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BANK OWNERSHIP AND COST EFFICIENCY IN RUSSIA, REVISITED
MIKHAIL MAMONOV,CENTER FOR MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND SHORT-TERM FORECASTING (CMASF); RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES – INSTITUTE
FOR ECONOMIC FORECASTING; NATIONAL RESEARCH UNIVERSITY HIGHER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS (MOSCOW)
ANDREI VERNIKOVNATIONAL RESEARCH UNIVERSITY HIGHER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS;
RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES - INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS (MOSCOW)
World Congress on Comparative Economics (Rome, June 25-27, 2015)
Motivation
Literature on comparative bank efficiency in transition economies and Russia:Caner, Kontorovich, 2004; Bonin, Hasan, Wachtel, 2005; Fries, Taci, 2005; Grigorian, Manole, 2006; Golovan, 2006; Fries, Neven, Seabright, Taci, 2006; Golovan, Karminsky, Peresetsky, 2008; Karas, Schoors, Weill, 2010; Peresetsky, 2010; Fungáčová, Poghosyan, 2011
“Conventional wisdom”: Foreign-owned banks are the best performers (although Mian, 2006 and Lensink et al., 2008
claim otherwise) State-owned banks lag behind in terms of efficiency (is it always true?)
Previous studies on banking in EMs and transition have missed the distorting effect that the revaluations of both securities and the all types of assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currency (Revals) might have on banks’ costs This is especially true for dollarized and commodity countries like Russia Cost efficiency must be re-estimated
The positions held by various bank groups in the efficiency ranking are assumed to remain (i) independent from bank-specific factors and (ii) permanent over the sample period. But this assumption is out of line with empirical evidence. The intra-group causes of ranking change need to be modelled.
2
Revaluations: Is it important to account for them? (1)
3
* The peaks correspond to Sberbank
Frequency distribution of banks according to the materiality of Revals
(a) Distribution by the number of banks (b) Distribution by the share in total assets of the banking system
Revaluations: Is it important to account for them? (2)
The effects of Revals are unevenly distributed among banks at each point of observations, so they do matter for the estimation results.
4
Negative Revals as percentage of total costs
4/1/
2005
10/1
/200
5
4/1/
2006
10/1
/200
6
4/1/
2007
10/1
/200
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4/1/
2008
10/1
/200
8
4/1/
2009
10/1
/200
9
4/1/
2010
10/1
/201
0
4/1/
2011
10/1
/201
1
4/1/
2012
10/1
/201
2
4/1/
2013
10/1
/201
3
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
3.90.7
13.1
35.9
20.6
50.3
76.0
68.0
Banking system average 5th percentile 25th percentile
50th percentile 75th percentile 95th percentile
Objective
Perform SFA estimation of Russian banks cost efficiency, comparing state banks to privately owned banks and foreign-controlled banks
Action plan: Show the materiality of Revals for the performance of Russian banks and the
uneven distribution of such revaluation among banks Control for Revals in the stochastic frontier analysis of comparative cost
efficiency of different bank groups in Russia See how bank group ranking changes when Revals are dropped Explain empirically what drives the change in rankings.
5
Data
1. Bank-specific factors (BSF): The Bank of Russia web-site (www.cbr.ru)– monthly balance sheets of banks (Form 101);– quarterly profit and loss accounts (Form 102).
2. Macroeconomic controls (MACRO): The Federal State Statistics Service web-site (www.gks.ru)
3. Time period: Q1 2005 – Q4 2013 (40 quarters)
4. Number of banks (depending on the quarter):– in original sample: 705-1024;– in adjusted sample: 650-997 after excluding observations below 1st and above 99th percentiles
The number of observations ranges from 20 000 to 29 000 depending on the quarter and the bank’s involvement in different activities (lending, securities, fees & commissions, etc.).
6
Bank grouping
State-1 State-2 Private Foreign
Two sub-groups of state-controlled banks, rather than one group: core state-controlled banks: Sberbank, VTB, Rosselkhozbank (STATE-1) other state-controlled banks: between 37 and 54 banks, depending on the period
(STATE-2)
A refined definition of foreign banks (FOREIGN). Focus on foreign bank subsidiaries, i.e. banks controlled by foreign strategic investors. Filter out:
pseudo-foreign banks (those ultimately controlled by Russian capital); banks owned by portfolio investors and non-banking entities (private individuals,
international institutions, development agencies, car manufacturers, clearing companies, securities firms, etc.).
More detail: Vernikov A. (2015), A guide to Russian bank data: Breaking down the sample of banks // SSRN Working Paper Series No 2600738.
7
Preliminary statistics: Bank groups
8
The breakdown of the sample of banks (the number of banks and the group’s share in total assets of the sample in the respective quarter)
Period
Core state-controlled banks
(State-1)
Other state-controlled banks
(State-2)
Domestic privately-owned banks
(Private)
Foreign subsidiary banks (Foreign)
Total
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
4Q2005 3 36.8 28 11.7 745 41.7 27 9.8 803 100.0
4Q2006 3 35.0 30 12.7 865 42.5 27 9.8 925 100.0
4Q2007 3 36.7 33 12.0 891 39.9 34 11.4 961 100.0
4Q2008 3 38.3 45 17.7 871 32.1 37 11.9 956 100.0
4Q2009 3 39.8 46 18.5 920 31.3 46 10.4 1015 100.0
4Q2010 3 39.4 41 17.4 908 33.1 48 10.1 1000 100.0
4Q2011 3 40.8 37 17.5 880 32.0 45 9.7 965 100.0
4Q2012 3 41.5 36 17.0 857 32.4 43 9.1 939 100.0
4Q2013 3 42.6 36 17.7 820 31.7 42 8.0 901 100.0
Empirical strategy (1): two-step vs. one-step
1. Two-step approach (Maudos and Fernández de Guevara, 2007; Solís and Maudos, 2008; Berger et al. 2009; Turk Ariss, 2010): estimate (1) bank-level efficiency scores econometrically and then (2) its determinants
2. Wang and Schmidt (2002): at step (1) efficiency scores are supposed to be one-sided, but at step (2) – two-sided variable, which yields biased estimation results
3. Battesse and Coelli (1995) propose a one-step approach for stochastic frontier analysis (SFA): estimate (1) and (2) simultaneously
4. One-step approach (Bonin et al., 2005; Karas et al., 2010)
5. We choose two-step approach for basic estimations and one-step alternative – for robustness checks
9
Empirical strategy (2): outline
1. Estimate and compare the two alternatives of bank-level cost efficiency via Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) under production approach:
alt=1: with Revals KEPT (as in previous research);alt=2: with Revals DROPPED,using translog cost function with 3 input prices (funds, personnel, physical capital), 3 outputs (commercial loans, deposits, fee & commission), and 1 netput (equity capital).
2. Aggregate bank-level SFA-scores into group-level for the following bank groups: STATE-1, STATE-2, FOREIGN, and PRIVATE (equaled weights)
3. Explain group rankings changes in terms of SFA-scores in a static panel framework:
where X is equity-to-assets ratio (h=1; the risk preferences case) OR loans-to-assets ratio (h=2; the assets composition case), which are, by assumption, responsible for changes in bank or banks’ groups positions in efficiency rankings over time; BSF and MACRO – other bank-specific and macroeconomic control variables; ε – regression error
2-step GMM is employed to address endogeneity and heteroscedasticity concerns in baseline regressions
Determine the distances
10
it
M
mmm
K
kitkkithh
jithjhj
jjhjih
altit MACROBSFXXGROUPGROUPSFA
11,,
3
1,
3
1,
)(
ihhjhjaltijj XSFAGROUPeachfor ,
)(,:
Empirical strategy (3): details
1. Translog cost function: general representation
alt=1: with Revals KEPT (as in previous research);alt=2: with Revals DROPPEDv is two-sided random error; u is one-sided inefficiency term (positive half-N distrib.)
2. Translog cost function: full representation
3. Bank-level cost efficiency score (SFA-score) takes the form:
11
ititititmitalt
it uvEQTrendPYfOC ln;;;lnln ,)(
}ˆexp{ )()( altit
altit uSFA
itqr q
itrrqm
itmmitlk j
itkklj
itjjalt
it PPPYYYOC ,
3
1
3
1,
3
1,,
3
1
3
1,
3
1,0
)( lnln2
1lnlnln
2
1lnln
itm
itpmj
itjjitus u
itssu EQTTTPTYPY lnlnlnlnln 12
21
3
1,
3
1,,
3
1
3
1,
itititm
ititmmj
ititjjit uvEQTEQPEQYEQ
lnlnlnlnlnln3
1,
3
1,
22
Preliminary statistics: translog cost function
12
Descriptive statistics of variables in the cost function (2005 Q1 – 2013 Q4)
Unit Symbol Mean St.Dev Min Max Obs Banks
Dependent variables
Total costs minus interest expenses minus Revals
RUB bn 7.7 69.8 0.0 2904 30784 1196
Total costs minus interest expenses
RUB bn 19.2 207.2 0.0 8886 30753 1196
Explanatory variables
Loans to households and nonfinancial firms
RUB bn 18.2 206.7 0.0 10015 30045 1159
Retail and corporate accounts and deposits
RUB bn 16.6 205.1 0.0 10375 30635 1191
Fee and commission income RUB bn 0.5 5.0 0.0 220.6 30635 1189
Average funding rate % 4.9 2.8 0.0 50.1 29365 1152
Price for personnel expense % 4.1 3.3 0.1 49.5 30784 1196
Price of physical capital % 23.7 22.4 0.2 180.0 30784 1196
Equity capital RUB bn 3.8 40.8 0.0 1954 30745 1196
)1(itOC
)2(itOC
itY ,1
itY ,2
itY ,3
itP ,1
itP ,2
itP ,3
itEQ
Estimation results 1/2: bank-level cost efficiency
13
Aggregate results of cost efficiency estimations: Frequency distribution of banks’ SFA scores as average of 2005Q1-2013Q4 (production approach)
5.60
10.8
3
16.0
6
21.2
9
26.5
2
31.7
6
36.9
9
42.2
2
47.4
5
52.6
8
57.9
1
63.1
4
68.3
7
73.6
0
78.8
3
84.0
6
89.2
9
94.5
2
99.7
5
0
5
10
15
20
25
alt=1: Revals kept alt=2: Revals dropped
Bank-level SFA-scores
% o
f tot
al n
umbe
r of
ban
ks
Estimation results 2/2: group-level cost efficiency in dynamics
alt=1: Revals kept alt=2: Revals dropped
Group-level SFA scores (arithmetic averages within each group)
142
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q2102030405060708090
100
Private State-1 State-2 Foreign
Ban
ks' S
FA s
core
s100 - Efficiency frontier
CR
I-S
IS
20
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q12
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102030405060708090
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Private State-1 State-2 Foreign
Ban
ks' S
FA s
core
s
100 - Efficiency frontier
CR
ISIS
GMM estimation results 1/3: what explains the within- and between-group heterogeneity of cost efficiency? Dependent variable: SFA cost efficiency score
15Revals KEPT DROPPED
M1.1 M1.2 M1.3 M2.1 M2.2 M2.3Dummy variables for bank ownership status (Domestic privately-owned banks is a referent group)
State-1 2.780 –1.584 –4.390 2.704* –5.365** 15.123***
State-2 8.559*** 7.387*** 7.055** 1.672*** 1.895*** 5.643***
Foreign –16.222*** –7.939*** –28.756*** –0.021 –4.456*** –20.925***
Bank-specific factors explaining within-group heterogeneity of cost efficiency
Equity-to-assets ratio (ETA) 0.661*** 0.676*** 0.638*** 0.426*** 0.417*** 0.419***
ETA × State-1
0.386
0.569***
ETA × State-2
0.090
–0.021
ETA × Foreign
–0.453***
0.241***
Loans-to-assets ratio (LTA) 0.607*** 0.606*** 0.589*** 0.439*** 0.439*** 0.428***
LTA × State-1
0.107
–0.244***
LTA × State-2
0.023
–0.074***
LTA × Foreign
0.215***
0.371***
No. of obs. (banks) 19546 (967)
19546 (967)
20319 (978)
19573 (967)
19573(967)
20319 (978)
Centered R2 0.337 0.369 0.352 0.557 0.559 0.549No. of endog. vars., excluded instruments 6, 12 9, 15 9, 15 6, 12 9, 15 9, 15P-value for Hansen J-stat 0.558 0.569 0.719 0.143 0.221 0.167Centered R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
***, ** and * – an estimate is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are not reported. Other bank-specific and macro controls are not reported in order to preserve space.
GMM estimation results 2/3: Ranking of group-level cost efficiencies based on heterogeneity factor No.1 (equity-to-assets ratio, ETA)
16
***, ** and * – an estimate is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are not reported
Outcomes:1) If Revals are kept, Foreign banks are always the least cost efficient group. But if Revals are dropped, Foreign with high ETA ratios are more cost efficient as compared to Private and State-2 groups;2) If Revals are kept, State-1 are always less cost efficient than State-2. But if Revals are dropped, State-1 with high ETA ratios outperform all the other groups
Percentile p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Panel 1: Revals KEPT (Model M1.2)
State-1 1.807 2.331 3.153 4.343* 6.592**
State-27.993*** 8.176*** 8.417*** 9.018*** 10.115***
Foreign–11.670*** –12.967*** –14.981*** –19.120*** –26.742***
Panel 2: Revals DROPPED (Model M2.2)
State-1–0.370 0.403 1.614 3.368** 6.679***
State-21.753*** 1.711*** 1.654*** 1.514*** 1.258***
Foreign–2.471*** –1.781** –0.709 1.493* 5.548***
Panel 3: Percentiles of ETA distributions within particular group of banks
State-18.8 10.1 12.3 15.3 21.2
State-26.7 8.8 11.5 18.1 30.3
Foreign8.2 11.1 15.6 24.7 41.5
Private8.2 11.0 16.5 27.1 44.3
GMM estimation results 3/3: Ranking of group-level cost efficiencies based on heterogeneity factor No.2 (loans-to-assets ratio, LTA)
17
***, ** and * – an estimate is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are not reported
Outcomes: When Revals are dropped, 1) State-1 banks can become the most cost efficient group if they substantially decrease LTA ratio; 2) On the contrary, Foreign banks are the most cost efficient only in case they substantially increase LTA.
Percentile p10 p25 p50 p75 p90Panel 1: Revals KEPT (Model M1.3)
State-1–0.453 0.286 2.141 2.702 3.224
State-27.568*** 7.975*** 8.262*** 8.488*** 8.695***
Foreign–27.380*** –23.573*** –18.699*** –15.599*** –13.536***
Panel 2: RevRevals DROPPED (Model M2.3)
State-16.140*** 4.454** 0.223 –1.058 –2.247
State-24.006*** 2.708*** 1.793*** 1.072*** 0.410
Foreign–18.552*** –11.989*** –3.586*** 1.758** 5.316***
Panel 3: Percentiles of LTA distributions within particular group of banks
State-136.8 43.7 61.1 66.3 71.2
State-222.0 39.4 51.7 61.4 70.3
Foreign6.4 24.1 46.7 61.1 70.7
Private23.3 39.4 54.8 66.7 75.8
Robustness check: Overview
We check the robustness of the findings by re-estimating Translog cost function and respective SFA scores
within the intermediation approach instead of the production approach; by adding more outputs (securities, foreign assets); by estimating total costs rather than operating costs as a dependent variable.
Empirical dependences of group rankings on risk preferences or assets composition within The production approach and Instrumental Variables (IV) Tobit estimation technique
rather than GMM procedure to account for the censored nature of SFA scores (i.e. lower and upper bounds, 0 and 100, respectively);
The intermediation approach and 2-step GMM procedure; The intermediation approach and IV Tobit estimation technique.
Our main outcomes remain qualitatively unchanged.
18
Robustness check: Banks groups’ SFA scores re-estimated 1/3
Adding securities into the translog (operating) cost function:
19
2005
q120
05q3
2006
q120
06q3
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07q3
2008
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08q3
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10q3
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11q3
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12q3
2013
q120
13q3
102030405060708090
100
Private State-1 State-2 Foreign
100 - Efficiency frontier
CRI-SIS
Ban
ks' S
FA s
core
s
Robustness check: Banks groups’ SFA scores re-estimated 2/3
Adding securities and foreign assets into the translog (operating) cost function:
20
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q120
05q3
2006
q120
06q3
2007
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07q3
2008
q120
08q3
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09q3
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100
Private State-1 State-2 Foreign
100 - Efficiency frontier
CRI-SISB
anks
' SFA
sco
res
Robustness check: Banks groups’ SFA scores re-estimated 3/3
Replacing operating costs with total costs in the translog cost function:
21
2005
q120
05q3
2006
q120
06q3
2007
q120
07q3
2008
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08q3
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09q3
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13q3
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Private State-1 State-2 Foreign
100 - Efficiency frontier
CRI-SIS
Ban
ks' S
FA s
core
s
Robustness check: IV-Tobit estimation results 1/2Ranking of group-level cost efficiencies based on heterogeneity factor No.1 (equity-to-assets ratio, ETA)
22
***, ** and * – an estimate is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are not reported
Outcomes: the same
Percentile p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Panel 1: Revals KEPT (Model M1.2)
State-11.548 2.028 2.780 3.869 5.924
State-27.921*** 8.128*** 8.400*** 9.078*** 10.314***
Foreign–11.785*** –13.090*** –15.116*** –19.278*** –26.942***
Panel 2: Revals DROPPED (Model M2.2)
State-1–0.678 0.165 1.488 3.403** 7.018***
State-21.677*** 1.665*** 1.648*** 1.608*** 1.534**
Foreign–2.635*** –1.952** –0.892** 1.286** 5.297***
Panel 3: Percentiles of ETA distributions within particular group of banks
State-18.8 10.1 12.3 15.3 21.2
State-26.7 8.8 11.5 18.1 30.3
Foreign8.2 11.1 15.6 24.7 41.5
Private8.2 11.0 16.5 27.1 44.3
Robustness check: IV-Tobit estimation results 2/2Ranking of group-level cost efficiencies based on heterogeneity factor No.2 (loans-to-assets ratio, LTA)
23
***, ** and * – an estimate is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are not reported
Outcomes: the same
Percentile p10 p25 p50 p75 p90Panel 1: Revals KEPT (Model M1.3)
State-1–0.739 –0.010 1.818 2.371 2.885
State-27.563*** 7.987*** 8.286*** 8.522*** 8.738***
Foreign–27.188*** –23.466*** –18.699*** –15.668*** –13.650***
Panel 2: Revals DROPPED (Model M2.3)
State-15.517*** 3.951*** 0.023 –1.166 –2.270
State-24.079*** 2.764*** 1.836*** 1.106*** 0.435
Foreign–18.378*** –11.881*** –3.561*** 1.729*** 5.252***
Panel 3: Percentiles of LTA distributions within particular group of banks
State-136.8 43.7 61.1 66.3 71.2
State-222.0 39.4 51.7 61.4 70.3
Foreign6.4 24.1 46.7 61.1 70.7
Private23.3 39.4 54.8 66.7 75.8
Reality check: What’s wrong with foreign banks in Russia?
The share of foreign banks in the Russian banking sector never exceeded 20% (now c. 10%) whereas in the majority of transition countries foreign banks prevail. Small market shares; inability to explore economies of scale
Some of foreign banks entered the Russian banking system just before the 2008-2009 crisis; lost money; became dormant
Risk aversion Institutional misalignment. The greater the difference in institutions between
the home and host countries, the stronger the negative effect that foreign banks can have on cost efficiency of the host banking system (Lensink, Meesters, Naaborg. Bank efficiency and foreign ownership: Do good institutions matter? JBF, 2008)
24
Conclusions 1/2
The effects of Revals are material for, and unevenly distributed among, banks in Russia, so they do affect the efficiency estimation results and upset bank group rankings
Having controlled for Revals in SFA-scores estimations, we find that, on average: efficiency scores become higher and less volatile across the board; the spreads between different types of banks in terms of efficiency shrink; foreign bank subsidiaries appear to be the least efficient market participants; during financial turmoil the efficiency of banks grows as compared to normal
circumstances; the core state banks are more efficient than other state-controlled banks in the post-
crisis period and nearly as efficient as domestic private banks.
Through GMM and Tobit estimations we show that bank-level characteristics such as asset composition and risk preference can help modelling the changes in the bank group rankings
25
Conclusions 2/2
GMM and Tobit estimations within production approach and intermediation approach demonstrate that: the core state banks tend to be the most efficient group in case they hold larger
equity capital and decrease loans-to-assets ratio (pursue non-interest income); conversely, foreign subsidiary banks can outperform other groups in terms of cost
efficiency only when they substantially increase lending These findings only become visible after Revals are dropped.
Some of our results are consistent with previous research in that state-owned banks are not necessarily less efficient as compared to privately-owned banks (Karas, Schoors, Weill, 2010)
Others results challenge the conventional wisdom with regard to the general level of Russian bank efficiency, the performance of foreign-controlled banks (Bonin, Hasan, Wachtel, 2005; Fries, Taci, 2005; Grigorian, Manole, 2006) and bank behavior during crises.
Our approach is applicable to other dollarized emerging markets.
26
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION!
MIKHAIL MAMONOVCENTER FOR MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND SHORT-TERM FORECASTING (CMASF); RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES -
INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC FORECASTING; NATIONAL RESEARCH UNIVERSITY HIGHER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS (MOSCOW, RUSSIA). EMAIL: [email protected]
ANDREI VERNIKOVNATIONAL RESEARCH UNIVERSITY HIGHER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS;
RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES - INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS (MOSCOW, RUSSIA). EMAIL: [email protected]