Batoche Books - McMaster Faculty of Social Sciences · 1999. 7. 31. · Batoche Books 1999. ... mate or to the character of the fauna and flora is materialistic, and yet has little

THE ECONOMICINTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

Edwin Seligman

Batoche Books1999

This text was prepared for the Archive of the History of Economics, byBatoche Books Limited, Kitchener, Ontario. It is available in print formfrom Botoche Books ([email protected]).

Political Science Quarterly, 1901–2, volume 16, pp. 612–640; volume 17, pp. 71–98, 284–312

To the student of the social sciences it is interesting to observe theprocess by which, in one respect at least, we are drifting back to theposition of bygone ages. Although Aristotle pointed out the essentialinterrelation of politics, ethics and economics, modern thought has suc-cessfully vindicated the claims of these disciplines, as well as of others,such as jurisprudence and the various divisions of public law, to beconsidered .separate sciences. For a long time, however, to the commondetriment of all, the independence of each was so emphasized and exag-gerated as to create the serious danger of forgetting that they are onlyconstituent parts of a larger whole. The tendency of recent thought hasbeen to accentuate the relations rather than the differences, and to ex-plain the social institutions which form the bases of the separate sci-ences in the light rather of a synthesis than of an analysis. This methodhas been applied to the record of the past, as well as to the facts of thepresent; the conception of history has been broadened until it is nowwell recognized that political history is only one phase of that wideractivity which includes all the phenomena of social life. If the term “poli-tics” is used in the common but narrow sense of constitutional and dip-lomatic relations, then to repeat the familiar dictum, “History is pastpolitics,” is to utter a half-truth, in lamentable disregard of these newerideas.

While, however, it is now conceded that the history of mankind isthe history of man in society, and therefore social history in its broadestsense, the question has arisen as to the fundamental causes of this socialdevelopment—the reason of these great changes in human thought and

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human life which form the conditions of progress. No more profoundand far-reaching question can occupy our attention; for upon the correctanswer depends our whole attitude toward life itself. It is the supremeproblem not only to the scientist, but to the practical man as well. Ofthis problem one solution has been offered which during the past fewdecades has been engaging the lively attention of thinkers not alone inGermany, where the theory originated, but in Italy, Russia and, to someextent, in England and France. The echoes of the controversy havescarcely reached our shores; but a movement of thought at once so boldand so profound cannot fail to spread to the uttermost limits of scientificthought and to evoke a discussion adequate to the nature of the problemand the character of the solution.

We may state the thesis succinctly as follows: The existence of mandepends upon his ability to sustain himself; the economic life is there-fore the fundamental condition of all life. Since human life, however, isthe life of man in society, individual existence moves within the frame-work of the social structure and is modified by it. What the conditionsof maintenance are to the individual, the similar relations of productionand consumption are to the community. To economic causes, therefore,must be traced in last instance those transformations in the structure ofsociety which themselves condition the relations of social classes andthe various manifestations of social life.

This doctrine is often called “historical materialism,” or the “mate-rialistic interpretation of history.” Such terms are, however, lacking inprecision. If by materialism is meant the tracing of all changes. to mate-rial causes, the biological view of history is also materialistic. Again,the theory which ascribes all changes in society to the influence of cli-mate or to the character of the fauna and flora is materialistic, and yethas little in common with the doctrine here discussed. The doctrine wehave to deal with is not only materialistic, but also economic in charac-ter; and the better phrase is not the “materialistic interpretation,” but the“economic interpretation” of history.

In the following pages an attempt will be made to explain the gen-esis and development of the doctrine, to study some of the applicationsmade by recent thinkers, to examine the objections that may be advancedand finally, to estimate the true import and value of the theory for mod-ern science.

The Economic Interpretation of History/5

IFew of the leading writers of the eighteenth or the first half of the

nineteenth century devoted much attention to the problem of historicalcausation. The historians were for the most part content to describe thefacts of political and diplomatic history; and, when they sought for any-thing more than the most obvious explanation of the facts, they gener-ally took recourse to the “great man” theory or to the vague doctrine ofthe “genius of the age.” Even the Nestor of modern historical writing,Ranke, attempted scarcely more than to unravel the tangled skein ofinternational complications by showing the influence of foreign politicsupon national growth.

While most of the historians gave evidence of only a slight philo-sophical equipment, the philosophers presented a “philosophy of his-tory” which sometimes showed scarcely more familiarity with history.That Rousseau was not a profound historical scholar, is to put it mildly.Others, like Lessing in his Education of Humanity1 and Herder in hisIdeas on the Philosophy of History2 were too much under the domina-tion of the theistic conception to give much impetus to a newer move-ment of thought, even though Herder in Germany, like Ferguson3 inScotland, may be called in some respects a forerunner of modern an-thropological investigations. Huxley, as well as many of the Germanwriters,4 has pointed out that Kant in his Idea of a Universal History5

anticipated some of the modern doctrines as to the evolution of society;but even Kant was not sufficiently emancipated from the theology of theage to take a strictly scientific view of the subject. With Hegel’s Phi-losophy of History we reach the high-water mark of the “idealistic “in-terpretation; but the Hegelian conception of the “spirit of history” hasshown itself at once too subtle and too jejune for general acceptance.

A second but less comprehensive attempt to interpret historicalgrowth in terms of thought and feeling was made by those who main-tained that religion is the keynote of progress. That each of the fivegreat religions has exerted a profound influence on human developmentis indubitable—Judaism typifying the idea of duty; Confucianism, oforder; Mohammedanism, of justice; Buddhism, of patience and Chris-tianity, of love. But, entirely apart from the fact that this explanationoverlooks the possibility of regarding religion as a product rather than acause, no light is thrown on the question why the retention of the samereligion is often compatible with the most radical changes in the charac-ter and condition of its devotees. The religious interpretation of history,

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even in the modified form of Mr. Benjamin Kidd’s theory, has found butfew adherents.

A third explanation, which can be traced to Aristotle and which hasmet with some favor among publicists, might be called the politicalinterpretation of history. It holds, substantially, that throughout all his-tory there can be discerned a definite movement from monarchy to aris-tocracy, from aristocracy to democracy, and that there is a constantprogress from absolutism to freedom, both in idea and in institution.But very many philosophers, including Aristotle himself, have pointedout that democracy might lead to tyranny; and modern anthropologyhas tended to discredit the existence of the first alleged step. Above all,it has been repeatedly shown that political change is not a primary, buta secondary phenomenon; and that to erect into a universal cause whatis itself a result is to put the cart before the horse.

With the failure of all these attempts of a more or less idealisticnature, the way was prepared for an interpretation of history whichwould look to physical, rather than to psychical, forces; or rather whichwould explain how the psychical forces, into which all social movementmay be analyzed, are themselves conditioned by the physical environ-ment. The name with which this doctrine is associated is that of Buckle.

The theory of the predominant influence of the external world tracedto many writers of the eighteenth century, of whom Vico6 andMontesquieu7 are easily the most famous.8 Buckle himself had no smallopinion of Montesquieu’s merits. He tells us9 that Montesquieu

knew what no historian before him had even suspected, that in thegreat march of human affairs, individual peculiarities count fornothing.... He effected a complete separation between biographyand history, and taught historians to study, not the peculiarities ofindividual character, but the general aspect of the society in whichthe peculiarities appeared.

Furthermore, we are told, Montesquieu

was the first who, in an inquiry into the relations between thesocial conditions of a country and its jurisprudence, called in theaid of physical knowledge in order to ascertain how the characterof any given civilization is modified by the action of the externalworld.


What Montesquieu, however, stated aphoristically and on the basisof the imperfect physical science of the day, Buckle first worked outphilosophically and with such wealth of illustration that he is properlyregarded as the real creator of the doctrine. In his celebrated secondchapter, entitled . The Influence of Physical Laws,” Buckle analyzedthe effects of climate, food and soil upon social improvement and itsbasis, the accumulation of wealth. Buckle, it is true, as we have beenlately reminded,10 does not claim that all history is to be interpreted inthe light of external causes alone. He does, indeed, tell us that in earlysociety the history of wealth depends entirely on soil and climate; but heis careful to add that in a more advanced state of society there are othercircumstances which possess an equal, and sometimes a superior, influ-ence.11 In fact, in a later chapter he maintains that “the advance of Euro-pean civilization is characterized by a diminishing influence of physicallaws and an increasing influence of mental laws”; and he concludes thatif, as he has shown, “the measure of civilization is the triumph of themind over external agents, it becomes clear that of the two classes oflaws which regulate the progress of mankind, the mental class is moreimportant than the physical.”12 At the end of his general analysis heeven goes so far as to maintain that

we have found reason to believe that the growth of European civi-lization is solely due to the progress of knowledge, and that theprogress of knowledge depends on the number of truths which thehuman intellect discovers, and on the extent to which they arediffused.13

While it is clear, therefore, that Buckle was by no means so extremeas some of his critics would have us believe, it is none the less probablethat his name will remain associated with the doctrine of physical envi-ronment. For it was he, after all, who most forcibly and eloquently calledattention to the importance of the physical factors and to the influencethat they have exerted in moulding national character and social life.Since his time much more has been done, not only in studying, as Bucklehimself did, the immediate influence of climate and soil,14 but also inexplaining the allied field of the effect of the fauna and the flora onsocial development. The subject of the domestication of animals, forinstance, and its profound effect on human progress has not only beeninvestigated by a number of recent students,15 but has been made thevery basis of the explanation of early American civilization by one of

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the most brilliant and most learned of recent historians.16 A Russianscholar17 has shown in detail the connection between the great riversand the progress of humanity, and the whole modern study of economicgeography is but an expansion on broader lines of the same idea.

Buckle, however, devoted most of his attention to the influence ofphysical forces on the production of the food supply. With the difficul-ties of the problem of distribution, which he confesses are of greaterimportance, he declares himself unable to grapple. An exception, in-deed, is to be made in the case of “a very early stage of society,” whereBuckle thinks he can prove that “the distribution of wealth is, like itscreation, governed entirely by physical laws.”18 His suggestive, but notvery successful, attempt to prove this point, which rests upon an accep-tance of the one fundamental error of the classical economists -- thewages-fund doctrine—can here only be mentioned.19 It is, however, im-portant to emphasize the fact that, with this one exception, Buckle makesno endeavor to throw any light on the connection between physical envi-ronment and the distribution of wealth; for distribution, he tells us, de-pends on “circumstances of great complexity, which it is not necessaryhere to examine,” and of which, as he adds in a note, “many are stillunknown.”20

IIThe explanation which Buckle made no attempt to give had been

advanced more than a decade before by another writer who was des-tined to become far more famous and influential. Karl Marx enjoyedsome qualifications for the task which were denied to Buckle. Bucklewas, indeed, well abreast of the foreign, as well as the English, litera-ture on history and natural science; but his economic views were almostentirely in accord with those of the prevalent English school. These prin-ciples so completely lacked the evolutionary point of view as to pre-clude any historical treatment of history. Karl Marx, on the other hand,not only possessed the philosophical and scientific equipment of a Ger-man university graduate, but found himself in direct and unqualifiedopposition to the teachings of the professional economists. While Bucklecontented himself with pointing out how physical forces affect the pro-duction of wealth, Marx addressed himself to the larger task of showinghow the whole structure of society is modified by the relations of socialclasses, and how these relations are themselves dependent on antecedenteconomic changes. In Buckle it was primarily the physicist that created


a certain materialistic interpretation of history; in Marx it was the so-cialist that brought about a very different and specifically economicinterpretation of history. In order to understand the genesis of the eco-nomic interpretation of history it will be necessary to say a few wordsabout the philosophical antecedents of Marx.

Like most of the young Germans of the thirties, Marx was a firmbeliever in Hegel. The Hegelian philosophy, however, really containedtwo separate parts—the dialectical method and the system. The funda-mental conception of the Hegelian dialectic is that of process, or devel-opment by the union of opposites—a method that advances from notionto notion through negation. In all logic we begin with a half truth; weproceed to its opposite, which is equally false; and we then combinethem into a third, which shows that they are equally true, when consid-ered as necessary constituents of the whole.21 This idea of process, ordevelopment, Hegel applied to his celebrated statement: “All that is realis reasonable; all that is reasonable is real.” Interpreted in one way, thiswould mean fatalism, or optimistic conservatism. But according to Hegeleverything that exists is by no means real. Only that is real which in thecourse of its development shows itself to he necessary. When it is nolonger necessary it loses its reality. As some of his followers pointedout, the French government had become so unnecessary by 1789 thatnot it, but the Revolution, was real. Hence the original statement turnsinto the opposite: All that is real becomes in the course of time unrea-sonable, and is thus from the very outset unreal; all that is reasonable inidea is destined to be realized, even though it may for the moment beutterly unreal. The original statements of the reasonableness of what isreal, and of the reality of what is reasonable, blend into the higher state-ment that all that exists is destined some day to pass out of existence.22

The importance of this dialectical method lay in the idea of pro-cess—in the realization of the fact that the conclusions of human thoughtand action are not final. Translated into social and political language, itformed the basis of the aspirations of the liberal and progressive ele-ments in the community. On the other hand, Hegel himself never drewthese radical conclusions from his theory because, although in his logiche made it clear that the truth is nothing but the dialectical processitself, he nevertheless posited, as a result of his whole philosophy, theconception of the “absolute idea.” Into the mysteries of this absoluteidea we are not called upon to penetrate; it is sufficient to point out that,as applied to the domain of social politics, it results in a moderate con-

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servatism. It is in the then existing German state that, according to Hegel,universality and individuality, law and liberty—the highest stage of theuniversal spirit—find their reconciliation!

The antagonism between the dialectical and the absolute system ofHegel was not at first perceived. Just as both individualists and social-ists to-day claim Adam Smith as the fountain head of their doctrines, sofor a time both radicals and conservatives in Germany harked back toHegel. Toward the end of the thirties the schism became apparent. TheYoung-Hegelians swore by the dialectical method and landed in radical-ism; the orthodox followers remained true to the “absolute idea” andbecame reactionaries. At first, however, politics was a dangerous fieldto enter, and the discussion turned on religion. As either Catholicism orEvangelical Protestantism was the state religion in each of the Germanstates, the attack on religion was indirectly political in character, andwas recognized as such. Strauss had set the ball rolling in 1835 by hisLife of Jesus. His assertion of the mythical character of the evangelistaccounts led to a famous dispute with Bruno Bauer, who went one stepfarther and maintained that they were not even myths, but pure fabrica-tions. In this reaction against the foundations of the state religion theYoung-Hegelians were practically forced back to the philosophical ma-terialism of England and France in the eighteenth century. But they nowrecognized the antagonism between their new views and the doctrine ofHegel. While the philosophical materialists had posited nature as theonly reality, Hegel regarded the absolute idea—that is, the intellect andits logical process—as the fundamental conception, and nature as onlythe derivative or the reflex of the absolute idea.

The uncertainty continued until the early forties, when Feuerbachpublished his Essence of Christianity,23 in which he sought to demolishthe idealistic or transcendental basis of all theology. In this workFeuerbach claimed that nature exists independently of philosophy, thatthere is in reality nothing but nature and man, and that our religiousconceptions are a product of ourselves, who again are nothing. but aproduct of nature. Who has not heard of Feuerbach’s famous phrase:Der Mensch ist was er isst—“Man is what he eats”? Feuerbach at onceshowed the Young-Hegelians that, important as the Hegelian dialecticsmay have been, the “absolute idea” was not the basis, but the product.

Feuerbach exerted a profound influence on the thinkers of the day.Curiously enough, however, he also, in the domain of social politics,gave rise to two antagonistic schools. Although in his philosophy a


materialist, or rather a “naturalist,” there was a decidedly idealistic strainin his ethical doctrine. With him religion is what the etymology of theword implies—the really important thing that binds men together. Ofhis attempt to erect an idealistic religion on a naturalistic basis, this isnot the place to speak.24 But it is important to point out that his doctrineof love as the basis of all religion led to the so-called “true” or “philo-sophical” socialism of the forties in Germany. The early socialists hadaccepted the views of the French reformers, St. Simon and Fourier. Nowthey asserted that all that was necessary was to apply Feuerbach’s “hu-manism” to social relations, in order to proclaim the speedy regenera-tion of mankind. The leaders of the “philosophical” socialists, Karl Grünand Moses Hess,25 for a time dominated the social movement in Ger-many.

While the superimposed idealism of Feuerbach led to the “philo-sophical socialism” of the forties, his original and basic naturalism helpedto produce in Karl Marx the founder of “scientific socialism.” Marxwas educated in Hegelianism, and to the end of his days loved to coquetwith the Hegelian dialectic. He had become a Young-Hegelian and wasdeeply influenced by the appearance of Feuerbach’s book. This set himthinking. The materialistic idea he accepted as beyond dispute, but herecognized some of its weaknesses. The materialism of the eighteenthcentury was essentially mechanical and unhistorical. It had developedbefore science had assumed its modern garb. The watchword of modernscience is that of evolution through natural selection. Although this hadnot yet been proclaimed even by the natural scientists, or at all eventshad certainly not been applied by any one to social conceptions, the ideawas in the air; and, although Marx was not at first especially well versedin natural science, the naturalism of Feuerbach, combined with the con-ception of process in the dialectic of Hegel, led him finally to the theorythat all social institutions are the result of a growth and that the causesof this growth are to be sought not in any idea, but in the conditions ofmaterial existence. In other words, it led him to the economic interpreta-tion of history. He then broke at once with the philosophical or senti-mental socialists, and devoted all his time henceforth to the deeper studyof economic conditions.

That Marx’s analysis of economic conditions led him to scientificsocialism is a thing by itself, with which we have here no concern; forthat is an economic theory, based upon his doctrines of surplus valueand profits, which have been engaging the attention of economists

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throughout the world. We need to lay stress on Marx’s philosophy, ratherthan on his economics; and his philosophy, as we now know, resulted inhis economic interpretation of history. It chanced that he also became asocialist; but his socialism and his philosophy of history are, as we shallsee later, really independent. One can be an “economic materialist” andyet remain an extreme individualist. The fact that Marx’s economicsmay be defective has no bearing on the truth or falsity of his philosophyof history.

IIILet us now proceed to illustrate the development of the new doc-

trine from the writings of Marx himself. It will be advisable to quotefreely, because these earlier works of Marx are little known even inGermany, and are almost unknown outside of Germany.26 Yet they areof the utmost importance in showing the genesis of an idea which is nowone of the storm centres not only of economic and social, but also ofphilosophical, discussion.

In his earliest essays we see only the radical political reformer. As ayoung man of twenty-four, he was called in 1842 to the editorship of theRheinische Zeitung, a daily paper started in Cologne by some of theYoung-Hegelians who belonged to the radical party. While battling forpolitical reforms Marx had his attention called for the first time to eco-nomic questions. He .severely criticised the historical school ofjurisconsults, because they regarded all existing legal institutions as thenecessary, and therefore the wise, result of a long evolution. To theiroptimistic conservatism Marx opposed the Hegelian idea of liberty. Itwas not, however, until after the Rheinische Zeitung had been suspendedby the government in 1843 that Marx went to Paris27 and became asocialist—influenced largely by St. Simon and Proudhon, and possiblyby the celebrated book of Lorenz Stein, which appeared the year before,on the socialistic and communistic movement in France.28 At Paris, Marxstarted in 1844, in conjunction with another leader of the Young-Hegelians, Arnold Ruge, the Deutsch-Franzöische Jahrbacher. Herethe beginning of the opposition to the French communists is perceptible;for in the introductory editorial we are told that what has saved Ger-many from “the metaphysical and fantastical ideas of Lamennais,Proudhon, St. Simon and Fourier” is the Hegelian logic.29 Yet Marxshowed the influence of Feuerbach by writing an article in criticism of


Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, in which he sought to prove how theologi-cal criticism was now necessarily being replaced by political criticism.Marx, indeed, went a step farther and emphasized the necessity of arevolution of the fourth estate—the proletariat. He was beginning toformulate his ideas on economic questions. “The relation of industryand of the world of wealth in general to the political world is the chiefproblem of modern times.”30 In another place he tells us that “revolu-tions need a passive element, a material basis.”31 In a later essay in thesame periodical on the “Jewish Question,” in which he opposed the viewsof Bruno Bauer, Marx claims that “we must emancipate ourselves be-fore we can emancipate others.’‘32 He seeks to show that the importanceof the French Revolution consisted in freeing not only the political forcesof society, but also the economic basis on which the political super-structure rested.33 The political change was in a certain sense idealism;but it marked at the same time the materialism of society.34

The double number of the Deutsch-Fransöische Jahrbücher wasthe only one that appeared. Ruge and Marx could not agree in theirattitude toward the question of communism. While in Paris, however,Marx formed an intimacy with his lifelong friend, Frederick Engels,whose acquaintance he had originally made while both were working onthe editorial staff of the Rheinische Zeitung.35 They now decided towrite in common a work against Bruno Bauer, who represented the morespeculative wing of the Young-Hegelians. This appeared in 1845 underthe title of The Holy Family.36 In this book, written almost entirely byMarx, he shows the strong influence of Feuerbach.37 As he was at thattime, however, more interested in opposing the transcendental notionsof the other Young-Hegelians in general than in emphasizing the differ-ences between himself and the “sentimental” socialists, it will not sur-prise us to find him defending Proudhon.38 Yet even here Marx showsthe essentially mechanical nature of the older French materialism, andpoints out how the philosophic materialism of Helvetius and Holbachled to the socialism of Baboeuf and Fourier.39 Incidentally, Marx callsattention to the economic basis of the French Revolution and points outthat the individual of the French Revolution differed from the individualof classic antiquity because his economic and industrial relations weredifferent.40 Finally, in another passage he asks outright:

Do these gentlemen think that they can understand the first wordof history as long as they exclude the relations of man to nature,

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natural science and industry? Do they believe that they can actu-ally comprehend any epoch without gasping the industry of theperiod, the immediate methods of production in actual life?... Justas they separate the soul from the body, and themselves from theworld, so they separate history from natural science and industry,so they find the birthplace of history not in the gross materialproduction on earth, but in the misty cloud formation of heaven.41

Although we find in Marx’s early works only these incidental allu-sions to the doctrine of economic interpretation, we are told by Engels,the literary executor of Marx, that Marx had worked out his theory by1845.42 That Engels is quite correct in this is shown not only by thequotations just mentioned, but also by the annotations which Marx madeto Feuerbach in 1845.43 Marx here objects to the old, mechanical mate-rialistic doctrine that men are simply the results of their environment,because it forgets that this environment can itself be changed by man.44

He also takes exception to Feuerbach’s whole view of religion, on theground that Feuerbach fails to perceive that man is the product of hissocial relations and that religion itself is a social outgrowth.45 A fullerstatement of his new46 position, however, is found in some recently dis-covered essays which were written at about that time.47 These articles,published anonymously in the Westfälischer Dampfboot,48 are of cardi-nal importance because Marx now for the first time emphasized hisdisagreement with the “sentimental socialists.” In the first series of ar-ticles, Marx criticises a German communistic sheet published in NewYork, which was devoting much attention to the Anti-Rent Riots.49 Marxdiscusses the agrarian movement in the United States and tries to showfrom his new point of view the connection between economic and politi-cal phenomena. In a second series of articles50 he joins issue with Grünand Hess, the chief advocates of philosophical socialism, and ridiculestheir failure to perceive that an alteration in methods of production bringsabout changes in the whole social life.51

By 184752 Marx had made a somewhat deeper study of economichistory. He was now so convinced of the truth of his new theory that heproceeded to make a furious onslaught on the older socialists in theperson of their chief representative—Proudhon. In reply to Proudhon’sPhilosophy of Misery Marx wrote his Misery of Philosophy. Here heelaborates the theory that economic institutions are historical categoriesand that history itself must be interpreted in the light of economic devel-opment. We read—in French, it is true, for Marx wrote equally well in


German, English and French—that the conception of private propertychanges in each historical epoch, in a series of entirely different socialrelations.53 In a more general way Marx contends that all social rela-tions are intimately connected with the productive forces of society. Hetells us that

in changing the modes of production, mankind changes all itssocial relations. The hand mill creates a society with the feudallord; the steam mill a society with the industrial capitalist. Thesame men who establish social relations in conformity with theirmaterial production also create principles, ideas and categories inconformity with their social relations .... All such ideas and cat-egories are therefore historical and transitory products.54

In another place he maintains that “the relations in which the pro-ductive forces of society manifest themselves, far from being eternallaws, correspond to definite changes in man and in his productiveforces.”55 Marx applies this general law in many ways. Thus, in anacute study of the doctrine of rent, he points out that rent in the Ricardiansense is nothing but “patriarchal agriculture transformed into commer-cial industry”;56 and, after explaining the historical growth of modernagricultural conditions, he concludes by objecting to the whole classicalschool, because it fails to see that economic institutions can be under-stood only as historical categories.57 In another passage he contendsthat money itself is not a thing, but a social relation, and that this rela-tion corresponds to a definite form of production in precisely the sameway as exchanges between individuals.58 Finally, in analyzing the es-sence of machinery and the historical importance of the principle ofdivision of labor, Marx tells us that “machinery is not any more of aneconomic category than is the ox that pulls the plough; it is a productiveforce. The modern factory, which is itself based on machinery, is a so-cial relation, an economic category.”59 In short, social life at any onetime is the result of an economic evolution.

In the famous Manifesto of the Communist Party,60 which appearedthe following year, we find the implications, rather than the direct state-ment, of the principle. After describing how the guild system of industrygave way to the modern industrial system, based on the world marketand on the revolution in industrial production, Marx points out that thebourgeoisie, in revolutionizing the methods of production, alters withthem the whole character of society, and displaces feudalism with mod-

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ern conditions. At the present day this is a truism; but at the time themanifesto appeared it was a novel and striking conception. Unfortu-nately, the thought was so inextricably interwoven with Marx’s pecu-liarly socialistic explanation of the effects of machinery, of the functionof capital and of the speedy cataclysm of society, that it made at the timebut little impression.

In the succeeding years Marx made various applications of his theory.In 1849 he published a series of articles on Wage-Labor and Capital, inthe course of which he traced the reason for the change from slavery toserfdom and to the wages system and again laid down the principle thatall relations of society depend upon changes in the economic life andmore particularly in the modes of production. He tells us that

with the change in the social relations by means of which indi-viduals produce, that is, in the social relations of production, andwith the alteration and development of the material means of pro-duction, the powers of production are also transformed. The rela-tions of production collectively form those social relations whichwe call society, and a society with definite degrees of historicaldevelopment .... Ancient society, feudal society, bourgeois societyare simply instances of this collective result of the complexes ofrelations of production, each of which marks an important step inthe historical development of mankind.61

In a series of articles published in 1850, on “The Class Struggles inFrance from 1848 to 1850,” Marx made the first attempt to apply hisprinciple to an existing political situation.62 He endeavored to show thatthe great crisis of 1847 was the real cause of the February revolution,and that the economic reaction of 1849 and 1850 was the basis of thepolitical reaction throughout the Continent. He followed this in 1852 byanother article on “The Eighteenth Brumaire,” in which he attempted tolay bare the economic foundations of the coup d’état in France, and toshow that the empire really depended on the small farmer or peasant,who had now become not a revolutionist, but a conservative.63 It is nthis work that we find the interesting bit of social psychology in whichthe ideals of life themselves, as well as the views of any one individual,no matter how eminent, are traced to social and economic causes:

On the various forms of property, on the conditions of social exist-ence, there rises an entire superstructure of various and peculiarly


formed sensations, illusions, methods of thought and views of life.The whole class fashions and moulds them from out of their mate-rial foundations and their corresponding social relations. The singleindividual, in whom they converge through tradition and educa-tion, is apt to imagine that they constitute the real determiningcauses and the point of departure of his action.64

In another passage he contends that

men make their own history, but they make it not of their ownaccord or under self-chosen conditions, but under given and trans-mitted conditions. The tradition of all dead generations weighslike a mountain on the brain of the living.65

During the early fifties, largely through the efforts of Mr. CharlesA. Dana, Marx was engaged to write a series of articles for the NewYork Tribune, which, under the editorship of Horace Greeley, was de-voting considerable attention to the Fourierist socialistic movement inthe United States. In these articles, which appeared in .English for aperiod of over eight years, some of them anonymously, as editorials ofthe Tribune, Marx discussed the general politics of continental Europein the light of his economic theory, and contributed in no mean degree tothe enlightenment of the American public.66 It was not, however, untilthe appearance in 1859 of his first professedly scientific work, Contri-butions to the Criticism of Political Economy, that Marx endeavored tosum up his doctrine of economic interpretation and to show how thisinduced him to attempt his analysis of modern industrial society. Hetells us that his

investigation led to the conclusion that legal relations, like theform of government, can be understood neither of and in them-selves nor as the result of the so-called general progress of thehuman mind, but that they are rooted in the material conditions oflife .... In the social production of their every-day existence menenter into definite relations that are at once necessary and inde-pendent of their own volition—relations of production that corre-spond to a definite stage of their material powers of production.The totality of these relations of production constitutes the eco-nomic structure of society—the real basis on which is erected thelegal and political edifice and to which there correspond definiteforms of serial consciousness. The method of production in mate-

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rial existence conditions social, political and mental evolution ingeneral.67

And, after speaking of the periods when the old forces are in tempo-rary conflict with the new, Marx proceeds:

With the alteration in the economic basis the whole immense su-perstructure is more or less slowly transformed. In consideringsuch transformations we must always distinguish between thematerial transformation in the economic conditions of production,of which natural science teaches us, and the legal, political, aes-thetic or philosophical—in short ideological forms, in which menbecome conscious of this conflict and fight it out.68

In his great work on Capital, published eight years later, althoughhe continually takes it for granted, Marx nowhere formulates this law.While the final chapter contains some interesting economic history ofEngland since the sixteenth century, Marx confines the discussion to astudy of the economic results rather than of the wider social or politicalconsequences. Partly for this reason and partly because the general publicdid not distinguish between his historical views and his socialistic analysisof existing industrial society, Marx’s view of history had at first butslight influence outside of socialistic circles. After his earlier works cameto be studied more carefully, the younger Marxists pointed out the realimport of the historical principle. But it was not until the publication in1894, eleven years after the death of Marx, of the third volume of Capi-tal, with its wealth of historical interpretation, that the continental writ-ers in general realized the significance of the theory; and it is only sincethat time that the heated controversy has spread throughout the scien-tific world.69 Since neither the earlier works of 1847 or 1859 nor any ofthe later volumes of Capital have as yet been translated, the English-speaking public has had only slight opportunity of grasping the realsignificance of Marx’s theory or its corollaries.

In the first volume of Capital the only passage in which Marx defi-nitely refers to his fundamental theory is tucked away in a note.70 Herehe compares his theory to that of Darwin and insists that it is based onthe only really materialistic method:

A critical history of technology would show how little any of theinventions of the eighteenth century are the work of a single indi-


vidual. Hitherto there has been no such book. Darwin has inter-ested us in the history of Nature’s technology, i.e., in the forma-tion of the organs of plants and animals, which organs serve asinstruments of production for sustaining life. Does not the historyof the productive organs of man, of organs that are the materialbasis of all social organization, deserve equal attention? And wouldnot such a history be easier to compile, since, as Vico says, humanhistory differs from natural history in this, that we have made theformer, but not the latter? Technology discloses man’s mode ofdealing with Nature,—the process of production by which he sus-tains his life, and thereby also lays bare the mode of formation ofhis social relations, and of the mental conceptions that flow fromthem. Every history of religion, even, that fails to take account ofthis material basis, is uncritical. It is, in reality, much easier todiscover by analysis the earthly core of the misty creations of reli-gion, than it is, conversely, to develop from the actual relations oflife the corresponding celestialized forms of those relations. Thelatter is the only materialistic, and therefore the only scientificmethod. The weak points in the abstract materialism of naturalscience, a materialism that excludes history and its process, are atonce evident from the abstract and ideological conceptions of itsspokesmen, whenever they venture beyond the bounds of their ownspecialty.

It is in the third volume of Capital that Marx gives a definite state-ment of his theory, with some necessary qualifications, inattention towhich is partly responsible for some of the objections to the theory.With this extract we may fitly close the series of quotations:

It is always the immediate relation of the owner of the conditionsof production to the immediate producers—a relation each of whoseforms always naturally corresponds to a given stage in the meth-ods and conditions of labor, and thus in its social productivity—inwhich we find the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entiresocial structure, and thus also of the political forms... This doesnot prevent this same economic basis in all its essentials fromshowing in actual life endless variations and gradations due tovarious empirical facts, natural conditions, racial relations, andexternal historical influences without number—all of which canbe comprehended only by an analysis of these conditions as theyare disclosed by experience.71

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IVWe have now studied the genesis and development of the doctrine,

chiefly in the words of Marx himself. But, it will be asked, how far isthe theory of economic interpretation original with Marx?

There are, indeed, abundant traces of the connection between eco-nomic causes and legal, political or social conditions to be found in theliterature of earlier centuries. Harrington, for instance, in his Oceana,tells us that the form of government depends upon the tenure and distri-bution of land. The very foundation of his whole theory is: “Such as isthe proportion or ballance of dominion or property in Land, such is thenature of the Empire.”72 In the eighteenth century we find writers, likeMöser,73 who emphasized the influence of property in land on politics.Especially in the socialists of the second quarter of the nineteenth cen-tury we find not infrequent allusions to a similar point of view. Fourier,St. Simon, Proudhon and Blanc naturally call attention to the influenceof economic conditions on the immediate politics of the day,74 and thefirst foreign historian of French socialism, Lorenz von Stein, elaboratedsome of their ideas by positing the general principle of the subordina-tion of the political to the economic life.75 The early minor Germansocialists, such as Marr, Hess and Grün,76 as well as here and thereother writers,77 express themselves sporadically in like manner. But iforiginality can properly be claimed only for those thinkers who not aloneformulate a doctrine but first recognize its importance and its implica-tions, so that it thereby becomes a constituent element in their wholescientific system, there is no question that Marx must be recognized asin the truest sense the originator of the economic interpretation of his-tory.78

It may be asked, finally, how far the other founders of scientificsocialism, Rodbertus and Lassalle, should share with Marx the honor oforiginating the doctrine of economic interpretation of history. The ques-tion of the priority of view as between Marx and Rodbertus was at onetime hotly discussed.79 The controversy, however, turned chiefly on thespecifically socialistic doctrines of labor and surplus value, which havein their essentials nothing to do with the economic interpretation of his-tory. Even as to that point, however, the friends of Rodbertus now con-cede that the charges originally preferred against Marx were false.80 Sofar as the economic interpretation of history is concerned, there is noclaim that Rodbertus originated or even maintained the doctrine.81

With reference to Lassalle, it would hardly be necessary to refer to


the matter at all, were it not for the fact that a prominent English econo-mist has recently implied that the doctrine is first found in his writings.82

As a matter of fact, it is now conceded by the ablest students of social-ism that Lassalle originated none of the important points in theory, eventhough it is true that without the marvelous practical sagacity of Lassallethe world at large would probably have heard but little of Marx andRodbertus. The International, in the hands of Marx, was a fiasco; prac-tical socialism, in the hands of Lassalle, became a powerful politicaland social force. But while Lassalle was a great agitator and statesman,he was not a constructive thinker,—in economics, at all events; andwhile Marx was a failure in practical life, he was a giant as a closetphilosopher,83 Whether or no we agree with Marx’s analysis of indus-trial society, and without attempting as yet to pass judgment upon thevalidity of his philosophical doctrine, it is safe to say that no one canstudy Marx as he deserves to be studied—and, let us add, as he hashitherto not been studied in England or America—without recognizingthe fact that, perhaps with the exception of Ricardo, that other greateconomist of Jewish extraction, there has been no more original, nomore powerful, and no more acute intellect in the entire history of eco-nomic science.

VIn the preceding sections we have studied the genesis and the early

formulation of the doctrine of historical materialism. Before proceedingto discuss its applications, it may be well. to obviate some misunder-standing by directing attention to what might be called, not so much themodifications, as the further elaboration, of the theory.

In saying that the modes of production condition all social life, Marxsometimes leads us to believe that he refers only to the purely technicalor technological modes of production. There are, however, abundantindications in his writings to show that he really had in mind the condi-tions of production in general.84 This becomes especially important indiscussing the earlier stages of civilization, where great changes oc-curred in the general relations of production, without much specific al-teration in the technical processes. The younger Marxists have devotedmuch time and ability to the elucidation of this point.

In the first place, even though it is claimed that changes in tech-nique are the causes of social progress, we must be careful not to taketoo narrow a view of the term. The adherents of the theory point out

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that, when we speak of technique in social life, we must include not onlythe technical processes of extracting the raw material and of fashioningit into a finished product, but also the technique of trade and transporta-tion, the technical methods of business in general and the technical pro-cesses by which the finished product is distributed to the final consumer.Marx intimated this repeatedly, and Engels has stated it clearly in aletter, in which he sums up the ideas for which he and Marx contended:

We understand by the economic relations, which we regard as thedetermining basis of the history of society, the methods by whichthe members of a given society produce their means of supportand exchange the products among each other, so far as the divi-sion of labor exists. The whole technique of production and oftransportation is thus included. Furthermore, this technique, ac-cording to our view, determines the methods of exchange, the dis-tribution of products and, hence, after the dissolution of gentilesociety, the division of society into classes, the relations of per-sonal control and subjection, and thus the existence of the state, ofpolitics, of law, etc .... Although technique is mainly dependenton the condition of science, it is still more true that science de-pends on the condition and needs of technique. A technical wantfelt by society is more of an impetus to science than ten universi-ties.85

The term technical must thus be broadened to include the wholeseries of relations between production and consumption. It is for thisreason that we speak not so much of the technical interpretation of his-tory—which would lead to misunderstanding—as of the economic in-terpretation of history.

The originators of the theory, moreover, go still further. When theyspeak of the materialistic or economic conception of history, they notonly refuse to identify “economic” with “technical” in the narrow sense,but they do not even mean to imply that “economic” excludes physicalfactors. It is obvious, for instance, that geographical conditions, to somedegree and under certain circumstances, affect the facts of production.To the extent that Buckle pointed this out, he was in thorough accordwith Marx; but the geographical conditions, as Marx has himself main-tained, form only the limits within which the methods of production canact. While a change of geographical conditions may prevent the adop-tion of new methods of production, precisely the same geographical


conditions are often compatible with entirely different methods of pro-duction. Thus, Marx tells us:

It is not the mere fertility of the soil, but the differentiation of thesoil, the variety of its natural products, the changes of the seasons,which form the physical basis for the social division of labor, andwhich, by changes in the natural surroundings, spur man on to themultiplication of his wants, his capabilities, his means and modesof labor. It is the necessity of bringing a natural force under thecontrol of society, of economizing, of appropriating or subduing iton a large scale by the work of man’s hand, that first plays thedecisive part in the history of industry.86

He goes on to explain, however, that “favorable natural conditionsalone give us only the possibility, never the reality,” of definite eco-nomic methods of production and distribution of wealth. In the sameway, Engels’ concedes that the geographical basis must be included inenumerating the economic conditions, but contends that its importancemust not be exaggerated.

This is, however, by no means the most important elaboration of thetheory. In the interval that elapsed between the first statement of thetheory in the forties and the death of Marx the founders of the doctrinehad little reason to moderate their statements. But after the death ofMarx, and especially when the theory began to be actively discussed inthe social-democratic congresses, the extreme claims of the orthodoxMarxists began to arouse dissent, even in the ranks of the socialiststhemselves. Partly as a result of this, partly because of outside criti-cism, Engels now wrote a series of letters in which he endeavored tophrase his statement of the theory so as to meet some of the criticisms.In these letters87 he maintained that Marx had often been misunderstoodand that neither he himself nor Marx ever meant to claim an absolutevalidity for economic considerations to the exclusion of all other fac-tors. He pointed out that economic actions are not only physical actions,but human actions, and that a man acts as an economic agent throughthe use of his head as well as of his hands. The mental development ofman, however, is affected by many conditions; at any given time theeconomic action of the individual is influenced by his whole social envi-ronment, in which many factors have played a role. Engels confessedthat Marx and he were “partly responsible for the fact that the youngermen have sometimes laid more stress on the economic side than it de-

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serves”; and he was careful to point out that the actual form of the socialorganization is often determined by political, legal, philosophical andreligious theories and conceptions. In short, when we read the latestexposition of their views by one of the founders themselves, it almostseems as if the whole theory of economic interpretation had been thrownoverboard.

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that these concessions,undeniably significant as they are, involved in the minds of the leadersan abandonment of the theory. Engels continued to emphasize the fun-damental significance of the economic life in the wider social life. Theupholders of the doctrine remind us that, whatever be the action andreaction of social forces at any given time, it is the conditions of produc-tion, in the widest sense of the term, that are chiefly responsible for thebasic permanent changes in the condition of society. Thus, Engels tellsus that we must broaden our conception of the economic factor so as toinclude among the economic conditions, not only the geographical ba-sis, but the actually transmitted remains of former economic changes,which have often survived only through tradition or vis inertiae, as wellas the whole external environment of this particular form. He even goesso far as to declare the race itself to be an economic factor. And, whilehe still stoutly contends that the political, legal, religious, literary andartistic development rests on the economic, he points out that they allreact upon one another and on the economic foundation.

It is not that the economic situation is the cause, in the sense ofbeing the only active agent, and that everything else is only a pas-sive result. It is, on the contrary, a case of mutual action on thebasis of the economic necessity, which in last instance always worksitself out.88

A controversy that has arisen since Engels’s death may serve tobring out the thought more clearly. A number of suggestive writers, ofwhom Gumplowicz89 is perhaps the most important, have attempted toexplain some of the leading facts in human development by the exist-ence of racial characteristics and race contests. Yet we now have aninteresting work by a Frenchman, who does not even profess himself anadvocate of the economic interpretation of history, maintaining, withsome measure of success, that the majority of different racial character-istics are the results of socio-economic changes which are themselvesreferable to physico-economic causes.90 Demolins, the chief representa-


tive to-day of the school of LePlay, has—at least, so far as appears fromhis writings—never even heard of Marx or his theory, and we find in hiswork very little of the detail of the class conflict which primarily inter-ested the socialists. But while Demolins reverts in essence to what mightbe called the commercio-geographical explanation of history, he is care-ful to point out how the conditions of physical life affect the methodsand relations of production, and how these in turn are largely respon-sible for the differentiation of mankind into the racial types that have.played a role in history. Thus, from his point of view, the race is largelyan economic product, and we begin to understand what Engels meantwhen he declared the race itself to be an economic factor.

The theory of economic interpretation thus expounded by Engelsmust be considered authoritative. He tells us that Marx never reallyregarded the situation in any other light. Nevertheless, it cannot be de-nied that there are passages in Marx which seem to be more extreme,and which represent the doctrine in that cruder form which is so fre-quently met with among his uncritical followers. We are bound, how-ever, to give him the benefit of the doubt; and we must not forget thatwhen a new theory supposed to involve far-reaching practical conse-quences is first propounded, the apparent needs of the situation oftenresult in an overstatement, rather than an understatement, of the doc-trine.

We understand, then, by the theory of economic interpretation ofhistory, not that all history is to be explained in economic terms alone,but that the chief considerations in human progress are the social con-siderations and that the important factor in social change is the eco-nomic factor. Economic interpretation of history means, not that theeconomic relations exert an exclusive influence, but that they exert apreponderant influence in shaping the progress of society.

So much for a preliminary statement of the real content of the eco-nomic conception of history, as explained and elaborated by the foundersthemselves. In a subsequent section we shall revert to this point andattempt to analyze somewhat more closely the actual connection be-tween the economic and the wider social relations of mankind.

VILet us now proceed to study some of the applications that have been

made of the theory of the economic interpretation of history. We canpursue this study without prejudicing the final decision as to the truth of

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the doctrine in its entirety. For it is obvious that we may refuse to admitthe validity of the theory as a philosophical explanation of progress as awhole, and yet be perfectly prepared to admit that in particular cases theeconomic factor has played an important role. It is natural, however,that the economic influence in any given set of facts should be empha-sized primarily by those whose general philosophical attitude wouldpredispose them to search for economic causes. It will not surprise us,then, to find that much good work in this direction has been accom-plished by the originators of the theory and their followers.

Marx himself made no mean contribution to the facts. Some of hisstatements are erroneous, and not a few of his historical explanationsare farfetched and exaggerated; but there remains a considerable sub-stratum of truth in his contributions to the subject. Of these contribu-tions the most familiar is the account of the transition from feudal tomodern society, due to the genesis in the seventeenth century of capitalgs a dominant industrial factor and to the industrial revolution of theeighteenth century. It was Marx who first clearly pointed out the natureof the domestic system and its transformation into the factory system ofour age, with the attendant change from the local to the national marketand from this, in turn, to the world market. It was Marx, again, whocalled attention to the difference between the economic life of classicantiquity and that of modern times, showing that, while capital playedby no means an insignificant role in ancient times, it was commercialand not industrial capital, and that much of Greek and Roman history isto be explained in the light of this fact. It was Marx, too, who firstdisclosed the economic forces which were chiefly responsible for thepolitical changes of the middle of the nineteenth century. And, finally,while Marx had originally devoted comparatively little attention to primi-tive civilization, we now know that in his manuscript notes he appliedhis doctrine in a suggestive way to the very first stages of social evolu-tion.91

It is perhaps in the early history of mankind that the most signaladditions to our knowledge have been made by recent writers. The pio-neer in this field was our great compatriot, Morgan. He was really thefirst to explain the early forms of human association and to trace societythrough the stages of the horde, the clan, the family and the state. More-over, although he did not work it out in detail or give his theory anyname, there is no doubt that he independently advanced the doctrine ofthe economic interpretation of history, without being aware of the fact


that it applied to anything but the early stages. Because of the greatneglect by subsequent writers of this part of Morgan’s achievements, itis necessary to call attention to it at somewhat greater length.

Morgan starts out with the guarded statement that it is “probablethat the great epochs of human progress have been identified more orless directly with the enlargement of the sources of subsistence.’‘92 Thegreat epochs of which he speaks, however, cease, in his opinion, withthe introduction of field agriculture.93 He discusses the assumption oforiginal promiscuity in the human race and maintains that, while it prob-ably existed at first, it is not likely that it was long continued in thehorde, because the latter would break up into smaller groups for subsis-tence and fall into consanguine families.94 In his treatment of the depen-dence of early man upon the physical characteristics of the food supply,he takes up in turn the early natural subsistence upon fruits and roots,the connection of fish subsistence with savagery and migration, the re-lations between the discovery of cereals, the cessation of cannibalismand the reliance on a meat and milk diet, the connection between thedomestication of animals and pastoral society and, finally, the transitionof what he calls horticulture into agriculture.95 In all this we seem to begetting little beyond Buckle. What differentiates Morgan entirely fromBuckle, however, is the fact that, while the latter confines him, self tothe simple problem of production, Morgan works out the influence ofall these factors upon the social and political constitution and traces thetransformation of society to changes in the form and conditions of prop-erty.

Although Morgan did not succeed in making thoroughly clear theeconomic causes of the early tracing of descent from the female line, hedid call attention to the connection between the growth of private prop-erty and the evolution of the horde into the clan or, as he calls it, thegens.96 He elucidated still more clearly the causes of the change of de-scent from the female to the male line, showing how it went hand inhand with the extension of the institution of private property.97 The ac-count of the development of slavery98 is perhaps not so novel; but thesuggestion of an economic basis for the transition from the clan to thepatriarchal family99 and from the polygamic to the monogamic family100

was as striking as it was original.While Morgan was in no way an economist and had probably never

heard either of Marx or of the historical school of economics, his finalconclusion as to the relations of private property to social welfare is in

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substantial agreement with modern views. He tells us that:

Since the advent of civilization the outgrowth of property his beenso immense, its forms so diversified, its uses so expanding and itsmanagement so intelligent in the interests of its owners, that ithas become, on the part of the people, an unmanageable power.The human mind stands bewildered in the presence of its owncreation. The time will come, nevertheless, when human intelli-gence will rise to the mastery over property and define the rela-tions of the state to the property it protects as well as the obliga-tion and the limits of the rights of its owners. The interests ofsociety are paramount to individual interests and the two must bebrought into just and harmonious relations.101

The greater part of Morgan’s Ancient Society, as well as of hisother works,102 was, however, devoted to an account of the historicalfacts, rather than of their economic causes. The controversy which atonce sprang up in England, and which has lasted almost to the presenttime, turned well-nigh exclusively upon the first set of considerations.When scientists were not agreed upon the facts, it would seem useless tospeculate about the causes of the facts. The trend given to the discus-sion by this early controversy is largely responsible for the fact thatuntil very recently writers on sociology or social history have almostcompletely neglected the economic aspect of the transitions which theydescribe.103 But, although some parts of Morgan’s theory—like the de-tails of the earliest consanguine family and the perhaps somewhat hastygeneralization as to primitive promiscuity—have been modified, thesubstance of his account of the uterine or maternal clan and of its devel-opment into the tribe and the state, as well as of the dependence of thetransition upon changes in the forms of property, have become incorpo-rated into the accepted material of modern science.

It was not, however, until the German advocates of the economicinterpretation of history took the matter up that Morgan’s real impor-tance was recognized. Engels published in 1884 his Origin of the Fam-ily, in which he showed that Morgan’s views marked a distinct advanceupon those of Bachofen and McLennan, and claimed that the Englisharchaeologists of the day had really adoptod Morgan’s theory withoutgiving him credit. Turning from the account of the develop merit to itscauses, Engels accepted all of Morgan’s conclusions as to the earlyuterine society and the development of monogamy, but carried them one


step further by combining, as he tells us, Morgan and Marx. Engelsascribed the transformation of gentile society to the first great socialdivision of labor—the separation of pastoral tribes from the rest of so-ciety. This in itself gave rise to intertribal exchange as a permanentfactor in economic life, and it was not long before intertribal exchangeled to barter between individuals—a barter chiefly in cattle and naturalproducts. With the transition from common to private property in suchmovables, the ground was prepared, on the one hand, for slavery and,on the other, for the downfall of the matriarchate. As private propertyincreased we find the second great step in the division of labor—theseparation of manual industry from agriculture. Exchange now becomesan exchange of commodities, and with the economic supremacy of themale there appear the patriarchate and then the monogamic family. Fi-nally comes the third step in the division of labor—the rise of the mer-chant class, with the use of metallic money. The growth of capital, evenif it be mercantile capital (as against the original cattle capital), ushersin a state of affairs with which the old gentile organization is no longerable to cope; and thus we find the origin of the political organization,the genesis of the state. In Greece, in Rome and in the Teutonic races ofthe easy middle ages this transition is a matter of record; but no onebefore Morgan and Engels had been able to explain it intelligibly.

The hints thrown out by Morgan and Engels have been worked upby a number of writers, few of whom can be classed as socialists. Atfirst the professed sociologists paid but little attention to the matter.With Kovalevsky, in 1890, we begin the series of those who attemptedto prove a somewhat closer connection between the family and privateproperty.104 In 1896 Grosse devoted a separate volume to the subject105

and brought out some new points as to the influence of economic condi-tions upon the character of the family, especially in the case of nomadicpeoples and the early agriculturists. In the same year ProfessorHildebrand published an admirable work on Law and Custom in theDifferent Economic Stages, in which, although not neglecting the ear-lier phases of social life, he laid the emphasis on the economic basis ofthe primitive agricultural community.106 For the still earlier period note-worthy work has been done by Cunow. After having prepared the wayby a study of the systems of consanguinity among the Australians107

Cunow published in 1898 a series of articles on the economic basis ofthe matriarchate.108 He emphasized the essential weakness, from thehistorical point of view, of the ordinary classification into hunting, pas-

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toral and agricultural stages.109 Beginning, however, with the huntingstage, Cunow maintains that the earliest form of organization rests onthe supremacy of the man, which is not by any means the same thing asthe supremacy of the father; for the polygamic or monogamic familywhich forms the basis oi the patriarchal system was of much later devel-opment. In the early stages we may have a uterine society—that is, atracing of descent through the mother—but we have no matriarchate.110

Cunow gives the economic reasons which explain this tracing of thedescent through the female and shows how, under certain conditions,she becomes more sought after until finally she attains such an eco-nomic importance that the matriarchate itself develops.111 Incidentallyhe traces the connection between the female and early agriculture, andexplains how her growing importance, both in and out of the home,exerted a decided influence upon the early division of labor. The matri-archate is shown very dearly to be largely an economic product.112

In 1901 Cunow followed up his exposition by another series of es-says on “The Division of Labor and the Rights of Women.”113 Here hepoints out the error of the usual statement that agriculture is a conditionprecedent to a disappearance of the nomadic life. On the contrary, main-tains Cunow, a certain degree of stationary settled activity is a conditionprecedent to the transition to agriculture.114 Agriculture, however, maydevelop either out of the pastoral stage or out of the hunting stage, andin each case the activity of the female is of cardinal importance. Thefemale is not only the primitive tiller of the soil, but also the creator ofthe earliest house industry, which plays such a distinctive role in primi-tive barter.115 The earliest division of labor rests on the principle that thefemale attends to the vegetable sustenance, the man to the animal diet,and on this fundamental distinction all the other social arrangements arebuilt up. Marriage for a long time is not an ethical community of idealinterests, but very largely an economic or labor relation.116

Of much the same character as this investigation are the attemptsmade still more recently to supply an economic explanation for the ori-gin of totemism117 and to study the economic causes of slavery. Espe-cially on the latter topic our knowledge of the early conditions has beengreatly increased by the detailed study of Nieboer.118 This writer, whoaccepts the theory of the brilliant Italian economist Loria, has over-turned many of the former notions on the subject and has studied sla-very, not only, as most writers have done, in the agricultural stage ofsociety, but also in the hunting, fishing and pastoral stages. Coming to


the later period of classic antiquity, Ciccotti has shed considerable lighton the origin and development of slavery in Greece, as well as in Rome,and has traced the connection between this fundamental fact and theentire political and social history.119 Other writers, such as Francotte120

and Pohlmann,121 have considered more in detail the economic status ofGreece and its influence on national and international conditions.

In the case of Roman history the relation between the land questionand national progress has always been so obvious that such historiansas Nitzsch and Mommsen did not have to wait for the rise of the schoolof economic interpretation. Even in the case of Rome, however, goodwork has since then been done, especially in the imperial period, inemphasizing the controlling influence of economic factors on the gen-eral development.122 So, also, some neglected points in the history ofHebrew antiquity have been brought out by writers like Beer andMehring.123

When we come to more recent periods of history, there is an embar-rassment of riches. The economic forces which were instrumental inshaping the transition from feudal to modern society are so obvious thatthe historians have for some time been laying stress on economic inter-pretation almost without knowing it. This is true, for instance, in thetreatment of the military system, which has been clearly described byBürkli in his account of the transition in Switzerland.124 One of the mostaccomplished of Belgian historians, Des Marez, has recently voiced hisconviction that

no one can investigate the deeper causes that have influenced thepeoples between the Rhine and the North Sea without perceivingthat it is above all the economic conditions, and not racial, lin-guistic or other factors, that have determined national progress.125

The newer view has led investigators to accentuate the economicfactor not only in the Crusades126 but also in the Reformation with thevictory of Calvinism and Puritanism.127 The professed historians them-selves have been so far influenced by the movement that Lamprecht,one of the most distinguished of German scholars, has recently made theeconomic factor the very foundation of the entire political and socialdevelopment of mediaeval Germany.128 In the acrimonious discussionwhich this “audacious” move has engendered—a discussion not yet con-cluded—the gradual triumph of the newer tendency seems by no means

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improbable.129 When we approach the centuries nearer our own time, ithas almost become a commonplace to explain in economic terms thepolitical transition of England in the eighteenth century, as well as theFrench and American revolutions. To take only a few examples frommore recent events, it is no longer open to doubt that the democracy ofthe nineteenth century is largely the result of the industrial revolution;that the entire history of the United States to the Civil War was at bot-tom a struggle between two economic principles; that the Cuban insur-rection against Spain, and thus indirectly the Spanish-American War,was the outcome of the sugar situation; or, finally, that the condition ofinternational politics is at present dominated by economic considerations.Wherever we turn in the maze of recent historical investigation, we areconfronted by the overwhelming importance attached by the youngerand abler scholars to the economic factor in political and social progress.

VIIWe come now to the most important part of the subject—a consid-

eration, namely, of the objections that have been urged to the doctrinehere under discussion. Some of these objections, as we shall learn later,are indeed weighty, but others possess only. a partial validity. Yet theemphasis is commonly put by the critics of economic interpretation onthe weak, rather than on the sound, arguments. It will be advisable,then, to consider first and at grater length some of these alleged objec-tions, reserving for later treatment those criticisms which possess greater.force.

Among the criticisms commonly advanced, the more usual may besummarized as follows: First, that the theory of economic interpretationis a fatalistic theory, opposed to the doctrine of free will and overlook-ing the importance of great men in history; second, that it rests on theassumption of “historical laws” the very existence of which is open toquestion; third, that it is socialistic; fourth, that it neglects the ethicaland spiritual forces in history; fifth, that it leads to absurd exaggera-tions.

It will be observed that these criticisms fall into two categories. Theone category takes exception, not only to the economic interpretation ofhistory, but to the general social interpretation of history. The otherclass of objections does not deny that the controlling forces of progressare social in character, but contends that we must not confound eco-nomic with social considerations and that the economic factor is of no


more importance than any of the other social factors. In the above listthe first and second criticisms are to be included in the former category;the third and the fifth in the latter; while the fourth criticism is so broadthat it falls partly in each category.

We begin with the first class of criticisms because some writersthink that they are triumphantly refuting the economic interpretation ofhistory, when they are in reality directing their weapons against a farmore comprehensive structure of ideas, which very few of the oppo-nents of the economic interpretation of history would like to see demol-ished. Let us consider, then, the objection that the doctrine is fatalistic,.that it is opposed to the theory of free will and that it overlooks theimportance of great men in history.

It is obvious that this is not the place to enter into a general philo-sophical discussion of determinism. For our purposes it is sufficient tostate that, if by freedom o[ the will we simply mean the power to decideas to an action, there is no necessary clash with the doctrine of economicor social interpretation. The denial of this statement involves a fallacy,which in its general aspects has been neatly hit off by Huxley:

Half the controversies about the freedom of the will... rest uponthe absurd presumption that the proposition “I can do as I like” iscontradictory to the doctrine of necessity. The answer is; nobodydoubts that, at any rate within certain limits, you can do as youlike assertion of the consciousness of their freedom, which is thefavorite refuge of the opponents of the doctrine of necessity, ismere futility, for nobody denies it. What they really have to do, ifthey would upset the necessarian argument, is to prove that theyare free to associate any emotion whatever with any idea however;to like pain as much as pleasure; vice as much as virtue; in short,to prove that, whatever may be the fixity of order o[ the universeof things, that of thought is given over to chance.130

In other words, every man has will power and may decide to act orto refrain from acting, thus showing that he is in this sense a free agent.But whether he decides in the one way or the other, there are certaincauses operating within the organism which are responsible for the de-cision. The function of science is to ascertain what these causes are. Allthat we know thus far is that every man is what he is because of theinfluence of environment, past or present. We need not here enter intothe biological disputes between the Weissmannist and the Neo-Lama-

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rckian; for, whether we believe, with the one, that the only factor inprogress is the power of natural selection to transmit and strengthencongenital characteristics or, with the other, that acquired characteris-tics are also inherited, we are dealing in each case with the operation ofsome form of past environment. Neither Weissmanists nor Neo-Lamarckians deny the obvious fact of the influence of present environ-ment on the individual, as such.

Since, therefore, man, like everything else, is what he is because ofhis environment, past and present,—that is, the environment of his an-cestors, as well as his own,—it is dear that, if we knew all the facts ofhis past and present environment, we should be in a much better posi-tion to foretell with some degree of precision the actions of every humanbeing. Although a man is free to steal or not to steal, we are even nowsafe in predicting that under ordinary circumstances an honest man willnot steal. His congenital and acquired characteristics are such that un-der certain conditions he will always elect a certain course of action. Inthe case of physical environment the matter is very simple. While anEskimo may be perfectly free to go naked, it is not a violent stretch ofthe fancy to assume that no sane Eskimo will do so as long as he re-mains in the Arctic regions. When we leave the physical and come to thesocial environment, as we necessarily do in discussing the doctrine ofeconomic interpretation, the essence of the matter is not much changed.

The theory of social environment, reduced to its simplest elements,means that, even though the individual be morally and intellectually freeto choose his own action, the range of his choices will be largely influ-enced by the circumstances, traditions, manners and customs of the so-ciety about him. I may individually believe in polygamy and may beperfectly free to decide whether to take one or two wives; but if I liveoutside of Utah, the chances are very great that I shall be so far guidedin my decision by the law and social custom as to content myself withone spouse. The common saying that a man’s religion is formed for himaffords another illustration. The son of a Mohammedan may elect tobecome a Christian, but it is safe to predict that for the immediate futurethe vast majority of Turks will remain Mohammedans.

The negation of the theory of social environment excludes the veryconception of law in the moral disciplines, It would render impossiblethe existence of statistics, jurisprudence, economics, politics, sociologyor even ethics. For what do we mean by a social law? Social law meansthat, amid the myriad decisions of the presumable free agents that com-


pose a given community, there can be discovered a certain general ten-dency or uniformity of action, deviation from which is so slight as not toimpair the essential validity of the general statement. In a race of canni-bals the abstention by any one savage from human flesh will not influ-ence the history of that tribe; in the present industrial system the offer onthe part of any one employer to double the customary wages of hisworkmen will have no appreciable effect upon the general relations oflabor and capital. The controlling considerations are always the socialconsiderations. At bottom, of course, the individual is the unit; and ev-ery individual may be conceived as—ideally, at least—a free agent. Butfor individuals living in society the theories that influence progress arethe social chokes, that is, the choices of the majority. The decision ofany one individual is important only to the extent that his influencepreponderates with the great majority; and then it is no longer an indi-vidual judgment, but becomes that of the majority.131

This is the reason why the “great man theory” of history has well-nigh disappeared. No one, indeed, denies the value of great men or thevital importance of what Matthew Arnold calls the remnant. Withoutthe winged thoughts and the decisive actions of the great leaders theprogress of the world would doubtless have been considerably retarded.But few now overlook the essential dependence of the great man uponthe wider social environment amid which he has developed.132 Aristotle,the greatest thinker of antiquity, defended slavery because slavery wasat the time an integral part of the whole fabric of Greek civilization. AJefferson would be as impossible in Turkey as a Pobyedonostseff in theUnited States, Pheidias is as unthinkable in China as Lionardo in Canada.On the other hand, the effects ascribed to great men are often largely theresult of forces of which they were only the chance vehicles. Caesarerected the Roman Empire, but the empire would undoubtedly have comeultimately with or without Caesar. Napoleon for the time transformedthe face of Europe, but the France of to-day would in all probabilityhave been in its essentials the same had Napoleon never lived. Washing-ton and Lincoln assuredly exercised the most profound influence ontheir times, but it is scarcely open to doubt that in the end the Revolutionwould have succeeded and the Rebellion would have failed, even thoughWashington and Lincoln had never existed.

While his appearance at a particular moment appears to us a matterof chance, the great man influences society only when society is readyfor him. If society is not ready for him, he is called, not a great man, but

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a visionary or a failure. Just as in animal life the freak or sport worksthrough natural selection as fixed by the environment, so in human lifethe great man can permanently succeed only if the social environment isripe. Biologists tell us that variation in the species is the cause of allprogress, but that the extreme limit of successful variation from theparent type in any one case does not exceed a small percentage. Thegreat man represents the extreme limit of successful variation in thehuman race. It is to him that progress seems to be, and in fact often is, inlarge measure due. But we must not forget that even then the great massof his characteristics are those of the society about him, and that he isgreat because he visualizes more truly than any one else the fundamen-tal tendencies of the community in which his lot is cast, and because heexpresses more successfully than others the real spirit of the age ofwhich he is the supreme embodiment.133

It is, therefore, an obviously incorrect statement of the problem toassert that the theory of economic interpretation, or the theory of socialenvironment of which it is a part, is incompatible with the doctrine offree will. If by determinism we erroneously mean moral fatalism, deter-minism is not involved at all.134 The theory of social environment in noway implies fatalism. Social arrangements are human arrangements,and human beings are, in the sense indicated, free to form decisions andto make social choices; but they will invariably be guided in their deci-sions by the sum of ideas and impressions which have been transmittedto them through inheritance and environment. So far as great men influ-ence the march of progress, they can do so only to the extent that theycan induce the community to accept these new ideas as something inharmony with their surroundings and their aspirations. Given a certainset of conditions, the great mass of the community will decide to act ina certain way. Social law rests on the observation that men will choosea course of action in harmony with what they conceive to be their wel-fare, and on the further observation that the very idea of an organizedcommunity implies that a majority will be found to entertain commonideas of what is their welfare. If the conditions change, the commonideas will change with them. The conditions, so far as they are social incharacter, are indeed created by men and may be altered by men, so thatin last resort there is nothing fatalistic about progress.135 But it is afterall the conditions which, because of their direct action or reaction onindividuals, are at any given moment responsible for the general currentof social thought.


To the extent, then, that the theory of economic interpretation issimply a part of the general doctrine of social environment, the conten-tion that it necessarily leads to an unreasoning fatalism is baseless. Menare the product of history, but history is made by men.136

The second objection to the theory under discussion is closely re-lated to the first. The economic interpretation

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Batoche Books - McMaster Faculty of Social Sciences · 1999. 7. 31. · Batoche Books 1999. ... mate or to the character of the fauna and flora is materialistic, and yet has little