Paradigms--Scientific and SocialAuthor(s): S. B. BarnesReviewed work(s):Source: Man, New Series, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Mar., 1969), pp. 94-102Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and IrelandStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2799267 .Accessed: 20/02/2012 10:07

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PARADIGMS-SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL

S. B. BARNES

University of Edinburgh

In their attempts to order, systematise and explain patterns of thought and belief, philosophers, sociologists and anthropologists have tended to use ideal models of 'rational thought' and 'scientific thought' as standards of comparison. In anthro- pology, for instance, there exists a controversy of long standing about the extent to which the magical and religious beliefs of preliterate communities can be accom- modated to such models; the writings of Frazer, Levy-Bruhl, Evans-Pritchard and Levi-Strauss can all, I think, be seen as landmarks in this debate. Often, in such material, one finds a detailed and sophisticated treatment of anthropological material related to sketchy and often implicit notions of what is rational or scien- tific; it could be that these ideas are so familiar that they need no elucidation, but on the basis of recent work I would oppose this view. Clarifying our ideas of science and rationality seems to pay off. Lukes (I967) has recently argued that universal criteria of rationality are available to anthropologists. He is able to establish a powerful case for this by examining the rules-logical and empirical-which define rationality in our society and by showing that if at least some of these rules are not assumed to be operating in other societies then we should not be able to attribute beliefs, concepts or even language itself to them. Similarly Horton (I967) in his discussion of the explanatory advantages and limitations of African traditional thought is greatly aided by a detailed understanding of Western natural science, an understanding which contradicts in some respects the stereotype image of science. Horton's work is a far cry from Frazer's in the sense that it takes science and its theories as an exceedingly complex entity rather than a simple intuitive model; perhaps we shall begin to see science as so complex that anthropological inter- pretations of primitive beliefs will serve as models in understanding it. Certainly none of the simple models for scientific activity currently advocated manages to achieve a tolerable consensus, and the particular diagnosis used as the basis of this article is the subject of controversy; it is in fact a diagnosis which runs counter to that of Horton at several points, notably those where he stresses the difference between science and other kinds of thought; it will be useful to list these.

i. The major distinctiveness of the scientific outlook is an awareness of the existence of alternative theories and sets of ideas.

2. This awareness exists in science only, as an oasis within our total culture: .... the modern Western layman is rarely more "open" or scientific in his outlook

than is the traditional African villager' (Horton I967). 3. The individual scientist is a microcosmic replica of the scientific world; there

is no need to distinguish individual and institutional factors within science. 4. There is a specifically scientific method used to develop and test theories.

Where the tests are negative there-is no attempt to preserve the theory by means of secondary elaboration as is common in the case of primitive beliefs.

PARADIGMS-SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL 95

I can now proceed with the alternative diagnosis which very largely bases itself on views presented by Thomas Kuhn as a result of a series of historical studies of scientific change. The crux of Kuhn's position is the concept of a paradigm:

A paradigm is a fundamental scientific achievement, and one which includes both a theory and some exemplary applications to the results of experiment and observation. More important it is an open ended achievement, one which leaves all sorts of research still to be done. And finally it is an accepted achievement in the sense that it is received by a group whose members no longer try to rival it or to create alternatives for it (Kuhn I963a: 358).

A scientific discipline may be considered to develop as follows: i. A set of phenomena will excite investigation but for a period nothing that

can be described as progress will occur. Investigators will cover the same ground many times; they will produce and reject many concepts and theories in attempts to interpret their results or guide their work. New investigators starting from scratch in the field will find themselves at no disadvantage.

2. Eventually a single paradigm will become accepted throughout the field. Kuhn gives many examples of this-for instance Franklin's fluid theory of electricity, the Aristotelian cosmology or the atomic theory.

3. This inaugurates a period of what Kuhn calls 'normal science' during which scientists tend unthinkingly to accept the paradigm as true and limit themselves to developing and checking its implications. The paradigm generates a set of ex- pectations about the natural world which the scientist seeks to confirm.

... he struggles to articulate and concretise the known, designing much special purpose apparatus and many special purpose adaptations of theory for that task. From these puzzles of design and adaptation he gets his pleasure (Kuhn I963a: 363).

The paradigms of normal science tend to be presented to the neophyte as dogma, devoid of their historical origin and with possible objections to them often care- fully concealed. Kuhn describes modem scientific training in detail as follows-

Typically, the undergraduate and graduate student of chemistry, physics, astronomy, geology, or biology acquires the substance of his field from books written especially for students. Until he is ready, or very nearly ready, to commence work on his own dissertation, he is neither asked to attempt trial research projects nor exposed to the immediate products of research done by others-to, that is, the professional communications that scientists write for each other. There are no collections of 'Readings' in the natural sciences. Nor is the science student encouraged to read the historical classics of his field-works in which he might dis- cover other ways of regarding the problems discussed in his text, but in which he would also meet problems, concepts and standards of solution that his future profession has long since discarded and replaced. In contrast, the various texts that the student does encounter display different subject matters, rather than, as in many of the social sciences, exemplifying different approaches to a single problem field. Even books that compete for adoption in a single course differ mainly in level and in pedagogic detail, not in substance or conceptual structure. Last, but most important of all, is the characteristic technique of textbook presentation. Except in their occasional introductions, science textbooks do not describe the sorts of problems that the professional may be asked to solve and the variety of techniques available for their solution. Rather these books exhibit concrete problem- solutions that the profession has come to accept as paradigms, and they then ask the student, either with a pencil and paper or in the laboratory, to solve for himself problems very closely related both in method and substance to those which the text or accompanying lecture has led him through. Nothing could be better calculated to produce 'mental sets' or 'Einstellungen'. Only in their most elementary courses do other academic fields offer even a partial parallel (Kuhn i963b: 344).

96 S. B. BARNES

Thus the neophyte receives a paradigm and in doing so learns to operate within a well defined set of concepts and procedures. He is trained to do 'normal science', i.e. to solve problems within a paradigm, and this type of activity, claims Kuhn, comprises the main element of ongoing scientific research.

4. Normal science does not however proceed without disturbance. The expecta- tions derived from the paradigm are not always fulfilled; anomalies and contra- dictions occur. These problems, which exist only in the light of the paradigm itself, are attacked with the object of reassimilating them. Reassimilation may occur by further empirical study of the anomalies, by reinterpreting them or by a secondary elaboration of the paradigm.

5. The existence of anomalies can sometimes lead instead to a different develop- ment, described by Kuhn as a 'scientific revolution' in which the existing paradigm is recognised as inadequate and allegiance is transferred to a new one. This process does not necessarily occur as a result of dispassionate objective evaluation; scientists cling tenaciously to their current paradigm, however unsatisfactory, should no alternative be available; new paradigms may gain support not because of any demonstrable superiority over the old but sinmply because scientists welcome the opportunity of a new try at explanation; or again polemic opposition to new paradigms may come from those heavily committed to existing beliefs. Moreover the transfer to a new set of theoretical tram rails does not necessarily involve individual changes of mind. Kuhn quotes scientists themselves in support of this point:

A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light but rather because its opponents eventually die and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it (Planck I948: 22). Although I am fully convinced of the truth of the views given in this volume ... I by no means expect to convince experienced naturalists whose minds are stocked with a multitude of facts, all viewed, during a long course of years, from a point of view directly opposite to mine ... but I look with confidence to the future-to young and rising naturalists, who will be able to view both sides of the question with impartiality (Darwin I929: 402).

The acceptance of a new paradigm completes a cycle and a new period of normal science commences; textbooks are rewritten to give the neophyte full confidence in the latest 'truth', and the period of confusion becomes reinterpreted as one of rationally achieved progress.

* * * * *

To what extent can this view of science be accepted? Certainly it is dangerous to generalise from Kuhn's particular studies to the nature of all scientific disciplines, and similarly it is dangerous to assume that scientific activity does not change over time.' Furthermore it is probably incorrect to think in terms of one paradigm per discipline; within psychology for instance cumulative progress is being made on the basis of a behaviourist paradigm and also along Freudian lines. Finally Kuhn tends to a rather dubious form of relativism in some of his writings, asserting that one paradigm is pretty much of the same value as any other, none being completely true; this leads to an over-emphasis of the arbitrary nature of paradigm changes. Nonetheless there are points in the diagnosis that are well backed by evidence and which I need to assert as true for the purpose of my argument.

PARADIGMS-SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL 97

I. The majority of scientific research activity is well described as problem solving within a set of concepts and procedures usually taken for granted.

2. Formal scientific training today is substantially as Kuhn describes it. Little effort is made to teach scientists to be 'objective', 'rational', 'sceptical' or 'open- minded' as such.z

3. Paradigm changes, and more specific conceptual and theoretical changes, do occur in science and usually possess the following characteristics.

a. One paradigm is not abandoned before another is available. The original paradigm is retained until this time and undergoes secondary elaboration, a process quite acceptable in science.

b. Individual scientists tend to believe in one theory only and bend their efforts to defending it or attacking alternatives. A change in belief is from one theory to another directly, not through a period of complete detachment.

c. Dominant theories within science change more rapidly than the beliefs of individual scientists. Particularly important is the way in which the individual scientist tends to adopt

one theory at a time to work with. Scientists seem to be able to tolerate empirical dissonance-an anomalous empirical occurrence-and are able to believe that it will be explained eventually: but theoretical dissonance or ambiguity is not accepted.3

Thus a picture of the individual scientist emerges which makes his thought less individually distinctive than Horton allows. Most of the time his awareness of alternatives is low and he refuses to accept dissonance and ambiguity in categories and theories; he utilises secondary elaboration. The gap with the primitive is narrowing and perhaps we can narrow it a little more by remarking that paradigm changes in science take place over a number of years and asking how convinced we ought to be about the stability of primitive beliefs over long periods. I want to create a further link by extending the notion of a paradigm. The notion of a set of categories, theories and procedures learnt in connexion with concrete examples, accepted by the entire reference group and applied to deal with problems in concrete situations can be extended, I think, to various beliefs held through whole societies. Cannot people, applying concepts of voluntary and involuntary action or seeking to determine whether a person is responsible for his behaviour, be described as operating with social paradigms? And if this is accepted cannot the term be extended to, say, Azande consulting witchcraft oracles or Kalabari diagnosing disease? This behaviour seems to me to fall within the definition of problem solving activity conducted within a set of rules given by social consensus but applied in an open ended way. If the analogy is a strong one, it should prove profitable to look at how paradigms are articulated and developed in science and how they are overthrown, and enquire to what extent similar processes are possible in primitive societies.4 My argument will be that some paradigm change processes are favoured in modern societies and that the major reason for this is not individual awareness of alternatives but differentiation in roles and institutions. Thus I shall be looking for differences not so much in 'types of thought' as in the con- texts within which the thought operates. It is sometimes suggested that primitive thought has distinctive features at a far more fundamental level than this; in so far as this view is correct my analogy will be weakened, though I do not think it would

4-M.

98 S. B. BARNES

ever become valueless. However if anthropologists were correct in suggesting that primitive thought is not conceptual, then the way in which primitives see anomaly and ambiguity and the notion of what a rule is for them would have to be re- considered. Levi-Strauss writes:

Signs resemble images in being concrete entities but they resemble concepts in their powers of reference. Neither concepts nor signs relate exclusively to themselves: either may be sub- stituted for something else. Concepts, however, have an unlimited capacity in this respect while signs have not. . . the engineer works by means of concepts and the bricoleur by means of signs. The sets which each employs are at different distances from the poles on the axis of opposition between nature and culture (I966: I8-20).

Worsley (i964) has quoted Vygotsky's (I962) work on the development of concepts in children to make a related point (strangely enough against Levi- Strauss). Worsley wants to distinguish conceptual thought and complex thought and quotes Vygotsky:-

In a complex, individual objects are united in the child's mind not only by his subjective impressions but also by bonds actually existing between these objects.... In a complex the bonds between its components are concrete and factual rather than abstract and logical (I964: 6i).

While a concept groups objects according to one attribute the bonds relating the elements of a complex to the whole and to one another may be as diverse as the contacts and relation- ships of the elements are in reality (I964: 62).

Worsley claims that aboriginal totemic classifications indicate 'complex- thinking' rather than 'thinking in concepts' but he uses the terms in a sense entirely different from Vygotsky's in that he is referring to relationships between things already labelled whereas Vygotsky describes the relationships between objects all existing under the same word-label. Thus, for Vygotsky, verbal thought in com- plexes misses discriminations between objects in the complexes, and is genuinely non-conceptual, whereas in Worsley's example the aborigines are aware of dis- tinctions between objects in their complexes and the existence of conceptual thought is not precluded. Only an interpretation of primitive thought in terms of Vygotsky's own position would provide a genuine alternative to conceptual thought and Vygotsky himself provides this (i962: 7I-2). He postulates complex- thinking as an explanation of Levy-Bruhl's material on participation, e.g. the fact that the Bororo tribe claim to be red parrots. According to Vygotsky this claim represents the incorrect translation of a term labelling a complex of people and red parrots.

Vygotsky does not give a detailed empirical analysis to justify his position and it must be considered not proven: its implications for anthropological practice would be enormous and hence it can be concluded that anthropologists implicitly have rejected it.

Levi-Strauss's position embodies many separate claims but they do not involve an alternative form of thought in the way that Vygotsky's position does. Thought in signs seems to be analogous to conceptual thought with certain limitations. Signs are 'preconstrained ... restricted by the fact that they are drawn from the language where they already possess a sense which sets a limit on their freedom of manoeuvre' (i966: i9) unlike concepts which 'possess simultaneous and theoreti- cally unlimited relations with other entities of the same kind' (i966: 20). Thought

PARADIGMS-SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL 99

in signs seems to turn into conceptual thought as it frees itself from its culture and becomes more 'transparent to reality' (I966: 20). Levi-Strauss recognises that the claim rests upon an unbreakable metaphor acknowledging that even the scientist 'never carries on a dialogue with nature pure and simple' (I966: I9). As the metaphor cannot be reduced it is reinforced; concepts 'open up' sets, signs merely reorganise them; scientists always attempt to go beyond the constraints of a particular state of civilisation, bricoleurs remain within them. These arguments are such excellent pieces of bricolage that it seems strange that Levi-Strauss has not realised the importance of this activity within natural science; his definition of conceptual thought is clearly too stringent. Despite this the argument quite validly stresses the impersonality of modern science-a characteristic it shares with much other Western thought-and consideration of this leads back to the theme of differentiation.

To be meaningful through an entire society statements must relate to a set of commonly held experiences. As roles differentiate, statements meaningful in the context of one specific role will communicate to successively smaller sections of the society; universally meaningful statements must refer to a smaller and smaller range of common experience. Specific shared cultural experience will diminish and that part of common experience which Levi-Strauss calls 'reality' will become increasingly important as a basis for communication. Differentiation will tend to lessen subjectivity.

Another important effect of differentiation has been described by Douglas (I966). Differentiation leads to the creation of specialised agencies of social control and the growth of organic solidarity; in the absence of these agencies the main classifi- cations of the social order are symbolically reinforced in other systems of classifica- tion and belief, and notions of pollution, danger, avoidance and taboo are present in these systems in so far as they are part of the central social institutions. Thus organic solidarity leads to a weakening of taboos and avoidances, and differentiated scientific activity, using classifications and beliefs increasingly devoid of general social significance, contains them only to a small extent. In so far as they exist, however, they provide interesting confirmation of Douglas's views. Horton (I967) has rightly described the insistence that science and its application be kept separate as a purifying movement, but besides concern with the science/not science boundary, examples exist of taboo and avoidance within science, for instance in maintaining disciplinary boundaries: one example of this was the reception accorded by chemists to methods of chemical analysis involving the use of enzymes; another, less recently, the resistance to biological theories of fermentation (in each case the resistance was on the grounds that the methods and theories were not specifically chemical). It is important to note that paradigms, besides providing rules for scientific work also provide the criteria by which recognition and reward are allocated among scientists. Thus the paradigm is a source of social order but there are no institutionalised mechanisms for dealing with threats to it; attacks upon paradigms may draw sanctions upon themselves in the automatic fashion character- istic of tabooed actions. A recent and extreme example of this is the strongly emotional response of American scientists to the work of Dr I. Velikovsky (Grazia et al. I963). Such clear cut examples are not easy to find, as avoidance behaviours normally occur invisibly in science, via adverse refereeing, refusal of publication,

IOO S. B. BARNES

lack of citation and general withdrawal of recognition. These procedures normally used to maintain standards within the paradigm can be used simply to protect it from threat and danger-and sometimes are; but attacks on scientific paradigms succeed none the less and I want to consider why.

* * * * *

To start with, what is involved for action in abandoning a paradigm? All the activities governed by the paradigm will have to be changed no matter how ingrained by habit or involved in the maintenance of relationships and hierarchies those activities may be. Now a scientific paradigm governs activities of an esoteric and restricted nature and activities which have no bearing on the general pattern of the scientists' social life. Social paradigms on the other hand tend to be extremely pervasive and to structure activities which it would be greatly disadvantageous to alter, or even activities which the individual is incapable of altering. Thus for the actor the social paradigm governs more action and more significant action than the scientific one. Abandoning, say, the molecular orbital theory of chemistry means a lot less than abandoning the notion of responsibility or, for example, abandoning belief in poison oracles if you are an Azande.

But paradigms only seem to be abandoned when an alternative theory is presented capable of being a new paradigm. Where do these new theories come from in science? Among sources of new paradigms are the theories of deviant groups continually existing within the discipline itself. Sometimes these are previously rejected paradigms; among professors of zoology in this country, for instance, the last Lamarchian evolutionist retired in the I960's. The wave theory of light was discarded for the corpuscular theory at the time of Newton but was still used by a small number of scientists until eventually it became dominant again. At the present time a small group of physicists including Max Bohm are following procedures contrary to the existing paradigms of quantum physics and these are directly related to a paradigm rejected earlier in the century.

But probably the most important source of new paradigms is metaphorical transposition of a theory from outside the discipline. One source of such theories is other scientific disciplines; physics for instance and information theory have provided models for physiology and psychology. In such cases certain patterns can be discerned. Occasionally one discipline will extend its empirical range and its paradigms will come to overlap with those of another discipline. Another common occurrence is for individuals to move from one field to another of lower status and continue to apply the techniques of their former paradigms (Ben-David I960). As science grows and becomes more differentiated this type of process increases in frequency.

Science, however, very often adopts theories present within the general social structure. Very many scientific theories trace back to common sense analogies. Electricity was first visualised as a fluid, so also was heat, valency was first thought of in terms of balls and hooks and the kinetic theory of gases literally did depend at first on the analogy between its theoretical entities and billiard balls. Hesse (I96I) has shown in detail how analogy from the familiar to the less familiar has been and still is vital to the development of the theories of mechanics; those

PARADIGMS-SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL IO]

paradigms which are thought closest to axiomatic deductive systems in their construction and use. The ability to handle metaphor and analogy seem vital not only for paradigm change but for articulation and extension of given paradigms and the problem solving involved in doing this. This implies that in terms of degree of abstraction the difference between our science and 'the science of the concrete' is a good deal less than Levi-Strauss implies, and also that the absence of awareness of alternatives is a dubious explanation of the stability of primitive beliefs-for it seetns unlikely that the primitive should be less adept at extending ideas by analogy and metaphor than we.5 Although science by its own develop- ment has generated enormous numbers of theoretical structures, concepts and images which in turn accelerate its growth as an institution, the whole process must be related to the restricted and specialised relationship to action of the paradigms of science and the differentiation process that produced it.

The basis of the case I have made so far rests upon the notion that the appli- cability of scientific concepts is limited to specialised peripheral situations. In a strict logical sense this is not true: concepts of space and time in physics challenge our everyday conceptions of these things, behaviourist psychology has immense implications for personal relationships and so does every other current psychological paradigm, and similarly, physiological paradigms logically involve conceptions about what we really are. Two points need to be made here. The first is that when such beliefs are disseminated for general social consumption they can arouse opposition and at one time specialised agencies controlling social order would be invoked against them. The second point is that scientists themselves remain un- worried by their paradigms whilst at the same time using social paradigms ap- parently in logical contradiction to them. Rules of content apparently prevent the scientist making his concepts fully general in terms of action. He is rather like the notorious philosopher who announced that his next lecture on 'The unreality of time' had been put back from 2 o'clock to 5 o'clock. Few scientists worry about whether a table is an illusion hiding a reality of atoms or whether it is real and represented by atoms in a useful fiction; two beliefs operate in different contexts and are judged in so far as they do their separate jobs. When beliefs enter the general social structure, however, their relevance to the action of the scientist cannot be appreciated and they must be judged in the context of social activities and their controlling paradigms, as these are the only criteria available to the out- sider. Thus dissonance and opposition are far more likely to occur.

* * * * *

This article has presented a view of Western science which links its growth with the existence of permissive social structural features and minimises the distinc- tiveness of the thought of the individual scientist. My data have not been specifi- cally drawn from social anthropology: but the similarities between the two fields will, I think, be of interest to anthropologists who can read between the lines of what I have here presented.

NOTES

I am indebted to Dr Mary Douglas and to Mr David Bloor of the Science Studies Unit, University of Edinburgh, for discussion of many of the points in this article.

102 S. B. BARNES

I I believe there is evidence that some scientists today have become aware of the way in which theories have changed, i.e. have become in a way conscious of what Kuhn describes; this aware- ness alters the behaviour of these scientists and thereby invalidates Kuhn's diagnosis.

2Horton takes the opposite view, he quotes ' . . . an English medical student, newly exposed to the scientific attitude,' as saying 'You seem to be as if when learning to skate, trying to find a nice hard piece of ice which you can stand upright on instead of learning how to move on it. You continue trying to find something, some foundation piece which will not move, whereas everything will move and you've got to learn to skate on it' (Abercrombie I960). However, it was not 'the scientific attitude' that this student was being faced with. The teaching contents which shook him were so unusual that Abercrombie wrote a book about them and their results. The book in fact records how students who had only experienced the normal forms of scientific training responded to a 'be suspicious of everything' type of approach.

3 The examination of scientific controversies provides good support for these views. Take the nineteenth century disputes between Darwinian and Lamarchian evolution or earlier between the Plutonist and Neptunist geologists; or more recently the valence-bond molecular- orbital controversy in chemistry, or again the steady state cosmology opposed by its 'expanding universe' alternative. In all these cases scientists have taken sides in the dispute and hurled evidence at each other (and sometimes polemic too). Further these are cases where the existing evidence has been clearly insufficient (at the time) to decide in favour of one view and some of the controversies have resolved themselves by allowing both theories limited validity.

4There is an unfortunate tendency for the success of modern science to lead to the view that a distinctive method of thought must have been involved. In itself this argument must fail due to the number of independent material factors that have favoured modern science, e.g. the increasingly large numbers of leisured elites that grew in the west, the unique technological resources, the refined quantitative concepts based on a complex economy and the greatly increased efficiency of information stQrage that follows the adoption of written language.

5 There seems to be a disagreement here among anthropologists. Evans-Pritchard and Horton for instance stress equilibrium in beliefs and social institutions; by contrast Douglas (i966) in her discussion of primitive worlds stresses the diversity of individual beliefs and their stability only in so far as they are social institutions.

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