who either stayed with the initial firm or switched to the optimal offer, M = 3.59, F(1, 230) = 7.205, p < .01. Moreover, among the brand switchers, those who switched to the suboptimal alternative reported a DCV (M = 4.08) higher than those who switched to the optimal offer, M = 3.66, F(1, 138) = 5.138, p < .05, implying that very high levels of DCV are required to activate vengeful choice behavior.

This set of results suggests that only moderate levels of vengeance are required to more than double the likelihood of a customer switching to a competitive service provider. In ad- dition, very high levels of DCV can lead a significant proportion of customers to switch to an alternative that is objectively recognized (in pretests and manipulation checks) as providing less value for the money-what would traditionally be considered a suboptimal choice outcome. This decision, to switch to the perpetrator's enemy even though it costs more for the same services, allows the decision maker to "get back at" the firm that is perceived to have done the consumer an injustice. We speculate that although there is less objective utility obtained from such an outcome, there is likely a significant emotional utility obtained.

Choice satisfaction. The coefficient of correlation between the two items in this scale (Satisfied: not at all, very; Content: not at all, very) was .673, p < .0001. An ANOVA conducted on choice satisfaction by condition was significant, F(2,229) = 5.69, p < .005. Satisfaction decreased in the

higher vengeance conditions. Specifically, choice satisfaction in the low-vengeance condition (M = 5.40) was higher than that in the moderate- (M = 4.70, p < .05) or high-vengeance (M = 4.47, p < .001) conditions. Satisfaction levels did not differ between those in the moderate- and high-vengeance conditions ( p > .35). Interestingly, among those who switched providers, satisfaction levels did not differ between those who switched to the optimal offer (M = 4.653) versus those who switched to the suboptimal offer, M = 4.933, t(183) = 0.62, p > S O . Thus, it would appear that the switchers choosing to exact revenge were not any less satisfied than those who switched to the optimal provider, even though those exacting revenge were getting a worse deal for their money.

STUDY 2

Study 1 demonstrated that, given a sufficiently negative product or service experience, consumers can indeed experience a desire for vengeance and be motivated to exact revenge on a firm through subsequent choice behavior. Study 1 showed that some consumers will choose a suboptimal choice alternative to exact revenge, and that they are no less satisfied with their choice outcome than those who choose the optimal alternative. This set of results raises a number of interesting questions such as: Which aspects of the service encounter tend to trigger the DCV feeling? Under what circumstances do consumers behave proactively?

Study 1 falls short of delineating the triggers of DCV and the consequent proactive response. To manipulate vengeance condition in Study 1, we varied a number of factors, including the severity of the initial problem, the personal treatment by the firm's employee, and the outcome of the complaint (see Appendix A). Because the aim of Study 1 was to demon- strate that sufficiently outraged consumers would behave proactively, we were mainly concerned with providing a strong manipulation of the desire for vengeance. However, because the Study 1 manipulation involved varying more than one aspect of a negative product or service experience, it is not yet clear what are the specific situational triggers of consumer vengeance. Study 2 was designed to address this issue.

Study 2 examines which specific aspects of a product or service experience lead to a high level of DCV and resulting


proactive response by manipulating two aspects of consumers' perceptions of justice of the firm's redress attempt: distributive and interactional justice. As discussed previously, we expected that DCV and vengeful behavioral responses would be driven primarily by the perceived level of interactional rather than distributive justice (i.e., by whether or not the customer was treated with respect, irrespective of the tangible outcome of the redress stage).

Method Participants and Design A total of 93 undergraduate students participated in this

study. The experiment consisted of a 2 x 2 (Interactional Jus- tice: Low and High x Distributive Justice: Low and High) between-subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions.

Procedure Similar to Study 1, participants were asked to imagine a

scenario in which they had a billing problem with a long distance carrier (10- 10- 123). Participants first read the same newspaper-like article used in Study 1, which describes the high level of competition in the telecommunications industry and clearly states that 10-10-ABC is the key rival to 10-10-123. Then, they were asked to imagine a situation described in a particular service encounter scenario. In all experimental conditions, the same severe initial problem was described. What was manipulated was how the customer service department handled the complaint of the consumer (described in more detail later). Measures of problem severity and consumers' likelihood to switch to another company were taken.

Next, similar to Study 1, participants were given details about product offers from two other firms. The slightly more expensive offer was provided by 10-10-ABC, the main competitor to 10-10-123 (see Appendix A). Respondents then decided whether they wanted to: (a) stay with 10-10-123, (b) switch to the competitor with the lowest price, or (c) switch to 10-10-123's fiercest rival (10- 10-ABC), which offered identical services but at a slightly higher price. Having chosen, respondents then reported satisfaction with their choice, perception of which offer provided better value for their money, and level of desire for vengeance toward 10-10- 123 (i.e., DCV). Respondents were also asked to name the major competitor to 10-10-123 and to evaluate the realism of the scenario.

Manipulation of Independent Variables See Appendix D for the manipulations of perceived jus-

tice (i.e., what happens to the consumer upon seeking redress from the firm) in each of the four experimental conditions. Manipulations of interactional and distributive justice were

carefully designed to make sure that all four experimental conditions had the same level of procedural justice.

Interactional justice. To manipulate interactional justice, we altered the type of response from employees in the customer service department. In the high interactional justice condition, the firm's employees: (a) responded in a polite manner, (b) apologized, and (c) admitted it was clearly the firm's mistake. In the low interactional justice condition, the employees (a) responded in a rude manner, (b) did not apologize, and (c) implied it was the customer's mistake. The pres- ence andlor absence of apology has been used by previous researchers to manipulate interactional justice (Goodwin & Ross, 1992).

Distributive justice. To manipulate distributive justice, we altered the monetary adjustment resulting from the consumer's conversation with the supervisor in the customer service department. In the high distributive justice condition, the supervisor agreed to eliminate all extra charges and credit the customer's account. In the low distributive justice condition, the supervisor informed the customer that, in case of no payment, the firm would start charging an interest on the amount due.

Results Manipulation Checks Interactional justice. Two 7-point Likert statements

(courteous employees; treated badly) were used to examine the manipulation of interactional justice. The coefficient of correlation for the two items in this scale was .83 1 (p < .001). The manipulation check, F(1, 91) = 208.51, p < .001, indicated that participants felt that they were better treated by the firm in the high interactional justice condition (M = 4.54) than in the low (M = 1.26, p < .001) condition, as expected.

Distributive justice. Two 7-point Likert statements (billing problem fixed; unfair charges deleted) were used to examine the manipulation of distributive justice. The coefficient of correlation for the two items in this scale was .779 (p < .001). The manipulation check, F(1, 91) = 9 2 . 1 , ~ < .001, indicated that the outcome of the problem they had with the firm was perceived as fairer in the high distributive justice condition (M = 3.8) than in the low (M = 1.29, p < .001) condition, as expected.

Other Checks Scenario realism. We measured the degree of scenario

realism with two bipolar items (Realistic, Likely in real life; coefficient of correlation =.837, p < .001). An analysis of variance conducted on scenario realism as a function of interactional justice, distributive justice, and their interaction revealed no significant effects. Thus, all groups of partici-


pants perceived the scenarios to be about equally realistic. The overall mean was 5.83 on a scale ranging from 1 to 7 with 7 being very realistic, implying that participants perceived the scenarios as fairly realistic.

Value for money Perceptions of value for the two switching options did not differ significantly among respondents by condition, ~ * ( 3 ) = 5.27, p = .153. Most (85%) believed that the "better value" option provided better value for money than did the suboptimal choice alternative, as expected. All other respondents (15%) believed the two switching alternatives provided about equal value for money. Par- ticipants who switched to the suboptimal alternative perceived it as equally (33.3%) or less valuable (66.7%) than the other alternative.

Main Results Choice. Of the 93 participants only 3 chose to stay with

10-10-123. This result is not surprising, given that all conditions were exposed to the same high level of problem severity. Of the 90 participants who chose to leave 10- 10-123, 6 switched to the suboptimal alternative (i.e., to rival 10-10-ABC). Table 3 shows the percentages of respondents who switched to the suboptimal alternative by perceived justice condition. As shown in Table 3, all respondents who made the suboptimal choice were in the low interactional justice condition.

Given the categorical nature of the dependent variable (choice) and the independent variables (interactional justice and distributive justice), a multinomial logit analysis was conducted to examine the effects of the two types of perceived justice and their interaction. Of all possible models, including those allowing for an interaction between the two types of justice, the only model that was not significantly different from the saturated model was the model containing interactional justice, x2(2) = .60, p > .70. Models including distributive justice, ~2 (2 ) = 7.28, p < .05, and the interaction between the two types of justice, ~2(3) = 7.49, p = .05, were significantly different from the saturated model. Taken to- gether, these results imply that interactional justice played the most significant role in affecting choice. More specifically, 11.5% of participants in the low interactional justice condition chose the suboptimal brand (i.e., when treated

rudely), whereas none of those in the high interactional juS- tice condition did so (i.e., when treated politely; p < .05). In other words, the proportion of participants choosing the suboptimal brand did not depend on tangible outcomes, i.e., on whether the level of distributive justice was high (5.0%) or low (7.6%, p > SO). The results of a Kruskal-Wallis analysis also support a significant role for interactional justice, x2(1) = 4.646, p < .05, and an insignificant role for distributive justice, ~2 (1 ) = .206, p > .60, in influencing switching behavior. Hence, H2b is supported.

DCK A scale identical to that used in Study 1 was used to measure DCV (see Appendix B). The scale had a Cronbach's alpha of .823. An analysis of variance conducted on DCV as a function of interactional justice, distributive justice, and their interaction revealed significant effects for both interactional justice, F(1, 89) = 8.366, p < .01, and distributive justice, F(1, 89) = 1 3 . 0 7 , ~ < .001, but not for their interaction, F(l,89) = .117, p > .70. Respondents in the low condition of interactional justice felt a higher DCV than those in the high condition, MI,, = 4.958 versus Mhigh = 4.356, t(91) = 2.338, p < .05. Interestingly, however, DCV was significantly influenced by the level of distributive justice as well, MI,, = 5.038 versus Mhigh = 4.235, t(91) = 3 . 1 8 6 , ~ < .005. Taken to- gether, these results imply that obtaining a poor outcome (i.e., low distributive justice) increases the stated desire for vengeance, but only the rude experience with the firm's employees (i.e., low interactional justice) acts as a trigger for vengeful choice behavior.

Choice satisfaction. A three-item scale was designed to measure respondents' satisfaction with their choice (satisfied; disappointed; and felt relief). Similar items have been used to measure choice satisfaction in previous research (see, e.g., Mittal & Kamakura, 2001). The scale had a Cronbach's alpha of .72. An ANOVA conducted on choice satisfaction as a function of interactional justice, distributive justice, and their interaction revealed no significant effects. Interestingly, among those who switched providers, those who switched to the suboptimal choice (i.e., the enemy's enemy) felt no less satisfied with their choice than those who switched to the optimal alternative, Msuboptimal = 5.50 versus Moptimal = 4.73, t(88) = 1.58, p > .lo. This result mirrors that obtained in Study 1, suggesting

TABLE 3 Percentage of Subjects Choosing Suboptimal Brand by Perceived Justice Condition: Study 2

Distributive Justice

Interactional Justice Low High Total

Low High Total

Note. Marginal percentages are compared using chi-square analysis. an=26 .bn=52Cn= 15 .dn=41 en=93 .*p


that the exacting of revenge may provide an emotional satisfaction that offsets the loss of objective product utility. In Study 2, where all participants experience a severe problem, the few respondents who chose to stay with 10-10-123 were the least satisfied with their choice, Mstay = 3.88 versus MOptimaj = 4.73, t (85) = 1.268, p > .20.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Consumer vengeance is a relatively unexplored but important behavioral phenomenon. It takes only a few very dis- gruntled customers to initiate a potentially devastating chain of events affecting a firm's brands. Witness, for example, the recent proliferation of brand-specific hate sites on the web (e.g., microsoftsucks.com) that are created by one or a few individuals but can be seen by hundreds or thousands of others. Although the focus of this research was limited to consumers' choice behavior following dissatisfying customer experiences, the impact of outraged consumers' feelings and likely subsequent behavior has even broader implications for corporations. The psychological mechanisms underlying this intriguing form of choice behavior were the major focus of this research. In brief, we found that very dissatisfying experiences can indeed lead consumers to exact revenge on firms through their subsequent choice behavior, and further, that it is the degree of interactional justice they perceive (i.e., how politely or rudely they are treated) and not the degree of distributional justice (i.e., whether or not their problem was fixed) that drives the vengeful behavioral response.

In Study 1, the DCV,was measured and found to be pos- itively associated with a tendency toward switching behavior on the part of consumers. Furthermore, when DCV was high, a significant proportion of consumers, after making the decision to exit the firm, subsequently chose a rival brand that charged higher prices than did another competitor (for the same services) to get back at the original service provider. Although previous researchers have reported in- stances of behavior that cannot be explained rationally on the part of angry decision makers (Elster, 1998; Lowenstein, 2000), this study offers empirical evidence of consumers behaving suboptimally for the purposes of getting even with a firm. Moreover, this study unveils one form of consumer response to dissatisfaction, taking revenge against a brand, that is different in nature from the traditionally studied ones of complaint, negative WOM, and exit.

Findings of Study 2 shed light on the mechanisms underlying vengeance as a feeling and as a behavior. Two aspects of perceived justice, interactional and distributive, were examined as possible psychological triggers to vengeance. Results showed that the tangible outcome of a complaint (i.e., perception of distributive justice) is a significant determinant of the feeling of DCV. However, it takes a per-

ception of bad personal treatment (i.e., low interactional injustice) for consumers to behave suboptimally or with revenge. In effect, the strong feelings of DCV led to a reactive switching behavior in cases of negative tangible outcomes. However, those feelings were not converted into a proactive response unless the consumer was also treated rudely. In fact, acting vengefully (i.e., proactively) came as a result of bad personal treatment regardless of the tangible outcome of the dispute.

Findings of Study 2 help explain some differences in findings of previous research concerning the relative impact of interactional and distributive justices on retaliatory responses (see, e.g., Blodgett et. al, 1997; Goodwin & Ross, 1992). Al- though previous studies have reported results pertaining either to affectiveresponse such as satisfaction (see, e.g., Goodwin & Ross, 1992) or to behavioral response such as spreading negative WOM (see, e.g., Blodgett et al., 1997), both consumers' feelings (DCV) and behavior (acting proactively) were measured in Study 2. Our findings are consistent with previous research that has revealed an important role for distributive justice in influencing consumers' feelings and a key role for interactional justice in determining retaliatory behavior. Our findings are also in line with research in service recovery that has emphasized the importance of interpersonal interaction with consumers and the prevention of retaliatory behavior that could be achieved through simple apology (Smith & Bolton, 1998; Singh, 1990a).

Further research is needed to better understand the vengeance construct and the underlying psychological mechanisms, as antecedents and as consequences. In both of our studies, we demonstrated that consumers experience a desire for vengeance and that some of them act on this desire. However, those who acted proactively were not significantly more satisfied with their choice than other consumers. Hence, it is still not clear why vengeance is sought and perhaps even valued by the concerned parties. Does exacting consumer vengeance provide customers with an affective coping mechanism that substitutes for product value, as we have suggested? Is it that those parties feel helpless and perceive that getting even will make them regain a power that they had lost? Do those parties feel that by getting even they re-establish a self-esteem that they had lost? Ad- dressing similar queries would help uncover important aspects of human behavior.

The role of personal treatment (i.e., interactional justice) has important managerial implications. First, firms' training of customer service employees to be courteous seems to be of great importance, particularly for those firms that tend to focus on redress outcome while not paying enough attention to personal interaction. Firms that adopt policies where rude employees' behavior is followed by a letter addressing the monetary problem should take heed. Our results suggest those policies may be ineffective in preventing customers from acting proactively. A relatively low-cost approach, a simple apology, may instead be particularly effective. Simi-


lar implications can be drawn for contexts other than business, especially where there exists a high potential for vengeful actions in interpersonal disputes, such as in family and work disputes, where personal confrontations are more common and higher personal involvement exists.

Interestingly, our results are in line with other studies showing that vengeance is a conscious act (Gabriel & Mo- naco, 1994; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). Respondents who acted vengefully seemed to be fully aware of what they were doing. They expressed a high desire for vengeance, even though they realized the suboptimal alternative was only of equal or lesser value than the forgone alternative. A sort of emotional satisfaction seems to be able to take the place of objective product utility when DCV is high. Fur- ther investigations are needed to better capture and understand the relief that seems to make revenge "sweet" in marketing as well as other contexts. Sports fans, for example, brag about rooting against a team that had beaten their fa- vorite team (Kass, 2000). Similar behaviors have been reported in politics (Abraham & Weiss, 2000).

Future research is needed to examine whether outraged consumers who have a variety of retaliatory actions would still choose to act proactively. To get back at perpetrating firms, outraged consumers resort to a variety of retaliatory actions such as complaining (arguing), spreading negative WOM, and discontinuing operations (Richins, 1987; Singh, 1990b). In both studies reported in this research, consumers were not given the option of bad-mouthing the firm, a common retaliatory behavior (Richins, 1983). Moreover, participants in the studies read a scenario describing what hypothet- ically happened when they called to complain. Hence, they did not personally experience a "fight" with the firm, another retaliatory response. It would be interesting to examine whether consumers would retaliate via choice only when other retaliatory options are not available. It also would be interesting to investigate whether individual difference~ may affect individuals' likelihood to act vengefully, especially given that, by nature, individuals are not equally vengeful (Stuckless & Goranson, 1992).

In everyday life, people make choices that, quite often, occur in contexts where negative interactions have taken place (e.g., after debates with colleagues, family members, etc.). It appears that a natural emotional response to these types of commonly experienced life events is the desire for vengeance. Some of these choices might have long-term and important impacts on their lives as well as the lives of others (e.g., electing committee members, making career decisions, allocating capital investments, etc.). From both a humanitarian and public policy perspective, no one wants people to choose divorce mainly to hurt their partners, or to elect the less qualified president for the sake of getting even with someone else, or not to buy the best house because they are upset with the real estate broker. This article has attempted to enhance our understanding of choices made by individuals to get even. It is hoped that a better understand-

ing of consumer vengeance as well as its antecedents and consequences will lessen the likelihood that individuals experiencing vengeful desires will make choices that are not in their own best interests.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We acknowledge insightful comments from Vikas Mittal and Madhu Viswanathan on earlier drafts of this article.

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APPENDIX A Manipulation of DCV: Study 1

Introduction (Common to all three conditions) A few weeks ago, while watching TV, you saw an ad for a telecommunications company announcing a special offer for long distance calls. The ad says that if you dial 10-10-123, you'll be charged 4 cents per min on all long distance calls you make during weekends and evenings. The ad also claims lower than average rates on calls made at all other times and great international rates. You found the offer attractive. So, you began to use the service.

Low DCV You just got your telephone bill. Except for a $10 fee that you were charged for joining the service, the bill came as expected. However, because you knew nothing about this fee, you called the customer service division to complain. The sales representative explains to you that their ad men- tions a joining fee, but agrees to waive it for you anyway.

Moderate DCV You just got your telephone bill. To your surprise, the amount due is above what you expected, especially given that you thought you had a good deal with your 10-10-123 long distance carrier. A thorough review of the long-distance bill reveals that (a) you were charged a $10 fee for having the service, a fee that you never knew about; (b) an automatic charge of 20 cents per call was applied to any call lasting less than 2 min; and (c) you were charged a rate of 20 centslmin on calls made during the day, a rate equal to (and not lower than) the average rate charged by other companies.

You call the customer service department to complain and ask for account adjustments. The sales representative tells you that there's nothing he can do about it. You ask for reconsideration. After a few calls, you manage to talk to a supervisor who accepts to waive for you the $10 fee and the automatic charge on very short calls. He, however, explains to you that he cannot do anything about the 20 centslmin rate charged on calls during the daytime.

High DCV You just got your telephone bill. To your big surprise, the amount due is way above what you expected, especially given that you thought you had a good deal with your 10- 10- 1 23 long distance carrier. Athoroughreview of the long-distance bill reveals that (a) you were charged a$IO fee for having the service, a fee that you were never told about; (b) an automatic charge of 20cents per call was applied to any call lasting less than 2 min; and (c) you were charged very high rates exceeding 30 centslmin on calls made during the day, a rate 10 cents above the average rate charged by other companies. Going over the

bill, you have the feeling that the company did not spare any for reconsideration. You wait for a few days and you call opportunity to charge you big money. again. This sales representative reacts in a rude manner

You call the customer service department to complain telling you that "you shouldn't expect to make your calls and ask for account adjustments. The sales representative for free!" Talking to a supervisor does not get you any- tells you that there's nothing he can do about it. You ask where either.

APPENDIX 5 Alternative Choice Options: Studies 1 and 2

10-10-789

Calls between 7:00 p.m. and midnight 4 centslmin Calls between midnight and 6:00 a.m. 2.5 centslmin Calls between 6:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m. 20 centslmin Calls to Canada and Mexico (weekdays) 30 centslmin Calls to Canada and Mexico (weekends) 10 centslmin Calls to Eastern Europe 48 centslmn Calls to Western Europe 35 centslmn

10-10-ABC

Calls between 7:00 p.m. and midnight 4 centslmin Calls between midnight and 6:00 a.m. 2.75 centslmin Calls between 6:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m. 20 centslmin Calls to Canada and Mexico (weekdays) 30 centslmin Calls to Canada and Mexico (weekends) 10 centslmin Calls to Eastern Europe 52 centslmin Calls to Western Europe 35 centslmin

Note. 10-10-ABC was identified as the perpetrator's largest rival

APPENDIX C Desire For Consumer Vengeance Scale

1. I should do something to get even with the [perpetrator] company. 2. It is unimportant for me to get back at [perpetrator] despite their

wrong-doing. (R) 3. I am not just mad with [perpetrator], I need to get even. 4. I have no desire to get revenge from [perpetrator]. (R) 5. I would like to make [perpetrator] regret what they did to me.

Note. 10- 10- 123 was substituted for perpetrator where indicated. R = reversed item. 1 = low vengence; 5= high vengence.

APPENDIX D Manipulation of Perceived Justice: Study 2

High InteractionalMigh Distributive You call the customer service department to complain and ask for account adjustments. The sales representative tells you that there's nothing he can do about it. You ask for reconsideration. You wait for a few days and you call again. This sales representative apologizes and reacts in a polite manner telling you "I'm terribly sorry about the misunderstanding, but I'm not authorized to make billing changes." You talk to a supervisor next. The supervisor states that all extra charges will be deleted, and he addresses you in a polite manner, stating: "I'm sorry for this miscommunication, and I hope you understand we want to serve you better in the future." The supervisor explains that you do not need to pay the extra charges on your current bill and provides you with credit. The supervisor concludes the call by saying: "I sincerely apologize for what happened and I am pleased I could help you."

High Interactional/Low Distributive You call the customer service department to complain and ask for account adjustments. The sales representative tells you that there's nothing he can do about it. You ask for reconsideration. You wait for a few days and you call again. This sales representative apologizes and reacts in a polite manner telling you 'I'm terribly sorry about the misunderstanding, but I'm not authorized to make billing changes.' You talk to a supervisor next. The supervisor states that none of extra charges will be deleted, but he addresses you in a polite manner, stating: "I'm sorry for this miscommunication, and I hope you understand we want to serve you better in the future." The supervisor explains that you must either pay by the end of the month or 10- 10- 123 will start charging you interest on the amount due. The supervisor concludes the call by saying: "I sincerely apologize for what happened and I wish I could be of more help to you."

Low InteractionalMigh Distributive You call the customer service department to complain and ask for account adjustments. The sales representative tells you that there's nothing he can do about it. You ask for reconsideration but the sales representative hangs up on you. You wait for a few days and you call again. This sales representative does not apologize either and reacts in a rude manner telling you that "you shouldn't expect to make your calls for free, and I'm not authorized to make any billing changes." You talk to a supervisor next. The supervisor states that all extra charges will be deleted, but he addresses you in a rude manner, stating: "This is certainly not a mistake on our part, and I hope you finally understand you need to be more care- ful in the future." The supervisor explains that you do not


need to pay the extra charges on your current bill and provides you with credit. The supervisor concludes the call by saying: "Smart consumers usually check all details of an offer before joining." He hangs up abruptly.

Low Interactional/Low Distributive You call the customer service department to complain and ask for account adjustments. The sales representative tells you that there's nothing he can do about it. You ask for reconsideration but the sales representative hangs up on you. You wait for a few days and you call again. This sales representative does not apologize either and reacts in a rude

manner telling you that "you shouldn't expect to make your calls for free, and I'm not authorized to make any billing changes." You talk to a supervisor next. The supervisor states that none of the extra charges will be deleted, and he addresses you in a rude manner, stating: "This is certainly not a mistake on our part, we do our best to explain all terms to our customers and I cannot do anything for the dumbbells that don't get it." The supervisor explains that you must either pay immediately or 10-10-123 will start charging you a high interest rate on the amount due. The supervisor concludes the call by saying: "Smart consumers usually check all details of an offer before joining." He hangs up abruptly.

Documents

BECHWATI_&_MORRIN_2003_Outraged Consumers - Getting Even at the Expense of Getting a Good Deal