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The loss of The Battle for Moscow (October-December 1941) was of direct result of environmental conditions, not a superior Russian Army.
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ATSS-BAR 5 October 2004
MEMORANDUM FOR THESIS
SUBJECT Thesis Statement
1 Thesis Statement The loss of The Battle for Moscow (October-December 1941) was of direct result of environmental conditions not a superior Russian Army
a Broad Subject Effects of weather and terrain in combat
b Narrowed Topic Battle for Moscow
c Group Members
AHMED HUSSEIN ANDREW J SCHEUERMANN BRIAN K KINSEY MATTHEWD KEMPER TABITHA L HODGE
2 Request approvaldisapproval of this Haines paper topic
~JLAN K KINSEY SGM USA Group Chairperson
I approve disapprove this topic
WILLIE BRITTON SGM USA ROI Faculty Advisor
2
Haines Paper Outline How Weather Can Effects Combat Operations
ROt SGMBRITTON
Thesis Statement The loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct
result of environmental conditions not a superior Russian Anny
I The Soldier MSGHodge
A Soldier Morale
B Clothing
II The Partisan effort SGM Hussein
A Contributions
B The Right to Bear Anns
III Terrain SGMKinsey
A Terrain Features
B Lines of Communication
IV Annaments SGMKemper
A Weapons
B Effects of Weather on Employment of Weapons
V The Opposing View MSG Scheuermann
A Adolph Hitler
B The Military Decision Making Process
VI Conclusion
3
On the night of June 22 1941 more than 3 million German soldiers 600000 vehicles
and 3350 tanks were positioned along a 2000km front stretching from the Baltic to the Black
Sea Their sites were all trained on Russia For Hitler the inevitable assault on Russia was to be
the culmination of a long standing obsession He had always wanted Russias industries and
agricultural lands as part of his living space for Germany and their Thousand Year Reich While
the Russians were well aware of German preparations and were tipped off to the impending
invasion by both their own intelligence as well foreign sources the Germans achieved total
surprise The Germans employed three army groups North Center and South and planned to
destroy all Soviet resistance in swift advances on Leningrad Moscow and Kiev Hitler threw
183 divisions into the assault while the Nazis faced 170 divisions which represented 54 percent
of the Red Armys total strength
Coupled with the element of surprise the Germans possessed better training more
extensive experience and were able to obtain decisive superiority at the points selected for
attack The Russians had large amounts of obsolete equipment were poorly deployed to meet the
attack and lacked defensive positions As a result the Russian frontier was quickly overrun and
the Germans achieved penetrations in many places By 16 July 1941 the Germans had captured
Smolensk which was less than 250 miles from Moscow and Army Group Center alone had
captured about 600000 men and 5000 tanks By the end of July the Germans controlled an area
of the Soviet territory more than twice the size of France
The failure of Typhoon almost entirely due to its lateness According to schedule
Moscow would be captured during the early part of the month ofAugust long before the cold
winter could set in In reality the German invasion armies had been held back by variables that
Hitler and the German General Staffhad not anticipated such as supply problems local
4
resistance Hilters changes in priorities and the devestating effects that the weather conditions
had on the terrain and communications These delays would eventually prove costly as the
unprepared and poorly supplied German troops marched on towards Moscow
The Germans also knew that the Russian roads were inferior for their vehicles and that
the Russian railway tracks were of a different size than what they were using yet no department
or planning logistics ever took these factors into account before the invasion took place
Another significant factor outlined by Bethell and Wright was the fact the Russian troops
were well aware of the advantages they had in their climate and rugged terrain Bethell outlines
excellent examples of this in the dense Forests of Poland and the soggy lands of the Pripet
Marshes No German tanks could operate in these hazardous areas and there was ample cover
for small groups Russian infantry would superbly camouflage themselves and infiltrate the
German positions through the forests and they even displayed their resourcefulness by
communicating to each other by imitating animal cries (Bethell 72)
Combined with the willingness to fight at any odds and the intimate knowledge of their
own terrain it is plain to see that the Russian were definitely not going to fall as easily as Hitler
had first thought Besides the brutal tenacity of the resistance Germany had another problem the
climate In the summer of 1941 the Ukraine has suffered a scorching summer which saw a large
amount of rainfall In the intense heat the German tank tracks ground the baked earth to
powdery fme dust which clogged machinery eyes and mouths and made it hard for troops to
function When it rained it brought short relief to the heat but the roads turned into axle-deep
mud paths that halted all movement while horses got stuck in mud and troops had their boots
sucked right off them only to stay in the ground Thousands of vehicles had to be left as they
were because they ran out of fuel to get out of the mud and the supply paths were choked as well
5
These road conditions combined with partisan forces behind German lines stifled supply lines by
destroying railway tracks and making all kinds of re-armament and food delivery impossible
While the Germans were being delayed and they struggled to get a solid foothold
figuratively and literally in Russia the months passed by and eventually gave way to the harsh
general winter which froze everything to the core As Germany pressed on towards Moscow
the cold weather really took its toll All too often the Germans didnt have enough supplies to
survive let alone fight
During offensive operations physical and mental rigors are part of any campaign and
will have a significant impact on the amount of fatigue within soldiers The October rains
contributed as the fatigue multiplied significantly in the German soldiers By mid October the
combination of cold rain and snow flurries relentlessly continued for days causing the dirt roads
to become muddy After days of continuous rain the German soldiers found themselves
marching toward Moscow with land covered in mud These rainy conditions were a strain on the
soldiers Not only did they lose their equipment but they also lost their boots as they tread
through the thickness of the mud Living in these conditions also kept the soldiers wet muddy
and very exhausted Soldiers became sick with fatigue and extremely demoralized as these
conditions continued to deteriorate Field Marshal von Bock noted in his diary October 21
1941 The Russians are less of a hindrance than the mud and the wetness
In November the situation grew worse The wet rain turned into snow and the
temperatures started to decline significantly The soldiers no longer had to deal with marching
through the mud but they were faced with taking on the bitter cold temperature and hunger The
soldiers were able to fmd shelter in Russian huts along the way However they found themselves
infected with lice and disease The mud slowed down the supply trains that the soldiers
6
desperately depended on Because the supply trains were unable to get through most of the
soldiers did not have the clothing they needed to keep themselves warm or the food they needed
to fight the overwhelming fatigue and bitter cold
At first the soldiers hope for cold weather so that the roads would become frozen to allow
the supply trains to get through With only three major roads toward Moscow and only one
partially paved the terrain and weather conditions proved too much for the supply trains In
order to keep the German Army soldiers equipped and fed they required 25 to 30 supply trains
monthly Only eight to ten supply trains eventually made it to the front line in November The
leadership on the front lines pleaded with the High Command to send winter clothing and food
for the soldiers but only ammunition and fuel was sent to support the soldiers This decision
was made by Hitler which coupled by the cold weather resulted in more casualties from the
cold than from combat operations
As winter intensified the plight of the German soldier became increasingly worse
Because of the lack of supplies bread was practically non-existent and eating potatoes became
their main form of subsistence Commanders were advising their soldiers to fmd anything they
could to keep warm to include wrapping their bodies in newspaper Unfortunately newspaper
was as hard to fmd as everything else Most soldiers were huddled together in trenches covered
with straw Usually there were 10 to 15 soldiers in these make shift shelters keeping each other
warm through contact and stoves they created to burn diesel fuel for warmth During December
it became increasingly common to see soldiers standing next to burned-out fires frozen solid
while trying to keep warm
The Soviet soldier would eventually gain everything that the German Soldier lost
Initially the Soviet soldier was also under equipped and consistently beaten at every
7
engagement Their morale was low but they fought with a ferocity and determination that is
inherent in all that have fought on their own soil Soviet determination was enough to slow
down the German advance and with the help of the Soviet weather would eventually stop him
There was also a strong belief that the weather would destroy the German Soldier as it did the
French Soldier in 1812
The Soviets welcomed the wet weather and the cold Nevertheless not even the Soviet
soldier was immune to the cold and German soldiers often came across Soviet soldiers and
horses frozen solid in the snow Although the weather proved difficult for the Soviet soldier
they were familiar with the difficulties associated with such conditions Having trained and lived
with the difficulties of the wet and freezing conditions he was able to out maneuver and
eventually out fight the German army
The failure of the German army to surround Moscow allowed the Soviet soldier the
advantage of adequate supplies Familiarity with the terrain and the knowledge ofwhat was
required to survive the cold created a lop-sided advantage for the Soviet soldier The Soviet
soldier moved on the run and normally had enough food to sustain him Their primary means of
travel was on horseback with one or two soldiers to each horse They sustained their horses on
the straw off thatched roofs and they sustained themselves with raw vegetables and dried bread
In December a new soldier joined the Soviet front lines These soldiers arrived from
Siberia and were conditioned to extreme arctic conditions since their childhood These soldiers
proved very versatile much to the dismay of the German soldier Their clothing allowed them to
move swiftly and silently when required and could wait hours in the snow The arrival of
Siberian Troops and their ability to monopolize the environment inflicted huge casualties on the
8
Gennan army and proved extremely demoralizing for the Gennan soldier and as history has
proven demoralized soldiers do not win wars
The difficulty of the terrain for re-supply and the extreme cold proved too much for the
Gennan soldier With his comrades dying everyday and worsening environmental conditions
any hope of taking Moscow died along with his morale The Soviet winter was proving to be
more dangerous then the enemy With every passing day the incidence of extreme cases of
frostbite increased Chief of Staff Liebenstein summoned up the plight of the Gennan soldier
best when he wrote Despite all claims and reports it has not been understood by those above
that we are too weak to defend ourselves (Zhukov 179)
The Partisan movement was born and organized after the Gennan invasion on 3 July
1941 Twelve days after the Gennan attack Stalin called for the establishment of an underground
movement in the occupied territories to fight the enemy During the Battle for Moscow in 1941
the objectives ofthe Partisans were military political and economic in nature The military
mission was to harass Gennan occupation forces inflict maximum damage on military and
industrial installations and gather intelligence Stalins political aim was to hold the allegiance
of the Russian population in and around Gennan occupied areas of the USSR and the communist
regime Application took the aspect ofpersuasion by a variety of means Actions ranging from
propaganda and psychological warfare to intimidation and brute force were the order of the day
The economic objective was to prevent or substantially reduce Gennan exploitation of the
occupied areas The Partisans were an integral part ofthe Russian military strategy tactics and
military weapons used against the Gennans Partisans aided the Soviet war in many other
functions They collected taxes for the Soviet government recruited soldiers for the Red Anny
9
and transported food into all sectors where Soviet soldiers were located They performed as the
long arm of the Soviet government (Zhuvov 178)
Partisan units ascended by transport and in foot formed divisions and groups organized to
combat enemy troops The Partisans fomented warfare everywhere They destroyed bridges
railroads roadways telephone lines set fires to forests stores and transport In the occupied
region conditions were extremely unbearable for the Germans and all their accomplices They
were hounded and annihilated at every step and their efforts consistently frustrated Agencies
closely associated with the Partisan movement were the Communist Party the Peoples
Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the Red Army (Von Luttichau 1963) A vast amount of
Freedom Fighters were based behind the German lines to be employed as needed in the
scheme ofRussian counterattacks planned for the winter counteroffensive Additional tasks were
to strive and prevent by force ifnecessary the Ukrainian population from shifting their loyalty
from the Russians to the Germans The Red Army Partisans marched at night and applied
diversionary tactics to draw off German security forces from their main target Partisans often
lived off the land They took food and clothing as needed from the local population either by
requisitioning or simply looting Partisans found their weapons and ammunition in large
quantities in abandoned Soviet arms dumps and from battlefields ofearlier campaigns Small
amounts of materials were attained from collaborators The Partisans maintained a very low
standard of living as not to draw attention to their activities For instance simple staples such as
tobacco soap medical supplies and salt were hard to come by and often the civilian fighters did
without When the mission was complete or the training period was over the Partisans returned
to their homes and civilian pursuits and blended into the population They used the same
10
methods to vanish from the scene when the Germans searched the forests for evidence of
partisan efforts
The entire country of sons and daughters of all the Soviet Republics heeded the call of the
party and government for the defense of Moscow Everyone worked day and night people
literally collapsed from fatigue and lack of sleep Driven by a feeling ofpersonal responsibility
for the fate ofMoscow and the fate of the homeland the partisans diligently worked toward a
common goal Though the Germans pulverized the vast majority of the Soviet Anny the
Partisans refused to surrender The partisans sense ofloyalty and commitment for their country
motivated them to fight without any assurance of any success The bitter cold that year
transcended the worst ever winter in the regions history Despite the conditions the Partisans
kept their faith and though tested by blood and death their character remained in tact (Macksey
1975)
An ever-present threat lacking the strength to engage major units in battle the Partisans
proved to be a continuous threat to the Germans The Partisans felt an obligation to carry their
weapons always and everywhere The militias when properly formed were in fact the people
themselves and included all men and women capable of bearing arms To preserve their country
it was essential that the entire population possess arms and train their children at a young age on
weapons use The Russians felt that their country could be secured entirely by arming the people
The possession ofarms was the distinction between losing their country and submitting to a
bmtal Hitler regime A well-regulated militia composed of citizens and husbandmen took up
arms to preserve their property and individual rights The belief of the day was political power
and ownership grew from the barrel ofa weapon In April 11 1944 Hitler revealed his agenda of
gun control (Macksey 1975) He remarked The most foolish mistake we could possibly
11
make would be to pennit the conquered Eastern peoples to have anns History teaches us that
all conquerors that allowed their subject populations to carry anns prepared their own downfall
by doing so Hitler continually felt the defeat and the threat from the militia (Molt Partisans
1990)
The conclusion is thus inescapable that history indicates the protected individual right of
a private citizen to own and carry fireanns in a peaceful manner is paramount to protect their
country and whats theirs The public respect of the Partisan movement played an integral part of
Gennanys downfall
During the Battle for Moscow it was proven that the Russian soldiers were familiar with
their terrain swamplands forest and rivers This strength also would have a decisive effect at
Moscow (Curtis 12) Therefore the loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct result of
weather not a superior Russian military force
During the Battle for Moscow (October - December 1941) nearly 3000000 soldiers
fought for the capital (www wnecedu) The Gennans suffered their first defeat during the
Battle for Moscow This battle went down in history as a turning point for the Gennan Army
After several victories on the battlefield the Germans were certain that there was nothing to stop
them from taking over Moscow The Gennan Army was expected to attack and destroy the
Russian Army which was reported to be no less than four and half million men strong (Lucas
1992)
The Battle for Moscow was moved forward in three great sweeps the first beginning on
the opening day of war June 22 1941 the second beginning on 3 October and the last on 16
November when it threw in everything it had in a desperate attempt to reach the capital (Kerr
1944) On October 3 1941 Gennany launched their second drive towards Moscow During the
12
flrst two weeks of October the German attack progressed without any problems Not until mid
October did the Germans start showing signs of slowing down due to the weather The Germans
noticed that the Soviets had blown up strategic bridges and thus started to experience terrain
effects Von Bock stopped his forces to regroup study the situation and make his plans for the
[mal assault scheduled for November 16 (Kerr 43)
Terrain features played a vital role during the Battle for Moscow During every battle since
the civil war commanders have taken advantage of the terrain features that are available on the
battlefield Commanders also considered the influence of swamplands rivers forests and natural
obstacles on the battlefield Due to the Germans lack of experience on the Soviet terrain and
land they were defeated at the hands of the Soviet Army during the Battle for Moscow The
majority of the Russian forests are merged with swamplands and only one major river the
Pripyat that flows from west to east provides access to the interior (CMH 104-5)
The Germans were taken by surprise during the early rain in the late fall The lack of
knowledge of the terrain and muddy season halted their military operations The roads became
soft which resulted in a pile up of the German re-supply vehicles The Germans underestimated
the road conditions and failed to take into consideration the rainy season The Germans fighting
ill Russian soil wonltl have been in a beller position to withstand the physical and psychological
strain involved if they had been previously subjected to thorough training in Russian terrain
(CMH 104-2)
The Germans were moving quickly and smashing their way along Russian highways The
Germans kept extending their lines of communication by smashing their way north through the
Smolensk-Moscow highway Von Bock and Von Kluge split their forces and kept heading
slnlight lo Moscow Von Bock split his forces further and sent them northeast towards Kalinin
13
and the majority to Mozhaisk which was sixty-five miles from Moscow Von Kluge sent one of
his largest task forces towards Gzhatsk another one towards Malo-Yaroslavetz and his last task
force towards Tula which was south of Moscow By extending their lines of communication the
Germans experienced difficulty in re-supplying themselves with fuel and ammunition The
Germans were moving through the Smolensk-Moscow and Tula-Moscow highways quickly and
with confidence that they would reach their objective The lines of communications were hard
and long to protect from vicious assault by Russian partisans working in the German rear (Kerr
50)
On November 16 1941 the Germans launched their final assault towards Moscow By
this phase of winter it was cold and the terrain was solidly frozen Temperatures were below 20
degrees and casuaHies from cold weather injuries were rising The Soviets initiated a massive
counter-offensive against the German Army deployed on the Moscow axis on December 5
(Glantz 97) As the Germans got closer to Moscow the Soviet defensive lines stopped them On
December 5 194] the Whermacht Conunanders decided to stop their attacks The German
battle report testified The soldiers fighting capacity is on the verge of exhaustion and it is
impossible more to expect performance ofdifficult tasks (web serpukhovsu)
The Gtrman AlHIY begclll its inilial assault on Moscow 30 September 1941 On the 6th of
October snow began to fall followed by a rain pattern that would be repeated until carly
December The ever-deepening river of mud slowed the German advance By the 3rd of October
the Nuzi b1itzkricg vas almost at a stand stilL middot[his allowed the Russians to fight them on almost
even ground for the first time By the 7th ofNovember freezing cold had set in signaling the start
of the Russian winter The invasion plan did not include a winter plan an oversight that would
1Ol HH GtIII1WIS dtady in the Baille [Of Moscow On the night of 4 December the temperature
14
dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not
fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were
astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat
ineffective
Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the
first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out
as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of
cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and
motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero
(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On
December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal
under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow
and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies
could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold
It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect
After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and
equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian
counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by
the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~
from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and
could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly
designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions
15
Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements
hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of
locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few
available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians
must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled
units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give
them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to
exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)
Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized
and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their
useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet
winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began
they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and
h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning
of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer
Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million
ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth
of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and
7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-
German surrender in April of 1945
16
The Opposing View
The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December
1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my
opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy
the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than
those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the
ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat
The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with
all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to
he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision
of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand
years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his
inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to
impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed
opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys
nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse
The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final
Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews
bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during
WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven
17
many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass
uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies
Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and
it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the
sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over
such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy
supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff
asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once
the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the
Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High
immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by
Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in
The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t
(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)
discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved
invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall
fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl
Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war
with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of
Victory signifying the political feelings of the day
18
A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding
offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks
regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The
Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the
Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons
learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so
overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an
txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter
months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely
separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not
1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned
Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers
were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the
Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had
reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man
Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history
would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the
knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury
In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army
19
that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly
indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth
Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case
the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred
While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a
they suffered in The Battle for Moscow
20
WORKS CITED
New York St Martin s Press 1986
===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s
Washington DC 1986
Washington DC 1986
Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military
Reviev 97 D ecember 1991
Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944
Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk
Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and
Day 1975
Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969
History 1987
2
Haines Paper Outline How Weather Can Effects Combat Operations
ROt SGMBRITTON
Thesis Statement The loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct
result of environmental conditions not a superior Russian Anny
I The Soldier MSGHodge
A Soldier Morale
B Clothing
II The Partisan effort SGM Hussein
A Contributions
B The Right to Bear Anns
III Terrain SGMKinsey
A Terrain Features
B Lines of Communication
IV Annaments SGMKemper
A Weapons
B Effects of Weather on Employment of Weapons
V The Opposing View MSG Scheuermann
A Adolph Hitler
B The Military Decision Making Process
VI Conclusion
3
On the night of June 22 1941 more than 3 million German soldiers 600000 vehicles
and 3350 tanks were positioned along a 2000km front stretching from the Baltic to the Black
Sea Their sites were all trained on Russia For Hitler the inevitable assault on Russia was to be
the culmination of a long standing obsession He had always wanted Russias industries and
agricultural lands as part of his living space for Germany and their Thousand Year Reich While
the Russians were well aware of German preparations and were tipped off to the impending
invasion by both their own intelligence as well foreign sources the Germans achieved total
surprise The Germans employed three army groups North Center and South and planned to
destroy all Soviet resistance in swift advances on Leningrad Moscow and Kiev Hitler threw
183 divisions into the assault while the Nazis faced 170 divisions which represented 54 percent
of the Red Armys total strength
Coupled with the element of surprise the Germans possessed better training more
extensive experience and were able to obtain decisive superiority at the points selected for
attack The Russians had large amounts of obsolete equipment were poorly deployed to meet the
attack and lacked defensive positions As a result the Russian frontier was quickly overrun and
the Germans achieved penetrations in many places By 16 July 1941 the Germans had captured
Smolensk which was less than 250 miles from Moscow and Army Group Center alone had
captured about 600000 men and 5000 tanks By the end of July the Germans controlled an area
of the Soviet territory more than twice the size of France
The failure of Typhoon almost entirely due to its lateness According to schedule
Moscow would be captured during the early part of the month ofAugust long before the cold
winter could set in In reality the German invasion armies had been held back by variables that
Hitler and the German General Staffhad not anticipated such as supply problems local
4
resistance Hilters changes in priorities and the devestating effects that the weather conditions
had on the terrain and communications These delays would eventually prove costly as the
unprepared and poorly supplied German troops marched on towards Moscow
The Germans also knew that the Russian roads were inferior for their vehicles and that
the Russian railway tracks were of a different size than what they were using yet no department
or planning logistics ever took these factors into account before the invasion took place
Another significant factor outlined by Bethell and Wright was the fact the Russian troops
were well aware of the advantages they had in their climate and rugged terrain Bethell outlines
excellent examples of this in the dense Forests of Poland and the soggy lands of the Pripet
Marshes No German tanks could operate in these hazardous areas and there was ample cover
for small groups Russian infantry would superbly camouflage themselves and infiltrate the
German positions through the forests and they even displayed their resourcefulness by
communicating to each other by imitating animal cries (Bethell 72)
Combined with the willingness to fight at any odds and the intimate knowledge of their
own terrain it is plain to see that the Russian were definitely not going to fall as easily as Hitler
had first thought Besides the brutal tenacity of the resistance Germany had another problem the
climate In the summer of 1941 the Ukraine has suffered a scorching summer which saw a large
amount of rainfall In the intense heat the German tank tracks ground the baked earth to
powdery fme dust which clogged machinery eyes and mouths and made it hard for troops to
function When it rained it brought short relief to the heat but the roads turned into axle-deep
mud paths that halted all movement while horses got stuck in mud and troops had their boots
sucked right off them only to stay in the ground Thousands of vehicles had to be left as they
were because they ran out of fuel to get out of the mud and the supply paths were choked as well
5
These road conditions combined with partisan forces behind German lines stifled supply lines by
destroying railway tracks and making all kinds of re-armament and food delivery impossible
While the Germans were being delayed and they struggled to get a solid foothold
figuratively and literally in Russia the months passed by and eventually gave way to the harsh
general winter which froze everything to the core As Germany pressed on towards Moscow
the cold weather really took its toll All too often the Germans didnt have enough supplies to
survive let alone fight
During offensive operations physical and mental rigors are part of any campaign and
will have a significant impact on the amount of fatigue within soldiers The October rains
contributed as the fatigue multiplied significantly in the German soldiers By mid October the
combination of cold rain and snow flurries relentlessly continued for days causing the dirt roads
to become muddy After days of continuous rain the German soldiers found themselves
marching toward Moscow with land covered in mud These rainy conditions were a strain on the
soldiers Not only did they lose their equipment but they also lost their boots as they tread
through the thickness of the mud Living in these conditions also kept the soldiers wet muddy
and very exhausted Soldiers became sick with fatigue and extremely demoralized as these
conditions continued to deteriorate Field Marshal von Bock noted in his diary October 21
1941 The Russians are less of a hindrance than the mud and the wetness
In November the situation grew worse The wet rain turned into snow and the
temperatures started to decline significantly The soldiers no longer had to deal with marching
through the mud but they were faced with taking on the bitter cold temperature and hunger The
soldiers were able to fmd shelter in Russian huts along the way However they found themselves
infected with lice and disease The mud slowed down the supply trains that the soldiers
6
desperately depended on Because the supply trains were unable to get through most of the
soldiers did not have the clothing they needed to keep themselves warm or the food they needed
to fight the overwhelming fatigue and bitter cold
At first the soldiers hope for cold weather so that the roads would become frozen to allow
the supply trains to get through With only three major roads toward Moscow and only one
partially paved the terrain and weather conditions proved too much for the supply trains In
order to keep the German Army soldiers equipped and fed they required 25 to 30 supply trains
monthly Only eight to ten supply trains eventually made it to the front line in November The
leadership on the front lines pleaded with the High Command to send winter clothing and food
for the soldiers but only ammunition and fuel was sent to support the soldiers This decision
was made by Hitler which coupled by the cold weather resulted in more casualties from the
cold than from combat operations
As winter intensified the plight of the German soldier became increasingly worse
Because of the lack of supplies bread was practically non-existent and eating potatoes became
their main form of subsistence Commanders were advising their soldiers to fmd anything they
could to keep warm to include wrapping their bodies in newspaper Unfortunately newspaper
was as hard to fmd as everything else Most soldiers were huddled together in trenches covered
with straw Usually there were 10 to 15 soldiers in these make shift shelters keeping each other
warm through contact and stoves they created to burn diesel fuel for warmth During December
it became increasingly common to see soldiers standing next to burned-out fires frozen solid
while trying to keep warm
The Soviet soldier would eventually gain everything that the German Soldier lost
Initially the Soviet soldier was also under equipped and consistently beaten at every
7
engagement Their morale was low but they fought with a ferocity and determination that is
inherent in all that have fought on their own soil Soviet determination was enough to slow
down the German advance and with the help of the Soviet weather would eventually stop him
There was also a strong belief that the weather would destroy the German Soldier as it did the
French Soldier in 1812
The Soviets welcomed the wet weather and the cold Nevertheless not even the Soviet
soldier was immune to the cold and German soldiers often came across Soviet soldiers and
horses frozen solid in the snow Although the weather proved difficult for the Soviet soldier
they were familiar with the difficulties associated with such conditions Having trained and lived
with the difficulties of the wet and freezing conditions he was able to out maneuver and
eventually out fight the German army
The failure of the German army to surround Moscow allowed the Soviet soldier the
advantage of adequate supplies Familiarity with the terrain and the knowledge ofwhat was
required to survive the cold created a lop-sided advantage for the Soviet soldier The Soviet
soldier moved on the run and normally had enough food to sustain him Their primary means of
travel was on horseback with one or two soldiers to each horse They sustained their horses on
the straw off thatched roofs and they sustained themselves with raw vegetables and dried bread
In December a new soldier joined the Soviet front lines These soldiers arrived from
Siberia and were conditioned to extreme arctic conditions since their childhood These soldiers
proved very versatile much to the dismay of the German soldier Their clothing allowed them to
move swiftly and silently when required and could wait hours in the snow The arrival of
Siberian Troops and their ability to monopolize the environment inflicted huge casualties on the
8
Gennan army and proved extremely demoralizing for the Gennan soldier and as history has
proven demoralized soldiers do not win wars
The difficulty of the terrain for re-supply and the extreme cold proved too much for the
Gennan soldier With his comrades dying everyday and worsening environmental conditions
any hope of taking Moscow died along with his morale The Soviet winter was proving to be
more dangerous then the enemy With every passing day the incidence of extreme cases of
frostbite increased Chief of Staff Liebenstein summoned up the plight of the Gennan soldier
best when he wrote Despite all claims and reports it has not been understood by those above
that we are too weak to defend ourselves (Zhukov 179)
The Partisan movement was born and organized after the Gennan invasion on 3 July
1941 Twelve days after the Gennan attack Stalin called for the establishment of an underground
movement in the occupied territories to fight the enemy During the Battle for Moscow in 1941
the objectives ofthe Partisans were military political and economic in nature The military
mission was to harass Gennan occupation forces inflict maximum damage on military and
industrial installations and gather intelligence Stalins political aim was to hold the allegiance
of the Russian population in and around Gennan occupied areas of the USSR and the communist
regime Application took the aspect ofpersuasion by a variety of means Actions ranging from
propaganda and psychological warfare to intimidation and brute force were the order of the day
The economic objective was to prevent or substantially reduce Gennan exploitation of the
occupied areas The Partisans were an integral part ofthe Russian military strategy tactics and
military weapons used against the Gennans Partisans aided the Soviet war in many other
functions They collected taxes for the Soviet government recruited soldiers for the Red Anny
9
and transported food into all sectors where Soviet soldiers were located They performed as the
long arm of the Soviet government (Zhuvov 178)
Partisan units ascended by transport and in foot formed divisions and groups organized to
combat enemy troops The Partisans fomented warfare everywhere They destroyed bridges
railroads roadways telephone lines set fires to forests stores and transport In the occupied
region conditions were extremely unbearable for the Germans and all their accomplices They
were hounded and annihilated at every step and their efforts consistently frustrated Agencies
closely associated with the Partisan movement were the Communist Party the Peoples
Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the Red Army (Von Luttichau 1963) A vast amount of
Freedom Fighters were based behind the German lines to be employed as needed in the
scheme ofRussian counterattacks planned for the winter counteroffensive Additional tasks were
to strive and prevent by force ifnecessary the Ukrainian population from shifting their loyalty
from the Russians to the Germans The Red Army Partisans marched at night and applied
diversionary tactics to draw off German security forces from their main target Partisans often
lived off the land They took food and clothing as needed from the local population either by
requisitioning or simply looting Partisans found their weapons and ammunition in large
quantities in abandoned Soviet arms dumps and from battlefields ofearlier campaigns Small
amounts of materials were attained from collaborators The Partisans maintained a very low
standard of living as not to draw attention to their activities For instance simple staples such as
tobacco soap medical supplies and salt were hard to come by and often the civilian fighters did
without When the mission was complete or the training period was over the Partisans returned
to their homes and civilian pursuits and blended into the population They used the same
10
methods to vanish from the scene when the Germans searched the forests for evidence of
partisan efforts
The entire country of sons and daughters of all the Soviet Republics heeded the call of the
party and government for the defense of Moscow Everyone worked day and night people
literally collapsed from fatigue and lack of sleep Driven by a feeling ofpersonal responsibility
for the fate ofMoscow and the fate of the homeland the partisans diligently worked toward a
common goal Though the Germans pulverized the vast majority of the Soviet Anny the
Partisans refused to surrender The partisans sense ofloyalty and commitment for their country
motivated them to fight without any assurance of any success The bitter cold that year
transcended the worst ever winter in the regions history Despite the conditions the Partisans
kept their faith and though tested by blood and death their character remained in tact (Macksey
1975)
An ever-present threat lacking the strength to engage major units in battle the Partisans
proved to be a continuous threat to the Germans The Partisans felt an obligation to carry their
weapons always and everywhere The militias when properly formed were in fact the people
themselves and included all men and women capable of bearing arms To preserve their country
it was essential that the entire population possess arms and train their children at a young age on
weapons use The Russians felt that their country could be secured entirely by arming the people
The possession ofarms was the distinction between losing their country and submitting to a
bmtal Hitler regime A well-regulated militia composed of citizens and husbandmen took up
arms to preserve their property and individual rights The belief of the day was political power
and ownership grew from the barrel ofa weapon In April 11 1944 Hitler revealed his agenda of
gun control (Macksey 1975) He remarked The most foolish mistake we could possibly
11
make would be to pennit the conquered Eastern peoples to have anns History teaches us that
all conquerors that allowed their subject populations to carry anns prepared their own downfall
by doing so Hitler continually felt the defeat and the threat from the militia (Molt Partisans
1990)
The conclusion is thus inescapable that history indicates the protected individual right of
a private citizen to own and carry fireanns in a peaceful manner is paramount to protect their
country and whats theirs The public respect of the Partisan movement played an integral part of
Gennanys downfall
During the Battle for Moscow it was proven that the Russian soldiers were familiar with
their terrain swamplands forest and rivers This strength also would have a decisive effect at
Moscow (Curtis 12) Therefore the loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct result of
weather not a superior Russian military force
During the Battle for Moscow (October - December 1941) nearly 3000000 soldiers
fought for the capital (www wnecedu) The Gennans suffered their first defeat during the
Battle for Moscow This battle went down in history as a turning point for the Gennan Army
After several victories on the battlefield the Germans were certain that there was nothing to stop
them from taking over Moscow The Gennan Army was expected to attack and destroy the
Russian Army which was reported to be no less than four and half million men strong (Lucas
1992)
The Battle for Moscow was moved forward in three great sweeps the first beginning on
the opening day of war June 22 1941 the second beginning on 3 October and the last on 16
November when it threw in everything it had in a desperate attempt to reach the capital (Kerr
1944) On October 3 1941 Gennany launched their second drive towards Moscow During the
12
flrst two weeks of October the German attack progressed without any problems Not until mid
October did the Germans start showing signs of slowing down due to the weather The Germans
noticed that the Soviets had blown up strategic bridges and thus started to experience terrain
effects Von Bock stopped his forces to regroup study the situation and make his plans for the
[mal assault scheduled for November 16 (Kerr 43)
Terrain features played a vital role during the Battle for Moscow During every battle since
the civil war commanders have taken advantage of the terrain features that are available on the
battlefield Commanders also considered the influence of swamplands rivers forests and natural
obstacles on the battlefield Due to the Germans lack of experience on the Soviet terrain and
land they were defeated at the hands of the Soviet Army during the Battle for Moscow The
majority of the Russian forests are merged with swamplands and only one major river the
Pripyat that flows from west to east provides access to the interior (CMH 104-5)
The Germans were taken by surprise during the early rain in the late fall The lack of
knowledge of the terrain and muddy season halted their military operations The roads became
soft which resulted in a pile up of the German re-supply vehicles The Germans underestimated
the road conditions and failed to take into consideration the rainy season The Germans fighting
ill Russian soil wonltl have been in a beller position to withstand the physical and psychological
strain involved if they had been previously subjected to thorough training in Russian terrain
(CMH 104-2)
The Germans were moving quickly and smashing their way along Russian highways The
Germans kept extending their lines of communication by smashing their way north through the
Smolensk-Moscow highway Von Bock and Von Kluge split their forces and kept heading
slnlight lo Moscow Von Bock split his forces further and sent them northeast towards Kalinin
13
and the majority to Mozhaisk which was sixty-five miles from Moscow Von Kluge sent one of
his largest task forces towards Gzhatsk another one towards Malo-Yaroslavetz and his last task
force towards Tula which was south of Moscow By extending their lines of communication the
Germans experienced difficulty in re-supplying themselves with fuel and ammunition The
Germans were moving through the Smolensk-Moscow and Tula-Moscow highways quickly and
with confidence that they would reach their objective The lines of communications were hard
and long to protect from vicious assault by Russian partisans working in the German rear (Kerr
50)
On November 16 1941 the Germans launched their final assault towards Moscow By
this phase of winter it was cold and the terrain was solidly frozen Temperatures were below 20
degrees and casuaHies from cold weather injuries were rising The Soviets initiated a massive
counter-offensive against the German Army deployed on the Moscow axis on December 5
(Glantz 97) As the Germans got closer to Moscow the Soviet defensive lines stopped them On
December 5 194] the Whermacht Conunanders decided to stop their attacks The German
battle report testified The soldiers fighting capacity is on the verge of exhaustion and it is
impossible more to expect performance ofdifficult tasks (web serpukhovsu)
The Gtrman AlHIY begclll its inilial assault on Moscow 30 September 1941 On the 6th of
October snow began to fall followed by a rain pattern that would be repeated until carly
December The ever-deepening river of mud slowed the German advance By the 3rd of October
the Nuzi b1itzkricg vas almost at a stand stilL middot[his allowed the Russians to fight them on almost
even ground for the first time By the 7th ofNovember freezing cold had set in signaling the start
of the Russian winter The invasion plan did not include a winter plan an oversight that would
1Ol HH GtIII1WIS dtady in the Baille [Of Moscow On the night of 4 December the temperature
14
dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not
fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were
astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat
ineffective
Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the
first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out
as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of
cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and
motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero
(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On
December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal
under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow
and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies
could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold
It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect
After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and
equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian
counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by
the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~
from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and
could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly
designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions
15
Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements
hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of
locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few
available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians
must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled
units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give
them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to
exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)
Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized
and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their
useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet
winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began
they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and
h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning
of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer
Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million
ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth
of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and
7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-
German surrender in April of 1945
16
The Opposing View
The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December
1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my
opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy
the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than
those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the
ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat
The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with
all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to
he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision
of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand
years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his
inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to
impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed
opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys
nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse
The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final
Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews
bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during
WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven
17
many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass
uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies
Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and
it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the
sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over
such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy
supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff
asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once
the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the
Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High
immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by
Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in
The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t
(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)
discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved
invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall
fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl
Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war
with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of
Victory signifying the political feelings of the day
18
A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding
offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks
regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The
Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the
Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons
learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so
overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an
txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter
months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely
separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not
1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned
Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers
were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the
Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had
reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man
Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history
would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the
knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury
In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army
19
that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly
indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth
Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case
the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred
While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a
they suffered in The Battle for Moscow
20
WORKS CITED
New York St Martin s Press 1986
===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s
Washington DC 1986
Washington DC 1986
Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military
Reviev 97 D ecember 1991
Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944
Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk
Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and
Day 1975
Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969
History 1987
3
On the night of June 22 1941 more than 3 million German soldiers 600000 vehicles
and 3350 tanks were positioned along a 2000km front stretching from the Baltic to the Black
Sea Their sites were all trained on Russia For Hitler the inevitable assault on Russia was to be
the culmination of a long standing obsession He had always wanted Russias industries and
agricultural lands as part of his living space for Germany and their Thousand Year Reich While
the Russians were well aware of German preparations and were tipped off to the impending
invasion by both their own intelligence as well foreign sources the Germans achieved total
surprise The Germans employed three army groups North Center and South and planned to
destroy all Soviet resistance in swift advances on Leningrad Moscow and Kiev Hitler threw
183 divisions into the assault while the Nazis faced 170 divisions which represented 54 percent
of the Red Armys total strength
Coupled with the element of surprise the Germans possessed better training more
extensive experience and were able to obtain decisive superiority at the points selected for
attack The Russians had large amounts of obsolete equipment were poorly deployed to meet the
attack and lacked defensive positions As a result the Russian frontier was quickly overrun and
the Germans achieved penetrations in many places By 16 July 1941 the Germans had captured
Smolensk which was less than 250 miles from Moscow and Army Group Center alone had
captured about 600000 men and 5000 tanks By the end of July the Germans controlled an area
of the Soviet territory more than twice the size of France
The failure of Typhoon almost entirely due to its lateness According to schedule
Moscow would be captured during the early part of the month ofAugust long before the cold
winter could set in In reality the German invasion armies had been held back by variables that
Hitler and the German General Staffhad not anticipated such as supply problems local
4
resistance Hilters changes in priorities and the devestating effects that the weather conditions
had on the terrain and communications These delays would eventually prove costly as the
unprepared and poorly supplied German troops marched on towards Moscow
The Germans also knew that the Russian roads were inferior for their vehicles and that
the Russian railway tracks were of a different size than what they were using yet no department
or planning logistics ever took these factors into account before the invasion took place
Another significant factor outlined by Bethell and Wright was the fact the Russian troops
were well aware of the advantages they had in their climate and rugged terrain Bethell outlines
excellent examples of this in the dense Forests of Poland and the soggy lands of the Pripet
Marshes No German tanks could operate in these hazardous areas and there was ample cover
for small groups Russian infantry would superbly camouflage themselves and infiltrate the
German positions through the forests and they even displayed their resourcefulness by
communicating to each other by imitating animal cries (Bethell 72)
Combined with the willingness to fight at any odds and the intimate knowledge of their
own terrain it is plain to see that the Russian were definitely not going to fall as easily as Hitler
had first thought Besides the brutal tenacity of the resistance Germany had another problem the
climate In the summer of 1941 the Ukraine has suffered a scorching summer which saw a large
amount of rainfall In the intense heat the German tank tracks ground the baked earth to
powdery fme dust which clogged machinery eyes and mouths and made it hard for troops to
function When it rained it brought short relief to the heat but the roads turned into axle-deep
mud paths that halted all movement while horses got stuck in mud and troops had their boots
sucked right off them only to stay in the ground Thousands of vehicles had to be left as they
were because they ran out of fuel to get out of the mud and the supply paths were choked as well
5
These road conditions combined with partisan forces behind German lines stifled supply lines by
destroying railway tracks and making all kinds of re-armament and food delivery impossible
While the Germans were being delayed and they struggled to get a solid foothold
figuratively and literally in Russia the months passed by and eventually gave way to the harsh
general winter which froze everything to the core As Germany pressed on towards Moscow
the cold weather really took its toll All too often the Germans didnt have enough supplies to
survive let alone fight
During offensive operations physical and mental rigors are part of any campaign and
will have a significant impact on the amount of fatigue within soldiers The October rains
contributed as the fatigue multiplied significantly in the German soldiers By mid October the
combination of cold rain and snow flurries relentlessly continued for days causing the dirt roads
to become muddy After days of continuous rain the German soldiers found themselves
marching toward Moscow with land covered in mud These rainy conditions were a strain on the
soldiers Not only did they lose their equipment but they also lost their boots as they tread
through the thickness of the mud Living in these conditions also kept the soldiers wet muddy
and very exhausted Soldiers became sick with fatigue and extremely demoralized as these
conditions continued to deteriorate Field Marshal von Bock noted in his diary October 21
1941 The Russians are less of a hindrance than the mud and the wetness
In November the situation grew worse The wet rain turned into snow and the
temperatures started to decline significantly The soldiers no longer had to deal with marching
through the mud but they were faced with taking on the bitter cold temperature and hunger The
soldiers were able to fmd shelter in Russian huts along the way However they found themselves
infected with lice and disease The mud slowed down the supply trains that the soldiers
6
desperately depended on Because the supply trains were unable to get through most of the
soldiers did not have the clothing they needed to keep themselves warm or the food they needed
to fight the overwhelming fatigue and bitter cold
At first the soldiers hope for cold weather so that the roads would become frozen to allow
the supply trains to get through With only three major roads toward Moscow and only one
partially paved the terrain and weather conditions proved too much for the supply trains In
order to keep the German Army soldiers equipped and fed they required 25 to 30 supply trains
monthly Only eight to ten supply trains eventually made it to the front line in November The
leadership on the front lines pleaded with the High Command to send winter clothing and food
for the soldiers but only ammunition and fuel was sent to support the soldiers This decision
was made by Hitler which coupled by the cold weather resulted in more casualties from the
cold than from combat operations
As winter intensified the plight of the German soldier became increasingly worse
Because of the lack of supplies bread was practically non-existent and eating potatoes became
their main form of subsistence Commanders were advising their soldiers to fmd anything they
could to keep warm to include wrapping their bodies in newspaper Unfortunately newspaper
was as hard to fmd as everything else Most soldiers were huddled together in trenches covered
with straw Usually there were 10 to 15 soldiers in these make shift shelters keeping each other
warm through contact and stoves they created to burn diesel fuel for warmth During December
it became increasingly common to see soldiers standing next to burned-out fires frozen solid
while trying to keep warm
The Soviet soldier would eventually gain everything that the German Soldier lost
Initially the Soviet soldier was also under equipped and consistently beaten at every
7
engagement Their morale was low but they fought with a ferocity and determination that is
inherent in all that have fought on their own soil Soviet determination was enough to slow
down the German advance and with the help of the Soviet weather would eventually stop him
There was also a strong belief that the weather would destroy the German Soldier as it did the
French Soldier in 1812
The Soviets welcomed the wet weather and the cold Nevertheless not even the Soviet
soldier was immune to the cold and German soldiers often came across Soviet soldiers and
horses frozen solid in the snow Although the weather proved difficult for the Soviet soldier
they were familiar with the difficulties associated with such conditions Having trained and lived
with the difficulties of the wet and freezing conditions he was able to out maneuver and
eventually out fight the German army
The failure of the German army to surround Moscow allowed the Soviet soldier the
advantage of adequate supplies Familiarity with the terrain and the knowledge ofwhat was
required to survive the cold created a lop-sided advantage for the Soviet soldier The Soviet
soldier moved on the run and normally had enough food to sustain him Their primary means of
travel was on horseback with one or two soldiers to each horse They sustained their horses on
the straw off thatched roofs and they sustained themselves with raw vegetables and dried bread
In December a new soldier joined the Soviet front lines These soldiers arrived from
Siberia and were conditioned to extreme arctic conditions since their childhood These soldiers
proved very versatile much to the dismay of the German soldier Their clothing allowed them to
move swiftly and silently when required and could wait hours in the snow The arrival of
Siberian Troops and their ability to monopolize the environment inflicted huge casualties on the
8
Gennan army and proved extremely demoralizing for the Gennan soldier and as history has
proven demoralized soldiers do not win wars
The difficulty of the terrain for re-supply and the extreme cold proved too much for the
Gennan soldier With his comrades dying everyday and worsening environmental conditions
any hope of taking Moscow died along with his morale The Soviet winter was proving to be
more dangerous then the enemy With every passing day the incidence of extreme cases of
frostbite increased Chief of Staff Liebenstein summoned up the plight of the Gennan soldier
best when he wrote Despite all claims and reports it has not been understood by those above
that we are too weak to defend ourselves (Zhukov 179)
The Partisan movement was born and organized after the Gennan invasion on 3 July
1941 Twelve days after the Gennan attack Stalin called for the establishment of an underground
movement in the occupied territories to fight the enemy During the Battle for Moscow in 1941
the objectives ofthe Partisans were military political and economic in nature The military
mission was to harass Gennan occupation forces inflict maximum damage on military and
industrial installations and gather intelligence Stalins political aim was to hold the allegiance
of the Russian population in and around Gennan occupied areas of the USSR and the communist
regime Application took the aspect ofpersuasion by a variety of means Actions ranging from
propaganda and psychological warfare to intimidation and brute force were the order of the day
The economic objective was to prevent or substantially reduce Gennan exploitation of the
occupied areas The Partisans were an integral part ofthe Russian military strategy tactics and
military weapons used against the Gennans Partisans aided the Soviet war in many other
functions They collected taxes for the Soviet government recruited soldiers for the Red Anny
9
and transported food into all sectors where Soviet soldiers were located They performed as the
long arm of the Soviet government (Zhuvov 178)
Partisan units ascended by transport and in foot formed divisions and groups organized to
combat enemy troops The Partisans fomented warfare everywhere They destroyed bridges
railroads roadways telephone lines set fires to forests stores and transport In the occupied
region conditions were extremely unbearable for the Germans and all their accomplices They
were hounded and annihilated at every step and their efforts consistently frustrated Agencies
closely associated with the Partisan movement were the Communist Party the Peoples
Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the Red Army (Von Luttichau 1963) A vast amount of
Freedom Fighters were based behind the German lines to be employed as needed in the
scheme ofRussian counterattacks planned for the winter counteroffensive Additional tasks were
to strive and prevent by force ifnecessary the Ukrainian population from shifting their loyalty
from the Russians to the Germans The Red Army Partisans marched at night and applied
diversionary tactics to draw off German security forces from their main target Partisans often
lived off the land They took food and clothing as needed from the local population either by
requisitioning or simply looting Partisans found their weapons and ammunition in large
quantities in abandoned Soviet arms dumps and from battlefields ofearlier campaigns Small
amounts of materials were attained from collaborators The Partisans maintained a very low
standard of living as not to draw attention to their activities For instance simple staples such as
tobacco soap medical supplies and salt were hard to come by and often the civilian fighters did
without When the mission was complete or the training period was over the Partisans returned
to their homes and civilian pursuits and blended into the population They used the same
10
methods to vanish from the scene when the Germans searched the forests for evidence of
partisan efforts
The entire country of sons and daughters of all the Soviet Republics heeded the call of the
party and government for the defense of Moscow Everyone worked day and night people
literally collapsed from fatigue and lack of sleep Driven by a feeling ofpersonal responsibility
for the fate ofMoscow and the fate of the homeland the partisans diligently worked toward a
common goal Though the Germans pulverized the vast majority of the Soviet Anny the
Partisans refused to surrender The partisans sense ofloyalty and commitment for their country
motivated them to fight without any assurance of any success The bitter cold that year
transcended the worst ever winter in the regions history Despite the conditions the Partisans
kept their faith and though tested by blood and death their character remained in tact (Macksey
1975)
An ever-present threat lacking the strength to engage major units in battle the Partisans
proved to be a continuous threat to the Germans The Partisans felt an obligation to carry their
weapons always and everywhere The militias when properly formed were in fact the people
themselves and included all men and women capable of bearing arms To preserve their country
it was essential that the entire population possess arms and train their children at a young age on
weapons use The Russians felt that their country could be secured entirely by arming the people
The possession ofarms was the distinction between losing their country and submitting to a
bmtal Hitler regime A well-regulated militia composed of citizens and husbandmen took up
arms to preserve their property and individual rights The belief of the day was political power
and ownership grew from the barrel ofa weapon In April 11 1944 Hitler revealed his agenda of
gun control (Macksey 1975) He remarked The most foolish mistake we could possibly
11
make would be to pennit the conquered Eastern peoples to have anns History teaches us that
all conquerors that allowed their subject populations to carry anns prepared their own downfall
by doing so Hitler continually felt the defeat and the threat from the militia (Molt Partisans
1990)
The conclusion is thus inescapable that history indicates the protected individual right of
a private citizen to own and carry fireanns in a peaceful manner is paramount to protect their
country and whats theirs The public respect of the Partisan movement played an integral part of
Gennanys downfall
During the Battle for Moscow it was proven that the Russian soldiers were familiar with
their terrain swamplands forest and rivers This strength also would have a decisive effect at
Moscow (Curtis 12) Therefore the loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct result of
weather not a superior Russian military force
During the Battle for Moscow (October - December 1941) nearly 3000000 soldiers
fought for the capital (www wnecedu) The Gennans suffered their first defeat during the
Battle for Moscow This battle went down in history as a turning point for the Gennan Army
After several victories on the battlefield the Germans were certain that there was nothing to stop
them from taking over Moscow The Gennan Army was expected to attack and destroy the
Russian Army which was reported to be no less than four and half million men strong (Lucas
1992)
The Battle for Moscow was moved forward in three great sweeps the first beginning on
the opening day of war June 22 1941 the second beginning on 3 October and the last on 16
November when it threw in everything it had in a desperate attempt to reach the capital (Kerr
1944) On October 3 1941 Gennany launched their second drive towards Moscow During the
12
flrst two weeks of October the German attack progressed without any problems Not until mid
October did the Germans start showing signs of slowing down due to the weather The Germans
noticed that the Soviets had blown up strategic bridges and thus started to experience terrain
effects Von Bock stopped his forces to regroup study the situation and make his plans for the
[mal assault scheduled for November 16 (Kerr 43)
Terrain features played a vital role during the Battle for Moscow During every battle since
the civil war commanders have taken advantage of the terrain features that are available on the
battlefield Commanders also considered the influence of swamplands rivers forests and natural
obstacles on the battlefield Due to the Germans lack of experience on the Soviet terrain and
land they were defeated at the hands of the Soviet Army during the Battle for Moscow The
majority of the Russian forests are merged with swamplands and only one major river the
Pripyat that flows from west to east provides access to the interior (CMH 104-5)
The Germans were taken by surprise during the early rain in the late fall The lack of
knowledge of the terrain and muddy season halted their military operations The roads became
soft which resulted in a pile up of the German re-supply vehicles The Germans underestimated
the road conditions and failed to take into consideration the rainy season The Germans fighting
ill Russian soil wonltl have been in a beller position to withstand the physical and psychological
strain involved if they had been previously subjected to thorough training in Russian terrain
(CMH 104-2)
The Germans were moving quickly and smashing their way along Russian highways The
Germans kept extending their lines of communication by smashing their way north through the
Smolensk-Moscow highway Von Bock and Von Kluge split their forces and kept heading
slnlight lo Moscow Von Bock split his forces further and sent them northeast towards Kalinin
13
and the majority to Mozhaisk which was sixty-five miles from Moscow Von Kluge sent one of
his largest task forces towards Gzhatsk another one towards Malo-Yaroslavetz and his last task
force towards Tula which was south of Moscow By extending their lines of communication the
Germans experienced difficulty in re-supplying themselves with fuel and ammunition The
Germans were moving through the Smolensk-Moscow and Tula-Moscow highways quickly and
with confidence that they would reach their objective The lines of communications were hard
and long to protect from vicious assault by Russian partisans working in the German rear (Kerr
50)
On November 16 1941 the Germans launched their final assault towards Moscow By
this phase of winter it was cold and the terrain was solidly frozen Temperatures were below 20
degrees and casuaHies from cold weather injuries were rising The Soviets initiated a massive
counter-offensive against the German Army deployed on the Moscow axis on December 5
(Glantz 97) As the Germans got closer to Moscow the Soviet defensive lines stopped them On
December 5 194] the Whermacht Conunanders decided to stop their attacks The German
battle report testified The soldiers fighting capacity is on the verge of exhaustion and it is
impossible more to expect performance ofdifficult tasks (web serpukhovsu)
The Gtrman AlHIY begclll its inilial assault on Moscow 30 September 1941 On the 6th of
October snow began to fall followed by a rain pattern that would be repeated until carly
December The ever-deepening river of mud slowed the German advance By the 3rd of October
the Nuzi b1itzkricg vas almost at a stand stilL middot[his allowed the Russians to fight them on almost
even ground for the first time By the 7th ofNovember freezing cold had set in signaling the start
of the Russian winter The invasion plan did not include a winter plan an oversight that would
1Ol HH GtIII1WIS dtady in the Baille [Of Moscow On the night of 4 December the temperature
14
dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not
fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were
astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat
ineffective
Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the
first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out
as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of
cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and
motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero
(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On
December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal
under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow
and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies
could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold
It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect
After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and
equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian
counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by
the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~
from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and
could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly
designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions
15
Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements
hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of
locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few
available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians
must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled
units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give
them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to
exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)
Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized
and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their
useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet
winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began
they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and
h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning
of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer
Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million
ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth
of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and
7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-
German surrender in April of 1945
16
The Opposing View
The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December
1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my
opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy
the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than
those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the
ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat
The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with
all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to
he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision
of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand
years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his
inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to
impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed
opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys
nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse
The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final
Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews
bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during
WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven
17
many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass
uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies
Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and
it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the
sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over
such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy
supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff
asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once
the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the
Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High
immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by
Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in
The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t
(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)
discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved
invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall
fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl
Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war
with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of
Victory signifying the political feelings of the day
18
A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding
offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks
regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The
Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the
Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons
learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so
overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an
txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter
months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely
separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not
1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned
Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers
were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the
Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had
reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man
Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history
would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the
knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury
In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army
19
that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly
indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth
Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case
the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred
While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a
they suffered in The Battle for Moscow
20
WORKS CITED
New York St Martin s Press 1986
===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s
Washington DC 1986
Washington DC 1986
Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military
Reviev 97 D ecember 1991
Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944
Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk
Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and
Day 1975
Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969
History 1987
4
resistance Hilters changes in priorities and the devestating effects that the weather conditions
had on the terrain and communications These delays would eventually prove costly as the
unprepared and poorly supplied German troops marched on towards Moscow
The Germans also knew that the Russian roads were inferior for their vehicles and that
the Russian railway tracks were of a different size than what they were using yet no department
or planning logistics ever took these factors into account before the invasion took place
Another significant factor outlined by Bethell and Wright was the fact the Russian troops
were well aware of the advantages they had in their climate and rugged terrain Bethell outlines
excellent examples of this in the dense Forests of Poland and the soggy lands of the Pripet
Marshes No German tanks could operate in these hazardous areas and there was ample cover
for small groups Russian infantry would superbly camouflage themselves and infiltrate the
German positions through the forests and they even displayed their resourcefulness by
communicating to each other by imitating animal cries (Bethell 72)
Combined with the willingness to fight at any odds and the intimate knowledge of their
own terrain it is plain to see that the Russian were definitely not going to fall as easily as Hitler
had first thought Besides the brutal tenacity of the resistance Germany had another problem the
climate In the summer of 1941 the Ukraine has suffered a scorching summer which saw a large
amount of rainfall In the intense heat the German tank tracks ground the baked earth to
powdery fme dust which clogged machinery eyes and mouths and made it hard for troops to
function When it rained it brought short relief to the heat but the roads turned into axle-deep
mud paths that halted all movement while horses got stuck in mud and troops had their boots
sucked right off them only to stay in the ground Thousands of vehicles had to be left as they
were because they ran out of fuel to get out of the mud and the supply paths were choked as well
5
These road conditions combined with partisan forces behind German lines stifled supply lines by
destroying railway tracks and making all kinds of re-armament and food delivery impossible
While the Germans were being delayed and they struggled to get a solid foothold
figuratively and literally in Russia the months passed by and eventually gave way to the harsh
general winter which froze everything to the core As Germany pressed on towards Moscow
the cold weather really took its toll All too often the Germans didnt have enough supplies to
survive let alone fight
During offensive operations physical and mental rigors are part of any campaign and
will have a significant impact on the amount of fatigue within soldiers The October rains
contributed as the fatigue multiplied significantly in the German soldiers By mid October the
combination of cold rain and snow flurries relentlessly continued for days causing the dirt roads
to become muddy After days of continuous rain the German soldiers found themselves
marching toward Moscow with land covered in mud These rainy conditions were a strain on the
soldiers Not only did they lose their equipment but they also lost their boots as they tread
through the thickness of the mud Living in these conditions also kept the soldiers wet muddy
and very exhausted Soldiers became sick with fatigue and extremely demoralized as these
conditions continued to deteriorate Field Marshal von Bock noted in his diary October 21
1941 The Russians are less of a hindrance than the mud and the wetness
In November the situation grew worse The wet rain turned into snow and the
temperatures started to decline significantly The soldiers no longer had to deal with marching
through the mud but they were faced with taking on the bitter cold temperature and hunger The
soldiers were able to fmd shelter in Russian huts along the way However they found themselves
infected with lice and disease The mud slowed down the supply trains that the soldiers
6
desperately depended on Because the supply trains were unable to get through most of the
soldiers did not have the clothing they needed to keep themselves warm or the food they needed
to fight the overwhelming fatigue and bitter cold
At first the soldiers hope for cold weather so that the roads would become frozen to allow
the supply trains to get through With only three major roads toward Moscow and only one
partially paved the terrain and weather conditions proved too much for the supply trains In
order to keep the German Army soldiers equipped and fed they required 25 to 30 supply trains
monthly Only eight to ten supply trains eventually made it to the front line in November The
leadership on the front lines pleaded with the High Command to send winter clothing and food
for the soldiers but only ammunition and fuel was sent to support the soldiers This decision
was made by Hitler which coupled by the cold weather resulted in more casualties from the
cold than from combat operations
As winter intensified the plight of the German soldier became increasingly worse
Because of the lack of supplies bread was practically non-existent and eating potatoes became
their main form of subsistence Commanders were advising their soldiers to fmd anything they
could to keep warm to include wrapping their bodies in newspaper Unfortunately newspaper
was as hard to fmd as everything else Most soldiers were huddled together in trenches covered
with straw Usually there were 10 to 15 soldiers in these make shift shelters keeping each other
warm through contact and stoves they created to burn diesel fuel for warmth During December
it became increasingly common to see soldiers standing next to burned-out fires frozen solid
while trying to keep warm
The Soviet soldier would eventually gain everything that the German Soldier lost
Initially the Soviet soldier was also under equipped and consistently beaten at every
7
engagement Their morale was low but they fought with a ferocity and determination that is
inherent in all that have fought on their own soil Soviet determination was enough to slow
down the German advance and with the help of the Soviet weather would eventually stop him
There was also a strong belief that the weather would destroy the German Soldier as it did the
French Soldier in 1812
The Soviets welcomed the wet weather and the cold Nevertheless not even the Soviet
soldier was immune to the cold and German soldiers often came across Soviet soldiers and
horses frozen solid in the snow Although the weather proved difficult for the Soviet soldier
they were familiar with the difficulties associated with such conditions Having trained and lived
with the difficulties of the wet and freezing conditions he was able to out maneuver and
eventually out fight the German army
The failure of the German army to surround Moscow allowed the Soviet soldier the
advantage of adequate supplies Familiarity with the terrain and the knowledge ofwhat was
required to survive the cold created a lop-sided advantage for the Soviet soldier The Soviet
soldier moved on the run and normally had enough food to sustain him Their primary means of
travel was on horseback with one or two soldiers to each horse They sustained their horses on
the straw off thatched roofs and they sustained themselves with raw vegetables and dried bread
In December a new soldier joined the Soviet front lines These soldiers arrived from
Siberia and were conditioned to extreme arctic conditions since their childhood These soldiers
proved very versatile much to the dismay of the German soldier Their clothing allowed them to
move swiftly and silently when required and could wait hours in the snow The arrival of
Siberian Troops and their ability to monopolize the environment inflicted huge casualties on the
8
Gennan army and proved extremely demoralizing for the Gennan soldier and as history has
proven demoralized soldiers do not win wars
The difficulty of the terrain for re-supply and the extreme cold proved too much for the
Gennan soldier With his comrades dying everyday and worsening environmental conditions
any hope of taking Moscow died along with his morale The Soviet winter was proving to be
more dangerous then the enemy With every passing day the incidence of extreme cases of
frostbite increased Chief of Staff Liebenstein summoned up the plight of the Gennan soldier
best when he wrote Despite all claims and reports it has not been understood by those above
that we are too weak to defend ourselves (Zhukov 179)
The Partisan movement was born and organized after the Gennan invasion on 3 July
1941 Twelve days after the Gennan attack Stalin called for the establishment of an underground
movement in the occupied territories to fight the enemy During the Battle for Moscow in 1941
the objectives ofthe Partisans were military political and economic in nature The military
mission was to harass Gennan occupation forces inflict maximum damage on military and
industrial installations and gather intelligence Stalins political aim was to hold the allegiance
of the Russian population in and around Gennan occupied areas of the USSR and the communist
regime Application took the aspect ofpersuasion by a variety of means Actions ranging from
propaganda and psychological warfare to intimidation and brute force were the order of the day
The economic objective was to prevent or substantially reduce Gennan exploitation of the
occupied areas The Partisans were an integral part ofthe Russian military strategy tactics and
military weapons used against the Gennans Partisans aided the Soviet war in many other
functions They collected taxes for the Soviet government recruited soldiers for the Red Anny
9
and transported food into all sectors where Soviet soldiers were located They performed as the
long arm of the Soviet government (Zhuvov 178)
Partisan units ascended by transport and in foot formed divisions and groups organized to
combat enemy troops The Partisans fomented warfare everywhere They destroyed bridges
railroads roadways telephone lines set fires to forests stores and transport In the occupied
region conditions were extremely unbearable for the Germans and all their accomplices They
were hounded and annihilated at every step and their efforts consistently frustrated Agencies
closely associated with the Partisan movement were the Communist Party the Peoples
Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the Red Army (Von Luttichau 1963) A vast amount of
Freedom Fighters were based behind the German lines to be employed as needed in the
scheme ofRussian counterattacks planned for the winter counteroffensive Additional tasks were
to strive and prevent by force ifnecessary the Ukrainian population from shifting their loyalty
from the Russians to the Germans The Red Army Partisans marched at night and applied
diversionary tactics to draw off German security forces from their main target Partisans often
lived off the land They took food and clothing as needed from the local population either by
requisitioning or simply looting Partisans found their weapons and ammunition in large
quantities in abandoned Soviet arms dumps and from battlefields ofearlier campaigns Small
amounts of materials were attained from collaborators The Partisans maintained a very low
standard of living as not to draw attention to their activities For instance simple staples such as
tobacco soap medical supplies and salt were hard to come by and often the civilian fighters did
without When the mission was complete or the training period was over the Partisans returned
to their homes and civilian pursuits and blended into the population They used the same
10
methods to vanish from the scene when the Germans searched the forests for evidence of
partisan efforts
The entire country of sons and daughters of all the Soviet Republics heeded the call of the
party and government for the defense of Moscow Everyone worked day and night people
literally collapsed from fatigue and lack of sleep Driven by a feeling ofpersonal responsibility
for the fate ofMoscow and the fate of the homeland the partisans diligently worked toward a
common goal Though the Germans pulverized the vast majority of the Soviet Anny the
Partisans refused to surrender The partisans sense ofloyalty and commitment for their country
motivated them to fight without any assurance of any success The bitter cold that year
transcended the worst ever winter in the regions history Despite the conditions the Partisans
kept their faith and though tested by blood and death their character remained in tact (Macksey
1975)
An ever-present threat lacking the strength to engage major units in battle the Partisans
proved to be a continuous threat to the Germans The Partisans felt an obligation to carry their
weapons always and everywhere The militias when properly formed were in fact the people
themselves and included all men and women capable of bearing arms To preserve their country
it was essential that the entire population possess arms and train their children at a young age on
weapons use The Russians felt that their country could be secured entirely by arming the people
The possession ofarms was the distinction between losing their country and submitting to a
bmtal Hitler regime A well-regulated militia composed of citizens and husbandmen took up
arms to preserve their property and individual rights The belief of the day was political power
and ownership grew from the barrel ofa weapon In April 11 1944 Hitler revealed his agenda of
gun control (Macksey 1975) He remarked The most foolish mistake we could possibly
11
make would be to pennit the conquered Eastern peoples to have anns History teaches us that
all conquerors that allowed their subject populations to carry anns prepared their own downfall
by doing so Hitler continually felt the defeat and the threat from the militia (Molt Partisans
1990)
The conclusion is thus inescapable that history indicates the protected individual right of
a private citizen to own and carry fireanns in a peaceful manner is paramount to protect their
country and whats theirs The public respect of the Partisan movement played an integral part of
Gennanys downfall
During the Battle for Moscow it was proven that the Russian soldiers were familiar with
their terrain swamplands forest and rivers This strength also would have a decisive effect at
Moscow (Curtis 12) Therefore the loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct result of
weather not a superior Russian military force
During the Battle for Moscow (October - December 1941) nearly 3000000 soldiers
fought for the capital (www wnecedu) The Gennans suffered their first defeat during the
Battle for Moscow This battle went down in history as a turning point for the Gennan Army
After several victories on the battlefield the Germans were certain that there was nothing to stop
them from taking over Moscow The Gennan Army was expected to attack and destroy the
Russian Army which was reported to be no less than four and half million men strong (Lucas
1992)
The Battle for Moscow was moved forward in three great sweeps the first beginning on
the opening day of war June 22 1941 the second beginning on 3 October and the last on 16
November when it threw in everything it had in a desperate attempt to reach the capital (Kerr
1944) On October 3 1941 Gennany launched their second drive towards Moscow During the
12
flrst two weeks of October the German attack progressed without any problems Not until mid
October did the Germans start showing signs of slowing down due to the weather The Germans
noticed that the Soviets had blown up strategic bridges and thus started to experience terrain
effects Von Bock stopped his forces to regroup study the situation and make his plans for the
[mal assault scheduled for November 16 (Kerr 43)
Terrain features played a vital role during the Battle for Moscow During every battle since
the civil war commanders have taken advantage of the terrain features that are available on the
battlefield Commanders also considered the influence of swamplands rivers forests and natural
obstacles on the battlefield Due to the Germans lack of experience on the Soviet terrain and
land they were defeated at the hands of the Soviet Army during the Battle for Moscow The
majority of the Russian forests are merged with swamplands and only one major river the
Pripyat that flows from west to east provides access to the interior (CMH 104-5)
The Germans were taken by surprise during the early rain in the late fall The lack of
knowledge of the terrain and muddy season halted their military operations The roads became
soft which resulted in a pile up of the German re-supply vehicles The Germans underestimated
the road conditions and failed to take into consideration the rainy season The Germans fighting
ill Russian soil wonltl have been in a beller position to withstand the physical and psychological
strain involved if they had been previously subjected to thorough training in Russian terrain
(CMH 104-2)
The Germans were moving quickly and smashing their way along Russian highways The
Germans kept extending their lines of communication by smashing their way north through the
Smolensk-Moscow highway Von Bock and Von Kluge split their forces and kept heading
slnlight lo Moscow Von Bock split his forces further and sent them northeast towards Kalinin
13
and the majority to Mozhaisk which was sixty-five miles from Moscow Von Kluge sent one of
his largest task forces towards Gzhatsk another one towards Malo-Yaroslavetz and his last task
force towards Tula which was south of Moscow By extending their lines of communication the
Germans experienced difficulty in re-supplying themselves with fuel and ammunition The
Germans were moving through the Smolensk-Moscow and Tula-Moscow highways quickly and
with confidence that they would reach their objective The lines of communications were hard
and long to protect from vicious assault by Russian partisans working in the German rear (Kerr
50)
On November 16 1941 the Germans launched their final assault towards Moscow By
this phase of winter it was cold and the terrain was solidly frozen Temperatures were below 20
degrees and casuaHies from cold weather injuries were rising The Soviets initiated a massive
counter-offensive against the German Army deployed on the Moscow axis on December 5
(Glantz 97) As the Germans got closer to Moscow the Soviet defensive lines stopped them On
December 5 194] the Whermacht Conunanders decided to stop their attacks The German
battle report testified The soldiers fighting capacity is on the verge of exhaustion and it is
impossible more to expect performance ofdifficult tasks (web serpukhovsu)
The Gtrman AlHIY begclll its inilial assault on Moscow 30 September 1941 On the 6th of
October snow began to fall followed by a rain pattern that would be repeated until carly
December The ever-deepening river of mud slowed the German advance By the 3rd of October
the Nuzi b1itzkricg vas almost at a stand stilL middot[his allowed the Russians to fight them on almost
even ground for the first time By the 7th ofNovember freezing cold had set in signaling the start
of the Russian winter The invasion plan did not include a winter plan an oversight that would
1Ol HH GtIII1WIS dtady in the Baille [Of Moscow On the night of 4 December the temperature
14
dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not
fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were
astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat
ineffective
Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the
first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out
as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of
cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and
motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero
(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On
December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal
under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow
and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies
could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold
It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect
After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and
equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian
counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by
the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~
from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and
could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly
designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions
15
Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements
hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of
locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few
available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians
must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled
units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give
them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to
exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)
Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized
and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their
useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet
winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began
they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and
h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning
of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer
Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million
ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth
of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and
7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-
German surrender in April of 1945
16
The Opposing View
The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December
1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my
opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy
the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than
those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the
ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat
The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with
all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to
he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision
of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand
years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his
inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to
impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed
opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys
nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse
The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final
Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews
bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during
WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven
17
many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass
uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies
Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and
it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the
sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over
such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy
supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff
asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once
the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the
Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High
immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by
Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in
The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t
(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)
discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved
invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall
fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl
Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war
with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of
Victory signifying the political feelings of the day
18
A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding
offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks
regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The
Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the
Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons
learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so
overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an
txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter
months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely
separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not
1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned
Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers
were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the
Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had
reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man
Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history
would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the
knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury
In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army
19
that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly
indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth
Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case
the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred
While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a
they suffered in The Battle for Moscow
20
WORKS CITED
New York St Martin s Press 1986
===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s
Washington DC 1986
Washington DC 1986
Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military
Reviev 97 D ecember 1991
Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944
Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk
Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and
Day 1975
Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969
History 1987
5
These road conditions combined with partisan forces behind German lines stifled supply lines by
destroying railway tracks and making all kinds of re-armament and food delivery impossible
While the Germans were being delayed and they struggled to get a solid foothold
figuratively and literally in Russia the months passed by and eventually gave way to the harsh
general winter which froze everything to the core As Germany pressed on towards Moscow
the cold weather really took its toll All too often the Germans didnt have enough supplies to
survive let alone fight
During offensive operations physical and mental rigors are part of any campaign and
will have a significant impact on the amount of fatigue within soldiers The October rains
contributed as the fatigue multiplied significantly in the German soldiers By mid October the
combination of cold rain and snow flurries relentlessly continued for days causing the dirt roads
to become muddy After days of continuous rain the German soldiers found themselves
marching toward Moscow with land covered in mud These rainy conditions were a strain on the
soldiers Not only did they lose their equipment but they also lost their boots as they tread
through the thickness of the mud Living in these conditions also kept the soldiers wet muddy
and very exhausted Soldiers became sick with fatigue and extremely demoralized as these
conditions continued to deteriorate Field Marshal von Bock noted in his diary October 21
1941 The Russians are less of a hindrance than the mud and the wetness
In November the situation grew worse The wet rain turned into snow and the
temperatures started to decline significantly The soldiers no longer had to deal with marching
through the mud but they were faced with taking on the bitter cold temperature and hunger The
soldiers were able to fmd shelter in Russian huts along the way However they found themselves
infected with lice and disease The mud slowed down the supply trains that the soldiers
6
desperately depended on Because the supply trains were unable to get through most of the
soldiers did not have the clothing they needed to keep themselves warm or the food they needed
to fight the overwhelming fatigue and bitter cold
At first the soldiers hope for cold weather so that the roads would become frozen to allow
the supply trains to get through With only three major roads toward Moscow and only one
partially paved the terrain and weather conditions proved too much for the supply trains In
order to keep the German Army soldiers equipped and fed they required 25 to 30 supply trains
monthly Only eight to ten supply trains eventually made it to the front line in November The
leadership on the front lines pleaded with the High Command to send winter clothing and food
for the soldiers but only ammunition and fuel was sent to support the soldiers This decision
was made by Hitler which coupled by the cold weather resulted in more casualties from the
cold than from combat operations
As winter intensified the plight of the German soldier became increasingly worse
Because of the lack of supplies bread was practically non-existent and eating potatoes became
their main form of subsistence Commanders were advising their soldiers to fmd anything they
could to keep warm to include wrapping their bodies in newspaper Unfortunately newspaper
was as hard to fmd as everything else Most soldiers were huddled together in trenches covered
with straw Usually there were 10 to 15 soldiers in these make shift shelters keeping each other
warm through contact and stoves they created to burn diesel fuel for warmth During December
it became increasingly common to see soldiers standing next to burned-out fires frozen solid
while trying to keep warm
The Soviet soldier would eventually gain everything that the German Soldier lost
Initially the Soviet soldier was also under equipped and consistently beaten at every
7
engagement Their morale was low but they fought with a ferocity and determination that is
inherent in all that have fought on their own soil Soviet determination was enough to slow
down the German advance and with the help of the Soviet weather would eventually stop him
There was also a strong belief that the weather would destroy the German Soldier as it did the
French Soldier in 1812
The Soviets welcomed the wet weather and the cold Nevertheless not even the Soviet
soldier was immune to the cold and German soldiers often came across Soviet soldiers and
horses frozen solid in the snow Although the weather proved difficult for the Soviet soldier
they were familiar with the difficulties associated with such conditions Having trained and lived
with the difficulties of the wet and freezing conditions he was able to out maneuver and
eventually out fight the German army
The failure of the German army to surround Moscow allowed the Soviet soldier the
advantage of adequate supplies Familiarity with the terrain and the knowledge ofwhat was
required to survive the cold created a lop-sided advantage for the Soviet soldier The Soviet
soldier moved on the run and normally had enough food to sustain him Their primary means of
travel was on horseback with one or two soldiers to each horse They sustained their horses on
the straw off thatched roofs and they sustained themselves with raw vegetables and dried bread
In December a new soldier joined the Soviet front lines These soldiers arrived from
Siberia and were conditioned to extreme arctic conditions since their childhood These soldiers
proved very versatile much to the dismay of the German soldier Their clothing allowed them to
move swiftly and silently when required and could wait hours in the snow The arrival of
Siberian Troops and their ability to monopolize the environment inflicted huge casualties on the
8
Gennan army and proved extremely demoralizing for the Gennan soldier and as history has
proven demoralized soldiers do not win wars
The difficulty of the terrain for re-supply and the extreme cold proved too much for the
Gennan soldier With his comrades dying everyday and worsening environmental conditions
any hope of taking Moscow died along with his morale The Soviet winter was proving to be
more dangerous then the enemy With every passing day the incidence of extreme cases of
frostbite increased Chief of Staff Liebenstein summoned up the plight of the Gennan soldier
best when he wrote Despite all claims and reports it has not been understood by those above
that we are too weak to defend ourselves (Zhukov 179)
The Partisan movement was born and organized after the Gennan invasion on 3 July
1941 Twelve days after the Gennan attack Stalin called for the establishment of an underground
movement in the occupied territories to fight the enemy During the Battle for Moscow in 1941
the objectives ofthe Partisans were military political and economic in nature The military
mission was to harass Gennan occupation forces inflict maximum damage on military and
industrial installations and gather intelligence Stalins political aim was to hold the allegiance
of the Russian population in and around Gennan occupied areas of the USSR and the communist
regime Application took the aspect ofpersuasion by a variety of means Actions ranging from
propaganda and psychological warfare to intimidation and brute force were the order of the day
The economic objective was to prevent or substantially reduce Gennan exploitation of the
occupied areas The Partisans were an integral part ofthe Russian military strategy tactics and
military weapons used against the Gennans Partisans aided the Soviet war in many other
functions They collected taxes for the Soviet government recruited soldiers for the Red Anny
9
and transported food into all sectors where Soviet soldiers were located They performed as the
long arm of the Soviet government (Zhuvov 178)
Partisan units ascended by transport and in foot formed divisions and groups organized to
combat enemy troops The Partisans fomented warfare everywhere They destroyed bridges
railroads roadways telephone lines set fires to forests stores and transport In the occupied
region conditions were extremely unbearable for the Germans and all their accomplices They
were hounded and annihilated at every step and their efforts consistently frustrated Agencies
closely associated with the Partisan movement were the Communist Party the Peoples
Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the Red Army (Von Luttichau 1963) A vast amount of
Freedom Fighters were based behind the German lines to be employed as needed in the
scheme ofRussian counterattacks planned for the winter counteroffensive Additional tasks were
to strive and prevent by force ifnecessary the Ukrainian population from shifting their loyalty
from the Russians to the Germans The Red Army Partisans marched at night and applied
diversionary tactics to draw off German security forces from their main target Partisans often
lived off the land They took food and clothing as needed from the local population either by
requisitioning or simply looting Partisans found their weapons and ammunition in large
quantities in abandoned Soviet arms dumps and from battlefields ofearlier campaigns Small
amounts of materials were attained from collaborators The Partisans maintained a very low
standard of living as not to draw attention to their activities For instance simple staples such as
tobacco soap medical supplies and salt were hard to come by and often the civilian fighters did
without When the mission was complete or the training period was over the Partisans returned
to their homes and civilian pursuits and blended into the population They used the same
10
methods to vanish from the scene when the Germans searched the forests for evidence of
partisan efforts
The entire country of sons and daughters of all the Soviet Republics heeded the call of the
party and government for the defense of Moscow Everyone worked day and night people
literally collapsed from fatigue and lack of sleep Driven by a feeling ofpersonal responsibility
for the fate ofMoscow and the fate of the homeland the partisans diligently worked toward a
common goal Though the Germans pulverized the vast majority of the Soviet Anny the
Partisans refused to surrender The partisans sense ofloyalty and commitment for their country
motivated them to fight without any assurance of any success The bitter cold that year
transcended the worst ever winter in the regions history Despite the conditions the Partisans
kept their faith and though tested by blood and death their character remained in tact (Macksey
1975)
An ever-present threat lacking the strength to engage major units in battle the Partisans
proved to be a continuous threat to the Germans The Partisans felt an obligation to carry their
weapons always and everywhere The militias when properly formed were in fact the people
themselves and included all men and women capable of bearing arms To preserve their country
it was essential that the entire population possess arms and train their children at a young age on
weapons use The Russians felt that their country could be secured entirely by arming the people
The possession ofarms was the distinction between losing their country and submitting to a
bmtal Hitler regime A well-regulated militia composed of citizens and husbandmen took up
arms to preserve their property and individual rights The belief of the day was political power
and ownership grew from the barrel ofa weapon In April 11 1944 Hitler revealed his agenda of
gun control (Macksey 1975) He remarked The most foolish mistake we could possibly
11
make would be to pennit the conquered Eastern peoples to have anns History teaches us that
all conquerors that allowed their subject populations to carry anns prepared their own downfall
by doing so Hitler continually felt the defeat and the threat from the militia (Molt Partisans
1990)
The conclusion is thus inescapable that history indicates the protected individual right of
a private citizen to own and carry fireanns in a peaceful manner is paramount to protect their
country and whats theirs The public respect of the Partisan movement played an integral part of
Gennanys downfall
During the Battle for Moscow it was proven that the Russian soldiers were familiar with
their terrain swamplands forest and rivers This strength also would have a decisive effect at
Moscow (Curtis 12) Therefore the loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct result of
weather not a superior Russian military force
During the Battle for Moscow (October - December 1941) nearly 3000000 soldiers
fought for the capital (www wnecedu) The Gennans suffered their first defeat during the
Battle for Moscow This battle went down in history as a turning point for the Gennan Army
After several victories on the battlefield the Germans were certain that there was nothing to stop
them from taking over Moscow The Gennan Army was expected to attack and destroy the
Russian Army which was reported to be no less than four and half million men strong (Lucas
1992)
The Battle for Moscow was moved forward in three great sweeps the first beginning on
the opening day of war June 22 1941 the second beginning on 3 October and the last on 16
November when it threw in everything it had in a desperate attempt to reach the capital (Kerr
1944) On October 3 1941 Gennany launched their second drive towards Moscow During the
12
flrst two weeks of October the German attack progressed without any problems Not until mid
October did the Germans start showing signs of slowing down due to the weather The Germans
noticed that the Soviets had blown up strategic bridges and thus started to experience terrain
effects Von Bock stopped his forces to regroup study the situation and make his plans for the
[mal assault scheduled for November 16 (Kerr 43)
Terrain features played a vital role during the Battle for Moscow During every battle since
the civil war commanders have taken advantage of the terrain features that are available on the
battlefield Commanders also considered the influence of swamplands rivers forests and natural
obstacles on the battlefield Due to the Germans lack of experience on the Soviet terrain and
land they were defeated at the hands of the Soviet Army during the Battle for Moscow The
majority of the Russian forests are merged with swamplands and only one major river the
Pripyat that flows from west to east provides access to the interior (CMH 104-5)
The Germans were taken by surprise during the early rain in the late fall The lack of
knowledge of the terrain and muddy season halted their military operations The roads became
soft which resulted in a pile up of the German re-supply vehicles The Germans underestimated
the road conditions and failed to take into consideration the rainy season The Germans fighting
ill Russian soil wonltl have been in a beller position to withstand the physical and psychological
strain involved if they had been previously subjected to thorough training in Russian terrain
(CMH 104-2)
The Germans were moving quickly and smashing their way along Russian highways The
Germans kept extending their lines of communication by smashing their way north through the
Smolensk-Moscow highway Von Bock and Von Kluge split their forces and kept heading
slnlight lo Moscow Von Bock split his forces further and sent them northeast towards Kalinin
13
and the majority to Mozhaisk which was sixty-five miles from Moscow Von Kluge sent one of
his largest task forces towards Gzhatsk another one towards Malo-Yaroslavetz and his last task
force towards Tula which was south of Moscow By extending their lines of communication the
Germans experienced difficulty in re-supplying themselves with fuel and ammunition The
Germans were moving through the Smolensk-Moscow and Tula-Moscow highways quickly and
with confidence that they would reach their objective The lines of communications were hard
and long to protect from vicious assault by Russian partisans working in the German rear (Kerr
50)
On November 16 1941 the Germans launched their final assault towards Moscow By
this phase of winter it was cold and the terrain was solidly frozen Temperatures were below 20
degrees and casuaHies from cold weather injuries were rising The Soviets initiated a massive
counter-offensive against the German Army deployed on the Moscow axis on December 5
(Glantz 97) As the Germans got closer to Moscow the Soviet defensive lines stopped them On
December 5 194] the Whermacht Conunanders decided to stop their attacks The German
battle report testified The soldiers fighting capacity is on the verge of exhaustion and it is
impossible more to expect performance ofdifficult tasks (web serpukhovsu)
The Gtrman AlHIY begclll its inilial assault on Moscow 30 September 1941 On the 6th of
October snow began to fall followed by a rain pattern that would be repeated until carly
December The ever-deepening river of mud slowed the German advance By the 3rd of October
the Nuzi b1itzkricg vas almost at a stand stilL middot[his allowed the Russians to fight them on almost
even ground for the first time By the 7th ofNovember freezing cold had set in signaling the start
of the Russian winter The invasion plan did not include a winter plan an oversight that would
1Ol HH GtIII1WIS dtady in the Baille [Of Moscow On the night of 4 December the temperature
14
dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not
fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were
astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat
ineffective
Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the
first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out
as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of
cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and
motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero
(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On
December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal
under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow
and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies
could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold
It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect
After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and
equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian
counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by
the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~
from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and
could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly
designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions
15
Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements
hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of
locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few
available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians
must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled
units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give
them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to
exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)
Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized
and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their
useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet
winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began
they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and
h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning
of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer
Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million
ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth
of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and
7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-
German surrender in April of 1945
16
The Opposing View
The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December
1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my
opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy
the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than
those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the
ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat
The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with
all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to
he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision
of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand
years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his
inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to
impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed
opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys
nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse
The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final
Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews
bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during
WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven
17
many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass
uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies
Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and
it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the
sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over
such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy
supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff
asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once
the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the
Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High
immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by
Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in
The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t
(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)
discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved
invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall
fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl
Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war
with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of
Victory signifying the political feelings of the day
18
A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding
offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks
regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The
Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the
Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons
learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so
overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an
txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter
months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely
separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not
1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned
Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers
were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the
Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had
reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man
Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history
would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the
knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury
In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army
19
that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly
indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth
Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case
the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred
While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a
they suffered in The Battle for Moscow
20
WORKS CITED
New York St Martin s Press 1986
===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s
Washington DC 1986
Washington DC 1986
Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military
Reviev 97 D ecember 1991
Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944
Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk
Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and
Day 1975
Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969
History 1987
6
desperately depended on Because the supply trains were unable to get through most of the
soldiers did not have the clothing they needed to keep themselves warm or the food they needed
to fight the overwhelming fatigue and bitter cold
At first the soldiers hope for cold weather so that the roads would become frozen to allow
the supply trains to get through With only three major roads toward Moscow and only one
partially paved the terrain and weather conditions proved too much for the supply trains In
order to keep the German Army soldiers equipped and fed they required 25 to 30 supply trains
monthly Only eight to ten supply trains eventually made it to the front line in November The
leadership on the front lines pleaded with the High Command to send winter clothing and food
for the soldiers but only ammunition and fuel was sent to support the soldiers This decision
was made by Hitler which coupled by the cold weather resulted in more casualties from the
cold than from combat operations
As winter intensified the plight of the German soldier became increasingly worse
Because of the lack of supplies bread was practically non-existent and eating potatoes became
their main form of subsistence Commanders were advising their soldiers to fmd anything they
could to keep warm to include wrapping their bodies in newspaper Unfortunately newspaper
was as hard to fmd as everything else Most soldiers were huddled together in trenches covered
with straw Usually there were 10 to 15 soldiers in these make shift shelters keeping each other
warm through contact and stoves they created to burn diesel fuel for warmth During December
it became increasingly common to see soldiers standing next to burned-out fires frozen solid
while trying to keep warm
The Soviet soldier would eventually gain everything that the German Soldier lost
Initially the Soviet soldier was also under equipped and consistently beaten at every
7
engagement Their morale was low but they fought with a ferocity and determination that is
inherent in all that have fought on their own soil Soviet determination was enough to slow
down the German advance and with the help of the Soviet weather would eventually stop him
There was also a strong belief that the weather would destroy the German Soldier as it did the
French Soldier in 1812
The Soviets welcomed the wet weather and the cold Nevertheless not even the Soviet
soldier was immune to the cold and German soldiers often came across Soviet soldiers and
horses frozen solid in the snow Although the weather proved difficult for the Soviet soldier
they were familiar with the difficulties associated with such conditions Having trained and lived
with the difficulties of the wet and freezing conditions he was able to out maneuver and
eventually out fight the German army
The failure of the German army to surround Moscow allowed the Soviet soldier the
advantage of adequate supplies Familiarity with the terrain and the knowledge ofwhat was
required to survive the cold created a lop-sided advantage for the Soviet soldier The Soviet
soldier moved on the run and normally had enough food to sustain him Their primary means of
travel was on horseback with one or two soldiers to each horse They sustained their horses on
the straw off thatched roofs and they sustained themselves with raw vegetables and dried bread
In December a new soldier joined the Soviet front lines These soldiers arrived from
Siberia and were conditioned to extreme arctic conditions since their childhood These soldiers
proved very versatile much to the dismay of the German soldier Their clothing allowed them to
move swiftly and silently when required and could wait hours in the snow The arrival of
Siberian Troops and their ability to monopolize the environment inflicted huge casualties on the
8
Gennan army and proved extremely demoralizing for the Gennan soldier and as history has
proven demoralized soldiers do not win wars
The difficulty of the terrain for re-supply and the extreme cold proved too much for the
Gennan soldier With his comrades dying everyday and worsening environmental conditions
any hope of taking Moscow died along with his morale The Soviet winter was proving to be
more dangerous then the enemy With every passing day the incidence of extreme cases of
frostbite increased Chief of Staff Liebenstein summoned up the plight of the Gennan soldier
best when he wrote Despite all claims and reports it has not been understood by those above
that we are too weak to defend ourselves (Zhukov 179)
The Partisan movement was born and organized after the Gennan invasion on 3 July
1941 Twelve days after the Gennan attack Stalin called for the establishment of an underground
movement in the occupied territories to fight the enemy During the Battle for Moscow in 1941
the objectives ofthe Partisans were military political and economic in nature The military
mission was to harass Gennan occupation forces inflict maximum damage on military and
industrial installations and gather intelligence Stalins political aim was to hold the allegiance
of the Russian population in and around Gennan occupied areas of the USSR and the communist
regime Application took the aspect ofpersuasion by a variety of means Actions ranging from
propaganda and psychological warfare to intimidation and brute force were the order of the day
The economic objective was to prevent or substantially reduce Gennan exploitation of the
occupied areas The Partisans were an integral part ofthe Russian military strategy tactics and
military weapons used against the Gennans Partisans aided the Soviet war in many other
functions They collected taxes for the Soviet government recruited soldiers for the Red Anny
9
and transported food into all sectors where Soviet soldiers were located They performed as the
long arm of the Soviet government (Zhuvov 178)
Partisan units ascended by transport and in foot formed divisions and groups organized to
combat enemy troops The Partisans fomented warfare everywhere They destroyed bridges
railroads roadways telephone lines set fires to forests stores and transport In the occupied
region conditions were extremely unbearable for the Germans and all their accomplices They
were hounded and annihilated at every step and their efforts consistently frustrated Agencies
closely associated with the Partisan movement were the Communist Party the Peoples
Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the Red Army (Von Luttichau 1963) A vast amount of
Freedom Fighters were based behind the German lines to be employed as needed in the
scheme ofRussian counterattacks planned for the winter counteroffensive Additional tasks were
to strive and prevent by force ifnecessary the Ukrainian population from shifting their loyalty
from the Russians to the Germans The Red Army Partisans marched at night and applied
diversionary tactics to draw off German security forces from their main target Partisans often
lived off the land They took food and clothing as needed from the local population either by
requisitioning or simply looting Partisans found their weapons and ammunition in large
quantities in abandoned Soviet arms dumps and from battlefields ofearlier campaigns Small
amounts of materials were attained from collaborators The Partisans maintained a very low
standard of living as not to draw attention to their activities For instance simple staples such as
tobacco soap medical supplies and salt were hard to come by and often the civilian fighters did
without When the mission was complete or the training period was over the Partisans returned
to their homes and civilian pursuits and blended into the population They used the same
10
methods to vanish from the scene when the Germans searched the forests for evidence of
partisan efforts
The entire country of sons and daughters of all the Soviet Republics heeded the call of the
party and government for the defense of Moscow Everyone worked day and night people
literally collapsed from fatigue and lack of sleep Driven by a feeling ofpersonal responsibility
for the fate ofMoscow and the fate of the homeland the partisans diligently worked toward a
common goal Though the Germans pulverized the vast majority of the Soviet Anny the
Partisans refused to surrender The partisans sense ofloyalty and commitment for their country
motivated them to fight without any assurance of any success The bitter cold that year
transcended the worst ever winter in the regions history Despite the conditions the Partisans
kept their faith and though tested by blood and death their character remained in tact (Macksey
1975)
An ever-present threat lacking the strength to engage major units in battle the Partisans
proved to be a continuous threat to the Germans The Partisans felt an obligation to carry their
weapons always and everywhere The militias when properly formed were in fact the people
themselves and included all men and women capable of bearing arms To preserve their country
it was essential that the entire population possess arms and train their children at a young age on
weapons use The Russians felt that their country could be secured entirely by arming the people
The possession ofarms was the distinction between losing their country and submitting to a
bmtal Hitler regime A well-regulated militia composed of citizens and husbandmen took up
arms to preserve their property and individual rights The belief of the day was political power
and ownership grew from the barrel ofa weapon In April 11 1944 Hitler revealed his agenda of
gun control (Macksey 1975) He remarked The most foolish mistake we could possibly
11
make would be to pennit the conquered Eastern peoples to have anns History teaches us that
all conquerors that allowed their subject populations to carry anns prepared their own downfall
by doing so Hitler continually felt the defeat and the threat from the militia (Molt Partisans
1990)
The conclusion is thus inescapable that history indicates the protected individual right of
a private citizen to own and carry fireanns in a peaceful manner is paramount to protect their
country and whats theirs The public respect of the Partisan movement played an integral part of
Gennanys downfall
During the Battle for Moscow it was proven that the Russian soldiers were familiar with
their terrain swamplands forest and rivers This strength also would have a decisive effect at
Moscow (Curtis 12) Therefore the loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct result of
weather not a superior Russian military force
During the Battle for Moscow (October - December 1941) nearly 3000000 soldiers
fought for the capital (www wnecedu) The Gennans suffered their first defeat during the
Battle for Moscow This battle went down in history as a turning point for the Gennan Army
After several victories on the battlefield the Germans were certain that there was nothing to stop
them from taking over Moscow The Gennan Army was expected to attack and destroy the
Russian Army which was reported to be no less than four and half million men strong (Lucas
1992)
The Battle for Moscow was moved forward in three great sweeps the first beginning on
the opening day of war June 22 1941 the second beginning on 3 October and the last on 16
November when it threw in everything it had in a desperate attempt to reach the capital (Kerr
1944) On October 3 1941 Gennany launched their second drive towards Moscow During the
12
flrst two weeks of October the German attack progressed without any problems Not until mid
October did the Germans start showing signs of slowing down due to the weather The Germans
noticed that the Soviets had blown up strategic bridges and thus started to experience terrain
effects Von Bock stopped his forces to regroup study the situation and make his plans for the
[mal assault scheduled for November 16 (Kerr 43)
Terrain features played a vital role during the Battle for Moscow During every battle since
the civil war commanders have taken advantage of the terrain features that are available on the
battlefield Commanders also considered the influence of swamplands rivers forests and natural
obstacles on the battlefield Due to the Germans lack of experience on the Soviet terrain and
land they were defeated at the hands of the Soviet Army during the Battle for Moscow The
majority of the Russian forests are merged with swamplands and only one major river the
Pripyat that flows from west to east provides access to the interior (CMH 104-5)
The Germans were taken by surprise during the early rain in the late fall The lack of
knowledge of the terrain and muddy season halted their military operations The roads became
soft which resulted in a pile up of the German re-supply vehicles The Germans underestimated
the road conditions and failed to take into consideration the rainy season The Germans fighting
ill Russian soil wonltl have been in a beller position to withstand the physical and psychological
strain involved if they had been previously subjected to thorough training in Russian terrain
(CMH 104-2)
The Germans were moving quickly and smashing their way along Russian highways The
Germans kept extending their lines of communication by smashing their way north through the
Smolensk-Moscow highway Von Bock and Von Kluge split their forces and kept heading
slnlight lo Moscow Von Bock split his forces further and sent them northeast towards Kalinin
13
and the majority to Mozhaisk which was sixty-five miles from Moscow Von Kluge sent one of
his largest task forces towards Gzhatsk another one towards Malo-Yaroslavetz and his last task
force towards Tula which was south of Moscow By extending their lines of communication the
Germans experienced difficulty in re-supplying themselves with fuel and ammunition The
Germans were moving through the Smolensk-Moscow and Tula-Moscow highways quickly and
with confidence that they would reach their objective The lines of communications were hard
and long to protect from vicious assault by Russian partisans working in the German rear (Kerr
50)
On November 16 1941 the Germans launched their final assault towards Moscow By
this phase of winter it was cold and the terrain was solidly frozen Temperatures were below 20
degrees and casuaHies from cold weather injuries were rising The Soviets initiated a massive
counter-offensive against the German Army deployed on the Moscow axis on December 5
(Glantz 97) As the Germans got closer to Moscow the Soviet defensive lines stopped them On
December 5 194] the Whermacht Conunanders decided to stop their attacks The German
battle report testified The soldiers fighting capacity is on the verge of exhaustion and it is
impossible more to expect performance ofdifficult tasks (web serpukhovsu)
The Gtrman AlHIY begclll its inilial assault on Moscow 30 September 1941 On the 6th of
October snow began to fall followed by a rain pattern that would be repeated until carly
December The ever-deepening river of mud slowed the German advance By the 3rd of October
the Nuzi b1itzkricg vas almost at a stand stilL middot[his allowed the Russians to fight them on almost
even ground for the first time By the 7th ofNovember freezing cold had set in signaling the start
of the Russian winter The invasion plan did not include a winter plan an oversight that would
1Ol HH GtIII1WIS dtady in the Baille [Of Moscow On the night of 4 December the temperature
14
dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not
fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were
astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat
ineffective
Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the
first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out
as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of
cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and
motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero
(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On
December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal
under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow
and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies
could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold
It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect
After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and
equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian
counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by
the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~
from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and
could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly
designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions
15
Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements
hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of
locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few
available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians
must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled
units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give
them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to
exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)
Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized
and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their
useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet
winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began
they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and
h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning
of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer
Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million
ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth
of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and
7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-
German surrender in April of 1945
16
The Opposing View
The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December
1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my
opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy
the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than
those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the
ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat
The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with
all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to
he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision
of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand
years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his
inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to
impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed
opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys
nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse
The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final
Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews
bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during
WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven
17
many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass
uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies
Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and
it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the
sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over
such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy
supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff
asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once
the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the
Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High
immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by
Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in
The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t
(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)
discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved
invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall
fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl
Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war
with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of
Victory signifying the political feelings of the day
18
A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding
offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks
regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The
Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the
Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons
learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so
overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an
txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter
months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely
separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not
1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned
Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers
were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the
Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had
reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man
Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history
would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the
knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury
In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army
19
that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly
indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth
Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case
the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred
While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a
they suffered in The Battle for Moscow
20
WORKS CITED
New York St Martin s Press 1986
===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s
Washington DC 1986
Washington DC 1986
Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military
Reviev 97 D ecember 1991
Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944
Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk
Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and
Day 1975
Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969
History 1987
7
engagement Their morale was low but they fought with a ferocity and determination that is
inherent in all that have fought on their own soil Soviet determination was enough to slow
down the German advance and with the help of the Soviet weather would eventually stop him
There was also a strong belief that the weather would destroy the German Soldier as it did the
French Soldier in 1812
The Soviets welcomed the wet weather and the cold Nevertheless not even the Soviet
soldier was immune to the cold and German soldiers often came across Soviet soldiers and
horses frozen solid in the snow Although the weather proved difficult for the Soviet soldier
they were familiar with the difficulties associated with such conditions Having trained and lived
with the difficulties of the wet and freezing conditions he was able to out maneuver and
eventually out fight the German army
The failure of the German army to surround Moscow allowed the Soviet soldier the
advantage of adequate supplies Familiarity with the terrain and the knowledge ofwhat was
required to survive the cold created a lop-sided advantage for the Soviet soldier The Soviet
soldier moved on the run and normally had enough food to sustain him Their primary means of
travel was on horseback with one or two soldiers to each horse They sustained their horses on
the straw off thatched roofs and they sustained themselves with raw vegetables and dried bread
In December a new soldier joined the Soviet front lines These soldiers arrived from
Siberia and were conditioned to extreme arctic conditions since their childhood These soldiers
proved very versatile much to the dismay of the German soldier Their clothing allowed them to
move swiftly and silently when required and could wait hours in the snow The arrival of
Siberian Troops and their ability to monopolize the environment inflicted huge casualties on the
8
Gennan army and proved extremely demoralizing for the Gennan soldier and as history has
proven demoralized soldiers do not win wars
The difficulty of the terrain for re-supply and the extreme cold proved too much for the
Gennan soldier With his comrades dying everyday and worsening environmental conditions
any hope of taking Moscow died along with his morale The Soviet winter was proving to be
more dangerous then the enemy With every passing day the incidence of extreme cases of
frostbite increased Chief of Staff Liebenstein summoned up the plight of the Gennan soldier
best when he wrote Despite all claims and reports it has not been understood by those above
that we are too weak to defend ourselves (Zhukov 179)
The Partisan movement was born and organized after the Gennan invasion on 3 July
1941 Twelve days after the Gennan attack Stalin called for the establishment of an underground
movement in the occupied territories to fight the enemy During the Battle for Moscow in 1941
the objectives ofthe Partisans were military political and economic in nature The military
mission was to harass Gennan occupation forces inflict maximum damage on military and
industrial installations and gather intelligence Stalins political aim was to hold the allegiance
of the Russian population in and around Gennan occupied areas of the USSR and the communist
regime Application took the aspect ofpersuasion by a variety of means Actions ranging from
propaganda and psychological warfare to intimidation and brute force were the order of the day
The economic objective was to prevent or substantially reduce Gennan exploitation of the
occupied areas The Partisans were an integral part ofthe Russian military strategy tactics and
military weapons used against the Gennans Partisans aided the Soviet war in many other
functions They collected taxes for the Soviet government recruited soldiers for the Red Anny
9
and transported food into all sectors where Soviet soldiers were located They performed as the
long arm of the Soviet government (Zhuvov 178)
Partisan units ascended by transport and in foot formed divisions and groups organized to
combat enemy troops The Partisans fomented warfare everywhere They destroyed bridges
railroads roadways telephone lines set fires to forests stores and transport In the occupied
region conditions were extremely unbearable for the Germans and all their accomplices They
were hounded and annihilated at every step and their efforts consistently frustrated Agencies
closely associated with the Partisan movement were the Communist Party the Peoples
Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the Red Army (Von Luttichau 1963) A vast amount of
Freedom Fighters were based behind the German lines to be employed as needed in the
scheme ofRussian counterattacks planned for the winter counteroffensive Additional tasks were
to strive and prevent by force ifnecessary the Ukrainian population from shifting their loyalty
from the Russians to the Germans The Red Army Partisans marched at night and applied
diversionary tactics to draw off German security forces from their main target Partisans often
lived off the land They took food and clothing as needed from the local population either by
requisitioning or simply looting Partisans found their weapons and ammunition in large
quantities in abandoned Soviet arms dumps and from battlefields ofearlier campaigns Small
amounts of materials were attained from collaborators The Partisans maintained a very low
standard of living as not to draw attention to their activities For instance simple staples such as
tobacco soap medical supplies and salt were hard to come by and often the civilian fighters did
without When the mission was complete or the training period was over the Partisans returned
to their homes and civilian pursuits and blended into the population They used the same
10
methods to vanish from the scene when the Germans searched the forests for evidence of
partisan efforts
The entire country of sons and daughters of all the Soviet Republics heeded the call of the
party and government for the defense of Moscow Everyone worked day and night people
literally collapsed from fatigue and lack of sleep Driven by a feeling ofpersonal responsibility
for the fate ofMoscow and the fate of the homeland the partisans diligently worked toward a
common goal Though the Germans pulverized the vast majority of the Soviet Anny the
Partisans refused to surrender The partisans sense ofloyalty and commitment for their country
motivated them to fight without any assurance of any success The bitter cold that year
transcended the worst ever winter in the regions history Despite the conditions the Partisans
kept their faith and though tested by blood and death their character remained in tact (Macksey
1975)
An ever-present threat lacking the strength to engage major units in battle the Partisans
proved to be a continuous threat to the Germans The Partisans felt an obligation to carry their
weapons always and everywhere The militias when properly formed were in fact the people
themselves and included all men and women capable of bearing arms To preserve their country
it was essential that the entire population possess arms and train their children at a young age on
weapons use The Russians felt that their country could be secured entirely by arming the people
The possession ofarms was the distinction between losing their country and submitting to a
bmtal Hitler regime A well-regulated militia composed of citizens and husbandmen took up
arms to preserve their property and individual rights The belief of the day was political power
and ownership grew from the barrel ofa weapon In April 11 1944 Hitler revealed his agenda of
gun control (Macksey 1975) He remarked The most foolish mistake we could possibly
11
make would be to pennit the conquered Eastern peoples to have anns History teaches us that
all conquerors that allowed their subject populations to carry anns prepared their own downfall
by doing so Hitler continually felt the defeat and the threat from the militia (Molt Partisans
1990)
The conclusion is thus inescapable that history indicates the protected individual right of
a private citizen to own and carry fireanns in a peaceful manner is paramount to protect their
country and whats theirs The public respect of the Partisan movement played an integral part of
Gennanys downfall
During the Battle for Moscow it was proven that the Russian soldiers were familiar with
their terrain swamplands forest and rivers This strength also would have a decisive effect at
Moscow (Curtis 12) Therefore the loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct result of
weather not a superior Russian military force
During the Battle for Moscow (October - December 1941) nearly 3000000 soldiers
fought for the capital (www wnecedu) The Gennans suffered their first defeat during the
Battle for Moscow This battle went down in history as a turning point for the Gennan Army
After several victories on the battlefield the Germans were certain that there was nothing to stop
them from taking over Moscow The Gennan Army was expected to attack and destroy the
Russian Army which was reported to be no less than four and half million men strong (Lucas
1992)
The Battle for Moscow was moved forward in three great sweeps the first beginning on
the opening day of war June 22 1941 the second beginning on 3 October and the last on 16
November when it threw in everything it had in a desperate attempt to reach the capital (Kerr
1944) On October 3 1941 Gennany launched their second drive towards Moscow During the
12
flrst two weeks of October the German attack progressed without any problems Not until mid
October did the Germans start showing signs of slowing down due to the weather The Germans
noticed that the Soviets had blown up strategic bridges and thus started to experience terrain
effects Von Bock stopped his forces to regroup study the situation and make his plans for the
[mal assault scheduled for November 16 (Kerr 43)
Terrain features played a vital role during the Battle for Moscow During every battle since
the civil war commanders have taken advantage of the terrain features that are available on the
battlefield Commanders also considered the influence of swamplands rivers forests and natural
obstacles on the battlefield Due to the Germans lack of experience on the Soviet terrain and
land they were defeated at the hands of the Soviet Army during the Battle for Moscow The
majority of the Russian forests are merged with swamplands and only one major river the
Pripyat that flows from west to east provides access to the interior (CMH 104-5)
The Germans were taken by surprise during the early rain in the late fall The lack of
knowledge of the terrain and muddy season halted their military operations The roads became
soft which resulted in a pile up of the German re-supply vehicles The Germans underestimated
the road conditions and failed to take into consideration the rainy season The Germans fighting
ill Russian soil wonltl have been in a beller position to withstand the physical and psychological
strain involved if they had been previously subjected to thorough training in Russian terrain
(CMH 104-2)
The Germans were moving quickly and smashing their way along Russian highways The
Germans kept extending their lines of communication by smashing their way north through the
Smolensk-Moscow highway Von Bock and Von Kluge split their forces and kept heading
slnlight lo Moscow Von Bock split his forces further and sent them northeast towards Kalinin
13
and the majority to Mozhaisk which was sixty-five miles from Moscow Von Kluge sent one of
his largest task forces towards Gzhatsk another one towards Malo-Yaroslavetz and his last task
force towards Tula which was south of Moscow By extending their lines of communication the
Germans experienced difficulty in re-supplying themselves with fuel and ammunition The
Germans were moving through the Smolensk-Moscow and Tula-Moscow highways quickly and
with confidence that they would reach their objective The lines of communications were hard
and long to protect from vicious assault by Russian partisans working in the German rear (Kerr
50)
On November 16 1941 the Germans launched their final assault towards Moscow By
this phase of winter it was cold and the terrain was solidly frozen Temperatures were below 20
degrees and casuaHies from cold weather injuries were rising The Soviets initiated a massive
counter-offensive against the German Army deployed on the Moscow axis on December 5
(Glantz 97) As the Germans got closer to Moscow the Soviet defensive lines stopped them On
December 5 194] the Whermacht Conunanders decided to stop their attacks The German
battle report testified The soldiers fighting capacity is on the verge of exhaustion and it is
impossible more to expect performance ofdifficult tasks (web serpukhovsu)
The Gtrman AlHIY begclll its inilial assault on Moscow 30 September 1941 On the 6th of
October snow began to fall followed by a rain pattern that would be repeated until carly
December The ever-deepening river of mud slowed the German advance By the 3rd of October
the Nuzi b1itzkricg vas almost at a stand stilL middot[his allowed the Russians to fight them on almost
even ground for the first time By the 7th ofNovember freezing cold had set in signaling the start
of the Russian winter The invasion plan did not include a winter plan an oversight that would
1Ol HH GtIII1WIS dtady in the Baille [Of Moscow On the night of 4 December the temperature
14
dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not
fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were
astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat
ineffective
Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the
first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out
as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of
cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and
motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero
(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On
December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal
under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow
and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies
could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold
It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect
After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and
equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian
counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by
the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~
from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and
could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly
designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions
15
Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements
hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of
locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few
available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians
must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled
units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give
them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to
exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)
Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized
and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their
useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet
winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began
they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and
h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning
of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer
Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million
ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth
of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and
7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-
German surrender in April of 1945
16
The Opposing View
The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December
1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my
opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy
the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than
those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the
ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat
The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with
all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to
he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision
of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand
years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his
inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to
impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed
opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys
nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse
The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final
Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews
bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during
WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven
17
many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass
uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies
Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and
it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the
sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over
such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy
supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff
asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once
the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the
Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High
immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by
Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in
The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t
(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)
discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved
invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall
fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl
Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war
with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of
Victory signifying the political feelings of the day
18
A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding
offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks
regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The
Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the
Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons
learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so
overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an
txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter
months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely
separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not
1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned
Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers
were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the
Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had
reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man
Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history
would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the
knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury
In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army
19
that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly
indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth
Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case
the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred
While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a
they suffered in The Battle for Moscow
20
WORKS CITED
New York St Martin s Press 1986
===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s
Washington DC 1986
Washington DC 1986
Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military
Reviev 97 D ecember 1991
Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944
Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk
Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and
Day 1975
Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969
History 1987
8
Gennan army and proved extremely demoralizing for the Gennan soldier and as history has
proven demoralized soldiers do not win wars
The difficulty of the terrain for re-supply and the extreme cold proved too much for the
Gennan soldier With his comrades dying everyday and worsening environmental conditions
any hope of taking Moscow died along with his morale The Soviet winter was proving to be
more dangerous then the enemy With every passing day the incidence of extreme cases of
frostbite increased Chief of Staff Liebenstein summoned up the plight of the Gennan soldier
best when he wrote Despite all claims and reports it has not been understood by those above
that we are too weak to defend ourselves (Zhukov 179)
The Partisan movement was born and organized after the Gennan invasion on 3 July
1941 Twelve days after the Gennan attack Stalin called for the establishment of an underground
movement in the occupied territories to fight the enemy During the Battle for Moscow in 1941
the objectives ofthe Partisans were military political and economic in nature The military
mission was to harass Gennan occupation forces inflict maximum damage on military and
industrial installations and gather intelligence Stalins political aim was to hold the allegiance
of the Russian population in and around Gennan occupied areas of the USSR and the communist
regime Application took the aspect ofpersuasion by a variety of means Actions ranging from
propaganda and psychological warfare to intimidation and brute force were the order of the day
The economic objective was to prevent or substantially reduce Gennan exploitation of the
occupied areas The Partisans were an integral part ofthe Russian military strategy tactics and
military weapons used against the Gennans Partisans aided the Soviet war in many other
functions They collected taxes for the Soviet government recruited soldiers for the Red Anny
9
and transported food into all sectors where Soviet soldiers were located They performed as the
long arm of the Soviet government (Zhuvov 178)
Partisan units ascended by transport and in foot formed divisions and groups organized to
combat enemy troops The Partisans fomented warfare everywhere They destroyed bridges
railroads roadways telephone lines set fires to forests stores and transport In the occupied
region conditions were extremely unbearable for the Germans and all their accomplices They
were hounded and annihilated at every step and their efforts consistently frustrated Agencies
closely associated with the Partisan movement were the Communist Party the Peoples
Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the Red Army (Von Luttichau 1963) A vast amount of
Freedom Fighters were based behind the German lines to be employed as needed in the
scheme ofRussian counterattacks planned for the winter counteroffensive Additional tasks were
to strive and prevent by force ifnecessary the Ukrainian population from shifting their loyalty
from the Russians to the Germans The Red Army Partisans marched at night and applied
diversionary tactics to draw off German security forces from their main target Partisans often
lived off the land They took food and clothing as needed from the local population either by
requisitioning or simply looting Partisans found their weapons and ammunition in large
quantities in abandoned Soviet arms dumps and from battlefields ofearlier campaigns Small
amounts of materials were attained from collaborators The Partisans maintained a very low
standard of living as not to draw attention to their activities For instance simple staples such as
tobacco soap medical supplies and salt were hard to come by and often the civilian fighters did
without When the mission was complete or the training period was over the Partisans returned
to their homes and civilian pursuits and blended into the population They used the same
10
methods to vanish from the scene when the Germans searched the forests for evidence of
partisan efforts
The entire country of sons and daughters of all the Soviet Republics heeded the call of the
party and government for the defense of Moscow Everyone worked day and night people
literally collapsed from fatigue and lack of sleep Driven by a feeling ofpersonal responsibility
for the fate ofMoscow and the fate of the homeland the partisans diligently worked toward a
common goal Though the Germans pulverized the vast majority of the Soviet Anny the
Partisans refused to surrender The partisans sense ofloyalty and commitment for their country
motivated them to fight without any assurance of any success The bitter cold that year
transcended the worst ever winter in the regions history Despite the conditions the Partisans
kept their faith and though tested by blood and death their character remained in tact (Macksey
1975)
An ever-present threat lacking the strength to engage major units in battle the Partisans
proved to be a continuous threat to the Germans The Partisans felt an obligation to carry their
weapons always and everywhere The militias when properly formed were in fact the people
themselves and included all men and women capable of bearing arms To preserve their country
it was essential that the entire population possess arms and train their children at a young age on
weapons use The Russians felt that their country could be secured entirely by arming the people
The possession ofarms was the distinction between losing their country and submitting to a
bmtal Hitler regime A well-regulated militia composed of citizens and husbandmen took up
arms to preserve their property and individual rights The belief of the day was political power
and ownership grew from the barrel ofa weapon In April 11 1944 Hitler revealed his agenda of
gun control (Macksey 1975) He remarked The most foolish mistake we could possibly
11
make would be to pennit the conquered Eastern peoples to have anns History teaches us that
all conquerors that allowed their subject populations to carry anns prepared their own downfall
by doing so Hitler continually felt the defeat and the threat from the militia (Molt Partisans
1990)
The conclusion is thus inescapable that history indicates the protected individual right of
a private citizen to own and carry fireanns in a peaceful manner is paramount to protect their
country and whats theirs The public respect of the Partisan movement played an integral part of
Gennanys downfall
During the Battle for Moscow it was proven that the Russian soldiers were familiar with
their terrain swamplands forest and rivers This strength also would have a decisive effect at
Moscow (Curtis 12) Therefore the loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct result of
weather not a superior Russian military force
During the Battle for Moscow (October - December 1941) nearly 3000000 soldiers
fought for the capital (www wnecedu) The Gennans suffered their first defeat during the
Battle for Moscow This battle went down in history as a turning point for the Gennan Army
After several victories on the battlefield the Germans were certain that there was nothing to stop
them from taking over Moscow The Gennan Army was expected to attack and destroy the
Russian Army which was reported to be no less than four and half million men strong (Lucas
1992)
The Battle for Moscow was moved forward in three great sweeps the first beginning on
the opening day of war June 22 1941 the second beginning on 3 October and the last on 16
November when it threw in everything it had in a desperate attempt to reach the capital (Kerr
1944) On October 3 1941 Gennany launched their second drive towards Moscow During the
12
flrst two weeks of October the German attack progressed without any problems Not until mid
October did the Germans start showing signs of slowing down due to the weather The Germans
noticed that the Soviets had blown up strategic bridges and thus started to experience terrain
effects Von Bock stopped his forces to regroup study the situation and make his plans for the
[mal assault scheduled for November 16 (Kerr 43)
Terrain features played a vital role during the Battle for Moscow During every battle since
the civil war commanders have taken advantage of the terrain features that are available on the
battlefield Commanders also considered the influence of swamplands rivers forests and natural
obstacles on the battlefield Due to the Germans lack of experience on the Soviet terrain and
land they were defeated at the hands of the Soviet Army during the Battle for Moscow The
majority of the Russian forests are merged with swamplands and only one major river the
Pripyat that flows from west to east provides access to the interior (CMH 104-5)
The Germans were taken by surprise during the early rain in the late fall The lack of
knowledge of the terrain and muddy season halted their military operations The roads became
soft which resulted in a pile up of the German re-supply vehicles The Germans underestimated
the road conditions and failed to take into consideration the rainy season The Germans fighting
ill Russian soil wonltl have been in a beller position to withstand the physical and psychological
strain involved if they had been previously subjected to thorough training in Russian terrain
(CMH 104-2)
The Germans were moving quickly and smashing their way along Russian highways The
Germans kept extending their lines of communication by smashing their way north through the
Smolensk-Moscow highway Von Bock and Von Kluge split their forces and kept heading
slnlight lo Moscow Von Bock split his forces further and sent them northeast towards Kalinin
13
and the majority to Mozhaisk which was sixty-five miles from Moscow Von Kluge sent one of
his largest task forces towards Gzhatsk another one towards Malo-Yaroslavetz and his last task
force towards Tula which was south of Moscow By extending their lines of communication the
Germans experienced difficulty in re-supplying themselves with fuel and ammunition The
Germans were moving through the Smolensk-Moscow and Tula-Moscow highways quickly and
with confidence that they would reach their objective The lines of communications were hard
and long to protect from vicious assault by Russian partisans working in the German rear (Kerr
50)
On November 16 1941 the Germans launched their final assault towards Moscow By
this phase of winter it was cold and the terrain was solidly frozen Temperatures were below 20
degrees and casuaHies from cold weather injuries were rising The Soviets initiated a massive
counter-offensive against the German Army deployed on the Moscow axis on December 5
(Glantz 97) As the Germans got closer to Moscow the Soviet defensive lines stopped them On
December 5 194] the Whermacht Conunanders decided to stop their attacks The German
battle report testified The soldiers fighting capacity is on the verge of exhaustion and it is
impossible more to expect performance ofdifficult tasks (web serpukhovsu)
The Gtrman AlHIY begclll its inilial assault on Moscow 30 September 1941 On the 6th of
October snow began to fall followed by a rain pattern that would be repeated until carly
December The ever-deepening river of mud slowed the German advance By the 3rd of October
the Nuzi b1itzkricg vas almost at a stand stilL middot[his allowed the Russians to fight them on almost
even ground for the first time By the 7th ofNovember freezing cold had set in signaling the start
of the Russian winter The invasion plan did not include a winter plan an oversight that would
1Ol HH GtIII1WIS dtady in the Baille [Of Moscow On the night of 4 December the temperature
14
dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not
fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were
astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat
ineffective
Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the
first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out
as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of
cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and
motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero
(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On
December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal
under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow
and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies
could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold
It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect
After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and
equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian
counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by
the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~
from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and
could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly
designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions
15
Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements
hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of
locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few
available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians
must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled
units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give
them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to
exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)
Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized
and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their
useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet
winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began
they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and
h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning
of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer
Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million
ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth
of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and
7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-
German surrender in April of 1945
16
The Opposing View
The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December
1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my
opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy
the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than
those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the
ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat
The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with
all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to
he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision
of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand
years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his
inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to
impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed
opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys
nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse
The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final
Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews
bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during
WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven
17
many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass
uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies
Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and
it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the
sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over
such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy
supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff
asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once
the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the
Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High
immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by
Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in
The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t
(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)
discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved
invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall
fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl
Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war
with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of
Victory signifying the political feelings of the day
18
A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding
offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks
regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The
Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the
Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons
learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so
overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an
txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter
months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely
separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not
1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned
Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers
were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the
Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had
reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man
Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history
would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the
knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury
In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army
19
that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly
indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth
Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case
the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred
While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a
they suffered in The Battle for Moscow
20
WORKS CITED
New York St Martin s Press 1986
===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s
Washington DC 1986
Washington DC 1986
Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military
Reviev 97 D ecember 1991
Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944
Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk
Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and
Day 1975
Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969
History 1987
9
and transported food into all sectors where Soviet soldiers were located They performed as the
long arm of the Soviet government (Zhuvov 178)
Partisan units ascended by transport and in foot formed divisions and groups organized to
combat enemy troops The Partisans fomented warfare everywhere They destroyed bridges
railroads roadways telephone lines set fires to forests stores and transport In the occupied
region conditions were extremely unbearable for the Germans and all their accomplices They
were hounded and annihilated at every step and their efforts consistently frustrated Agencies
closely associated with the Partisan movement were the Communist Party the Peoples
Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the Red Army (Von Luttichau 1963) A vast amount of
Freedom Fighters were based behind the German lines to be employed as needed in the
scheme ofRussian counterattacks planned for the winter counteroffensive Additional tasks were
to strive and prevent by force ifnecessary the Ukrainian population from shifting their loyalty
from the Russians to the Germans The Red Army Partisans marched at night and applied
diversionary tactics to draw off German security forces from their main target Partisans often
lived off the land They took food and clothing as needed from the local population either by
requisitioning or simply looting Partisans found their weapons and ammunition in large
quantities in abandoned Soviet arms dumps and from battlefields ofearlier campaigns Small
amounts of materials were attained from collaborators The Partisans maintained a very low
standard of living as not to draw attention to their activities For instance simple staples such as
tobacco soap medical supplies and salt were hard to come by and often the civilian fighters did
without When the mission was complete or the training period was over the Partisans returned
to their homes and civilian pursuits and blended into the population They used the same
10
methods to vanish from the scene when the Germans searched the forests for evidence of
partisan efforts
The entire country of sons and daughters of all the Soviet Republics heeded the call of the
party and government for the defense of Moscow Everyone worked day and night people
literally collapsed from fatigue and lack of sleep Driven by a feeling ofpersonal responsibility
for the fate ofMoscow and the fate of the homeland the partisans diligently worked toward a
common goal Though the Germans pulverized the vast majority of the Soviet Anny the
Partisans refused to surrender The partisans sense ofloyalty and commitment for their country
motivated them to fight without any assurance of any success The bitter cold that year
transcended the worst ever winter in the regions history Despite the conditions the Partisans
kept their faith and though tested by blood and death their character remained in tact (Macksey
1975)
An ever-present threat lacking the strength to engage major units in battle the Partisans
proved to be a continuous threat to the Germans The Partisans felt an obligation to carry their
weapons always and everywhere The militias when properly formed were in fact the people
themselves and included all men and women capable of bearing arms To preserve their country
it was essential that the entire population possess arms and train their children at a young age on
weapons use The Russians felt that their country could be secured entirely by arming the people
The possession ofarms was the distinction between losing their country and submitting to a
bmtal Hitler regime A well-regulated militia composed of citizens and husbandmen took up
arms to preserve their property and individual rights The belief of the day was political power
and ownership grew from the barrel ofa weapon In April 11 1944 Hitler revealed his agenda of
gun control (Macksey 1975) He remarked The most foolish mistake we could possibly
11
make would be to pennit the conquered Eastern peoples to have anns History teaches us that
all conquerors that allowed their subject populations to carry anns prepared their own downfall
by doing so Hitler continually felt the defeat and the threat from the militia (Molt Partisans
1990)
The conclusion is thus inescapable that history indicates the protected individual right of
a private citizen to own and carry fireanns in a peaceful manner is paramount to protect their
country and whats theirs The public respect of the Partisan movement played an integral part of
Gennanys downfall
During the Battle for Moscow it was proven that the Russian soldiers were familiar with
their terrain swamplands forest and rivers This strength also would have a decisive effect at
Moscow (Curtis 12) Therefore the loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct result of
weather not a superior Russian military force
During the Battle for Moscow (October - December 1941) nearly 3000000 soldiers
fought for the capital (www wnecedu) The Gennans suffered their first defeat during the
Battle for Moscow This battle went down in history as a turning point for the Gennan Army
After several victories on the battlefield the Germans were certain that there was nothing to stop
them from taking over Moscow The Gennan Army was expected to attack and destroy the
Russian Army which was reported to be no less than four and half million men strong (Lucas
1992)
The Battle for Moscow was moved forward in three great sweeps the first beginning on
the opening day of war June 22 1941 the second beginning on 3 October and the last on 16
November when it threw in everything it had in a desperate attempt to reach the capital (Kerr
1944) On October 3 1941 Gennany launched their second drive towards Moscow During the
12
flrst two weeks of October the German attack progressed without any problems Not until mid
October did the Germans start showing signs of slowing down due to the weather The Germans
noticed that the Soviets had blown up strategic bridges and thus started to experience terrain
effects Von Bock stopped his forces to regroup study the situation and make his plans for the
[mal assault scheduled for November 16 (Kerr 43)
Terrain features played a vital role during the Battle for Moscow During every battle since
the civil war commanders have taken advantage of the terrain features that are available on the
battlefield Commanders also considered the influence of swamplands rivers forests and natural
obstacles on the battlefield Due to the Germans lack of experience on the Soviet terrain and
land they were defeated at the hands of the Soviet Army during the Battle for Moscow The
majority of the Russian forests are merged with swamplands and only one major river the
Pripyat that flows from west to east provides access to the interior (CMH 104-5)
The Germans were taken by surprise during the early rain in the late fall The lack of
knowledge of the terrain and muddy season halted their military operations The roads became
soft which resulted in a pile up of the German re-supply vehicles The Germans underestimated
the road conditions and failed to take into consideration the rainy season The Germans fighting
ill Russian soil wonltl have been in a beller position to withstand the physical and psychological
strain involved if they had been previously subjected to thorough training in Russian terrain
(CMH 104-2)
The Germans were moving quickly and smashing their way along Russian highways The
Germans kept extending their lines of communication by smashing their way north through the
Smolensk-Moscow highway Von Bock and Von Kluge split their forces and kept heading
slnlight lo Moscow Von Bock split his forces further and sent them northeast towards Kalinin
13
and the majority to Mozhaisk which was sixty-five miles from Moscow Von Kluge sent one of
his largest task forces towards Gzhatsk another one towards Malo-Yaroslavetz and his last task
force towards Tula which was south of Moscow By extending their lines of communication the
Germans experienced difficulty in re-supplying themselves with fuel and ammunition The
Germans were moving through the Smolensk-Moscow and Tula-Moscow highways quickly and
with confidence that they would reach their objective The lines of communications were hard
and long to protect from vicious assault by Russian partisans working in the German rear (Kerr
50)
On November 16 1941 the Germans launched their final assault towards Moscow By
this phase of winter it was cold and the terrain was solidly frozen Temperatures were below 20
degrees and casuaHies from cold weather injuries were rising The Soviets initiated a massive
counter-offensive against the German Army deployed on the Moscow axis on December 5
(Glantz 97) As the Germans got closer to Moscow the Soviet defensive lines stopped them On
December 5 194] the Whermacht Conunanders decided to stop their attacks The German
battle report testified The soldiers fighting capacity is on the verge of exhaustion and it is
impossible more to expect performance ofdifficult tasks (web serpukhovsu)
The Gtrman AlHIY begclll its inilial assault on Moscow 30 September 1941 On the 6th of
October snow began to fall followed by a rain pattern that would be repeated until carly
December The ever-deepening river of mud slowed the German advance By the 3rd of October
the Nuzi b1itzkricg vas almost at a stand stilL middot[his allowed the Russians to fight them on almost
even ground for the first time By the 7th ofNovember freezing cold had set in signaling the start
of the Russian winter The invasion plan did not include a winter plan an oversight that would
1Ol HH GtIII1WIS dtady in the Baille [Of Moscow On the night of 4 December the temperature
14
dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not
fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were
astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat
ineffective
Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the
first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out
as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of
cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and
motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero
(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On
December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal
under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow
and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies
could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold
It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect
After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and
equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian
counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by
the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~
from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and
could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly
designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions
15
Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements
hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of
locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few
available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians
must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled
units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give
them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to
exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)
Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized
and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their
useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet
winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began
they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and
h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning
of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer
Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million
ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth
of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and
7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-
German surrender in April of 1945
16
The Opposing View
The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December
1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my
opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy
the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than
those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the
ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat
The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with
all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to
he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision
of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand
years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his
inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to
impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed
opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys
nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse
The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final
Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews
bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during
WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven
17
many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass
uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies
Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and
it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the
sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over
such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy
supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff
asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once
the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the
Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High
immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by
Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in
The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t
(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)
discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved
invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall
fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl
Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war
with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of
Victory signifying the political feelings of the day
18
A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding
offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks
regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The
Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the
Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons
learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so
overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an
txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter
months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely
separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not
1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned
Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers
were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the
Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had
reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man
Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history
would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the
knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury
In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army
19
that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly
indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth
Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case
the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred
While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a
they suffered in The Battle for Moscow
20
WORKS CITED
New York St Martin s Press 1986
===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s
Washington DC 1986
Washington DC 1986
Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military
Reviev 97 D ecember 1991
Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944
Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk
Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and
Day 1975
Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969
History 1987
10
methods to vanish from the scene when the Germans searched the forests for evidence of
partisan efforts
The entire country of sons and daughters of all the Soviet Republics heeded the call of the
party and government for the defense of Moscow Everyone worked day and night people
literally collapsed from fatigue and lack of sleep Driven by a feeling ofpersonal responsibility
for the fate ofMoscow and the fate of the homeland the partisans diligently worked toward a
common goal Though the Germans pulverized the vast majority of the Soviet Anny the
Partisans refused to surrender The partisans sense ofloyalty and commitment for their country
motivated them to fight without any assurance of any success The bitter cold that year
transcended the worst ever winter in the regions history Despite the conditions the Partisans
kept their faith and though tested by blood and death their character remained in tact (Macksey
1975)
An ever-present threat lacking the strength to engage major units in battle the Partisans
proved to be a continuous threat to the Germans The Partisans felt an obligation to carry their
weapons always and everywhere The militias when properly formed were in fact the people
themselves and included all men and women capable of bearing arms To preserve their country
it was essential that the entire population possess arms and train their children at a young age on
weapons use The Russians felt that their country could be secured entirely by arming the people
The possession ofarms was the distinction between losing their country and submitting to a
bmtal Hitler regime A well-regulated militia composed of citizens and husbandmen took up
arms to preserve their property and individual rights The belief of the day was political power
and ownership grew from the barrel ofa weapon In April 11 1944 Hitler revealed his agenda of
gun control (Macksey 1975) He remarked The most foolish mistake we could possibly
11
make would be to pennit the conquered Eastern peoples to have anns History teaches us that
all conquerors that allowed their subject populations to carry anns prepared their own downfall
by doing so Hitler continually felt the defeat and the threat from the militia (Molt Partisans
1990)
The conclusion is thus inescapable that history indicates the protected individual right of
a private citizen to own and carry fireanns in a peaceful manner is paramount to protect their
country and whats theirs The public respect of the Partisan movement played an integral part of
Gennanys downfall
During the Battle for Moscow it was proven that the Russian soldiers were familiar with
their terrain swamplands forest and rivers This strength also would have a decisive effect at
Moscow (Curtis 12) Therefore the loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct result of
weather not a superior Russian military force
During the Battle for Moscow (October - December 1941) nearly 3000000 soldiers
fought for the capital (www wnecedu) The Gennans suffered their first defeat during the
Battle for Moscow This battle went down in history as a turning point for the Gennan Army
After several victories on the battlefield the Germans were certain that there was nothing to stop
them from taking over Moscow The Gennan Army was expected to attack and destroy the
Russian Army which was reported to be no less than four and half million men strong (Lucas
1992)
The Battle for Moscow was moved forward in three great sweeps the first beginning on
the opening day of war June 22 1941 the second beginning on 3 October and the last on 16
November when it threw in everything it had in a desperate attempt to reach the capital (Kerr
1944) On October 3 1941 Gennany launched their second drive towards Moscow During the
12
flrst two weeks of October the German attack progressed without any problems Not until mid
October did the Germans start showing signs of slowing down due to the weather The Germans
noticed that the Soviets had blown up strategic bridges and thus started to experience terrain
effects Von Bock stopped his forces to regroup study the situation and make his plans for the
[mal assault scheduled for November 16 (Kerr 43)
Terrain features played a vital role during the Battle for Moscow During every battle since
the civil war commanders have taken advantage of the terrain features that are available on the
battlefield Commanders also considered the influence of swamplands rivers forests and natural
obstacles on the battlefield Due to the Germans lack of experience on the Soviet terrain and
land they were defeated at the hands of the Soviet Army during the Battle for Moscow The
majority of the Russian forests are merged with swamplands and only one major river the
Pripyat that flows from west to east provides access to the interior (CMH 104-5)
The Germans were taken by surprise during the early rain in the late fall The lack of
knowledge of the terrain and muddy season halted their military operations The roads became
soft which resulted in a pile up of the German re-supply vehicles The Germans underestimated
the road conditions and failed to take into consideration the rainy season The Germans fighting
ill Russian soil wonltl have been in a beller position to withstand the physical and psychological
strain involved if they had been previously subjected to thorough training in Russian terrain
(CMH 104-2)
The Germans were moving quickly and smashing their way along Russian highways The
Germans kept extending their lines of communication by smashing their way north through the
Smolensk-Moscow highway Von Bock and Von Kluge split their forces and kept heading
slnlight lo Moscow Von Bock split his forces further and sent them northeast towards Kalinin
13
and the majority to Mozhaisk which was sixty-five miles from Moscow Von Kluge sent one of
his largest task forces towards Gzhatsk another one towards Malo-Yaroslavetz and his last task
force towards Tula which was south of Moscow By extending their lines of communication the
Germans experienced difficulty in re-supplying themselves with fuel and ammunition The
Germans were moving through the Smolensk-Moscow and Tula-Moscow highways quickly and
with confidence that they would reach their objective The lines of communications were hard
and long to protect from vicious assault by Russian partisans working in the German rear (Kerr
50)
On November 16 1941 the Germans launched their final assault towards Moscow By
this phase of winter it was cold and the terrain was solidly frozen Temperatures were below 20
degrees and casuaHies from cold weather injuries were rising The Soviets initiated a massive
counter-offensive against the German Army deployed on the Moscow axis on December 5
(Glantz 97) As the Germans got closer to Moscow the Soviet defensive lines stopped them On
December 5 194] the Whermacht Conunanders decided to stop their attacks The German
battle report testified The soldiers fighting capacity is on the verge of exhaustion and it is
impossible more to expect performance ofdifficult tasks (web serpukhovsu)
The Gtrman AlHIY begclll its inilial assault on Moscow 30 September 1941 On the 6th of
October snow began to fall followed by a rain pattern that would be repeated until carly
December The ever-deepening river of mud slowed the German advance By the 3rd of October
the Nuzi b1itzkricg vas almost at a stand stilL middot[his allowed the Russians to fight them on almost
even ground for the first time By the 7th ofNovember freezing cold had set in signaling the start
of the Russian winter The invasion plan did not include a winter plan an oversight that would
1Ol HH GtIII1WIS dtady in the Baille [Of Moscow On the night of 4 December the temperature
14
dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not
fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were
astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat
ineffective
Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the
first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out
as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of
cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and
motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero
(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On
December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal
under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow
and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies
could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold
It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect
After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and
equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian
counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by
the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~
from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and
could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly
designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions
15
Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements
hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of
locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few
available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians
must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled
units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give
them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to
exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)
Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized
and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their
useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet
winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began
they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and
h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning
of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer
Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million
ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth
of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and
7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-
German surrender in April of 1945
16
The Opposing View
The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December
1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my
opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy
the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than
those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the
ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat
The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with
all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to
he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision
of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand
years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his
inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to
impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed
opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys
nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse
The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final
Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews
bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during
WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven
17
many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass
uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies
Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and
it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the
sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over
such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy
supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff
asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once
the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the
Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High
immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by
Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in
The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t
(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)
discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved
invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall
fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl
Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war
with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of
Victory signifying the political feelings of the day
18
A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding
offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks
regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The
Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the
Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons
learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so
overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an
txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter
months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely
separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not
1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned
Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers
were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the
Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had
reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man
Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history
would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the
knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury
In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army
19
that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly
indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth
Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case
the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred
While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a
they suffered in The Battle for Moscow
20
WORKS CITED
New York St Martin s Press 1986
===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s
Washington DC 1986
Washington DC 1986
Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military
Reviev 97 D ecember 1991
Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944
Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk
Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and
Day 1975
Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969
History 1987
11
make would be to pennit the conquered Eastern peoples to have anns History teaches us that
all conquerors that allowed their subject populations to carry anns prepared their own downfall
by doing so Hitler continually felt the defeat and the threat from the militia (Molt Partisans
1990)
The conclusion is thus inescapable that history indicates the protected individual right of
a private citizen to own and carry fireanns in a peaceful manner is paramount to protect their
country and whats theirs The public respect of the Partisan movement played an integral part of
Gennanys downfall
During the Battle for Moscow it was proven that the Russian soldiers were familiar with
their terrain swamplands forest and rivers This strength also would have a decisive effect at
Moscow (Curtis 12) Therefore the loss of the Battle for Moscow was a direct result of
weather not a superior Russian military force
During the Battle for Moscow (October - December 1941) nearly 3000000 soldiers
fought for the capital (www wnecedu) The Gennans suffered their first defeat during the
Battle for Moscow This battle went down in history as a turning point for the Gennan Army
After several victories on the battlefield the Germans were certain that there was nothing to stop
them from taking over Moscow The Gennan Army was expected to attack and destroy the
Russian Army which was reported to be no less than four and half million men strong (Lucas
1992)
The Battle for Moscow was moved forward in three great sweeps the first beginning on
the opening day of war June 22 1941 the second beginning on 3 October and the last on 16
November when it threw in everything it had in a desperate attempt to reach the capital (Kerr
1944) On October 3 1941 Gennany launched their second drive towards Moscow During the
12
flrst two weeks of October the German attack progressed without any problems Not until mid
October did the Germans start showing signs of slowing down due to the weather The Germans
noticed that the Soviets had blown up strategic bridges and thus started to experience terrain
effects Von Bock stopped his forces to regroup study the situation and make his plans for the
[mal assault scheduled for November 16 (Kerr 43)
Terrain features played a vital role during the Battle for Moscow During every battle since
the civil war commanders have taken advantage of the terrain features that are available on the
battlefield Commanders also considered the influence of swamplands rivers forests and natural
obstacles on the battlefield Due to the Germans lack of experience on the Soviet terrain and
land they were defeated at the hands of the Soviet Army during the Battle for Moscow The
majority of the Russian forests are merged with swamplands and only one major river the
Pripyat that flows from west to east provides access to the interior (CMH 104-5)
The Germans were taken by surprise during the early rain in the late fall The lack of
knowledge of the terrain and muddy season halted their military operations The roads became
soft which resulted in a pile up of the German re-supply vehicles The Germans underestimated
the road conditions and failed to take into consideration the rainy season The Germans fighting
ill Russian soil wonltl have been in a beller position to withstand the physical and psychological
strain involved if they had been previously subjected to thorough training in Russian terrain
(CMH 104-2)
The Germans were moving quickly and smashing their way along Russian highways The
Germans kept extending their lines of communication by smashing their way north through the
Smolensk-Moscow highway Von Bock and Von Kluge split their forces and kept heading
slnlight lo Moscow Von Bock split his forces further and sent them northeast towards Kalinin
13
and the majority to Mozhaisk which was sixty-five miles from Moscow Von Kluge sent one of
his largest task forces towards Gzhatsk another one towards Malo-Yaroslavetz and his last task
force towards Tula which was south of Moscow By extending their lines of communication the
Germans experienced difficulty in re-supplying themselves with fuel and ammunition The
Germans were moving through the Smolensk-Moscow and Tula-Moscow highways quickly and
with confidence that they would reach their objective The lines of communications were hard
and long to protect from vicious assault by Russian partisans working in the German rear (Kerr
50)
On November 16 1941 the Germans launched their final assault towards Moscow By
this phase of winter it was cold and the terrain was solidly frozen Temperatures were below 20
degrees and casuaHies from cold weather injuries were rising The Soviets initiated a massive
counter-offensive against the German Army deployed on the Moscow axis on December 5
(Glantz 97) As the Germans got closer to Moscow the Soviet defensive lines stopped them On
December 5 194] the Whermacht Conunanders decided to stop their attacks The German
battle report testified The soldiers fighting capacity is on the verge of exhaustion and it is
impossible more to expect performance ofdifficult tasks (web serpukhovsu)
The Gtrman AlHIY begclll its inilial assault on Moscow 30 September 1941 On the 6th of
October snow began to fall followed by a rain pattern that would be repeated until carly
December The ever-deepening river of mud slowed the German advance By the 3rd of October
the Nuzi b1itzkricg vas almost at a stand stilL middot[his allowed the Russians to fight them on almost
even ground for the first time By the 7th ofNovember freezing cold had set in signaling the start
of the Russian winter The invasion plan did not include a winter plan an oversight that would
1Ol HH GtIII1WIS dtady in the Baille [Of Moscow On the night of 4 December the temperature
14
dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not
fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were
astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat
ineffective
Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the
first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out
as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of
cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and
motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero
(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On
December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal
under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow
and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies
could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold
It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect
After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and
equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian
counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by
the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~
from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and
could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly
designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions
15
Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements
hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of
locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few
available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians
must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled
units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give
them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to
exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)
Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized
and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their
useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet
winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began
they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and
h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning
of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer
Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million
ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth
of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and
7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-
German surrender in April of 1945
16
The Opposing View
The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December
1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my
opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy
the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than
those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the
ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat
The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with
all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to
he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision
of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand
years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his
inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to
impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed
opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys
nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse
The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final
Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews
bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during
WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven
17
many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass
uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies
Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and
it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the
sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over
such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy
supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff
asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once
the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the
Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High
immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by
Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in
The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t
(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)
discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved
invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall
fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl
Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war
with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of
Victory signifying the political feelings of the day
18
A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding
offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks
regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The
Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the
Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons
learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so
overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an
txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter
months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely
separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not
1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned
Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers
were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the
Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had
reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man
Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history
would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the
knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury
In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army
19
that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly
indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth
Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case
the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred
While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a
they suffered in The Battle for Moscow
20
WORKS CITED
New York St Martin s Press 1986
===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s
Washington DC 1986
Washington DC 1986
Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military
Reviev 97 D ecember 1991
Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944
Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk
Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and
Day 1975
Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969
History 1987
12
flrst two weeks of October the German attack progressed without any problems Not until mid
October did the Germans start showing signs of slowing down due to the weather The Germans
noticed that the Soviets had blown up strategic bridges and thus started to experience terrain
effects Von Bock stopped his forces to regroup study the situation and make his plans for the
[mal assault scheduled for November 16 (Kerr 43)
Terrain features played a vital role during the Battle for Moscow During every battle since
the civil war commanders have taken advantage of the terrain features that are available on the
battlefield Commanders also considered the influence of swamplands rivers forests and natural
obstacles on the battlefield Due to the Germans lack of experience on the Soviet terrain and
land they were defeated at the hands of the Soviet Army during the Battle for Moscow The
majority of the Russian forests are merged with swamplands and only one major river the
Pripyat that flows from west to east provides access to the interior (CMH 104-5)
The Germans were taken by surprise during the early rain in the late fall The lack of
knowledge of the terrain and muddy season halted their military operations The roads became
soft which resulted in a pile up of the German re-supply vehicles The Germans underestimated
the road conditions and failed to take into consideration the rainy season The Germans fighting
ill Russian soil wonltl have been in a beller position to withstand the physical and psychological
strain involved if they had been previously subjected to thorough training in Russian terrain
(CMH 104-2)
The Germans were moving quickly and smashing their way along Russian highways The
Germans kept extending their lines of communication by smashing their way north through the
Smolensk-Moscow highway Von Bock and Von Kluge split their forces and kept heading
slnlight lo Moscow Von Bock split his forces further and sent them northeast towards Kalinin
13
and the majority to Mozhaisk which was sixty-five miles from Moscow Von Kluge sent one of
his largest task forces towards Gzhatsk another one towards Malo-Yaroslavetz and his last task
force towards Tula which was south of Moscow By extending their lines of communication the
Germans experienced difficulty in re-supplying themselves with fuel and ammunition The
Germans were moving through the Smolensk-Moscow and Tula-Moscow highways quickly and
with confidence that they would reach their objective The lines of communications were hard
and long to protect from vicious assault by Russian partisans working in the German rear (Kerr
50)
On November 16 1941 the Germans launched their final assault towards Moscow By
this phase of winter it was cold and the terrain was solidly frozen Temperatures were below 20
degrees and casuaHies from cold weather injuries were rising The Soviets initiated a massive
counter-offensive against the German Army deployed on the Moscow axis on December 5
(Glantz 97) As the Germans got closer to Moscow the Soviet defensive lines stopped them On
December 5 194] the Whermacht Conunanders decided to stop their attacks The German
battle report testified The soldiers fighting capacity is on the verge of exhaustion and it is
impossible more to expect performance ofdifficult tasks (web serpukhovsu)
The Gtrman AlHIY begclll its inilial assault on Moscow 30 September 1941 On the 6th of
October snow began to fall followed by a rain pattern that would be repeated until carly
December The ever-deepening river of mud slowed the German advance By the 3rd of October
the Nuzi b1itzkricg vas almost at a stand stilL middot[his allowed the Russians to fight them on almost
even ground for the first time By the 7th ofNovember freezing cold had set in signaling the start
of the Russian winter The invasion plan did not include a winter plan an oversight that would
1Ol HH GtIII1WIS dtady in the Baille [Of Moscow On the night of 4 December the temperature
14
dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not
fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were
astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat
ineffective
Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the
first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out
as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of
cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and
motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero
(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On
December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal
under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow
and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies
could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold
It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect
After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and
equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian
counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by
the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~
from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and
could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly
designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions
15
Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements
hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of
locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few
available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians
must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled
units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give
them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to
exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)
Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized
and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their
useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet
winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began
they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and
h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning
of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer
Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million
ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth
of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and
7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-
German surrender in April of 1945
16
The Opposing View
The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December
1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my
opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy
the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than
those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the
ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat
The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with
all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to
he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision
of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand
years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his
inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to
impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed
opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys
nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse
The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final
Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews
bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during
WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven
17
many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass
uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies
Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and
it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the
sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over
such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy
supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff
asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once
the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the
Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High
immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by
Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in
The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t
(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)
discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved
invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall
fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl
Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war
with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of
Victory signifying the political feelings of the day
18
A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding
offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks
regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The
Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the
Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons
learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so
overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an
txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter
months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely
separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not
1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned
Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers
were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the
Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had
reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man
Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history
would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the
knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury
In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army
19
that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly
indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth
Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case
the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred
While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a
they suffered in The Battle for Moscow
20
WORKS CITED
New York St Martin s Press 1986
===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s
Washington DC 1986
Washington DC 1986
Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military
Reviev 97 D ecember 1991
Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944
Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk
Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and
Day 1975
Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969
History 1987
13
and the majority to Mozhaisk which was sixty-five miles from Moscow Von Kluge sent one of
his largest task forces towards Gzhatsk another one towards Malo-Yaroslavetz and his last task
force towards Tula which was south of Moscow By extending their lines of communication the
Germans experienced difficulty in re-supplying themselves with fuel and ammunition The
Germans were moving through the Smolensk-Moscow and Tula-Moscow highways quickly and
with confidence that they would reach their objective The lines of communications were hard
and long to protect from vicious assault by Russian partisans working in the German rear (Kerr
50)
On November 16 1941 the Germans launched their final assault towards Moscow By
this phase of winter it was cold and the terrain was solidly frozen Temperatures were below 20
degrees and casuaHies from cold weather injuries were rising The Soviets initiated a massive
counter-offensive against the German Army deployed on the Moscow axis on December 5
(Glantz 97) As the Germans got closer to Moscow the Soviet defensive lines stopped them On
December 5 194] the Whermacht Conunanders decided to stop their attacks The German
battle report testified The soldiers fighting capacity is on the verge of exhaustion and it is
impossible more to expect performance ofdifficult tasks (web serpukhovsu)
The Gtrman AlHIY begclll its inilial assault on Moscow 30 September 1941 On the 6th of
October snow began to fall followed by a rain pattern that would be repeated until carly
December The ever-deepening river of mud slowed the German advance By the 3rd of October
the Nuzi b1itzkricg vas almost at a stand stilL middot[his allowed the Russians to fight them on almost
even ground for the first time By the 7th ofNovember freezing cold had set in signaling the start
of the Russian winter The invasion plan did not include a winter plan an oversight that would
1Ol HH GtIII1WIS dtady in the Baille [Of Moscow On the night of 4 December the temperature
14
dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not
fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were
astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat
ineffective
Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the
first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out
as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of
cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and
motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero
(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On
December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal
under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow
and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies
could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold
It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect
After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and
equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian
counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by
the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~
from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and
could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly
designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions
15
Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements
hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of
locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few
available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians
must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled
units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give
them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to
exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)
Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized
and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their
useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet
winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began
they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and
h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning
of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer
Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million
ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth
of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and
7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-
German surrender in April of 1945
16
The Opposing View
The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December
1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my
opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy
the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than
those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the
ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat
The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with
all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to
he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision
of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand
years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his
inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to
impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed
opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys
nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse
The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final
Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews
bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during
WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven
17
many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass
uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies
Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and
it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the
sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over
such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy
supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff
asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once
the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the
Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High
immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by
Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in
The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t
(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)
discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved
invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall
fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl
Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war
with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of
Victory signifying the political feelings of the day
18
A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding
offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks
regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The
Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the
Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons
learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so
overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an
txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter
months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely
separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not
1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned
Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers
were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the
Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had
reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man
Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history
would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the
knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury
In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army
19
that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly
indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth
Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case
the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred
While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a
they suffered in The Battle for Moscow
20
WORKS CITED
New York St Martin s Press 1986
===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s
Washington DC 1986
Washington DC 1986
Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military
Reviev 97 D ecember 1991
Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944
Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk
Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and
Day 1975
Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969
History 1987
14
dropped to -25 F The German panzers would not start and machine guns and artillery would not
fire because the lubricants and oils used had congealed Casualties [rom frostbite were
astounding and the extreme cold quickly sapped the soldiers strength rendering them combat
ineffective
Marshall Timoshenko stated The great danger [or the German Command is that the
first big change in the weather will knock out all oftheir motorized equipment We must hold out
as long and in any way possible but immediately go over to the attack when the first few days of
cold have broken the back of the German forces This backbone consists of the tanks and
motorized artillery that will become useless when the temperature hits 20 [F] below zero
(Ziemke Bauer 66) By 5 December the Gelman Army was at a complete standstilL On
December 6th with the temperature dipping to -38 F the German Army began its withdrawal
under the cover of darkness Before the October rains they had expected to overrun Moscow
and be home by Christmas The number of frostbite cases rose to almost 1500 per day Supplies
could not be delivered by vehicle only the Soviet locomotives could operate in the extreme cold
It was becoming increasingly clear that the German Army was demoralized in every aspect
After all how could they fight without food clothing and shelter and willi weapons and
equipment that were useless under the onslaught of the Russian winter All this and the Russian
counter-offensive was yet to begin The Soviet Army did not face the problems encountered by
the Germans mainly because lhey were usiug seasoned velenlS uf [ht ussian willitl Soldit~
from Siberia and the Russian Steppes Mountains were well adapted to the harsh conditions and
could function normally in such extreme weather Soviet cquipment and weapons were speciaJly
designed for use under the most severtgt conctilions
15
Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements
hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of
locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few
available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians
must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled
units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give
them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to
exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)
Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized
and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their
useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet
winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began
they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and
h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning
of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer
Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million
ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth
of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and
7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-
German surrender in April of 1945
16
The Opposing View
The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December
1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my
opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy
the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than
those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the
ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat
The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with
all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to
he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision
of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand
years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his
inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to
impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed
opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys
nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse
The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final
Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews
bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during
WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven
17
many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass
uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies
Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and
it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the
sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over
such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy
supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff
asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once
the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the
Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High
immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by
Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in
The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t
(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)
discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved
invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall
fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl
Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war
with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of
Victory signifying the political feelings of the day
18
A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding
offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks
regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The
Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the
Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons
learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so
overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an
txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter
months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely
separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not
1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned
Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers
were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the
Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had
reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man
Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history
would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the
knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury
In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army
19
that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly
indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth
Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case
the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred
While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a
they suffered in The Battle for Moscow
20
WORKS CITED
New York St Martin s Press 1986
===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s
Washington DC 1986
Washington DC 1986
Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military
Reviev 97 D ecember 1991
Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944
Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk
Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and
Day 1975
Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969
History 1987
15
Field Marshall Kluge stated in his messages to higher headquarters All movements
hurdened hy enormous snowdrifts Rai l transport is stall ed for the same reason and the loss of
locomotives owing to freezing increases the problem The snow stops the shifting of the few
available reserves For the above reasons all time schedules are meaningless The Russians
must contend with the same difficulties but their mobile well-equipped cavalry ski and sled
units (the latter used to bring rations and fodder to the cavalry and to transport the infantry) give
them tactical advantages that together with larger manpower reserves they are now trying to
exploit operationally ( Ziemke Rauer 101)
Never again would the German Army enjoy the great successes of the past Demoralized
and beaten by an enemy they could not fight they had no choice but to retreat leaving their
useless broken equipment behind The German Commanders had not planned for the Soviet
winter That proved to be their undoing Only 29 miles from Moscow when the winter began
they would get no closer On 6 December 1941 the Battle for Moscow was forever lost and
h~glf11he end ofth~ gre81 Germ~n war machine s quest for world domination At the heginning
of the Battle for Moscow the German offensive consisted of 119 Infantry Divisions 19 Panzer
Divisions 15 Motorized Divisions 12 Romanian Divisions 18 Finnish Divisions over 3 million
ohJiers GOOOOO HlOlOf vehides 3500 tanks awJ 1000 aitmiddotefa[t TIle RUSSlll f0r(~eS had strfngth
of 5 million soldiers 77 Divisions 6 Armored Divisions 6 Cavalry Divisions 20000 tanks and
7000 combat aircraft By the end of the Battle for Moscow the German Army had lost over one-
German surrender in April of 1945
16
The Opposing View
The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December
1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my
opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy
the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than
those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the
ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat
The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with
all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to
he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision
of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand
years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his
inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to
impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed
opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys
nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse
The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final
Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews
bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during
WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven
17
many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass
uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies
Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and
it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the
sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over
such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy
supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff
asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once
the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the
Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High
immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by
Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in
The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t
(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)
discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved
invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall
fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl
Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war
with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of
Victory signifying the political feelings of the day
18
A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding
offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks
regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The
Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the
Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons
learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so
overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an
txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter
months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely
separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not
1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned
Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers
were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the
Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had
reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man
Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history
would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the
knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury
In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army
19
that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly
indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth
Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case
the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred
While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a
they suffered in The Battle for Moscow
20
WORKS CITED
New York St Martin s Press 1986
===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s
Washington DC 1986
Washington DC 1986
Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military
Reviev 97 D ecember 1991
Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944
Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk
Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and
Day 1975
Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969
History 1987
16
The Opposing View
The Battle of Moscow during World War II Specifically 30 September to 5 December
1941 The German defeat is often explained as the result of the weather and terrain but it is my
opinion that the rea~on for defeat was Adolph Hitler and the poor military deci~ion making hy
the German Military The casualties recorded by the Germans were high but not higher than
those recorded by the Russian Army History shows us as well as reports from soldiers on the
ground that being overwhelmed by extreme cold did not cause the defeat
The German decision to invade Russia OPERATION TYPHOON was not popular with
all members of the German High Command Adolph Hitler and his thinking at the time need to
he looked at The hook he wrote whi le in jail in the 1920 ~ MlEN KAivfPF spell out his vision
of the Third Reich He thought of the Third Reich as a Reich that would last for a thousand
years Thomas Mann wrote of a man who confounds his hysteria with artistic sensibility his
inner confusion with deep thinking cmd withoHt the least doubt or rompundiol undertakes to
impose upon a pcople with a intellectual tradition as great as Germanys his own thick-headed
opinions With this basic explanation of Hitler we can draw parallels to the German Armys
nefelt lnr discount weather as the significmt ~mse
The downfall of the Third Reich began early in the war The Third Reichs Final
Solution to the Jewish problem was especially important The worsening treatmcnt of the Jews
bodied men willing to fight for Germany There were many German Jews that fought during
WWI and there would have been many that would have fought for Germany again Eleven
17
many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass
uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies
Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and
it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the
sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over
such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy
supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff
asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once
the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the
Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High
immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by
Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in
The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t
(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)
discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved
invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall
fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl
Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war
with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of
Victory signifying the political feelings of the day
18
A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding
offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks
regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The
Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the
Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons
learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so
overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an
txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter
months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely
separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not
1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned
Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers
were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the
Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had
reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man
Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history
would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the
knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury
In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army
19
that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly
indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth
Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case
the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred
While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a
they suffered in The Battle for Moscow
20
WORKS CITED
New York St Martin s Press 1986
===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s
Washington DC 1986
Washington DC 1986
Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military
Reviev 97 D ecember 1991
Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944
Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk
Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and
Day 1975
Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969
History 1987
17
many other scientists not only put Germany behind in producing some types of weapons of mass
uestruction it also propdJeu the United States anu other Allies
Precise military planning had always been a point of pride within the German Army and
it was evident in their long list of victories Failure to take into consideration the terrain and the
sheer vastness of Russia would prove signifilanL Vvnen wnsiuering military operations over
such vast distances you must first consider your logistic trail Outrunning your logistical reshy
supply or lines of communication is unforgivable considering the capabilities of the staff
asselilhleu for this particular opefation Perhaps the problem lay within Hitler s meuuling Once
the German High Command started the planning for the Invasion ofRussia Hitler had the
Wehnnacht conduct a parallel planning session for the same operation in secret When the High
immediately implemented the Wehrmaeht plan This would be the first of many such actions by
Hitler that completely weakened the trust and confidence the senior military leadership had in
The intelligence preparation for OPERATION TY PHOON contain d a poor assessmet t
(lrtroop strength and the cap3hility oft e Rtlsgi~tl Ann) Thfgt Siberi[llt Wi~rf~ compiF)
discounted as part of the force Their special 1raining and battle-hardened skills proved
invaluable The failure of the Germans to consider the partisan effort as part of the overall
fighling force cosllhem dearly on lllClJlpOWer estimaks Josf SI OLll (he se [-proth111rl
Commander ofthc Armed Forces of Russia cultivated a stTong national pride by calling the war
with Germany The great patriotic war proved to be very effective The pride and fervor of
Victory signifying the political feelings of the day
18
A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding
offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks
regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The
Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the
Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons
learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so
overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an
txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter
months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely
separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not
1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned
Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers
were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the
Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had
reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man
Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history
would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the
knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury
In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army
19
that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly
indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth
Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case
the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred
While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a
they suffered in The Battle for Moscow
20
WORKS CITED
New York St Martin s Press 1986
===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s
Washington DC 1986
Washington DC 1986
Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military
Reviev 97 D ecember 1991
Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944
Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk
Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and
Day 1975
Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969
History 1987
18
A through study of military history is a prerequisite for any successful commanding
offictr Tht Gt1Blan Miljtary8 failufc to nAuuK NapukuIlS udcai auu uihcr usdul batiks
regarding the same set of circumstances were also contributing factors to the defeat The
Russians learned not to discount terrain and the indigenous soldier through their battle with the
Finns in 1918-19 This loss by the Russians and the failure ofthe Germans to take those lessons
learned showed cause and effect of history repeating itself Had the Germans not been so
overconfident in a quick defeat over the Russians they may have planned and provided for an
txenutu tngag ntnL This would have maut them consider exknded combat into the winter
months The shortened days sparse population (leaving no built shelters) and the widely
separated roads were all factors in Napoleons defeat in Russia The use of military history not
1111) provides 11S lih inleiligence but also valuable pictures of lessons harned
Upon final review Adolph Hitler s arrogance and complete disregard for his soldiers
were the deciding factors in the German defeat at Moscow His failure to believe the truth of the
Colonel General Hoepner of the German High Cornn and stated that the German Army had
reahed its peak in October The policy Hitler instituted that called for resisting to the last man
Most of the weather related easnalties could have been preventen jf a quick review of history
would have taken place While the weather during the winter of 1941 was formidable the
knew it then or later was Adolph Hilkr and all his fury
In conclusion by all historical accounts the Russian winter not a superior Russian Army
19
that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly
indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth
Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case
the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred
While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a
they suffered in The Battle for Moscow
20
WORKS CITED
New York St Martin s Press 1986
===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s
Washington DC 1986
Washington DC 1986
Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military
Reviev 97 D ecember 1991
Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944
Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk
Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and
Day 1975
Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969
History 1987
19
that are clearly evident in The Battle for Moscow but both German and Russian accounts clearly
indicate that the Russian vinter accounted ror the tum of events in the Russians favor Roth
Armies clearly make reference to the fact that they counted on the weather in Germanys case
the weather to tum the tide ofbatlle in their ravor and that is e acHy what occurred
While both sides endured many hardships and lost thousands of men the weather took a
they suffered in The Battle for Moscow
20
WORKS CITED
New York St Martin s Press 1986
===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s
Washington DC 1986
Washington DC 1986
Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military
Reviev 97 D ecember 1991
Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944
Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk
Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and
Day 1975
Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969
History 1987
20
WORKS CITED
New York St Martin s Press 1986
===-=--===--=--==-=a=n=d--S-wa=m=p Center for Military History --s
Washington DC 1986
Washington DC 1986
Glantz David M Halting of the German Juggernaut Moscow December 1941 Military
Reviev 97 D ecember 1991
Kerr Walter Boardman The Russian Army Massachusetts Plimpton Press 1944
Hitlers rVfistakes lJev Y crk
Macksey Kenneth The Partisan of Europe in the Second World War New York Stein and
Day 1975
Zhukov Georgi K Marshal Zhukov s Greatest Battles New York Evanston 1969
History 1987