(BASEES_Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies ) Cameron Ross-Local Politics and Democratization in Russia (BASEES_Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies)-Routledge

Local Politics and Democratization in Russia

This comprehensive study of local politics in Russia shows that the key reforms of local government, and the struggle to forge viable grass-roots democracies, have been inextricably linked to the wider struggle for power between the regions and the Kremlin, and to the speci c nature of Russias highly politicized and negotiated form of asymmetrical federalism. During the Yeltsin era all attempts to create a universal and uniform system of local self-government in the Federation were a failure. Under the protection of their constitutions and charters, and the extra-constitutional rights and powers granted to them in special bilateral treaties, regional leaders, particularly in Russias 21 ethnic republics, were able to instigate highly authoritarian regimes and to thwart the implementation of key local government reforms. Thus, by the end of the Yeltsin era the number of municipalities, their type, status and powers, varied tremendously from region to region. Putins local government reforms also need to be viewed as an integral component of his wider centralizing political agenda, and his assault on the principles and practices of federalism. With the instigation of his dictatorship of law and power vertical, Putin has thwarted the development of grass-roots democracy and overseen the creation of local electoral authoritarian regimes. Putins new system of local self-government marks a victory for the proponents of the statist concept of local self-government over those who championed the societal concept, codi ed in Article 12 of the Russian Constitution. Overall, this book is an important resource for anyone seeking to understand politics in contemporary Russia.

Cameron Ross is a Reader in Politics in the College of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Dundee. He has published widely in the eld of Russian politics, particularly in the areas of regional and local level politics. His most recent books are: Regional Politics in Russia (Manchester University Press, 2002), Federalismand Democratisation in Russia (MUP, 2003) and Russian Politics under Putin(MUP, 2004).

BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European StudiesSeries editor:

Richard SakwaDepartment of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent

Editorial Committee:

Julian CooperCentre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham

Terry CoxDepartment of Central and East European Studies, University of Glasgow

Rosalind MarshDepartment of European Studies and Modern Languages, University of Bath

David MoonDepartment of History, University of Durham

Hilary PilkingtonDepartment of Sociology, University of Warwick

Stephen WhiteDepartment of Politics, University of Glasgow

Founding Editorial Committee Member:

George Blazyca

Centre for Contemporary European Studies, University of Paisley

This series is published on behalf of BASEES (the British Association for Slavonic and East European Studies). The series comprises original, high-quality, research-level work by both new and established scholars on all aspects of Russian, Soviet, post-Soviet and East European Studies in humanities and social science subjects.

1 Ukraines Foreign and Security Policy, 19912000Roman Wolczuk

2 Political Parties in the Russian RegionsDerek S. Hutcheson

3 Local Communities and Post-Communist TransformationEdited by Simon Smith

4 Repression and Resistance in Communist EuropeJ.C. Sharman

5 Political Elites and the New RussiaAnton Steen

6 Dostoevsky and the Idea of RussiannessSarah Hudspith

7 Performing Russia Folk Revival and Russian IdentityLaura J. Olson

8 Russian TransformationsEdited by Leo McCann

9 Soviet Music and Society under Lenin and StalinThe Baton and SickleEdited by Neil Edmunds

10 State Building in UkraineThe Ukranian parliament, 19902003Sarah Whitmore

11 Defending Human Rights in RussiaSergei Kovalyov, dissident and human rights commissioner, 19692003Emma Gilligan

12 Small-Town RussiaPostcommunist livelihoods and identities A portrait of the intelligentsia in Achit, Bednodemyanovsk and Zubtsov, 19992000Anne White

13 Russian Society and the Orthodox ChurchReligion in Russia after communismZoe Knox

14 Russian Literary Culture in the Camera AgeThe word as imageStephen Hutchings

15 Between Stalin and HitlerClass war and race war on the Dvina, 194046Geoffrey Swain

16 Literature in Post-Communist Russia and Eastern EuropeThe Russian, Czech and Slovak ction of the changes 198898Rajendra A. Chitnis

17 Soviet Dissent and Russias Transition to DemocracyDissident legaciesRobert Horvath

18 Russian and Soviet Film Adaptations of Literature, 19002001Screening the wordEdited by Stephen Hutchings and Anat Vernitski

19 Russia as a Great PowerDimensions of security under PutinEdited by Jakob Hedenskog, Vilhelm Konnander, Bertil Nygren, Ingmar Oldberg and Christer Pursiainen

20 Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940Truth, justice and memoryGeorge Sanford

21 Conscience, Dissent and Reform in Soviet RussiaPhilip Boobbyer

22 The Limits of Russian DemocratisationEmergency powers and states of emergencyAlexander N. Domrin

23 The Dilemmas of DestalinisationA social and cultural history of reform in the Khrushchev eraEdited by Polly Jones

24 News Media and Power in RussiaOlessia Koltsova

25 Post-Soviet Civil SocietyDemocratization in Russia and the Baltic StatesAnders Uhlin

26 The Collapse of Communist Power in PolandJacqueline Hayden

27 Television, Democracy and Elections in RussiaSarah Oates

28 Russian ConstitutionalismHistorical and contemporary developmentAndrey N. Medushevsky

29 Late Stalinist RussiaSociety between reconstruction and reinventionEdited by Juliane Frst

30 The Transformation of Urban Space in Post-Soviet RussiaKonstantin Axenov, Isolde Brade and Evgenij Bondarchuk

31 Western Intellectuals and the Soviet Union, 192040From red square to the left bankLudmila Stern

32 The Germans of the Soviet UnionIrina Mukhina

33 Re-constructing the Post-Soviet Industrial RegionThe Donbas in transitionEdited by Adam Swain

34 Chechnya Russias War on TerrorJohn Russell

35 The New Right in the New EuropeCzech transformation and right-wing politics, 19892006Sen Hanley

36 Democracy and Myth in Russia and Eastern EuropeEdited by Alexander Wll and Harald Wydra

37 Energy Dependency, Politics and Corruption in the Former Soviet UnionRussias power, oligarchs pro ts and Ukraines missing energy policy, 19952006Margarita M. Balmaceda

38 Peopling the Russian PeripheryBorderland colonization in Eurasian historyEdited by Nicholas B Breyfogle, Abby Schrader and Willard Sunderland

39 Russian Legal Culture Before and After CommunismCriminal justice, politics and the public sphereFrances Nethercott

40 Political and Social Thought in Post-Communist RussiaAxel Kaehne

41 The Demise of the Soviet Communist PartyAtsushi Ogushi

42 Russian Policy towards China and JapanThe Eltsin and Putin periodsNatasha Kuhrt

43 Soviet KareliaPolitics, planning and terror in Stalins Russia, 19201939Nick Baron

44 Reinventing PolandEconomic and political transformation and evolving national identityEdited by Martin Myant and Terry Cox

45 The Russian Revolution in Retreat, 192024Soviet workers and the new communist eliteSimon Pirani

46 Democratisation and Gender in Contemporary RussiaSuvi Salmenniemi

47 Narrating Post/CommunismColonial discourse and Europes borderline civilizationNataa Kovacevic

48 Globalization and the State in Central and Eastern EuropeThe politics of foreign direct investmentJan Drahokoupil

49 Local Politics and Democratization in RussiaCameron Ross

Local Politics and Democratization in Russia

Cameron Ross

First published 2009by Routledge2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canadaby Routledge270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

2009 Cameron Ross

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication DataA catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN 10: 0-415-33654-6 (hbk)ISBN 10: 0-203-89145-7 (ebk)

ISBN 13: 978-0-415-33654-3 (hbk)ISBN 13: 978-0-203-89145-2 (ebk)

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2008.

To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledgescollection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.

ISBN 0 203 89145 7 Master e book ISBN

Contents

List of appendices, gures, tables and boxes xAbbreviations xiiiAcknowledgements xiv

1 Introduction 1

The importance of local government 1Federalism and local self-government 2De ning democracy 3Local democracy 5Decentralization and subsidiarity 6From local government to local governance 7The statist and societal concepts of local self-government in Russia 9Outline of the study 9

2 Russian federalism and local politics 11

Federalism and federations 11Federalism in Russia 12The distribution of powers: federal, regional and local 15Local self-government in Russia 16Putins radical assault on the principles of federalism and democracy 20Conclusion 25

3 Local government in the USSR 28

Local councils (sovety) 29Local executive committees (ispolkomy) 29Local soviets and state enterprises 32Local budget revenues 34

viii Contents

The 1971 legislation on local government 35The Gorbachev reforms of the late-1980s 38The April 1990 and July 1991 laws on local self-government 42

4 Local government reform under Yeltsin 47

Parliament versus president 47The Russian Constitution of December 1993 49The 1995 Law on local self-government 50Functions and competences of local self-governments 52Local political institutions 58Regional variations in the implementation of the 1995 Law 58

5 Local government reform and Putins power vertical 68

Principal features of the 2003 Law 69Problems of implementing the 2003 Law 77Conclusion 80

6 Fiscal federalism and local budget revenues 82

Fiscal federalism and local nance 82The tax system and tax revenues 87Measuring scal centralization/decentralization 95The impact of the 2003 Law and tax legislation on localbudget revenues 104

7 Fiscal federalism and local budget expenditures 106

Key areas of municipal expenditure 107Distribution of expenditure between federal, regional andlocal budgets 108Expenditure on unfunded mandates 111The public utilities reform and the monetization of bene ts 115Local expenditure and enterprise divestiture 116Regional and local socio-economic asymmetries 119The socio-economic crisis of small cities 127

8 Local elections and parties 131

Municipal elections under Yeltsin 19958 131Municipal elections under Putin 20045 146Key factors explaining Russias weakly institutionalized party system 160Party and electoral reforms under Putin 165

Contents ix

9 Local and regional executives 169

Local executives and local councils 169The powers and responsibilities of local executives 171The 2003 Law, local executives and councils 172Mayors versus governors 175

10 Electoral authoritarianism and Putins electoral vertical 184

Putins electoral vertical 184The manipulation and falsi cation of local elections 187Politicization and control of electoral commissions 194Conclusion 196

11 Conclusion 199

Financial autonomy 200Support for local self-governance 201Parties, elections and local democracy 201The appointment of governors and mayors 202

Appendix 5.1 204

Notes 210Bibliography 251Index 268

List of appendices, gures, tablesand boxes

Appendix

5.1 Powers and functions of settlements, municipal districts and citydistricts, Articles 146 of the 2003 Law 205

Figures

5.1 The administrative division of the Russian Federation 68 9.2 Methods of electing heads of municipalities 173

Tables

3.1 Communist Party and Komsomol membership of city councils andtheir executive committees, elected 1982 31

4.1 Selected functions by tier of government in Western Europe 53 4.2 Functions of local government in the Russian Federation 54 5.1 Enumerated responsibilities of the levels of local government 72 6.1 Normative deductions from the basic shared (regulated taxes) in the

budgets of cities 19972001 87 6.2 Tax sharing rates between federal, regional and local budgets (shown

as a fraction of 100 per cent revenue collections for VAT and income taxes; and as effective collection rates for pro t tax) 89

6.3 Taxes and fees in Russia 2005 91 6.4 Classi cation of local government revenue sources 2001 93 6.5 Estimation of changes in tax income between levels of the budget

system 19982000 and 20015 (per cent) according to the Russian Federation Programme of Budget Federalism 20015 94

6.6 Distribution of taxes between budgets of various levels according to provisions of the Budget Code 2005 95

6.7 Distribution of taxes to municipalities 2006 96 6.8 Share of local taxes by type of municipality (per cent) 2006 96

List of appendices, figures, tables and boxes xi

6.9 Distribution of revenues between levels of the budget system:percentage of the Consolidated Budget of the Russian Federation 97

6.10 Distribution of revenues between levels of the Russian budgetsystem (excluding transfers): percentage of GDP 98

6.11 Local revenue growth (decline) rates 19972002 98 6.12 Variations in income receipts from taxes in the Republic of Tatarstan

20045 for all levels of the budget system of the Russian Federation (billion roubles) 98

6.13 Municipal budget revenues by source 19962002 (per cent) 100 6.14 Mean share of local revenues in 74 regions 2001 (per cent) 101 6.15 Structure of the income of local budgets in the regions of the Volga

Federal District 2004 (per cent) 103 6.16 Structure of the income of local budgets (billion roubles) 2006 104 7.1 Structure of expenditure in local budgets in the Russian Federation

19962002 (per cent) 108 7.2 Expenditures of local budgets 2006 108 7.3 Local government expenditures in the consolidated national

budget 109 7.4 Distribution of expenditure between regional and local budgets

19962001 (per cent) 110 7.5 Expenditure by type of municipality 2006 (planned) 111 7.6 Unfunded mandates in the Russian Federation 113 7.7 Rent and utility payment bene ts and housing allowances

(Perm City) 1999 115 7.8 The monetization of bene ts in the regions 116 7.9 The nancing of divested social assets (per cent share by source) 118 7.10 The cost of nancing divested social assets by selected city/region

1997 118 7.11 Economic statistics of federal subjects 2003 120 7.12 Per capita consolidated expenditures in the federal subjects 1998

(in roubles) 122 7.13 Subjects of the Federation with the most and least debts 2006 123 7.14 Share of cities and districts with de cits above the Russian

average 1999 124 7.15 Novgorod 1998: Expenditure needs and own revenues of

municipalities (in million roubles) 125 7.16 Structure of local budget de cits in the Russian Federation 2006 126 7.17 Share of subsidies in municipal budgets 2006 126 7.18 Ten regions with the largest share of their populations living in

monopro le cities in the Russian Federation 128 7.19 Share of monopro le cities by size of city 128 7.20 Public services provision by rms (percentage of rms) 129 8.1 Variation in turnout by type of election: selected cities 133 8.2 Heads of municipalities elected 19958 134 8.3 Municipal councils elected 19958 140

xii List of appendices, figures, tables and boxes

8.4 Regions in which no deputies or heads of local administrations were nominated by a political association or bloc 19958 municipalelections 144

8.5 Party saturation of local councils (per cent) 145 8.6 Average turnout in Russian local elections 20045 (per cent) 148 8.7 Electoral turnout in 20 municipal raions of Penza Oblast 20035 149 8.8 Turnout (average per cent) and votes against all (average per cent)

in municipal elections in Saratov and Tula regions 2005 151 8.9 Average share of votes against all in subjects of the Federation

19952003 (per cent) 153 8.10 Social composition of deputies and heads of local councils elected

20045 156 8.11 Party membership of local councils and heads of local

administrations/municipalities 19958 and 20045 156 8.12 Party membership of municipal councils and heads of municipal

administrations December 2005 (type of municipality, number ofmembers and (per cent) 157

9.1 Number of deputies in councils of settlements and city districts 174

Boxes

2.1 The constitutional provisions of local self-government 17 4.1 Powers granted to municipalities (Article 6 of the 1995 Law) 57 4.2 Classi cation of regions according to the organization of the system

of organs of local self-administration 1998 63 9.1 Powers granted to the mayor of Chelyabinsk as codi ed in the city

charter 170

Abbreviations

AO Autonomous Okrug/OblastAPR Agrarian Party of RussiaCDSP The Current Digest of the Soviet PressCDPSP The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet PressCPRF Communist Party of the Russian FederationCPSU Communist Party of the Soviet UnionGDP Gross Domestic ProductGRP Gross Regional ProductIEWS Institute of East West StudiesLDPR Liberal Democratic Party of RussiaNDR Our Home is RussiaNPR Peoples Party of RussiaNPSR National Patriotic Union of RussiaPR Proportional RepresentationRF Russian FederationRFE/RL Radio Free Europe/Radio LibertyRPL Russian Party of LifeRPP Russian Party of PensionersRSFSR Russian Soviet Federative Socialist RepublicSPS Union of Right ForcesUR United RussiaUSSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the publishers for granting me permission to include some materials from the following studies:

Cameron Ross, Federalism and electoral authoritarianism under Putin, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 13, No. 3, Summer 2005.

Cameron Ross, Local government reform in the Russian Federation: a tortuous and twisted path, Local Government Studies, Vol. 32, No. 5, November 2006.http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713673447~db=all

Cameron Ross, Municipal government in the Russian Federation and Putins electoral vertical, Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization,Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring 2007.

Cameron Ross, From party and state domination to Putins power vertical: the subjugation of mayors in communist and post-communist Russia, in John Garrard (ed.), Heads of the Local State: Mayors, Provosts and Burgomasters Since 1800,Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007.

1 Introduction

On 16 September 2003 a new law, On the General Principles of Organizing Local- Self Government in the Russian Federation (hereafter, the 2003 Law)1 was rati ed by the Russian parliament (the State Duma), which led to a doubling of the number of municipali ties (from 11,957 to 24,208) by December 2005.2 The rst major round of elections to these new municipalities took place over the period 20045, and by December 2005, 198,815 deputies and 13,655 heads of local administrations had been duly elected.3 In addition, the creation of the new municipalities required the recruitment and training of hundreds of thousands of administrative personnel. It is somewhat surprising, given the vast numbers of citizens who are now engaged in grass-roots politics, that the study of local self-government in Russia has been somewhat neglected. While there have been a plethora of scholarly works devoted to regional politics, there have been far fewer books devoted to municipal politics, and even fewer that deal with both politics and nance.4 In Russia the study of local govern ment has been dominated by legalistic studies, which focus on the formal rights and powers of municipalities.5 In this study I provide an account of local government reforms from Gorbachev to Putin, and I examine local level politics and nance.

The importance of local government

As Porter and Young rightly stress:

The many challenges of post Soviet Russian state building and political transition are not limited to national institutions in Moscow. Two tasks critical to the overall political and social success of contemporary Russia include strengthening the reach of the state through effective local administration and empowering local governments with suf cient autonomy and capacity to address local concerns.6

Moreover, for many scholars the development of local level democracy is an essential if not a suf cient condition for the consolidation of democracy at the national level. As Pratchett argues, from Tocqueville onwards, there has been a strong normative argument within political theory that local self-government

2 Introduction

is a fundamental component of broader democratic structures and practices.7

By serving as a school of democracy and a training ground for national level politicians, local government provides the foundation for strong national demo-cratic institutions and practices.8 As Sisk notes:

Around the world there is a new appreciation that local governance is much more than city administration that collects taxes and delivers essential services such as basic education, clean water, sewers, transportation, or housing. Instead, local democracy is rightly seen as the very foundation of a higher quality and more enduring democracy. Local governance is the level of democracy in which the citizen has the most effective opportunity to participate actively and directly in decisions made for all of society. A vigorous and effective local democracy is the underlying basis for a healthy and strong national-level democracy.9

In a similar vein Hahn argues,

it is hard to imagine a successful transition to democracy taking place only at the national level. Indeed, it seems more reasonable to argue that the democratization of national political institutions without corresponding changes taking place locally would be a prescription for political instability.10

Finally, for Peter John, local democracy:

offers citizens the potential to exercise their freedom and to express their local identities in a manner that is different from and complementary to higher tiers of government. Locally elected governments offer the bene ts of diversity; provide a supply of public goods that re ect the preferences of those who live in local jurisdictions; and can ensure that higher levels of government express a plurality of territorial and functional interests.11

Federalism and local self-government

As I shall demonstrate in this study, the development of local government and the struggle to form viable local democracies have been inextricably tied to the devel-opment of federalism in Russia and the wider struggle for power between Russias 89 federal subjects (regions, republics and autonomies) and the Kremlin.12 The structures and powers (both formal and informal) of local governments in post-communist Russia vary signi cantly across the Federation. These variations spring primarily from the development of high levels of constitutional, socio-economic and political asymmetry, which developed, in Russias federal subjects during the Yeltsin era (19919). During this period we witnessed the creation of a highly politicized contract form of federalism, which granted some federal subjects (the ethnic republics) far greater powers than others (the territorially de ned federal subjects), and, in particular, allowed the ethnic republics to shape their own political institutions, including their local governments.

Introduction 3

The three major laws that have been adopted on local self-government in the post-communist era (in 1991,13 1995,14 and 200315) have been intimately linked to this wider power struggle between the centre and the periphery, and to the speci c nature of Russias highly politicized and negotiated form of federalism. At times local government has been used as a mere pawn by the federal government in its attempt to gain greater power over the federal subjects. Many regional administrations, on the other hand, have also sought to subjugate or limit the powers of local self-governments, as part of their power-struggles with the centre.

De ning democracy

In order to assess the prospects for the development of a viable form of democracy in Russias localities we need to de ne what we mean by this highly contested concept. As Diamond notes, David Collier and Steven Levitsky have uncovered over 550 subtypes of democracy.16

For Diamond and Morlino, at a minimum democracy requires:

1 universal, adult suffrage2 recurring, free, competitive, and fair elections3 more than one serious political party4 alternative sources of information.

If elections are to be truly meaningful, free and fair, there must be some degree of civil and political freedom beyond the electoral arena so that citizens can articulate and organize around their political beliefs and interests.17

Robert Dahl lists the following eight institutional guarantees that citizens must enjoy before a country can be classi ed as a democracy:

1 freedom to form and join organizations2 freedom of expression3 right to vote4 eligibility for public of ce5a right of political leaders to compete for support5b right of political leaders to compete for votes6 alternative sources of information7 free and fair elections8 institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other

expressions of preference.18

Diamond also stresses the importance of contestation in free and fair elections but, in his de nition of liberal democracy, he places much greater emphasis on the provision of civil and political liberties. His de nition of liberal democracy is both broader and stricter than Dahls more minimalist de nition of elec-toral democracy. While Dahl and other minimalists, such as Schumpeter and Huntington, acknowledge the need for minimal levels of civil freedom, in order

4 Introduction

for competition and participation to be meaningful, they do not devote much atten -tion to the basic freedoms involved, nor do they attempt to incorporate them into actual measures of democracy.19 For Diamond there are nine essential attributes of a liberal democracy:

1 Real power lies in fact as well as in constitutional theory with elected of cials and their appointees, rather than with unaccountable internal actors (e.g. the military) or foreign powers.

2 Executive power is constrained constitutionally and held accountable by other government institutions (such as an independent judiciary, parliament, ombudsman and auditor general).

3 Not only are electoral outcomes uncertain, with a signi cant opposition vote and presumption of party alternation in government over time, but no group that adheres to constitutional principles is denied the right to form a party and contest elections (even if electoral thresholds and other rules prevent smaller parties from winning representation in parliament).

4 Cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups, as well as traditionally disadvantaged or unempowered majorities, are not prohibited (legally or in practice) from expressing their interests in the political process, and from using their language and culture.

5 Beyond parties and intermittent elections, citizens have multiple ongoing channels and means for the expression and representation of their interests and values, including a diverse array of autonomous associations, movement and groups that they are free to form and join.

6 In addition to associational freedom and pluralism, there exist alternative sources of information, including independent media, to which citizens have (politically) unfettered access.

7 Individuals have substantial freedom of belief, opinion, discussion, speech, publication, assembly, demonstration and petition.

8 Citizens are politically equal under the law (even though they are invariably unequal in their political resources), and the above-mentioned individual group liberties are effectively protected by an independent, impartial judiciary, whose decisions are enforced and respected by other centres of power.

9 The rule of law protects citizens from unjusti ed detention, exile, terror, torture, and undue interference in their personal lives not only by the state but also by organized antistate forces.20

Likewise for Schedler, elections are a necessary but not a suf cient condition for modern democracy. Moreover, while liberal democracies go beyond the elec-toral minimum, electoral democracies do not. They manage to get elections right but fail to institutionalize other vital dimensions of democratic constitutionalism, such as the rule of law, political accountability, bureaucratic integrity, and public deliberation.21

Fareed Zakaria alerts us to another important distinction that between liberaland illiberal democracies. Following Diamond, Zakaria argues that, liberal

Introduction 5

democracies are polities marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion and property.22 Illiberal democracies by contrast are Democratically elected regimes, often ones that have been reelected or reaf rmed through referenda [which] routinely [ignore] constitutional limits on their power and [deprive] their citizens of basic rights and freedoms.23 For Zakaria, a key feature of any liberal democratic state is respect for the rule of law. Przeworski, in a similar manner stresses that the decisive step toward democracy is the devolu-tion of power from a group of people to a set of rules.24

Local democracy

For Soos and Zentai, two additional dimensions must be taken into account when it comes to de ning local democracy. The rst comes from the local nature of the subject of analysis. A distinctive feature of local governments is their autonomy, i.e. their freedom from the direct involvement of external forces. If local administrative units have no legal, political and nancial autonomy, the term local (self-) government loses its meaning. The degree of autonomy is a crucial element in the assessment of local democracy.25

For Sisk answers to the following questions are vital when it comes to assessing local government autonomy:

1 Authority: Does the municipal structure make policy and take major decisions, or does it mostly implement policy debated and created at a larger level, such as in a national or provincial (or in federal systems, state) parliament?

2 Financial capacity: What is the all-important pattern of revenue ow and scal authority? Who controls the budget?

3 Capacity for policy implementation: Does the structure and exercise of local authority create political space for civil society organizations and all major players on an issue to have an assured role in local decision-making processes?

4 Devolution to the appropriate level: To what extent is power within a municipal structure devolved to the forum at which it is best exercised, such as decentralization of decision-making to wards, community groups, or special panels?26

The second dimension according to Soos and Zentai is that a viable democracy requires a certain level of effectiveness. As Stoker notes:

Openness and deliberation are to be valued but they lose their lustre in a system that lacks the capacity for effective action. Good local governance requires the capacity to act. Effective bureaucracy and professional expertise will continue to be central to good local governance.27

6 Introduction

Consequently, policy performance is a crucial dimension of local democracy assessment.

To summarize, local democracy for Soos and Zentai is conceptualized as a local government that is autonomous, effective, open, and representative, surrounded by a civil society in the framework of guaranteed political rights.28

Decentralization and subsidiarity

A major emphasis in the academic literature on local government are the bene ts of decentralization. As Danielian notes:

a modern democratic state cannot provide ef cient public administration of economic and social processes unless it guarantees the existence of local self-government. These processes are too complicated and diverse to be governed from a single centre of power. Decentralization of decision-making results in a more ef cient Public Administration.29

The bene ts of decentralization and subsidiarity are codi ed in the European Charter of Local Self-Government, which states that decision-making for public policies should, wherever possible be exercised by those authorities which are closest to the citizen.30 Moreover, according to a concept paper of the United Nations Human Settlement Programme:

Responsibility for service provision should be allocated on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity, that is, the closest appropriate level consistent with efficient and cost-effective delivery of services. This will maximize the potential for inclusion of the citizenry in the process of urban governance. Decentralization and local democracy should improve the responsiveness of policies and initiatives to the priorities of the citizens. Cities should be empow-ered with suf cient resources and autonomy to meet their responsibilities.31

In a seminal study, Rosenbaum lists the following bene ts of decentralization:

1 it serves to fragment and disperse political power [such that] no single unit, branch or actor [is] allowed to exercise all aspects of power and decision making within a government,

2 serves to create additional civic space. By generating more centers of power, there are inevitably more venues in which civil society organi-zations interest groups, business associations, labor unions, the media, etc. can develop and nd sustenance,

3 helps to create opportunities for the emergence of opposition politi-cal groups and, in particular, create resources for opposition political parties ,

4 creates numerous training grounds for the development of democratic skills and practices,

Introduction 7

5 provides more options for individual citizens seeking a positive response from government,

6 provides for diversity in response to popular demands,7 provides the citizenry with a greater sense of political ef cacy, and8 provides much greater opportunities for meaningful and responsive eco-

nomic development.32

Moreover, as Timofeev notes, it is important to make a distinction between the fol low ing three forms of decentralization: deconcentration, delegation and devolution.

Through deconcentration, the central government gives some autonomy to its local of ces that are appointed by, and are accountable to, the higher hierarchy. Under delegation, locally elected government bodies assume new responsibilities subject to strict regulations by upper-level government. The process of devolution establishes complete autonomy of locally elected gov-ern ment bodies in their exclusive spheres of responsibility.33

Often the distribution of powers to local governments is a process of deconcentration rather than delegation or devolution. Thus, it is vitally important to clearly dis-tinguish, from the outset, between truly decentralizing decision-making powers (autonomy) to regional and local governments and using local governments for the deconcentration of functions from the federal and regional government levels.34

As I shall demonstrate, Putin has deconcentrated a number of policy areas to regional administrations now that he has gained control over the appointment of regional governors (see Chapter 2).

From local government to local governance

More recently, scholars of local politics have sought to stress the distinction between local government and local governance. As Sisk notes:

There is a growing awareness that elected authorities and professional munici-pal administrators cannot tackle social problems and economic imperatives without an extensive, structured role for non-governmental actors in civil society. Civil society groups, businesses and unions, professional associations, churches, charitable groups, and community-based organizations now work more closely than ever with governments . New emphasis is being placed on the broader concept of governance involving citizens and the many organizations of civil society in the pursuit of the public good, not just on the of cial processes of government.35

For John,

Governance is a exible pattern of public decision-making based on loose networks of individuals . Governance implies that these networks are more

8 Introduction

open, complex and potentially unstable than hitherto and that bargaining and the building of trust form more of the story of political life than the standard operating procedures of bureaucracies, the closed nature of party government and the hidden power of local elites. In particular, governance indicates there are stronger and new networks between government and non-government actors.36

This new stress on governance has arisen out of the steady erosion in the legiti-macy of representative democracy, particularly at the local level, where turnout at elections has been falling precipitously all across the world, leading some politi-cal scientists to proclaim that there is a crisis of local democracy. For Stoker, representative democracy has become a mechanism for granting legitimacy to decision-takers rather than a strong mechanism for governmental accountability to citizens.37 Furthermore, as Sisk notes:

Many believe that the balance has tilted too much in the direction of repre sen-ta tive over direct democracy and adversarial versus more collaborative forms of decision making. The focus on elections and sharp differences between policy platforms among politicians has created a distance between citizens and public of cials and created heightened divisions among social groups. The consequence is that the average citizen becomes apathetic and withdraws from political life.38

In the light of these more negative aspects, scholars and practitioners of local politics have warned that we must be careful not to romanticize the role of local government. Smaller communities are not necessarily more democratic than national governments; indeed, they can be sti ing or disabling in reinforcing relationships of subordination and narrow parochialism.39 Moreover, as I shall demonstrate in this study, local autonomy does not necessarily mean more democracy. Corruption, and collusion between politicians and businessmen, is often more prevalent at the local level than at the nation level. As Dowley warns us:

The scholarly community bears a responsibility to nd out when and how decentralization contributes to more effective, transparent, representative government, and when it leads to much worse outcomes, such as increased corruption, clientelism, growing regional inequalities or ethnic con ict.40

Furthermore, local of cials and governments may more easily be captured by business elites. Thus, for John:

To nd out who governs it is not enough to identify the political leaders and the prominent public sector organizations because these people and bodies do not operate on their own . Researchers need to look beyond the formally constituted organizations [to] members of the local elites who operate in long-term relationships with each other.41

Introduction 9

Local business and political elites may coalesce to defend their joint interests in what Clarence Stone has termed an urban regime.42 Moreover, just as the development of local democracy can enhance the development of democracy nationwide, authoritarianism at the local level can also feed and nourish authoritarian regimes at the national level.

The statist and societal concepts of local self-government in Russia

Throughout Russian history two diametrically opposite concepts of local government have been ercely debated the statist and the societal. In statist theory:

local government takes on the administration of particular state functions. There is no independent activity by the organs of local self-government: there is merely a de-concentration of power wherein the central power retains ultimate control but assigns speci c duties to these bodies. Thus, local self-government exists as administrative tentacles of the central state, and serves to implement state policies.42

In the societal theory of local government, which stresses the self-governing nature, there is a separation of state and local government, a belief that societys interests should be distinguished from the interests of the state.43 As Campbell notes:

The opposition between the centralized state theory and the decentralized society theory has been central to each phase of reform of Russian subnational government since the early nineteenth century.44

The Russian Constitution, which was rati ed in 1993, appeared to signal a victory for the societal concept, as local self-governments were de ned in Article 12 as non-state bodies (see Chapter 2). However, in practice during the Yeltsin presidency (as discussed in Chapters 2 and 4) the regions adopted a dual system of local government (guided by the statist concept) and local self-government (employing the societal concept). Since President Putin came to power in 2000 there has been a concerted effort to bring local self-government back into the state and to make it part of the presidents power vertical (see Chapter 5).

Outline of the study

In chapter 2, I discuss the troubled development of federalism in Russia from Yeltsin to Putin, and the problems of delineating the powers of the federal centre, the regions and local governments. Authoritarian leaders (particularly in the 21 ethnic republics) have been able to use federalism as a pretext to install dictatorial regimes, and to claim sovereignty and control over their territories and natural resources. Yeltsins highly politicized and contract form of federalism also sanctioned the regional subjugation of the powers of local governments, and gross violations of

10 Introduction

Article 12 of the 1993 Russian Constitution and the 1995 Law. Under Putin, we have witnessed a concerted effort to tame the regions and to recentralize power in the Kremlin. Under the pretext of preserving the unity of the state and defeating terrorism, the Putin regime has led an assault on the key principles of federalism and democracy.

Chapter 3 examines the communist partys domination of local government in the late Soviet period and Gorbachevs failed attempts to reform the system. In Chapter 4, I analyze the tortured and twisted path of local self-government reforms under Yeltsin, and the power of regional elites to thwart the implementation of the 1995 Law. In Chapter 5, I examine Putins attempt to create a universal and uniform system of local self-government and to reassert the statist concept of local self-governance with the adoption of the 2003 Law.

Chapters 6 and 7 provide a detailed examination of the scal capacity and nancial autonomy of local governments from Yeltsin to Putin. In Chapter 8, I turn to an analysis of local parties and elections, while Chapter 9 deals with local executives, and the struggle for power between mayors and governors. In Chapter 10, I assess the prospects for the development of a viable local democracy in Russia in the face of Putins and the Kremlins blatant manipulation of elections and attempts to create what I term an electoral vertical.

Throughout the study, I relate the reforms of the structures and powers of local government, and the problems of creating a viable local democracy, to the complex struggle for power, which has been played out between the centre and the periphery under Yeltsin and Putin. The following three key questions are addressed in the study:

1 To what degree are local self-governments in Russia politically and economi-cally autonomous?

2 What has been the impact of Russias highly asymmetrical and negotiated form of federalism on the development of local self-government and local democracy?

3 What are the prospects for the creation of viable democracies at the municipal level?

2 Russian federalism and local politics

As Sisk notes:

The rich array of national, regional, cultural, and community settings estab-lishes various contexts in which local government takes place. The role of local governance in a large countrys federal system, for example, may be remarkably different from the role played by local authorities in small highly centralized countries . Municipalities differ signi cantly often within a single country or setting on the degree of devolution and the types of governing responsibilities exercised at the local level.1

In December 1993, Russia rati ed its rst post-communist constitution which, in Article 1, proclaimed that it was a democratic federative rule of law state with a republican form of government.2 In this chapter, I provide an examination of the Russian federal system and the constitutional distribution of powers between, central, regional and local bodies of power.

Federalism and federations

For Elazar, the simplest possible de nition of federalism is self rule plus shared rule.3 According to Watts, in federations:

1) neither the federal nor the constituent units of government are constitutionally subordinate to the other, i.e., each has sovereign powers derived from the constitution rather than another level of government; 2) each is empowered to deal directly with its citizens in the exercise of legislative, executive and taxing powers and 3) each is directly elected by its citizens.4

In addition, scholars of federalism have put forward the following structural pre-requisites that states must meet before they can be classi ed as federations:5

1 The existence of at least two tiers of government, both tiers of which have a formal constitutional distribution of legislative, executive and judicial powers and scal autonomy.


2 Some form of voluntary covenant or contract among the components normally a written constitution (not unilaterally amendable and requiring for amendment the consent of a signi cant proportion of the constituent units).

3 Mechanisms to channel the participation of the federated units in decision-making processes at the federal level. This usually involves the creation of a bicameral legislature in which one chamber represents the people at large and the other the component units of the federation.

4 Some kind of institutional arbiter, or umpire, usually a supreme court or a constitutional court to settle disputes between the different levels of government.

5 Mechanisms to facilitate intergovernmental collaboration in those areas where governmental powers are shared or inevitably overlap.6

Moreover, as Elazar stresses, the structure of federalism is meaningful only in polities whose processes of government re ect the federal principle.7 Here, we need to add a cultural dimension to the ve structural de nitions provided above. As Watts notes, a recognition of the supremacy of the constitution over all orders of government and a political culture emphasizing the fundamental importance of respect for constitutionality are therefore prerequisites for the effective operation of a federation.8

Federalism in Russia

Federations may be mono-national or multi-national. Following Kymlicas de nition a multi-national state refers to countries that contain more than one national group which see themselves as distinct societies and demand various forms of autonomy or self-government to ensure their survival as distinct societies.9

Belgium, Canada, Spain, Russia, Malaysia, Cyprus and India are examples of multi-national federations that encompass or attempt to encompass more than one national group.10

With a population of 142 million citizens incorporating some 172 nationalities and an area covering 170 million square kilometres, Russia is one of the largest and most ethnically diverse multi-national federations in the world. The 1993 Constitution listed 89 federal subjects comprising 32 ethnically de ned subjects (21 republics, 10 Autonomous Okrugs and 1 Autonomous Oblast) and 57 territoriallybased subjects (49 Oblasts, 6 Krais and the cities of Moscow and St Petersburg).

Asymmetry

The Russian Federation is also highly asymmetrical. The federal subjects vary widely in the size of their territories, ethnic composition and populations. Thus, for example, the territory of the republic of Sakha-Yakutiya is 388 times greater in size than that of the Republic of North Osetiya-Alaniya. The population of Moscow in 2002 (8.539 million) was 474 times greater than that of the sparsely populated Yevenk Autonomous Oblast (18,000).

Russian federalism and local politics 13

There are also vast differences in the socio-economic status of the federal subjects. A majority of Russias ethnic republics are highly dependent on nancial support from the federal budget. Thus, for example, nancial subsidies comprised 87.7 per cent of Ingushetiyas budget revenues in 2002, and 82.5 per cent in 2003. Federal transfers in 2003 comprised 80 per cent of budget revenues in the republics of Dagestan and Tyva, while they made up 70 to 80 per cent of the revenues of the republics of Kabardino-Balkariya, Karachaeva-Cherkessiya and North Osetiya-Alaniya. In the republic of Altai they comprised 60 per cent, and in Adygeya, Buryatiya, Kalmykiya and Marii El between 50 and 60 per cent.11 Such high levels of inequality between regions are particularly worrying in multi-national federations, where the unequal distribution of resources can quickly take on an ethnic dimension, exacerbating tensions between ethnic groups. However, the economic dependence of the ethnic republics on the federal budget has also been an important factor in calming down secessionist demands.

There are also sharp variations in the revenues of municipal budgets. As Kurlyandskaya notes, In some regions the ratio between the per capita revenues of the richest and the poorest municipalities exceeds 1:100.12 I discuss regional and local level economic asymmetries in more detail in Chapter 7.

The Russian Federation is also constitutionally asymmetrical. While Article 5(4) of the Russian Constitution declares that all subjects of the Federation are equal, in fact the ethnic republics were granted far greater powers than the territorially de ned subjects. Socio-economic and constitutional asymmetry in turn generates political asymmetry. Thus, for example, rich donor subjects (regions that pay more taxes to the federal budget than they receive back) have been more successful in carving out higher levels of political autonomy than the impoverished recipi-ent regions that depend on federal transfers from the centre for their economic survival. There were eight donor regions in 1997, 13 in 1999, 19 in 2001 and 21 in 2006.13

The Federation Treaty and the Russian Constitution

During the period that has become known as the parade of sovereignties (19913) there were real worries that the Russian Federation would follow the fate of the USSR and fall apart. The creation of a federal state based on the dual principles of ethnicity and territory was therefore seen by many members of the political elite as the only way to prevent the disintegration of the state. In March 1992 Yeltsin, fearful of the break-up of the Federation, signed a Federation Treaty, which conceded major powers to the ethnic republics.14 In the Treaty, the republics were recognized as sovereign states and they were granted independent powers over taxation and ownership of their land and natural resources. In addition, the republics were to have their own constitutions, supreme courts and presidents. In contrast, the territorially based regions were given none of the above rights and their chief executives (governors) were to be directly appointed by the President. Tatarstan and Chechnya both refused to sign the Federal Treaty, and in November 1992 Tatarstan adopted its own rival Constitution, which declared that it was a


sovereign state, and a subject of international law, associated with the Russian Federation on the basis of a treaty and the mutual delegation of powers. Chechnya, which declared its independence as early as November 1991, proclaimed that it was an independent sovereign state and a full and equal member of the world community of states.

The Federation Treaty had been signed at a time when Yeltsin was weak and appeared to be losing his struggle for power with the Russian parliament. Yeltsins victory over parliament in October 1993 turned the tables and Yeltsin then sought to take back in December 1993 what he had been forced to give up in March 1992. The Constitution stripped the republics of their rights of sovereignty and secession. Thus, Article 4(1) states that the sovereignty of the Russian Federation extends to the whole of its territory and Article 4(3) declares that the Russian Federation ensures the integrity and inviolability of its territory. Further articles guarantee the supremacy of the Federal Constitution. Thus, Article 4(2) states that the constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws are paramount throughout the territory of the federation and Article 15(1) declares that the Constitution has supreme legal force, is direct acting and applies throughout the territory of the Federation. Laws and other legal enactments adopted in the Federation must not contradict the Constitution.15

However, Yeltsins victory was not as clear-cut as it would appear. First of all, many of the provisions of the Constitution are actually very vague or ambiguous, while others are contradictory. Of particular concern is the confusion that has been left over the current status of the Federal Treaty. Article 11 of the Constitution states that the distribution of powers between the federal government and federal subjects is to be determined by both the Constitution and the Federal Treaty. Second, there is the question of whether turnout at the referendum in December 1993 was actually over 50 per cent. It is now argued by many scholars that turnout was much lower than the of cial 54.8 per cent, and this has substantially weakened the legitimacy of the Constitution. Third, there is the question of how much support the Constitution received in the ethnic republics. An essential attribute of any democratic federation is the voluntary membership of its subjects. In 42 of the 89 republics and regions the Constitution failed to be rati ed either because turnout was too low or the majority of citizens voted against it. Fourth, a number of republics had rati ed their own constitutions before the December 1993 Federal Constitution, and they claimed that their constitutions took precedence over the Russian Constitution. Nationalist leaders in the republics could henceforth legitimately argue that the Russian Constitution was not valid in their territories. Authoritarian leaders were able to use federalism as a pretext to install dictatorial regimes, and to claim sovereignty and control over their territories and natural resources.

Yeltsin had won a pyrrhic victory. By 1996, the Federal Government reported that 19 of the 21 republican constitutions were in breach of the Federal Constitution. Those constitutions (Chuvashiya, Sakha-Yakutiya, Chechnya, Tatarstan and Tyva) rati ed between the signing of the Federal Treaty in March 1992 and the rati cation of the Russian Constitution on 12 December 1993 were the most confederal, including as they did declarations of sovereignty, rights of secession


and citizenship. As noted above, Tatarstan declared that it was an associate member of the Russian Federation. Only Chechnya went so far as to declare its complete secession, and in 1994 and 1999, Russian troops had to be sent into the Republic to restore federal control.16

The distribution of powers: federal, regional and local

Federal and regional powers

Article 71 grants the federal government exclusive powers over a broad range of national policies (including the national economy, federal budget, federal taxes and duties, foreign and defence affairs), and Article 72 lists a number of powers that are to be shared between the federal authorities and the federal subjects. No exclusive powers were delegated to the federal subjects. Instead, the subjects are granted only residual powers (Article 73), that is, powers over those relatively few policy areas not provided for in Articles 71 and 72. Another important article in the Constitution is Article 78, which allows the centre to transfer the implementation of some of its powers to the federal subjects and vice versa. This article was used by the Yeltsin regime to promote the development of bilateralism and contract federalism, which is discussed below.

Constitutional powers of local self-government

For Elazar:

federalism orders civil societies, their politics and territories, in at least four ways: 1) by establishing a certain kind of constitutional and legal frame-work for them; 2) by encouraging certain geographical patterns within them;3) by in uencing their political culture basis; and 4) by shaping the political behaviour of their residents or citizens.17

Each of these points he argues, help to shape the patterns of urbanization and urban politics in distinctive ways.18 Denters and Rose argue that one of the major differences between unitary and federal systems is that in federal systems the role of the national government vis--vis local government tends to be more limited.19

Likewise, Mike Goldsmith notes that in Federal systems, the position of the central government is generally quite weak in the intergovernmental relationship, whereas in unitary systems the central government looms large in the affairs of most localities.20 For Smith the major difference between unitary and federal systems is that in federalism the structure of these relations cannot be changed without adhering to a constitutional procedure involving the local governments in the decision. In unitary systems, changes can be made by a simple legislative act or government policy.21

Elazar also argues that local governments in federal systems are able to capture more powers than those in unitary systems. Local governments in the USA, he


argues, gained a substantial measure of entrenched political power because they [were] able to capitalize on the spirit of noncentralization the spirit of federalism, if you will in their day-to-day operations and in their bargaining with other governments.22

Local self-government in Russia

The speci c powers of local self-governments are outlined in Articles 1303 of the Russian Constitution (see Figure 2.1). Kourliandskaya et al., summarize these key powers, as follows:

1 Local communities possess autonomy in addressing issues of local importance.

2 Local self-government may follow a diversity of organizational models.3 Regional authorities must take into account the preferences of the local com mu-

nities when determining the boundaries of local government jurisdictions.4 Local governments possess nancial autonomy (albeit limited), with discre tion

over the management of municipal property and the implementation of local budgets.

5 Adequate funding is guaranteed for the performance of additional state functions delegated to the local governments by the decision of federal or regional state authorities.

6 Local governments will be reimbursed for the costs of implementing federal mandates.23

One of the most controversial articles in the Russian Constitution is Article 12, which declares that In the Russian Federation local self-government is recog-nized and guaranteed. Within the limits of its powers local self-government is independent. Bodies of local self-government do not form part of the system of bodies of state power. As Wollmann and Butusova note, Article 12 was hailed by liberal jurists in Russia as nally recognizing (and legitimating) the local self-government level as standing distinct and autonomous from the sphere and domain of the state and possessing a non-state, societal quality.24 Thus, Article 12 was supported by those who supported the societal concept of local self-government. In addition, it was championed by an in uential group of federal politicians, including the Deputy Prime Minister, Sergei Shakhrai, who apparently saw local self-government as an instrument for limiting the excessive independence of regional leaders, particularly in the ethnic republics.25 Conservative jurists and those who supported the statist concept of local government criticized Article 12 for its arti cial distinction of two power channels and its fostering an overly wide claim of local autonomy.26

This debate over the societal and statist concepts of local government has a long history in Russia. A similar debate raged around the status of the zemstvos (local government bodies created in 1864). As Porter and Young note:


Article 3(2) The people exercise their authority directly and also through bodies of state power and bodies of local self-government.

Article 12In the Russian Federation local self-government is recognized and guaranteed. Within the limits of its powers local self-government is independent. Bodies of local self-government do not form part of the system of bodies of state power.

Article 130(1) Local self-government in the Russian Federation ensures that the popu lationautonomously resolves questions of local importance and the ownership, utilization and disposal of municipal property.(2) Local self-government is exercised by citizens by means of referendums, elections and other forms of direct expression of will and through elected and other bodies of local self-government.

Article 131(1) Local self-government in urban and rural settlements and other territories is exercised with due consideration for historical and other local traditions. The structure of local-self government bodies is autonomously determined by the population.(2) Changes to the borders of territories where local self-government is exercised are permitted with due consideration for the opinion of the population of the relevant territories.

Article 132(1) Bodies of local self-government autonomously manage municipal property; formulate, approve and implement the local budget; levy local taxes and duties; implement the protection of public order; and also resolve other questions of local importance.(2) Individual state powers can be vested in bodies of local self-government by law, with the transfer of the material and nancial resources necessary to exercise them. The exercise of delegated powers is monitorable by the state.

Article 133Local self-government in the Russian Federation is guaranteed by the right to judicial protection, compensation for additional expenditure arising as a result of decisions adopted by bodies of state power, and the prohibition of the restriction of the rights of local self-government established by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws.

Box 2.1 The Constitutional Provisions of Local-Self-Government

Source: The Russian Federation Constitution, in Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society,London and New York: Routledge, 1996, pp. 395429.

The chief architect of the zemstvo statute, Interior minister, P. A. Valuev was a proponent of the state theory of self-government . However many of the nobles who stood for election subscribed to a different theory of local


self-government. These men drew distinctions between state affairs and local interests and thought that societys interests could and should be distinguished from the interests of the state. From the perspective of this societal theoryof local self-government, the zemstva should be an independent institution standing outside of the governmental apparatus.27

As Campbell notes, in post-communist Russia the societal theory of local self-government:

in both its liberal and traditionalist forms, became attached to the communal or settlement approach to local government structure the idea that all settlements, however small, have the right to elect their own mayors and councillors and be constituted as municipalities in the full sense.28

The state theory of local self-government in sharp contrast favoured the territorial principle under which rural municipalities could be based on districts rather than individual settlements.29

However, the independence granted to local self-government in Article 12 has never been put into practice. In Russias quasi-federal system, regional elites have been able to subjugate local level bodies with impunity. In many of the ethnic republics (e.g. Adygeya, Bashkortostan, Dagestan, Kalmykiya, Komi, North Osetiya-Alaniya, Sakha-Yakutiya, Tatarstan) the chief executives have been able to carve out personal efdoms and to instigate highly authoritarian regimes. Local governments have been directly subordinated to republican administrations, and heads of municipalities have been directly appointed by republican presidents (see Chapters 4 and 9).30

The provisions of Article 12 are also in any case somewhat contradicted by Article 132(2) of the Constitution, which states that Individual state powers can be vested in bodies of local self-government by law, with the transfer of the material and nancial resources necessary to exercise them. City governments, in particu-lar, have been overloaded by these obligatory state duties, which both regional and federal bodies pass down to them, and over which, they have considerable monitoring powers.

Problems of coordinating the implementation of joint powers

Article 72(1) states that the establishment of the general principles for the organization of a system of bodies of state power and local-self government fall within the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the components of the Russian Federation. Article 76(2), which de nes the legislative framework for regulating questions of joint jurisdiction, stresses that laws of local government are established in correspondence with federal and regional laws. Federal and regional legislation may not infringe or limit the constitutional rights of local self-governments.

As Leskin observes:


Over 60 per cent of federal laws regulating relations in such areas as the economy, natural resource management, and social development require coor-di nation of actions of federal and regional governments to deal with concrete issues. And every twentieth federal law speci es instances when consultations must also be held with local governments.31

In addition, more than 80 per cent of laws of the subjects of the federation pro-vide for some form of interaction between governments of the subjects and local government.32 However, there are virtually no legal procedures to regulate such cooperation.

The lack of such mechanisms leads to the establishment of informal relations that are ineffective and far from perfect from a legal point of view. This in turn, does not allow for the timely resolution of a host of urgent nancial, economic, and social problems, and creates an environment conducive to red tape and corruption.33

In order to address these issues, a special commission was set up by President Putin in 2001. It was charged with clarifying the powers of federal, regional and local governments (see discussion below).

Bilateral treaties

Over the period 19948, 46 bilateral treaties were signed between the federal gov-ernment and subjects of the Federation, granting the local signatories a whole host of political and economic privileges. The vast majority of these treaties (42 of the 46) also contained provisions that violated the Russian Constitution. In many instances, the bilateral treaties actually legitimized those extra-constitutional powers that the republics had unilaterally proclaimed in their republican constitutions. Special and often secretive agreements attached to the bilateral treaties granted the republics the right to appoint federal of cials in their territories, conduct their own independent relations with foreign states, set up their own national banks, and create their own political and administrative organs. In many cases, the bilateral treaties sanctioned the regional subjugation of the powers of local governments and gross violations of Article 12.34

In June 1999, the Russian parliament adopted a law to regulate the treaties that reiterated the fact that all new treaties had to conform to the Federal Constitution.35

However, the law came too late to make any impact, as no new treaties were forthcoming after the last bilateral treaty was signed with Moscow Oblast in June 1998.

By the mid-1990s political power had passed from the centre to the regions, and regional politics was rmly under the control of regional elites. As the Ministry of Justice reported, of the 44,000 regional acts adopted over the period 19957, almost half were in violation of the Russian Constitution and federal legislation.36

Thus, on the eve of Putins accession to the presidency, there were major


variations across the Federation in the structures, functions and powers of local governments. More often than not, it was regional elites who had the nal say over which powers would be delegated to municipalities. Indeed, the degree of political and economic asymmetry at the local level was even higher than in the regions.

Putins radical assault on the principles of federalism and democracy

By the end of the Yeltsin era, constitutional federalism had been replaced by a highly politicized form of contract federalism. The result, as Campbell stresses, was not decentralization but autonomization whereby the state was held together by a loose parade of treaties bargained between the centre and the individual regions.37 As Sakwa notes, a distinctive type of segmented regionalism emerged as Russia in effect fragmented along the lines of the 89 regions, with the federal authorities in effect becoming a ninetieth.38

In May 2000, Vladimir Putin was inaugurated as President and he immediately initiated a series of radical reforms, the primary aims of which were to create a uni ed economic, legal and security space across the Federation. Over the last seven years, we have witnessed a concerted attack on the powers of the regions and localities, and a recentralization of economic and political power in the hands of the Kremlin.39 Through the instigation of what he terms a dictatorship of law, Putin has sought to reign in the anarchic and feudal powers of the regions, and to bring an end to the negotiated federalism of the Yeltsin era.

Most of the bilateral treaties have now been rescinded, and regional legislation is gradually being brought into line with the Constitution. The ex-of cio membership of regional chief executives in the Federation Council has also been ended. Regional chiefs are now subject to daily oversight from Putins Presidential envoys in the seven new federal super-districts. In 2000, Putin was also granted powers to dismiss regional governors and assemblies if they adopted legislation that violated the Russian Constitution or federal laws. In turn, the heads of federal subjects were given similar powers to dismiss heads of local administrations.40

Presidential appointment of governors

The scope and pace of Putins reforms were intensi ed after the Beslan hostage crisis of September 2004, which Putin has used as an excuse to clamp down on federalism and democracy. Putin enacted a number of new amendments and laws on Russias party and electoral systems, including the right of the President to directly appoint regional governors and republican presidents. According to new legislation adopted by the Duma on 11 December 2004, regional assemblies were charged with the task of giving approval to the Presidents nominees.41 If a legislature twice declines to con rm the Presidents nominee, the President has the right to disband the assembly and to appoint an acting regional head to serve until a new legislature is elected. The President also has the right to dismiss regional heads for failure to ful l their duties, or if they lose the Presidents con dence.42

To date, Putin has used his power of dismissal only rarely. On 9 March 2005, the


Governor of the Koryak AO, Vladimir Loginov, was the rst to be dismissed, ostensibly over an energy crisis in the region.43

Putin argued that these reforms were necessary to ensure the unity of the country, the strengthening of state structures and con dence in the authorities, and the creation of an effective system of internal security.44 Other supporters of the direct appointment of regional executives, such as the Chair of the Dumas Constitutional Legislation Committee, Vladimr Pligin (a member of United Russia), argued that it will strengthen the power vertical, and they defended its legality by citing Article 77 of the Russian Constitution, which calls for a uni ed system of executive power in the Russian Federation.45 Opponents argue that it will destroy the countrys constitutionally mandated federative structure and replace it with a unitary state. Thus, for example, Vladimir Ryzhkov, who was one of the few independent deputies left in the Duma in 2004, declared:

The President is asking us to violate three constitutional principles at one go: the principle of democracy, by depriving citizens of their right to elect their own leaders; the principle of federalism since appointment from above has nothing to do with the principles of a federation; and the principle of a law-based state, since the President is proposing that we ignore the Constitution, the laws, and the decisions of the Constitutional Court.46

In an open letter to Constitutional Court chair Valerii Zorkin, Ryzhkov listed ten articles of the Russian Constitution that he believes are violated by Putins proposals: Articles 1, 3, 5, 10, 11, 32, 71, 72, 73 and 77).47

It is not surprising that a majority of Russias regional governors publicly embraced Putins proposals: many of them were coming to the end of their terms in of ce, and others were so unpopular with their electorates that they had been able to stay in power only by resorting to electoral fraud and corruption. Those 30 or so governors who stood on United Russias Party List for the 2003 Duma elections, and those who brought home the votes for Putin in the 2004 Presidential elections, no doubt hoped to be rewarded with further terms in of ce. Moreover, since the adoption of the new legislation on appointing governors came into operation in January 2005, regional governors and republic presidents have been rushing to join United Russia. At the partys 7th Congress, held in December 2006 it was stated that 68 regional heads were members of United Russia.48

In utilizing his new powers, Putin to date has tended to reappoint incumbent governors. As Coalson notes, the pattern of gubernatorial appointments has clearly shown that the reform was not intended to replace ineffective governors who had come to power by manipulating a awed electoral system.49 Of the 53 regions that had passed through the new appointment system by April 2007, Putin had reappointed 36 incumbents and there were just 17 new appointments.50 Many of those who have been reappointed have already been in power for over a decade. Thus, for example, Konstantin Titov the Governor of Samara Oblast, the President of Tatarstan, Mintimer Shaimiev, and the governors of Khansy-Mansiskii AO Okrug, and the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, Alexander Filiponko and Nikolai


Volkov have held of ce since 1991. On completion of their new terms, these governors will have served for 18 or 19 years.51 Nor has Putin been averse to reappoint unpopular or autocratic leaders. Thus, for example, Putin reappointed Murtaza Rakhimov, the President of Bashkortostan, who has been accused of human rights violations, corruption and electoral fraud.52

Direct appointment of mayors

In his September 2004 speech, Putin also called for governors to be given a greater role in the formation of local organs of power.53 Recently, there have been calls for governors to be given the right to directly appoint the mayors of their capital cities. As Coalson notes, public support for such a policy has come from a number of high-ranking politicians, such as Lyubov Sliska, the First Deputy Chair of the Duma (and a member of United Russia); Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Deputy Chair of the Duma (head of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia); and Vladislav Surkov, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration. However, other key politicians, such as Boris Gryzlov, Chair of the Duma (Head of United Russia), have declared their opposition to such a policy.54

Critics argue that the elimination of mayoral elections would also require changes to the Russian Constitution. As noted above, Article 32(2) of the Russian Constitution states that Citizens of the Russian Federation shall have the right to be elected to bodies of state governance and organs of local self-government.55

Furthermore, as noted above, Article 130(2) declares that local self-government shall be exercised by the citizens through referendums, elections, and forms of expression of their will, through elected and other bodies of local self-government, and Article 131(1) states that the structure of bodies of local self-government shall be determined by the population independently.56 The appointment of mayors would also violate the European Charter of Local Self-Government to which Russia is a signatory. Article 3.2 of the Charter stipulates that rights in the eld of local self-government must be exercised by democratically constituted authorities.57 If this policy goes ahead, the president will appoint the regional governors and the governors will appoint the mayors of their capital cities, thus extending Putins power vertical from the Kremlin to the cities. (This issue is discussed further in Chapter 9.)

Delineation of powers: federal, regional and local

In July 2001, Putin set up a commission chaired by Kozak (the Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration) that was charged with drawing up new proposals on the distribution of powers between federal, regional and local governments. Two key laws were produced as a result of the commissions work: the July 2003 Law On Amending the Federal Law, On the Fundamental Principles of the Organization of Legislative (Representative) and Executive Bodies of State Power of the Subjects of the Russian Federation (hereafter, July 2003 Law), and the 2003 Law. As Leskin notes, the adoption of these laws necessitated a revision of the basic provisions of


155 previously adopted federal laws (including the Budget and Tax Codes of the Russian Federation) and termination of forty-two federal laws. Moreover, the provisions of several thousand laws passed by subjects of the Russian Federation had to be amended.58 A key result of this legislation was the:

Introduction of an exhaustive list of forty-one powers (issues, areas of regulation) granted to governments of the subjects of the Russian Federation and related matters that come under the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the subjects of the Russian Federation (Article 72 of the Russian Constitution), as well as an exhaustive list of issues of local signi cance for municipalities of every type (communities, municipal regions, and city districts).59

Federal intervention

Under Putin, the federal government has also been given new rights of federal intervention. Thus, for example, regions with budget de cits exceeding 30 per cent of their income are subject to direct administrative control by the federal government. In addition, the 2003 Law gives governors and republican presidents similar rights to take control of municipalities and to dismiss their chief executives (see Chapter 5). While intervention may be justi ed in cases of administrative malpractice, there is always the worry that federal and regional bodies will use these new rights to penalize politically disobedient municipalities.60

Harmonization of legislation

By 2000, the number of normative legal acts adopted by the regions and republics exceeded 300,000, approximately one-quarter of which violated federal laws.61 One of Putins rst policy initiatives was to call for regional and local legislation to be brought into line with the Constitution and federal laws. Over the period 20003, local procurators disputed about 10,000 illegal acts, of which over 8,000 were harmonized with federal legislation.62

Of particular intensity was the campaign to bring regional and local normative acts on various aspects of local government up to par with federal legislation. Thus, already in mid-2001, in his report to the Russian President (On Violations of Federal Legislation Concerning Local Self-Government), the Procurator General of the Russian Federation noted that governments of regions and republics infringe on the competence of local governments, illegally delegate to local bodies their powers as well as powers of the federal government, and promulgate laws that contradict federal legislation.63 In particular, it was stressed that, regional administrations illegally assumed jurisdiction over local issues, disposed of local budget revenues, and included in the budgets of subjects of the federation, revenues generated through selling and renting municipal property.64 By 2003:

over 55,000 normative acts of municipal entities (including their charters) were harmonized with federal legislation. Of this number, almost 13,000


were harmonized on the basis of representations of procurators, about 39,000 on the basis of protests by public procurators, and some 3,000 on the basis of applications to the courts.65

In a number of cases, the harmonization of laws has had a positive impact on the development of democracy. Thus, for example, as Hahn demonstrates, In many regions, especially in the national republics, regional chief executives were forced to give up their power to appoint city and district administrative heads after courts upheld prosecutors protests that this practices was unconstitutional.66 Nonetheless, despite these achievements many republics continue to adopt legislation that violates federal laws, and the constitutional powers of local governments continue to be infringed. To a large degree, decisions over which powers are granted to a speci c region or local body of power remain highly politicized, and depend on the political and economic status of the region in question.

In December 2001, 72 per cent of Bashkortostans laws still violated federal norms, a gure that was actually higher than it was at the beginning of Putins reforms in May 2000. The Tatarstan leadership has also steadfastly refused to renounce the republics sovereignty. Article 1 of the republics revised constitution, which was adopted in April 2002, continues to uphold the 1994 bilateral treaty with Moscow, even though it contradicts both the federal and republican constitutions in several places. The constitution also reiterates the republics citizenship rights. Moreover, in 2007 Tatarstan rati ed a new bilateral treaty with Moscow, which grants it considerable autonomous powers, many of which continue to contradict the Russian Constitution and federal law.

The merger of federal subjects

New legislation was adopted in 2001 to promote the merger of federal subjects. As Chebankova notes, ve such mergers involving six regions had taken place by March 2007, reducing the number of federal subjects from 89 to 83. These mergers have been imposed by the federal centre top-down often against the background of ethnic resistance, and mostly in accordance with the interests of ruling elites.67

Thus, for example, The refusal of governors Alexy Barinov and Vladimir Loginov of Yamalo-Nenetsk and Koryak Autonomous Okrugs respectively to support the merger of their regions with neighbouring territories led to their dismissal and the subsequent launch of criminal proceedings against them.68

There are real fears that these mergers will lead to the gubernization of Russia, and that the remaining ethnic republics and autonomies will be swallowed up by the territorially de ned regions. There is also evidence that Putins merger policy has sharpened ethnic tensions across the Federation, opening up a Pandoras box of ethnic and territorial disputes.69 Although there has been consensus over the merger of Komi-Permyak Autonomous Oblast with Perm Oblast, and also the merger of Taimyr and Yevenk autonomous oblasts with Krasnoyarsk Krai,70 there has been much more opposition from ethnic Adygs to the proposed uni cation of Adygeya with Krasnodar Krai. Ethnic con icts have also suffered over the


redrawing of municipal boundaries in conformity with the new provisions of the 2003 Law (see Chapter 5).71

Deconcentration of powers to governors

According to Heinemann-Grder, the Kozak reforms have led to a more uni ed, systematized but also centralized system of intergovernmental relations. Whereas the federal government was granted approximately 700 areas of responsibility, the regions retained just 50.72 However, at a meeting of the State Council in July 2005, Putin promised that that 114 powers of the federal government were to be given back to the federal subjects, in the areas of:

forestry, water resources, environmental protection, veterinary services, licens-ing, protection of historical and cultural monuments, education, science, land use and housing legislation, including the governors rights to supervise the heads of the power ministries, Ministry of Interior, Emergencies, and Justice (although not security bodies or the procuracy) in their respective regions.73

In his speech to the Federal Assembly in April 2007, Putin reported that in 2006 important powers in the areas of urban development, forestry management, land and water relations, wildlife protection, and employment74 had been transferred to the jurisdiction of regional authorities. Many commentators hailed these moves as an indication that Putin was reversing his centralizing policies in favour of a new programme of devolution. However, such developments should more rightly be viewed as a process of deconcentration of duties rather than a devolution of powers.

As Clark notes, Decentralization occurs when local governments have both resources and the authority to use these resources. Deconcentration indicates that resources are devolved to the localities from the centre but their use is still under central direction.75 For Ros

Documents

(BASEES_Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies ) Cameron Ross-Local Politics and Democratization in Russia (BASEES_Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies)-Routledge