BATTLE BOOK - GMT GamesWithout belaboring the point, his men were right. With a screen of skirmishers in advance and to the side, the gringos started down the road towards the resacas

1Gringo! Battle Book

© 2004 GMT Games, LLC

© 2004 GMT Games, LLCP.O. Box 1308, Hanford, CA 93232-1308www.GMTGames.com #0306

BATTLE BOOK

The Battles of:

Monterey • Buena Vista

Cerro Gordo • El Molino del Rey

and Chapultepec

2 Gringo! Battle Book


The War with Mexico is not a topic that excites admiration in toomany minds, especially in these days of political correctness. With-out going into all the pros and cons of why we were there in the firstplace, suffice to say both sides had a lot to be unhappy about. ThatPresident Polk, with Zach Taylor’s help, pushed the situation overthe edge, is pretty much a given. Then again, Mexico, with her po-litical stew at its usual boil, did not exactly shrink from wading in.As a matter of fact, opinion below the Rio Grande—and throughoutmuch of the Western world—was that the small and fractured U.S.Army would be a push-over for Mexico’s far larger, European-trained and armed force.

Whatever, Mexico still considered Texas part of Mexico, even thoughit was now a U.S. state. So, in May of 1846, with a prod from Presi-dent Paredes, Mexico’s commanding general, the unfortunate butnot totally incapable, Mariano Arista, took his Army of the North,crossed the Rio Grande, and headed into United States territory fora confrontation. Arista had executed a turning maneuver againstTaylor’s army at Fort Brown/Matamoros, by crossing the Rio Grandedown river in an effort to seize Taylor’s supplies at Port Isabel. Un-fortunately for Arista, Taylor countered the move rather quickly bygetting between Arista and the gulf and then heading south towardsthe Mexican army.

The US Army of Observation was a division-sized force of US regu-lars under “Old Rough and Ready”, Zachary Taylor, a man of im-mense courage and even larger political ambitions, but a tacticianof somewhat minimal military perception. His usual theory was totake everything with a bayonet charge, and he had a poor apprecia-tion of the marvelous artillery he had been given and had a simi-larly dim conception of logistics. His peers may have thought littleof him, but his men loved him. Not something the Mexicans couldsay about their generals.

Most US “survey” texts tend to place Arista’s Mexicans at about6000 to Taylor’s 2200+. While the latter figure is pretty much unas-sailable, the Mexican numbers are not so sacrosanct. In fact, allMexican sources state Arista had only about 3700 men! As 6000would be accurate only if all the Mexican line regiments were up topaper strength—which they almost never were, added to whichArista left a sizeable force behind at Matamoros—we have optedfor a Mexican army of just under 4000 or so. Regardless, troopnumbers were almost totally irrelevant at the first major engage-ment of the war, for Palo Alto was an artillery battle in almost itsentirety. Unfortunately for the Mexicans, all the good stuff was onthe wrong side of the field.

The Mexicans deployed in a rather extended—and thin—line acrossthe road south to the Rio Grande, just north of a large growth oftrees (Palo Alto means “tall timber”, or something to that effect).Taylor, who insisted on approaching the Mexicans complete with arather huge wagon train, deployed in the face of the Mexicans. Bothsides expected a classic, frontal battle—it was not to be.

The Mexicans opened with a few desultory artillery shots, all ofwhich hit the ground and bounced with such minimal impetus thatthe deployed US regulars simply avoided them by stepping aside.Then the US artillery opened up. The “flying” field and horse artil-lery of Sam Ringgold and John Duncan moved and fired so rapidly,and to such accurate effect, that the Mexicans could not believetheir eyes. After standing there and getting pounded for some time,Arista finally ordered Torrejon to charge the US right and changethe impetus of the battle. Off went Torrejon’s men…but before theycould arrive, Garland swung the 5th infantry around and into Square,successfully beating off Torrejon’s charge. It was then further dis-rupted by some counter-charging Dragoons.

As Torrejon trotted back to the Mexican lines, some burning wadsfrom Duncan’s guns lit a grass fire several hundred yards in front of

Historical BackgroundTaylor and Northern Mexico (Monterey and Buena Vista)



the US lines, starting a wall of grass fire that spread westward to-wards the road. With the billowing smoke providing cover, bothsides re-dressed their lines, with the Mexicans attempting to swingtheir right forward in an oblique manner and both sides, in effect,each wheeling about 30º. However, all this achieved was that, whenthe smoke lifted, the Mexican infantry was closer to the US guns,which now proceeded to rain destruction on the Mexican right winginfantry as it crossed in front of them. This put most of the Mexicanright into a full retreat, and Arista’s request for a second Torrejoncharge came to naught.

Short of artillery ammunition, his men in a state of virtual shock,Arista chose discretion over valor and withdrew from the field. TheMexicans had lost some 350 men; the rest were almost totally de-moralized. US losses were limited to five deaths, but the Mexicanarmy was still intact (their retreat was quite orderly) and they stillheld the road. Unfortunately, one of the US losses was Major SamuelRinggold, their brilliant artillerist, who had his entire groin areashot out by a Mexican cannonball as he stood up in the stirrups ofhis horse. Ouch.

After Palo Alto, Arista marched his rather dispirited army some 20miles south, down the road, to what his engineers determined wouldbe a far better defensive position: a broad “resaca” that cut acrossboth roads south…a position virtually covered by dense chaparraland approachable only at a difficult angle. The Mexicans called thisResaca de Guerrero; the gringos chose the name by which the north-ernmost channel was known: de la Palma.

The Mexican position was quite good…so good that Ampudia andseveral of Arista’s staff convinced Arista that the Americans wouldnever attack such an unassailable position, especially outnumberedas they were. So, Arista deployed to cover both possible approachesand then sat down in his tent to write a few letters and reports. Un-fortunately for Arista, several things were now conspiring to workagainst both him and his army:

•• His men had not eaten a half-decent meal in a day;

•• Most, if not all, of his men were totally demoralized by what theyhad seen of the US artillery. Few had any desire to see them inaction again. (Arista’s staff had chosen this location just for thatreason, that it effectively limited the offensive effectiveness ofthe US guns.);

•• Arista’s deployment left his left wing totally hanging, mostlybecause he was advised—and believed—that Taylor could notget any men into this area;

•• The chaparral-covered terrain almost totally nullified Arista’s tre-mendous advantage in cavalry; and, of course, there was always…

•• Pedro de Ampudia. Stung that the “government” had given com-mand to Arista and not him, the unabashedly fame-and-office seek-ing Ampudia apparently spent most of the battle playing Iago,whispering all sorts of lies into Arista’s ear. Then again, Aristacould have taken a peek outside his tent to see what all the shoot-ing was about.

Into this nest of defanged vipers walked Taylor’s army, somewhatreduced in strength because his subordinates had talked Zach intoleaving the wagons to the rear, which required a guard…some guns(all those over 6-pounder level), some infantry (the Artillery battal-ion), and some cavalry (Kerr’s dragoons). Taylor’s advance scoutsreported that Arista’s new position appeared, as advertised,untakeable, especially given the relative strengths of the armies. A

quick council of war was held, with Taylor’s advisors about splitdown the middle between aggression and caution. However, whenTaylor—always a sucker for the basic principle of “…when in doubt,just slam right up the middle and hope the bayonet carries the day”—heard that his men felt that, having prevailed rather easily the daybefore, they would have no problem winning again, he ordered hisarmy to attack.

Without belaboring the point, his men were right. With a screen ofskirmishers in advance and to the side, the gringos started down theroad towards the resacas. Part of the 5th US filtered through thechaparral at the western edge of the resaca, while the rest of thesmall army moved forward under heavy, and often effective, fire.After skirmishers unmasked the Mexican batteries at the center,batteries whose guns were taking their toll on the slowly advancingNorth Americans, Charles May’s dragoons were ordered to chargethem. They did, knocking most of the Mexican gunners to the side.But their momentum carried them far beyond their target, acrossthe resacas and halfway to Mexico. May’s men had to turn aroundand then fight their way back through Diaz de la Vega’s infantry,which had reformed behind them. In doing so, May’s bugler grabbedhold of General Vega himself, taking him prisoner…for which Maythen took the credit.

Taylor was not overly happy at May’s failure and now orderedBelknap’s infantry in to “… take those guns, and, by God, keepthem.” This meant, of course, Taylor’s favorite tactic, the bayonetassault…and it was a fearful one, with Mexicans and North Ameri-cans slugging it out in the resacas in desperate, hand-to-hand fight-ing. When the Mexican line started to waver, a final US assaultbroke it… and the entire Mexican center collapsed.



By this time, Arista, still in his tent finishing off his correspondence(Ampudia having insisted that all the noise he was hearing was justsome skirmishing with advance scouts), smelled a rat… especiallywhen half his army streamed by his tent in overdrive. Finally alertedthat there was a battle on, he grabbed Torrejon’s lancers and or-dered a charge, himself in the lead. Well, most of Torrejon’s mendidn’t see any advantage in that sort of thing; most of them trottedin a halfhearted way towards the oncoming gringos, a few actuallyran some Americanos through with their lances, and then they allturned and headed back to the Rio Grande. And with US infantrynow showing up on his rear left flank (having scratched and choppedtheir way through the chaparral), Arista, too, took off… also at topspeed. It was First Mexican to the Rio Grande Wins the Piñadatime… and the first, but not the last, excellent opportunity to dealthe gringos a hard blow drowned in the Rio Grande along with hun-dreds of routing Mexicans.

US losses, this time, were not so inconsequential—over 100 deadand wounded—as the fighting in the resacas had been brutal. Givenan opportunity to fight, the Mexican regular “Line” units had shownthey could be tough. Arista’s army, though, was finished as a fight-ing force, at least for the time being. Reports of losses at the Resacaran from 600 to 1200+. Even worse, the average Mexican foot sol-dier now didn’t know who to fear most: the gringos, their artillery,or his own comic-opera commanders.

With no viable enemy army in sight, Taylor now headed into Mexico.

Now that two battles had been fought, the US Congress finally gotaround to declaring war, which then enabled them to ship more troopsto Taylor. These turned out to be, for the most part, hordes of un-trained and unfit states volunteers. The volunteers were roundlydespised by the regulars, and, for the most part, with good reason.They knew little of organized warfare; even worse, they knew noth-ing about maintaining a healthy camp. Taylor managed to get mostof the three-month short-termers sent back, but, of those who stayed,far too many died of disease and exposure.

Arista had retreated towards Monterey, the capital of Nuevo Léon,considered the key to defending the most important city in northernMexico, Saltillo. Arista estimated he would need at least 7000 more

men to even start to prepare a defense, but his opinion was no longerneeded, as the political winds in Mexico City had shifted yet again.The new president of Mexico was Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna,self-styled “Napoleon of the West”. Arista was out; Francisco Mejía,who made Ampudia look good (see the notes on Mejía in theMonterey Order of Battle), was in.

Well, he was for a while. Most of the survivors from the two Maybattles filtered down to Monterey, where they sat while Santa Annasuggested Saltillo would be a better place to take a defensive stand.Mejía, however, took ill—something he did better than anythingelse—to be replaced by the omnipresent Ampudia, who smelled agood opportunity to make some political hay with a spirited de-fense of Monterey. So he began to troll the “presidios” for troopswhile Santa Anna sent up some reinforcements from Mexico City.Ampudia also began to build the defenses around the town, mostlywith civilian help, as Santa Anna’s reinforcements wouldn’t arriveuntil the end of August. And while all this was going on, Taylorfinally decided to move his army south.

By mid-September, Taylor’s army of 5795 men (not including of-ficers) was approaching Monterey. The army was no longer com-pletely “professional”, as it had been at Palo Alto and Resaca; now,almost half of it was comprised of volunteer units. At about thesame time, Ampudia had managed to amass a somewhat motley,but willing, force of 7300 or so men, about 2300 of whom had seenaction against Taylor’s army before. Despite outnumbering (albeitslightly) the Americans, the literal numbers were misleading. Twentypercent of Ampudia’s army was cavalry, which would be useless inany fighting inside the city. Moreover, defending the city requiredholding far too many key points, thereby stretching an already thinforce even thinner. As formidable as the defenses of Montereylooked, at some point they were going to be vulnerable.

And formidable they were, indeed. The city, itself, was ringed bysteep mountains to the east, south and west; only the north wasapproachable. The linchpin of the city’s defense was the hugeCiudadela—The Citadel, which commanded all approaches fromthe North, and whose guns reached virtually all quarters of the city.The Black Fort, as it was known, was also considered impregnable.Directly to the west of the city was Independence Hill, on top ofArista

Ampudia



which the Mexicans had built a redan which led down to theObispado, an abandoned Bishop’s Palace with more thick walls thatdirectly overlooked the city. And across the Santa Catarina River,which flowed by the southern edge of the city, was another ridgewith redans and fortifications, Federation Hill. Both of these hillsguarded not only the western approach to Monterey but the Mexi-can lines of communication to Saltillo. Other fortifications had beenconstructed along the northeastern edge of the city—at La Tenéria(so-named for the abandoned tannery that guarded its open end)and El Rincon del Diablo—and barricades and têtes-de-pont hadbeen constructed within the city. The city itself consisted mainly ofone-story, flat-roofed adobe houses—many with iron-barred win-dows and heavy, wooden doors— which had now been sandbaggedand loopholed for further defensive benefits. It was a city that couldbe held by a determined, well-commanded garrison. Ampudia, how-ever, was not the man to provide such leadership.

Taylor divided his army into two sections, as he planned to executea double envelopment from east and west. The first, under the com-mander of the 2nd Division, William Worth, consisted of that divi-sion plus Hays’ Texas Rangers. This column was to seize the west-ern defenses to the city and cut-off communications with Saltillo.The rest of the army, two divisions, would hit the city from its north-eastern edge. Considering that this was not a field battle, but anassault on a well-defended city, the plan showed some rather un-Taylor-like aggressive creativity.

Worth’s division set out on the afternoon of the 20th, slowly work-ing its way westward towards Independencia. Mexican outpostsquickly relayed the news of the American movements to Ampudiawho, after some thought, hurried a few more men onto the hill andthen ordered Romero’s cavalry brigade to keep the Saltillo roadopen. By 6 AM the morning of the 21st, Worth’s column was againon the move. As they rounded the bend and headed towards theroad they were greeted by a charge from the Jalisco Lancers andGuanajuato Activos, which was driven back by accurate fire fromthe Texas Rangers and Worth’s batteries.

Worth now decided to seize the Mexican position across the riveron Federation Hill. A small group of some 300 infantry waded acrossthe hip-deep Santa Catarina under fire from the western redan and,by noon, had worked its way through the trees to the base of thehill. As they caught their collective breaths and prepared for theprecipitously uphill assault, Worth sent the rest of his 2nd brigadeto join them. Scaling the heights from both the west and south theattackers, led by Colonel Persifor Smith, quickly subdued the de-fenders of the redan, captured one of the guns and turned it on ElSoldado, at the eastern end, which had no guns with which to reply.By mid afternoon, Worth held Federation Hill and the Saltillo Road,the latter despite several more attempts by the Mexican cavalry todrive them off.

Things had not progressed quite so well on the other side of the city.Taylor had ordered John Garland to take Twiggs’ Division and “dem-onstrate” against the eastern end of the town. (Why Garland and notTwiggs? See the notes in the Order of Battle.) The only problemwith this was that Taylor’s request sounded more like an order for adirect assault, so Garland marched his brigade right at the northernedge of the town. Before long they were under heavy fire from theBlack Fort and, when Garland angled his division to the right—towards the Purisma Bridge—they also came under flanking firefrom La Tenéria. This was too much for the volunteers of the Wash-ington and Baltimore Battalion, who broke for the rear while theremaining men headed into the city.

Unit cohesion quickly disintegrated as the remaining regiments cameunder heavy Mexican fire. Most of the regulars were forced to with-draw. Ironically, though, one company from the 1st US somehowfound itself in possession of the old tannery building that faced theopen end of the incomplete Fort La Tenéria. Even as Mejia rushedreinforcements into La Tenéria, Taylor, seeing Garland’s units re-treating, ordered John Quitman’s brigade into the assault. Quitman,unlike Garland, swung way to the east, away from the Black Fort,and, by mid-afternoon, pinpointed his attack against La Tenéria.Aided by fire from the 1st US troops in the Tannery, Quitman tookthe fort. That was about as far as the American troops got, as heavyUS losses forestalled any further movements.

Nightfall brought a cold rain, but it did not diminish the expecta-tions and plans of Worth at the western end of the city. By 3 AM, ahand-picked force of regulars under Lt.Col Childs made their wayup the almost cliff-like western slope of Independencia, clawed theirway over the top and overran the redoubt, her defenders streamingback into the safety of the Obispado. Artillery was needed, andWorth’s men now dragged a howitzer, piece by piece, up the cliff,and turned it on the abandoned palace. By late afternoon, the U.S.commanded all the viable approaches to the city.

Ampudia now reverted to an almost laager-like mentality of with-draw and defend. It would be extremely facile to simply say Ampudiawas a coward and had no stomach for an open fight. While Ampudiawas not exactly Horatio at the Bridge, this does not appear to bewhat his reasoning was. Cut off, with his left wing, western de-fenses gone, and with far too many non-line units upon which todepend he assumed a house-to-house style defense, where theywould have stone walls to stiffen their spines, was the best way tohandle the situation. The theory wasn’t all that bad; Ampudia sim-ply didn’t have the resiliency or courage of his own convictions tocarry it through to a conclusion.

On the morning of the 23rd, Quitman, under Taylor’s orders beganto cautiously filter his troops across the canal—and the abandonedMexican positions—and into the city. Taylor, himself, joined theadvance at about 11 AM, and, by 2 P.M., they were only a fewblocks away from the main plaza. Here they stopped, Taylor fear-ing even greater losses than his troops were already taking in theheavily defended inner city.

Santa Anna



To the west, however, things were different. Worth, hearing the gun-fire to the east, assumed it was a signal to attack. He formed twocolumns, each advancing eastward along the two main streets run-ning into the city. Resistance, as expected, was fierce. The Mexi-cans contested each house, each street, and each block. The Ameri-cans abandoned the idea of advancing down the streets and decidedto go directly through the walls. Grabbing six-pounder shells fromthe guns they dug small holes in the common walls of the buildings,lit a short fuse, and waited for the explosive results. It was slowgoing—but it was sure. House by exploding house, Worth’s infan-try blew its way into Monterey.

By mid-afternoon, Worth had set up the 10" mortar in the Plaza deSan Antonio, near what appeared to be a cemetery. Shortly after,the gun started lobbing shells towards the center of town and itsrenowned Cathedral. Soon after it achieved its first direct hit,Ampudia asked for a meeting with Taylor. What followed was alengthy two-day palaver in which Ampudia, wily as ever, tried tocon Taylor out of as much of the latter’s victory as he could. Taylorfinally relented to a somewhat unusual quasi-Honors of War situa-tion which allowed the Mexican army to retire and put an ersatztruce in place for several weeks.

Taylor’s army had taken a bad beating, losing close to 9% of itstotal force (whereas the Mexican losses amounted to only 5%). Hisacquiescence to many of Ampudia’s requests can be ascribed to hisrealization that his army could probably not have survived anotherday of attacking… which leads one to wonder what would havehappened if Ampudia had shown somewhat more spine than anamoeba. As it was, Ampudia was a beaten man, and it was Taylor’smistake to not recognize the tremendous advantage that gave him.Regardless, Taylor should also have known that his “truce” was apolitical disaster—Polk’s cabinet was not only aghast, they instantlyrepudiated the whole thing—as well as operationally unsound.

As far as President Polk and his advisers were concerned, Taylorwas finished. Not only was the Monterey truce untenable, but Tay-lor was starting to show presidential ambitions. More importantly,Winfield Scott had come up with a viable plan to take the war intothe heart of Mexico by invading through Vera Cruz. In order toensure the success of this expedition, though, Scott would need vir-tually all of Taylor’s regulars, which he was now empowered tohave shipped to him in the Gulf. As for Taylor, he was reinforcedwith yet another horde of dismal volunteers and told to stay put inSaltillo. He was not happy.

Santa Anna, however, was gleeful. His scouts had just interceptedan American courier carrying the whole of Scott’s plan—includedthe removal of the regulars—to Taylor. He now had the opportunityto turn momentum in favor of Mexico. With an enemy army to thenorth and an invasion about to arrive in the south, Santa Anna trans-formed himself from the “Napoleon of the West” to the “HaroldGodwinson of Central America”. His plan? Gather a new army,march north, smash the stripped-down and unsuspecting Taylorbefore Scott could land, and then turn his attention to Vera Cruz.

On paper it looked great. Unfortunately, certain aspects of the planseem to have escaped Santa Anna, or at least he pooh-poohed them.Almost half the army was not only newly raised, few—if any—hadany experience or drill of any kind. Symptomatic of this was SantaAnna’s order to not engage in any practice firing of weapons inorder to save ammunition. This meant that several thousand menwent into action without ever having fired their muskets. Even worse,the route chosen by Santa Anna was 100+ miles of more than “hardroad”; it was mostly pitiless desert, terrain even seasoned troopswould have found a hardship. For the auxiliaries, defenserias and “National Guard” units, it was a deathtrap.

Taylor had, at this time, some 4700 men, virtually all of whom werevolunteers, sitting south of Saltillo at the hacienda Buena Vista.While he spent most of early February moving between Buena Vistaand another base, some miles to the south, at Agua Nueva, SantaAnna’s army continued on its march, losing hundreds of men a day.By February 16 its vanguard cavalry had reached Encarnacion, onlya day’s ride from the Americans at Agua Nueva; the bulk of thearmy marched in during the next two days. By this time thousandshad died or deserted, despite Santa Anna’s exhortations and prom-ises of plunder and glory… and if that didn’t work and you werecaught more than a couple of hundred yards from camp, you gotshot on the spot. None of it had much effect, and Santa Anna listedhis strength at Encarnacion at just a little over 15,000 … or threetimes that of the Americans. This, though, was a tired army.

Americans patrols, by now, had spotted the army and sent the alarmto Taylor at Agua Nueva. Taylor now deferred to his second-in-command, John Wool, who had been over this ground before, to notonly pick the place to stand but the disposition of the troops as well.And Wool knew just where that was: the rugged, lunar-like terrainjust south of Buena Vista. The right flank was clearly delimited bya series of gullies whose 20-foot sides were so steep that they effec-tively precluded military movement. To the American left, was awide plateau which was sliced into a half dozen, steep-sided “fin-gers” by difficult, rocky ravines, carved out by eons of running water.Where one of these fingers reached out to the road as it ran by thegullies was La Angostura, or “The Narrows”, a defile only 40 feetacross. It was so easily defendable that Santa Anna would be forcedto flank the American army on the plateau, a task made quite diffi-cult by the ravines they would have to cross to do so.

Pushing his army in an effort to catch the Americans still underpreparation, Santa Anna’s advance screen of cavalry rode onto theopen ground just below La Angostura on the morning of February22nd, asking for a parlay with Taylor (the standard Mexican methodof buying time, one to which the gringos never seemed to catch on).When the Mexican emissary demanded Taylor’s surrender, quitecivilly of course, Taylor replied in rather brusque language, whichhis aide, Major William Bliss, reduced to a most un-Zach like, “Ibeg leave to say that I decline acceding to your request.” The battlewas on.



Wool had deployed the small army so that the Angostura positionwas heavily defended, with the remainder of the units to the left ofthe defile, along the plateau, to guard against what was sure to be aMexican flanking move. Santa Anna, though, was still moving hishuge army—eight large brigades of infantry which he had placed inthree divisions—into position. There were a lot of Mexicans, to besure; the main question was, were they ready to do the job?

Santa Anna first set up his heavy guns on a knoll south of the Ameri-can position, where, at about 2 P.M., they began to send out a roundevery now and then. About an hour later, Mejia’s brigade of activosfeinted towards the American right while Ampudia’s Light Brigadestarted to work its way through the ravines to the south towards themountains and the thinly defended American left. Taylor quicklydispatched William Humphrey with several rifle-armed, mountedvolunteer companies to cover that area, and, at about 3:30, Hum-phreys and Ampudia started a series of small fire-fights as the Mexi-cans tried to get up and around the Kentucky and Arkansas trooperswhile the latter attempted to counter the maneuver. Neither side hadmuch effect on the other, as fire was disorganized while both sidesconcentrated on the difficult terrain. Within an hour or so, darknessbegan to fall and further actions ceased for the night.

Taylor, aware of the presence of Miñon’s cavalry riding around inthe area to the north, now felt it best to return to Saltillo to see howthe garrison there was doing. In case anything was happening—andtrusting that Wool’s dispositions would hold for awhile—he tookwith him Jeff Davis’ Mississippi Rifles as well as May’s dragoons,probably his two best units.

Santa Anna used nightfall to begin to implement his tactical plan.Ampudia’s and Mejia’s probes had shown him what Taylor had,that Angostura was a lost cause, and that the plateau, if attainable,was held by a thinly stretched force of Americans. To that end, heplanned a massive, concentrated assault by almost all of his forceson the American left. Wool, in the meantime, began to strip some ofthe forces from Angostura to help on the plateau. Sherman’s, andhalf of Bragg’s, battery (he had one gun in Saltillo and another acrossthe gullies) remained on the plateau in support, while the rifle com-panies of the Kentucky and Arkansas mounted regiments still heldoff Ampudia along the lower ledges of the mountain. Only Lane’s3rd Indiana was available as a reserve.

At dawn, Ampudia renewed his assault on Humphrey along themountains, while Blanco’s brigade made a half-hearted move to-wards La Angostura, a maneuver which fooled no one. It was adifferent story with Lombardini’s three brigades, all of which movedunder cover of a broad ravine just to the south of the Americans andemerged, in brilliant parade-ground fashion, ready to assault theAmerican line. Right behind them came Pacheco’s very irregularirregulars, moving in behind Lombardini to his right, while the re-maining brigades in Ortega’s division remained just to the rear as aready reserve. About 7000 Mexicans were about to descend on the2nd Indiana and O’Brien’s three guns.

Indiana Brigade commander, Joe Lane, immediately ordered his mento hold at all costs, but his subordinate, William Bowles, either didn’thear this right or didn’t want to hear it. After a heavy exchange offire, he yelled for his men to “… cease fire and retreat!” The Hoo-siers, who had already lost over 15% of their men, instantly brokeand ran, leaving a huge hole between Humphrey’s now-beleagueredtroopers on the mountain and Bissell’s 2nd Illinois …a hole in whichonly O’Brien and his three guns stood. O’Brien had no choice but

to fall back, leaving a previously captured 4-pounder for the on-coming Mexicans. His retrograde move was instantly covered by awall of fire from the 2nd Illinois and Sherman’s battery, as the en-tire American line undertook a slow and disciplined withdrawal ofsome hundred or so yards.

Unfortunately, this move completely isolated the Arkansas and Ken-tucky troopers at the mountain, all of whom now took to their horsesin full flight to the rear. The American left flank no longer existed,and through this huge vacuum swept Juvera’s cavalry, headed forthe thinly defended supply base at the Buena Vista rancho. It wasabout 9 A.M., and Santa Anna’s plan was working perfectly.

It was at about this time that Taylor returned from Saltillo, alongwith May’s dragoons and Davis’ Mississippi Rifles. Taylor quicklytook command at La Angostura and sent Wool to reform the slowlyretreating infantry. Wool ordered Davis to cover the approach to thehacienda while he sent over the 3rd Indiana and one of Bragg’sguns. In the meantime, Steen’s dragoons hastened back to BuenaVista to reinforce the Kentucky and Arkansas troops that had haltedtheir retreat there, only to find their respective commanders, Marshalland Yell, in a shouting match over who had seniority. As Juvera’stroopers galloped to the charge, the command confusion was toomuch, and virtually all of the volunteers took off once again. OnlyYell and a handful of men, plus the dragoons, remained, as Juvera’sbrigade charged home.

The van of the charge was most successful, overrunning the re-maining infantry, killing Yell in the process. But Steen launched animmediate counter-charge at the center of the Mexican column, slic-ing it in half. The front portion overran the hacienda and chargedright into the face of one of Sherman’s guns, which brought themup short in no time. The rear portion of the Mexican cavalry nowfell back in disarray, only to be shelled by more American artilleryfrom the plateau to the south.

Juvera, repulsed at the hacienda, now regrouped what he could andturned to the south to charge the Mississippi Rifles and James Lane’s3rd Indiana. Davis, however, had deployed the two regiments in aninverse “V”, and Juvera’s lancers rode right into it, where the deadlyfire from the rifles shot them to ribbons, routing them into a nearbyravine for cover. It was about this time that, several miles to thenorth, Vincente Miñon’s column of lancers, sent ahead on just thismission, emerged from the mountain passes east of Saltillo andcharged the American garrison at Saltillo: several companies of in-fantry and a couple of guns. The charge was mostly half-hearted…and totally unsuccessful. Major Warren’s troops made short workof Miñon, with the latter beating a hasty retreat back into the moun-tains …yet another opportunity lost to unenthusiastic cavalry work.

Back at Buena Vista, Juvera’s failed flanking maneuver lead to ashort period of inactivity, during which Santa Anna reorganized forthe final, big assault. He moved almost all of his troops over to hisright and sent them back onto the plateau, under Perez. Again, thenumbers were massive, but this time the American line was tighterand reinforced by the well-placed guns of O’Brien and George Tho-mas. Close-ranged, rapid fire chewed huge holes in the Mexicanline. The Mexican soldiers slowed, wavered, and then began to fallback, at which time Colonel John Hardin, assuming it was a full-fledged retreat, ordered a counter-charge by a mixed group of Illi-nois and Kentucky companies. The Mexicans were anything butthrough, however, and a fresh brigade of Mexican infantry metHardin’s assault head-on, killing Hardin and pushing the American



line back, once again. American artillery fire was causing heavycasualties, but the Mexicans were still moving forward as darknessapproached.

It was at this point that Braxton Bragg and his battery arrived. Pushedinto the line with guns blazing, Bragg was told by Taylor to main-tain his position at all costs: “… double-shot your guns and give‘em hell, Bragg.” And that he did. The first round of fire blew awayMexican infantry in bunches, the second stopped them cold, whilea third round sent the entire Mexican line scurrying back for cover.Braxton Bragg, a commander whose men so disliked him that theyonce tried to kill him by rolling a lit shell into his tent, had, in es-sence, used double-shotted volleys to signal the end of the battle.Santa Anna tried to get Torrejon’s brigade to charge the Americanline, but they came under withering flanking fire by Washington’sbatteries, and, as they turned back to the Mexican lines the skiesopened and the rain came down in thick, cold sheets. The Mexicanshad fought well, but the outnumbered Americans, supported mag-nificently by their guns, had held. Both sides were so “played out”that a continuation of battle by either side was highly unlikely.

The casualties were grotesque. The Americans lost almost 15% oftheir men: 665 men killed, wounded (which was as good as beingkilled given the medical skill of the day) and missing. For SantaAnna, the numbers were far worse: 3533 killed, wounded or miss-ing, almost a quarter of his army. (To be sure, 1900 of those werejust “missing” as opposed to being casualties, but the end resultwas the same.)

Santa Anna reported a victory, based on guns and flags captured…an interesting spin on losing one-fourth your army. From a purelytactical viewpoint the battle was a draw, both sides having beenbeaten up so badly that neither could continue. However, from astrategic standpoint, it was a huge American victory. Santa Annawas forced to drag his army back to San Luis Potosí with only some7000 men, less than a third of what he started out with. For Taylor,the victory was bittersweet. Buena Vista had been John Wool’s battle;he set it up, and he directed most of the movements. And, althoughTaylor was, once again, a hero, he was also on the shelf, as the cruxof the war shifted to Scott’s army moving on Mexico City. Both-ered by the relative inactivity, Taylor relinquished command andwent home to Baton Rouge. By fall of 1848 he had been elected12th president of the United States.

DESIGNER’S NOTE: Some of this article appeared, in somewhatdifferent form, in Strategy & Tactics magazine, #212, which, forthose interested in more battles from this war, also contains gameson the first two engagements of the war, Palo Alto and Resaca de laPalma, plus Rio Sacramento. Information can be obtained fromDecision Games.

Gringo! ContentsA complete game of Gringo! contains the following:2 34” x 22” maps (one is backprinted)4 Sheets of die-cut counters

Note: Sheet 2 contains only 240 units1 GBACW System Rules1 Battle Book4 Player Aid Cards1 die (10-sided)

GAME DESIGN: Richard H. Berg

DEVELOPER: John Alsen

ART DIRECTOR: Rodger MacGowan

PACKAGE DESIGN & COUNTER ILLUSTRATIONS: RodgerMacGowan

MAP ARTWORK: Mark Simonitch

COUNTER & RULES LAYOUT: Mark Simonitch

PRODUCTION COORDINATION: Tony Curtis

PRODUCERS: Tony Curtis, Rodger MacGowan, AndyLewis and Mark Simonitch

HEAD OF RESEARCH: Anton Adams

ADDITIONAL OoB RESEARCH: Carleton Andrews

Playtesters for GBACW Version: Anton Adams, Keith Cumisky,Mike Junkin, Derek Batchelor, Jeff Boschmann, PaulGlowacki

PROOF READERS: Elis Simpson, Kevin Duke

CREDITS



(11.8) SQUARESquare is a defensive formation used by infantry unitsto maximize their defensive potential against chargingcavalry. It did make them vulnerable to artillery fire andit was often difficult to get a unit out of Square in any

semblance of cohesion. Square may be formed during Movementor, with some difficulty, in reaction to an enemy infantry attack orcavalry charge.

(11.81) Who May Form Square: The ability to do this is restrictedto units with training. This means the regulars. Only Regular infan-try units may attempt to form Square.

• The US Regular infantry are those units that have no “state” des-ignation. E.g., 2 Ind (2nd Indiana Volunteers) is not a Regularunit. The 1st Arty Regiment is.

• The Mexican Regulars are the Line, Ligero, and Activos units.

PLAY NOTE: Dismounted Regular US cavalry—the Dragoons—may form square. It was part of their Indian fighting training.

(11.82) Forming Square during Movement: Non-disordered Regu-lar infantry units that are not adjacent to an enemy unit, and areunder Advance or Attack Orders, may form Square as part of Move-ment. It costs a unit two (2) MP to form Square. Place a “Square”marker on top of the unit.

(11.83) Standard stacking restrictions apply. If the unit was in LineExtension, simply remove the extender markers when they go intoSquare. In addition, one artillery unit may remain if stacked with aninfantry forming Square, but it may not move into a hex with infan-try in Square. Once stacked in the Square, it may not move out untilthe units leave Square.

(11.84) Forming Square as Reaction: Non-disordered Regular in-fantry units, under Attack or Advance Orders, may attempt to formSquare when in danger of being charged (11.5) by cavalry. The de-cision to do so is made immediately after the charging unit announcesit is doing so, and which hex is the target, but before the cavalryundergoes the Charge UDD (11.54).

The player attempting to form Square, then undertakes a UDD forthe unit:

• Pass means it forms Square• Fail means it does not, and is Disordered.

(11.85) Square Facing. All hexes surrounding a unit in Square areconsidered Frontal.

(11.86) Effects on Combat and Movement Square has the follow-ing effects on combat situations:

• Units in Square subtract one (–1) from pre-Shock DR (not addone, as in 11.55).

• Subtract one (–1) from all combat-related Disordered and Rallydie rolls for units in Square. This does not apply to die rolls forentering/leaving Square.

• Units in Square are treated as Massed Targets, regardless of thenumber of SP’s in the hex.

• Units in Square have a Movement Allowance of one. Not onehex, one MP.

• Units in Square may not Shock, nor may they enter an enemyZOC.

• Units in Square are automatically under Attack Orders, regard-less of what the rest of the Command is doing. However, theycannot use Refuse.

Additional Rules ApplicableTo All Battles

(8.29) Mortars. These rather ungainly looking guns—they re-sembled nothing less than someone trying to blow dinner leftoversout of a big kettle—have some interesting pros and cons, most hav-ing to do with their high trajectory fire.

• They may not fire at any target within a two-hex range.

• They may not combine fire with any other guns.

• Terrain effects against artillery fire are halved, rounding down.Thus, the trenchworks on the plateau just east of at La Angostura(BV) do not affect mortar fire (–1 halved, rounded to ‘0’), butthere is a –1 adjustment if it fires into La Angostura through theparapets of the trench (–2 halved to –1).

• Mortars may fire over blocking terrain that is in the adjacent hex(or Monterey “block”) …as long as that adjacent hex is not en-emy occupied or controlled and there is then a line of sight fromthat adjacent hex/block to the target.

EXAMPLE #1: The US mortar is in Monterey 3443; the US con-trols Loma de Independencia (Independence Hill). The mortar couldfire at a target in 3041, but not one in 2943, because there is noLOS from 3342/3 to the latter.

EXAMPLE #2: The US mortar is in the Plaza de San Antonio(Monterey); there are no Mexican units in either of the two cityblocks directly to the east. The mortar could fire at the Cathedral(on the east edge of the Main Square).

HISTORICAL NOTE: For the most part, mortars were highly in-effective as anti-personnel field guns. They were designed for siegework, although the 10" mortar Taylor had at Monterey was just asineffective against The Black Fort. The 7" mortar included withthe Mexicans at Buena Vista is somewhat speculative, as it doesnot appear in many of the sources. One also wonders what a Mexi-can army trying to move across a desert to engage an enemy armyin a stand-up battle would want with such a gun …but one learnsnever to underestimate the capacity of Santa Anna to surprise.



(11.87) A unit in Square may fire at more than one target/hex. Ifdoing so, the player divides/distributes the firing strength pointsamongst the target hexes in any fashion he wishes, as long as:

1. No target hex may be fired at by more than one-half (1/2) theunit’s strength (even if firing at only one hex!); and

2. The usual 8.31 maximum is now observed for any one target.

EXAMPLE: An 8 SP infantry regiment is in Square. It may fire 4SPs into two different hexes.

(11.88) Leaving Square takes the place of Movement. It also re-quires a Cohesion check die roll to undertake successfully. Roll onedie and compare it to the unit’s Cohesion Rating. Make the follow-ing die roll adjustments:

1. If the unit is Disordered, add one (+1);2. If the unit is adjacent to an enemy unit, add two (+2).3. If the unit is stacked with a leader, subtract two (–2).

If the adjusted die roll is the same as or lower than the unit’s Cohe-sion Rating, the unit successfully leaves Square; if it was Disor-dered while in Square it is no longer Disordered.

If the adjusted die roll is higher, it leaves Square but becomes Dis-ordered. If already Disordered, it Routs. Units leaving Square as-sume their command’s Orders if In Command; if Out of Command,they are under Advance.

(11.89) Units in Square may remain in Square if Disordered.

ANNOTATED SOURCES:BOOKS:Adams, Anton, The War in Mexico (The Emperor’s Press, Chicago 1998). Themost recent work on the war, and a most valuable source, complete with excel-lent maps, OoBs with numbers, and a battle by battle run-through of the pro-ceedings. Also includes extensive discussion on tactics, weapons, and uniforms.Invaluable.

Alcaraz, Ramon (trans by Albert Ramsey), The Other Side (Burt Franklin,N.Y.,1970 reprint of the 1850 edition). The one “Mexican” source we couldreadily get our hands on (Barcena’s “Recuerdos” was unattainable), this one ispretty much a howler …much grandiosity, wringing of hands and laying of blame.The North Americans are greatly despised — something the 1850 US editorsfelt they had to ameliorate with equally politically incorrect statements. Interest-ing to get some of the feel of how Mexico felt (not good). It also contains someexcellent maps (except for the one for Buena Vista, which bears only a passingresemblance to the battlefield), much better Mexican OOB and deployment in-formation for the earlier battles than virtually any other source.

Bauer, K. Jack, The Mexican War, 1846–1848 (U. of Nebraska Press, Lincoln,1992). Probably the best single volume concentrating on mostly the militaryaspects of the war, with far more detail in that area than most other volumes.This reprint of the 1974 edition does correct some of the typos that caused one toblink, but other, similar “wha’s?” remain (notes about which are spread throughthe rules).

Connor, Seymour and Faulk, Odie, North America Divided; The Mexican War1846–1848 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1971). In terms of its narra-tive, just another of those overview books. HOWEVER, the 90+ page annotatedbibliography is magnificent, listed by subject with comments on virtually everybook—US, Mexican, old, recent—on the subject. For that alone, invaluable.

Dillon, Lester R., Jr., American Artillery in the Mexican War, 1846–1847(Presidial Press, Austin, 1975). Interesting little book with some good hard in-formation on the US guns, plus some rather unusual theories on certain battlesand people. He does spot the disparity between the number of Bragg guns at BVand where they were used. He also is of the two-resacas school of thought.

Eisenhower, John S.D., So Far From God (Random House, NY, 1989). The mostrecent of the survey books on the war, and one of the best written. Eisenhower ismore interested in the “why’s and wherefore” …and ramifications if the war. Hedoes come up with unusual numbers, though, and they come without discussion.Interesting, with some good pictures and supporting art. Mediocre maps.

Henry, Robert Selph, The Story of the Mexican War (Da Capo Press, NY, 1950).A well-written, survey book—one of many—that has a little more bite than most.Dreadful maps.

Nevin, David, The Mexican War (Time-Life Books, Alexandria VA, 1978). Fora marvelous visual look at the war, this is a great book. From the sweepingpainting of Palo Alto, complete with grass fire, to the watercolors of Montereystreet-fighting, to the individual portraits and daguerreotypes of the partici-pants, this book is invaluable. That the text, while surface, is succinct andsupportive is an added benefit. Bottom Line: you can see what it was like.Great stuff.

Nichols, Edward J., Zach Taylor’s Little Army (Doubleday & Co., Garden CityNY, 1963). A Taylor reconstructionist, although he does admit that Zach wasnot one of history’s greats. Good volume on the first half of the war with someequally good information. Mostly supportive rather than first-line. Excellent mapsby Palacios.

Smith, Justin H. The War with Mexico, Vol. I. (Peter Smith, Gloucester MA1963). 75 years old and still the definitive work on the subject. So, all right, theMexicans are all swarthy banditos who couldn’t out-think a chimichanga—theunrepentant “bad guys”—but that’s part of the fun in reading Smith — andhe doesn’t spare some of the gringos, either. Smith was single-handedly respon-sible for the abrupt fall of Zachary Taylor as an American hero. His research wasvoluminous, as can be gleaned from the large number of informative footnotes.Smith may not be Politically Correct, but he knew his subject. His maps are, forthe most part, quite good, especially as he notes what he based them on.

Tyler, Ronnie C., The Mexican War, A Lithographic Record (Texas State His-torical Association, Austin, 1973). Playtester George Pearson literally stumbledupon this book, which contains 50 period lithographs, many in full color, of thewar, including the remarkable series of works by Carl Nebel on each of thebattles. The information provided visually by some of these—especially Nebel’sdetailed and evocative views of the battlefields, as well as those done for Montereyby Daniel Whiting—was just as valuable as the maps and the texts.

Urwin, Gregory J.W., The United States Cavalry, An Illustrated History (BlandfordPress, New York, 1983). Osprey-type book with a lot more meat. Good chapter onformation of regular dragoons and their operations in the war, as well as how wellthe volunteer cavalry units did. Several specific cavalry actions discussed in de-tail, and the weapons the different units carried is also provided.

Webb, Walter Prescott, The Texas Rangers (University of Texas Press, Austin,1991). Reprint of 1935 work, a rather complete, but somewhat flowery and un-critical view of the rangers. Nice pics of the boys, though …and it is very infor-mative.

I also had done extensive reading in David Lavender’s Climax at Buena Vistaand the wonderful Chronicles of the Gringos, compiled by George Winston Smithand Charles Judah; however, that was over ten years ago, and I did not retracethose steps this time around.

MAPS:The Monterey map presented a couple of problems, as there were several thatappeared excellent, but all of which differed in seemingly small—but often sig-nificant—details, such as the location of barricades, redans, etc. We chose tocombine the information contained on the maps in Alcaraz and Smith, whichwere far more detailed than any of the others (and were closer to the period).This was augmented to no small extent by several contemporary drawings andpaintings (one of which, for example, details the extended stone walls on thesouth/river edge of the city) as well as the narratives and personal descriptions.Needless to say, this was a difficult—but fun—map to recreate …and we spentmuch time in getting the city “grid” as close to actuality as possible.

There is no shortage of Buena Vista maps, most of which agree what the battle-field looked like. (Then there’s the map in Alcaraz, which must have been drawnafter a three-Chihuahua fandango.) Most modern maps leave out some of thebranches from the main road—and most importantly the one that runs onto theplateau just behind the gringo lines—and some older maps show items for whichthere is no explanation (like the phantom “stone wall” in Smith’s map). When indoubt, we used Smith, as he based his version on Mexican topological surveys,aside from two visits to the battlefield site.

The map for Cerro Gordo is the one in Tony Adams’ book, which is the one inJustin Smith’s. The only difficulty was in determining the (relative) elevationlevels.

The El Molino map is based on the very detailed one surveyed (and autographed)by Lt. Robert E. Lee and drawn by Z.B. Towers of the Engineers in 1848. Thereis no dearth of maps on this area/battle.



bility of sticking it out for another day, or of coordinating his at-tacks, it could have been an impressive Mexican win.

Given evenly matched players, the Mexican has a slight advantage…providing he can keep his troops in some semblance of order…and stay away from the US artillery.

CHANGES TOBASIC RULES

PLAY NOTE: Some changes are covered in greater detail in theSpecial Rules.

5.0 THE ACTIVATION SYSTEM(5.34.) Neither side may use Brigade Coordination at any level ofcommand.

(5.4.) Efficiency Transfer is not used.

6.0 THE ORDERS SYSTEM(6.2) Brigade Orders Change. For the US, this applies to the indi-vidual Regiments.

10.0 FIRE COMBAT(10.61) Mexican artillery may not move and fire in the same Phase.

11.0 SHOCK ASSAULT(11.5) US Irregular (Volunteer) Cavalry may not Charge.

13.0 MORALE AND RALLY(13.2) Brigade Combat Effectiveness. For the US, this applies toRegiments.

(13.3) Division Combat Effectiveness is not used.

(13.42) Mexican leaders may not be used to affect/help Rally in anyway, other than specifically stated in the Special Rules.

14.0 SPECIAL UNITS(14.2) Mexican cavalry may not Dismount.

15.0 ENGINEERING(15.1) Constructing Breastworks is ignored; no one may buildbreastworks. The US breastworks are discussed in the Special Rules.

SPECIAL RULES APPLYINGTO BOTH SCENARIOS

TERRAINThe battlefield of Buena Vista is almost surrealistic, one which pro-vides some unusual problems for both sides.

The area is essentially a valley between two rather forbiddingmountain ranges, one of which can be seen encroaching on thefield in the SE portion of the map. Extending from this mountainis a series of ravines, dug out over the eons by now (for the mostpart) forgotten rivulets. The sides of some of these ravines rangefrom tough-going, to difficult, to almost impossible; e.g., the sidesof the plateau near La Angostura rise some 40–50 feet straight up.Aside from the difficulties in traversing such obstacles, in form-

BUENA VISTAFebruary 22–23, 1847

Preliminary InformationBuena Vista is the “ biggest” battle of the war, a classic confronta-tion between a small, mobile army emphasizing firepower, and aconsiderably larger, but slower, Euro-Napoleonic-style force. Assuch, we recommend players have familiarity not only with the sys-tem, but with the various pluses and minuses each army has …asthese will often be the telling factors.

There are two BV scenarios: the February 23rd scenario, and theFull-battle, which covers the tentative skirmishing and positioningof the 22nd.

Map ScaleEach hexes covers c. 110 yards from side to side …or 80 yards,depending on which source map you think is more reliable. We hadat least a half dozen maps, some US, some Mexican, and a fewfrom that period. The numbers varied, but not enough to make amajor issue over it.

Length of GameNot as long as the usual GBACW dice-burner, but at least six toeight hours for a complete game would be about normal.

BalanceThis is a battle that, on the surface, the Mexican Player should havea fairly easy time winning. He outnumbers the gringos by 3–1, andhe has some fairly good units with him. However, several factorsare working against him: general army fatigue, a large number ofuntrained units (both factors represented, initially, by the low Co-hesion ratings), and the usual mediocre to miserable subordinatecommand staff.

For the US player, desperation will be rampant most of the time. Hehas far too many volunteers, several of whom cut and ran more thanonce during the actual battle. What he does have is a very indepen-dent command system, the usual American superiority in artillery(this is the battle on which Braxton Bragg dined out for decades),and units like Jeff Davis’ crack Mississippi Rifles (more dining outfor Davis). It’s “Ten Holes and Five Fingers” time for the gringos.

Historically, Buena Vista was a tactical draw, with both sides takinga beating. Strategically, with Taylor still holding his position, it wasa US victory …but a very close one. Had Santa Anna had the capa-



ing these deep cuts, the rivulets managed to deposit a good deal of“debris”, mostly in the form of stones, rocks, boulders and what-ever. What is indicated on the map as “streams”, are nothing morethan an inch or two of trickling water. These, together with someminor tree growth, made moving up and down the ravines a majorproblem for cavalry and artillery.

On the other, western side, is a spectacular series of gullies throughwhich runs …actually dribbles …what’s left of the river that formedthem. These narrow gullies have almost vertical, 20–30 foot sides,rendering them uncrossable to all but the most determined infantry.Even then, it is not recommended. About the only feasible crossingon the map is to the rear of La Angostura (which is treated as astream hexside), which is where McKee crossed over before thebattle began. (They’re there to guard a rather tortuous mountaintrail that Santa Anna could have used to by-pass Taylor’s position.Santa Anna did not so choose because of the difficulty of using thattrail. See the Optional Rule on this, below.)

The restricted passage between the spurs and the gullies—at 1632/1633—is appropriately named La Angostura, The Narrows. Andnarrow it is —40 feet from the spur to the gully (or, realistically,about 15% of a game hexside!!). To reinforce this passage, GeneralWool had his men dig a ditch during the night of 2/22, backed by aparapet of earth, behind which the infantry stood. Thermopylae,Mexican-style. The spur immediately above and to the east of LaAngostura was further protected against enemy fire by a somewhathaphazard breastwork.

Special Facing Rule [7.1] Units in 1632—La Angostura—face thehexside, not the vertex. The three hexes to the front—1532, 1633,1732 (albeit across the slope)—are its frontal hexsides; the otherthree, it’s “rear”. Fire may directed into/through any reachable hexwithin the arc between 1036-1532 and 1633-1733-2336, etc.

The Trench and the Breastworks: The defensive benefit of thesehexsides apply to those units in 1632, north of the hexside, insidethe “teeth” …and only through those hexsides. However, the trenchand the breastworks do not exist during the February 22nd turns,until the Night-2 turn. (They were constructed during the night af-ter the first day of battle.) Of course, they can be so constructedonly if the US player occupies the appropriate hexes during theNight-2 turn. There is no cost to doing this; they just appear at thebeginning of the 0600 turn.

The Elevation changes are relative …scale varies, depending onthe location. However, the map differentiates among:

• Gradual Slope: a change in elevation without a slope indicator.Thus, while 2142-2242 and 1731-1730 both represent changesfrom Level 1 to Level 2, the former is distinctly abrupt, almostcliff-like, while the latter is quite gradual.

• Steep Slope: any change in elevation of around 30–45o or so.

• Sheer Slope: any change in elevation that is closer to straight upthan what “steep” represents. For all intents and purposes, theseare uncrossable militarily.

• All Level 5 and 6 hexes are considered Rough hexes.

The Gullies, as discussed above, are crossed with great difficulty,and only by infantry. And, yes, the +5 cost means units with only 5MP available may not cross them …ever.

The light woods on the map are mostly sparse, single-lines of treesthat dotted the countryside. They aren’t much of a hazard or ob-stacle, but they do allow us to throw in a little green.

The roads are nothing more than dirt paths beaten down into thestony ground by years of use. The Road halves all elevation changecosts, rounding down; it also negates any “d” or “D” effects. TheRoad has no effect on streams or the trench. The face changingbenefits for roads apply.

Buena Vista is a hacienda; officially, “Hacienda de la Buena Vista”.It had four, maybe five, ill-kept, adobe, flat-roofed buildings, mili-tarily usable only by small detachments. In the words of one of thebattle participants, it was a “… dirty, insignificant little rancho.”Because it was slightly uphill from the valley and plateau to thesouth, it provided a marvelous location from which to watch thedeveloping battle.

Disorder Terrain: Note that some terrain types require a UDD/Disorder die roll (small ‘d’), while others are automatic Disorders(large ‘D’). The d/D applies as soon as the unit enters such hex orcrosses such hexside, and it applies each time such movement takesplace. Units that are already Disordered may not enter auto-D hexesor cross such hexsides, and that restriction includes retreat move-ment resulting from combat.

Line of Sight: To make things easy, there is no terrain, other thanchange in elevation, that blocks LOS. That includes those trees thatdot the countryside, which were pretty sparse at best. The desultory,rundown buildings of the hacienda are too dispersed to affect LOS.

Some difficulty arises, though, when the slopes come into play.

Target on lower elevation: both sheer and steep slopes act as block-ing terrain for small-arms fire and artillery firing at a range of fourhexes or less if the slope hexside is closer to the target unit than thefiring. Halfway is considered closer to target. (With fire range be-ing ‘2’ for most units, this is a problem that occurs rarely.) Theslopes do not block artillery firing at 5 or more hexes.

Target on higher elevation: the sheer or steep slopes block LOSonly if firing unit is firing through a (higher) slope hexside that ispart of the firing hex—unless the target is directly adjacent.

Units may always fire into adjacent hexes through slope hexsides(with some drm’s for the tendency to fire high when firing at targetsthat are much higher or lower). However, because of the difficultiesin depressing and raising the guns, artillery may not fire into anadjacent hex separated by a sheer or steep slope hexside, whetherhigher or lower.

DESIGN NOTE: As for the mountain in the SE corner of the map,by the time you get past level ‘6’, you’re into “straight up” themountainside. Level 6 represents the farthest limit a military unitcould go on this rather formidable mountain range.

CourageSome of the leaders—on both sides—showed a defi-nite tendency towards wobbly legs, soft spines, and adesire to return home. These leaders are indicated witha “+” next to their Profile Rating.

Any time any “+” Leader is within one hex, or stacked with, anyunit from his “side” (whether it is his command or someone else’s)that is the (defending) subject of a Shock attack, before resolvingthat Shock, that leader’s Player rolls the die.

If the DR is a ‘0’ or a ‘9’, the leader in question hasturned tail and bolted. Place a “Bolted” marker on thatleader; he is not “in play”. At that instant, and beforeanything else is resolved,



• The units from his command are now Out of Command (until, atbest, their next activation).

• Undertake a UDD for each combat unit in that leader’s commandthat was within his range at the moment he Bolted. If it fails, it isDisordered (as if from Shock).

The next time that unit is Activated, before doing anything else, theplayer rolls to see what the leadership status of that command is.Roll the die:

• If the DR is a 0–1, the “Bolted”, no leader status remains in place.

• If the DR is a 2–3, remove the Bolted marker and flip that leaderto his Replacement for the remainder of the game.

• If the DR is a 4–9, the fellow has come to his senses—a little coldwater and a couple of sharp slaps across the cheeks probablyhelped—and returned to command. Remove the Bolted marker,and that leader is back to his original condition. (And he can stillBolt again!)

ThunderstormsStarting with the 1300 game-turn of 2/23, either player rolls the dieat the end of the Orders Segment (II). If he rolls a ‘0’ or a ‘9’, athunderstorm has broken loose, with the following effects:

• All MAs are halved, rounding up.

• No unit may cross a Sheer or Steep slope.

• Command Ranges are halved.

• Artillery range maximum is seven (7) hexes.

• There is an automatic –1 when firing any unit during a thunder-storm.

• If a small-arms unit fires during the storm, if the die roll used toresolve that fire is a natural “even”, that unit incurs an AmmoDepletion of 1 level. (This represents the problems with wet pow-der, and is obviously used only when using 10.9.).

Thunderstorms last only one turn, and there is only one Thunder-storm per game. Once a storm occurs, do not roll for it again.

MEXICAN SPECIAL RULESMexican Command Efficiency and ActivationSanta Anna is the Overall Commander. The Mexican Player getsfour Efficiency markers (1, 2, 3, 4). These apply to all units in SantaAnna’s Army, as follows.

Santa Anna in the Mexican Staging Area:• All Infantry Division Commanders, and all Cavalry Brigadiers in

the MSA get that Efficiency that turn.

• All Infantry Division Commanders, and all Cavalry Brigadierson the Map get that Efficiency, minus one (to a minimum of 1).

Santa Anna on the Map:• All Infantry Division Commanders, and all Cavalry Brigadiers

on the Map and within Santa Anna’s Range get that Efficiencythat turn.

• All Infantry Division Commanders, and all Cavalry Brigadierson the Map and not within Santa Anna’s Range that Efficiency,minus one (to a minimum of 1).

• All Infantry Division Commanders, and all Cavalry Brigadiers inthe MSA get that Efficiency that turn minus one (to a minimumof 1).

Reinforcements: Use the AM listed for the turn of arrival.

EXAMPLE: At the start of a Turn, Santa Anna is in his CommandBox in the MSA and the Mexican Player draws the ‘3’ EfficiencyMarker.

• Pacecho (I Division) is in the MSA, as is Mejia’s Brigade. Theyget 3 AM; but Uraga is on the map. He gets only 2 AM.

• Lombardini (II) is on the map, so all his In Command and MSAbrigades get 2 AM. Any brigades outside his range get only 1AM.

• Juvera (2/Cav) is in the MSA; he gets 3 AM (as Cavalry does notneed a Division Commander to relay Efficiency).

• Artillery always gets 3 AM (2 regular, one extra for the SanPatricio’s, as below).

Mexican CavalryThe four Mexican Cavalry regiments are activated when the Cav-alry AM is drawn. They are independent of any Division Command,and they do not suffer any penalty for being out of any DivisionCommander’s Range.

The Mexican Staging Area (MSA)The Mexican Army does not use the reserve Rules (6.3). They maynot be placed In Reserve. The abilities of 6.3 are replaced by theseMSA rules.

The Mexican Staging Area has a box for each Mexican brigade. AllMexican units enter the game-map, from the MSA, through hexes1549-1949 inclusive.

Movement Into/Out of the MSAIt costs 1 MP (any/all types of units) to enter 1549-1949 from theMSA …and vice versa. Only units exiting (retreating off) the mapthrough 1549-1949 may enter the MSA; all other units are elimi-nated if they leave the map through any other hex. US units may notenter the MSA; those that attempt to do so are treated to a fandango,given a brief (?) speech from Santa Anna, and then thrown to thecoyotes. (It is somewhat difficult to tell which of the last two isworse.)

Routed UnitsMexican units that rout are placed in their MSA Box.

The Mexican Player may attempt to Rally any Routed units in theMSA, in Phase IV/B/2. To do so, he undertakes a UDD.

• If the same as or lower than the rating, the unit is Rallied to Dis-ordered status (retaining any Hits).

• If higher than the unit’s Disordered Cohesion, it remains Routedand loses a SP.

He may adjust the die roll as follows:

• If Santa Anna is in his Command Box in the MSA during thisPhase, subtract one (–1) from the die roll.

• If it is a Night Turn, subtract one (–1) from the die roll.



• For each intact (all units in the brigade) cavalry brigade in theMSA, subtract one (–1) for each such brigade. No units in thecavalry brigade may be Disordered or Routed.

Fatigue and DisorderMexican brigades can reduce Fatigue only if they (all units) are intheir MSA. 17.43 applies, but only if the entire brigade spends theturn in its MSA.

PLAY AND HISTORICAL NOTE: Obviously, as the gameprogresses, the Mexican Player must start making choices as towhether Santa Anna is best on the field, running the show, or backin the rear, flogging the troops onward. Historically, he did a bit ofthe latter, hanging a prospective deserter every so often to stiffen awobbly spine or two.

Santa Anna’s Personal GuardThe two Hussars of the Guard of the Supreme Powers cavalry unitsare Santa Anna’s personal guard. They stay stacked, in the samehex, with him, and goes wherever he goes, moving at the same rate.They may not attack, charge or do anything other than move whenso attached. They do defend normally, of course.

Mexican Off-Board MovementThe road leading off-map at 1033 is a rather rough, mountain trailthat skirts the rather imposing mountains just off the west edge andends up several hundred yards behind the Mexican Staging Area!Santa Anna was very much aware of it and seriously consideredsending some troops to flank Taylor, which is why McKee is sittingwhere he is on the morning of February 23rd. (Wool was also awareof it.) The prevailing opinion is that Santa Anna chose not to do sobecause it was a difficult trip over rutted, narrow paths, which prettymuch obviated bringing artillery. Justin Smith, however, visited thebattlefield several times and stated that the trail was a viable infan-try path, albeit a rough one. Knowing all this, we have the follow-ing rule.

At any one time during the game (either one or two-day battles) theMexican Player may remove any one infantry brigade (all units)from its Staging Area Box and place it in the Mexican Off-MapMovement Box. Neither Artillery nor cavalry may be placed in theOff-Map Box. This requires the use of that command’s entire AM.

When the Mexican Player places a brigade in the Off-Map Box hetakes the three Off-Map Movement markers—one with an ‘8’, onewith a ‘10’ and one with a ‘12’—and puts them in a cup, randomlydrawing one. This is the number of AMs that the brigade will taketo reach the western edge of the map (as below). He keeps this markersecret until it has to be revealed.

When the brigade reaches the western edge of the map the MexicanPlayer may now do one of two things:

1.He may (attempt to) enter the brigade through any hex withintwo hexes of 1033. Units so entering may move into an enemy ZOC,but they may not enter a US-occupied hex …nor may they fighttheir way onto the map. (Let’s keep these rules to a workable length,OK?) After that, they’re on their own. If the units cannot enter, theyremain off-map until they can. Or,

2.He may return the brigade to the Staging Area. Use the Off-MapMovement markers as above and add +2 AM to represent fatiguefrom the original march.

Any Mexican unit of the brigade forced to retreat must retreat to-wards 1033. Units attempting to enter via 1033 may not be resup-plied if Out of Ammo.

PLAY NOTE: Using this rule helps the Mexicans, tipping the bal-ance somewhat in their favor.

Mexican Small Arms FireThe Mexican infantry was armed, mostly, with muskets. That wasn’tthe problem. The problem was that the powder the Mexican Armyused was of inferior grade, requiring the soldiers to often double theamount used to get an adequate charge. This resulted in a shoulder-smashing kick, to which the soldiers adjusted by firing their mus-kets from any physical position other than against the shoulder. Theresult of all this was that their musket (and rifle) fire was less effec-tive than it could have been.

When using the Small-Arms Fire Table for Mexican “M”, “C”, and“R” weapons (but not those peculiar escopettes [E] the cavalry car-ried) the Mexican player subtracts one (–1) from each and everysuch die roll.

Mexican units may not use Prepared Fire (10.5) under any circum-stances.

Mexican LancersMost (if not all) Mexican Cavalry was armed withlances. They were thus more in the Napoleonic modethan the US mounted troops. Lance-armed cavalry (L)adds one (+1) to the resolution of all Charges.

PLAY NOTE: This means the Mexican lancers get a +2 for Charg-ing, not just a +1.

DESIGN NOTE: Mexican cavalry used either carbines orescopettes. Which units used which is almost impossible to tell. Sowe gave the regular line units the carbines and the rest theescopettes.

Mexican ArtilleryMexican artillery batteries may not be assigned to any brigade ordivision. They fire only

• when the Mexican Artillery AM is drawn, and• in Reaction.

The Mexican artillery has three AM every turn. With two of them,any/all Mexican guns can fire. With the third AM, “San PatricioOnly”, only the guns of the San Patricio batteries may fire.

PLAY NOTE: Mexican canister/grape is so ineffective because ofpoor powder/shot.

Los ZapadoresLos Zapadores were an “elite” infantry unit of ”engi-neers” (sappers) under the direct command of GeneralSantiago Blanco. The Zapadores

• may be assigned/attached to any infantry brigade at the begin-ning of any turn that both the Zapadores and the brigade of As-signment are in the MSA, and Santa Anna is there, too. Other-wise, they stay in the MSA, or on the field if already assigned.

• may be treated as an Independent command, using whatever theMexican Efficiency marker is for that Turn (and the ZapadoresAM).



Miñon’s Marauding MinionsThe cavalry brigade of General Vincente Miñon had been sent east,through the mountain passes, with orders to attack the rear lines ofcommunication of Taylor’s army at Saltillo. It did so, in rather des-ultory fashion, and was easily repulsed by the Saltillo garrison (fourcompanies of Illinois foot, one from the Mississippi Rifles, a six-pounder from Bragg’s battery, plus some heavy howitzers underCaptain Webster.) (Another such column of cavalry, from SantaAnna’s “Division of Observation”, under General José Urrea, hadbetter success to the north, disrupting supply and travel fromMonterey for a month or so!)

We feel that Miñon would never have been a factor in the battle(there is little, if any, evidence to indicate he would have turnedsouth to aid Santa Anna). At best, his horses would have been inpretty poor shape even if he had had some success at Saltillo. So,for those of you who feel that the Mexicans need yet another use-less brigade of 1000+ men, here’s what you do.

Starting with the 1200 turn of 2/23, in any turn in which the MexicanPlayer draws an Efficiency Marker of ‘3’ or more for his Cavalry, hemay use that entire turn’s Cavalry Efficiency to bring in Minon. Thismeans that the only AM placed in The Pool is one Minon AM, plusone AM, each, for the other cavalry commands.

Miñon’s brigade may be brought in through any three contiguoushexes along the NE border of the map between 3801 and 4810. Allunits in Minon’s brigade arrive with a Fatigue Level of ‘2’.

The turn following Minon’s arrival, the US Player has available asa Reinforcement:

• 2 Illinois ‘d’ infantry (Bissell), and• a 1-gun 6-pounder from Bragg’s C, 3/US battery.

They enter as Independents through 1301 or 1601; if they cannot,they do NOT enter at ANY time. They may use March Orders, ifeligible.

SPECIAL RULES FOR THEUNITED STATES

U.S. Efficiency and Activation SystemBy the time of Buena Vista, most of Taylor’s regulars had beenstripped away and sent to Winfield Scott for the Vera Cruz expedi-tion. They had been replaced by untested volunteers to such an ex-tent—of the 4700 men available, only 700, including artillerists,were regulars—that virtually all semblance of command hierarchyhad disappeared. However, because the US army was composed ofsuch small units, and, perhaps, because they were volunteers, theydisplayed a remarkable independence of action at BV. The com-mand system for this battle is adjusted accordingly.

The US Command Hierarchy is very simple. Taylor is Overall Com-mander; Wool is a sort of second OC, with both functioning, ingame terms, as Corps (probably more like Division) co-command-ers. Below that, all “commands’ are regiments, each with a regi-mental commander who functions like the Basic Rules’ brigadiers.

The US Player draws only one Efficiency Marker per Turn, fromwhich he gets AM for only three groups: “Taylor”, “Wool”, and“Independent”.

In the Activation Efficiency Determination Phase (II/A), the USPlayer must designate each of his regiments and batteries/section asbelonging to one of these groups. Regiments may belong to a Tay-lor or Wool Command if the regimental leader is within thatcommander’s range. Otherwise, they are Independent. See, below,for artillery.

There is a series of boxes for each Regiment, onto which the USPlayer places his Command Indicator. The assignments made in II/A last the entire turn. Units under Taylor/Wool may receive “Divi-sion Orders”, even though they are actually only regiments.

Units operating under Taylor or Wool use the drawn Efficiencymarker, without any adjustment, and that commander’s AM. Forexample, all Taylor-designated regiments are activated when a Tay-lor AM is drawn.

The mechanic for Independents, though, is somewhat different. TheIndependent AMs are numbered 1–4. The specific # of AMs placedin The Pool is that of the maximum possible Efficiency any indi-vidual Independent could have that turn.

Independents use the turn’s Efficiency marker, minus one, and thenadjusted by the Regimental leader’s Orders Rating, and the Inde-pendent AM. Thus, drawing an Efficiency marker of ‘3’, reducedautomatically to a ‘2’, and a leader with a +1 Orders Rating, thatIndependent will have 3 possible AM that turn. To indicate this,place an Independent Marker, information side down, atop thatLeader. That marker will indicate that the Leader will be activatedwhen Independent AM 1, 2 or 3 is drawn. If Independent AM ‘4’ isdrawn (if in The Pool), it is not activated.

PLAY NOTE: A Regimental leaders’ Order’s Rating is used, there-fore, for two mechanics:

• Changing Orders during an Activation (as per 6.2).• Adjusting that Regiment’s Efficiency for that turn.

EXAMPLE: There are three independent regiments. The US playerdraws a ‘3’ Efficiency for that Turn, which is automatically re-duced to a ‘2’. One regimental leader is a +1, one a 0, one a –1.This means that the US Player will have, available, three Indepen-dent AM—#’s 1, 2 and 3—that turn. Three AMs numbered 1-2-3are placed in The Pool and the leaders marked accordingly. The+1 regiment (with a 3 marker) will be activated when 1, 2 and 3are drawn; the ‘0’—led regiment (with a 2 marker) when 1 and 2are drawn, the ‘–1’ led regiment (with a 1 marker) only when the‘1’ AM is drawn.

US ArtilleryUS Artillery units activate either as Independents (all artillery unitsstacked with or adjacent to another artillery unit), or, if within Tay-lor or Wool’s Range, as part of a regiment (and so designated whenthe Taylor/Wool assignments are made). When Independent, USartillery has an Orders Rating of +1.

SaltilloTaylor’s main base of operations was the city of Saltillo, about 5–6miles north of Buena Vista. Taylor had received word that Miñon’scavalry brigade had circled to the east, slipped through the passes,and was headed towards Saltillo. With Saltillo defended by only a



minimal garrison, Taylor was rather worried that his base would betaken and his army would be trapped.

Therefore, each turn, starting with the 1700 turn of 2/22, the USPlayer rolls a die in the Initiative segment. If he rolls the DR listedon the Turn Track Taylor, all of the 1st Mississippi, the Texas Rang-ers, and the 2nd Dragoons (with May), are immediately removedfrom play. If they are still on the map by the 2000 turn, they areautomatically removed at the beginning of that turn.

Taylor, and all of the departing combat units, return to the game, asReinforcements, (through hex 1601) in the 2/23, 0600 game-turn.

The Texas RangersThere is a detachment from Hays’ regiment of TexasRangers (see Monterey), led by Ben McCulloch. TheRangers pretty much did what they wanted (and muchof what they did do wasn’t very pretty), although, as

cavalry, they are nominally attached to Lt. Col May. To reflect theirindependence of thought and action, the US player may either usethem as part of May’s cavalry, or he may use them as an individual“regiment”. For this purpose, McCulloch’s Rangers are consideredto have an Orders Rating of +1, and an Action Profile of Aggres-sive.

Marshall as Cavalry CommanderHumphrey Marshall was the de facto cavalry com-mander for the battle, serving as a sort of ersatz briga-dier. To represent this, Marshall may command—in ad-dition to his Kentucky Mounted men —any three, non-

regular cavalry units (counters) …the Texas Rangers are consid-ered regulars for this purpose …within his range, whether they aremounted or dismounted. These “attached” cavalry are so designatedin the Activation Efficiency Phase (II/A), and such designation lastsfor, at least, that turn, and until designated otherwise (in a subse-quent II/A).

Captured Mexican GunsJohn Washington’s B, 4US battery contains two cap-tured, Mexican four-pounders. The battery personnelwas not as trained in their use as their standard caliber,and the limbers and caissons were not the same type

Ringgold had had installed to make the artillery “flying”. Thus, theyhave a reduced Movement Allowance.

THE ONE-DAY BATTLE;February 23

This scenario simulates the main battle, beginning with the unfold-ing of Santa Anna’s initial attack. There is no information as to howmany losses were taken by units on the 22nd, although the fightingwas minimal. Therefore, no units start with any reduced strength.

The game starts with the February 23rd, 0600 game-turn and endseither when one side Withdraws, or at the end of the 2000 game-turn.

The Mexican Player automatically has the Initiative for the 0600game-turn and may deliberately choose any AM available. No unitshave any Fatigue.

Initial Deployment, United States Army ofOccupationCavalry is listed as mounted or dismounted and Specific Orders aregiven. If none given, choice is up to the Player. Units may be facedas desired.

Hex Units

2014 Taylor

Anywhere Wool

1912 May; 2 Dragoons [March]

1810, 1910 Davis; MS Rifles (Mounted) [March]

W/i 1 hex 1729 Jm Lane; 3 IN (all)

1632 1 IL ‘c’, B, 4 US guns (two 6’s, two H12’s) [At-tack]

1732 Hardin ; 1 IL ‘b’ [Attack]

1833 1 IL ‘a’; B, 4 US ( two 6’s, two 4’s) [Attack]

3135 McCullough’s Texas Rangers (Mounted) [Ad-vance] [a]

3236 1st Dragoons (Mounted) [Advance] [a]

W/i hex of 3936 Yell; AR Cav ‘a’, ‘b’ (Mounted) [Advance]

3038, 3138 McKee; 2 KY ‘a’ ‘b’ [Attack]

3239 E, 3 US battery (all guns) [b]

3339, 3440 Bissell; 2 IL ‘a’ ‘b’ ‘c’, Texas Foot [Attack]

3541 C, 3 US (all guns)

3642, 3742, 3843Bowles, 2 IN ‘a’ ‘b’ ‘c’

4243, 4444 Marshall ; 1 KY Mtd ‘a’ ‘b’ (Mounted or Dis-mounted) [Orders Player’s Choice]

4546, 4547 1 KY ‘c’, AR Cav ‘c’ (Dismounted) [Attack] [c]

[a] Treat these as one “command”, at least to start the game.

[b] The actual whereabouts of some of the US guns on the morning ofthe 23rd can get a mite confusing. We’ve chosen the simplest one.

[c] The Arkansas ‘c’ is under the command of Marshall.

BUENA VISTA SCENARIOS



Initial Deployment, Mexican Army of the North [a]Cavalry is listed as mounted or dismounted. Specific Orders aregiven. Units may be faced as desired. No units have any Fatigue.

Starting in the Mexican Staging Area:Mejia ’s Brigade (3/I); all of Ortega’s Division (III); Andrade’s 4/Cavalry.

Hex Units

1946 Santa Anna; the Hussars

1641 Zapadores (Independent) [Advance]

W/i 1 hex Juvera’s 2nd Cavalry; Torrejon ’s 3rdof 1943 Cavalry [Advance]

2144 Leon Artillery battery

2145, 2246 San Patricio Artillery battery

2945 Ballarta Artillery battery

In any Level Pacheco (I), Uraga’s Brigade (5/I);1 hex from All of Lombardini ’s Division (II)2243/4 – 2743/4

3946 4 Line Infantry (Guzman) [a] [Advance]

4246-9 Ampudia’s Light Brigade [Attack] [b]

[a] The 4th Line infantry is assigned to Ampudia’s Brigade and isconsidered part of that brigade for the remainder of the game.

[b] Ampudia’s good Orders rating, when compared to his ratingsfor the first three battles, is based on his performance (and unusualenergy) at Buena Vista.,

THE TWO-DAY BATTLEFebruary 22-23

The game starts with the February 22nd, 1300 game-turn and endseither when one side withdraws, or at the end of the February 23rd2000 game-turn (when Santa Anna’s supply situation dictated hisabandoning the battlefield.) It allows the players to recreate the origi-nal maneuvers prior to the next day’s fighting.

The Mexican Player automatically has the Initiative for the firstgame-turn.

For the first turn, the Mexican Player automatically, without draw-ing, has an Efficiency of ‘3’. The US draws.

Initial Deployment, United States Army ofOccupation [a]Cavalry is listed as mounted or dismounted. If none given, choice isup to the Player. Unit Orders are up to the Player. Units may befaced as desired.

Hex Units

1629 Taylor [b]

1632 Wool; 1 Ill a ; B, 4 US (two 4’s, two 6’s,two 12H’s)

1732 Hardin. 1 Ill b

1833 1 Ill c; B, 4US (two 6’s)

W/i 1 hex of 1729 3rd Indiana; James Lane

W/i 1 hex of 2128 2nd Indiana; Bowles

W/i 1 hex of 2734 1st Dragoons (Mtd) [c]

W/i 1 hex of 2936 2nd Illinois (a, b, c); 1st Texas Foot;Bissell

W/i 1 hex of 3138 2nd Kentucky; McKee [e]

W/i 1 hex of 3440 Arkansas Cavalry (Mtd): Yell [d]

W/i 1 hex of 3740 1st Kentucky Mtd (Mtd); Marshall

2834 E, 3US battery (three 6-pounders; oneH12)

2631 C, 3US battery (two 6-pounders, one H12) [e]

1524,1625 1st Mississippi Rifles (Mtd); Davis

1809-10 2nd Dragoons; Texas Rangers; May

[a] Although all sources agree as to which units were present, fewagree on exactly where they were when the battle started on 2/22.Our deployments used those sources which tended to place unitsbefore Santa Anna’s arrival south of La Angostura.

[b] Also problematical, as with [a], is the location of Taylor, theMississippi Rifles, and May’s 1st Dragoons. They left with Taylorwhen he returned to Saltillo the evening of the 22nd and were notinvolved at all in the preliminary fighting of the 22nd. There is someindication both units were being held, in reserve, far to the rear—which is where we have placed them. See the Saltillo rules, below.

[c] Any one of May’s cavalry units may be attached to any othercommander, simply by being within the latter’s range.

[d] Detachments from these units were sent across the gullies, tothe west, to guard the approach on that flank (c. hex 1021). Exactlywhen is a good question.

[e] One of Bragg’s six-pounders is with the Saltillo garrison.

Initial Deployment, Mexican Army of the North [a]No Mexican units start on the map. Some start in the Mexican Stag-ing Area (see below); the rest enter the game as Reinforcements.All Mexican reinforcements, as well as those that start the game inthe Staging Area, are at Level –1 Fatigue.

Starting in the Mexican Staging Area: Santa Anna; the Hussars;Ampudia’s Light Bgde; Pacheco (I), Mejia’s Brigade (3/I);

Reinforcements (All during 2/22)

Turn Units

1300 San Patricio Arty Battalion; Juvera’s 2nd Cavalry Bri-gade; Zapadores [3 AM; Zapadores arrive with the CavAM]

1400 Uraga’s Brigade (5/I) [2 AM]

1500 Torrejon ’s 3rd Cavalry Brigade [2 AM]

1600 Lombardini (II); Conde ’s Brigade; Perez’s Brigade;de Leon Artillery Battery [3 AM; Artillery only 2 AM]

1800 Ortega (III), Guzman’s Brigade (4/III); Terres’ Bri-gade (6/III); Parrodi ’s Brigade (7/III); Andrade’s 4thcavalry Brigade; Ballerta’s Artillery Battalion [3 AM;Artillery only 2 AM]



RULES APPLICABLE ONLYTO THE TWO-DAY BATTLE

Mexican ReinforcementsIt costs arriving reinforcements one AM to be placed in its MexicanStaging Area box. All Reinforcements enter the game in AdvanceOrders.

Mexican FatigueAs noted, above, the Mexican Army was not in good shape. It hadlost 25% to attrition over the last month on its march across thedesert from San Luis Potosí, had not eaten in the last 12 or so hours,and had slept little, if any, the previous night. Santa Anna wouldhave been wiser to allow his army to rest at Agua Nueva, just southof Buena Vista, before joining battle …but he chose otherwise and,on the 22nd, was forced to use an army whose effectiveness wasseverely reduced by fatigue.

To simulate this, all Mexican reinforcements, as well as those thatstart the game in the Staging Area, are at Level –1 Fatigue.

Reassignment of Mexican Line InfantryAs festivities started on the morning of the 23rd, Santa Anna rein-forced Ampudia’s light brigade with a regular line unit—the 4thLine—from Guzman’s brigade. The player may “Re-create” this, ifhe wishes, at any time starting with the 0600 2/23 turn. He maytransfer any single Line Infantry regiment to Ampudia’s commandfor the rest of the game, if the regiment is either

• within Ampudia’s Range, or• in the MSA, as is Ampudia’s brigade.

PLAY NOTE: This is not available for the 2/23 scenario, as the 4thLine has already been reassigned.

Straggler RecoveryUS Units use the normal rule (16.2); Mexican units may recoverStragglers only if in the MSA.

“What If?” Santa Anna Rested His MenThe following, “alternate history” rule is highly optional; it is in-cluded for those who wish to explore the avenues of possibility.

Assume that Santa Anna realized that his army was at the end of itsemotional tether and decided to let them take a breather at AquaNueva. He thus starts the battle one day later (same time, though, ashe still had to get to La Angostura). None of his units have anyFatigue Level.

However, the US Player may redeploy any/all of his on-map unitsas he sees fit, as long as no unit deploys in a hex ending in —44 orhigher.

Winning the GameSanta Anna’s objective is to put Taylor’s army hors de combat for awhile, so that he can turn his attention to Scott’s coming invasion atVera Cruz. He can do this either by “destroying” Taylor’s army, orby cutting Taylor’s LOC so that the latter is forced to retire far tothe north. Taylor, of course, is trying to avoid either of these; if hecan retain the field at the end of the battle, he has “won the day”—regardless of what losses he takes (for the most part).

Automatic Mexican Victory #1: If, at the end of any turn, theMexicans control 1601, 1809, and 1810, and there are no US unitson or adjacent to the road 1601-1810, the Mexican wins.

Automatic Mexican Victory #2: All US commands, other than theartillery, are Combat Ineffective.

Automatic US Victory: All Mexican commands are either CombatIneffective or in the MSA. For this purpose, Andrade’s Brigade isnot considered.

Failing the above, it’s a fight to the finish. (We assume that no Mexi-can player will ever get swept off the map in entirety; if that hap-pens to you, perhaps a hobby switch to, say, raising guppies, wouldbe salutary.) Players earn points for rendering enemy commandsIneffective and/or attaining geographic objectives, as follows. Con-trol means occupy or last to occupy.

Objective US Points Mexican Points

Ineffective Enemy 6 2Command [a], each

Controls 1632 1 10

Controls both 1809-1810 3 5

Mexican unit occupies 0 5any one hex in 1027-1033

Mexican unit controls 1601 0 5

No Mexican non-routed unit in 10 0any hex xx26 or lower(i.e., to the north)

Santa Anna killed [b] 5 0

[a] For purposes of victory points, a Mexican brigade that has someunits in the MSA but all of its on-map units are Disordered isconsidered Ineffective.

[b] There are no points for loss of any other commander as onlythe Mexican army was led by cult of personality. The gringosmay have liked Taylor, but it really mattered little to them whowas in command.

NEW ARTILLERY UNITS: After countersheet #1 was printed,it was decided that artillery should have the same cohesion levelon their disordered side as their front side—therefore, sheet 2contains the corrected artillery units.



MONTEREYNuevo Léon, Mexico

September 20–23, 1846Preliminary InformationMonterey—an assault complete with cavalry charges and street fight-ing—is probably the most demanding scenario in Gringo! . It hasan extended amount of “special” rules, most having to do with theunusual nature of street-fighting and the game-type terrain rules itrequires. And both players must make a large number of difficultstrategic decisions, decisions often made obsolete by rapidly chang-ing situations. It is also potentially a long game. We thereforestrongly recommend that you give one of the other battles a run-through before tackling Monterey.

Length of GameThe game is not played using the usual Turn Track. Rather it usesfour Assault Periods, each period with five (5) turns. More infor-mation on this is given, below. Experience shows that each AssaultPeriod takes about 8+ hours. Redeployment, between periods, takesabout half an hour. While the game can take less than four AssaultPeriods, it will usually take at least two. Keep in mind that thiscovers four days of actual fighting. It’s a long game.

MapThe Monterey map uses a scale of c.125 yards per hex. The city ofMonterey is drawn to scale using the actual (and complete) streetlayout at the time.

BalanceMany factors to consider here, but, overall, the US is slightly fa-vored.

CHANGES TO BASICGBACW RULES

(3.0) SEQUENCE OF PLAYI. Ampudia Strategic Posture Determination. Before determin-ing Initiative, the Mexican Player must determine Ampudia’s Stra-tegic Posture, as per the rules for doing so.

II. A. Activation Efficiency Determination. US Efficiency appliesto its Divisions. The Mexican Efficiency applies to its Brigades,depending on their location, as per Ampudia’s Strategic Posture.

II. B Division Orders. The US Player must be within range of Tay-lor. The Mexican Play may change any brigade (the Mexican armyhas no divisions) if Ampudia’s posture is “aggressive” and the Bri-gade Leader is within range of Ampudia.

II. C Reinforcement Orders is not used.

II. D Reserve Placement is not used.

IV.D. When the fifth Turn of that Assault Period is finished, playproceeds to the Interphase, unless it is the 4th Assault Period, inwhich case, the game is over.

THE INTERPHASEWhen all five (5) Turns of each Assault Period have been played,players, in the Interphase, may do the following:

Stage 1: US Unit RelocationStage 2: US Rally and RecoveryStage 3: Mexican Re-deployment and RallyStage 4: US Re-Staging

(4.0) COMMAND(4.2) CHAIN OF COMMAND(4.21) The US Chain of Command is Brigade to Division to Overall(Taylor). The Mexican Chain of Command is Brigade to OC(Ampudia).

(4.3) There are no Artillery Leaders.

(5.0) THE ACTIVATION SYSTEM(5.1) TURN INITIATIVE:Neither player uses their OC Ratings for this. However, the Mexi-can Player adjusts his Initiative DR according to his (Ampudia’s)Strategic Posture.

(5.2) EFFICIENCYUS EfficiencyThe general principles of Efficiency apply, except that there are noCorps commanders. Instead, Efficiency markers are drawn for theDivision commanders. And, the Division Commanders each havean Efficiency Rating for adjusting the drawn AM marker for theirDivision.

5.22 is changed slightly to note that a Division’s Efficiency (AMfor use) is increased by one if that Division’s commander is eitherin the same Staging Area as Taylor or on-map within Taylor’s com-mand range.

The Cavalry Brigade (under Henderson) is treated as a “Division”for AM purposes. As a Brigade Commander Henderson has no rat-ing to adjust his AM Efficiency. Henderson’s individual units (1Tex, 2 Tex and 2 Dragoon) may be re-assigned to other brigades(limit one per brigade). If all cavalry units are so assigned:

• Henderson is placed and must remain in a Staging Area for thatassault period.

• No cavalry AMs are used.

Mexican EfficiencyMexican Efficiency depends much on Ampudia’s Strategic Posture.The Monterey and Outside City AMs use the Mexican Efficiencymarkers, as adjusted by Ampudia’s Strategic Posture. AM for theBlack Fort and unattached artillery (usually those guns outside thecity) are fixed and not affected by Efficiency.



The Mexican Army has:

• 1 to 4 Monterey AM, these apply to all brigades whose leadersstart the turn inside/within Monterey. They are affected by Effi-ciency.

• 1–4 Outside the City AM for those brigades whose leaders startin a hex outside the city. They are affected by Efficiency.

• 2 Artillery AM —always two, not affected by efficiency—for allguns outside the City that do not start a Turn stacked with a unitfrom a specific brigade, or start the Turn within the CommandRange of a brigadier.

• 2 Black Fort AM ; see M.9.

• The usual March Orders AM.

(5.34) Brigade Coordination is not used in this battle.

(5.36) Mexican brigadiers within the Urban City may use II/B Di-vision Orders to change Orders at the beginning of a Turn depend-ing on Ampudia’s Strategic Posture, but regardless where Ampudiais in terms of Range. Otherwise, they may do so only if Ampudia iswithin range.

(5.4) Efficiency Transfer is not used.

(6.0) THE ORDERS SYSTEM(6.3) The Reserve Rule is not used. The Interphase between AssaultPeriods is used to rally and redeploy units.

(7.0) FACING(7.14) Units in fortified hexes—see 5.44 and 6.12—that have morethan two hexsides so protected, may face the hexside, not the ver-tex, as facing is dependent upon the fortification, not the position-ing. When inside a fortification all “protected” hexsides are treatedas Frontal; all “unprotected” hexsides are treated as Flank.

EXAMPLE #1: In Ft Libertad (3146), all of the hexsides are pro-tected, except for the 3146/3246 hexside.

EXAMPLE #2: unit in 3108 uses normal facing rules.

(7.15) Units inside a fortified hex may fire through any fortifiedhexside (given 7.14) as long as they are facing towards one of thosehexsides. They may fire through an unprotected hexside only whenfacing such a hexside.

PLAY NOTE: For firing purposes a unit may face only a protectedhexside or only an unprotected hexside—no overlap regardless ofthe counter’s actual facing.

(8.0) STACKINGThe rules for this (as well as several other entire sections) insideMonterey are different; see the separate rules for Monterey.

(9.0) MOVEMENTSee the separate rules for Monterey.

(10.0) FIRE COMBAT(10.2) Some Elevation Notes. (For elevation within the City, seeM.2)

The Bishop’s Palace (Obispado; 3341) renders that hex Level 6 (eventhough the hex, itself, is Level 5).

Fortifications and redans have no effect on LOS. However, LaTeneria Distillery (2503)—not the redan—renders that Level Twohex into a Level Three hex. (This means that units on top of thedistillery can fire over the redan—and into it.)

(10.6) Artillery may not fire into any adjacent hex that is two hexes(or more) lower or higher than the firing hex.

(10.61) Mexican artillery may not move and fire in the same Phase.

(10.8) The varying effects of the large number of fortifications interms of Fire are given on the Fortification Effect Chart.

(11.0) SHOCK ASSAULT(11.36) Mexican Shock Commitment. Any Mexican infantry unitwishing to Shock must die roll for Commitment. (It would takeplace instead of 11.11 [3].) The die roll adjustment for this dependson Ampudia’s Strategic Posture (see the rule for this, and the chart).Cavalry Charge is covered by 11.54.

(11.42) The varying effects of the large number of fortifications interms of Shock are given on the Fortification Effect Chart.

(11.5) CAVALRY CHARGE:US Volunteer Cavalry (all the Texas units) and Mexican Irregulars(Canales’ Presidiales, the Bejar Auxiliares and the Permanent com-panies) may not Charge.

(12.0) COMBAT RESULTS(12.4) RETREATMexican Retreat: Mexican units retreating do so either:

• Towards their Brigade Leader, if such movement does not movethem closer to an enemy unit; or

• Towards the Cathedral/Plaza Mayor complex/block in the city.

US Retreat: US units retreating do so either:

• Towards their Brigade Leader, if such movement does not movethem closer to an enemy unit; or

• Towards the Staging Area from which they entered the map.

US units that retreat off-map into their Staging Areas are eligible toreenter the game in the following Assault Period (not turn).

(12.5) ROUT12.53: Routed US units are placed in the Staging Area they origi-nally came from. Routed Mexican units are placed in either theOutside Routed Box or Monterey Routed Box, depending on wherethey were when Routed.

(13.0) MORALE AND RALLY(13.3) Division Combat Effectiveness. This rule is not used.

(13.42) [Rally DRMs] Mexican leaders may not be used to affect/help Rally in any way.

(13.5) Recovery from Rout occurs in the Interphase; being in Re-serve is not used in this game.



(13.52) Recovered US units stay in the SA they were in when ral-lied.

Recovered Mexican units are all placed in a Plaza Block closest totheir brigadier, even if he is outside the city. The Plaza Blocks are:

• Plaza de San Antonio (either block),• Plaza de Cadulines, and• Plaza de Mayor (either block).

(14.0) SPECIAL UNITS(14.2) Mexican cavalry may not Dismount.

(15.0) ENGINEERING(15.1) This section is ignored; no one may build breastworks.

PLAY NOTE: The Mexican player can put up street barricades,but that is covered by a different mechanic. See M.75.

(17.0) FATIGUE(17.4) REDUCING FATIGUEFatigue is reduced only during Interphases. All unit Fatigue is re-moved during the Interphase. All units start the next Assault Phase“fresh” (if not quiet as eager as they were before).

SPECIAL RULESASSAULT PERIODSThe game is divided into four Assault Periods, with the players “start-ing anew” at the beginning of each period. In between each AssaultPeriod is an Interphase, wherein players can redeploy, rally and re-cover.

Each Assault Period has five (5) turns. When the fifth turn has beencompleted, so has that Assault Period.

There are no Night Turns.

The InterphasePLAY NOTE: The Interphase can take some time; it’s like settingup anew.

Stage 1. US Unit RelocationAt the beginning of each Interphase, the US Player may:

• Leave units in place.

• Move individual units so that they are within their BrigadeLeader’s Range. Such movement may not move the unit withinfour (4) hexes or three (3) block-points of a Mexican combat unit,unless the US unit is moving away from the Mexicans. Regard-less, all such movement must be towards the Brigade Leader.Disordered units may be moved.

• Place up to two SP of artillery in a Full City Block which the USeither occupies or controls (last player to occupy) that is withintwelve (12) infantry MP’s of the guns’ initial location—as longas such movement does not violate the above movement restric-tions. That gun is considered to be on top of the roof of a houseand may not move for the rest of the ensuing period. It may beredeployed the next Period, though.

• Units on the map may move off the map into any US StagingArea, as long as they do not violate the above restriction and theirbrigadier is in, or has moved into, that SA.

• Re-assign cavalry units and/or the C, 1 US guns.

Stage 2: US Rally and Recovery• All disordered units that are in a US Staging Area are automati-

cally restored to normal status. Any Brigade Leader in a U.S.Staging Area has all of his routed units returned. All Fatigue isremoved. Units that have Step Losses may reduce those losses byone. However, no unit may so reduce losses to recover to origi-nal, printed strength. Once they take a Step Loss, they are alwaysoperating with at least one Step of Loss.

• Disordered units that are on the map (but not in Staging Areas)and within their Brigade Leader’s Range are flipped to their nor-mal side and have all Fatigue removed. They do not recover anyStep Losses.

• Eliminated units are not affected, or returned, by this rule.

Stage 3: Mexican Redeployment:After the US Player has finished the first two stages of his rede-ployment, the Mexican Player may Redeploy and Rally.

• First, determine which Strategic Posture he (Ampudia) will adopt.

• Re-assign up to three units from one brigade to another.

• Within the restrictions of his Strategic Posture he may place hisunits in any hexes, Points or Blocks that are not within three hexesor two blocks/points of a US unit. Units that start adjacent to aUS unit may not move.

• All Mexican units in the City are automatically Rallied, Recoverfrom Rout (unit placed with its brigadier) and remove Fatigue.No die rolls necessary.

• Mexican units outside the city are Rallied and reduce Fatigue bytwo levels. Recovery from rout occurs normally (13.52).

• No steps are recovered and eliminated units are not affected, orreturned, by this rule.

Stage 4. US Staging Area Re-assignmentThe US Player may re-assign all units in Staging Areas to new Stag-ing Areas, if he wishes, in the same fashion as he did for the firstAssault Period. However, no more than one Division may ever beassigned to Staging Area #4.

DESIGN NOTE: That’s because SA #4 is really a non-existent place;the area represents units on the march from SA #3 that have anearly start.

Reassigning UnitsThe US Player may assign one cavalry regiment to a brigade, onecavalry unit per brigade. If all cavalry units are so re-distributed theUS Player does not get to use the Cavalry AM.

The lone, unattached artillery battery—the Siege guns of C, 1 US,may either remain independent (and be used as per the Siege Gunrules), or they may be attached to any one brigade that has no otherguns attached.

The Mexican Player may re-assign up to three units during eachInterphase, from one brigade to another. Units inside the Black Fortare so eligible, if there are no US units within one hex of the roadrunning 2114-2515. You may have to keep track of this on paper.

US Siege GunsThe term “Siege Guns” refers to artillery capable ofdestroying walls. The US Player has two guns whichqualify as “Siege” guns, his 24-pounder howitzers from‘C’, 1 US. These are the only US guns that have any



affect on the walls of the Black Fort; all other guns fire only at“human” targets (or the Cathedral). The 24-pounders may fire ei-ther as field guns (against troops) or against the walls of the BlackFort.

C, 1 US exists either as an independent battery, or as a battery at-tached to a brigade.

If independent, the guns do not operate under any AM. Instead, theUS Player may undertake three 3 activations per Turn at any timeduring any of his AM. During an Independent Activation, those gunsmay either Move or Fire, not both. If attached to a brigade, theyoperate like any other battery.

The assignment of guns is determined at the beginning of each As-sault Period and may not be changed during that Period. Regard-less, C, 1 US always starts an Assault Period in a Staging Area.

To fire at the Black Fort walls the US Player determines the range(the wall is considered to be in the hex closer to the firing guns) androlls the die. If he rolls the die within the range listed on the SiegeGun Table he reduces that wall hex by one.

• From SA #1 it is 14 hexes (range) to 2016-8, the only walls it canhit from there. The reverse is also true.

• In SA #2 it is 12 hexes to 2016-8.• SA #3/4 are out of range.

All other ranges are counted from the hex the siege guns are in.

When that wall hexside has suffered the number of hits listed below(use SP markers) it is no longer there; otherwise, regardless of thenumber of hits it still provides the benefits listed on the terrain chart.As you can see from that table, it’s not a very effective form ofwarfare, is it.

Black Fort Walls are:

• The Moat/Outside Walls (3 Hits to destroy),• Any Bastion hex in entirety (e.g., 2018) (6 Hits to destroy), and• Any of the 4 “walls” of the Citadel facing N, S, E or W. (5 Hits to

destroy)

Fire at any other target—mostly personnel inside the Fort—is con-ducted as per the usual Artillery rules.

SPECIAL MEXICAN COMMAND RULESAmpudia’s Strategic PostureThe Commander of the Mexican Army of the North, Major-Gen-eral Pedro de Ampudia, spent most of the time prior to the actualassault wavering between plans to attack Taylor’s army as it ap-proached (which wouldn’t have been a bad idea for the period inwhich Taylor’s army was strung out all over the Mexican country-side) and bowing to local pressure to hole up inside the city anddefend to the last man. Each strategy had its adherents and ulti-mately Pedro decided on an almost totally defensive stance. It couldhave been different—actually Ampudia was somewhat bold the firstday or so, using both his cavalry brigades to assault US troops—and we hereby allow the Mexican Player to choose between a hand-ful of strategic postures.

Prior to each Assault Period the Mexican Player must choose whetherhe (Ampudia) will be Aggressive, Cautious, or Defensive. Eachposture carries with it benefits and restrictions, and it also has amajor effect on the Ampudia Surrender die rolls. Virtually all ofthese are listed on the Ampudia Strategic Posture Chart, which theMexican Player should peruse closely—and both players should

keep handy as a reference as posture affects a wide range of activi-ties.

Once chosen, a Posture remains in effect for the entire Assault Pe-riod. It cannot be changed until the next Period.

The Mexican Player does not have to reveal his choice until he hasto do something that would make such revelation necessary …which,to be honest, in most cases is almost instantly.

Uraga’s Orders RatingsCol. Jose Lopez Uraga, in charge of the Black Fort garrison, wasactually quite a capable brigadier …and he commands, probably,the best brigade in Ampudia’s army. Because he is isolated in laCiudadela, Uraga has two Orders Change Ratings …which he useswhen the rules require—except when he gets Orders via the Tele-graph (M.72)—as follows:

• If he is inside the Black Fort, he uses the –2• If he is anywhere else, he uses the +1.

CanalesIf Canales is killed, there is no Replacement Leader, and his twoPresidiales units are immediately removed from the game.

Mexican Hidden Deployment (Optional Rule)PLAY NOTE: This is a rule that gives the game a lot of sizzle. Itdoes, though, require a certain amount of bookkeeping and hon-esty.

Any units that the Mexican Player wishes to start an Assault Periodinside a Partial or Full Urban Block, or in any Point to which a LOScould be traced from any of the US Staging Areas only through aFull City Block , do not have to actually be placed on the map.They may be deployed “Hidden”.

EXAMPLE: At the start of the game, Mexican units in the Plaza deMayor cannot be seen by any US units in Staging Areas becauseLOS from the SA’s is blocked by the Urban City Blocks.

To deploy Hidden units, record the unit and its Block location on apiece of paper at the start of the turn

A Hidden unit becomes “spotted”—no longer hidden and placed onthe map—when one of the following happens:

• It Fires or Shock Attacks.• It moves into or through a hex or block into which any US unit on

the map could “see”—trace a LOS. (There is always a US unit inany Staging Area which was used by the US Player at the start ofthe Period). See the LOS mechanics in the Terrain rules.

Once the US Player occupies Obispado and both redans on ElSoldado,

• Units may hide only in Full City Blocks• Any movement by a Hidden unit reveals its location.

SPECIAL RULESFOR THE CITY

This section is quite extensive, as the “terrain” for Monterey is dif-ferent from any other game in the system. All of the rules, below,apply to movement/combat inside the city.



Monterey, a rather beautiful city of low-slung, white buildings,groves of trees, etc., is nestled in the foothills of the Sierra Madre—one of the more picturesque cities in northern Mexico. At the timeof the battle it contained about 10,000 inhabitants. It also contains ahost of problems for the designer, problems whose solutions ask fora bit of flexibility and understanding on the part of the players ifthey want to get some of the feel of what this fascinating assaultwas like. We have tried to be as brief as humanely possible.

DESIGN NOTE: Many of you may have seen Monterey when watch-ing the several Major League games played there some years ago.The “mountain” in the background is the game’s Loma deIndependencia. Most of our vision of Monterey, in terms of how wehave represented it on the map, comes from the several detailedand descriptive pictures and drawings of the city included in Tyler’s“The Mexican War”

(M.1) THE MAPThe Monterey map is divided into two types of terrain:

• The Hex grid, for all areas outside “the city”.• A Block and Point system, for inside the city of Monterey.

The former uses the normal terrain rules (9.4), except for The BlackFort, which we’ll cover, below (M.9).

The Santa Catarina River was hip-deep fordable in most places, sowe have not bothered with any “ford” rules. The roads east of thecity do not cross the river, or effect the cost of doing so. The road tothe south includes a bridge.

(M.2) THE CITY(M.21) Monterey is considered to be all Streets and City Blocks.The city of Monterey is defined by two things:

• The Street grid. The intersections where streets meet are calledStreet Points. There are also street points along streets wherethere are no intersections.

• The City Blocks. The four different types of blocks represent thevaried level of buildings within that block.

(M.22) A Block is an area of the City surrounded by hexes, streetsand/or Block-Dividing lines. A Block is “identified” by the letters/numbers of the streets surrounding it.

Posture Chosen:

Item Affected Aggressive Cautious Defensive

Initiative DR Adjustment 0 –1 –3

Efficiency Adjustment:Outside City +1 0 –1Inside City 0 +1 +1

Units May Start Assault Period[a] Anywhere [b] In Monterey or

a fortified hex

Cavalry Restrictions None [b] Starts in Monterey Starts in Monterey.

+2 to all 11.54 DR.

Effect on Orders Dierolls by BrigadeLeaders inside City –1 0 +1

May use II/B to Change Ordersif in Urban City YES NO NO

Location of Ampudia Anywhere Must Start in Monterey Must Start and Stay in Cathedral

Shock Attack Commitment? Dieroll –2 Dieroll Dieroll +2

Def. Shock Dieroll (11.37) Dieroll +2 Dieroll Dieroll –2

Barricades to Build 1 2 4

Calling Canales May Use 2 Canales AM May Use 1 Canales AM No Canales AM

a = Uraga's Brigade must start in the Black Fort in the First assault Periodb = But not within six MP's of a US Staging Area

All units of at least one infantry brigademust start in Ampudia's Range.

Remainder in Monterey or fortified hex.

THE AMPUDIA STRATEGIC POSTURE CHART



There are four different types of blocks:

1.Open are blocks with little or no buildings/walls. Those build-ings and other terrain shown have no effect on movement or com-bat.

2.Plazas are open areas and were the center of town activities.

PLAY NOTE: The Plaza de San Antonio and the Plaza Mayor (orMain Square) are subdivided by Block Dividers into two or moreblocks. The Plaza de San Antonio, at the southern edge of the city,is divided into three Plaza Blocks, at the center of which is the cityCemetery, a Partial City Block (for game purposes).

3.Partial City are blocks which contain enough buildings to aidprotection but delay movement.

4.Urban City . These are the “urban” areas of Monterey, consisting(mainly) of one story, flat-roofed adobe houses that the Mexi-cans have sandbagged and loop-holed for defense.

Some of the Urban City blocks also represent larger edifices:

• The Hospital (P/Q-2/3).• The Prison (in the center of the Plaza Mayor, which disrupts Street

#10).• The Cathedral (X/10,11, just off the Plaza Mayor).• The Bull Ring (Just off Street W, south of the Plaza Mayor).

(M.23) Streets.Running through the city are the Streets. These are identified bynumbers (from 1 to 11), for the streets running generally east-west,and letters (A to BB) for those running generally north-south.

PLAY NOTE: The Numbering/Lettering system for all of this isneeded if you are using Hidden Movement and/or are playing bymail/computer.

Along the streets are points, usually at intersections or correspond-ing to block dividers. Points are used to regulate movement of units.When moving on streets, units move from Point to Point.

(M.24) Block Dividers divide and separate large Blocks into dif-ferent blocks. Dividers are not streets. They simply delineate blocks.

(M.25) The Ojo de Agua, the canal running through the easternsection of the city, is a Stream, except where it becomes a Pond. Seethe Terrain tables. There are several bridges crossing the canal. Thecanal acts as a Block Divider.

(M.26) Stone Walls. These run along portions of the southern edgeof the city, separating city blocks from plazas. They serve as protec-tion, in that they pretty much negate any fire (they’re Level Two),

and they are extremely difficult to cross. (They were fairly high.)Exception: the street ‘to Saltillo” running through the wall allowspassage through the wall.

(M.27) Elevation and LOS: Within the city, the following eleva-tion premises are used:

• Streets, Open Blocks and Plaza Blocks are Level One.• Partial City Blocks and Stone Walls are Level Two.• Urban City Blocks are Level Three.

LOS may not be traced through Partial and Urban City Blocks.

(M.3) URBAN CITY MOVEMENT(M.31) Units inside the Urban/Block portion of the city move fromPoint-to-Point, Point-to-Block (or vice versa), and/or block-to-block.If two blocks are separated by a Block Divider, units pay the cost ofentering the new block.

(M.32) The cost to enter a block or street is whatever is listed on thechart, regardless of the size of the block or the length of the street.

(M.33) Infantry and cavalry using Attack Orders get several ben-efits in the Urban City:

• Units may move into an “adjacent” (see M.5) Point without draw-ing Reaction Fire. See M.63.

• It negates any possible Ambush. See M.67.

(M.34) Command ranges are traced using Point and Block costs asif they were hex costs. Ranges may never be traced through UrbanBlocks, even if friendly occupied.

(M.35) Phasing units may enter City Blocks occupied by EnemyUnits. See M.72.

(M.4) FACING AND STACKING IN URBANPOINTS/BLOCKS(M.41) Units inside Monterey City do not have to be faced in anyparticular direction. They are always considered to have “Frontal”facing and may not be flanked, either by fire or shock.

PLAY NOTE: Thus, there is no cost to “change facing” while mov-ing.

(M.42) The Stacking restrictions inside the City are somewhat morerestrictive: 4 SP of Foot, 3 SP Mounted, or one unit (whichever islarger), plus 3 guns in a Point or 6 guns in a Block. Artillery maycombine with either foot or mounted.

(M.5) ADJACENCY(M.51) Inside the Urban City, the term “adjacent” means either:

• A unit one Point distant from an enemy unit in another Point.• A unit in a Point which borders a Block occupied by an enemy

unit (and vice versa).

(M.52) Rule 9.52 does not apply inside the city. Instead:

• Units using Advance Mode that move adjacent to an enemy unitmay draw Movement Reaction Fire (M.63) from the latter. If theydo draw Reaction Fire, they must stop, ending their movementfor that Phase. If they do not draw fire, they may continue tomove.

PLAY NOTE: Thus, unlike 9.52, where mere presence and positionis the defining factor, whether or not a unit must cease movementunder adjacency circumstances depends on Reaction Fire.



• Units in Attack Mode do not draw Reaction Fire when movingadjacent to an enemy unit. However,

(a) they do have to stop (for that Phase) when so moving, but

(b) they can Shock units in adjacent Points only—not Blocks(see M.72). Units in Advance may not Shock.

DESIGN NOTE: In this case, “Attack” represents something dif-ferent than the usual, linear-oriented attack of the base game sys-tem.

(M.53) Artillery units may move adjacent only if stacked with afriendly non-artillery unit, or moving into a Point/Block alreadyoccupied by a friendly non-artillery unit.

(M.6) FIRE COMBATFire Combat is pretty much the same inside the City as outside (inthe hex field), with the following changes.

(M.61) Range.• Each Point is considered to be one hex from the next Point when

using the Range Table.• Each Block is considered to be one hex from any Point that is

bordering that Block.• Each Block is considered to be two hexes from any adjacent Block,

whether separated by a street or a Block Divider.

(M.62) What a unit may fire at depends mostly on LOS. In thiscase, terrain elevation is important. Also a consideration, for unitsin street Points, is that you can only fire in a “straight line”; bulletsand shot do not turn corners. When in doubt, use a straight edge todetermine whether a unit in Point ‘a’ could fire at one in Point “B”without intervening Blocks.

(M.63) In addition to the types of non-Phasing Fire available through10.4, a non-phasing unit may use Movement Reaction Fire againstan enemy/Phasing unit that moves adjacent and is not in AttackMode.

PLAY NOTE: This is obviously more “fun” when you play HiddenMovement. We called it “Adobe Ambush” during testing.

(M.64) Prepared Fire. The following units are always consideredto be using Prepared Fire:

• All non-Phasing units in Fortified hexes, Blocks or BarricadedPoints.

• Phasing units that have not moved that Phase.

(M.65) Units in Blocks may fire in any direction (there is no “fac-ing”, remember?) However, firing in more than one direction istreated as Splitting Fire. Units in Points may fire only into adjacentBlocks and into Points to which they may trace a LOS. Again, theymay do so in any direction, but if firing in more than one direction,that is treated as Splitting Fire.

(M.66) Units in Points may use no more than 4 SP (or two artillerySP!) when firing in any one direction. Units in Blocks use 10.14.

DESIGN NOTE: We have ignored the question as to whether unitsin blocks are inside buildings or atop them. You don’t really wantto get into that sort of detail, now do you?

(M.67) Adobe Ambush. A unit that is moving along streets is sub-ject to Ambush when it enters the ZOC of a unit in a Full City Hex.Essentially, such unit is subject to enemy Reaction Fire when itenters the street/ZOC—and such Reaction Fire is resolved with thefollowing possible adjustments:

+1 dr adjustment if unit spent only 1 MP to enter the hex (see12.24).

+1 dr adjustment if unit is in Attack Order.+2 dr adjustment if unit is in March Order.

The above are cumulative.

PLAY NOTE: This rule, essentially, is usable only when playingwith Hidden City Deployment. Otherwise, it’s too easy to avoid.Note, though, that protecting a unit by using Defend Orders makesit difficult to launch any cohesive assaults on enemy-held blocks.Interesting choice.

(M.7) SHOCK(M.71) Any phasing unit under Attack Orders that ends Movementin a Point may Shock attack enemy units in:

• any adjacent Point (including Points bordering a Block the unitwishing to Shock is in); or

• any hex adjacent to that Point, and vice versa (for units in hexesjust outside the city grid).

Units in Advance may not Shock attack when inside the City.

(M.72) Any active unit that ends Movement in a Block (M.35) mustShock attack enemy units in that Block. Thus, a phasing unit wish-ing to Shock attack enemy units in a Block must first move into thatBlock as part of Movement and then resolve combat as part of Shock.Stacking restrictions apply separately to each side.

PLAY NOTE: Shock Combat in Blocks takes place with both sidesin the same place. If it so happens that both sides are still thereafter combat resolution, they stay there until one side leaves, ei-ther voluntarily or involuntarily.

(M.73) Units that must Retreat from a Block;

• do so into the Point from which they came, if the attacker;• do so into any unoccupied Point otherwise.

If they cannot so Retreat, they stay and lose an additional SP.

(M.74) Units may not form Square in Points or Blocks.

PLAY NOTE: Remember, there is no Position Superiority. This isnot linear warfare.

(M.75) Barricades. Barricades are jerry-rigged, tem-porary street fortifications that provide defensive ben-efits for those “behind” (actually, stacked with) them,very much like Breastworks. Barricades may be placed:

• On any Street Point.• On any bridge Point.

The Mexican Player starts the game with three (3) Barricades. Hemay build (place) additional barricades only at the beginning of the2nd, 3rd and 4th Assault Periods. The number of barricades he mayso place is limited by Ampudia’s Strategic Posture and the countermix (10).

Barricades increase the cost of moving into a Point. They also adddefensive (terrain) benefits to units that are stacked with the barri-cade. The Monterey Terrain Chart lists the benefits/costs of barri-cades.

Once in place, a barricade may not be moved. Any player may de-stroy a barricade by passing into the Point and paying 1 MP to de-stroy barricade. He does not have to destroy it; it is simply an op-tion.



(M.8) CAVALRY IN THE CITYMounted Cavalry units operate differently—and far less effec-tively—inside the City than outside (in the hexes):

• Mounted Cavalry may not move into Urban or Partial City Blocks,although they can fire into them.

• Mounted Cavalry may charge only through and/into Plaza Blocks.Any other block type prohibits charging …or Shock of any kind,unless they dismount.

• Mounted Cavalry may charge “down” a street to shock/chargeenemy units in a Point. They gain all the benefits of Charge—except they first halve their SP (rounding down) before makingany adjustments. (The Lords of Design Giveth, and the Lords ofDesign Taketh Away). The charge path must be straight. (In otherwords, no turning the corner to charge).

(M.9) THE BLACK FORTThe Black Fort—so named by the US troops because the walls wereblack—was called Ciudadela (Citadel) by the Mexicans. The Cita-del was a heavily reinforced and fortified abandoned cathedral with25–30 foot walls. The Mexicans surrounded it by some more works:11-foot thick walls and a 12-foot moat. All of this stood on a smallhill, rendering virtually any spot on the map within reach of herguns. Communications between the fort, commanded by ColonelJosé Lopez Uraga, and HQ was handled by a rough form of tele-graph! Essentially—and practically—it was untakeable by the typeof army Taylor had. However, for those who insist…

(M.91) The Black Fort consists of four types of terrain:

• The Moat (moat and wall, as noted above). The Moat/Outer Wallis Level 4. These Walls need 3 hits to be destroyed.

• Clear Terrain inside the Moat. These are Level 3 (2017, 2115,2118 and 2217).

• The Bastions (at each of the four corners). These are Level 4(2016, 2018, 2216 and 2218). These Walls need 6 hits to be de-stroyed.

• The actual Citadel, the “block” in the center (2116 and 2117).This is Level 4. These Walls need 5 hits to be destroyed.

(M.92) The fort was built to hold about 30 guns; the Mexicans hadnine (the number varies based on the source). The guns are placedeither in a bastion or the Citadel. Once placed they may not move.The garrison troops are placed in any hex, bastion inside the fort, orin the Citadel, which is treated as if it were a single Urban Block.

DESIGN AND PLAY NOTE: Historically, the fort was manned byUraga’s “brigade”. The Mexican Player will quickly note that this

seems to be a waste of good units. In game terms, perhaps so.However, Ampudia and his staff viewed Ciudadela as the linchpinof their northern defense. He did not intend to leave its defense to“Defenserias” and other assorted semi-rabble. Most players willmove at least one regiment out. Keep in mind, though, the VP worthof this fort.

(M.93) Ampudia may give Orders directly to Uraga, in The BlackFort—i.e., allow Uraga to change Orders—by using the telegraph.If Ampudia is in The Cathedral and Uraga is in The Black Fort, thetelegraph can be used, which means there is no Orders Rating dieroll necessary for Uraga (even though he’s “out of range”).

(M.94) All Artillery Fire against the Fort Walls is resolved usingthe US Siege Gun Table. No other US guns have any affect on theWalls. For all other, anti-personnel Fire, units inside the Black Fortignore all ‘d’ results. All D’s become d’s (with no +/– modifiers).

(M.95) Artillery and infantry in the Black Fort get a +1 drm to all oftheir Fire.

PLAY NOTE: Infantry in the Clear hexes cannot fire at anythingoutside the fort.

(M.96) There are only two AM for The Black Fort, and they areused for all the artillery and infantry inside the Fort plus Uraga, ifhe starts inside the Fort. If Uraga starts Outside the Fort, the units inhis brigade that are also outside use the applicable AM. The Mexi-can Player gets 2 Black Fort AM each Turn, and they are not af-fected by Mexican Efficiency. Units inside the Black Fort never runout of ammunition.

(M.97) Units occupying the fort may enter and leave the fort via theroad/bridge using road rates. Units that do not control the fort maynot use this road or bridge.

UNUSUAL EVENTS AND RULESDuty Calls #1: Ole Davy Twiggs

This rule concerns one of those tangential stories thatmake reading about wars and the people who foughtthem so much less depressing than it ought to be. Seemsthat the irrepressible Twiggs had this great fear of get-

ting a bullet in the belly and dying from, not the actual wound, butthe infection that would quickly result. Ole Davy, who was not theMensa representative at Monterey, theorized that if he emptied hiscolon of all matter there would be a much lesser chance of suc-cumbing to such a horrible death. It, therefore, occurred to him thattaking a laxative right before the battle would allow him to enter thefray clean as a whistle, at least “colonically.” Then, extending thatline of thinking to the sort of conclusion Ole Davy often came upwith, he figured an extra dose would keep him extra spanking clean…cleaner than clean, as it were.

Doesn’t take too long to figure out where Twiggs spent the 21st: inback of his tent, glued to his seat, lending depth to the phrase horsde combat.

For those of you wishing to simulate this, at the start of each Periodof play, roll a die for Twiggs. If the die roll is odd, Davy’s on thethrone and is unavailable for the day’s events. Garland now com-mands his division, with Major Lear running the 3/1 brigade. Ifeven, duty has called (ahem), and Twiggs is fit to command. Well,he never was really fit to command—but at least he’s upright. Thiscan only happen once.



Duty Calls #2: Antonio CanalesAntonio Canales’ contingent of “rancheros” had beendisbanded after their dismal (non)-performance at bothPalo Alto and Resaca de la Palma. Canales, himself,was still “negotiating” to have the US set him up as El

Supremo of Northern Mexico, so the Mexican High Command wasviewing him a little suspiciously anyway.

Therefore, they assigned him about 600 auxiliaries from Tamaulipasand, putting him under Ampudia’s command, gave him instructionsto harass the approaching gringos and then report for duty—neitherof which he did to any great effect. The result was that, when thebattle started, Canales and his troopers were outside the city.

This was an interesting opportunity for Ampudia to put a little pres-sure on Taylor, and he did attempt to make contact with Canales.Nothing, however, came of it—and Canales was a no-show at themain event. We give you the (slim) opportunity to correct that over-sight.

If the Ampudia’s Strategic Posture for the period is either Aggres-sive or Cautious he may attempt to get Canales into play. To do thishe places either 1 (Cautious Posture) or 2 (Aggressive Posture)Canales AM in The Pool. Each time the Canales AM is drawn, theMexican Player rolls the die:

• If he rolls an ‘8’ or ‘9’, Canales is activated for the rest of thatAssault Period. The AM used to activate cannot be used to moveCanales men; that will occur with the rest of the AM drawn thatPeriod. Once activated, place all the Canales AM in The Pool; hewill have 2 AM each turn, no more, no less. At the end of hisactive Assault Period, Canales goes home and is no longer in thegame.

• If he rolls a ‘2–7’, the attempt has failed.

• If he rolls a ‘0’ or a ‘1’ not only has the attempt failed but theMexican Player may not try again for the remainder of the game.

Once Canales is activated, his AM is available to be placed in thepool for the rest of that Period. However, Canales and his troopersalways start a Period off map. The Mexican Player must immedi-ately write down which hex he wishes to use for Canales’ entry(when finally activated), either:

• 4053, 4832, 1949, or 1039

Canales enters like any other reinforcement, except that he may notdo so if the chosen hex is enemy-occupied. The Mexican Playermay not change the Entry Hex, but once Canales has entered hestays on the map for the rest of that Period, to be used as an addi-tional brigade.

Winning the GameAt the end of any Assault Turn in which the US Player occupies theCathedral the US Player automatically wins the game. Failing that,the following is the method to determine victory.

In the Surrender Interphase, at the end of each Assault Period (notturn), the US Player totals the number of Victory Points he has ac-cumulated for occupying or controlling (last to occupy) hexes andblocks, along with a few other items as listed on the Surrender Chart.

He then rolls the die and consults the Surrender Table under thecolumn for the Strategic Posture assumed by the Mexican Playerduring the past Period. If he rolls within the range listed, Ampudiasurrenders and the US Player wins. If not, proceed with the nextPeriod. If it is the 4th (last) Period, subtract one from any die roll…and this time, if the US Player doesn’t win, the Mexican does.

AMPUDIA SURRENDER TABLE

Posture forthat Period 0-15 16-30 31-45 46-60 61-80 81+

Aggressive NO 8-9 5-9 2-9 Auto Auto

Cautious NO 9 7-9 5-9 1-9 Auto

Defensive NO NO 9 7-9 4-9** Auto

If it is the 4th Assault Period, subtract one (–1) from all dierolls.An Auto is still an Auto.

NO = Surrender? Besame mi Burrito, Gringo!

# - # = If US Player rolls within this range, Mexicans sur-render and US Wins; otherwise, treat as a NO.

Auto = Vamos, muchachos!! It's all yours, Gringo!

** = Historical Result

United States Victory Points Accumulatedby end of Assault Period

US VP'sObjective for US Occupation Earned

The Cathedral (Block #163) Auto. US Victory

Any hex inside The Black Fort 25

Each Full City Block Controlled 1

La Teneria Redan (2403) 3

La Teneria Distillery (2503) 1

El Rincon del Diablo 2

Fort Libertad 3

Obispado (Bishop's Palace) 5

Federacion Redan 1

El Soldado 3

Southern Redans (both, 4323-4) 1

Plaza del Toro (Bull Ring, Block #146) 2

Plaza de San Antonio (all blocks) 1

Purisma Bridge Plaza (block #153) 2

Santa Catarina Bridge (3830-3930) 1

Each time Cathedral is hit [a] by US Arty Fire 1

Each Mexican Brigade Ineffective [b] 10

a = A Hit is any result other than a No Effect. The TerrainEffects of being a Full City Block apply. Note that be-cause of its height - tallest building in town by far - theCathedral can be "seen" from virtually anywhere on themap!

b = Canales “brigade” does not count for VP.

MONTEREY VICTORY CHART



PLAY NOTE: The Mexican Deployment at the start of each As-sault Period can be very important. His main problem is he’s gottoo much ground to cover. This is an aspect of play that will im-prove exponentially after the first play-through.

HISTORICAL NOTE: Most of the Mexican deployment is “un-known.” Mejia did have his HQ at the Purisma Bridge, with thefollowing known “dispositions.”

• About 300 of the Aguascalientos and Querétero Activos held thePurisma position, along with the 12-pounders.

• The remainder of the Querétero Activos plus some companiesfrom the 2nd Ligero held the La Teneria redoubt.

• The rest of the brigade was within the triangular area formed bythe Purisma Bridge, La Tenéria and El Rincon del Diablo, the lastof which was held by several hundred more men from one of theremaining regiments.

Ramirez's Brigade was assigned the western edge of the city, and itwas his men who held the positions on both Independencia andFederacion.

• Ft. Libertad contained a small detachment.• Obispado was held by the 1st Mexico Activo.

It appears that Romero's cavalry was stationed at the western end ofthe city, while Torrejon watched the approaches from the shadow ofthe Black Fort, on the outskirts of the north-central edge of town.

The US Army of Occupation Initial DeploymentThe US Player has available all the units with an “M”, and listed onthe Monterey OoB, below.

The US assigns each of his four divisions to one of his four StagingAreas (see the map) to start the first Assault Period. He may assigna division to any of the four Staging Areas, but only one (1) Divi-sion may be assigned to SA #4.

In addition, the US player may assign any one Cavalry regiment(both counters, if that applies) to any one brigade. He may alsoattach the C, 1 US battery to a brigade that has no other battery.

The US units do not have to be placed on the map until they actu-ally move. Units in the SA's are not reinforcements; they are con-sidered to be "on the map" (even though, physically, they are not).They appear, and move, when activated.

Orders are assigned as the US Player wishes.

The Historical Dispositions for the first day of the assault were:

SA #1: Twiggs' 1st Division, Butler's Field Division andHenderson's Cavalry, the latter minus all the Texas Cavalry, plusthe C, 1 US Heavy Artillery.

SA #4: Worth's 2nd Division, to which was attached the TexasCavalry. The latter must be assigned to a brigade.

MONTEREY INITIALDEPLOYMENTS

First Assault PeriodGeneral Sequence: The Mexican Player determines his initial de-ployment first. He places all his units that could be "seen" by theUS Player on the map . The US Player then determines which divi-sions will enter through which of his Staging Areas. And, finally,the Mexican Player places the rest of his units on the map (unlesshe is using Hidden Deployment).

The Mexican Army of the NorthThe Mexican Player will be operating under the restrictions of what-ever Strategic Posture Ampudia (the Mexican Player) has chosen;see below.

Once that is determined, he places his units on the map. The Mexi-can Player has available all units with an “M” on them, and listedon the Monterey OoB, below. There are, however, several deploy-ment requirements for the first Assault Period:

1. Uraga's Brigade must be placed in the Black Fort. It is under“Attack” Orders.

2. For the first Period, the Mexican must make the following artil-lery dispositions:

Where What

Black Fort two 4-pounders, six 12-pounders; one 18-pounder; guns are placed in either one ormore of the 4 corner bastions, or in 2116-7,all hexes of which are Level 3.

El Rincon del three 8-pounders.Diablo (3106)

La Teneria (2403) two 8-pounders; one 4-pounder; one H6howitzer

Purísma Têtes-de- two 8-pounders, one 12-pounder;pont (the 2 bridges one counter in each bridge/Point.just west of 2911)

Fort Libertad (3146) four 6-pounders.

Obispado (3341) two 8-pounders, one 12-pounder, one H6Howitzer.

Federacion Redan two 8-pounders.(4439)

Anywhere in ten 6-pounders.Monterey

There are no guns in El Soldado.

3. Canales and his Presidiales are not available until activated; seeDuty Calls #2.

4. The remainder of the units available may be placed as desired.All units start under whatever Orders the Mexican Player wishes(except for Uraga’s brigade, above).

5. The Mexican Player may place three (3) Barricade counters inany street intersection he wishes.



EL MOLINO DEL REYMexico City, September 9, 1847

Molino is a good introduction to the GBACW system. Counters arefew, the command and activation system is somewhat less detailed,and the action is rather fast and furious.

Historical BackgroundThe basic premise is that the US Player (Winfield Scott) has de-cided that the best approach to the city—about a mile and a half NEof the game-map—is across the eastern and southern causeways.The only way for him to use these causeways is to take the keyMexican “stronghold”, Chapultepec.

However, Scott is also under the (misguided) impression that thetwo buildings to the west, Casa Mata and El Molino del Rey, arerepositories for Mexican artillery. He has decided that, before hecan proceed to Chapultepec, and thence Mexico City itself, he mustsecure his left flank.

Although Scott had his entire army at his disposal, when he attackedEl Molino, many of the units were dispersed, to the east, as “feints, and thus the US Player has only three brigades available.

MapThis El Molino map uses a scale of 110 yards per hex.

Length of GameThe game is played until one player wins; see below.

BalanceThe Mexicans again outnumber the US, although that is illusory, asmuch of the Mexican numerical strength is in its cavalry, whichplayed almost no part in the battle. However, the Mexicans do havewhat appears to be a solid defensive position. Yet, the US is stillfavored …mostly because the two Mexican defensive positions arenot mutually supportable, many—but certainly not all—of the Mexi-can units are shaky, and the Mexicans have little or no functionalcommand system.


(3.0) SEQUENCE OF PLAYII. A. Activation Efficiency Determination. There is no “Efficiency”;this is already pre-determined; see changes to 5.2, below.

II. B Division Orders . Used only by the US and only if the briga-dier is within Command Range of Worth.

II. C Reinforcement Orders is not used.


(4.0) COMMANDThere are no Corps/Army Commanders; only Brigadiers, plus theUS has a Division Commander (who is, for game purposes, theOC), Worth, who moves only in the Commander Movement Phase(IV/A). The Mexicans have no Overall Commander, and must func-tion under that reality. Worth’s Activation Rating is not used.

HISTORICAL NOTE: Santa Anna spent virtually the entire fivedays of the Battle for Mexico City either in, or riding around, thecity, performing no function other than to mess around with thedeployment of troops to no visible gain. His only appearance at ElMolino and Chapultepec was about an hour after the North Ameri-cans had taken the Mill. He had no perceptible effect on either oneof the assaults.

(5.0) ACTIVATION(5.1) US adds two (+2) to Initiative DR.

(5.2) There is no Efficiency in this battle.• The US always gets three (3) Army AM per turn;• The Mexican gets three Army (3) AM per turn in each turn in

which it has the Initiative. In turns in which the US has the Initia-tive, it gets two (2) Army AM.

PLAY NOTE: If you wish to give the Mexicans a leg up, ignore the2 AM for No Initiative restriction, and give them 3 AM each turn.

(5.3) When a player’s Army AM is drawn, he may activate all of hisunits, not just some. The only exception is that General Worth movesonly in the OC Movement Phase, IV/A, as per 4.17.

(5.34) Only the US may use Brigade Coordination.

(5.36) As there is no Mexican leader above Brigade Level; all Mexi-can brigadiers are treated as Out of Command for this battle and,thus, do not get to use II/B (Division Orders).

(6.0) THE ORDERS SYSTEM(6.1) There are no March orders in this battle; just Advance andAttack.

(6.3) The Reserve Rule is not used.

(10.0) FIRE COMBAT(10.61) Mexican artillery may not move and fire in the same Phase.

(11.0) SHOCK ASSAULT(11.37) [NEW DRM] Units defending against shock behind a For-tification or Stone Wall hexside subtract one (–1) when undertakinga Pre-Shock Cohesion check. See the Terrain Rules for this battlefor more detail on the several different types of man-made fortifica-tions.



(13.0) MORALE AND RALLY(13.3) Do not use Division Combat Effectiveness.

(13.42) Mexican Brigadiers do not provide any Rally DRMs.

(14.0) SPECIAL UNITS(14.2) Mexican cavalry may not Dismount.

(15.0) ENGINEERING(15.1) No one may build breastworks.

(17.0) FATIGUEFatigue is not used; the battle is too short.

SPECIAL RULESFOR THE BATTLE

TERRAINThe Molino battlefield looks simple; that is deceptive, as there ismuch detail, and a large handful of unusual “terrain” types, bothnatural and man-made.

Marsh/Flooded. Mexico City (off the map to the NE) is surroundedby partially reclaimed swamp (at this time). Some of it was fields,some of it marsh. Pretty much all of it had been flooded by SantaAnna at the approach of the North Americans, reducing (most) mili-tary movement to the Causeways.

Cypress Grove. These were part of the Chapultepec Park and wererather swampy—and very beautiful. Note that hex 1711 is not somuch “flooded” as swampy without the cypress trees.

Maguey Hexsides. A line of large maguey plants—medium height,cactus/palm-like flora—which offered some protection.

Ravines. The two dry ravines on the map were almost uncrossable,except where the Roads traversed them. Using the Roads negatesthe cost of crossing the ravines. However, units Shock Attackingacross the Ravine where the road crosses still use the Ravine Com-bat effects. No US infantry unit may cross the west-most ravine[1827/1828 to 2434/2533] or move west of it.

Strongpoint Buildings: Here we refer specifically to Casa Mata, asmall fort-like building, and El Molino (including 2114), a series oflow, flat-roofed warehouses which had been strengthened by sand-bags on the roofs, etc. Casa Mata was surrounded, except where theroad entered the building, by a dry moat. That effect is built-in.

Mexican units, if required to retreat Casa Mata or El Molino, maytake a step loss instead

Chapultepec. The name refers specifically to the 200-foot high “Hillof the Grasshopper”, atop which rests the Mexican Military Col-

lege (Colegio Militar). The depiction of this fort is rather simpli-fied, because of the scale. Therefore:

• Regardless of the elevation level of the hex, only those hexsideswith the “steep” icon are Steep.

• It costs infantry 1 MP to move into 1809 by the Road. If they areattacking into that hex from 1909, it is treated as if the Road werenot there.

• It costs Infantry 2 MP to move from 1808 to 1809 and vice versa.

• It costs infantry 3 MP to move in either Colegio hex (1808-9)from a hex outside US units may enter, or Shock across, a Colegiohex only if they roll a 7–9 when they wish to do so. This repre-sents the confusion and delay in getting scaling ladders to thetroops. Mexican units may not cross the walls to move in or outof the Colegio.

• Artillery may enter 1808-9 only by means of the road; the costlisted is for moving from 1808-9 and vice versa. Cavalry may notenter the Colegio.

Fortifications . Much detailed by Lee’s survey, these are well-con-structed breastwork-type blockades, built for protecting firing unitsas well as retarding charging enemy. They offer such protectiononly against units firing/attack through the hexsides with the teethpointing out.

Stone Walls. Just like it says, but not built for military purposes.They simply exist as protection and a barrier.

Trench. This is the large, dry ditch that runs just in front of CasaMata, used by Ramirez to deploy his brigade. It offers the usualprotection such ersatz—and here, rather erratic—trenches usuallyoffer.

HISTORICAL NOTE: There appears to have been a similar, butsmaller, ditch running north-south, along the western edge of thepark of Cypress groves. It is mentioned in two sources, but is noton any maps. As it did not play any part in the battle, we haveignored it.

Fosse: The Mexicans had dug a ditch in front of the western edge ofthe wall of the Colegio Militar. This, and the mines planted justbelow it, is covered in much greater detail in the Chapultepec sce-nario.

Ditch: The western side of the Chapultepec Park had an irrigationditch (apparently dry) that provided a minor obstacle.

Causeway. Slightly elevated road through the flooded lands andmarshes. No effect on combat.

Aqueducts. Several of the Causeways had large, stone aqueductsrunning their length to/from the city. The aqueducts offered protec-tion to any one using them for such, although it was not difficult tomove through them, by way of their many, large arches. Note thatsuch protection applies only to units defending against fire/attackcoming through a hexside not connected to the defending hex bythe aqueduct. The aqueducts block LOS for artillery, but not formuskets.

AM AvailabilityThe US uses the 3 US Army AM; the Mexican Player has availablethree Mexican Army AM; how many he gets to use depends onInitiative.



InitiativeThe US Player automatically has the Initiative for the first game-turn. After that, players Die roll, with the US adding two (+2) to hisDR. See the US First Turn restrictions, below.

U.S. First Turn, First AMThe US starts the game with the Initiative. However, for that firstArmy AM (only) he may activate only:

• The Storming Party and the Light Battalion.• His artillery, but they may only Fire, not move.

U.S. First Turn CommandAll US brigadiers are considered to be in Command Range ofWorth—although they really aren’t—for the first game-turn only.(They’ve been given their orders.)

VictoryThe games is played until one player wins. Who wins is determinedas follows:

The U.S. Player wins if, at the end of any game-turn (not Activa-tion Phase), he occupies all hexes of two of the following:

• Casa Mata (1822).• El Molino (1816, 1915, 2015, 2016).• Chapultepec (1808-9).

The Mexican Player wins if, at the end of any game-turn, any twobrigades (Sumner’s Cavalry is not considered a brigade for thispurpose) are Combat Ineffective.

If both of the above exist at the same time, the game is a Draw. (TheUS Player has taken his objectives, but has lost enough men to ren-der the capture of Mexico City a much more difficult project than ithistorically was.)

a MajGen William Worth commanded the assault on ElMolino with this ad hoc, reinforced division: his two bri-gades (Garland's and Clark/McIntosh's), plus Cadwalader’s(from Pillow's Division).

b Col McIntosh is standing in for Brig Gen Clark, the actualbrigade commander, who is hors de combat for this battle.

c These two units start stacked; they were both part of thesame regiment (The Regiment of Voligeurs and Foot Rifle-men).

EL MOLINO DEL RAYUS Deployment & Reinforcements

Hex Units [All Brigades are under Advance Orders]

3212 Worth [a]

W/i one hex of 2814 Garland; 4th US, 2nd Arty, 3rd Arty

2624-2526 McIntosh [b]; 5th US, 6th US, 8th US

2821, 2921, 3021 Cadwalader; 11th US, 14th US, Voltigeurs and Foot Riflemen [c]

2619 Wright’s Storming Party (2 bns) [d]

2719 The Light Battalion [d]

W/i one hex of 2529 Sumner; 1st, 2nd, 3rd Dragoons, Mounted Rifles (mounted) [e]

2706 One 6-pounder from Drum's G/4 US battery

2713 Two 6-pounders from Drum's G/4US battery

2718 Huger's two 24-pounders

2623 Duncan's battery (A, 2US a and b)

d These units operate independently; they have no leader:

• They are always In Command.• They may Change Orders when activated without

dierolling.

e Sumner’s Cavalry may not move until a Mexican cavalryunit enters the map. After that, they’re free to do what theywant.

No US infantry unit may cross the ravine [1827/1828 to 2434/2533] or move west of it.



a These two units were quite large, especially the 11th Line,with a reported strength of around 900. That’s 18 SP, andthat means it can extend two additional hexes.

b Our numbers for these units (in terms of SP) are based onthe troop strengths on the 13th (the assault on Chapultepec),upped to account for losses. We could not find any numbersspecific to El Molino. The Fijo Bn is sometimes listed asthe Regular Mexican Standing Battalion.

c Rangel was originally deployed in the Mata/Molino area,but Santa Anna withdrew him as a reserve brigade the nightbefore the US attack.

d It appears, in some sources, that Ramirez placed 2 compa-nies (160 men) of the 2nd Ligero in the Cypress Garden. Itis possible that this was actually the 3rd Ligero, which startedon Chapultepec, but moved to reinforce the troops at ElMolino early in the battle.

e There is no indication of the size/type of guns in this group.There is also some question as to whether there were six orseven guns. However, by the 13th, the Mexicans had three4-pounders and an 8-pounder inside the castle, most likelythe remaining guns from El Molino. Our Mexican sourcessay six at El Molino, but the North Americans captured threeguns at that battle. As Mexican artillery fire at El Molinowas not very effective or helpful, we’ve gone with 6. Tomake matters even more confusing, it is not quite clear ex-actly where these guns were deployed. We’ve gone with theinformation that, when Santa Anna redeployed, he movedhis six guns “closer to El Molino”.

MEXICAN REINFORCEMENTSA large force of Mexican cavalry (with a lone supporting footunit) is sitting just off the map, to the west of Hacienda LosMorales. Santa Anna had hoped that it would play a big rolein sweeping the North Americans from the field by attackingtheir flank. That never happened, a result of poor commandcooperation, and the usual reluctance of the Mexican leaders.

Whenever a Mexican AM is drawn, the Mexican Player mayattempt to activate—and bring in—one of his cavalry brigades.To do this, he rolls the die for the chosen brigade:

• If the choice is Alvarez, a DR of 0 or 9 will activate thatbrigade.

• If the choice is Andrade, a DR of 9 will activate that bri-gade.

Mexican cavalry enters the game in Advance Mode, throughhex 3201.

Once activated, the brigade is available for the remainder ofthe battle, unless/until it becomes Combat Ineffective. At theend of the Game Turn that it does so, all units in that brigadeare permanently removed from the game, regardless wherethey are at the time.

Available Mexican Cavalry [a]:Alvarez; 2nd Line Cav, 3rd Line Cav, 5th Line Cav, 9th LineCav, Tulancingo Curaissiers

Andrade; Oaxaca Cav Bn, Michoacan Cav Bn; Los Pintosinfantry [b]

[a] Both brigades comprise Alvarez’s cavalry division. Hecommands one of its brigades, Andrade the other. We treatthem as separate brigades.

[b] A most interesting unit. According to the notes in Smith,vol 2., and a Mexican source, these were “semi-savage“pintos”—men from the hot region … marked with spots.They lay flat when charged upon, and hewed the enemydown with heavy knives (machetes), and they were ex-pected to fill the Americans with terror.” Perhaps. But that’sthe only mention they ever get, anywhere. As you see, theyhave no small-arms.

Hex Units [All Brigades are under Advance Orders]

1820-4 (Casa Mata) Perez; 4 Ligero, 11 Line Infantry; Deploy Extended a

W/i 2 hexes of 1915 Leon; Nat.Guard units of Liberty Bn, Union Bn, Querétaro Bn, Miña Bn b

1603, 1604 Rangel; Guanajuato Activos; Hidalgo Bn c

1917-1927 [c] Ramirez; 1st Line, 12th Line, 2nd Ligero [d], Fijo de Mexico Bn [See below] d

1817-1819 Two 2SP 4-pounders, one 3SP 8-pounder e

In or adjacent to the Colegio Militar Bravo; 3rd Ligero, Students of the Colegio Militar; two 24-pounders; one 68-pounder Howitzer

EL MOLINO DEL RAYMexican Deployment & Reinforcements



CERRO GORDOApril 18, 1847

Preliminary InformationCerro Gordo presents the designer with several problems. First isthat the battle took place over two days. One the 18th, the US ad-vanced one division to seize Atayala. Santa Anna’s reaction to thatwas minimal. On the following morning, the battle continued. Forgame purposes we have melded the two days into one continuousflow of play (12 turns).

Second is that eternal game design bugaboo: the players know toomuch, far more than the historical participants. The lines of sightwere almost non-existent for all but troops on the higher elevations,and, even “worse,” Santa Anna was convinced, as were most of hisadvisors, that the only approach was by the National Highway andsome of the lower ground just to the south (as you can see from theinitial Mexican deployment). For this reason all Mexican units startthe game “inactive”.

Given all of that, Cerro Gordo is, like most of the battles in thiswar, an unusual one. The US is very aggressive, the Mexicans arenot. However, the Mexicans have far more troops and the advan-tages that mountainous terrain can offer.

MapThis scenario uses the Cerro Gordo map. The scale is c. 115 yardsper hex.

Length of Game12 turns—or about five hours based on playtester experience.

BalanceFavors the US, but not greatly. Much depends on how the MexicanPlayer reacts—when he can—to the US advance. Hopefully, theMexican player, given what he knows, will do a damn sight betterthan Santa Anna.

InitiativeThe US Player automatically has the Initiative until the turn afterAtalaya is taken. Starting with the next turn, players roll for Initia-tive, with the US Player adding Scott’s Initiative rating to his dieroll if Scott is on the map (and 9.33 isn’t in effect).


(3.0) SEQUENCE OF PLAYII. A. Activation Efficiency Determination . There is no “Effi-ciency”; this is already pre-determined; see changes to 5.2, below.

II.D. Reserve Placement is not used.

III.C.3. Action Phase:

• Add: The US Player may fire his off-map Artillery as an activa-tion.

• Add: The Mexican Player may use his AM to attempt to Activateone of his Brigades.

(4.0) COMMAND(4.11) The Army Commanders have two functions:

• Initiative.• Santa Anna also acts as Division Commander for the Mexicans,

in that any brigadier within his Command Range may ChangeOrders, without a die roll, in the Division Orders Phase (II/B).US Brigadiers may do same if the chain of command —Scott toDivision to Brigadier—is in place.

(4.12) There are no Corps Commanders (ignore 4.12).

(4.13) The US Division Commanders’ Activation Rating is not used.Moreover, they move as per 4.17.

(4.3) There are no Artillery Leaders.

(5.0) ACTIVATION(5.2) There is no Efficiency in this battle. Both Players always getthree Army AM per turn. See “new” 5.37, below.

(5.3) When a player’s Army AM is drawn, he may activate all of hisunits, not just some. The only exception is that US Division com-manders move only in the OC Movement Phase, IV/A, as per 4.17.


(5.37) If the Mexican Player uses an AM to activate one of his bri-gades, as above, then he may not undertake the Action Phase withhis units, except for artillery fire.

(5.4) Not used.

(6.0) THE ORDERS SYSTEM(6.1) There are no March orders in this battle; just Advance andAttack.

(6.12) Division Orders is used only by the US, and only when Tay-lor is on the map.

For the Mexicans there are no Divisions. Any brigade in commandrange to Santa Ana may change orders in this phase.

(6.3) Units may not enter Reserve.

PLAY NOTE: Two Mexican brigades and the Mexican reinforce-ments are in reserve at the start of the game. This means they can-not be activated until taken out of reserve at the end of Turn one, atthe earliest.



(10.0) FIRE COMBAT(10.61) Mexican artillery may not move and fire in the same Phase.Remember, they need not be activated to fire.

(11.0) SHOCK ASSAULT(11.5) Cavalry ChargeThe Mexicans have, potentially, a large contingent of cavalry. Unfor-tunately, they have three factors working against their efficient use:

• The terrain, which limits the Charge Path (11.52 and 11.53) andany charge benefits (11.55). Of course, they can use normal Shock(into hexes they can actually reach).

• Their commander, General Valentin Canalizio, was, shall we say,somewhat lacking in eagerness to participate. Perhaps his “fore-boding of disaster” (most likely his) made him a bit tense and un-sure. Not unusual with Mexican upper level officers in this war.

• The units themselves: The splendiferously and colorfully uni-formed Mexican cavalry regiments performed poorly throughoutthe war, usually failing to attack, or even participate, in any mean-ingful way. (There were exceptions.) At Cerro Gordo they tookone look at the approaching North American’s and high-tailed itback to Mexico City.

(11.55) Additional DRM: Lancers add one (+1) when Charging.

DESIGN/HISTORICAL NOTE: The Tulancingo Cuirassiers, prob-ably the best cavalry unit in the Mexican Army, was, in the Napo-leonic sense, Heavy Cavalry. While this does not give them a ShockDRM, they are far easier to commit to combat with their high Co-hesion Ratings, reflecting their “heaviness”.

(13.0) MORALE AND RALLY(13.3) Division Combat Effectiveness. Not used.

(13.42) This may not be used by Mexican leaders. They may not beused to affect/help Rally in any way.

(15.0) ENGINEERING(15.1) This section is ignored; no one may build breastworks.



TERRAINThe Faux Road/Northern Approach. Given the above, Santa Annawas sure that the only avenue of approach to his Cerro Gordo posi-tion was along the Highway. However, engineers Pierre G.T. Beau-regard and Z.B. Tower informed Scott that Santa Anna could beflanked by moving to the north of his positions. Scott sent Robert E.Lee and some engineers out to clear the path as far as could be done(about to the point where a LOS can be gained from la Atalaya tothe mouth of that path as it emerged), and that was where, and bywhat means, Scott planned his attack. The game starts with Twigg’stwo brigades having used this “cleared” (well, made somewhateasier) path.

The National Highway. The Mexican opinion was that this excel-lent (for that era) road was the only viable route an army could take

to cross the mountains and reach Mexico City. As such, it providesthe best method of movement in the game, negating the generalmovement restriction applied to all terrain, above.

Rio del Plan. This was not a very big river, in terms of width. How-ever, it ran through a gorge with cliffs of up to 500 feet. It wasuncrossable.

Steep Slopes. Infantry moving up, and cavalry moving down, SteepSlopes must, at the conclusion of their movement for that Phase,UDD to see if such movement has Disordered them.

Fortification (el Telegrafo). Santa Anna’s engineering preparationswere amazingly half-hearted and slipshod. Some redoubts were fin-ished; others (such as the ones for the easternmost Mexican troops)were only laid out in terms of placement. For those fortifications inplace, a unit in a hex protected by these redoubts may fire throughany hexside that is part of the hex it is in. Moreover, a unit in such ahex cannot be “flanked” through a redoubt hexside.

PLAY NOTE: Remember that units defending inside such fortifi-cations (a) get a –1 DRM to any pre-Shock Cohesion checks, and(b) may ignore Retreat results.

The Camp. The tents of Santa Anna’s army were spread all overthis area. They have no affect on the game.

Mexican ActivationAll Mexican units, except those In Reserve, start the game “inac-tive”. Inactive infantry units may not undertake anything in theirAM’s Action Phase, except that any artillery may fire (at targets towhich it can trace a LOS).

There are two ways units may be Activated, and once activated theyremain so for the rest of the game.

Any Mexican Brigade (units in Command range only) or any indi-vidual unit, is automatically activated at the start of any MexicanAM that any US combat unit is within four (4) MP and Line ofSight.

For any one of his AM drawn in any one Game-Turn, the MexicanPlayer may Activate any one brigade (units in Command range only).Units of that brigade may undertake a normal Action Phase. If hechooses to do this, he may not undertake anything else, other thanartillery fire, with any other units.

US Off-Map ArtilleryStarting with the Game-Turn after the Turn in which the US Player(first) captures Atalaya, he has the use of a 68-pounder piece ofHeavy Artillery that they have managed to drag up the side of theridges to the south of the Rio del Plan (about 4 hexes off-map).

Each time a US AM has been drawn/selected, before undertakingany other action, the US Player may designate as a target of this gunany one hex south of, or adjacent to (and north of) the NationalHighway between 2334 and 4330, inclusive. He then rolls one die(there are no DRM), consults the Off-Map Artillery Fire Table, andapplies the result, if any.

VictoryThe game is played until one player wins or 12 turns have beenplayed. Who wins is determined as follows:

The U.S. Player wins if, at the end of any game-turn (not Activa-tion Phase), he occupies El Telegrafo (2030) and has exited at least10 SP of non-disordered Infantry off the map through 1027.



Mexican Historical Victory : The Mexican Player wins if, at theend of any game-turn, any three (3) U.S. brigades are Combat Inef-fective and the US has not satisfied the above victory conditions.

Mexican Competitive Victory: The Mexican Player wins if, atthe end of any game-turn, any two (2) U.S. brigades are CombatIneffective and the US has not satisfied the above victory condi-tions. This victory condition may not be used if the Mexican Cav-alry have been activated.

If neither player has achieved victory, as above, by the end of twelve(12) turns, the Mexican Army is considered to have survived andblocked passage. The Mexican Player wins.

CERRO GORDOInitial Mexican DeploymentAll Brigades are under Advance Orders except Vasquez andAmpudia.

Units may be Faced as Desired unless stated otherwise.

Hex Units

1130 Santa Anna; Hussars of the SupremePower

3839-40 Pinzon; 5 Line Infantry, Atlixco NG;Artillery: 1 x 12lb, 2 x 8lb, 4 x 4lb (a totalof 3 artillery units). [All UnitsFacing East]

3935-6 Araujo; Libertad Bn, Zacapoastla NG;Artillery: 4 x 4lb, 4 x 8 lb (a total of 2 ar-tillery units) [All UnitsFacing East]

3832-3 Badillo; Jalapa NG Co., Coatepec NG Co.,Teusitlan NG Co; Artillery: 6 x 4lb, 3 x8lb [All UnitsFacing East]

3136, 3236 Jarero; Matamoros NG, Tepeaca NG;Artillery: 1 x 8lb, 4 x 4lb

2534, 2634-5, 2734 Diaz de la Vega; 6 Line, Grenadier Guardsof the Supreme Power;Artillery: 4 x 16lb, 3 x 8 lb

2528 1 SP Infantry Detachment

2030 3 Line/Vasquez; Artillery: 4 x 4lb

Any Camp Hex Vasquez; 1 Ligero, 2 Ligero, 3 Ligero, 4Ligero; Galeana NG Artillery [In Reserve]

1730, 1831, 1931 Ampudia; 4 Line, 11 Line [In Reserve]

Mexican AM Available: Three Mexican Army AM.

Mexican ReinforcementsThe following units are available as Reinforcements. To bebrought in requires them to be Activated (see below). If SantaAnna is in any Cerro Gordo Village Hex, or within 4 MP of1027, these Reinforcements are within his Command Range.Arteaga’s “brigade” may not be activated before the cavalry.The Reinforcements are In Reserve at the start. They enterthrough hex 1027.

• Canalizio [The Cavalry]; 5th Line Cav, 9th Line Cav, MoreliaActivos Cav, Tulancingo Cuirassiers, Chalchicomula ActivosCav, Jalapa Activos Cav, Orizaba Activos Cav

• Arteaga; Puebla Activos, Puebla Natl Guard

HISTORICAL NOTE: Arteaga’s brigade came up just as thebattle was ending, made a brief appearance just west of CedrroGordo, and then retired.

CERRO GORDOInitial US DeploymentPlayers choice as to start Orders. Set-up only is 1 unit per hex.

Hex Units

Level 2 hex Twiggs (2 Div), Harney (1/2Div);between 3125-3625 1st Artillery, 3 US, Regt of Mountedinclusive Rifles (dismounted); K, 1 US Artillery

Battery, 4 x 12lb Howitzers from theHowitzer & Rocket Company.

Level 2 hex Riley (2/2Div); 4th Artillery, 2 US, 7 US.between 3825-4224 The Rockets of the Howitzer &inclusive Rocket Company.

US AM Available: Three US Army AM

US ReinforcementsThe US Player may bring in any one of the following groups,one per Turn (not AM) starting with the Turn after the US Playeroccupies Atayala (2528). Some of the groups have restrictionsas to when they may be used.

Reinforcements may enter the map through either 4825-6, or4836-8. The US Player may bring on Army Commander, MajGenWinfield Scott, with any infantry brigade, below.

• 1st Brigade,Volunteer Division: Shields; 2 NY, 3 Ill, 4 Ill, 3rdVol. Artillery Battery.

• 2nd Brigade,Volunteer Division: Pillow; 1 PA, 2 PA, 1 Tenn,2 Tenn, US Marine Detachment.

• 1st Brigade, 1st Division: Worth (1 Div), Garland; 2 Artillery, 3Artillery, 4 US; A, 2 US Artillery Battery. This brigade may notenter until both Shields and Pillow have done so.

• 2nd Brigade, 1st Division: Clarke; 5 US, 6 US, 8 US. This bri-gade may not enter until both Shields and Pillow have done so.

• 2nd Dragoons, Tenn Mtd Volunteers [a].

[a] = For the purpose of changing Orders, these two units maydo so, as per the rules for such, when in range of Twiggs, Harney,or Riley. (TheTenn Mtd Vols were historically “unattached”, butthis rule suffices to cover that.)

HISTORICAL NOTE #1: Shields’ Brigade (attached for thebattle to Twiggs’ 2nd Division) and, much later, Worth’s Divi-sion (which saw no action), were brought in through 4825 andthe cleared Level 2 hexes. Pillow’s Brigade entered, in a some-what confused manner (not unusual, considering Pillow’s tal-ents, or lack thereof) through 4836-8. The Dragoons and HeavyGuns (not used in this game),attached to Twiggs, remained inthe rear.

HISTORICAL NOTE #2: The commander of the Volunteer Di-vision, MajGenRobert Patterson, was not present. Shields’ bri-gade was attached to Twiggs’ 2nd Division; Pillow operatedwithout Divisional Command.



CHAPULTEPECMexico City, September 13, 1847Preliminary InformationThe Chapultepec scenario is somewhat unusual, if alone for thefact that it uses a scale different from the other battles, 45 yards perhex. While the Turn/Am sequence remains the same, each Turn (andall the Activations within) now represents 20 minutes, not an hour.

Some of the basic rules mechanics have been streamlined (cf. theartillery fire rules, below). Unless changed by any of the followingrules all rules dependent on stacking or range are unchanged to keepthings simple (i.e. Artillery Approach Fire is still three hexes).

We also note that Chapultepec makes for a very good solitaire game,as there is not that much for the Mexican player to do, in terms ofstrategy or even movement.

MapThis scenario uses the Chapultepec map. The scale is 45 yards perhex. The half/partial hexes along the east and north edges of themap are playable.

Length of GamePlay until there is a winner. 4–5 hours depending on your solitaireplay pace.

BalanceIt is hard to see how the Mexicans can win this one. Chapultepec,itself, may be a difficult target, but there is nothing—and no one—supporting it. Its garrison is pretty much on its own, except for theone battalion that Santa Anna did release during the storming. If theplayers allow the Mexican to use the Optional Reinforcements (be-low), that will change the balance.


(3.0) SEQUENCE OF PLAYII. A. Activation Efficiency Determination. There is no “Effi-ciency”; this is already pre-determined; see changes to 5.2, below.

II. B Division Orders is used only by the US.


(4.0) COMMANDThere are no Corps/Army Commanders, only Brigadiers, plus theUS Division Commanders, who move only in the CommanderMovement Phase (IV.A).

The US Division Commanders’ Activation Rating is not used.

(4.3) There are no Artillery Leaders

(5.0) ACTIVATION(5.1) US automatically has the Initiative each game-turn.

(5.2) There is no Efficiency in this battle. The US always gets three(3) Army AM per turn; the Mexican always gets two.

PLAY NOTE: Two Mexican AM reflects the somewhat half-heartedMexican commitment to defending the hill. If you want to give theMexicans a bit more opportunity, give them 3 AM.

(5.3) When a player’s Army AM is drawn, he may activate all of hisunits, not just some. The only exception is that US Division com-manders move only in the OC Movement Phase, IV.A, as per 4.17.


(5.36) As there is no Mexican leader above Brigade Level, all Mexi-can brigadiers are treated as Out of Command for this battle and,thus, do not get to use II.B Division Orders .

(5.4) Efficiency Transfer is not used.

(6.0) THE ORDERS SYSTEM(6.1) No March orders in this battle; just Advance and Attack.

(6.3) The Reserve Rule is not used.

(8.0) STACKING AND EXTENSION(8.1) Chapultepec stacking is:

• Four infantry SP (or one unit), or• Six guns, or• one infantry unit plus one artillery unit.

(8.4) Line Extension is not used; we’ve kept the units to small enoughsize, vis a vis the scale, to make this unnecessary. See, though, Spe-cial Fire Rules, below.

(10.0) FIRE COMBATSee the Special Rules for Fire, below.

(10.61) Mexican artillery may not move and fire in the same Phase.

(13.0) MORALE AND RALLY(13.3) Division Combat Effectivenesst is not used.

(13.42) Mexican leaders may not be used to help Rally in any way.

(15.0) ENGINEERING(15.1) This section is ignored — no one may build breastworks.

(15.24 [NEW]). Units defending against shock behind a Fortifica-tion or Stone Wall hexside, or in a Colegia hex, subtract one (–1)when undertaking a Pre-Shock Cohesion check (11.37). See theTerrain Rules for this battle for more detail on the several differenttypes of man-made fortifications.





TERRAINCauseways and Roads. For game purposes, they are the same.

Aqueducts. Several of the Causeways had large, stone aqueductsrunning their length to/from the city. The aqueducts offered protec-tion to any one using them for such, although it was not difficult tomove through them, by way of their many, large arches. The aque-ducts block LOS for shot/shell artillery, but not for grapeshot ormusketry. (Where the aqueducts paralleled the stone walls we leftthem out, feeling them to be redundant at this scale.)

DESIGN NOTE: We hope you will excuse us for running the aque-duct along the hexsides, somewhat unrealistically.

Marsh/Flooded. Mexico City (off the map to the NE) is surroundedby partially reclaimed swamp (at this time). Some of it was fields,some of it marsh. Pretty much all of it had been flooded by SantaAnna at the approach of the North Americans, restricting (most)military movement to the Causeways.

Cypress Grove and Swamp. Greater Chapultepec was a large, rect-angular park. The western side of the park was a beautiful grove ofcypress trees, set in a naturally swampy environment. Some hexesreflect the presence of large numbers of trees; others are just swampy,with scattered trees.

Fortifications . Much detailed by Lee’s survey, these are well-con-structed breastwork type blockades, built for protecting firing unitsas well as retarding charging enemy. A unit in a hex protected bythese redoubts may fire through any hexside that is part of the hex itis in. Moreover, a unit in such a hex cannot be “flanked” through aredoubt hexside.

PLAY NOTE #1: Remember that units defending inside such forti-fications (a) get a –1 DRM to any pre-Shock Cohesion checks, and(b) may ignore Retreat results.

PLAY NOTE #2: Notice the two mini-redoubts for hexes 3540 and3542. Made to hold a gun or two, it does not appear they were somanned during the assault.

Stone Walls. Just like it says, but not built for military purposes.They simply exist as protection and a barrier.

Chapultepec. The name refers specifically to the steep Hill of theGrasshopper, about 200 feet above the surrounding area, atop whichrests the Mexican Military College (Colegio Militar). The hill hassix levels of elevation, the Colegio being on the sixth and highest.(2645 is not part of the Colegio; it is a Level 5). Many hexsides areSteep Slope, the crossing of which automatically Disorders the unit.Others are Sheer and uncrossable. The 6th level, the Colegio, maynot be crossed by any Mexican unit, except through the gate, and byUS units only if they have Scaling Ladders (see below). See, also,the note on the fosse, plus the rules on the Mines.

Colegio Militar . The buildings of the college are distinguished fromthe rest of the hilltop. 2446 and 2545 are clear hexes (courtyard);the rest are buildings. Artillery may be placed in, and used from,either.

Fosse: The Mexicans had dug a ditch in front of the western edge ofthe wall of the Colegio Militar. It has no effect on the game, as theUS can’t get over that wall unless they have scaling ladders, any-way.

MINESThe Mexicans planted several mines below the westernwalls of the Colegio. Unfortunately, they had to be setoff by hand, something the Mexicans delayed doing,and then failed to do when they finally remembered them.

There are three Mine markers for hexes 2145, 2146 and 2247. Anytime a Mexican AM is drawn, the Mexican Player may attempt toexplode the mines. He may do this only once for each hex—removethe counter after the attempt.

To try to explode a mine, the Mexican player rolls the die:

• A 0 or a 9 explodes the Mine.• A 1–8 fails, and no further attempts for that hex.

Any unit in an exploding Mine hex is automatically Disordered andloses 1 SP.

SCALING LADDERSThe U.S. assault troops got to the base of the walls of Chapultepeconly to find that the scaling ladders, absolutely necessary to get upthe vertical walls, were nowhere in sight. They had to wait for sometime for troops to bring them up. To reflect this:

• Any US unit that wishes to move into a Level 6 (Colegio) hex—either by movement or Shock— from outside the hill top muststart adjacent to that hex. Exception: units may move throughthe gates if there is no opposition on the other side; otherwise,treat it is a regular hilltop hex.

• To see if it can so move/Shock, the US Player rolls the die foreach such attempt.

If that DR is a 6–9, the Scaling Ladders have arrived, and the unitmay move. If that DR is a 0–5, no ladders and no movement.

Rolling for ladders does not prevent firing.

SMALL-ARMS FIRE(8.31) The Maximum Fire Strength per hex is four (4).

(8.45) If both units—‘a’ and ‘b’ (e.g., the 4 US regiment)—of thesame regiment are in adjacent hexes, for purposes of combiningfire SP’s, they are treated as if they were “extended”.

Infantry uses the Chapultepec Small-Arms Range Chart to deter-mine the DRM for fire.

SPECIAL ARTILLERY RULESOn-Map ArtilleryGiven the scale of the map, any gun of the era could reach any hexon the map with relative efficiency, given good Line of Sight. There-fore, to simplify matters, the artillery in this battle do not use thenormal artillery firing rules. Instead, they use the Chapultepec Ar-tillery Firing Table.

When firing on-map guns, the player rolls the die and consults thattable. He adjusts that dieroll as follows:

+1 for each SP over ‘1’ in that unit. Thus, a 2SP section wouldget a +1 DRM.

+1 for firing at any target within three hexes. This does not applyto the Mexican 68’s and all Howitzers and Rockets.

–1 all Mexican guns.

–? Terrain as per TEC.

–1 Artillery moved.



Restrictions. Aside from the normal LOS rules:

• Mexican artillery in the Colegia (atop the hill) may not fire intoany hex adjacent to, but outside, the Colegia. (A question of theinability of the guns to depress at that angle). However, artillerymay pre-shock reaction fire (the attackers are coming to the guns).

• No artillery unit may fire at any target within two hexes that istwo elevation levels lower or higher.

US Off-Map ArtilleryThe US had eight guns of various type (see note below) deployed tothe south and southwest of Chapultepec, which was in range of allof these mini-batteries. To reflect this, and the early morning pre-assault bombardment;

• Before starting play, the US Player may engage in a pre-assaultbombardment, rolling four times on the Chapultepec Artillery Fire

Table. He then starts the game with one of his Army AM.

• Each time the US draws his Army AM—except for the first AMhe uses in the game, which is covered by the pre-assault bom-bardment— he may roll once on the Chapultepec Artillery FireTable before activating his units.

LOS is not an issue in off-map fire; the US can fire at any hex. It isan issue for on-map guns. US off-map artillery may not fire at anyhex that is within two hexes of a friendly unit. The only modifierswhich apply are those for terrain.

HISTORICAL NOTE: The off-map US artillery consisted of 3 cap-tured Mexican 16-pounders, 3 8” howitzers, 1 24-pounder moun-tain howitzer, and a 10” mortar. Referring to the El Molino map,they were split into 4 sections, located in El Molino hexes 2706,2714, 2214, and 2613.

CHAPULTEPECUS Assault ForceNo US units start on the map; all units enter as Reinforcements.They enter under whatever Orders (Assault or Advance) the USPlayer wishes.

There are six “groups” of Reinforcements. The US Player maybring in one group per Turn (not AM). Each group must arrivewithin the game map parameters noted below.

Clarke’s Brigade: Enters through any hex on western edge, be-tween 1044 and 1051, inclusive. Units: (2/1Div) [d].

Smith’s Brigade: See Special rule on Smith, below. Units: (1/2Div).

Pierce’s [e] Brigade: Enters through any hex on western edge,between 1044 and 1051, inclusive. Units: (1/3Div), includingMcKenzie’s Storming Party; Reno’s Rocket and Howitzer Com-pany.

Cadwalader’s Brigade: Must enter through hex 1041 [a] Units:(2/3Div); I, 1 US Artillery [b].

Shield’s Brigade: Enters through any hex(es) along southern edgethat are not “blocked” by a Stone Wall (e.g., may not enter through2253). Units: (1/4Div); A/2US ‘a’ artillery.

Roberts’ Brigade: Enters through any hex(es) along southern edgethat are not “blocked” by a Stone Wall (e.g., may not enter through2253). Units: (2/4Div). including Casey’s Storming Party.

US AM Available: Three US Army AM.

Division Commanders may be brought in with any one of the bri-gades in their division. The US Overall Commander, MajGen.Winfield Scott, is off-map and not used.

• Worth (1st Division).• Pillow (3rd Division).• Quitman (4th Division).

InitiativeThe US Player always has the Initiative.

Smith’s BrigadeBrigadier Persifor Smith’s brigade, nominally in Twigg’s 2nd Di-vision, is under the divisional command of Quitman for this battle.Twigg’s counter is not used.

Smith’s regiments entered the battle from a somewhat unusual“angle”. Quitman, aware that the Mexican redoubt defended bythe Morelia Bn would be difficult, and costly, to take with a fron-tal assault, sent Smith’s troops off to the east, into the floodedfields. After slogging their way across the swampy fields and end-less irrigation ditches, they came into the battle (and what wouldbe our map) on the left flank, and somewhat behind, the MoreliaBn, driving them away from the redoubt.

Smith may always choose to enter through hex 3552 (the TacubayaRoad) as a normal reinforcement. However, the US Player maychoose to send Smith on his flanking maneuver. In that case, theUS Player states that Smith may be attempting to flank.

• Smith may enter the map only after at least three other brigadeshave entered the game.

• Smith may enter through any hex along the eastern edge of themap, from 3743 to 3750, inclusive. The US Player should writethat down, keeping it secret.

• To actually bring Smith onto the map, when a US AM is drawn,the US Players rolls a die for Smith. If the DR is 7-9, Smithenters; if 0-6, he remains off-map. Add one (+1) for each previ-ous game-turn in which Smith, eligible to arrive, has not yetdone so.

Note: Smith’s failure to enter on its first turn does not preventotherwise normal reinforcements on the following turn; Smith at-tempts an entering die roll and another brigade may enter as above.

PLAY NOTE: Yes, it is mathematically possible that Smith willnot arrive.

Notes for the US Assault Force at Chapultepec:[a] If playing historically, Cadwalader’s brigade enters first. His-

torically, the battalion of Voltigeurs (which was part of a regi-ment combining them with the Foot Riflemen), was divided upand divied out: 4 companies were the advance for Pierce’s bri-gade, and another 4 companies attacked the few Mexican troopsguarding the southern walls.

[b] This section of guns from Magruder’s battery is commanded byLieut. Thomas J. Jackson, later known as “Stonewall”.

[c] Hale’s rockets, as opposed to the less reliable Congreve rockets(which the US army also used). They were fairly accurate up to2000 or so yards.

[d] This was the last brigade, historically, to enter the battle.

[e] Franklin Pierce, eventually 14th President of the United States.



Historical Mexican ReinforcementsThe Mexican Player has two units and a leader that he can bringinto the game:

• General Joaquin Rangel.

• San Blas Activos Bn (both counters) [c]. The battalion may enterwith any Mexican Army AM drawn after the first game-turn. Itenters through 3540 (partial hex), under Advance Orders.

• Hidalgo Battalion. This unit may enter with any Mexican ArmyAM drawn after the the turn in which the San Blas Bn has en-tered. It enters through either 3540 or 3744 [h].

VICTORYThe game is played until one player wins. Who wins is determinedas follows:

The U.S. Player wins if, at the end of any game-turn (not Activa-tion Phase), he occupies all eight (8) hexes of the Colegia Militar,the top of Chapultepec.

The Mexican Player wins if, at the end of any game-turn, any three(3) brigades are Combat Ineffective and the US has not taken theColegio.

Optional Mexican ReinforcementsSanta Anna had two divisions held in reserve, east of Chapultepec.They were never released because Santa Anna feared additionalattacks along the southern causeways, and he “froze”, failing tocommit anyone in sufficient time to help. This rule allows theMexican Player to be a little less indecisive than Santa Anna…ifthe players agree to use it. Essentially, he gets to use/release therest of Rangel’s brigade [d].

The following regiments, all in Rangel’s brigade, are available asOptional Reinforcements:

• Grenadiers of the Guard of the Supreme Powers (two counters).• Mixto de Santa Anna [e].• Matamoros National Guard Bn.

Starting with the game-turn after the turn in which the San BlasBn arrives, the Mexican player may release/bring these in as rein-forcements.

• He may bring in only one per game-turn (and if he uses thatturn to bring in the Hidalgo Bn, he may not bring in anyoptionals).

• He selects the arriving unit blindly, by drawing it from a cup,like he draws AM.

• For the Activation/AM he uses to bring in that unit, no otherMexican units may move or Shock; they may fire.

• The arriving units may enter through either 3540 or 3743. If thehex is occupied by US troops, it may not enter through it.

Notes:[a] These are the famous cadets, teenagers mostly, some younger,

and much-honored in Mexican lore, Los Niñoes Heroes, whofought as bravely and determinedly as any older man ever wouldhave.

[b] Part of Rangel’s brigade; but, until Rangel enters as a reinforce-ment, may be commanded by Bravo. This was considered oneof the better Mexican infantry units.

[c] Commanded by a real tongue-twister, LtCol Felipe SantiagoXicoténcatl. Very unusual to find a high-level officer with aNachuatl surname. Akin to finding a Catholic or Jewish com-mander in the US Army at the time. The San Blas, apparently,tried to reinforce the College but only made it halfway up theentrance road before being beaten back.

[d] The other division, under Ramirez, would never have been re-leased.

[e] At the time of Buena Vista, this was an ad hoc battalion made upof remnants of the 6th, 7th, and 8th Line Infantry. Probably aboutthe same at this time.

[f] The SP reduction represents losses taken at El Molino.

[g] This is based on General Bravo’s report the day after, as delin-eated in the notes to Smith (Vol 2, p.408).

[h] The appearance of this battalion is mentioned in only a fewsources, although it was part of Rangel’s troops at Molino. Itseems to have been used to defend the Tacubaya Road.

CHAPULTEPECInitial Mexican Deployment [g][All units are under Advance Orders]

Hexes Units

1453 Miña National Guard Bn

3750 Union National Guard Bn (with 1 SP al-ready lost) [f]

3446, 3545, 3646 Matamoros de Morelia Bn, One per hex:2 SP of 8lb guns, 2 SP of 4lb guns, 1 SP of4lb guns [b]

2148 Queretero National Guard Bn (with 1 SPalready lost) [f]; Patria National Guard Bn

Any Level 5 hex Toluca National Guard Bnbetween 2245-2543

In the Colegia Gen. Nicolas Bravo; 10 Line Inf. (both),Militar Cadets of the Military College [a]

Any Level 3 2SP of 24lb guns; 1SP of 68lb gun;or > hex 1 SP of 8lb gun; 3 SP of 4lb guns

Mexican AM Available: Two Mexican Army AM. (The playersmay use 3 Mexican AM if they wish to attain better play balance).

Optional DeploymentNo, the historical deployment doesn’t look overly efficient to me,either. Then again, other than holing up inside the Colegio andpraying for divine intervention (as Santa Anna is not about to pro-vide much of the same), what could be better? So, if you agree, orjust simply want to explore alternatives, we suggest the follow-ing.

• The Matamoros de Morelia Bn, and those 5 guns, still go intothat redoubt.

• The rest of the units may be placed anywhere on the map, butnot in any road hex that is also on the edge of the map (cf. youcannot put a unit in 1041 or 3552). The Cadets must be placedin the Colegio…and remember, the only way Mexican troopscan enter Level 6/Colegio, is by the gate.



COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION CHARTSFor Monterey and Buena Vista

MEXICO, ARMY OF THE NORTH atMONTEREYMAJOR GENERAL PEDRO de AMPUDIA [a]

East Wing Brigade / BG Francisco Mejia [l]10th Line2nd Ligero3rd LigeroQueretaro ActivoAguascalientos Activo

West Wing Brigade / BG Simeon Ramirez4th Ligero1st Mexico ActivoSan Luis Potosí ActivoMorelio ActivoMonterey Auxiliares [c]

Reserve Brigade / Col. N. Mendoza1st Line7th LineZapadoresNuevo Leon Defenserias [d]

Black Fort Garrison / Col. Jose Lopez Uraga3rd Line4th Line6th + 8th Line [e]

East Wing Cavalry / BG Anastasio Torrejon1st Line CavalryLigero Cavalry3rd Line Cavalry7th Line Cavalry8th Line Cavalry

Presidiales [n] / BG Antonio Canales [k]

West Wing Cavalry / BG Manuel RomeroGuanajuato Activo CavalryJalisco Lancers [g]San Luis Potosí Activo Cavalry1st Nuevo Leon Activo CavalryBejar Auxiliares Squadron1st & 2nd Tamaulipas Permanent Cos [f]Lampazos Permanent Co. [f]Bejar Permanent Co. [f]La Bahia Permanent Co. [f]

Artillery Location

two 4-pounder In the Black Fort [h]six 12-pounders In the Black Fort [h]one 18-pounder In the Black Fort [h, m]three 8-pounders Fort Diabloone 4-pounder La Teneria (redan)two 8-pounders La Teneria (redan)one Mnt. Howitzer La Teneria (redan)

one 12-pounder Purisma Bridge tête-de-ponttwo 8-pounders Purisma Bridge tête-de-pontfour 6-pounders Ft. Libertadtwo 8-pounders Obispadoone 6” Howitzer Obispadoone 12-pounder Obispadotwo 8-pounders Federacion Ridge redan [i]ten 6-pounders Monterey [j ]

General Note: The exact location and assignment of the individualunits is extremely difficult to pin down, mostly because it changed fromone moment to the next. Sources also tend to differ, and the MexicanOoB given in Smith (based on that signed by Ampudia and Condé)gives only units, not commands.

[a] The Cuban-born Ampudia was called the “Culinary Knight” for hishabit of boiling his opponents’ heads in oil; one of the more interestingpersonages in the war. Handsome of looks and military in bearing, hehad the backbone of a frightened ferret. In Eisenhower’s succinct words,he vacillated between “ … bravado and terror.” Monterey was not hisbest day, either, as he spent most of the time indoors. In his favor, we donote that he tried to talk his staff into attacking Taylor’s army as itapproached, only to be rebuffed by those who chose discretion overvalor. Then again, Ampudia didn’t argue too strenuously it appears. Hewas slippery enough, however, to both avoid Santa Anna’s politicalwrath (for a while) as well as bamboozle Taylor into a rather pro-Mexi-can peace following the battle.

[b] There are no Division Commanders.

[c] There is a good chance that these were simply local police, armedtownspeople, and assorted similar rabble. They don’t appear anywhereelse during the war.

[d] There is considerable confusion as to whether these men were in-fantry or cavalry. Ampudia’s return lists them as cavalry, but it is aremarkably large unit to be mounted (and, in essence, wasted inside acity. So, despite the notation in Ampudia’s returns, we have assumedthat such a large group would, most likely (and as is noted in othersources), be used dismounted. “Defenserias” was the military term forwhat we call local militia. Even lower than the Auxiliares, and prob-ably similar—in ability, training and method of levy—to the “NationalGuard” units one finds at Buena Vista. For a visual, picture all thoseworthless troops in any Zorro movie.

[e] As the total manpower of these two units had dropped to less than100, they were combined into one regiment at Monterey.

[f] For game purposes, these are all lumped into the “Permanent” counter.Their total strength was less than 100 rank-and-file, with the La Bahiacontingent numbering one soldier. Wonder whether he was an officeror just a trooper? Knowing the Mexican Army predilection for this sortof thing, he probably considered himself “Colonel” of the regiment.For those interested, the numbers are Tamaulipas (50), Lampazos (23),Bejar (22) … and the lone Bahia Rider.

[g] One of the really good Mexican cavalry units, even if it was militia,the Jalisco Lancers fought everywhere. At Monterey, under their com-mander, Lt.Col. Juan Najera, they charged the Texas Rangers as thelatter emerged onto the Saltillo Road from the shadow of Loma deIndependencia … only to get shot to ribbons, including Najera. Even



the staunchly bigoted rangers commented on their remarkable braveryand discipline.

[h] The Black Fort guns were manned by the fore-runners of the infa-mous San Patricio battalion, here called the Colorado Company.

[i] These guns were originally placed in El Soldado Fort but were movedto the redan when Worth’s column appeared on the Saltillo Road.

[j] The sources estimate the number of guns inside Monterey as any-where between 7 and 17 (and of no indicated type). With no one sourceappearing to have any greater insight then the others, we opted for themedian: 10, which would confirm the total Mexican guns with at leastone of the many, varying sources.

[k] General Antonio Canales, known as the “Chaparral Fox”, was oneof Mexico’s most devastating, brutal, ruthless—and effective—guerillafighters. Prior to the war, he was known mostly for hit-and-run raidsinto Texas in which the destruction was equal to anything the Apachescould ever come up with. As a result, he was fair game for the TexasRangers, who considered it a personal quest to kill Canales, who sportedeasily the biggest mustache in the war. One source says he “... was asleast as shifty as he looks.” He proved, however, to be most inadequateas a battlefield commander. Perhaps this was because, while fightingwith the Mexican army, he was wheeling and dealing with the US Gov-ernment to have them set him up as ruler of a local kingdom. Canales’motley crew was supposed to harass Taylor’s lines before and duringthe battle. It appears that Ampudia attempted to have Canales do justthat, but The Chaparral Fox appears to have missed/ignored his cues.Yet another botched opportunity.

[l] Need a good quote? Justin Smith’s “War with Mexico” is just loadedwith ‘em. Here’s what he says about Mejia: “ … a little, pockmarkedman in blue glasses, who looked like a sot, and thus far in the campaignhad been distinguished only for bad health and a pompous vocabulary.”To his credit, JS provides a half-dozen sources for this opinion in thenotes. Mejia actually took command of the Mexican army after Resacabut fell ill, was replaced by Requena, took over again, and then handedover the baton to Ampudia mid-summer.

[m] This large gun, not usually found with a Mexican field army, wasprobably from Fort Brown, in Texas.

[n] = The standard Canales’ gathering of mounted usual suspects, moresuited to slash and burn raids against civilians than organized warfare.

UNITED STATES, ARMY OF OCCUPATION atMONTEREYMAJOR GENERAL ZACHARY TAYLOR

1st Division / BG David Twiggs [a]3/1 Brigade / Col John Garland3 US Infantry4 US InfantryMiss and Texas Vol Infantry [g]Bragg’s ‘E’, 3 US Field Arty

4/I Brigade / Lt. Col Henry Wilson1 US InfantryThe Washington and Baltimore BattalionRidgely’s ‘C’, 3 US Horse Arty

Field Division / MajGen William Butler1/Field Brigade / BG Thomas Hamer1 Ohio Infantry1 Kentucky Infantry

2/Field Brigade / BG John Quitman1 Tennessee Infantry1st Mississippi Rifles [j ]

2nd Division / Col William Worth [d]1/2 Brigade / Lt. Col Thomas Staniford8 US InfantryChilds’ Artillery BnDuncan’s ‘A’, 2 US Field Arty

2/2 Brigade / Col. Persifor Smith5 US Infantry7 US InfantryLouisiana Volunteer Company [h]Mackall’s ‘K’, 1 US Field Arty [b]

Cavalry Division / MG James Pinckney Henderson [c]1st Texas [e]2nd Texas2nd Dragoons [i]

UnbrigadedWebster’s ‘C’, 1US Heavy Battery [f]

[a] = Ah, poor Old Davy. See the rules for what happened to him atMonterey. Twiggs was, essentially, a Taylor clone in terms of tactics …which, for him, consisted of one word: attack.

[b] = Thomas Jackson (later “Stonewall”) was assigned to this batterybut apparently only arrived at Point Isabel the day the fighting started.

[c] = Henderson’s status as a Major General was a Texas “commis-sion”; probably got it from the governor. Henderson was also the gov-ernor. This “division” is treated as an independent brigade.

[d] = Worth viewed Monterey as his big chance to finally get field grade.A fairly good commander in any case, he did un-nerve several of hissubordinates by riding off towards Independence Hill muttering some-thing about finding a “… grade or a grave.” Interestingly—and tangen-tially—aside from having a city named after him, Worth has a ratherlarge, obelisk monument to his memory in New York … right in frontof the Toy and Hobby Center and one block from the old SPI offices!

[e] = Mounted infantry … early version of the Texas Rangers for themost part. The close-range firepower of their new Colt “Walker” re-volvers, added to their almost maniacal, and deeply prejudicial, hate ofMexicans—fostered by years of raids by Canales’ rancheros and equallybarbarous Texan reprisals—made the Texas Rangers the most ferocious,furious and feared—by both sides— single group of fighters in the war.One US officer called them “… packs of human bloodhounds”, andZachary Taylor stated “I am glad to have the Texa[n]s … with me …but I never want to see them again.” He was mighty glad to have themat Monterey, though, where Hays’ regiment not only single-handedlydestroyed the charge of the Jalisco Lancers but also, the following day,dismounted and lead the infantry in the brutal house-to-house fighting.Like volcanoes, they were magnificent and horrible to contemplate,and just as difficult to control. The majority of them were psychopathickillers with a handy “Letter of Marque” from the US government.

[f] = This includes the two siege guns (24-pounder howitzers) as wellas the 10" mortar. Both were monumentally ineffective against the BlackFort, but the 10-incher was the gun that Worth dragged into the city onthe last day, planted in front of the cemetery in the Plaza de San Anto-nio, and began lobbing shells into the cathedral, which housed Ampudia… and the Mexican arsenal!

[g] = Most of the 3rd Texas, commanded by Albert Sidney Johnston,had gone home in August. What was left combined with a company ofMississippi volunteers.



[h] Remnants of the 1st and 2nd Louisiana regiments. One source re-ferred to this as The Phoenix Company.

[i] May’s 2nd Dragoons were actually unassigned; for game purposeswe’ve listed them with the Cavalry.

[j] Although the Mississippi Rifles were mounted infantry, here, asat Buena Vista, they fought entirely dismounted.

MEXICO, ARMY OF LIBERATION [a]At BUENA VISTAMAJOR GENERAL ANTONIO LOPEZ de SANTA ANNA [b]

Santa Anna’s Guard: Hussars of the Guard of the Supreme Pow-ersUnassigned: Los Zapadores[c]

Light Brigade / MG. Pedro de Ampudia [d]1st Ligero2nd Ligero [e]3rd Ligero4th Ligero

1st Division [f] / MG Pacheco3rd Brigade [e] / BG MejiaSan Luis Potosi ActivosMorelia Activos

5th Brigade [g] / BG UragaCelaya ActivosLeon Activos1st Bn Guanajuatos Activos*2nd Bn Guanajuatos Activos*

2nd Division / MG Lombardini1st Brigade / BG Garcia Condé [h]1st Line3rd Line5th LineJalisco Activos [i]

2nd Brigade / BG Perez10th Line11th LineHidalgo Bn*Michoacan Activos [i]

3rd Division / MG Ortega4th Brigade / MG Guzman4th Line [j]1st Mexico Activos2nd Mexico ActivosLagos Activos

6th Brigade / BG TerresAguascalientes ActivosGuadalajara ActivosQueretero ActivosSanta Anna Bn [k]

7th Brigade / BG Parrodi [l]12th LinePuebla ActivosFijo de Mexico* [m]Costa Guarda di Tampico BnTampico Veterans di Costa Garda

1st Cavalry Bde / Gen. Miñon [n]4th CavalryJalisco LancersCazadores [o]Oaxaca ActivosPuebla Activos

2nd Cavalry Bde / Gen. Juvera5th Cavalry9th CavalryTulancingo CuirassiersMorelia Activos

3rd Cavalry Bde / Gen. Torrejon3rd Cavalry7th Cavalry8th CavalryLigero di MexicoGuanajuato Activos

4th Cavalry Bde / Gen Andrade [p]Michoacan ActivosPresidiales

Artillery [q]San Patricio Battalion [r]Ballarta BattalionBattery de Leon

* = Irregulars

a = Some sources call this army " … of the North", others, the "Army ofLiberation". We go with the latter, as the former was pretty well de-stroyed as a cohesive fighting force in the first three battles, and SantaAnna brought in a host of new units. There are no "official" returns forhow many Mexicans were available at Buena Vista, although the figure15,142 is the usually accepted one (the Agua Nueva numbers). All ofthis is quite speculative, as is the make-up and strength allocation forseveral of the brigades, such as Pacheco's … whose totally raw recruitswere not only recently raised but didn't even bother to file any reports… and Juvera's cavalry, whose actual units are somewhat of a mystery.For the most part, we have tried to cross-reference information fromother battles as well as tangential references to units throughout thesources. We also hold out hope that someone can always come up withmore accurate, specific information.

The "correct" make-up of Santa Anna's Army of Liberation is rathercloudy, mostly because the returns (OoB's) for the battle were lost. Dili-gent research - which we left to several outside sources—can providesome good hints, though. For the command hierarchy we relied uponthe Mexican returns from Agua Nueva (where Santa Anna's armystopped for a short breather) of the day before. As for individual regi-ments and their numbers, there is a lot of interpolating, cross-referenc-ing, etc. It is our feeling that this OoB is as close as you can get to"accurate". An additional note: a few sources give the Mexicans a 1000-man cavalry brigade under Juan Alvarez. We do not accept this. Morereliable information places Alvarez in command of the "Army of theSouth", in Mexico City, at the time of Buena Vista.

b = The Mexican commander at Buena Vista, the always mercurial,often inept, but ever-so-fascinating President of Mexico, Antonio Lopezde Santa Anna, was, to be colloquial, a real "piece of work". Oftentreated as a self-aggrandizing buffoon in North American texts, he wascertainly that at times. However, given the right circumstances he couldbe anything but. His troops seemed to like him, although his seniorofficer staff deserted faster than unpaid mercenaries… leaving him withan upper-level command that resembled nothing more than a Mexican



road-show version of Gilbert & Sullivan. He botched much of the Mexi-can defense against Scott's Vera Cruz expedition in 1847, much as hemisread the Texan's militarily misguided determination at The Alamo adecade earlier. However, his Buena Vista campaign revealed, if not ahigh level of capability, certainly a military mind with a modicum ofinsight. Santa Anna's problem, however, was that his strategic capabili-ties often outweighed his tactical.

c = The “crack” Zapadores (engineers) were under the direct commandof Colonel Santiago Blanco.

d = Ah, Pedro's back, yet again. This guy has more lives than a Bud-dhist cat. You'd think that, after Monterey, Santa Anna would have as-signed him to guarding Mayan ruins. Not so. Upon receiving word thathe was being court-martialed for his (lack of) performance at Monterey,Ampudia immediately turned around and pointed fingers at his subor-dinates (not without cause, to be sure). Bureaucracy being what it is,this meant that any legal action had to be delayed, and Santa Annaneeded experienced generals at Buena Vista. After the battle, he was"banished" by Santa Anna.

e = The 2nd Ligero arrived marching with Mejia’s brigade.

f = Pacheco's Division was comprised of mostly inept locals, Montereyrejects, and recent enlistees. (Can you say "shanghaied" in Spanish?) Itmight be safe to say that, other than the aerobic workout of the hikefrom San Luis Potosí, this unit had absolutely no drill or training. Mosthad never fired their muskets, even in practice … an order Santa Annahad given to preserve ammunition.

g = The four Active Militia units in this brigade each have two combatunits to reflect their size.

h = Five days later, Garcia Condé was commanding the Mexican cav-alry at the battle of Sacramento.

i = The presence of these two units is somewhat suspect. They show upin some returns, not in others. The best information gives them toLombardini’s division, and we then divided them between his two bri-gades.

j = The 4th Line was attached to Ampudia’s Light Brigade for the fight-ing on the 23rd.

k = An ad hoc battalion of units from the remnants of the 6th, 7th and8th Line.

l = Parrodi was the fellow who got "head-faked" out of Tampico byAnn Chase, wife of the American consul there. Given Tampico's valueas a port, this was not an insignificant piece of jelly-footing on Parrodi'spart, as Tampico was considered a really tough nut to crack. (Then again,

so was Vera Cruz.)

m = The battalion of "clerks" - ‘sons of Mexico’ - from Mexico City.Their flag was captured during Hardin's disastrous counter-charge atthe end of the battle.

n = Not present at the actual battle; busy wasting everybody's time andenergy at Saltillo in a major botched opportunity. See the BV rules.That one of Mexico's crack cavalry regiments, the Tulancingo Cuiras-siers, was with Miñon is not a 100% certainty, but they’re too good tonot include.

o = Mounted Infantry with rifles. An unusual Mexican unit.

p = This brigade featured the two Andrade brothers. Los Dos Andrades- Miguel and Manuel - were pretty poor stuff. So were their troops. ThePresidiales pretty much stayed close to the nearest exit. (Literally; theywere rear guard on the march up from San Luis Potosí.)

q = Much confusion and conflicting information as to how many Mexi-can guns were actually present at the battle, ranging from 17, to the 20we have, to a possibility of 25. (Author Tony Adams says there mayhave been as many as 39 at Aqua Nueva, many of which would havebeen left behind.) The appellation "de Leon" cannot be nailed down; Ihave it somewhere in my notes … but cannot find from exactly where itcame. In addition, few sources mention the 7" mortar (which Smithlists as a 7" howitzer). Several testers wanted to know what Santa Annawould be doing hauling a mortar across the desert; perhaps, under thetheory that he did not know exactly where he would confront Taylor heneeded one in case the confrontation was of a siege nature.

r = The infamous San Patricio Battalion, subject of a recent, rather drearymovie, was made up of (mostly) Catholic ex-patriot US immigrants,only some of whom were actually "deserters" (the quasi-Irish appella-tion, "St. Patrick's", probably comes from the fact that its "American"leader was John Riley). The Mexicans actually called it Legión deEstrangaros, and its true commander was Major Francisco Moreno …a native-born Floridian! Scott had many of them hanged after the fall ofMexico City, although a goodly number were not, mostly due to Scott'sscrupulous insistence on fair trials for all concerned. Many of the sup-posed deserters were not even US citizens, just Catholic immigrantswho felt more akin to the strongly-Catholic Mexico than the rather stone-stupid bigots who peppered the US army at the time. The more thingschange ….



[a] See Rules concerning U.S. Command. Essentially, Taylor andWool are leading a small division.

[b] Captain Conner's Texas Foot was attached to the 2nd Illinoisfor the battle.

[c] The two 4-pounders in Washington's battery were capturedMexican guns.

[d] Except for the possible arrival of the ‘d’ unit of the 2nd Illinois,and the 6-pounder from the C, 3US battery (see the rules), theseunits are not in the game.

[e] There was no official "Cavalry Brigade", and the three unitslisted were actually detachments from the parent formations.May appears to have been "in charge", at least by dint of rank,although the three units do not appear to have ever operated in acoordinated fashion at Buena Vista. Much of the mounted vol-unteer force at BV was under the command of HumphreyMarshall, although that, too, was somewhat ephemeral.

Command Units Combat Leader Division Commander

Cavalry [e] 1 Dragoons Lt Col Chas May None2 DragoonsMcCulloch's company of Texas Rangers

Indiana Brigade 2 Indiana Col. W. Bowles BrigGen.Jos. Lane [f]3 Indiana Col. James Lane

Independent Arkansas Cavalry Col. Archibald Yell None1 Kentucky Mounted Col. Humphrey Marshall2 Kentucky Col. W.R. McKee1 Mississippi Rifles Col. Jefferson Davis1 Illinois Col. John Hardin2 Illinois + Texas Foot [b] Col. Wm. Bissell

Artillery C, 3US Horse Capt. Braxton BraggE, 3US Field Capt. Tom ShermanB, 4 US Field[c] Capt. John Washington

Saltillo Garrison [d] 1 Illinois, 2 co's Major William Warren2 Illinois, 2 co's1st Miss. Rifles, 1 co.C, 3US (one 6-pounder)C, 1 US (Webster's section pf 24H's)

[f] The Indiana contingent had two Lanes: Col James L. lead the3rd Indiana, while General Joseph L command the only "bri-gade" Taylor had, the Indiana Brigade. Most sources agree thatJoseph Lane was a highly accomplished, partisan-type com-mander, pretty much out of his element in such formalized styleof warfare with which he was now involved. A couple of daysprior to the battle, the two Lanes appear to have gotten into afist fight with each other, as two politicians are often wont todo. The end result was that the 3rd Indiana was removed fromGeneral Lane's command, although Joe was left in charge of the"brigade" … whatever that meant.

[g] In game terms, what we have done is to eliminate the “brigade”as a functioning command, and make Joseph Lane replacementleader for Bowles (2nd IN). James Lane stays in command ofthe 3rd.

UNITED STATES, ARMY OF OCCUPATION At BUENA VISTAMAJOR GENERAL ZACHARY TAYLOR [a]BRIG. GENERAL JOHN WOOL

GMT Games, LLCP.O. Box 1308, Hanford, CA 93232-1308

www.GMTGames.com

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BATTLE BOOK - GMT GamesWithout belaboring the point, his men were right. With a screen of skirmishers in advance and to the side, the gringos started down the road towards the resacas