Case/ Docket Number Case Title Doctrine

November 12

GR 185449Goodyear Philippines, Inc. and Remegio M. Ramos v. Marina

L. Angus

In the absence of an express or implied prohibition against it, collection of both retirement benefits and separation pay upon severance from employment is allowed. This is grounded on the social justice policy that doubts should always be resolved in favor of labor rights.

retirement benefits and separation pay are not mutually exclusive. Retirement benefits are a form of reward for an em -ployee's loyalty and service to an employer and are earned under existing laws, CBAs, employment contracts and com-pany policies. On the other hand, separation pay is that amount which an employee receives at the time of his sever-ance from employment, designed to provide the employee with the wherewithal during the period that he is looking for another employment and is recoverable only in instances enumerated under Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code or in illegal dismissal cases when reinstatement is not feasible.

"Under prevailing jurisprudence, x x x a quitclaim cannot bar an employee from demanding benefits to which he is legally entitled.” Release and quitclaims are often looked upon with disfavor when the waiver was not done voluntarily by employees who were pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their obligations.

GR 198620P.J Lhuillier, Inc. and Mario

Ramon Ludena v. Flordeliz Ve-layo

It need not be stressed that the nature or extent of the penalty imposed on an erring employee must be commensurate to the gravity of the offense as weighed against the degree of responsibility and trust expected of the employee's posi-tion. On the other hand, the respondent [accounting clerk] is not just charged with a misdeed, but with loss of trust and confidence under Article 282(c) of the Labor Code, a cause premised on the fact that the employee holds a position whose functions may only be performed by someone who enjoys the trust and confidence of management. Needless to say, such an employee bears a greater burden of trustworthiness than ordinary workers, and the betrayal of the trust reposed is the essence of the loss of trust and confidence which is a ground for the employee's dismissal.

There are two classes of corporate positions of trust: on the one hand are the managerial employees whose primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or a subdivision thereof, and other officers or members of the managerial staff; on the other hand are the fiduciary rank-and-file em-ployees, such as cashiers, auditors, property custodians, or those who, in the normal exercise of their functions, regu-larly handle significant amounts of money or property. These employees, though rank-and-file, are routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer's money or property, and are thus classified as occupying positions of trust and confidence.

It has been held that in dismissing a cashier on the ground of loss of confidence, it is sufficient that there is some basis for the same or that the employer has a reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the miscon -duct, thus making him unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Therefore, if there is sufficient evidence to show that the employer has ample reason to distrust the employee, the labor tribunal cannot justly deny the employer the authority to dismiss him. Indeed, employers are allowed wider latitude in dismissing an employee for loss of trust and confidence.

GR 211228

University of Pangasinan, Inc., Cesar Duque/ Juan Lla-

mas Amor/ Dominador Reyes v. Florentino Fernandez and

Heirs of Nilda Fernandez

[N]o essential change is made by a re-computation as this step is a necessary consequence that flows from the nature of the illegality of dismissal declared in that decision. A re-computation (or an original computation, if no previous com-putation has been made) is a part of the law—specifically, Article 279 of the Labor Code and the established jurispru-dence on this provision—that is read into the decision. By the nature of an illegal dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add on until full satisfaction, as expressed under Article 279 of the Labor Code. The re-computation of the conse-quences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the decision does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of monetary consequences of this dismissal is affected and this is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments.

GR 192531

Bernardina P. Bartolome v. Social Security System and Scanmar Maritime Services,

Inc.

Rule XV if the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial devia-tion from Arc. 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase “dependent Parents” to refer to “legitimate par-ents”.

The term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is used and ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in need of support or assistance.

Moreover, the same Article 167 (j), as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not intend to limit the phrase "depen-dent parents" to solely legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article 167 provides that "in their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legiti-mate descendants who are secondary beneficiaries." Had the lawmakers contemplated "dependent parents" to mean legitimate parents, then it would have simply said descendants and not "legitimate descendants." The manner by which the provision in question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase "dependent parents" was intended to cover all parents - legitimate, illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.

GR 198408

Conchita J. Racelis v. United Philippines Lines, Inc. and/or Holland America Lines, Inc.,

and Fernando Lising

Deemed incorporated in every seafarer’s employment contract, denominated as the POEA-SEC or the Philippine Over-seas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract, is a set of standard provisions determined and imple-mented by the POEA, called the “Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels,” which are considered to be the minimum requirements acceptable to the government for the employment of Filipino seafarers on board foreign ocean-going vessels.

Among other basic provisions, the POEA-SEC – specifically, its 2000 version – stipulates that the beneficiaries of a de-ceased seafarer may be able to claim death benefits for as long as they are able to establish that (a) the seafarer ’ s death is work-related, and (b) such death had occurred during the term of his employment contract.

Under the 2000 POEA-SEC, the terms “work-related injury” and “work-related illness” are, in turn, defined as follows:

* Work-Related Injury – injury(ies) resulting in disability or death arising out of and in the course of employment.* Work-Related Illness – any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under

Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied.

Case law explains that “[t]he words ‘arising out of’ refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words ‘in the course of’ refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place. As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise ‘in the course of employment’ when it takes place within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.”

As to the term of employment contract, while it is true that a medical repatriation has the effect of terminating the sea-farer’s contract of employment, it is, however, enough that the work-related illness, which eventually becomes the prox-imate cause of death, occurred while the contract was effective for recovery to be had.

November 19

GR 184618

Peak Ventures Corporation and/or El Tigre Security and

Investigation Agency v. Heirs of Nestor Villareal

The twin reliefs that should be given to an illegally dismissed employee are full backwages and reinstatement.  Back-wages restore the lost income of an employee and is computed from the time compensation was withheld up to actual reinstatement. Anent reinstatement, only when it is not viable is separation pay given.

“A floating status requires the dire exigency of the employer’s bona fide suspension of operation, business or undertak-ing.” “It takes place when the security agency’s clients decide not to renew their contracts with the agency x x x” and also “in instances where contracts for security services stipulate that the client may request the agency for the replace-ment of the guards assigned to it x x x.”  In the latter case, the employer should prove that there are no posts available to which the employee temporarily out of work can be assigned.

There is constructive dismissal when an act of clear discrimination, insensitivity or disdain on the part of the employer has become so unbearable as to leave an employee with no choice but to forego continued employment.  “Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay.”

Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715, an employee who is unjustly dismissed shall be entitled to (1) reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges; and, (2) full backwages, inclu-sive of allowances, and to other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement.  If reinstatement is no longer viable, separation pay is granted. “[S]epa-ration pay is intended to provide the employee money during the period in which he will be looking for another employ-ment.”  Backwages, on the other hand, “are granted on grounds of equity for earnings lost by an employee due to his il-legal dismissal.”

Payment of backwages must be computed form the time the employee was unjustly dismissed up to his actual rein-statement.

GR 209201

New Filipino Maritime Agen-cies Inc., St. Paul Maritime

Corp., and Angelina T. Rivera v. Michael D. Despabeladeras

The seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the sea-man is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days , subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical condition.

Section 20(D) of the POEA-SEC instructs that no compensation and benefits shall be payable in respect of any injury, in -capacity, disability or death of the seafarer resulting from his willful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties. Employee—seafarer is duty-bound to complete his medical treatment until declared fit to work or assessed with a per -manent disability grading.

Seafarer who is guilty of medical abandonment (failure to complete his treatment even before the lapse of the 240 days period cannot claim for disability compensation since his wilful discontinuance of medical treatment constitutes a breach of his duties.

GR 209202

Catalino Belmonte, Jr. v. C.F. Sharp Crew Management,

Inc.,/ Juan Jose P. Rocha and James Fisher (Guernsey) LTD.

“The entitlement of a seafarer on overseas employment to disability benefits is governed by the medical findings, by law and by the parties’ contract.” Section 20-B of the POEA-SEC laid out the procedure to be followed in assessing the seafarer’s disability in addition to specifying the employer’s liabilities on account of such injury or illness. The same pro-vision also provides that the seafarer is not irrevocably bound by the findings of the company-designated physician as

he is allowed to seek a second opinion and consult a doctor of his choice. In case of disagreement between the findings of the company-designated physician and the seafarer’s private physician, the parties shall jointly agree to refer the matter to a third doctor whose findings shall be final and binding on both.

November 24

GR 195792Abosta Ship Management

and/or Artemio Corbilla v. Wil-hilm M. Hilario

Promotion and choice of personnel is an exercise of management prerogative. Management prerogatives are valid, so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer ’s interest, and not for the purpose of de-feating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements. There are, however, limitations on the exercise of management prerogatives, such as existing laws and the principle of equity and substan -tial justice.

Under the principle of equity and substantial justice, change of mind was not a valid reason for the non-deployment of respondent- employee. He lost the opportunity to apply for other positions in other agencies when he signed the con-tract of employment with petitioner- employer. Simply put, that contract was binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind of either one of them.

The unilateral and unreasonable failure to deploy respondent constitutes breach of contract, which gives rise to a liabil -ity to pay actual damages. The sanctions provided for non-deployment do not end with the suspension or cancellation of license or the imposition of a fine and the return of all documents at no cost to the worker. They do not forfend a sea -farer from instituting an action for damages against the employer or agency that has failed to deploy him.

November 26

GR 192924 Philippine Airlines, Inc. V. Reynaldo Paz

The rule is that the employee is entitled to reinstatement salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the LA decision grant-ing him said relief. In Roquero v. Philippine Airlines, the Court underscored that it is obligatory on the part of the em-ployer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. This is so because the order of reinstatement is immediately executory. Unless there is a restraining order issued, it is ministerial upon the LA to implement the order of reinstatement. The unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate a dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time the employer failed to re-instate him.

However, such rule was relaxed in Garcia—After the labor arbiter’s decision is reversed by a higher tribunal, the em-ployee may be barred from collecting the accrued wages, if it is shown that the delay in enforcing the reinstatement pending appeal was without fault on the part of the employer.

The test is two-fold: (1) there must be actual delay or the fact that the order of reinstatement pending appeal was not executed prior to its reversal; and (2) the delay must not be due to the employer’s unjustified act or omission. If the de-lay is due to the employer’s unjustified refusal, the employer may still be required to pay the salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the Labor Arbiter’s decision.

GR 196102Government Service Insur-ance System v. Aurelia Y.

Calumpiano

Cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are considered as occupational diseases under Nos. 19 and 29, respectively, of Annex "A" of the Implementing Rules of P.D. No. 626, as amended. Thus, it is not necessary that there be proof of causal relation between the work and the illness which resulted in the respondent's disability. The open-ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. In general, a covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.

However, although cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are listed occupational diseases, their com-pensability requires compliance with all the conditions set forth in the Rules. In short, both are qualified occupational diseases. For cerebro-vascular accident, the claimant must prove the following: (1) there must be a history, which should be proved, of trauma at work (to the head specifically) due to unusual and extraordinary physical or mental strain or event, or undue exposure to noxious gases in industry; (2) there must be a direct connection between the trauma or exertion in the course of the employment and the cerebro-vascular attack; and (3) the trauma or exertion then and there caused a brain hemorrhage. On the other hand, essential hypertension is compensable only if it causes impairment of function of body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes and brain, resulting in permanent disability, provided that, the following documents substantiate it: (a) chest X-ray report; (b) ECG report; (c) blood chemistry report; (d) fun-duscopy report; and (e) C-T scan.

The degree of proof required to validate the concurrence of the above-mentioned conditions under P.D. No. 626 is merely substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not direct causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable. As correctly pointed out by the CA, probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings. For, in interpreting and carrying out the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing Rules and Regulations, the primordial and paramount consideration is the employee's welfare. To safeguard the worker's rights, any doubt as to the proper interpretation and application must be resolved in [his] favor.

Probability, not certainty, is the test of proof in compensation cases; that the primordial and paramount consideration is the employee's welfare; that the strict rules of evidence need not be observed in claims for compensation; that medical findings of the attending physician may be received in evidence and used as proof of the facts in dispute; that in any determination of compensability, the nature and characteristics of the job are as important as raw medical findings and a claimant's personal and social history; that where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employ-ment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimant's own negligence or misconduct; and that the policy is to extend the application of the law on employees' compensation to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder.

GR 208567

Jeanette Manalo, Vilma Bar-rios, Lourdes Lynn Michelle

Fernandez and Leila Taino v. TNS Philippines Inc., and Gary

Ocampo

Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly defined a project employee as one whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employ-ment is for the duration of the season.Additionally, a project employee is one whose termination of his employment contract is reported to the DOLE everytime the project for which he was engaged has been completed.

once a project or work pool employee has been: (1) continuously, as opposed to intermittently, rehired by the same em-ployer for the same tasks or nature of tasks; and (2) these tasks are vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer, then the employee must be deemed a regular employee.

Although it is true that the length of time of the employee’s service is not a controlling determinant of project employ-ment, it is vital in determining whether he was hired for a specific undertaking or in fact tasked to perform functions vi-

tal, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer.

To the Court, the phrase “because we need further time to determine your competence on the job” would refer to a pro-bationary employment. Such phrase changes the tenor of the contract and runs counter to the very nature of a project employment.

GR 190486 Stanley Fine Furniture v. Vic-tor Gallano

To terminate the employment of workers simply because they asserted their legal rights by filing a complaint is illegal.   It violates their right to security of tenure and should not be tolerated.