Battle of Arras (1917)

For other battles with the same name, see Battle of Arras(disambiguation).

The Battle of Arras (also known as the Second Battleof Arras) was a British offensive during the First WorldWar. From 9 April to 16 May 1917, British, Canadian,South African, New Zealand, Newfoundland, and Aus-tralian troops attacked German defences near the Frenchcity of Arras on the Western Front. There were majorgains on the first day, followed by stalemate. The battlecost nearly 160,000 British casualties and about 125,000German casualties.For much of the war, the opposing armies on theWesternFront were at a stalemate, with a continuous line oftrenches stretching from the Belgian coast to the Swissborder.[1] In essence, the Allied objective from early1915 was to break through the German defences into theopen ground beyond and engage the numerically inferiorGerman army in a war of movement.[2] The Arras offen-sive was conceived as part of a plan to bring about thisresult.[3] It was planned in conjunction with the FrenchHigh Command, who were simultaneously embarking ona massive attack (the Nivelle Offensive) about eighty kilo-metres to the south.[3] The aim of this combined opera-tion was to end the war in forty-eight hours.[4] At Arrasthe Allied objectives were to draw German troops awayfrom the ground chosen for the French attack and to takethe German-held high ground that dominated the plain ofDouai.[3]

The British effort was a relatively broad front assault be-tween Vimy in the northwest and Bullecourt in the south-east. After considerable bombardment, Canadian troopsadvancing in the north were able to capture the strategi-cally significant Vimy Ridge and British divisions in thecentre were also able to make significant gains astridethe Scarpe river. In the south, British and Australianforces were frustrated by the elastic defence and madeonly minimal gains. Following these initial successes,British forces engaged in a series of small-scale opera-tions to consolidate the newly won positions. Althoughthese battles were generally successful in achieving lim-ited aims, these were gained at the price of relatively largenumbers of casualties.[3]

When the battle officially ended on 16 May, British Em-pire troops had made significant advances but had beenunable to achieve a breakthrough.[3] New tactics (em-bodied in SS. 135, Instructions for the Training of Di-visions for Offensive Action and SS.143 Instructions for

the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action) and theequipment to exploit them, with the platoon becoming theprincipal tactical unit, in four sections: Lewis gun, riflegrenade, bomber and rifle;[5] with the creeping barrage,the graze fuze and counter-battery fire had been used,particularly in the first phase and had demonstrated thatset-piece assaults against heavily fortified positions couldbe successful. This sector then reverted to the stalematethat typified most of the war on the Western Front.

1 Prelude

At the beginning of 1917, the British and Frenchwere stillsearching for a way to achieve a strategic breakthroughon the Western Front.[2] The previous year had beenmarked by the costly success of the Franco–British offen-sive astride the river Somme, while the French had beenunable to take the initiative because of intense Germanpressure at Verdun until after August 1916.[2][6][7] Bothbattles consumed enormous quantities of resources whileachieving virtually no strategic gains on the battlefield.[2]Nonetheless, the cost to Germany of containing theAnglo-French attacks had been high, and given that thematerial preponderance of the Entente and its allies couldonly be expected to increase in 1917, Hindenburg and Lu-dendorff decided on a defensive strategy on the WesternFront for that year.[8] This impasse reinforced the Frenchand British commanders’ belief that to end the stalematethey needed a breakthrough;[2] while this desire may havebeen the main impetus behind the offensive, the timingand location were heavily influenced by a number of po-litical and tactical factors.[4]

1.1 Political background

The mid-war years were momentous times. Governingpoliticians in Paris and London were under great pres-sure from the press, the people and their parliamentsto bring the war to a victorious close.[9] The casualtiesfrom the battles of Gallipoli, the Somme and Verdunhad been high and there was little prospect of victoryin sight. The British prime minister, H. H. Asquith, re-signed in early December 1916 and was succeeded by the“Welsh wizard”, David Lloyd George.[9] In France, pre-mier Aristide Briand, with the redoubtable General (laterMarshal) Hubert Lyautey as Minister of Defence, werepolitically diminished and resigned in March 1917.[10]

1

2 2 PRELIMINARY PHASE

The United States was close to declaring war onGermany;[11] American public opinion was growing in-creasingly incensed by a long succession of high-profileU-boat attacks upon civilian shipping, starting with thesinking of RMS Lusitania in 1915 and culminating inthe torpedoing of seven American merchantmen in early1917.[11] The United States Congress finally declared waron Imperial Germany on 6 April 1917, but it would bemore than a year before a suitable army could be raised,trained, and transported to France.[11]

1.2 Strategic background

See also: Operations on the Ancre, January–March 1917Although the French and British had intended to launch

Front lines at Arras prior to the assault.

a spring offensive in 1917, the strategy was threatenedin February, when the Russians admitted that they couldnot meet the commitment to a joint offensive, which re-duced the two-front offensive to a French assault alongthe Aisne River. In March, the German army in the west(Westheer), withdrew to the Hindenburg line in Oper-ation Alberich, which negated the tactical assumptionsunderlying the plans for the French offensive.[10] UntilFrench troops advanced to compensate during the Battlesof Arras, they encountered no German troops in the as-sault sector and it became uncertain whether the offensive

would go forward. The French government desperatelyneeded a victory to avoid civil unrest but the British werewary of proceeding, in view of the rapidly changing tac-tical situation.[10] In a meeting with David Lloyd George,French commander-in-chief General Nivelle persuadedthe British Prime Minister, that if the British launcheda diversionary assault to draw German troops away fromthe Aisne sector, the French offensive could succeed. Itwas agreed in the London Convention of 16 January, thatthe French assault on the Aisne would begin in mid-Apriland that the British would make a diversionary attack inthe Arras sector approximately one week prior.[10][12]

1.3 Opposing forces

Three Allied armies were already concentrated in the Ar-ras sector. They were deployed, roughly north to south,as follows: the First Army under Horne, the Third Armyunder Allenby, the Fifth Army under Gough. The overallBritish commander was Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haigand the battle plan was devised by General Allenby.[13]Unusual for the First World War, three Scottish divisions(all of Third Army) were near each other for the startof the attack:- the 15th Scottish Division of VI Corpsand 9th Scottish Division and 51st Highland Division ofXVII Corps. The strongly Scottish-influenced 34th Di-vision was also positioned in the midst of their ScottishXVII Corps neighbours.Facing the British Empire forces were the Sixth Armyunder 73-year-old General von Falkenhausen and theSecond Army under General von der Marwitz (who wasrecovering from an illness he had contracted on theEastern Front). The armies had been organised asGruppeSouchez,Gruppe Vimy andGruppe Arras, deployed in thatorder north to south.[14] Seven German Divisions were inthe line; their remaining divisions were in reserve to re-inforce or to counterattack as required.[15]

General von Falkenhausen reported directly to GeneralErich Ludendorff, operational chief of the German HighCommand (the Oberste Heeresleitung or OHL). Luden-dorff’s staff contained several extremely capable officers,notably Major Georg Wetzell, Colonel Max Bauer andCaptain Hermann Geyer.[16] Since December 1916, Lu-dendorff’s staff had been developing counter-tactics tooppose the new Allied methods that had been used at theSomme and Verdun. Although these battles were costlyfor the Allies, they also seriously weakened the Germanarmy. In early 1917 the German army was instructedto implement these counter-tactics (the Elastic Defence);Falkenhausen’s failure to do so would prove disastrous.[16]

2 Preliminary phase

The British plan was well developed, drawing on thelessons of the Somme and Verdun of the previous year.

2.2 Battle in the air 3

Rather than attacking on an extended front, the full weightof artillery would be concentrated on a relatively narrowstretch of eleven miles, from Vimy Ridge in the north toNeuville Vitasse, four miles south of the Scarpe river.[17]The bombardment was planned to last about a week at allpoints on the line, with a much longer and heavier bar-rage at Vimy to weaken its strong defences.[18] Duringthe assault, the troops would advance in open formation,with units leapfrogging each other in order to allow themtime to consolidate and regroup. Before the action couldbe undertaken, a great deal of preparation was required,much of it innovative.

2.1 Mining and tunnelling

Exit from the Allied military tunnels in the Carrière Wellington.

Since October 1916, the Royal Engineers had been work-ing underground to construct tunnels for the troops.[18]The Arras region is chalky and therefore easily excavated;under Arras itself is a vast network (called the boves) ofcaverns, underground quarries, galleries and sewage tun-nels. The engineers devised a plan to add new tunnels tothis network so that troops could arrive at the battlefieldin secrecy and in safety.[18] The scale of this undertakingwas enormous: in one sector alone four Tunnel Compa-nies (of 500 men each) worked around the clock in 18-hour shifts for two months. Eventually, they constructed20 kilometres of tunnels, graded as subways (foot traf-fic only); tramways (with rails for hand-drawn trolleys,for taking ammunition to the line and bringing casualtiesback from it); and railways (a light railway system).[18]Just before the assault the tunnel system had grown bigenough to conceal 24,000 men, with electric lighting pro-vided by its own small powerhouse, as well as kitchens,latrines, and a medical centre with a fully equipped op-erating theatre.[19][20][21] The bulk of the work was donebyNewZealanders, includingMaori and Pacific Islandersfrom the New Zealand Pioneer battalion,[19] and Bantamsfrom the mining towns of Northern England.[18]

Assault tunnels were also dug, stopping a fewmetres shortof the German line, ready to be blown open by explosives

on Zero-Day.[18] In addition to this, conventional mineswere laid under the front lines, ready to be blown imme-diately before the assault. Many were never detonatedfor fear that they would churn up the ground too much.In the meantime, German sappers (military engineers)were actively conducting their own underground opera-tions, seeking out Allied tunnels to assault and counter-mine.[18] Of the New Zealanders alone, 41 died and 151were wounded as a result of German counter-mining.[19]

Most of the tunnels and trenches are currently off-limitsto the public for reasons of safety. A 250metre portion ofthe Grange Subway at Vimy Ridge is open to the publicfrom May through November and the Wellington tunnelwas opened to the public as the Carrière Wellington mu-seum in March 2008.[22][23]

2.2 Battle in the air

British machine gunners fire on German aircraft near Arras.

Although the Royal Flying Corps entered the Battle withinferior aircraft to the Luftstreitkräfte, this did not detertheir commander, General Trenchard, from adopting anoffensive posture. Dominance of the air space over Ar-ras was essential for reconnaissance, and the British car-ried out many aerial patrols. Trenchard’s aircraft, act-ing in support of ground forces, carried out artillery spot-ting, photography of trench systems and bombing.[24][25]The reconnaissance activities were coordinated by the 1stField Survey Company, Royal Engineers.[26] Aerial ob-servation was hazardous work as, for best results, the air-craft had to fly at slow speeds and low altitude over theGerman defences. It became even more dangerous withthe arrival of the “Red Baron”, Manfred von Richthofen,with his highly experienced and better-equipped "FlyingCircus" in March 1917. Its deployment led to sharply in-creased casualty rates among Allied pilots and April 1917was to become known as Bloody April. One German in-fantry officer later wrote “during these days, there was awhole series of dogfights, which almost invariably endedin defeat for the British since it was Richthofen’s squadron

4 3 FIRST PHASE

they were up against. Often five or six planes in succes-sion would be chased away or shot down in flames”.[27]The average flying life of a Royal Flying Corps pilot inArras in April was 18 hours.[24] Between 4 and 8 April,the Royal Flying Corps lost 75 aircraft in combat, withthe loss of 105 aircrew.[24] The casualties created a pilotshortage and replacements were sent to the front straightfrom flying school: during the same period, 56 aircraftwere crashed by inexperienced RFC pilots.[24]

2.3 Creeping barrage

To keep enemy action to a minimum during the assault, a"creeping barrage" was planned.[28] This requires gunnersto lay down a screen of high explosive and shrapnel shellsthat creeps across the battlefield about one hundred me-tres in advance of the assaulting troops.[28] The Allies hadpreviously used creeping barrages at the battles of NeuveChapelle and the Somme but had encountered two tech-nical problems. The first was accurately synchronisingthe movement of the troops to the fall of the barrage: forArras, this was overcome by rehearsal and strict schedul-ing. The second was the barrage falling erratically as thebarrels of heavy guns degrade swiftly but at differing ratesduring fire: for Arras, the rate of degradation of each gunbarrel was calculated individually and each gun calibratedaccordingly. While there was a risk of friendly fire, thecreeping barrage forced the Germans to remain in theirtrenches, allowing Allied soldiers to advance without fearof machine gun fire.[28] Additionally, the newNo. 106 in-stantaneous fuze had been developed for high-explosiveshells so that they detonated on the slightest impact, va-porising barbed wire.[28] Poison gas shells were used forthe final minutes of the barrage.[28]

2.4 Counter-battery fire

The principal danger to assaulting troops came from en-emy artillery fire as they crossed no man’s land, account-ing for over half the casualties at the first day of theSomme. A further complication was the location of Ger-man artillery, hidden as it was behind the ridges. In re-sponse, specialist artillery units were created to attackGerman artillery. Their targets were provided by 1stField Survey Company, Royal Engineers,[29] who collateddata obtained from “flash spotting” and sound ranging.(Flash spotting required Royal Flying Corps observers torecord the location of tell-tale flashes made by guns whilstfiring.[26] On Zero-Day, 9 April, over 80% of Germanheavy guns in the sector were neutralised (that is, “unableto bring effective fire to bear, the crews being disabledor driven off”) by counter-battery fire.[29] Gas shells werealso used against the draught horses of the batteries andto disrupt ammunition supply columns.[30]

3 First phase

The preliminary bombardment of Vimy Ridge started on20 March; and the bombardment of the rest of the sec-tor on 4 April.[18] Limited to a front of only 24 miles (39km), the bombardment used 2,689,000 shells,[30] over amillion more than had been used on the Somme.[10] Ger-man casualties were not heavy but the men became ex-hausted by the endless task of keeping open dug-out en-trances and demoralised by the absence of rations causedby the difficulties of preparing and moving hot food un-der bombardment.[30] Some went without food altogetherfor two or three consecutive days.[30]

By the eve of battle, the front-line trenches had ceasedto exist and their barbed wire defences were blown topieces.[30] The official history of the 2nd Bavarian Re-serve Regiment describes the front line as “consisting nolonger of trenches but of advanced nests of men scatteredabout”.[30] The 262nd Reserve Regiment history writesthat its trench system was “lost in a crater field”.[30] Toadd to the misery, for the last ten hours of bombardment,gas shells were added.[31]

Zero-Hour had originally been planned for the morningof 8 April (Easter Sunday) but it was postponed 24 hoursat the request of the French, despite reasonably goodweather in the assault sector. Zero-Day was rescheduledfor 9 April with Zero-Hour at 05:30. The assault was pre-ceded by a hurricane bombardment lasting five minutes,following a relatively quiet night.[30]

When the time came, it was snowing heavily; Alliedtroops advancing across no man’s land were hindered bylarge drifts. It was still dark and visibility on the battle-field was very poor.[31] A westerly wind was at the Alliedsoldiers’ backs blowing “a squall of sleet and snow intothe faces of the Germans”.[30] The combination of the un-usual bombardment and poor visibility meant many Ger-man troops were caught unawares and taken prisoner, stillhalf-dressed, clambering out of the deep dug-outs of thefirst two lines of trenches.[30] Others were captured with-out their boots, trying to escape but stuck in the knee-deep mud of the communication trenches.[30]

3.1 First Battle of the Scarpe (9–14 April1917)

The major British assault of the first day was directlyeast of Arras, with the 12th Division attacking Obser-vation Ridge, north of the Arras—Cambrai road.[31] Af-ter reaching this objective, they were to push on towardsFeuchy, as well as the second and third lines of Germantrenches. At the same time, elements of the 3rd Divi-sion began an assault south of the road, with the takingof Devil’s Wood, Tilloy-lès-Mofflaines and the Bois desBoeufs as their initial objectives.[31] The ultimate objec-tive of these assaults was the Monchyriegel, a trench run-ning between Wancourt and Feuchy, and an important

3.2 Battle of Vimy Ridge (9–12 April 1917) 5

A British machine gun post near Feuchy.

component of the German defences.[31]Most of these ob-jectives, including Feuchy village, had been achieved bythe evening of 10 April though the Germans were still incontrol of large sections of the trenches between Wan-court and Feuchy, particularly in the area of the heav-ily fortified village of Neuville-Vitasse.[31] The followingday, troops from the 56th Division were able to force theGermans out of the village, although the Monchyriegelwas not fully in British hands until a few days later.[31] TheBritish were able to consolidate these gains and push for-ward towards Monchy-le-Preux, although they sufferedheavy casualties in fighting near the village.[32]

18 pounder gun crew in action during the advance near Athies

One reason for the success of the offensive in this sectorwas the failure of German commander von Falkenhausento employ Ludendorff's new Elastic Defence.[33] In the-ory, the enemy would be allowed to make initial gains,thus stretching their lines of communication. Reservesheld close to the battlefield would be committed oncethe initial advance had bogged down, before enemy re-inforcements could be brought up. The defenders wouldthus be able to counter-attack and regain any lost terri-tory. In this sector, Falkenhausen kept his reserve troops

too far from the front and they were too late for a usefulcounter-attack on either 10 or 11 April.[33]

3.2 Battle of VimyRidge (9–12 April 1917)

Main article: Battle of Vimy RidgeAt roughly the same time, in perhaps the most care-

Canadian machine gun squad at Vimy Ridge.

fully crafted portion of the entire offensive, the CanadianCorps launched an assault on Vimy Ridge. Advancingbehind a creeping barrage, and making heavy use ofmachine guns – eighty to each brigade, including oneLewis gun in each platoon – the corps was able to ad-vance through about 4,000 yards (3,700 m) of Germandefences, and captured the crest of the ridge at about13:00.[34] Military historians have attributed the successof this attack to careful planning by Canadian Corps com-mander Julian Byng and his subordinate General ArthurCurrie,[35] constant training, and the assignment of spe-cific objectives to each platoon.[34] By giving units spe-cific goals, troops could continue the attack even if theirofficers were killed or communication broke down, thusbypassing two major problems of combat on the WesternFront.[34]

3.3 First Battle of Bullecourt (10–11 April1917)

South of Arras, the plan called for two divisions, theBritish 62nd Division and the Australian 4th Division toattack either side of the village of Bullecourt and push theGermans out of their fortified positions and into the re-serve trenches.[36] The attack was initially scheduled forthe morning of 10 April, but the tanks intended for theassault were delayed by bad weather and the attack waspostponed for 24 hours. The order to delay did not reachall units in time, and two battalions of theWest YorkshireRegiment attacked and were driven back with significantlosses.[36] Despite protests from the Australian comman-

6 4 SECOND PHASE

German troops with British tank captured 11 April nearBullecourt.

ders, the attack was resumed on the morning of 11 April;mechanical failures meant that only 11 tanks were ableto advance in support, and the limited artillery barrageleft much of the barbed wire in front of the Germantrenches uncut. Additionally, the abortive attack of theprevious day alerted German troops in the area to the im-pending assault, and they were better prepared than theyhad been in the Canadian sector.[37] Misleading reportsabout the extent of the gains made by the Australians de-prived them of necessary artillery support and, althoughelements of the 4th Division briefly occupied sections ofGerman trenches, they were ultimately forced to retreatwith heavy losses.[37] In this sector, the German com-manders correctly employed the Elastic Defence and weretherefore able to counter-attack effectively.[38] The Ger-mans acquired two of the tanks which had been used, andafter seeing them perforated by armour-piercing bullets,believed the rifle A.P. bullet was an effective anti-tankweapon, which threw them off-guard.[39]

4 Second phase

After the territorial gains of the first two days, a hiatus fol-lowed as the immense logistical support needed to keeparmies in the field caught up with the new realities. Battal-ions of pioneers built temporary roads across the churnedup battlefield; heavy artillery (and its ammunition) wasmanhandled into position in new gun pits; food for themen and feed for the draught horses was brought up, andcasualty clearing stations were established in readiness forthe inevitable counter-attacks. Allied commanders alsofaced a dilemma: whether to keep their exhausted divi-sions on the attack and run the risk of having insufficientmanpower or replace them with fresh divisions and losemomentum.[40]

In London, The Times commented: “the great value ofour recent advance here lies in the fact that we have ev-erywhere driven the enemy from high ground and robbedhim of observation. [H]aving secured these high seats[Vimy, Monchy and Croisailles] and enthroned ourselves,

it is not necessarily easy to continue the rapid advance.An attack down the forward slope of high ground, ex-posed to the fire of lesser slopes beyond, is often ex-tremely difficult and now on the general front ... theremust intervene a laborious period, with which we were fa-miliar at the Somme, of systemic hammering and storm-ing of individual positions, no one of which can be at-tacked until some covering one has been captured”.[41]

The German press reacted similarly. The VossischeZeitung, a Berlin daily newspaper, wrote: “We have tocount on reverses like that near Arras. Such events area kind of tactical reverse. If this tactical reverse is notfollowed by strategical effects i.e., breaking through onthe part of the aggressor, then the whole battle is noth-ing but a weakening of the attacked party in men andmateriel.”[42] The same day, the Frankfurter Zeitung com-mented: “If the British succeed in breaking through it willrender conditions worse for them as it will result in free-dom of operations which is Germany’s own special art ofwar”.[42]

General Ludendorff, however, was less sanguine. Thenews of the battle reached him during his 52nd birth-day celebrations at his headquarters in Kreuznach.[43] Hewrote: “I had looked forward to the expected offen-sive with confidence and was now deeply depressed”.[43]He telephoned each of his commanders and “gained theimpression that the principles laid down by OHL weresound. But the whole art of leadership lies in applyingthem correctly”.[43] (A later court of inquiry would es-tablish that Falkenhausen had indeed misunderstood theprinciples of the Elastic Defence.) Ludendorff immedi-ately ordered reinforcements.[34] Then, on 11 April, hesacked General von Falkenhausen’s chief of staff and re-placed him with his defensive line expert, Colonel Fritzvon Lossberg.[16] Von Lossberg went armed with a voll-macht (a power of attorney enabling him to issue orders inLudendorff’s name), effectively replacing Falkenhausen.Within hours of arriving, von Lossberg was restructuringthe German defences.[43]

During the Second Phase, the Allies continued to pressthe attack east of Arras. Their aims were to consolidatethe gains made in the first days of the offensive;[33] to keepthe initiative,[16] and to break through in concert with theFrench at Aisne.[16] However, from 16 April onwards, itwas apparent that the Nivelle Offensive was failing andHaig came under pressure to keep the Germans occupiedin the Arras sector in order to minimise French losses.[37]

4.1 Battle of Lagnicourt (15 April 1917)

Observing that the Australian 1st Division was holding afrontage of 13,000 yards (12,000 m), the local GermanCorps commander (General Otto Von Moser, command-ing the German XIV Reserve Corps) planned a spoil-ing attack to drive back the advanced posts, destroy sup-plies and guns and then retire to the Hindenburg defences.

4.3 Battle of Arleux (28–29 April 1917) 7

Passing his plans to higher command, they assigned an ex-tra division to his corps to further strengthen the attack.Attacking with 23 battalions (from four divisions), theGerman forces managed to penetrate the Australianfront line at the junction on the Australian 1st Divisionand Australian 2nd Division and occupy the village ofLagnicourt (damaging some Australian artillery pieces).Counter-attacks from the Australian 9th and 20th Battal-ions restored the front line, and the action ended with theAustralians suffering 1,010 casualties, against 2,313 Ger-man casualties.[44]

4.2 Second Battle of the Scarpe (23–24April 1917)

British 18-pounder battery under German fire close to Monchy-le-Preux, 24 April. In the foreground is an advanced dressingstation

At 04:45 on 23 April, following two days of poor visibil-ity and freezing weather, British troops of the ThirdArmy(VI and VII corps), attacked to the east along an approx-imate 9-mile (14 km) front from Croisilles to Gavrelleon both sides of the Scarpe. The 51st Division attackedon the northern side in heavy fighting on the western out-skirts of Roeux Wood and the chemical works. On theirleft, the 37th Division, attacked the buildings west ofRoeux Station and gained the line of their objectives onthe western slopes of Greenland Hill, north of the railway.On the left of the main British attack the 63rd Division,made rapid progress against Gavrelle and secured the vil-lage. To the south of the Scarpe and east of Monchy-le-Preux the 29th Division gained the western slopes ofthe rising ground known as Infantry Hill. The Cojeulriver marked a divisional boundary within the VI Corps.Guémappe on the north side of the river was the objectiveof the 15th Division,[45] attacking east fromWancourt to-wards Vis-en-Artois. The objective was commanded bythe higher ground on the south bank and it was not untilthe 50th Division captured the rise on the south side of

the Cojeul that the village was taken. Several determinedGerman counter-attacks were made and by the morningof 24 April, the British held Guémappe, Gavrelle andthe high ground overlooking Fontaine-lez-Croisilles andCherisy; the fighting around Roeux was indecisive.[46]

4.3 Battle of Arleux (28–29 April 1917)

The principal objective of the attack was the need to sus-tain a supporting action tying down German reserves inorder to assist the French offensive against the plateaunorth of the Aisne traversed by the Chemin des Dames.Haig reported,[46] “With a view to economising mytroops, my objectives were shallow, and for a like reason,and also in order to give the appearance of an attack ona more imposing scale, demonstrations were continuedsouthwards to the Arras-Cambrai Road and northwardsto the Souchez River”.At 04:25 on April 28 British and Canadian troopslaunched the main attack on a front of about eight milesnorth of Monchy-le-Preux. A fierce battle continuedthroughout the greater part of the 28 and 29 April. TheGermans delivered determined and repeated counter-attacks. The British positions at Gavrelle alone were at-tacked seven times with strong forces, and on each occa-sion the German thrust was repulsed with great loss bythe 63rd Division. The village of Arleux-en-Gohelle wascaptured by Canadian troops, (1st Canadian Division),after bitter hand-to-hand fighting, and British troops,(2nd Division, Major-General C. E. Pereira), made fur-ther progress in the neighbourhood of Oppy, on Green-land Hill (37th Division), and between Monchy-le-Preuxand the Scarpe (12th Division).

4.4 Second Battle of Bullecourt (3–17 May1917)

The Hindenburg Line near Bullecourt.

After the initial assault around Bullecourt failed to pene-trate the German lines, British commanders made prepa-rations for a second attempt. British artillery began an in-tense bombardment of the village, which by 20 April hadbeen virtually destroyed.[47] Although the infantry assault

8 5 AFTERMATH

was planned for 20 April, it was pushed back a number oftimes and finally set for the early morning of 3May.[47] At03:45, elements of the 2nd Division attacked east of Bul-lecourt village, intending to pierce the Hindenburg Lineand capture Hendecourt-lès-Cagnicourt, while Britishtroops from the 62nd Division attacked Bullecourt,whichwas finally taken by the British 7th Division and despitedetermined effort by the Germans was held by the British62nd Division.[48] German resistance was fierce and whenthe offensive was called off on 17 May, few of the initialobjectives had been met. The Australians were in posses-sion of much of the German trench system between Bul-lecourt and Riencourt-lès-Cagnicourt but had been un-able to capture Hendecourt. To the west, British troopsmanaged to push the Germans out of Bullecourt but in-curred considerable losses, failing also to advance north-east to Hendecourt.[49]

4.5 Third Battle of the Scarpe (3–4 May1917)

See also: Capture of Oppy Wood

After securing the area around Arleux at the end ofApril, the British determined to launch another attackeast fromMonchy to try to break through the Boiry Riegeland reach the Wotanstellung, a major German defensivefortification.[38] This was scheduled to coincide with theAustralian attack at Bullecourt in order to present theGermans with a two–pronged assault. British comman-ders hoped that success in this venture would force theGermans to retreat further to the east. With this objec-tive in mind, the British launched another attack near theScarpe on 3 May. However, neither prong was able tomake any significant advances and the attack was calledoff the following day after incurring heavy casualties.[38]Although this battle was a failure, the British learned im-portant lessons about the need for close liaison betweentanks, infantry, and artillery, which they would later applyin the Battle of Cambrai (1917).[38]

5 Aftermath

By the standards of theWestern front, the gains of the firsttwo days were nothing short of spectacular. A great dealof ground was gained for relatively few casualties and anumber of strategically significant points were captured,notably Vimy Ridge. Additionally, the offensive suc-ceeded in drawing German troops away from the Frenchoffensive in the Aisne sector.[34] In many respects, thebattle might be deemed a victory for the British and theirallies but these gains were offset by high casualties andthe ultimate failure of the French offensive at the Aisne.By the end of the offensive, the British had sufferedmore than 150,000 casualties and gained little ground

British troops returning for a rest following the Battle of Arras.

since the first day.[33] Despite significant early gains, theywere unable to effect a breakthrough and the situation re-verted to stalemate. Although historians generally con-sider the battle a British victory, in the wider context ofthe front, it had very little impact on the strategic or tac-tical situation.[33][34] Ludendorff later commented: “nodoubt exceedingly important strategic objects lay behindthe British attack, but I have never been able to discoverwhat they were”.[43] In contradiction to this he was also“very depressed; had our principles of defensive tacticsproved false, and if so, what was to be done?"[50]

On theAllied side, twenty-five Victoria Crosses were sub-sequently awarded. On the German side, on 24 April1917, Kaiser Wilhelm awarded Von Lossberg the Oak-leaves (similar to a bar for a repeat award) for the Pourle Mérite he had received at the Battle of the Somme theprevious September.[51]

5.1 Casualties

Stained glass window by Harry Clarke in Wexford dedicated tothe memory of Lt William Henry O'Keefe who was killed in

action.[52]

The most quoted Allied casualty figures are those inthe returns made by Lt-Gen Sir George Fowke, Haig’s

5.3 War poetry 9

adjutant-general. His figures collate the daily casualty tal-lies kept by each unit under Haig’s command.[53] ThirdArmy casualties were 87,226; First Army 46,826 (includ-ing 11,004 Canadians at Vimy Ridge); and Fifth Army24,608; totalling 158,660.[54] German losses by contrastare more difficult to determine. Gruppe Vimy andGruppeSouchez suffered 79,418 casualties but the figures forGruppe Arras are incomplete. The writers of the GermanOfficial History Der Weltkrieg, recorded 78,000 Britishlosses to the end of April and another 64,000 casualtiesby the end of May, a total of 142,000 men and 85,000German casualties.[55] German records excluded those“lightly wounded”. Captain Cyril Falls (the writer of thatpart of the British Official History describing the Bat-tles of Arras, Military Operations 1917 volume I) esti-mated that 30%needed to be added toGerman returns forcomparison with the British.[56][56] Falls makes “a generalestimate” that German casualties were “probably fairlyequal”.[56] Nicholls puts them at 120,000;[54] and Kee-gan at 130,000.[4] A notable non-casualty of the battlewas C.S. Lewis (1898–1963), author of books includingThe Chronicles of Narnia.[57] Although several sourceslist Lewis as having been wounded in April 1917, his au-tobiography makes it clear that he did not arrive in Franceuntil November of that year, and that his wounding nearArras took place in April 1918.

5.2 Commanders

AlthoughHaig paid tribute to Allenby for the plan’s “greatinitial success,”[58] Allenby’s subordinates “objected tothe way he handled the ... attritional stage”. Allenby wassent to command the Egyptian Expeditionary Force inPalestine. He regarded the transfer as a “badge of failure”but he “more than redeemed his reputation by defeating”the Ottomans in 1917–18.[58] Haig stayed in his post untilthe end of the war.When it became apparent that a major factor in theBritish success was command failures within his ownarmy, Ludendorff removed several staff officers, includ-ing General von Falkenhausen[38] who never held a fieldcommand again, spending the rest of war as Governor-General of Belgium. In early 1918, The Times carriedan article – entitled Falkenhausen’s Reign of Terror – de-scribing 170 military executions of Belgian civilians thathad taken place since he had been appointed governor.[59]

Ludendorff and Von Lossberg learned a major lessonfrom the battle. They discovered that although the Al-lies were capable of breaking through the front they couldprobably not capitalise on their success if they were con-fronted by a mobile, clever enemy.[60] Ludendorff imme-diately ordered training in “war of movement” tactics andmanoeuvre for his counter-attack divisions.[60] Von Loss-berg was soon promoted to general and directed the Ger-man defence in Haig’s Flanders offensives of the summerand late autumn. (Von Lossberg was later to become “leg-endary as the fireman of the Western Front; always sent

by OHL to the area of crisis”).[16]

5.3 War poetry

Siegfried Sassoon makes reference to the battle in hisanti-war poem The General in which is derided the in-competence of the British military staff.[61] The Anglo-Welsh lyric poet Edward Thomas was killed by a shell onApril 9, 1917, during the first day of the Easter Offensive.Thomas’s war diary gives a vivid and poignant picture oflife on the Western front in the months leading up to thebattle.

6 References

6.1 Notes[1] Ashworth, 3–4

[2] Ashworth, 48–51

[3] Ashworth, 55–56

[4] Keegan (London), 348–352

[5] Griffith, P. Battle Tactics of the Western Front, (1996) pp.84–93.

[6] Terraine, J. Douglas Haig (2005) pp. 230–231. andPhilpott, W. Bloody Victory (2009) p. 623.

[7] Doughty, R.A. Pyrrhic Victory (2005) ch. 6, pp. 250—310.

[8] Wynne, ibid, p. 133.

[9] Keegan (London), 227–231

[10] Strachan, 243–244

[11] Keegan (London), 377–379

[12] Falls, C. OH 1917 I Appendices, p.16.

[13] Nicholls, 23

[14] Nicholls, 39

[15] Nicholson, Chap VIII

[16] Lupfer, Chap.1

[17] Wynne, G.C. If Germany Attacks, p. 168. (1976 edn)

[18] Nicholls, 30–32

[19] New Zealand Defence Force press release

[20] Tunnellers in Arras at the Wayback Machine (archivedNovember 23, 2007)

[21] “The Arras tunnels”, NZ Ministry for Culture and Her-itage, 1 February 2008

[22] Veterans Affairs Canada website

10 6 REFERENCES

[23] Von Angelika Franz “Tunnelstadt unter der Hölle” SpiegelOnline (German)

[24] Nicholls, 36

[25] Levine, 252–253

[26] History of the Defence Surveyors Association at theWayback Machine (archived June 9, 2007)

[27] Jünger, p133

[28] Nicholls, 53–4

[29] Sheffield, 194

[30] Wynne, 173–175

[31] Oldham, 50–53.

[32] Oldham, 56.

[33] Keegan (New York), 325–6

[34] Strachan, 244–246

[35] Berton, Pierre (1986). Vimy. Toronto: McLelland andStewart. pp. 104–105. ISBN 0-7710-1339-6.

[36] Oldham, 66.

[37] Liddell Hart

[38] Oldham, 38–40

[39] Fuller, 109.

[40] Buffetaut, 84

[41] The Times, 20April 1917, “Winning of theHighGround”,p 6

[42] Quoted in The Times, 13 April 1917, page 6

[43] Ludendorff 421–422

[44] Bean, Vol IV, Ch X

[45] Report on Operations by 15th Division – Battle of Arras– Period April 19th/20th to April 28th/29th', 5 May 1917WO 95/1914

[46] Sir Douglas Haig’s 4th Despatch (1917 Campaigns), 25December 1917

[47] Oldham, 69.

[48] Oldham, 60–70.

[49] Oldham, 71.

[50] Ludendorff Memoirs, ii, p. 421 in Wynne, G.C. If Ger-many Attacks, p. 183.

[51] Pour le Mérite online archive

[52] Costigan, Lucy; Michael Cullen (2010). strangest genius:The Stained Glass of Harry Clarke. The History Press Ire-land. p. 245. ISBN 978-1-84588-971-5.

[53] Preserved at the British Public Record Office

[54] Nicholls, 210–211

[55] Reichsarchiv 1939, pp. 272, 276.

[56] Falls, cited by Nicholls, 211

[57]

[58] Sheffield & Bourne, 495–6

[59] The Times, 6 January 1918, page 9

[60] Buffetaut, 122

[61] Siegfried Sassoon (1886–1967) War Poets AssociationWebsite Retrieved 2010-02-26

6.2 Bibliography

• Ashworth, Tony. Trench warfare 1914–1918. Lon-don: Macmillan Press, 2000. ISBN 0-330-48068-5

• Bean, C.E.W. Volume IV – The Australian ImperialForce in France: 1917, Sydney: Angus and Robert-son, 1933. OCLC 9945668

• Buffetaut, Yves. The 1917 Spring Offensives: Ar-ras, Vimy, Le Chemin des Dames. Paris: Histoire etCollections, 1997. ISBN 2-908182-66-1

• Falls, Cyril Bentham; Becke, Archibald Frank;Edmonds, James E.Military Operations, France andBelgium, 1917: The German Retreat to the Hinden-burg Line and the Battles of Arras. Volume I. Lon-don: Macmillan, 1940 (reprinted 1992) ISBN 0-901627-90-9

• Edmonds, James E.; Wynne, G. C. (1940). Mili-tary Operations France&Belgium 1917: AppendicesI. London: Macmillan. (facsimile reprint, Naval &Military Press 2010 ISBN 978-1-84574-733-6)

• Fuller, J.F.C.. Memoirs of an Unconventional Sol-dier. London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1936.OCLC 1015446.

• Gilbert, Martin. First World War. London: Harper-Collins, 1995. ISBN 978-0-00-637666-8

• Holmes, Richard. The Western Front. London:BBC Publications, 1999. ISBN 978-1-57500-147-0

• Jünger, Ernst. Storm of Steel (trans. Michael Hof-man). Penguin Group, 2003. ISBN 978-0-14-118691-7

• Keegan, John. The First World War. London:Pimlico, 1999. ISBN 978-0-7126-6645-9 OCLC248608836

• Levine, Joshua. On a Wing and a Prayer. London:Collins, 2008. ISBN 978-0-00-726945-7

• Liddell Hart, Basil. The Real War, 1914–1918.Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1930. OCLC56212202

11

• Ludendorff, Erich. My War Memoirs. London:Naval & Military Press, 2005. ISBN 978-1-84574-303-1

• Lupfer, Timothy T. The Dynamics of Doctrine: TheChange in German Tactical Doctrine during the FirstWorld War Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat StudiesInstitute, 1981. Archived 30 May 2008. OCLC784236109

• New Zealand Defence Force. Arras TunnellersMemorial (press release) Archived 21 October 2008.

• Nicholls, Jonathon. Cheerful Sacrifice: The Battleof Arras 1917. Pen and Sword Books, 2005. ISBN1-84415-326-6

• Nicholson, G.W.L., Official History of the Cana-dian Army in the First World War: Canadian Ex-peditionary Force 1914–1919. Ottawa: QueensPrinter and Controller of Stationary, 1962. OCLC55016603

• Oldham, Peter. The Hindenburg Line. Pen andSword Books, 1997. ISBN 978-0-85052-568-7

• Reed, Paul. Walking Arras. Pen and Sword Books,2007. ISBN 1-84415-619-2

• Die Kriegsführung im Frühjahr 1917. DerWeltkrieg 1914 bis 1918 : Die militärischen Oper-ationen zu Lande XII (Die digitale landesbibliotekOberösterreich 2012 ed.). Berlin: Mittler. 1939.OCLC 248903245. Retrieved 3 March 2014.

• Sheffield, Gary. Forgotten Victory: The First WorldWar – Myths and Realities. London: Review (Hod-der), 2002. ISBN 978-0-7472-6460-6

• Sheffield, Gary and Bourne, John. Douglas Haig:War Diaries and Letters 1914–1918. UK: Wieden-feld & Nicolson, 2005. ISBN 978-0-297-84702-1

• Stokesbury, James L. A Short History of World WarI. New York: Perennial, 1981. OCLC 6760776

• Strachan, Hew. The First World War. New York:Viking, 2003. OCLC 53075929

• Winkler, Gretchen and Tiedemann, Kurt M. von.Pour le Mérite (Online Archive) Accessed: 6 June2007

• Wynne, G.C. If Germany Attacks: the Battle inDepth in the West, London: Faber, 1940. (Facsimileedition: West Point Military Library, 1973: ISBN0-8371-5029-9)

7 External links• The Battle of Arras at 1914–1918.net Online historyof the battle, accessed 4 April 2007

• The Battle of Arras at the War Chronicle Anotheronline history of the battle, accessed 16 April 2007

• New Zealand Tunnellers Memorial in Arrasarchived 21 October 2008

• The Arras tunnels – NZHistory.net.nz

• France reveals British WWI cave camp BBC News5 May 2008

• Finding Private Adams Exploring the life of a sol-dier killed at Oppy-Gavrelle

• Online history of theWorcestershire Regiment Gen-eral history of a regiment involved in the battle, ac-cessed 24 April 2007

12 8 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

8 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

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