Battle of Kiev (1941)
The First Battle of Kiev  was the German name for the
operation that resulted in a very large encirclement of So-
viet troops in the vicinity of Kiev  during World War II.
This encirclement is considered the largest encirclement
in the history of warfare (by number of troops). The op-
eration ran from 7 August to 26 September 1941 as part
of Operation Barbarossa, the Axis invasion of the Soviet
Union.[2] In Soviet military history, it is referred to as the Kiev Defensive Operation (
), with somewhat different dating of 7 July – 26
September 1941.
was encircled, with the Germans claiming 665,000 cap-
tured. However, the Kiev encirclement was not com-
plete, and small groups of Red Army troops managed to
escape the  cauldron  days after the German pincers met
east of the city, including the headquarters of Marshal
Semyon Budyonny, Marshal  Semyon Timoshenko  and
Commissar Nikita Khrushchev. The commander of the
Southwestern Front—Mikhail Kirponos—was trapped
behind enemy lines and killed while trying to break
through.[3]
July 1941. On 1 September, the Southwestern Front
numbered 752–760,000 troops (850,000 including re-
serves and rear service organs), 3,923 guns and mortars,
114 tanks and 167 combat aircraft. The encirclement
trapped 452,700 soldiers, 2,642 guns and mortars and 64
tanks, of which scarcely 15,000 escaped from the encir-
clement by 2 October. Overall, the Southwestern Front
suffered 700,544 casualties, including 616,304 killed,
captured, or missing during the month-long Battle for
Kiev. As a result, five Soviet field armies (5th, 37th, 26th,
21st, and the  38th), consisting of 43 divisions, virtually
ceased to exist. The 40th Army  was badly affected as
well. Like the Western Front before it, the Southwestern
Front had to be recreated almost from scratch. [4]
1 Prelude
After the rapid progress of Army Group Center through
the central sector of the Eastern front, a huge salient de-
veloped around its junction with  Army Group South  by
late July 1941. A substantial Soviet force, nearly the en-
tire Southwestern Front, positioned in and around  Kiev
was located in the salient.[5][6] While lacking mobility and
armor due to high losses in tanks at the Battle of Uman,[6]
they nonetheless posed a significant threat to the German
advance and were the largest single concentration of So-
viet troops on the Eastern Front at that time.
On 3 August, Hitler temporarily cancelled the drive on
Moscow in favor of driving south and attacking Kiev
in Ukraine.[7] However on 12 August 1941,  Supplement
to Directive No. 34  was issued, and it represented a
compromise between Hitler, who was convinced the cor-
rect strategy was to clear the salient occupied by Soviet
forces on right flank of Army Group Center in the vicin-
ity of Kiev before resuming the drive to Moscow, and
Halder,  Bock  and  Guderian, who advocated an advance
on Moscow as soon as possible. The compromise re-
quired 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups of Army Group Cen-
ter, which were redeploying in order to aid  Army Group
North and  Army Group South respectively, be returned
to  Army Group Center, together with the  4th Panzer
Group of  Army Group North, once their objectives were
achieved. Then the three Panzer Groups, under the con-
trol of Army Group Center, will lead the advance on
Moscow.[8] Initially,  Halder, chief of the  OKH  General
Staff, and  Bock, commander of Army Group Center,
were satisfied by the compromise, but soon their opti-
mism faded as the operational realities of the plan proved
too challenging.[9]
On 18 August,   OKH   submitted a strategic survey
(Denkschrift ) to Hitler regarding the continuation of op-
erations in the East. The paper made the case for the
drive to Moscow, arguing once again that Army Groups
North and South were strong enough to accomplish their
objectives without any assistance from Army Group Cen-
ter. Pointing out that there was only enough time left be-
fore winter to conduct a single decisive operation against
Moscow.[9]
On 20 August, Hitler rejected the proposal based on the
idea that the most important objective was to deprive the
Soviets of their industrial areas. On 21 August Jodl  of
OKW  issued a directive, which summarized Hitler’s in-
structions, to Brauchitsch  commander of the Army. The
paper reiterated that the capture of Moscow before the
onset of winter was not a primary objective. Rather, that
the most important missions before the onset of winter
were to seize the  Crimea, and the industrial and coal re-
gion of the Don; isolate the oil-producing regions of the
Caucasus  from the rest of the Soviet Union and in the
north, to encircle  Leningrad and link up with the Finns.
Among other instructions, it also instructed that Army
Group Center is to allocate sufficient forces to ensure
the destruction of the “Russian 5th Army” and, at the
1
same time, to prepare to repel enemy counterattacks in
the central sector of its front.[10] Hitler referred to the
Soviet forces in the salient collectively as the “Russian
5th Army”.[11] Halder  was dismayed, and later described
Hitler’s plan as “utopian and unacceptable”, concluding
that the orders were contradictory and Hitler alone must
bear the responsibility for inconsistency of his orders and
that the OKH can no longer assume responsibility for
what was occurring; however, Hitler’s instructions still
accurately reflected the original intent of the Barbarossa
directive of which the OKH was aware of all along.[12]
Engel in his diary for 21 August 1941, simply summa-
rized it as, “it was a black day for the Army”. [13] Halder
offered his own resignation and advised Brauchitsch to do
the same. However, Brauchitsch  declined, stating Hitler
would not accept the gesture, and nothing would change
anyhow.[12] Halder  withdrew his offer of resignation.
On 23 August, Halder convened with Bock and Guderian
in Borisov (in Belorussia), and afterwards flew with Gud-
erian to Hitler’s headquarters in East Prussia. During
a meeting between  Guderian   and Hitler, with neither
Halder  nor Brauchitsch present, Hitler allowed Guderian
to make the case for driving on to Moscow, and then re-
jected his argument.[14] Hitler claimed his decision to se-
cure the northern and southern sectors of western Soviet
Union were “tasks which stripped the Moscow problem
of much of its significance” and was “not a new propo-
sition, but a fact I have clearly and unequivocally stated
since the beginning of the operation.” Hitler also argued
that the situation was even more critical because the op-
portunity to encircle the Soviet forces in the salient was
“an unexpected opportunity, and a reprieve from past fail-
ures to trap the Soviet armies in the south.”[12] Hitler also
declared, “the objections that time will be lost and the
offensive on Moscow might be undertaken too late, or
that the armoured units might no longer be technically
able to fulfill their mission, are not valid.” Hitler reiterated
that once the flanks of Army Group Center were cleared,
especially the salient in the south, then he would allow
the army to resume its drive on Moscow; an offensive,
he concluded, which “must not fail.”.[13] In point of fact
Hitler had already issued the orders for the shift of Gud-
erian’s panzer group to the south.[15] Guderian returned
to his panzer group  and began the southern thrust in an
effort to encircle the Soviet forces in the salient. [12]
The bulk of  2nd Panzer Group  and the  2nd Army were
detached from Army Group Centre and sent south.[16]
Its mission was to encircle the  Southwestern Front, com-
manded by  Budyonny, in conjunction with  1st Panzer
Group  of  Army Group South  under  Kleist, which was
driving up from a southeasternly direction.[17]
2 Battle
The Panzer armies made rapid progress. On 12 Septem-
ber, Kleist’s 1st Panzer Group, which had by now turned
Guderian at a forward command post for one of his panzer reg-
iments near Kiev, 1941
bridgeheads at Cherkassy and Kremenchug. Continuing
north, it cut across the rear of  Budyonny’s Southwestern
Front. On 16 September, it made contact with Guderian’s
2nd Panzer Group   advancing south, at the town of
Lokhvitsa, 120 miles behind Kiev.[18] Budyonny was now
trapped and soon relieved by Stalin's order of 13 Septem-
ber. No successor was named, leaving the troops to their
individual corps and division commanders.
After that, the fate of the encircled Soviet armies was
sealed. With no mobile forces or supreme commander
left, there was no possibility to effect a break out. The in-
fantry of the German 17th Army and 6th Army of Army
Group South soon arrived, along with 2nd Army (also
on loan from Army Group Center and marching behind
Guderian’s tanks). They systematically began to reduce
the pocket assisted by the two Panzer armies. The encir-
cled Soviet armies at Kiev did not give up easily. A savage
battle in which the Soviets were bombarded by artillery,
tanks and aircraft had to be fought before the pocket was
overcome. By 19 September, Kiev had fallen, but the
encirclement battle continued. After 10 days of heavy
fighting, the last remnants of troops east of Kiev surren-
dered on 26 September. The Germans claimed 600,000
Red Army soldiers captured, although these claims have
included a large number of civilians suspected of evading
capture.
during September, inflicting 600,000 losses on the Red
Army, while Soviet forces west of Moscow conducted a
futile and costly offensive against German Army Group
Center near Smolensk. These operations, such as the
Yelnya Offensive, were conducted over very bad terrain
against defenders in fortified strong points, and nearly all
of these counter-offensives ended in disaster for the  Red
 
107,540 Soviet personnel were awarded the medal for the de-
 fence of Kiev from 21st June 1941.
formations defending Moscow were seriously weakened.
With its southern flank secured, Army Group Center
launched  Operation Typhoon in the direction of Vyazma
in October.
nearly all of the Crimea and  Left Bank Ukraine  before
reaching the edges of the Donbas industrial region. How-
ever after four months of continuous operations his forces
were at the brink of exhaustion, and suffered a major de-
feat in the Battle of Rostov (1941). Army Group South’s
infantry fared little better and failed to capture  the vital
city of  Kharkov  before nearly all of its factories, skilled
laborers and equipment were evacuated east of the  Ural
Mountains.
man commanders argued that had operations at Kiev been
delayed and had Operation Typhoon been launched in
September rather than October, the   Wehrmacht  would
have reached and captured Moscow before the onset of
winter.[19] Heinz Guderian  and  Fedor von Bock  in par-
ticular fiercely argued that the “diversion” to Kiev would
have dire consequences if the operation dragged on for
too long. Winter was coming in a few weeks, and if
Moscow was not taken before the first snow, the entire
operation would literally bog down in the mud.
However, David Glantz argued that had Operation Ty-
phoon been launched in September, it would have met
greater resistance due to Soviet forces not having been
weakened by their offensives east of Smolensk. The of-
fensive would have also been launched with an extended
right flank.[19] Glantz also claims that regardless of the fi-
nal position of German Troops when winter came, they
would have still faced a counteroffensive by the 10 reserve
armies raised by the Soviets toward the end of the year.
If Kiev had not been taken before the  Battle of Moscow,
the entire operation would have ended in utter disaster for
the Germans.[19][20][21]
5 See also
[1] Glantz (1995), p. 293
[2]   The Devil’s Disciples: Hitler’s Inner Circle, Anthony Read,
p. 731
[5] Glantz, David,   Barbarossa Derailed: The battle for 
Smolensk, Volume 2, March 2011, page 54-55
[6] “Barbarossa”, Alan Clark, William Morrow and Com-
pany, 1965. P. 130
pany, 1965. P. 101
Smolensk, Volume 2, March 2011, page 55
[9] Glantz, David,   Barbarossa Derailed: The battle for 
Smolensk, Volume 2, March 2011, page 56
[10] Glantz, David,   Barbarossa Derailed: The battle for 
Smolensk, Volume 2, March 2011, page 57
[11] Glantz, David,   Barbarossa Derailed: The battle for 
Smolensk, Volume 2, March 2011, page 60
[12] Glantz, David,   Barbarossa Derailed: The battle for 
Smolensk, Volume 2, March 2011, page 58
[13] Glantz, David,   Barbarossa Derailed: The battle for 
Smolensk, Volume 2, March 2011, page 59
[14] Guderian p. 200
[15] Guderian p. 202
pany, 1965. Pp. 111, 139
[17] “Barbarossa”, Alan Clark, William Morrow and Com-
pany, 1965. P. 133
pany, 1965. Pp. 135, 141
[19] Glantz, David,   The Soviet-German War 1941-1945: 
Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay, October 2001, page
23
War (1941–1945), volume I:The Summer-Fall Campaign
(22 June-4 December 1941). Carlisle, PA: Selfpublished,
1999.
December 1941-April 1942). Carlisle, PA: Selfpublished,
1999.
Bibliography
Press, 1952. (Reissue edition, 2001).
7 Further reading
and Company
Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler ,
Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas,
ISBN 0-7006-0899-0
and Konecky
Supremacy in the East , Cambridge University Press,
ISBN 978-1-107-01459-6
Coordinates:   50°27′13″N 30°30′59″E / 50.4536°N
30.5164°E
8.1 Text
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