THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

GENERALS AND BATTLES

WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW

CIVIL WAR GENERALS

VICTORYDEFEAT

WESTERN THEATRE EASTERN THEATRECO

NFE

DER

ACY

Beauregard (Mississippi)Shiloh

Albert Johnston (Mississippi)

Bragg (Tennessee)Chattanooga

Hood (Tennessee) Atlanta Campaign, Franklin and Nashville

Beauregard (Potomac)First Manassas

Lee (North Virginia)Seven Days, Second Manassas, Antietam, Chancellorsville, Fredericksburg, Gettysburg

Stonewall Jackson (North Virginia)First Manassas, Shenandoah Valley, Seven Days

James Longstreet (North Virginia)Second Manassas

UN

ION

Buell (Ohio)Shiloh

Grant (Tennessee)Shiloh, Vicksburg, Chattanooga

Sherman (Tennessee)Atlanta Campaign, Marching through Georgia

Thomas (Cumberland)Franklin and Nashville

McDowell (Potomac)First Manassas

McClellan (Potomac)Shenandoah Valley, Seven Days, Second Manassas, Antietam

Burnside (Potomac)Fredericksburg

Hooker (Potomac)Chancellorsville

Meade (Potomac)Gettysburg

BATTLES IN 1861FIRST MANASSAS/BULL RUN (JULY 21, 1861)

BEAUREGARD & JOHNSTON V. MCDOWELL

EASTERN THEATRE (MANASSAS, NORTH VIRGINIA)

Beauregard + 22,000 men are positioned south of the Bull Run River in Manassas, North Virginia. On July 16th, McDowell marched south with 30,000 men and attacks Beauregard (22,000) on 21st July. Almost close to defeat on the 21st, however the Confederates fought strong, especially Stonewall Jackson who stood ‘like a wall’. The Confederacy was saved by Johnston’s 11,000 troops who came from the Shenandoah. The Union panicked and fled. U- 3000 vs. C-2,000.

Why it was important:o Did the Confederacy miss an opportunity by not following up on their victory

with an attack on Washington DC? The Southern army was disorganized and in short supplies… Success in attacking Washington D.C. would not have won the war.

BATTLES IN 1862SHILOH (APRIL 6-7 1862)

JOHNSTON (THEN BEAUREGARD) V. GRANT & BUELL

WESTERN THEATRE (SHILOH, TENNESSEE)Grant (40,000) encamped at Shiloh, waiting for Buell’s army. On April 6th Johnson launched surprise attack on Grant. Many Union soldiers panicked and fled, but enough stayed to ensure the rebels did not win a total victory. Johnston died and Beauregard took over. Buell’s army (25,000) arrive in the night. The next day the Confederates were forced to retreat. C- 10,600 v. U – 13,000.

Why it was important:o Halleck becomes general-in-chief of the Union army (Lincoln hopes he will

be vigorous) o Davis replaced Beauregard with Bragg

PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN (MARCH THROUGH JULY)

McClellan planned to attack Richmond up the peninsular between York and James River to avoid a frontal attack. Instead of attacking they besiege Yorktown (giving Davis more time). When they were about to attack, the Confederates withdrew. McClellan advances cautiously. Convinced that they were outnumbered and waited for reinforcement.

SHENANDOAH VALLEY (MARCH-JUNE 1862)

JACKSON V. MCCLELLAN

EASTERN THEATRE (SHENANDOAH VALLEY, VIRGINIA)Jackson (18,000 men) were sent into Shenandoah Valley to stop Union troops moving south into Richmond. From March-July 1862 there were 6 battles (7000 Union casualties, Jackson diverted 60,000 Union troops from other tasks and inspired the South)

Why it was importanto Lincoln sent no troops to help McClellan, because he was worried about

the threat Jackson posed on Washington D.C.

THE SEVEN DAYS (JUNE 25TH-JULY 1ST 1862)

LEE VS. MCCLELLAN

EASTERN THEATRE (RICHMOND, VIRGINIA)Lee attacked at the end of June. Lee had overcomplicated battle plans and defects in command structure, which led to disjointed attacks. Stonewall Jackson was also lethargic (lacking enthusiasm). But it did save Richmond from being taken over by McClellan. C- 20,614 v. U – 15,849.

Why it was important:o Taints the reputation Jackson had at First Manassas and Shenandoaho Lee’s offensive saved Richmond

SECOND MANASSAS (29-30TH AUGUST1862)

LEE AND JACKSON VS. POPE AND MCCLELLAN

EASTERN THEATRE (MANASSAS, NORTH VIRGINIA)Lincoln ordered McClellan to join forces with General Pope (commanding Union forces around D.C.). With a united army, Pope would advance on Richmond. Lee (determined to strike first) headed North with 55,000 men. Lee sent Jackson (25,000) north of Pope, who was still awaiting McClellan’s slow arrival. 26-27th August, Jackson captures Pope main supply depot. McClellan came and with Pope they attacked Jackson on the 29th-30th August. This was a Union disaster (failed to realise that the rest of Lee’s army was coming, Pope was defeated when Longstreet attack his left flank). Most Union troops escaped. C- 9,000 vs. U- 16,000.

Why it was importanto Lincoln reluctantly reappoints McClellan

ANTIETAM (17TH SEPTEMBER 1862)

LEE VS. MCCLELLAN (THEN BURNSIDE)

EASTERN THEATRE (SHARPSBURG, MARYLAND)

Lee invaded Maryland with 40,000 men (protect Virginia’s harvest; gain Maryland volunteers; win a decisive victory; demoralize the North; persuade Britain to recognize the Confederacy). Lee lost a copy of his operational orders, what made their way into McClellan’s hands… McClellan forced Lee back to the Potomac River. Lee did not retreat, but took position behind Antietam Creek. McClellan did not attack (despite Lee being hopelessly outnumbered!). Jackson’s corps rejoin Lee. Across 3 separate battles (because badly handled) at Antietam on the 17th September, the Union won partially with no follow through to complete success, meaning Lee managed to hang on. McClellan was able to claim victory when Lee retreated to Virginia.

Why it was important:o Bloodiest single-day battle (C- 11,000 and U- 12,000)o Within days Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamationo The likelihood of British intervention for Lee was now smallo McClellan is replaced with Burnside when he fails to follow up his victory

(ironic)

FREDERICKSBURG (11-15TH DECEMBER 1862)

LEE VS. BURNSIDE

EASTERN THEATRE (FREDERICKSBURG, VIRGINIA)

Burnside (100,000) men marched South. Lee (75,000) took up a strong position in Fredericksburg. 13th December, Burnside launched a series of suicidal attacks, losing 11,000 men. Lee lost less than 5000 men. Burnside attempted to turn Lee’s flank but got bogged down in mud…

Why it was important:o Decline in Union morale

BATTLES IN 1863

CHANCELLORSVILLE (30TH APRIL- 6TH MAY 1863)

LEE VS. HOOKER

EASTERN THEATRE (CHANCELLORSVILLE, VIRGINIA)

Hooker (130,000 men) reach Chancellorsville on the 30th April. Lee led 50,000 Confederates to meet Hooker. He sent Jackson with 28,000 men to attack Hookers right flank. Jackson attacked just before dusk, driving Union forces back in confusion. Jackson is shot by his own men at night when they were inspecting the battlefield. He had his arm amputated, contracted pneumonia and died on May 10th. But he had ensured defeat as Hookers troops retreated.

Why it was important:o Impressive victory for Robert E. Lee (many see it as his most impressive)

o He had significantly fewer meno Inflicted 17,000 casualties

o Confederate morale was high despite Jackson’s deatho Hooker resigned after this battle, and Meade took charge of the Army of

Potomac

GETTYSBURG (1ST – 3RD JULY 1863)

LEE (WITH LONGSTREET) VS. MEADE

EASTERN THEATRE (GETTYSBURG, PENNSYLVANIA)

Lee invaded Pennsylvania thinking it would be the only way to make Lincoln accept Southern independence. On July 1st rebel soldiers stumble across Union soldiers at Gettysburg. The Confederacy won on the first day of battle, with Unionists retreating to Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill. On July 2nd, Longstreet attacked the Union left. They had some success in doing this, but the day ended in stalemate. On 3rd July Lee launched his main attack, but his charge was a disaster. In less than an hour the Confederacy suffered 6,500 casualties. Lee had been beaten.

Why it was important:o Lee lost 28,000 men in 3 days (1/3 of his command)o Lee retreated back to Virginia and accepted full responsibility for he losso Lee tried to resign, but Davis would not accept his resignationo The myth of Lee’s invincibility had been broken – impact on morale o After this, Lee is never strong enough to invade the North o BUT VICTORY WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN A TURNING POINT

o Lee couldn’t have held a Northern city if capturedo The Union were seeing success in the Westo Meade is unable to follow up the victory to suggest Gettysburg caused

the defeat

CAPTURE OF VICKSBURG (18TH MAY – 14TH JULY 1863)

In April, seeking a way to capture Vicksburg, Grant took a gamble. Marching his army down the west side of the Mississippi, he relied on Admiral Porter’s fleet sailing past Vicksburg. Two weeks after this happened, Grant’s army was ferried across the Mississippi. Grant then cut inland, in 3 weeks he won several battles and besieged Vicksburg. On the 4th July, 30,000 Confederate troops surrendered. Port Hudson was captured 5 days later meaning the Confederacy was cut in two.

CHATTANOOGA (21ST SEPTEMBER- 25TH NOVEMBER 1863)

LEE (WITH LONGSTREET) VS. GRANT

WESTERN THEATRE (CHATTANOOGE, TENNESSEE)

Under pressure from Lincoln to advance, General Rosecrans advances against General Bragg. Bragg gave battle at Chickamauga, reinforced by 12,000 men from the Army of North Virginia. Bragg came close to winning. Only the brave action of Thomas enabled the Union army to retreat to Chattanooga. Bragg now besieged Chattanooga. The Union was so short on food they thought they’d have to surrender. Grant acted swiftly, ensuring Chattanooga was supplied and then stormed. The next day Grants men besieged Missionary Ridge. Rebel forced retreated.

Why it was important:o Union victory confirmed that Grant was the Union’s greatest general.

BATTLES IN 1864SHENANDOAH VALLEY (AUTUMN 1864)

The Confederacy suffered serious setback in the Shenandoah Valley. Sheridan, the new Union commander, chased the Confederates up the valley, winning the battles at Winchester and at Cedar Creek.

ATLANTA CAMPAIGN (7TH MAY- 2ND SEPTEMBER 1864)

JOHNSTON (THEN HOOD) VS. SHERMAN

WESTERN THEATRE (ATLANTA, GEORGIA)

In May, Sherman with 100,000 men, left Chattanooga and headed towards Atlanta (Georgia capital and important industrial/rail center). His Confederate opponent, General Johnston (70,000 men) retreated. By July Union forces had reached the outskirts of Atlanta. Davis now replaced Johnston with Buell (little skill as commander). A series of attacks on Union lines led to the loss of 20,000 Confederates. At the end of August, Hood was forced to abandon Atlanta.

Why it was important:o Boost northern morale

MARCHING THROUGH GEORGIA (AUTUMN 1864)

Sherman left Thomas to watch Hood, and set off with 62,000 men on a march through Georgia to Savannah on the coast. Cutting adrift from supplies, Sherman’s aim was to demoralize the South, destroying its capacity to fight. He left a swath of destruction 100km wide. Union forced captured Savannah in mid-December. The 450km march inflicted $100 million damage, crippling the railway network and gave a lie to the Confederates promise to protect its people.

Why it was important:o First example of total warfare

FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE (WINTER 1864)

HOOD VS. THOMAS

WESTERN THEATRE (FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE)

Instead of trying to stop Sherman, Hood invaded Tennessee. His scheme to defeat Thomas, reconquer Kentucky and then help Lee – came to nothing. In November Hood ordered a suicidal assault on Union forces at Franklin (losses were 3x the North). The Union was now pulled back to Nashville. One 15-16th December, Thomas struck the most complete victory of the war.

Why it was important:o Shows Thomas as one of the Civil War’s unsung heroeso . It virtually destroyed Hood and the Army of Tennessee

George B. McClellanThe New York Evening Post commented in McClellan's obituary, "Probably no soldier who did so little fighting has ever had his qualities as a commander so minutely, and we may add, so fiercely discussed." This fierce discussion has continued for over a century. McClellan is usually ranked in the lowest tier of Civil War generals. However, the debate over McClellan's ability and talents remains the subject of much controversy among Civil War and military historians.

McClellan has been universally praised for his organizational abilities and for his very good relations with his troops. They referred to him affectionately as "Little Mac"; others sometimes called him the "Young Napoleon". It has been suggested that his reluctance to enter battle was caused in part by an intense desire to avoid spilling the blood of his men. Ironically, this led to failing to take the initiative against the enemy and therefore passing up good opportunities for decisive victories, which could have ended the war early, and thereby could have spared thousands of soldiers who died in those subsequent battles. Generals who proved successful in the war, such as Lee and Grant, tended to be more aggressive and more willing to risk a major battle even when all preparations were not perfect.

McClellan himself summed up his cautious nature in a draft of his memoirs:

‘It has always been my opinion that the true course in conducting military operations, is to make no movement until the preparations are as complete as circumstances permit, &

never to fight a battle without some definite object worth the probable loss.’

McClellan's reluctance to press his enemy aggressively was probably not a matter of personal courage, which he demonstrated well enough by his bravery under fire in the Mexican–American War. Stephen Sears wrote,

There is indeed ample evidence that the terrible stresses of commanding men in battle, especially the beloved men of his beloved Army of the Potomac, left his moral courage in

tatters. Under the pressure of his ultimate soldier's responsibility, the will to command deserted him. Glendale and Malvern Hill found him at the peak of his anguish during the

Seven Days, and he fled those fields to escape the responsibility. At Antietam, where there was nowhere for him to flee to, he fell into a paralysis of indecision. Seen from a longer perspective, General McClellan could be both comfortable and successful performing as

executive officer, and also, if somewhat less successfully, as grand strategist; as battlefield commander, however, he was simply in the wrong profession.

One of the reasons that McClellan's reputation has suffered is because of his own memoirs. Historian Allan Nevins wrote, "Students of history must always be grateful McClellan so frankly exposed his own weaknesses in this posthumous book." Doris Kearns Goodwin claims that a review of his personal correspondence during the war reveals a tendency for self-aggrandizement and unwarranted self-congratulation.

Robert E. Lee, on being asked (by his cousin, and recorded by his son) who was the ablest general on the Union side during the late war, replied emphatically: "McClellan, by all odds!" While McClellan's reputation has suffered over time, especially over the last 75 years, there is a small but intense cadre of American Civil War historians who believe that the general has been poorly served on at least four levels.

1. McClellan proponents say that because the general was a conservative Democrat with great personal charisma, radical Republicans (fearing his political potential) deliberately undermined his field operations.

2. Radical Republicans were the true winners coming out of the American Civil War, they were able to write its history, placing their principal political rival of the time, McClellan, in the worst possible light.

3. Historians eager to jump on the bandwagon of Lincoln as America's greatest political icon shifted blame for early military failures from Lincoln to McClellan.

4. Lincoln and Stanton deliberately undermined McClellan because of his conciliatory stance towards the South, which might have resulted in a less destructive end to the war had Richmond fallen as a result of the Peninsula Campaign. Proponents of this school claim that McClellan is criticized more for his admittedly abrasive personality than for his actual field performance.

‘Two armed mobs chasing each other around the country, from which northing could be learnt’

- Helmuth Von Motke, (Prussian chief of staff)

Different to European military tradition German army had universal conscription and officer recruitment based on

education and ability, not on noble privilege, to ensure the link between the army and the nation

By 1840, Moltke had taken an interest regarding use of the railroads. Hence, he placed great emphasis on integration of the railroad into mobilization and deployment planning.

Europeans armies: Prepared for war in peacetime, had organizational foundations, had a proper selection process of military leaders

No recognisable army/command structure Neither side knew exactly which army structure would be most effective. 

Additionally, neither side thought the war would last very long, so there was a certain amount of lee-way granted to those who recruited units.

At the Battle of Wilson’s Creek in 1861, the division was divided into three branches: infantry regiments, cavalry regiments and artillery batteries. Over time, leaders on both sides realized that this jumble of responsibilities led to issues on the battlefield. 

At the beginning of the war, there was a greater tendency for authority on a battlefield to flow horizontally, with more units operating autonomously, as was the case at Bull Run.  At Bull Run the Confederate forces on the field were actually divided into two small armies with neither having a legitimate claim to command the other.

Political appointment > military appointments McClellan's rapid promotion was partly due to his acquaintance with Salmon

P. Chase, Treasury Secretary and former Ohio governor and senator Sherman's brother and in-laws were active in Republican politics; Grant

cultivated a relationship with Congressman Elihu Washburne; George G. Meade flattered Mary Lincoln to advance his interests.

Lincoln appointed Republicans, Democrats and men of particular ethnic backgrounds to secure the support of their respective constituencies and thereby unite the North.

16 political generals (Union): 8 Republicans & 8 Democrats, including 2 Germans & 2 Irishmen

One of the reasons that Lincoln did not sack McClellan sooner, was that such a move would have agitated the Democrats.

Few had military qualifications

One private wrote home in 1862: his notion of battles had come from pictures ‘all stood in a line, and standing in a nice level field fighting, a number of ladies taking care of the wounded etc. But it isn’t so.’

West Point graduates dominated the general staff from Fort Sumter to Appomattox. However, the academy’s alumni made up a tiny fraction of the Union’s fighting force.

Soldiers had little time for military discipline The local origin and makeup of most volunteer units had a poor effect on

discipline. During the Second Bull Run, Confederate Brig. Gen. Charles S. Winder had

30 men bucked and gagged at one time for straggling on the march. They took the corporal punishment badly: half of them deserted that night, the rest "swore Winder's next battle would be his last.