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DOI: 10.1177/016344378400600102

1984 6: 3Media Culture Society Paddy Scannell

The BBC and foreign affairs: 1935-1939

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The BBC and foreignaffairs: 1935-1939PADDY SCANNELL

In the second half of the thirties British politicswas dominated by the increasinggravityof the international situation as the threat of the European war loomed evercloser. How did broadcastingrepresent the progress of foreignaffairs? This account

is largely concernedto

explainan

absence,to

show why therewas so

little coverageby the BBC, particularlyin talks series, discussions and debates, of the march ofevents that led eventually, in September1939, to the Second World War. Theanswer has much to do with the hidden hand of the state; with the machinations ofthe ForeignOffice, and later with Chamberlains conduct of his policy ofappeasement towards the dictators.

The Bartlett affair

The BBCs difficulties with the presentationof foreign affairs on radio can betraced back to the Vernon Bartlett

row

of 1933 (cf. Briggs1979: 194-197, andHaworth 1981 from which this account is largelydrawn).Vernon Bartlett becamethe BBCs foreigncorrespondentin 1932, havingpreviouslyworked for the DailyMail, Reuters, the DailyHerald and The Times. His brief included establishingpersonalcontacts with Europeanbroadcastingstations, recruiting stringersinforeigncapitals,and regular 15-minute weeklybroadcast talks on foreignaffairs forthe regularprogramme and for schools broadcasts. He worked within the ambit ofthe Talks Department.On 14 October 1933 Germany pulled out of the Dis-armament Conference convened by the Leagueof Nations at Geneva. After the sixoclock news that evening,which gave full coverage of the event, Bartlett made ashort broadcast commentary, the general tenor of which was that the Germanaction was understandable giventhe intractabilityof the allies and their failure tohonour the pledgesof Versailles. Britain, argued Bartlett, would have done thesame thing if it had been in Germanysshoes.

These comments caused immediate uproar. MacDonald, the Prime Minister,rang Reith at once to declare that the BBC was turninghis hair grey and to knowwho was the government-himselfand his colleagues,or the BBC? He followedthis up with a letter of complaint to the Board of Governors. The matter wasdiscussed in Cabinet. The ForeignOffice was perturbed.Press comment rangedfrom the DailyTelegraph.rcondemnation of Bartletts graveindiscretion to the

DailyHerald.r praise for a courageous and outspokenbroadcast. In the short termthe BBC quietly dispensedwith Bartletts services, and he was not asked to talkagainon radio for several years. In the longerterm it was a curtain raiser on the


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issues at stake in the relationshipbetween government, the ForeignOffice and theBBC which were to be increasinglydifficult as the decade progressed.The ForeignSecretarywas alarmed by the terrible powerof such a broadcast to create publicpanicand wondered whether such power should be left in the hands of the BBC.The Cabinet decided in effect that it could not do otherwise without challengingthe independenceof the Corporation-afear which the left-wingpress raised at

the time. ReynoldsNews (22 November 1933) expressedits worries at themachinations of the establishment and defended radio correspondentsfrom thekid-glovedictators at the ForeignOffice.

The ForeignOffice was sensitive to being branded as censoringor interferingwith free speech.In a private conversation with Rex Leeperof the ForeignOffice,

Alan Dawnay (Controllerof Programmes)admitted that a serious blunder hadbeen made, and after Bartletts departurethe BBC was eager to clear with theForeign Office the nature of future talks on sensitive areas. On 2 February 1934Reith discussed with MacDonald, apropos the Bartlett affair, the whole questionofBBC liaison with government departmentswhich MacDonald felt could be much

improvedwithout prejudiceto the autonomy of the BBC. Less than two weeks laterReith had a very helpfulmeetingwith Sir Robert Vansittart and Sir Warren Fisherat the ForeignOffice which did much to ease the strained relations between theBBC and the department.Vansittart was most affable and anxious to arrange allsorts of contacts. By the end of the month he and Reith had arrangedto meetmonthlyfor regulardiscussions on foreignaffairs (cf. Stuart, 1975: 116-117).

At the request of Reith, Leeperhad drawn up some suggestionsfor the handlingof talks on foreignaffairs. He put forward three main options: one or two regularspeakers, a panel of expertsor reports from foreigncapitals. AlthoughLeeperpreferredthe first, the Foreignsecretary and other colleagueswere less keen. Theirmain concern

was

the tendencyof listeners (especiallyforeignlisteners)to acceptthe broadcast voice as official. John Salt, for the Talks Department,suggestedaseries of talks by intelligenttravellers giving their strictly personalviews andtherebyneutralizingthe effect of a singleexpert speaker.During1934 no one voicedominated the foreign scene as Bartlett had done, and a varietyof travellersexpresseda variety of opinions.This arrangement was, in the end, to prove asunsatisfactoryas the use of the singleaccredited expert. Duringa visit to GermanyRichard Crossman broadcast his impressionsof the country, but his trip coincidedwith Hitlers Nightof the Long Knives. Crossmans view of Hitlers purge of theBrownshirts as a personaltriumphover factional intrigue, with his word now lawin the sense of burningpublicapprovalcaused the ForeignSecretaryto despairofthe vein of exultant approvalrunningthroughthe talk and Vansittart to dismissit as go-getter, sensation-mongeringHearstliness, man on the spot and red-hotstuff. Though Dawnay defended the talk, pointing out the difficulties ofreportingin censor-ridden countries like Germany, the ForeignOffice reaction putan end to Salts proposal(this paragraph is condensed from Haworth, 1981:48-49).

The Citizen and His Government

The majorcrisis in relations between the government, the ForeignOffice and theBBC came a year or so later. In 1935 the BBCs Adult Education AdvisoryCommittee (AEAC)had recommended a balanced series of 12 educational talks

I 1 . ~1 , , &dquo;t,


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under the title The Citizen and His Government (cf. WAC R51/83; BP 5, paras.54-62; and Briggs, 1979: 198-201). The first seven talks were to be expositorybyCaptainHarold Balfour MP, and Mrs AgnesHeadlam-Morley.The last five were tobeginwith two talks on fascism and communism by Sir Oswald Mosleyand HarryPollitt, followed by three talks critical of the precedingtwo by MPs representingthe three constitutional parties-Isaac Foot (Liberal),Herbert Morrison (Labour)and Kenneth Pickthorn (Conservative).The outline of the series

was

approvedbythe Board of Governors,and submitted informallyin the summer of 1935 to theForeignOffice, who raised no objectionat the time. By the autumn it had becomeapprehensive.On 13 September1935 Leeperrang Dawnayurging the BBC to dropthe Pollitt talk, and a little later Vansittart expressedto Reith his concern thatMosleyshould be allowed to broadcast. Pollitt had recentlyidentified himself withDimitrovs call, at the Seventh World Congressof the Communist International inthe summer of 1935, for a united anti-fascist strugglein every country. The BritishCommunist Party was findinggrowingevidence of popular support for a unitedfront (cf. Branson and Heinemann, 1973: 334, and Rust, 1949: 33-35). The

ForeignOffice disliked Pollitts stance in view of their plans to make diplomaticrepresentations to the Soviet Union about the infiltration of communistpropagandainto Britain. Their fears over Mosleywere prompted by Mussolinisrecent attack on Abyssinia.

These points were considered by the Board of Governors but, after carefulthought, rejected.The Board took the view that it was their duty to allowexpressionto all shades of politicalopinionwith any substantial backing,and theissue at stake in the series was not the pointof view of individual speakers,but theclaims of differingsystems of government. Mosleywould not be allowed in his talkto refer to the Abyssinianquestion.There was no connection, the Governors felt,between Pollitts talk and any flow of Comintern propagandainto Britain. Theoverall structure of the series would do more to discredit and weaken communismin Britain than any measure to check the spreadof subversive propaganda.It wasagreedunanimouslythat, subject to such safeguards,the series should proceed.

The Foreign Office threatened to take the matter further, but an imminentgeneralelection gave a pretext for postponingthe last five talks in the series whichhad alreadystarted. After the election the AEAC pressedagainfor the inclusion ofthe talks in the Springschedule for 1936. Negotiationsreopenedwith the ForeignOffice and Lord Stanhope(Under-Secretaryof State) stated that the governmentpolicyremained the same, addingthat it would be extremelyembarrassingto thegovernment if the BBC allowed Mr Pollitt to broadcast his views. By now the Boardof Governors was preparedto abandon the series providedthat the BBC could statepublicly that the government was anxious that the talks should not be given.Stanhopecountered by askingif the Board had considered the effect of such anannouncement on Parliament shortly before the new Charter was due fordiscussion in the House. It would strengthen,he suggested,the case for those whodemanded more Parliamentarycontrol of the BBC.

The ForeignOffice insisted that government intervention should not bementioned. Anthony Eden, the ForeignSecretary,prepareda memorandum whichwas discussed in Cabinet on 12 February1936. He concluded:

Though it is still desirable that the BBC should withdraw the objectionableitems of theirprogramme without bringingin His MajestysGovernment, it seems impossibleto induce them to


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do so; and if the talks are, in fact, withdrawn throughGovernment intervention, it would seemdifficult, and in fact undesirable, to refuse to permitthem to say so. It would however be neithertrue nor desirable to state publiclythat the talks would be an embarrassment to the Governmentat the present time; but it would be true to say that theywere not in the national interest. (EdenMemorandum, 7 February1936, WAC R5/83)

The Cabinet agreedthat Baldwin should get the new Post Master General (MajorG. C. Tryon)to find the final solution, and that he should be authorized to makeit quite clear that the government would not permitthe broadcasts. A week laterBaldwin was able to report that the BBC had agreedto withdraw the Pollitt andMosleytalks and that no public reference would be made to governmentintervention. The Cabinet formallyrecorded its congratulations(Briggs 1979:200).

The agreedpublic formula for cancellingthe talks was: In view of the effectwhich the proposed talks might have on an international situation alreadyaggravatedby recent developments,the Corporationhas decided to cancel thetalks (BP5para 58).The AEAC was not particularly impressedbythis resolution ofthe issue. Cecil Graves tried hard to persuadeits members of the wisdom of theBBCs decision, since occasions must from time to time arise when to do otherwisewould quite possiblycost a considerable set-back to the work of the Corporation,and to the objectiveswhich it shared in common with the committee. But thecommittee was not to be persuaded. At a meetingon 14 February1936 Graves wasasked if the BBC had capitulated because of the imminent publicationof theUllswater Report, and Graves replied that the BBC was naturally not anxious, atthe present juncture, for a great deal of publicattention to be focused on such anissue. Graves was then asked to withdraw from the meetingwhile the committeepasseda resolution expressingits grave concern at the decision to cancel the talks,and the hope that this did not represent any narrowingof the field over whichbalanced controversy mightbe permitted.

Graves had tried to persuade the committee that no change in policy hadoccurred, or was likelyto take place,and the Board of Governors, in its reply to theresolution, confirmed unanimouslythat subject to adequate safeguardsbeingtaken, controversial series of talks should take a prominent place in theprogrammes of the BBC. This did not answer the point of the resolution aboutnarrowingthe field of controversy.

The matter did not rest there. A few months later the new General AdvisoryCouncil considered the resolution of the AEAC, at its request, in a meetingon 29

June 1936. The Chairman of the Governors gave a confidential resume of thewhole story, and reaffirmed BBC policy on controversial broadcasting.In thediscussion that followed there was generalconcern at the future implicationsof theaffair, and at the danger to the freedom of broadcast speech from governmentintervention. Its power to intervene was acknowledged,but the consensus ofopinion was that the BBC would not be justifiedin acceptingsuch interventionunless satisfied, with or without the necessary information, that a course advised bythe government was in the publicinterest, or unless the government was openlyprepared to accept responsibility for enforcing its will. There was generalapprehension in regard to future possibilitiesof veiled interference by thegovernment.

The affair of TbeCitizen and His Government was quitecritical in clarifyingthereal nature of the relationshipbetween the BBC and the state. The magnitudeof


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its implicationsand the consequences that followed from it must be understoodclearly.It is astonishingand slightlyappallingthat a recent Director General, thelate Sir Charles Curran, should have had no knowledgeof this case, althoughit wasdescribed with exemplaryclaritybyBurrows (inBP5) for the BBC Directorate manyyears ago. Of the clause in the Charter which empowers Ministers to require theBBC either to broadcast, or to refrain from broadcastingparticular material,Curran writes: In either case the BBC is free to announce that such a direction hasbeen received. He continues a little later:

The power to require the BBC to refrain from broadcastingparticular material is the famousunused veto. This arouses immense suspicionin the minds of visitors to Britain, who are notaccustomed to the force of convention in British society.The fact that the power exists leads themto suspect that it must be used, or that its use must, at times, be threatened in order to securedesired objectives.This is simplynot the case. (Curran, 1979: 63-64)

A wry smile at the quaint notion that only benighted foreigners might findanythingfishyin this unused veto must giveway to dismaythat the Corporationtodayshould be so ignorantof the history of its own dealingswith government.

The force of convention in Britishsociety

is sometimes establishedby

force, andTheCitizen and His Government was one such instance. Nor can it be dismissed asan isolated event or an accidental hiccup in a normallysmooth set of relations. Itwas in effect the culmination of a series of pressures to which broadcastinghadbeen subjectedever since the ban on controversy (imposedby force)was lifted in1928. It clearlynarrowed the field of controversy, whatever the BBC might say, tothe differences between the three constitutional politicalparties.Opinionto theright or left of these was not acceptableto the British state, thoughuntil that timethe BBC had acceptedin principlethe rightof expressionfor communist and fascistpositionson radio, even if theywere there onlyto be disproved.Secondlyit gavethe

ForeignOffice de

factocontrol over the discussion of

foreignaffairs on radio.

The BBC, in the aftermath of the Vernon Bartlett row, had been progressingcomfortablyenough with routine consultation and advice. Now it knew that if theForeignOffice felt stronglyenough it both could and would make its wishesprevail.Thirdly, and most disastrously,the state had made the BBC carry the canfor the whole business, and had successfullyconcealed its exercise of power fromthe public. This was an intolerable violation of the principles on whichbroadcastingin this country was supposedto rest, and made nonsense of thesupposedindependenceof the BBC.

The proposed talks were in no sense a danger to some vital, or indeed

particularly significantaspect ofstate

policy.Theywere no more than

potentiallyembarrassingto ForeignOffice mandarins with uneasy visions of the propagandamileage certain foreign governments might get from them; while a right-winggovernment simply disliked the idea of a communist speaking on radio to theBritish public. To say the talks were not in the national interest was a convenientsmokescreen for a government more concerned with controlling, rather thaninforming,publicopinion.

The Ullswater Committees praiseof the BBC for exercisingthe responsibilityforcontroversy confided to it by the state with outstandingindependenceseemed ahollow mockery.Until this particularoccasion the independenceof the BBC, frail

thoughit was,was

perilouslypreserved.For the rest of the decade itwas

in pawnto

the state. The caution of the BBCs attitude towards the SpanishCivil War, itssilence on the risingmenace of Nazi Germany, its ineptitudewhen the crisis broke


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in 1838, its apparent complacentindifference in 1939 when war was inevitable-allthis can be seen as stemming from this incident in 1935 and 1936. Our task now isto chart the unfoldingof such consequences.

The SpanishCivil War-shameful timidity?In the aftermath of The Citizen and His Government The BBC maintained anextremelylow profileon all politicalissues. The Talks Department was in a state ofshock. News, still in its infancy, was havingteethingtroubles. When the SpanishCivil War broke out in July 1936 it produceda non-interventionist response fromthe British government, a violent polarization of British public opinion, andanother politicalminefield for the BBC. There were no symposiafrom the TalksDepartment on the subject, not even of the purely informative and educativevariety.There were no further Crisps in Spainfeature programmes to bringthat of1931 up to date. There were plenty of individuals in the BBC who caredpassionatelyabout the events in Spainand wanted to say somethingabout it, but

preciselybecause it was the most divisive issue in British

politicsof the 1930s,

because it split government and opposition, polarizedright and left-wingopinion,and brought bitterness and class-consciousness into foreign policy (Mowat,1968: 577) it was an untouchable subjectfor all areas of programming other thannews. And news soon found itself in trouble.

We cannot accept JonathanDimblebyschargeof shameful timidity over theBBCs coverage of the SpanishCivil War (Dimbleby,1975).It fails to recognizetheextent of the BBCs difficulties in handling political issues in general and thepeculiardifficulties of this issue for the News Department.For by 1937 accusationswere flying to and fro yet again of bias in the BBC. There were all the usual

signs-questionsin the House, letters of

complaintfrom

publicpersons, and a

ramp in the popular press. The DailyMail set the ball rolling with a campaignagainstthe menace of the red bias on radio. In a leader article ( 13 January1937)itwanted to know, Who is responsiblefor the conspicuousand persistent pro-redbias given to the BBCs service of news bulletins dealingwith the SpanishCivilWar? The left-wingpress repliedwith a content analysisof bulletins to show thatitems of rebel news (i.e. about Franco)outweighedgovernment news by two orthree to one, and were helping to damp down sympathyfor the Spanishdemocratic forces. The tone of voice of the announcers was adduced by some asevidence of bias, and the exact terminolgyfor describingboth sides was a matter of

exquisite diplomacy.The BBC followed the

ForeignOffice in

referringto the

Madrid government as the government, and every recognisedhandbook onInternational Law in calling the Burgosgovernment the insurgents(cf. Tbe BBCand LeftWlingBia.r, 1937 undated, WAC R34/523).

The whole of the news room wanted some one of them to be sent out to reporton the war from the front line, but that this was not permitted,althougheverynewspaper had a reporter on the scene (Dimbleby,1975: 76).

The qualityof agency material was admitted to be very unsatisfactory,and JohnCoatman, Head of News, had alreadycomplainedabout the matter. Each of thefour agencieshad their man in Madrid. There were none with Franco in Burgos.News from both sides was

highlypartisanand

strictlycensored,but the flow of

information from government sources outran that from the insurgentsby six toone. Communiques received from the same side on the same day frequently


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In January 1938 Chamberlain ordered a specialwatch to be kept on the BBCafter statements in the news that no steps towards the improvementof Anglo-Italian relations were intended in the near future. It was preciselythis thatChamberlain was after, hopingto drive a wedgein the Axis by wooingMussolinifrom Hitler, and it was on this issue that Edens resignationwas forced two weekslater. The BBC news statement was corrected on the order of the Prime Ministers

secretariat, and denied in the mainnews bulletin the

followingday(News Review,27 January 1938). There was a flurry in the press two weeks later as Germanydenied rumours of unrest in the army, blamingPolish Jewsand the BBC for thestory. The German ForeignOffice stronglyattacked the BBC suggestingthat thereports were inspired by a new British PropagandaCommittee set up byChamberlain and chaired by Vansittart (ManchesterGuardian, 12 February1938).TbeTimes, on the same day,pointed out that the new committee had not yet met,and that BBC bulletins were compiledfrom agency tapes. On 3 March Sir PhilipHenderson, the ambassador in Berlin, told Hitler that Halifax had that same dayarrangeda press conference with responsiblenewspaper editors, and had also

talked with the presidentof the NPA and senior BBC officials. To all he hademphasizedtheir responsibilityin the maintenance of peace (Historyof theTimes,vol IV: 910, n.l). A week later the ForeignOffice, immediatelybefore Hitlersannexation of Austria (9 March), informed the press that no pressure could orwould be exercised over newspaper content, but that personalattacks on Germanleaders, as distinct from reports and policy criticism, would make Halifaxs

negotiations more difficult (P.E.P. Report, 1938: 202). Thus the governmentsappeasement policy began, not with direct censorshipof the British media, butwith discreet surveillance and diplomaticpressure.

As Hitler marched into Austria the BBC Talks Department was runninga talks

symposium called Tbe Way of Peace(commenced February1938).Its progresswas

not uneventful, and the series caused a minor furore when one of the speakers,SirJosiahWedgwood MP, was not allowed to deliver his contribution as originallywritten. Wedgwood had included in his script a long shoppinglist of Hitlersterritorial demands and ambitions which the BBC insisted he must cut: Concretechargesof this sort, which are at the most conjecture,ought not to be giventhegreat publicity of the microphone.Wedgwoodrefused to omit the offendingpassage and another more amenable speakerwas fielded in his place. Wedgwoodmade a fuss in the newspapers and wrote a pamphletattackingBBC censorship.The BBCs Home IntelligenceUnit (organizedby Sir StephenTallents) noted that

the widespreadimpressioncreated by this incidentwas

that the BBC, dueto recent

politicalevents (Austria), would not let dictators be criticized (fordetails cf WACR34 / 512).In a crucial memorandum written seven months later (belowpp.15-17)JohnCoatman, now Director North Region,bitterlycriticized this series as playingabout on the academic,idealistic fringesof the subjectof war and peace. It bore asmuch relation to the necessities of the moment as the chatter of elderlyspinstersata Dorcas Societystea-party bears to the fightof religionagainst sin. Coatmanmaintained that what had reallybeen needed at that time were realistic talks byLiddell Hart, Admiral Richmond, Seton-Watson, Harold Nicholson, Voigt,Haldane and others tellingsimply and clearlythe decisions this country would

certainly have to take in the near future, and the state of military,economic andother resources in relation to those decisions (Coatman to Nicolls, 5 October 1938.WAC R34/325).What Coatman meant by realism will become plain later.


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At the same time the BBC was under pressure from two directions over politicaltalks on radio-from the Labour Party and its own Talks AdvisoryCommittee(TAC).It had still not succeeded in establishingan agreedcode of practicebetweenparties, between Government and Opposition,over the right of reply toGovernment broadcasts outside election periods. It had been trying hard to do sosince the Ullswater Reporthad recommended the need for further progress in thisdirection, but so far without success. In this it was urged on by the TAC, a newcommittee formed earlyin 1937 under the chairmanshipof Sir Walter Moberley.The committee supersededthe AEAC, and marked a shift in policyaway from thespecializedlistening groups for adult education talks towards the generalaudience(Briggs,1965: 223). Its brief was to advise the BBC on major matters of talkspolicy, to make suggestionsfor talks, to consider and comment on theCorporationsproposalsand to act as consultants in the planning of particularseries. One of its most active members was Megan LloydGeorgeMP, who, at thesecond meetingof the committee (1July 1937) had put down the followingresolution which the committee accepted:

That this committee desires to reaffirm its view previouslyexpressedas to the importanceof thediscussion before the microphonebywhatever methods the BBC finds practicable,of live politicalissues which are actuallyunder consideration.

Even before this resolution the BBC had been pressingthe Post Master General forsome agreedformula for politicaltalks on radio, but the Post Office simplystalled.On 7 February1938 the Chairman of the Governors wrote to Tryonasking againfor an answer to the letter he had written nearlya year ago on 1 March 1937. Tryonreplied on 18 February1938 that there is no prospect of agreement beingreachedbetween the Parties in the present circumstances, and consequentlythere are nofurther steps which can be taken at the present time.

A week later, immediatelyafter Edens resignation, the Secretaryof the LabourParty (J.S. Middleton)wrote to request-in the generalpublicinterest-the right,as the Official Opposition, to broadcast its views on the present InternationalSituation in specialrelation to the Governments new declaration of policy.Thiswas the first time that an oppositionparty had asked for the right to make a policystatement outside election time (apart from the agreedprocedurefor the Budget),and it put the BBC in a quandary. Should it accede to this request, at the sametime offering the right of reply to other partiesor the opportunity to make someother policystatement? How often should this be allowed? In its official reply tothe Labour PartyDelegationafter a meetingwith the Board of Governors in Marchthe BBC stated that it had alwaysheld the view that there should be greateropportunityfor broadcast discussions of politicalcontroversy, but that its effortshad so far, and not for want of trying, provedabortive. It would now look into thewhole matter afresh in conjunctionwith its TAC.

In the wake of the Austrian crisis Reith, at a Control Board Meeting(5 April)had raised the questionof the effect on the public of the generallysensationaltenor of the news. This was not the BBCs fault he declared-an odd way ofputtingit-but he wanted everyone to giveserious thoughtto ways and means offormulatinga positive policy to keep the country in better morale. The nationneeded heartening (WAC R34/534).OBs had few ideas other than Royalbroad-casts to give an idea of foreigngoodwilltowards this country and belief in itsfuture (for these repliescf. WAC R34/486). For Features Moray McLaren was


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bubblingwith ideas. He put forward a four-part historical programme on TbeDefenceof Christendom to show the rape of Europein the past by ancient Goths,Huns, Vandals and Infidels. This was followed by a weird medleyof programmesto illustrate the themes of Libertyand Freedom (particularlyBritish)as exemplifiedby the Armada, Trafalgar,Mount Everest, Nansen, Abraham Lincoln, FlorenceNightingale,Henry V, Scott of Antarctica and the Golden Hind. For Talks,Maconachie was more sombre and realistic. In reply to Cecil Graves (to whom thetask of implementingthe new policyhad been delegatedbyReith), he declared:

I have been thinkingover this proposalsince you mentioned it to me, and feel that propagandaofthis kind is full of pitfalls.If, for instance, we were dealingwith subjectsof real importance,such asthe military strengthof this country, it would surelybe futile, if not dishonest, to leave out theblack spots, and emphasisemerelythe bright ones.

He suggestedmore particularly that Features or Variety might create a seriesbuilt round a pessimisticcharacter, who, through a series of misadventures,wasmade to look ridiculous-the idea being to kill pessimismby ridicule. He also

suggestedthat

JohnHilton

mightgivea series of

monthlytalks. These would

probablybe crude and emotional, and would appealprobablyonlyto the workingclass with whom it would probablybe very effective (Briggs,656).Maconachie didnot think the BBC could broadcast talks series on such important subjectsas ourmilitary strength (whichwas quite inadequatehe added) unless it came franklyinto the open and made its intentions plain with a generaltitle such as the BrightSide. Such a series, so labelled, was unlikelyto be successful.

For the News Department, R. T. Clarkes reply was the most sombre of all: As far as News is concerned,it is very difficult for me to put up any suggestionon the matter ofimprovingthe morale of the country. I am afraid that at present the majorityof peoplewould

admit that the main items ofnews

are, in themselves,depressing .. It seemsto me

that the onlyway to strengthenthe morale of the peoplewhose morale is worth strengtheningis to tell them thetruth, and nothingbut the truth, even if the truth is horrible. (Briggs,656-657)

In the light of Clarkes comments Reiths own scheme for national hearteningwas perhaps the most bizarre of all. He proposedthat the BBC should administera cheerful tonic calculated to remove any inferioritycomplexlatent in the mind ofthe man in the street about Britains industrial efficiency,capacityand achieve-ment. He wanted the news bulletins to carry a regularIndustrial Reportwhich, in abreak with precedent,would give a pat on the back to British industryby namingindividual firms that were holdingtheir own in world markets-the Reith Awardfor Industry. This fatuous scheme was practicallythe last thing Reith did in theBBC. On 30 June he left the Corporationto go to Imperial Airways,and thefruitless task of pursuingthis idea fell to others. It was greetedwith no enthusiasmin the News Room, and collapsedentirelyat the end of August after protractedwrangles with the Federation of British Industry whose competitiveinstinctsdisliked the idea of free publicity for some but not for others (detailsfrom WACR28/94).

Meanwhile Basil Nicolls (Controllerof Programmes)was grapplingwith theintractable questionof politicalbroadcasts. In two longmemoranda (30 Mayand 3June 1938. WAC R34/ 534)he tried to define policyguidelineson the matter,drawinga sharp distinction between two different categoreisof politicalbroadcastsand the different treatment they mightreceive. Category(A) was politicsin thenarrow sense of the word, i.e. PartyPolitics. In essence this involved the emotional


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months later the Director of Overseas Services declared that, while he was notblindly opposedto broadcasts from the scene of action, he felt there were timeswhen such thingswere liable to be unhelpful, misleadingand purelysensational,and therefore not in accordance with the principleswhich guide our actions as aBritish organisation.The Americans networks had made a great splash in printabout their coverage of the Munich crisis, presumablywith a view to impressingtheir sponsors. The question

was

how far the BBC could preserve its principlesif itdecided to follow in the wake of American broadcasting?(cf. Crisis Broadca.rt.r,D.O.S. to C.P. 24 October 1938. WAC R34/325).

Munich and after

The Czechoslovakia crisis was now boilingup. In August and SeptemberNicollswas pursuingattempts with the party Whips to come to some arrangement overcategory (A) broadcasts for the autumn schedule, but these negotiationswereovertaken by events and had to be postponed.Reith, before his departure,hadposed the problemof the BBCs treatment of sensational events in relation tomaintaining the nations morale. Outwardlyat least the BBCs performanceduringthe critical period(late Septemberto earlyOctober)appearedto be much asmight by now be expected.Nicolls was anxious, as the crisis deepened, to getpermissionfrom Reuters to set up loud-speakersin publicplacesso that the BBCssober and objective news bulletins mightbe made as widelyavailable as possible.This was taking a leaf out of Goebbelss book, who had already done this inGermany. Sir Roderick Jones (who owned Reuters) flatly turned down the idea,and events were moving too swiftlyfor it to be worth pursuing(JardineBrown to

Tallents, 28 September1938.WAC

R28/297).Some years later the BBC Registrycompileda report, quite fullydocumented,on the BBCs handling of the Munich crisis (WAC R34/325). The compilersummarized what s/he took to be the consensus of opinionoutside the BBC aboutthe role of broadcastingat that time:

Broadcastingnaturallyplayedan importantpart in the Czechoslovakia crisis of September/October1938, and was commended afterwards on all sides for its efficient service and for its steadyingeffect

on anxious listeners, only too readyto seize on wild rumours and to believe the most sensationalnewspaper stories.... There was no censorshipby the Government of the BBC news bulletins orbroadcast material, thoughthe Corporationnaturally kept in close touch with the appropriatedepartmentsand the bulletins fell in line with Government policy.... The news bulletinsbecame the most important section of the programmes to a world wide audience duringthoseanxious daysand the calm voice of the BBC announcers evoked specialcomment from abroad incontrast to the excited accents of American announcers, and the extreme anti-Czechoslovakpropagandafrom Germany.... The BBC earned considerable praiseand practicallyno criticismfor its part in keepinglisteners informed on new developments,and exertinga calminginfluenceby the avoidance of sensationalism or rumour-mongering.

The bulletins themselves, on those critical two days(29 and 30 September)whenChamberlain flew to Hitler and returned with his scrap of paper promisingpeace inour times, contained-even in the moment of triumph-asteelyglintof the trueimplicationsof these events. A full record on microfiche of BBC news bulletins exists onlyfrom the beginningof the war. Beforethat onlya handful of new scriptsas broadcast have been preserved:those for the General Strike, afew from early1938, and those on 29 and 30 September1938.


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The information gap

Munich brought to a head all the dissatisfactions in the News Department withagency material that had been accumulatingover a decade. In a four pagememorandum R. T. Clark, now Head of News, reviewed the whole problem(cf.News Agenciesduringthe Crisis, 4 November 1938. WAC R28/297).For homenews the Press

Associationwas

largelyexcused since itwas in

thesame

boatas

everyone else-a completeinability to get any information at all from DowningStreet. In the absence of any official information it had fallen back on Lobby talkand Club gossip,but this of course we could not use. The bulk of Clarks reportdealt with the inadequaciesof Reuters.

Clark beganby pointingout that, as a commerical organization,Reuters hadhad to adjust to the demands of its customers. As such it had changedenormouslyfrom the service it had been before 1914. Reuters main clients now were thepopular press with seven or eight editions nightly and peculiar methods ofpresentation:

They can onlytake a very limited supplyof foreignnews, and that the most sensational. (I do notmean the most sensational politically,but the most sensational from the pointof view of the typeof reader for which they cater. The birth of a babywith four heads in Bulgariais much moresensational from the pointof view of this type of paper than the fall of the French Cabinet.)Theresult is that Reuters is concentratingon the non-essential and picturesquestuff, and furthermoreowingto the changedconditions in Fleet Street, where the old fashioned trained sub-editor is arapidlydisappearingtype, it writes and re-writes one story.

The result of these changeswas predictable.Reuters coverage of the crisis was poorand perfunctory.When the Czechoslovakia situation looked like growinginto anews story the agency had sent out one of their senior men, but three of his main

stories were cancelled in their entirety within hours of their dispatch. For the firstfour or five dayshe had relied entirelyon German Sudeten sources. Godesburg wasbadlycovered and Munich was worse. Duringthe whole of the crisis the service ofthe three agencies(the other two were Central News and ExchangeTelegraph)wastotallyinadequatefor the purposes of the type of service which the Corporationistrying to give.

By contrast Clark pointed out, the serious newspapers had their own foreigncorrespondents.Such newspapers used Reuters mainlyas a check and as a cover,relyingon their own staff for at least nine tenths of foreignnews. Their coverage ofthe crisis was far superiorto the agencies.The best thing the BBC could do wouldbe to givethe News Department a service equivalentto the foreigncorrespondentsof the serious newspapers. This, for reasons of costs, would obviouslynot provideaservice as comprehensiveas The Times, but it would secure a separate and reliablesource of news, particularlyat times and in places where such a service wasessential.

Playingfair with the peopleThe ex-head of News, John Coatman, raised the most fundamental questionofall-the extent of Government control of the BBCs activities in the sphere ofnews. This critical issue was posedin an importantmemorandum (the BBC andNational Defence, 5 October 1938, WAC R34/325)which registereda deep andurgent disquiet on the matter. Coatman argued that the BBC was, in times of


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crisis, the most importantpublicinstitution in this country. Its prestigewas uniquesince the mass of the peoplebelieved that the BBC could speakfor the governmentand yet was independentof it:

This belief should be carefullynoted by us, because it not onlygivesus great authority, but alsothrows on us a very specialresponsibilityand exposes us to a specialdanger.The responsibilityIrefer to is that of playingfair with the peopleof this country, of being,in fact, trulyindependentof impropercontrol or coercion by the Government. The dangerI refer to is that the Government,knowing now more clearlythan ever the power and value of the BBC in times of crisis, may seek tosecure control and influence over us such as would prevent us from, as I have put it, playingfairwith the people. I am speaking now of the period before war is actuallydeclared. On thedeclaration of war, of course, we must come under direct Government control.

What gravelytroubled Coatman was that it had been common knowledgein theBBC for at least a year, that war with Germany was inevitable, and yet thisknowledge(and the magnitudeof its implicationsand consequences)had not beencommunicated to the listeningpublic.This pointis substantiated in the minutes ofthe meetingof the Board of Governors (BG);of Control Board (CB);of Controllers

Meetings (CM); and of Programme Board (PB)-all of which show thatcontingencyplans for war had been routinely discussed and prepared since themiddle of 1937. By August 1938 the Cabinet had accepteda synchronizedschemefor wartime broadcastingand instructions for action when war was declared (CM,minute 411, 5 August 1938).The BBCs own arrangements for the outbreak of warwere agreed on 9 September(CM minute 435). Arrangementsfor Staff, includingwartime pay scales, were finalized just before the crisis (CM, minute 468, 23September:CB minute 561, 27 September).It was in this context-of behind-the-scenes planningbased on the certainty of war, and a front-of-house policywhichappearedto evade that certainty-that Coatman expressedhis dismay.

The substantial core of Coatmans argument must speak for itself:I say, with a full sense of responsibilityand, since I was for over three years Chief News Editor, witha certain authority, that in the past we have not playedthe part which our duty to the peopleof thiscountry called upon us to play. We have, in fact, taken part in a conspiracy of silence. I am notsayingfor a moment that we did this willinglyor even knowingly,and most certainlythere is not aword of accusation against any individual in what I am saying. In view of our history and ourpeculiar relationship to the Government, and also the very short ume, comparativelyspeaking,duringwhich we have been at work, I think even the sternest critic can hardlyhave expectedus tobehave differently.But now thingshave changed.The positionof this country is infinitelymoredangerousthan it has ever been in modern times, and the past few weeks have invested the BBCwith a new importance,givenit a more vital role in the national life, and have, therefore, laid anew

responsibilityon

us whoare

its servants This responsibilityis to let the peopleof this countryknow, as far as the sources available to us allow, just what is happening I am not for a momentsuggestingthat the BBC should have a rival foreignpolicyto that of the Government. In any casethat is impossible,and even if it were not impossibleit would be grosslyimproperand irre-sponsible.What I mean is that we should make it our duty to get the most authoritative andresponsiblenon-official students of foreignaffairs to expose the developmentof events franklyandfearlesslyin our generaltalks and news talks We would, of course, keep full liaison with theGovernment, but we would never allow ourselves to be silenced except when we are taken mto thatconfidence which our positionand sense of responsibilityentitles us to, and are given specific,validreasons for not followingout some course of action on which we had decided.

Coatman gave examplesof what he meant by a conspiracyof silence. Over ayear before, at a private gathering, a member of the Government had said thatBritain would almost certainly be at war with Germany over Czechoslovakia bySeptember1938. That opinion, and the facts on which it was based, was known to


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many peopleoutside official circles, includingseveral in BroadcastingHouse. Yetthe BBC was unable to let the British people know, in any way, that such acontingencywas not only possible, but almost certain. What most troubledCoatmans conscience was that, in consequence, the country was totallyunpreparedfor war. The authorities had simplyplayedat Air Raid Precautions.The Home Office had done well within the terriblyclose limits imposedon it bysecrecy and Government policyin the last few months, but its action would havebeen immeasurablymore effective and the country immeasurablysafer, had thesituation been exposedin all its urgency. It might, probablywould, have made allthe difference between the surrender to which democracyhas submitted and thenegotiationof a real peace which would have left Europesecure.

The attempt to reassert autonomy

Coatmans memorandum was not intended simplyto review what was past. TheMunich

Agreementhad

giventhis

country,he wrote, a

breathing spacenot a

permanent peace, which the BBC must use to rethink its responsibilitiesto thecountry and its relations with government:

I know that what I have been sayingnow demands a certain adjustmentin our organisationforbroadcast news and talks. It requiresimportantadjustmentsin our relations with the Governmentand, above all, it requiresresolution and knowledgeon the part of us of the BBC. I make a pleaforrealism in our talks and news, and a determination to keepour people informed of developmentsat home and abroad, developmentswhich concern them vitally,usingthat world in its literal sense.

Coatmans memorandum was widelycirculated in the BBC. If it had been slowto respond to the implicationsof the Austrian crisis, this time the response was

swift. In the midst of the crisis the BBCs handling of it was discussed atProgramme Board on 29 September.The matters raised were largelyadministrativeand technical-including the allegation that the recordingof Chamberlainsspeech at Heston, on his return from Godesburg,had been played at too fast aspeed so altering the pitch, and hence the impression,of his voice. At the nextmeeting(6 October)the implicationsof the crisis were beginningto sink in. Afternoting that the ForeignOffice had expressedhigh appreciationof the work of thenews department,the next matter raised-by Coatman-was that of governmentcontrol. On this matter Nicolls stated that there was a clear distinction betweeninterference with broadcastingby the Government on its own behalf, of whichthere had been none during the crisis, and advice from the Foreign Office onmatters affectingthe national interest, which would have to be soughtby the BBCif it were not offered in the first place.There was some discussion as to whetherthere had been enoughtopical talks on the factors leadingup to the crisis and thepersonalities involved, and Maconachie stated there had been a talk onCzechoslovakia and a brief portrait of Dr Benes (the Czech Prime Minister).Othermatters were dealt with and finallyit was agreedthat, in the wake of events, thereshould be a series of talks on After the Crisis in which the first speakerswould beordinarypeopledescribingtheir reactions, and the later ones would be authorativespeakersansweringthe points they had made. It was hoped that the series wouldnot be so edited, especiallyas regardspolitics,as to make them uninteresting(PBminute 167, 13 October). Next day, at the enlargedControl Board (forRegionalDirectors), under a minute headed Broadcastingin time of War, it was agreed


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that the lessons of the crisis should be recorded and present programme arrange-ments should be revised where necessary and givenwider publicity. The issue wasdiscussed at length againat Programme Board (3 November).It was agreedthatthe value of a post mortem would be greatly enhanced if it led to a definition ofpolicyin advance of the next crisis. This was deferred until the next meeting(17November) when the whole questionof the BBCs relationshipwith governmentwas reviewed. It

was

resolved that the BBC (1) neither could nor should adoptan

editorial policyof its own; (2) should endeavour to ventilate informed opinioneven thoughcritical of the government, balanced with the official view; (3) shouldanticipate events as far as possibleand try to givelisteners the necessary backgroundinformation before matters became so critical that there was oppositionto theirbeing treated at all; (4) should, duringa crisis, broadcast more topicalmaterial(this, Nicolls said, would be met to a considerable extent by the current plan toestablish BBC correspondentsin Europeancapitals);(5)should treat current eventsmore regularlyand in greater detail than at present, possiblyby a generalextensionof news.

The immediate response of Maconachie and the Talks Department was to run asymposium along the lines suggestedby the Programme Board. Everyman and theCrisis (commenced November 1938)thoughit may have helped in restoring thenations morale, did little to add to the nations politicaleducation as to the realimplicationsof Munich (cf. Cardiff 1980: 45). The changein the BBCs attitudeshowed most markedlyin the activities of the News Department from Novemberonwards. There efforts were made immediatelyto act upon the discussions andresolutions of Programme Board, whose effect was to strengthenClarks belief thatthe job of the Department was to go on pluggingaway at the truth, no matter howhorrible. His request for more staff, and particularlyfor foreign correspondents,was

acceptedas an

imperative necessity(CM, 3 March 1939).Meanwhile effortshad been made to get what staff there were to the European trouble spots in theimmediate wake of the crisis. Murrayleft for Pragueon 1 October, and a week laterDimbleby and the recordingvan headed in the same direction (CB,4 October). Achangein the tenor of news was soon discerned. In November Tallents received aprivateletter-or at any rate a very semi-official one-from A. P. Ryan in theOffices of the Cabinet, complainingof the tendentious nature of the newsbulletins and the predominanceof commentators who in the past were of a pacifistnature but had lately become ultra-bellicose. Ryan observed that the news whileperhaps containingnothing to which specificobjection could be taken, has

managedto

conveya sort of

leaninginone

direction (cf.WAC

R41 / 132 / 1).By early 1939 listeners had become accustomed to hearingnightly in the newsactual recordingsof fieryforeigndictators makingtheir speeches. And what wasmore, accordingto Mr F. WashingtonFlatt, the BBC makes a point of recordingthe most vehement part of the speech, which of course is greetedwith wildcheering.... Is it that they are trying to foment fear and turmoil in the minds ofEnglishlisteners? (letter to The Times 29 March 1939).This correspondentwas amonth at least behind the times, for duringthe whole of Februarythere had been along and extraordinarycorrespondencein that newspaper about the tenor of BBCnews.

It beganon 2

Februarywitha

letter from Mrs E. Hester Blagden(ThePalace,Peterborough)complainingthat: . j,..., ( )


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Some of us ordinarycitizens are troubled and perplexedthat while our Prime Minister and ForeignSecretarydo all in their power to bringabout friendlycooperationbetween this country and thepeoplesof Germany and Italy, we are subjectedevery eveningin BBC news bulletins to hearingonlythose words from abroad which must aggravate ill feelingsand exasperate tired minds, so thatnightly we can go to bed more certain that war must come?

Mrs Blagdenwanted to know if somethingcould be done to rectifythis.Her letter struck some

deeplyresponsivechordin

the readershipof The Timesfor there followed an avalanche of letters, of which those published were but afraction, in which the critics far outnumbered the contented (TheTimers leader, 25February1939).One earlycorrespondentput it mildly: Everybodymust have beenfilled with admiration for the restraint shown by the BBC at the time of the crisis,but since then it does seem inclined to yieldto the temptation to dramatise thenews (W. G. Odger,9 February).Others were less inhibited: alarmist, emotional,sensationalist, rumour-mongering,givingfolk the jitters, one-sided (everyitemtending to place the Fascist nations in an unfavourable light),left-wing.... These were the chargesendlesslyrepeated,with evidence drawn inas

support from previousoccasions. It did not escape the memory ofsome

correspondentsthat it has been exactly the same in the SpanishCivil War; theatrocities on Francos side were always givenprominencein the bulletins whilenothingwas said about Republicanoutrages (cf. WAC Press Cuttings,News / 1939,P370).

The popularpress soon weighedin : The fat boysof the BBC who try to makeour flesh creep are under fire. They are the news announcers who have beensendingthe country to bed at nightconvinced of immediate catastrophe.Now theyare beingcriticised and it is right and proper theyshould be, for the manner andsubstance of much of the news broadcast is deplorable.... Thus, and muchmore, DailyMail (15 February).Soon after this commotion had died down therewas another, as the press splasheda spate of BBC Suicides said to have beencaused by hearingbad news on the wireless (cf. NottinghamJournal, 15 April).There were no reportedcases of newspaper suicides.

The BBC was not deterred, and the News Department was not without one ortwo supporters. Professor V. G. Childe, who held the Chair of Prehistoric

Archeologyat EdinburghUniversity(andwho had crossed swords with the BBC ona previousoccasion)wrote to congratulatethe Corporationon its objectivenews:The present correspondencein The Times is the best testimonyto your success inseparatingnews from propaganda.PersonallyI confess I find the deciphermentofthe ruling oligarchys tortuous aims, by applyingto the skilfullyselected half-truths in The Times the methods of criticism of ancient authors taught at Oxford,abetter guideto the conduct of my own affairs than any attempt to discover what isreallyhappening.This latest press ramp was discussed, with Clark present for theNews Room, at the enlargedControl Board which agreedthat it was not the job ofthe BBC to send peoplecomfortablyto bed. The fact that an item of BBC news didnot appear next dayin a particular listeners pet newspaper was not a reflection onits authenticity(EnlargedCB, 3 March, minute 136).

BringingChurchill to the

microphoneWhile all this was goingon attempts to establish an agreedprocedureon politicaltalks of the category (A) variety had been resumed. These had been postponed


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when the Munich crisis blew in, but by the beginningof 1939 senior officials in theBBC had returned once againto the task of rollingthis particular stone uphill.TheBoard of Governors, and the BBC administrators, with a newfound resolution,beganto take a firmer line. The Corporationwas no longeran appeaser, thoughitsefforts to break the silence were againeventuallyto be contained. In negotiationsfrom the end of 1938 throughto the summer of 1939 continuous efforts were madeboth to bring the opponents of appeasement to the microphone(ChurchillandEden above all), and to mobilize publicopinionto an awareness of the inevitabilityof the Europeanwar. Both are evidence of that new found determination, in theaftermath of Munich, to play fair with the British people.

In October 1938 Churchill had broadcast from London to America a powerfuland sustained attack on government policy,appealingfor American support as thelightsin Europewent out (full text in Tbe Times, 17 October). The followingweekControl Board, noting that Halifax had agreed to broadcast to America afterChurchill (to correct him of course),proposedthat it mightbe desirable to get atalks series along the same lines by government and oppositionspeakersfor theBBC National Programme. Frederick Ogilvie(the

new

Director General)agreedtotake the matter up with Sir Horace Wilson, Chamberlains faithful civil servant(qv. Mowat 1968: 593). The time was scarcelyopportune however owingto thepreoccupationsof Whitehall, and further attempts to arrange politicaltalks weredeferred until the new year. On 1 January 1939 Ogilvie wrote to CaptainMargesson(ConservativeChief Whip) saying that he was most anxious tostraightenout arrangements for politicalbroadcasting,and askingfor a meetingathis earliest convenience.

After a meetingwith Margesson(18January) a new initiative began, thoughwith foreignpolicydefinitelyexcluded in the meantime. What was now acceptedin principleby the parties were regularcategory (A) broadcasts on domestic issuesby front bench spokesmen.Ogilviecontacted the Labour Partyfor suggestionsand

Attlee proposeda debate on Problems of Old Age Pensions (Attlee to Ogilvie, 15February),which was accepted by the other parties. The news of regular radiodiscussions on politicalissues by the parties was publicizedin the newspapers. Thisprompted Churchill to write to Ogilvieaskingif some provisionought not to bemade for public men who have held high office, and who are not likelyto bechosen as spokesmenof their parties. Churchill gave a list of those who, likehimself, were unlikely candidates for the microphoneunder the presentarrangement. They included Eden, Duff Cooper, Lord Cecil, Amery, LloydGeorge, Stafford Cripps and Lansbury.Yet it may be thought that theyhave acontribution to make which would be of value, and that large numbers of yourlisteners would like to hear what theyhave to say. The idea that no publicmen notnominated byparty Whips should be allowed to speakon radio is not defensible inpublic policy (Churchill to Ogilvie 21 February). Ogilvie replied in mostconciliatoryand friendly terms. The BBC had long been anxious to increase itsfacilities for politicalbroadcasting,and it seemed best at first to ask the partiestochoose the subjectsand the speakers.But, he went on, we are closelyconsideringfurther stages in the developmentof politicalbroadcasting,includingthe onewhich you are goodenoughto outline (Ogilvieto Churchill, 24 February).

., ~ ~.


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Closingthe door on the anti-appeasersWhat Ogilvienow tried to establish was the right to discuss, at the microphone,issues over which the parties were internallydivided. Althoughthe object of thisexercise would be to bring Churchill and Eden to the microphone on theirdifferences with their party over foreignpolicy,Ogilviebeganhis campaignmore

subtly.It would be useless to tackle the Conservative

Partyhead on, so he started

with the marginallyeasier option of persuadingthe Labour Party to air some of itsdifferences on radio. The pretext havingbeen established, the next move would bein the direction of the Government. AccordinglyOgilviewrote to Attlee inquiringif he, or anyone else, mightbe willingto take part in a microphonedebate with SirStafford Cripps.Cripps,who figured in Churchills little list of party offenders,had been seriouslyat odds with the Labour leadershipfor some years. He was wellto the left of the Party, and had been prominentin the PopularFronts UnityCampaign,organizedin 1937 by the Socialist League,the Communist Party andthe IndependentLabour Party-all of whom had been anathematised by theLabour

Party (cf.Mowat

1968: 581-582).In

January1939

Crippshad reactivated

the Popular Front campaign,which was rejected again by the Labour PartysNational Executive. Crippspersistedhowever and was expelledfrom the Partyforhis pains (Mowat 1968: 636). Thus Ogilviesproposalwas not only highlytopicaland controversial, but probed as well the Partys divided attitude to the mostforbidden of subjects-foreignpolicy.

Attlee however sent the proposalsmartlypacking:It would be setting an entirelynew precedentin politicalbroadcastingto initiate discussions ondomestic differences between members or ex-members of the same politicalparty No suchsuggestionhas been made, as far as I know, in the cases of MR EDEN or MR DUFF COOPER whohave differed with the Conservative

Partyon the issue of

foreignpolicy.I think

youwill find that

similarlythe various occasions on which MR CHURCHILL, during recent years, has differed fromthe Government have not been made occasions for such a debate.

He went on to say that politicalbroadcastinghad alwaysbeen confined to thediscussion of matters at issue between recognizedparties. The difficultyofadmittingfortuitous collections of individuals had, alwaysbeen recognisedasopeningthe door very wide to all kinds of cranks (Attleeto Ogilvie,16 March).Heand his colleagueswould not entertain the idea. Ogilviereplied in quiet despairthat the way of broadcastingis hard!. He reminded Attlee how hard the BBC hadtried to open up politicaldebate on radio. He hoped Attlee did not think that thenew arrangement was the sum total of what could or should be done. He repliedthat the line between cranks and non-cranks (Attlees terms, not his) might bedifficult to draw, but it was one which it was the business of the BBC to face. Hesaid that there was a general feeling in the BBC that the public demandoccasionallyto hear a Churchill, a LloydGeorge,a Lansburyor a Cripps,was by nomeans unreasonable. He hopedto be able to approach Attlee and the other leaderswhen the times were a little rosier. In the meantime, he concluded, MayI ask youto extend your sympathyto the BBC for its present inability,throughno fault of itsown, adequatelyto dischargewhat it believes to be its duty to listeners and to thecountry(Ogilvieto Attlee, 19 March).

As that door closed the BBC was tryinganother way in. At a Controllers Meetingheld on 10 March (cf. minute 120)the Chairman of the Governors (R. C. Norman)was asked to contact the Post Master General about the possibilityof a debate on


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Eden and Churchills request for a wider form of National Government. Before hedid so the crux of the matter was raised in the Commons (27March)by Sir Richard

Acland, a Liberal MP and another prominentsupporter of the Popular Front. Acland raised a questionwhich he had alreadytried to put twice before, and which

had been twice postponedfor the convenience of the Government. At just aftereleven oclock that night he was able at last to put the questionwhich onlythePrime Minister can answer. Why is he entitled to state (on radio) his views offoreign affairs when he chooses, and why is no other leader entitled, on anyoccasion, to make any reply?Chamberlain left the answer to his Post MasterGeneral, MajorG. C. Tryon.This providedNorman with the pretext for raisingthe matter, and he wrote to Tryonon 5 April.

Tryon,usingthe classic ployof all Post Masters General when awkward questionson broadcastingwere raised in the House, had replied that the questionas to whoshould broadcast was a matter for the Governors of the BBC to decide. This, saidNorman, was of course the true constitutional doctrine to which he unreservedlyadhered. However, he found himself wonderingwhether the practice which hasgrown up with regard to political broadcastingdoes really accord with thisdoctrine. Normans letter was very tactful, and it roared like any suckingdove.But it did clearlymake the critical points. There were difficulties,he granted,arising out of the BBCs policyof balanced controversy. The Prime Minister of theday, whatever his politicalcolour, was more than a party leader and was entitled tospeaksometimes as the leader of the nation. So the BBC had gladlyallowed MrChamberlain to make a number of broadcasts in the past few months, and hadwithheld the right of reply though not infrequently the speechesincludedpassages of a party nature. It was a goodthing that, after years of trying, the BBChad been able at least to arrange broadcast debates on Old Age Pensions and

MunicipalTrading.Encouragingthoughthis was as a start, no-one could claim thatthese were the questionson which the mind of the publicwas concentrated, or thatany of the issues which had been before the public for many months had beenadequatelydiscussed on the air. Theywere issues frequentlydebated in Parliamentand canvassed daily in the press; but the vast audience of thirty million wholistened to the wireless were deprivedof any opportunityof getting, through theunrivalled instrument which the BBC controlled, such an education in the mostvital controversial questionsas was in the sole power of broadcastingto offer.

Acland was, said Norman, uncomfortablynear the truth in sayingthat whoshould speak at the microphonewas in the hands of the Prime Minister. Andmatters were made worse by the fact that although many prominentpoliticiansoutside the Government had spokenover the air to the United States, theyremained unheard in this country-a fact which had naturallyexposedthe BBC tomuch criticism. It could not be rightthat the British people,at such a time as this,had no chance to hear statesmen of the standingof Churchill, LloydGeorgeorEden. It was essential that they, alongwith leadingmembers of the government,should come to the microphone.I gravelydoubt, said Norman, whether we aredoingour duty and exercisingproperlythe discretion which, as you trulysay, lieswith us under the Charter. Norman ended bynotingthat thoughhe was shortly tolay down his chairmanship,he had not wanted to departwithout registeringhissense of the urgency of the matter, and hoped that Tryonwould discuss the wholequestionwith the new Chairman. Tryonsreply was a rude as it was short. Hethanked Norman for his views and was glad to have them before he departed(see


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WAC R34 / 5 34 / 3for this correspondencewith Churchill, Attlee and Tryonand forother details).This finallyclosed the door on these efforts to bring the opponentsof appeasement to the microphone.The BBC had one more cast of the dice. Itmight yet try to mobilize public opinionto prepare for war and in so doingsmugglein Churchill and Eden as speakers.This it tried to do in those last fewmonths before September1939.

Preparingthe nation for warBack in December 1938 the Ministryof Labour had contacted Sir StephenTallents(in chargeof Public Relations for the BBC) over its preparationsfor a generalpublicity campaignto launch its new National Service scheme. In the first fewmonths of 1939 the Whitehall and militaryapparatuses moved ponderouslyintoaction and the News Department found itself up to its neck in Army propagandaschemes and the plansof the War Office which, as Richard Dimbleby confided toDonald Boyd,are more or less of a compulsorynature as far as we are concerned.

By Easter the campaignwas well and trulyboggeddown throughthe lack of anycoordinated government plans or any established means of liaison betweenWhitehall, the army and the BBC.

At the end of April Charles Siepmann(now Director of Programme Planning)wrote to advise Basil Nicolls that there was considerable puzzlementand anxietyinBroadcastingHouse at the lack of any clearlyemergingpolicy.Gielgudand theothers were sick, he said, of half measures and a policywhich seemed to vacillatebetween appeasement and half-hearted propaganda.Siepmann summed up thegeneralfeeling that if we wait upon the Government the immense influence ofbroadcastingfor mobilisingpublic opinion and a proper appreciationof ourpresent state, recruitment and National Service will all be deferred until the bombsare dropping(Siepmann to Nicolls, 20 April. See WAC R34/486 from which thefollowingaccount is compiled).

Siepmannsuggested,with respect, that the BBC should take the initiative and atonce devote a portion of the daily programme schedule to giving effect to aconcerted scheme of professionalpropaganda.He wanted every section of thecommunity to be made aware of its particular danger;to launch a majorcampaignfor army recruitment, ARP and local emergency services; to exploit the appeal ofChurchill and Eden, the illustrative resources of feature and educative possibilitiesof talks as a spearhead for the exercise. It would need the co-operationofGovernment departments,but the BBC must take the lead.This recommendation was immediatelyacceptedand over the next six weeks theBBC went ahead with its own preparationsfor a majorcampaignon the themes of

ARP and National Service. It was hampered by fairly continuous examplesofWhitehall inefficiencyand stupidity in banningitems for broadcastingwhen theywere obviouslyof urgent public interest (WhitehallInefficiency, Nicolls toGraves, 10 May for detailed examples).In spite of this the BBC moved ahead.LindsayWellingtongrappledwith plans for a big talks series to persuade thecountry to support the recruitment drive. His jotted notes reveal an almost equalconcern to persuadethe government of the gravityof the situation, with the addedworry that to initiate a big campaignwas worse than useless if the administrativemachineryfor dealingwith a big influx of recruits was not in existence. Wellingtonbeganwith the assumptionthat a great many people still did not believe that


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Britain was on the brink of war and that until they understood that this was so theywould be unwillingto volunteer for national service. A statement of the realsituation and the necessary objectives, coupledwith a direct appeal for concreteaction was the indispensablefirst step. Two popularfigureshad scarcelybeen heardon radio-Eden and Churchill. Let them speakon the situation generally(whichwill ensure a large radio audience) on condition that they appeal for recruits for

National Service. Add to this broadcastson

the requirementsof the four serviceswhich need recruits by men alreadyorganizingand servingin them (basis= comeand help instead of go and help). He then sketched out a sequence of suchappeals,startingwith Eden and Churchill, spreadout over successive daysof oneweek.

At the same time Laurence Gilliam was draftingdetailed proposalsfor a featuresseries to support The BBC RecruitingDrive. The series would recreate the eventsleadingto Munich, the crisis itself and its implicationsthrough to the present. Itwould combine news bulletins, publicspeeches,foreignpress and radio bulletinswith publicreactions to these events drawn from Everyman and the Cri.ri.r, datafrom the Institute of Public Opinionand from Mass Observation reports. It mighthave been brilliant had it ever been done.

By the end of May detailed planshad been drawn up for a two week campaignwhich the BBC wanted to launch between 18 June and 1 July. The short list ofspeakershad been prepared:the leaders of the three parties,and a sampledrawnfrom Baldwin, Churchill, Lord Derby, Morrison, Gracie Fields (for womenrecruits),LloydGeorge,Dorman Smith, Eden, Halifax and Anderson. Everythingwas ready. Onlythe official green lightwas needed. On 31 May Nicolls wrote to theMinistryof Labour enclosingthe preliminarydraft of the scheme. He asked theMinistryto give it a generalblessingon behalf of the Government, and to twoaspects of it in particular.The BBC wanted to be able to tell its speakersthat thescheme had generalGovernment approval,and that the suggestedguidelinestheyshould take in their talks had been drawn up in consultation with the MinistryofLabour. Secondlyif the BBC was to make this big effort, it would be useless unlessit reallycould go all out to convince the country, without necessarilybeing veryalarmist, that the need was urgent and the crisis still remained. Nicolls pointedoutthat time was of the essence-speakersneeded to be recruited, and if the planwasto make the Radio Times it must be with the printerswithin a week at the latest.

On 5 June there was a meeting at the Ministryof Labour between thedepartment,the Lord PrivySeals Office and Nicolls and Maconachie of the BBC.Before the meetingstarted Nicolls was told that the Ministryof Labour was verykeen on the idea but there were grave doubts about the attitude of the Lord PrivySeals Office which had a General Policycontrol over the Ministryof Labour. MrS. H. Wood then spokefor the Lord PrivySeal who was very gratefulfor the BBCsSscheme, but who rather felt it was taking a steam hammer to crack a nut. Heobjectedto having in all the big guns-Churchill, LloydGeorge,etc.-since itwould make people think that the Government was in a hole and must havemismanaged its recruiting campaignin the past. The truth was that the presentcampaignwas the most phenomenallysuccessful campaignever launched inBritain. He added that the Lord PrivySeal objectedto this crisis programme asbeinglikelyto givepeoplethe idea that theymightbe involved in a war in a fewmonths time-by, say, September!


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Readingbetween the lines Nicolls inferred that the objectionsto the scheme wereclearly(a) PartyPolitical (i.e. jealousyof the Churchills and LloydGeorgespullingthe irons out of the fire), and (b) Appeasement or some shade of it (i.e. thedoctrine that if we were to be prepared,the objectivemust not be obtained at theexpense of saying that Germany mightgo to war). At one point a MinistryofLabour official stated that the departmentonlyexpectedto get 1 ~0, 000 recruits outof a

targetof half a million set

for2

July.Wood

replied that thiswas

better thanalarmingpeople.Nicolls had no option but to withdraw all the majoringredientsof the scheme. There was a good deal of further discussion amongst thegovernment representativesat the other end of the room, much of which wasinaudible to Maconachie. Nicolls reassured him afterwards that he hadnt missedmuch (cf. this account with Briggs,1965: 657-8).

So the BBCs last effort was squashed,like all precedingones. Nicolls sent rounda memorandum (6 June) to all concerned telling them of his very greatdisappointmentthat the plans, due to politicalor other extraneous motives of theGovernment, would have to be very considerablywatered down. Nearlyall the

featureswere

cancelled,so

toowere

the elder statesmen talks, alongwithmost

ofthe What can I do? talks plannedto advise ordinarycitizens on ARP and so on.Nicolls was angeredat the waste of time and effort that staff had been involved in.He was now no longer prepared to put the BBC to any great expense orinconvenience on behalf of a Government who saw no need for urgency.

The summer of 1939 was glorious. In Julyand August the BBC did all the thingsit usuallydid at that time of year; there was plentyof tennis, cricket and golf, therewere the usual August Bank Holidayspecials.There were OB relays from theseaside. Features did a programme on Oxford-UndergraduateSummer (producedby StephenPotter)-from its backwaters to its common rooms. John Betjemantalked about How to look at books. North Regionlaunched a

new

series called MrMike Walks In, in which the microphoneturned the audience into broadcasters bycallingon them informallyin their own homes. JohnPudneyproduceda ModernPastoral about the coming of electricityto a remote Essex village,and J. B.Priestlybeganreadingin instalments his new novel Let the PeopleSing before itwas published.There were new quiz programmes and parlourgames-Noahs Ark,

All in Bee and For Amusement Only.The Radio Times carried details of what the Autumn had in store for listeners byway of talks, music and entertainment. At last

this hypnotic trance-as if warm daysshould never cease-was broken. On 3SeptemberNeville Chamberlain came to the microphonewhich he had so jealouslypreservedas his own exclusive property to announce to the nation that Britain wasofficiallyat war with Germany.

Note on Sources

z

Most of the material in this article comes from the BBC Written Archive Centre (WAC), Cavertham,Reading.Sources are referenced by their file numbers. Newspaper quotes are from their extensivePress CuttingsCollection which is boxed chronologicallyand accordingto subjectmatter (e.g. News1936).Broadcast PolicyPaper 5 (BP5) on the Broadcastingof Controversial Matter, is particularlyuseful. Written internally in 1942 at the request of the BBC directorate, it is a detailed and reliableaccount of relationshipsbetween the BBC, governments and partiesfrom the earlydaysto the firstyear of the war. Its purpose was to brief the Director General as he preparedto retrieve the politicalindependenceof the Corporationfrom government control at the end of the war.


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BibliographyBRANSON, N and HEINEMANN, M (1973).Britain in the Nineteen-Thirties, PantherBRIGGS, A (1965). The Hirtoryof Broadcastingin the United Kingdom,vol. II, The Golden Age of

Wireless,OUPBRIGGS, A (1979). Governingthe BBC, BBCCARDIFF, D (1980).The Serious and the Popular:aspects of the evolution of stylein radio talk 1928-

1939, Media Culture and Society,vol. 2, no. 1CURRAN,

C

(1979). A Seamless Robe, CollinsDIMBLEBY, D (1975).Richard Dimbleby, Hodder and StoughtonHAWORTH, B (1981). The British Broadcasting Corporation,Nazi Germany and the ForeignOffice,

Historical Journalof Film, Radio and Television,vol. 1, no. 1The History of theTimes, vol. 4, Times PublishingCo., 1952MOWATT, C L (1968).Britain Between the Wars, Methuen, UniversityPaperbackPOLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PLANNING (1938).Reporton the PressRUST, W (1949).The Storyof the DailyWorker, PeoplesPressSTUART C (1975). The Reith Diaries, Collins

Documents

BBC 1930-s. Media Culture Society-1984-Scannell-3-26.pdf