TO BE OR NOT TO BE : JAMAICA,

BELIZE AND THE THIRD WORLD

TONY THORNDIKE

Department of International Relations and Politics

North Staffordshire Polytechnic

STOKE-ON-TRENT ST4 2DE

England.

Paper presented to the Sixth Annual

Caribbean Studies Association Conference,

St. Thomas, US Virgin Islands,

May 1981.

Maybe what I did wrong was to challenge the power of the Western economic structure ... and for this I will remain unrepentant and unreconstructed.

So said Michael Manley to the world in the aftermath of the

spectacular electoral defeat of his Peoples National Party (PNP)

government in October 1980. But whether the electorate voted

specifically against his persuasive and eloquent pursuit of the

cause of reform and development in the Third World, aided and abetted

by some of his PNP colleagues, rather than on straight bread-and-butter

issues as food, commodity and utility shortages, violence and high

prices,is at best highly controversial. At the very least there is

a substantial argument, based on personal observation and interviews

in the run--up to the poll, that the latter was clearly the most

predominant factor. Similarly, the electorate of Jamaica's nearest

Commonwealth Caribbean neighbour, Belize, also voted (in November 1979),

against all the poll forecasts !2kor anew government, that of George

Price's Peoples United Party (PUP). A major part of the PUP platform

was, besides the overriding striving and advocacy for a secure

independence, identification with Third World issues and solidarity:

not only with the aims of the several movements and institutions involved

with their expression,and the working toward their eventual resolution

in the world at large and in Central America and the Caribbean in

particular,but also support for regional revolutionary regimes in

Nicaragua and Grenada. Yet public perception outside Belize would

riot readily associate that territory as being involved and committed.

The hypothesis of this paper is two-fold. First, that in the

two Commonwealth Caribbean states chosen for comparative analysis

because of the apparent discrepancy over their commitment to Third

World perceptions and concerns, the two electorates responded affirmatively

to the call to continue such commitment. It is suggested that it is

far more useful to compare the form and direction in which such --- -- -- - --- - - commitment has taken, and why, rather than to contrast degrees of

commitment as expressed, for instance, in public statements by the

political elite, employing content analysis or similar methodology.

After all, resources, perceptions and geographic position will obviously

effect the degree of conmitment. It will also be strongly influenced

by the style of leadership and the personality of the leader concerned.

Policies are identified with personalities the world over but

particularly so in the Caribbean even though the personalities

themselves may not wish it so. However much it may be deplored,

including by such as C.L.R. James to whom "the method of thinking

about personalities and politics is the abiding curse of West Indies

politics",(3) it remains a fact. Indeed, Manley has been popularly

characterised as the "Caribbean Nyerere". ( 4 ) Therefore, it is

reasonable to propose that the degree of commitment of individual

Third World states to Third World aspirations is comnensurate with

its resources, including that of leadership and its style and

preferences, and its sub-regional, regional and international per-

ceptions;and that that in turn dictates the form and direction of

the commitment. Put in this way, the commitment of Belize is as

important to itself as that of Jamaica, even though its manifestation

is different in scope, range and method.

One important caveat remains to be mentioned with regard to this

part of the hypothesis. The fact that Belize has not obtained formal

independence in contrast to Jamaica is not - the basis for comparison,

although it has naturally to be taken into account. In fact, its

anomalous position has had contradictory consequences: on one hand,

it has obviously restricted freedom of action in defence and foreign

affairs, the two most important areas of reserved powers held by the

British after the internal self-government constitution was granted in

1964,(traditionally the shortlived precursor to independence under the

British scheme), in view of the Guatemalan threat. On the other, within

this unsatisfactory situation the Belizean political process has not

only matured considerably but, consequent upon the internationalisation

of the dispute, has led to the clarification and exposition of positive

positions on many international issues.

The second part of the hypothesis follows logically: that commitment

to Third World values and aspirations is expressed by - all Third World

states, even, albeit mutely, selectively and occasionally by such as Chile

or to cover up excesses of corruption and brutality by those such as

Haiti and Amin's Uganda. They do so in their different ways and as

opportunities permit or necessities dictate, especially in relation to

the indiyidual concrete economic and geographical circumstances in which

they find themselves. It is by no means essential for there to be a

simultaneous commitment to socialist doctrine or any of its variants,

although all Third World governments would wish to be characterised as I I progressive", whatever the interpretation.

With the obvious exception of Cuba, Latin American countries have

not often been perceived as being wholly Third World in their attitudes:

the very words "Afro-Asian bloc" sums it up. But this is a grave

mistake. The first initiatives for the establishment of the Group of

77 in 1961, concerned with the economic problems of underdevelopment,

emanated largely from Latin America and in particular, from Argentinian

economist Raul Prebisch, the first secretary-general of ECLA and later

of UNCTAD. As one American cornentator has rightly said of the 1950s,

In ECLA, under the leadership of Raul Prebisch, the Latin American states began to formulate a doctrine for development at considerable variance to what was widely accepted in the North. (5)

Latin Americans were also responsible for the development of the concept

of dependencia, now an accepted part of the vocabulary of international

politics. On the political front in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),

their presence is less conspicuous. But they also represent what

Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley called at the NAM summit in

Havana "the greatest potential for the expansion of our mwement. 1, (61

He was right: since 1964 the Latin OAS states have discussed matters

of common concern, both economic and political, especially prior to

UNCTAD meetings. Subsequently establishing a Special Comission for

Latin American Coordination (CELLA) in 1969, they successfully pressurised

for UNCTAD 3 to be held in Santiago, Chile. Disputes with the US grew,

especially involving Peru and Chile, at least up to the violent overthrow

of the Allende regime. These developments have been significant to the

new English-speaking members of the OAS and others such as Belize. Despite

problems, what Bhoutros-Ghali called "sociological solidarity"(7) between

the British and Hispanic-based cultures is emerging, and taking such

concrete forms as oil financing arrangements and support for Belizean

independence.

What are the major issues with which Third world(*) countries are

concerned? Several are readily identifiable: anti-imperialism and

neo-colonialist dependency problems; anti-racialism; economic development

on the basis of a New International Economic Order; non-alignment and

the right to seek to judge issues on their merits rather than in response

to the pressures of power; social reconstruction following the impact

of colonialism, its preferences and prejudices; and a search for an

individual national identity as well as a unity of the deprived. Of

course, not all Third World states feel equally strongly about each and

every one of these issues and others, nor do they express their feelings

about all or any consistently. Also, their commitment to all or any may

be manifested on a regional rather than an international basis.

Given Belize's particular circumstances it is not surprising that

it relates much more specifically to Central American and

Caribbean political situations than does Jamaica, with its wider

hemispheric and international perspectives.

These differences in emphasis and direction may go a little

way to explain why Third World consciousness and establishment of

positions has taken a long time to emerge - for many Latin American countries, for well over a century - and the experience of Jamaica and Belize is no exception. It is part and parcel of the decolonisation

process, by which is meant not only the formal transfer of sovereignty

but economic, social and cultural changes, on an increasingly

structural basis, necessary to enhance political autonomy. Carl Stone

has usefully outlined three stages of decolonisation, the last of which

only concerns us.

... the apprenticeship of the emergent political elite in parliamentary government; the attainment of independence accompanied by illusions of Netropolitan benevolence; and the disillusioment of the experience of neo-colonialism which has induced more radical nationalist policies. (9)

The slow pace of this process was mirrored by the slow emergence

of such Third World institutions as the NAM and the Group of 77 (10)

which, although they have "quite specific, loosely structured, but

functional corporeal (bodies) ... a significant history and very

probably an extensive future", (11) they suffer from a diversity of

specific needs attitudes and ideologies amongst their members which,

once the rhetoric has been peeled away, are often only too apparent.

Jamaica's identification with these concerns did not begin with

the accession of the PNP to power in 1972. The previous Jamaica

Labour Party (JLP) administration under Prime Minister Hugh Shearer,

with pressure from its influential associated trade union grouping,

particularly from 1968 onwards, made its opinions clearly known and

heard on several issues, notably on Southern Africa, the diplomatic

recognition of Cuba (I2) and, regionally, the secession of Anguilla

and the further fragmentation of the Caribbean. (I3) But the JLP

tradition against regional cooperation on an institutionalised basis,

sterning from its former leader Bustamante's criticism of the Federation

of the West Indies culminating in his relentless pressure in the

notorious referendum campaign in 1961 to exclude Jamaica, was apparent

with its constant undermining of CARIFTA and discouragement of any

enlargement. (I4' Manley, however, was to view the encouragement of

regional integration as part and parcel of what he perceived as

Jamaica's pivotal position as a Third World country. What was

required, he recorded, was

a tough minded recognition that national survival, like business survival, is a matter of margins and that regionalism can provide the framework in which internal markets are increased, external bargaining power enhanced and international recognition maximised.(l5)

Four specific advantages existed, in his view, all of which

underline his essential radicalism and his conception du monde:

firstly, it would meet an urgent need for all countries in the region

to "develop techniques for handling trade and other relations with

the outside world on the basis of a common policy"; secondly, the

increased negotiating strength which could be achieved by handling

major foreign capital interests, like the bauxite companies, on a

common basis; thirdly, it would provide a base from which to enter

the mainstream of Third World politics; and fourthly, there were

the intangible benefits offered by the psychological boost which

regional integration would give to the security and dignity of the

Commonwealth Caribbean as a whole and, by inference, others. (16)

His general outlook was clear and it was not new to those who

knew him. Son of ex-Prime Minister Norman Manley (1955-62), he had

returned in the early 1950s from higher education at the London School

of Economics where he had met many of the future African political elite.

Soon actively involved in trade union and PNP affairs, he became a

Senator in 1962, a member of the House of Representatives in 1967 and

PNP leader in 1969. Describing himself as

an internationalist in perception, a democratic socialist by persuasion, a member of the Non- Aligned Movement by commitment and a member of the Third World by circumstance,(l7)

he rapidly assumed an active role in both Third World fora and in other

international gatherings, notably the Commonwealth Heads of Government

Meetings, backed by several colleagues. Elsewhere, other members of

his administration furthered the activist image of Jamaica: Foreign

Minister P.J. Patterson, for example, was outstanding in his adept

leadership of the ACP group in the Lome negotiations with the EEC.

His election defeat, and the scale of it, (I8) was both a personal

humiliation and a shock to the world community as a whole. Although

a highly detailed analysis of the election need not concern us here,

the question must be asked: was it due to his Third World commitment

and his championing of the cause of the less developed?

He and the PNP lost because of economic chaos and shortages, even

of the barest necessities, violence and inflation, itself partly caused

by successive devaluations. The problem facing the analyst is that

much of this became to be associated in much of the public mind with

democratic socialism which was proclaimed as the guiding ideology of

the PNP by Manley in 1974. Inasmuch as this related to his Third

World activism and his increasingly close links with Cuba, it must be

considered to be an essential ingredient. Its espousal certainly

exacerbated the rift between the PNP and JLP, up to then largely

personalist. Besides presenting the electorate with a genuine ,

alternative for the first time since the late 1940s it remwed the

PNP from the category of "typical" West Indian political party as

outlined by Ayearst some twenty years earlier, i.e., loosely organised

with only lip-service paid to socialism, stressing nationalism and

national identity instead, primarily at election times. (19) As will

be suggested, the public associated democratic socialism with shortages

and sacrifices and with an apparent disturbingly close involvement by

Cuba in local domestic politics: to that extent and that alone, they

expressed an opinion about the form and direction of Jamaica's diplomacy

add espousal of Third World concerns, rather than about the princiyle of

commitment as such. Jamaica was too exposed to the whims and winds of

imperialism and everybody, even notable figures in the Private Sector

Organisation of Jamaica, (20) knew it.

The timing of ~anley's announcement in 1974 was not random.

Jamaica had suffered severely by the oil crisis and, despite a temporary

boom in bauxite, the trade deficit soared. Although Manley had always

sincerely believed in socialism, (21) the rhetoric was useful to demand

sacrifices from those better financially placed in order to alleviate

the very real hardship of the masses. In other words, it permitted

the goverment to demand sacrifices in the name of building a socialist

society. In this sense, socialism - not religion - became an opiate, offering, not a better life, but a more acceptable means of coercing

people into accepting bitter necessity. Therefore, it was not socialism

which brought defeat but the sacrifices suffered in its name. The

sacrifices were small up to 1976 when Manley's charisma and energetic

campaigning won him such a decisive victory in the socalled "Heavy

Manners" election, despite a State of Emergency occasioned by widespread

violence and assassinations. As the world recession deepened, so

making his attempts at social experiments more and more difficult,

progressive deterioration followed. With each sacrifice the spectre

of imperialism and allegation of "destabilisation", perceived as

orchestrated by Washington,was blamed, although at the same time US

aid was anxiously solicited. Even before the election some of his

most ardent pro-radical colleagues admitted the "extreme" anti-capitalist

and pro-Third World statements had done too much harm to Jamaica.

The large-scale desertion of the highly vocal professional middle

classes and capital did nothing to ease the problem posed by the need

to allocate 552 of foreign exchange earnings to loan-servicing. This had

catastrophic effects so far as the unemployed and low wage earners

were concerned. (22) But even the pro-JLP media felt it necessary to

reproduce in full Manley's speech to the NAM Havana summit in 1979. (23)

It also reported with approval his strong stance against the then newly

elected British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, at the Commonwealth

Leaders Lusaka conference, who favoured the "Muzorewa option" in

Zimbabwe. (24)

Manley's commitment and involvement in Third World affairs naturally

involved working with Cuba. His personal friendship with, and admiration

of, Fidel Castro became wellknown. This was made plain at the Havana

summit . The forces committed to the struggle against imperialism are stronger today than ever before. We believe that this is so because our hemisphere has had a Movement and a Man: a catalyst and a rock: and the Movement is the Cuban Revolution and the Man is Fidel Castro. (25)

The political rather than the commercial link was obvious: after all,

there are no bauxite refining facilities in Cuba; both produce sugar:

both have restrictions on imports: and high prices for Jamaican

manufactured goods would not appeal to foreign currency starved Cubans.

But it was not his admiration for Castro and the Cuban Revolution

which became the issue so much as what he termed "principled relations"

seemed to involve. Despite relentless JLP pressure, the majority

welcomed the assistance provided by Cuban medical technicians, dam

engineers, builders and teachers. Rather, it was the overt political

activity of the Cuban Ambassador Ulysses Estrada and his public

denunciation of the JLP which shocked the electorate. Ironically,

it was US Ambassador Vincent DeRoulet who began the trend of deep

involvement in local politics with the exertion of his undoubted

influence among the business class or orchestrate support for Manley

and the PNP in 1972. (26) He was later declared persona non grata

just as incoming Prime Minister Seaga would have done to Estrada had

he not chosen himself to leave the island 24 hours after the result

was declared.

Seaga, although perceiving his victory as a "blow against communism",

warned that "radicalism, Marxism and communism" that had "infected"

Jamaica would no longer be tolerated. But he reasserted Jamaica's

nonalignment ("but not a non-alignment tied to the coat-tails of one

foreign power") would continue as would its commitment to a "positive

Caribbean policy" of integration. Diplomatic relations with Cuba would

also be fully maintained as defitted a near neighbour with whom many

"natural links" existed, but on a "more correct basis". (27) His Deputy

Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Shearer, on whose trade union links

he heavily relies, positively affirmed these aims. In other words,

although Jamaica's voice as a Third World spokesman will no longer be

heard so stridently and clearly in world fora, the commitment will remain

but its direction qualified by a consciousness that economic reconstruction

is a first priority both for domestic reasons and to provide a firm basis

for future further thrusts of Jamaican diplomacy.

Whereas Manley enjoyed an international, Third World and regional

reputation (and continues to do so) and had published his political

philosophy, all of which was reflected in Jamaican diplomacy, the voice

of Belize and of its political leaders appears relatively insignificant.

But set against its particular constitutional, geographic and economic

environment, there has been a considerable degree of activity in certain

directions. Among the most important specific factors to be taken into

account are the search for a secure independence; the fragile economic

and demographic base; the dominance of foreign owned corporations,

especially the Belize Estate and Produce Company, and Tate and Lyle;

ethnic divisions between Creole, Mestizo and Maya 1ndian;and the

contrasting pulls from two cultural poles, the Commonwealth Caribbean

and Hispanic Central America.

Premier George Price, self-effacing, shy, ascetic and a devout

Catholic, is now an "old man" of Caribbean politics having been in

continuous power since 1954. His role in the founding of Peoples' Committee

and the later PUP, and the Belizean nationalist movement generally,

dates from the ill-executed devaluation of the Belizean dollar by the

British in 1949. From that time he searched not only for a Belizean

identity out of its various ethnic strands, resting as it does in a

"cultural shatterzone", (28) but for the material advancement of its

peoples and the attainment of a secure independence. His espousal

of a Latin American orientation for Belize - his party has always enjoyed substantial support from the rural Mestizos and Mayas rather

than the West Indian, largely urban, Creoles ( 29 ) - has for long been

compromised. Until relatively recently, many Latin American states

supported the Guatemalan claim and looked askance at "Belice". Their

political doubts of a radical English-speaking (at least officially)

nation in their midst whose boundaries were suspect appeared to be

substantiated economically by a ECLA report in 1968 to the effect that

Belize's undeveloped primary producing economy was too different from

the relatively more industrialised, inter-dependent economies of the

neighbouring republics and that membership of the Central American

Common Market (CACM), a cause dear to Price's heart, would only be

detrimental to its economy. (30) In Grant's words, the ECLA Secretariat's

report

brought home to Price the cruel fact that a fondness for the country's Latin connection could not alone sustain initiatives towards closer links between Belize and Central America. (31)

By contrast, he has been forced to recognise the territory's military

and economic dependence on Britain and the Commonwealth Caribbean

respectively, the eastward links once regarded as unacceptable. The

first approach to the Fourth Conference of the Heads of Commonwealth

Caribbean governments in 1967 was eventually followed by full membership

of CARIFTA in 1971 and subsequently of CARICOM, the economic justification

being that Belize's agro-industry would provide member governments with

their beef and cereals. Instead of that being fulfilled, Belize did

receive consistent and active support for its struggle for independence.

The internationalisation of the dispute between Guatemala and Belize by

the Commonwealth Caribbean was matched by Price's own activities.

Strenuous efforts were made through personal visits to exploit a growing

disenchantment by several Central American states with Guatemala's

opposition to the formation of an effective common front against

the dominant US-owned multinational banana companies, a gesture

which was to later yield positive results.

To allow Belize the necessary legal powers as a colony to join

in CARIFTA's activities, Britain amended the constitution through new

Letters Patent giving the Premier or his delegate responsibility for

external affairs in certain circumstances. Psychologically and legally

boosted, a dynamic foreign policy emerged. In late 1973, the then

Minister of Internal Affairs, Lindberg Rogers, flew to Algiers to

solicit support on the eve of the Conference of Non-Aligned Heads of

State; earlier, the Eighth Conference of the Heads of Government in

the Caribbean called for a Scheme of Mutual Defence against External

Aggression at their meeting in Barbados. While Belize was not the

only Caribbean territory on their minds, Price put great importance

on this "show of solidarity" which would, in his opinion, help to

influence world public opinion in Belize's favour. (32) Within the

Commonwealth nexus, tixpressions of support intensified with further

resolutions at the next Heads of Government meeting in St. Lucia, and

then at the Prime Ministers' Conferences in Kingston and London in 1975

and 1977 respectively. At both of these, secure defence agreements

were called for, to which Britain felt unable to make a specific reply, (33)

with either a Commonwealth or a UN military guarantee as an alternative

if Britain felt it to be practicable. It should be noted, en passant,

that no Commonwealth state actually offered to help provide such a

guarantee, and, that in the case of the UN, there is no provision in

its Charter for this. By contrast, Cuba did in 1978.

Further widening of the circle of allies was rapid, beginning with

the 16th Session of ECLA held in Trinidad in 1974, which Belize attended.

This was followed by support from Cuba, following a visit there by

Jamaica's Prime Minister Manley. Later, at the Conference of Ministers

for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Nations at Lima, Peru, Guatemala was

not only denied even observer status, but the cause of Belizean independence

was adopted as a matter of policy. (34) Again on the 'Third Worldt

front, representatives of Belize were invited by Mrs. Bandaranaide to

attend the conference of Heads of State of Governments of Non-Aligned

Countries in Sri Lanka during August 1976. Accorded a special status,

the delegation's participation was successful in that a resolution

pledging unconditional support for Belize was passed. (35)

Guatemala was to lose the support of first, its CACM partners and

then of Latin America and later its consistent backers, the USA and

Israel, in the UN. Barbados opened the UN campaign in 1968 in the form

of a complaint that the General Assembly was not giving the Belizean

question proper attention. (36) Later, when the Security Council met in

Panama City, in March 1973, Belize's new partners took the opportunity

to strongly criticise Guatemala (37' and back in New York, Guatemala'k

claim to the Committee of 24 that Belize had "never been a colony" but

was "a territory illegally occupied" was overwhelmingly rejected.

There followed over the years a series of pro-Belizean resolutions

until ultimately, in 1980, Guatemala was the only dissenting voice, C38)

Not surprisingly, Guatemala was ultimately persuaded by this combination

of UN pressure and Third World solidarity amounting to almost a moral

collective security system to enter into substantive negotiations with

Britain and Belize. After several false starts, an eventual agreement

was reached in London in March 1981, although it was greeted by a

serious outbreak of violence largely in Belize City inspired by the

bitterly anti-Price United Democratic Party (UDP), a loose coalition still

dominated by ex-PUP dissidents.

The internationalisation of the dispute has been related in some

detail as it radicalised Price, made necessary the incorporation of new

leaders, who happened to be socialists, to help press home the attack,

and exacerbated the ethnic and class divisions in the country to an

unprecedented degree. Inevitably, these have led to a strong expression

of support for Third World, specifically Caribbean and Latin American,

objectives, just as strong relatively speaking and in their own way, as

that of the far more politically sophisticated and economically developed

Jamaica.

Price's radicalism has, as suggested above, grown with the inter-

nationalisation of the dispute and the reaction of the upper class white

Creoles. Once a laissez-faire capitalist, he made socialism a dirty

word: in 1950 he referred to "Communism, Nazism, Fasci'sm, Socialism

and British Colonialism" as "chickens of the same brood". (39)

vision was one of attracting foreign, specifically US, capital, but all

that happened was that the tax holidays and open market in land offered

led to massive land ownership by US corporations, to the extent that

less than 7% of Belizean land holdings over 100 acres are owned by

Belizeans, and less than 9% of all freehold land. (40) Socialism

seemed more attractive and he took into his cabinet two highly educated

and avowed socialists, Assad Shoman and Said Musa. Shoman's influence

in policy making grew rapidly and was soon accused by the LTDP publicly

and other PUP ministers privately of being "corm~funist" and pro-Cuban,

to the extend that he was forced to resign prior to the 1979 election.

His clear support, with that of Price, over Panama's right to sovereignty

over the Canal, of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, of the NJM in Grenada,

of Manley in Jamaica as well as to the more general Third World concerns

was clear, sincere and unequivocal. In the event the UDP electoral

challenge failed to materialise and one of Price's first acts after

victory was to reappoint Shoman as his closest aide. After the election,

both Price and Shoman (and occasionally, Musa) have paid visits to

Nicaragua and Grenada to make plain Belizean support for their causes. (41)

The combination of electoral victory and the Guatemalan agreement

is more than a milestone in Belizean affairs: with independence envisaged

for late 1981:~~) it marks a new internal situation. Previously,

No failure has been as damaging to Price's cause as his inability to bring Belize to the independence promised in 1964. The other compromises with his original vision can to a large extent be seen as a byproduct of the greater compromise whereby Price has been forced to rely for his country's continued existence on the military power of the nation he once castigated. The years of waiting, far from increasing the expectation, have soured the vision and produced a situation in which now the majority of people appear content, even desirous, of remaining under the British military umbrella. (43)

The post-London settlement riots must be seen in that context. The

long period of "dead end" has left its mark: even a radical periodical

was moved to observe that there existed "an incredible lack of commitment

of a majority of the people to an early independence'' (44) and implied a

substantial support for the party of dependency and the British link, the

UDP . (45) The strength of this sentiment was shown in the 1979 electoral

result, the UDP claiming 46.8% of the votes cast, with 51.82 going to the

PUP.

Nonetheless, just as the Jamaican electorate voted for bread-and-

butter issues (literally as well as figuratively) rather than on Jamaica's

Third World commitment, so that of Belize affirmed that it would, on

balance, rather see itself and their country identified with the

same commitments and the process of decolonisation and nation building.

It is not therefore a case of "to be" or "not to be" committed at whatever

level of international discussion and action, but of "how" and ''to what

extent". No Third World state and their populations, whatever their

prevailing ideology or governmental structure can afford not to be inyolved

in the issues that crucially concern their development, let alone ignore

them.

Notes

1. Caribbean Contact, November 1980, p.16.

See, for instance, The Guardian (London), November 18, 1980 and New York Times, November 16, 1980.

C.L.R. James, Party Politics in the West Indies (San Juan, Trinidad: Vedic Enterprises Ltd., 1962), p.37.

The Guardian, November 9, 1980.

C.L. Robertson, "The Creation of UNCTAD", in R.W. Cox (ed.) International Organisation (London: Macmillan, 19691, p.262.

P. Willetts, The Non-Aligned in Havana. Documents of the Sixth Summit Conference and an Analysis of their Significance for the Global Political System (London: Frances Pinter, 1980), p.52.

B. Bhoutros-Ghali, contribution a L'Etude Des Ententes Regionales (Paris, 1949), quoted in R. Yalem, Regionalism and Morld Order (Washington DC: Public Affairs Press, 1965), p.18.

No attempt is made in this study to further divide the less developed territories of the world into "Newly Industrialising Countries" of which Jamaica may tentatively be considered a possible member, the socalled "Fourth World" of those who haven't reached this stage such as Belize and the unfortunate "Fifth World", or unkindly named "basket cases", the only example in the Caribbean being, in the author's opinion, Haiti.

C. Stone, Perspectives on Decolonisation: A Comparative Content Analysis of Parliamentary Speeches in Jamaica and Trinidad (Mona: ISER, U W I , dup., n.d.), p.1.

See C. Geldart and P. Lyon, "The Group of 77: A Perspective View1', International Affairs (London), Vo1.57, No.1 (Winter 1980-81).

Ibid., p.101. - It was Shearer's JLP government which led the way out of the OAS diplomatic boycott of Cuba by establishing, in the first instance, relations at consulate level in 1970.

"Anguilla: the Anatomy of Decolonisation", New World Quarterly, Vol.lV; No.1 (1967), p.26.

A.J. Payne, The Politics of the Caribbean Community, 1961-79. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980), pp.140-41.

M. Manley, "Overcoming Insularity in Jamaica", Foreign Affairs, Vo1.49, No.1 (1970), p.106.

Ibid., p.107; 110. - M. Manley, The Politics of Affirmation (London: Third Uorld Foundation Monograph 1, 19791, p.6.

On a 75.7% turnout, the JLP won 57.7% of the v o G t o the-PNPTs 42.3% and 51 of the 60 seats in the House of Assembly to the PNP1s 9. In 1976, the turnout was 85% and the positions were reversed: 56.8% of the votes went to the PNP (47 seats) and 43.2% (13 seats) to the JLP.

M. Ayearst, "A Note on Some Characteristics of West Indian Political Parties", Social and Economic Studies, Vo1.3, No.2 (1954) p.189.

Informationfmm interviews with PSOJ personalities, Kingston, May 1980.

"I have always been on the Left and I will die there: I am also a Democrat": M. Manley, reported in The Guardian, December 14 1976.

For instance, by Hugh Small, the last PNP Finance Minister. The Guardian, October 1, 1980.

Daily Gleaner, September 9, 1979.

Ibid., July 21, 1979.

Ibid., September 9, 1979. - C. Stone, "Democracy in Danger", Daily Gleaner, May 5, 1980.

Caribbean Contact, op.cit.

C.H. Grant, The Making of Modern Belize (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p.14.

Alma H. Young, Ethnic Conflict, Partisanship and Radical Politics in Belize (unpub. paper presented to the third CSA conference, Santiago de 10s Caballeros, Dominican Republic, 1978), pp.4-7.

Economic Commission for Latin America, Possibilities of Economic Cooperation between British Honduras (Belize) and Central America, December 1968 (E/CN. 12/809/Rev. 1).

Grant, op.cit., p.315.

Sunday Advocate News (Barbados), July 1, 1973.

H.C. Debates, July 13, 1977.

GAOR, Thirtieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 23, document A/10217.

The New Belize, Vol.lV, No.4 (December 1976)

UN Plenary Session, 1702nd. meeting, October 22, 1968.

GAOR, A/AC.109/L.112OY p.10.

Insight (London), December 1980, p.1.

Assad Shoman, "The Birth of the Nationalist Movement in Belize, 1950-1954", RISRA, Occasional Paper No.] (1979), p.43.

40. The Belize Issue (London: Latin America Bureau, 1978), p.50.

41. The New Belize, Vol.lX, No.11 (December 1979).

42. Insight, April 1981, p . 1 . The "London Agreement" between Belize and Guatemala was signed on March 11 1981 and the Belizean Constitutional Conference was from April 6 to 12. A referendum in Belize was to be arranged over the terms of the London agreement.

43. P.D. Ashdown, Some Thoughts on the Career of George Cadle Price (unpub. paper presented to the SCS conference, High Leigh, Hertfordshire, England, April 1979), p.8.

44. Gombay, February 1979, p.17.

45. Alma H. Young, 1 Leaders and Followers in Belize and Barbados (unpub. paper presented to the Fifth CSA Conference, Curacao, May 1980), pp.17-18.