Bank One Case

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Bank One:“The UncommonPartnership”

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“If Lou Grant could only see me now!” Mason Adamssaid as he stepped onto the rooftop of the 24-story

Columbus Center, the headquarters of Banc OneCorporation. It was October 1979. Adams was there tobegin filming a new series of Bank One TV spots. Asreported by Johanna M. White, Marketing Administratorof Banc One Corporation, the Friday night filming ranwell into early Saturday morning as the 40-degree weatherand high winds continued throughout the filming. “Thesite for the announcement of our name change spot wasselected to dramatize the moment of change,” explainedJohn A. Russell, at that time Bank One Vice Presidentand Director of Marketing.

Mason Adams, more popularly recognizable as EdAsner’s boss on the “Lou Grant Show,” had been selectedas spokesman for City National Bank, re-named BankOne, and all of the corporation’s affiliate banks in Ohio.“We’ll look back on October 22, 1979, the first day for our

Bank One:“The UncommonPartnership”

This case was prepared by Peter L. Phillips,at the Design Management Institute, incollaboration with Stephen A. Greyser,Harvard Business School, as a basis forclass discussion rather than to illustrateeither effective or ineffective handling of anadministrative situation.

D E S I G N M A N A G E M E N T I N S T I T U T E C A S E S T U D Y


use of our unified identification, as a veryimportant event in the history of our holdingcompany and our affiliate banks,” Adams saidin his special filmed message to all associatesof Bank One. Adams had been engaged byBank One as a spokesperson only for thecampaign announcing the new name.

The first edition (Vol.1 No.1) of the BANKONE Wire, the corporation’s employeenewsletter, explained the change in identity.

“October 22, 1979 was the day when a newname took its place on the Columbus skylineand on the main streets in cities and townsacross Ohio. Although the people, their work,and the buildings from which they serve theircustomers remain the same, familiar nameslike City National Bank, Farmers Savings andTrust Company, Security Central, orCoshocton National Bank are no more. Intheir place a new name will grace the buildingsigns and appear across checks, deposit ticketsand literally hundreds of other forms. Thesimilar corporate name will replace First BancGroup in stock market listings. The newname is BANK ONE, the corporate identityBANC ONE.” (Logos for Bank One and BancOne Corporation are shown in Exhibit 1.)

Banc One President (since 1958) John G.McCoy explained the decision was made tomove to a common identity for all banks affil-iated with the Banc One Corporation to keeppace with the new Ohio bank branching law,to make possible more effective marketing,and to better identify in the minds of investorsthe collective success of all banks in the group.

“The conversion will allow group purchas-ing of certain supplies and the consolidationof a number of forms. Thus far, we havetrimmed the 1,017 different forms we usedto use in half.”

“Perhaps the single most importantelement in this name change,” McCoystressed, “is that we remember that each bankwill continue to operate locally to meet theunique needs of the community it serves. Acommon identity does not change theuncommon partnership.”

The History of Banc One

The history of Banc One Corporation beganin 1868 with the formation of Sessions and

Company. The McCoy family purchased thebank shortly after the turn of the century andrenamed it The City National Bank & TrustCompany. The bank continued to be run bythree generations of the McCoy family.

By 1968 the McCoy family had created abank holding company in order to acquireother small banks in the state of Ohio.Originally known as First Banc Group ofOhio, Inc., the name was changed to BancOne Corporation once acquisitions were tar-geted outside of the state of Ohio. Because theholding company was non-secured and non-insured, Ohio Banking law prohibited it fromusing the term “bank” with a “k” in the cor-porate name. However, they could use theterm “bank” (with a “k”) for their acquisi-tions. Consequently, they renamed The CityNational Bank & Trust Company as BankOne. Bank One records indicate that John G.McCoy was at first not happy with the name“Bank One” for the banks. A large number ofnames had been suggested, and tested withconsumers, but the name Bank One keptemerging as the clear favorite.

The holding company had, until this time,acquired only Ohio banks. The vision,according to John G. McCoy, was to crossstate borders and acquire banks nationwide.In order to unify all of these acquisitionsunder one name, it was believed the term“city” was no longer appropriate. Thus thecompany created two nomenclature systems:Bank One for the banks, and Banc OneCorporation for the holding company.

Patterns of Growth and Innovation

Over the 30-year period through 1999, theholding company grew from $31 million inassets to over $250 billion, according toMoody’s Investors Services.

Banc One Corporation’s strategy was togrow through acquisition as well as innova-tion. The acquisition process started in thestate of Ohio. Deane Richardson, chairmanemeritus of Fitch, Inc., a design and brandingfirm engaged by Banc One Corporation toassist in unifying the acquired banks’ identi-ties within the holding company, observedthe growth process. He stated: “During thoseearly years, mergers and acquisitions were

Bank One: The Uncommon Partnership

2 Design Management Institute Case StudyPurchased by Steve Tvardek ([email protected]) on March 25, 2013

based upon purely financial gain, not market-ing or branding strengths. As banks wereacquired one after the other in contiguouscounties across the state of Ohio, there wasoften resistance to any change in identity.These banks were very independent.”Richardson went on to explain that John G.McCoy recognized that he would have to findinnovative ways to convince these acquiredindependent banks to accept the change andembrace the marketing innovations Banc OneCorporation was aggressively pursuing.

Among those marketing innovations,McCoy and his holding company were thefirst to initiate and introduce a BankAmeri-card service outside of California, markingthe beginning of present day national creditcard programs. Banc One was also the firstfinancial corporation to introduce and installplastic card automated teller machines (1970).It was also the first banking organization tohandle a group of broker relationships forVISA cash management accounts includingMerrill Lynch, Dean Witter, and others(1981).

In 1984 John B. McCoy succeeded hisfather as CEO of the company. McCoy askedFitch to evaluate the changing customer activ-ities occurring in bank lobbies. As a result ofthis evaluation, Fitch designed “The Bank ofthe Future” in Kingsdale, a shopping center inUpper Arlington, a suburb of Columbus. The“new generation” Kingsdale Financial Centerincluded an interactive video center and asales boutique environment that offered suchservices as insurance, real estate, brokerageservices, and travel. According to Fitch, thegoal was to design a customer-oriented envi-ronment that would be perceived as a one-stop center providing an efficient and valuableresource for financial services of all kinds. TheKingsdale Financial Center was the forerun-ner to the Sawmill Financial Marketplace,opened by Banc One in Columbus in early1988. The Marketplace, which was open sevendays a week, featured investment, travel andtrust services, home financing and realtorservice, as well as all traditional bank services.

John B. McCoy hired John Fisher, a radiodisk jockey from New Jersey, to be Senior VicePresident of Marketing. Richardson describedFisher as being “very extroverted, charming,

and very easy to like.” One of Fisher’s firsttasks was to create programs to educate thebank’s customers on the benefits of usingATM machines and VISA cards. According toRichardson, at first customers didn’t trust thedevices, or the cards, and the acquired smallerbanks had no interest in installing thesystems. However, he said Fisher was highlysuccessful in educating both banks and cus-tomers so that Bank One was soon consideredthe most influential of the emerging “elec-tronic banks.” Fisher implemented aggressiveadvertising campaigns that were highlyfocused on customer needs and benefits and adeparture from the traditional ‘interest ratesand services available’ advertising style bankswere using at the time.

Due to the wide publicity the bankreceived under Fisher’s leadership, the pressbegan to refer to McCoy and Fisher as “TheUncommon Partnership.” Fisher used thisterm as a marketing positioning theme. Hereported his intent was to communicate, in apowerful and compelling way, that Banc Onebanks were “people’s banks.” McCoy wantedto be certain that all banks in the groupwould be perceived as “consumer-focusedbanks.” Fisher often referred to them as“Tiffany Banks.” The largest and most presti-gious competitor at the time was the Bank ofOhio. Banc One’s strategy was to differentiatethemselves from the older traditional finan-cial institutions by offering “an uncommonpartnership” with the bank customer.

Bank One: “The Uncommon Partnership”

Design Management Institute Case Study 3

Exhibit 1. Representation of two logos, one for BankOne and one for Banc One Corporation


Moving Beyond Ohio

Changes to banking laws in 1978 had permit-ted Ohio-based holding companies to pur-chase banks and conduct business outside thestate of Ohio. John B. McCoy graduallyexpanded the company’s holdings first toother midwestern states, and then furtherwest to Arizona, Texas, Colorado, and Utah.(Exhibit 2 lists the acquired companies anddates of acquisition through 1998.) In an arti-cle, “Searching for that old Banc One magic,”John W. Milligan described McCoy’s strategy:1

The strategy was called the Uncommon

Partnership, and it worked this way: McCoy

would use Banc One’s stock, which for years

carried one of the industry’s richest premiums,

to acquire highly profitable, well-run institu-

tions in attractive markets. Banc One would

leave the newly acquired bank’s management in

place and give it considerable local autonomy,

while also providing it with the company’s

extensive product set and marketing expertise

that rarely failed to further increase profits.

This would propel Banc One’s earnings, boost-

ing the stock and allowing McCoy to do even

more deals. Who wouldn’t want to sell out to

Banc One under such happy circumstances?

Everyone became a winner.

It had to end some time, just as great sports

dynasties inevitably run out of momentum and

must be rebuilt or reinvented. Banc One’s fall

from grace occurred in 1994, when concern

surfaced over its reliance on derivatives to boost

profitability, but in truth, McCoy was finding it

increasingly difficult to run such a large compa-

ny with its old decentralized framework. The

Uncommon Partnership was officially eulo-

gized on February 22, 1995, in a McCoy speech

to a gathering of his senior executives in Atlanta

when he offered a new vision of a new Banc

One—this one a national financial services

company that would operate with far greater

standardization, and in many instances central-

ization, than previously had been the case. The

bank’s binding constitution would now be a

‘National Partnership’ built on an obligation to

adopt common goals, objectives, and processes,

McCoy told his starting team in Atlanta.

Stronger Consumer Focus

A key implication of the new vision was astrategic shift to stronger consumer-orientedmarketing.

In April 1996, McCoy and the board ofBanc One Corporation hired Kenneth T.Stevens as chairman and chief executive ofBank One’s retail group. Stevens’ backgroundand expertise were in retail marketing toconsumers. He had been the president ofPepsiCo’s Taco Bell Corporation.

Banking Strategies magazine published aninterview with Stevens in late 1998 regardingthe specific changes he had been instituting atBank One.2

One of the things that attracted me to Bank

One was its reputation on the retail side. It was

known as a retail bank. But chief executive John

McCoy realized in the mid-1990’s that as good

as Bank One was from a retail standpoint, it

couldn’t go to market in a uniform, consistent

manner. It was a loose confederation of some 60


4 Design Management Institute Case Study

1. U.S. Banker, v 106,n6, pp 26-32,June 1996.

2. Kenneth Cline, senior editor, Banking Strategies

magazine, November/December, 1998.

Exhibit 2. List of acquisitions and datesBanc One Corporation—Interstate growth through acquisition of non-Ohio banks

1987 January, acquired American Fletcher Corporation, Indiana

1988 April, acquired Marine Corporation of Milwaukee, Wisconsin

1989 July, acquired Deposit Insurance Bridge Bank, Texas

1990 February, acquired Bright Banc Savings Association, Texas

1992 January, acquired Marine Corporation of Springfield, Illinois

March, acquired First Illinois Corporation, Illinois

November, acquired Affiliated Bankshares of Colorado, Inc., Colorado

November, acquired Team Bancshares, Inc., Texas

1993 March, acquired Valley national Corporation, Arizona

May, acquired Key Centurion Bancshares, Inc., West Virginia

December, acquired Central Banking Group, Inc., Oklahoma

1994 August, acquired Liberty National Bancorp, Inc., Kentucky & Indiana

1996 January, acquired Premier Bancorp, Inc., Louisiana

1998 April, acquired First Chicago NBD, Illinois*

* FirstChicago NBD had its headquarters in Chicago, Illinois, but also had a dominant presencein Michigan, Indiana, Florida, as well as international offices in Argentina, Australia, Canada,China, England, Germany, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan.


to 70 banks. Each one marketed in its own way.

So one of the opportunities was to move to

a line-of-business structure. John decided we

were going to look, feel and act like a national

company. When I got here, we began creating

a retail line of business. We established one

officially in May 1996.

We aspire to become the premier national

retailer of financial services. When we say

‘premier,’ we really want to be recognized as the

leader—not a leader, not part of the pack, not

pretty good, but the leader. And we have devel-

oped some metrics to chart where we are on

that journey. The second word, ‘national,’

means that we go to market in a uniform,

consistent manner, that we have national

performance standards, national metrics,

national products, just like any other company

that operates nationally.

‘Retailer’ is also a very important word to us.

We want to be known as a great retailer, not a

banking retailer or even a financial services

retailer. And what makes great retailers great is

that they know more about their customers

than anybody else. They’re able to take that cus-

tomer knowledge and use it productively on the

front line. The knowledge itself is great, but the

ultimate challenge is using it as a foundation

for fruitful programs and approaches.

In the same interview published in BankingStrategies, Stevens had this to say about hisapproach to branding at Bank One.

Our belief is, the way you create a great brand is

by delivering or creating that superior customer

service experience, having a ubiquitous distri-

bution system, and then wrapping all that in

compelling communications. It’s the whole

package that creates the brand.

The things we do that might be visible—

whether it’s putting Bank One on a Wheaties

box, as we did, or doing a sports sponsorship

—only work if they reinforce an experience that

we want people to have. That’s why every spon-

sorship or event that we do has to have an inte-

grated program associated with it. It’s not about

just giving an entity some money and getting

your name slapped up there. It’s really about

experiential branding.

Stevens was referring to the bank’ssponsorship relationship with the Arizona

Diamondbacks baseball team. As part of theagreement, the Diamondbacks named thestadium they built in Phoenix Bank OneBallpark; the announcement that the newstadium would be called Bank One Ballparkwas made on April 5, 1995, and the stadiumopened on March 31, 1998. Bank One putautomated teller machines in the stadium. Aside panel on the Wheaties box showed thecompany logo on that stadium. As part of theaffinity-marketing program, Bank Oneoffered consumers special checking accountswith Diamondbacks-imprinted checks.Stevens reported that in the first 14 weeks ofthe promotion the bank opened more than23,000 accounts. Bank One also initiatedsimilar affinity programs with the ColoradoRockies baseball team.

In 1997, Banc One Corporation acquireda seven-year-old Dallas-based credit cardcompany, First USA, Inc., a division of FirstUSA Bank. First USA, Inc. was generallyregarded as a leader in affinity programs,according to Stevens.

Creating the Bank One Brand

When Kenneth Stevens became chairman andchief executive of Bank One’s retail group inApril 1996, he stated that he was impressedwith the quality of the bank’s various retailproducts and offerings, but was concernedthat the bank was not ready to go to marketin a unified and consistent manner. Each ofthe 70 banks in the group was undertaking itsmarketing independently under the Bank Onename. McCoy and Stevens agreed that to beperceived as a national company, Bank Onewould have to look, feel, and act like a nation-al company.

Stevens asked the bank’s advertisingagency, The Martin Agency, to conduct asearch for brand consultants to assist in theprocess. Martin narrowed the search to threefirms and finally recommended Fitch to bethe brand consultants for Bank One inSeptember 1997.

Fitch had worked with the McCoys andBanc One Corporation in previous years on avariety of projects including the KingsdaleFinancial Center (described above). Thisexperience with the corporation during its


Design Management Institute Case Study 5Purchased by Steve Tvardek ([email protected]) on March 25, 2013

evolution persuaded Stevens to engage Fitchas Bank One’s brand consultant firm.

Separately, Stevens hired Brad Iversen asExecutive Vice President and Director ofMarketing in August 1997. Iversen had previ-ous experience in developing branding pro-grams while he was in charge of marketingwith Nations Bank during their re-branding.

Brad Iversen described his philosophy ofbranding this way. “The process of developinga truly strong and enduring brand is amarathon—not a sprint. There is no reasonto rush. This process is not about advertisingor tag lines, it is about strategy, perception,and behavior.” Iversen explained that, fromhis viewpoint, what was needed was a clear,simple way to embrace the needs of all thebank’s lines of business. In order to do this itwould be critical to take the time to get inputfrom key stakeholders in each business. To besure each business was represented accurately,Iversen required Fitch to conduct interviewswith not only the presidents of each businessbut also senior executives at least one leveldown from the president.

Fitch conducted monthly meetings ofthese line-of-business groups at theirColumbus-based agency headquarters for oneyear. Discussions were not limited exclusivelyto Bank One or even the banking industry.Participants were encouraged to discuss whyand how various brands outside the bankingindustry worked or didn’t work. Iversenexplained that the purpose of discussing thesebrand situations was to coach participants inunderstanding that branding and advertisingwere not one and the same.

Iversen and Fitch established four rules forthese discussions:

1. Every subject is open and on the table fordiscussion.

2. The word “No” cannot be used.3. The phrase, “It can’t be done in a bank,”

was not allowed.4. No negative attitudes would be permitted.

During these discussions, no one sat at the“head” of the table. Rather everyone was con-sidered to simply be “at” the table. The Fitchteam consisted of everyone, at all levels, whowould be involved with the project, not justthe account executives. The Martin Agency

personnel also attended these discussionmeetings.

In Iversen’s view, the sessions were highlyproductive and led to a great deal of trustamong all parties for the process.

During this one-year period of “discovery”in 1997-8, Iversen said that senior manage-ment “really pushed the team hard.” The keyquestion was whether the team really coulddevelop a consistent branding strategy thatwould meet the needs of all the business unitsequally. From Iversen’s point of view, a criticalissue was how to communicate this activityinternally. “How do you make 93,000 employ-ees aware of the project and its purpose, andhow do you get them involved?”

Bill Faust, CEO of Fitch at the time, statedthat an internal communications plan wasdeveloped during 1998. It included a series ofworkshops with those in middle managementwho would have to deal hands-on withbranding issues on a day-to-day basis. Eachworkshop included from 20 to 25 people andparticipants were called “Brand Purveyors.”

In addition to these monthly meetings andmiddle management workshops, Fitch con-ducted a visual audit of all current Bank Onebusiness materials as well as those of com-petitors. Forty executives were selected forpersonal interviews, including Stevens andJohn B. McCoy. Existing Bank One customerresearch was reviewed. During the summer of1998 a draft senior management presentationwas developed.

Fitch developed a time line for the entireproject, shown in Exhibit 3. Fitch also createda list of key deliverables that included a brandarchitecture, brand positioning, a descriptionof brand characteristics, and a “brand toolkit.”

Fitch and Bank One also developed aBrand Vision booklet for prospective distri-bution to all employees in late 1998. Theforeword to this booklet explained itspurpose:

This book was designed to help you understand

our brand vision. The brand vision reflects the

needs of our customers within all our lines of

business. It integrates ideas, comments, and

decisions from many of our executives and

employees.

Reading and understanding this book is a key



step in the evolutionary process toward building

and managing the Bank One brand as one of

our most valuable assets in the years ahead.

The booklet also explained the company’svision of a successful brand.

Branding is an integral part of doing business

and rising above the competition. A strong

brand can sum up and symbolize the many

facets of a complex organization, its products

and services, its philosophy, and its people.

The most effective brands create broad

awareness and build loyalty through every

interaction and communication. Time has

proved that the investment of money and effort

yields significant financial results. Brands are

highly valued corporate assets.

On the facing page, the draft booklet showedfour corporate logos that the companybelieved represented strong brands: GE, Coca-Cola, IBM, and amazon.com. (Exhibit 4reproduces the page with the logos and Fitch’saccompanying text regarding what successfulbrands can achieve.)

Merger with First Chicago NBD

According to Iversen and Faust the Bank Onebranding project was working according toschedule. The time line had been strictly fol-lowed—until the eighth month (April 1998).It was then that First Chicago NBD (a com-mercial bank) and Bank One agreed to merge.First Chicago and NBD had previouslymerged in 1995. The decision to merge withBank One just three years later, according toIversen, came as a surprise to many people inthe banking industry—primarily becauseBank One had always been positioned as aretail bank and First Chicago NBD had astrong position as a commercial bank.

Suddenly Bank One was not just a retailbank. Many facets of the evolving brand iden-tity program would have to be revisitedimmediately.

A document produced by Bank Onedescribes First Chicago NBD as follows:

In 1863, the First National Bank of Chicago

began operating under Charter #8, granted by

the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency.

Acquisitions of other financial services

companies began as early as 1881 and in recent

years have included the purchase of many local

banks, bank holding companies, and savings

and loans. They include American National

Corporation, First United Financial Services,

Gary-Wheaton Corp., Morgan Shareholders

Services Trust Company, and Lake Shore

National Bank.

The roots of NBD are in Detroit, where in

1933 it was capitalized equally by General

Motors Corporation and the Reconstruction

Finance Corporation. Both General Motors and

the RFC divested their interests in the bank

during the 1940’s.

Through a number of acquisitions, NBD

went on to become the largest banking compa-

ny in Indiana and Michigan and gained signifi-

cant trust presence in Florida.

The 1995 merger of equals between NBD

and First Chicago Corporation joined two

major and respected Midwest financial services

institutions.

In 1998, [the now-named] First Chicago

NBD had a dominant presence in Michigan,

Indiana, Florida, and Illinois, as well as interna-

tional offices in Argentina, Australia, Canada,

China, England, Germany, Japan, Mexico, South

Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan.

Immediately upon learning of the merger,Brad Iversen contacted his counterpart atFirst Chicago NBD to explain the brandinginitiative that had been underway for eightmonths at Bank One, and to discuss ways toget the program adapted to and incorporatethe needs of First Chicago NBD. The firstreaction from First Chicago NBD, Iversenrecalled was, “You are a retail bank, we are acommercial bank, and your identity has noth-

Exhibit 3. Fitch timeline



Brand Development Time Line Discovery July-September 1997 Definition (Architecture/Positioning)October-December1997 Management Input January-February 1998 Preliminary Brand Language March-April 1998 Demonstration Projects May-August 1998 Management Input September-October1998


ing to do with us.” Those involved at the timeremember that executives from both organi-zations reported that it was evident therewould be a culture clash between the banksthat would have to be addressed carefully.

A New Identity Challenge

Up until the point of merger with FirstChicago NBD, all of the brand developmentdiscussions and strategies had been focusedon retail and consumer activities. A key issuethat was debated by each participating workgroup had been which of three brand archi-tectures to adopt: monolithic (single masterbrand), discrete brand (individual brandsfor different units), or endorsed (individualbrands with each unit identified as part of acorporate parent). John McCoy had favoredthe monolithic, single master brand,approach because, in his view, it would offergreater efficiencies and economies of scale,provide more leverage in the global market-place, unify what had become a diverseorganization, and allow the corporation tocapitalize on existing equity. Faust reportedthat all the work groups had agreed. This

strategy had worked well for Banc One fora number of years, while it acquired othersmaller, retail banks. During this acquisitionperiod, most of the local bank brands hadbeen deleted. This practice had slowlydeveloped considerable equity in the BankOne name.

First Chicago NBD executives understoodwhat the Bank One Retail Bank Group wasdoing, but resisted becoming part of a brandthat was being focused so completely on retailactivities. Iversen reported that First ChicagoNBD favored an endorsed approach, e.g., “ABank One Company.”

John Tomick, Senior Vice President ofAdvertising at First Chicago NBD, was the firstFirst Chicago NBD employee hired by BankOne in the fall of 1998. He was made BankOne’s Senior Vice President of MarketingServices, instantly becoming an integral mem-ber of the brand development team.According to Iversen: “Tomick brought strongbranding knowledge and experience to thetable, but more importantly he was wellregarded by, and credible with First Chicagomanagement. He had great knowledge of theFirst Chicago NBD history and culture that



Exhibit 4. GE, Coca-Cola, IBM, amazon.com logos from vision book


would be very important to resolving the issueof how to combine both brands effectively.”

John Tomick stated that it was his beliefthat the overall project had to fall between anintegrated brand strategy approach (a strategyto effectively combine each bank’s market-place positioning), and a primarily graphics-based solution. He described First ChicagoNBD as a “money center” commercial bank,with the bulk of its profits from business-to-business transactions, even though it hadcharacteristics of a retail bank as well. BankOne was clearly more a retail bank. With its1997 purchase of the credit card division ofFirst USA Bank, and now with The FirstChicago NBD merger, the Banc OneCorporation was now engaged in three mainareas—retail banking, credit card services,and commercial banking.

To bring these three different core busi-nesses under one brand would require,according to Tomick, starting with building avery strong foundation. He used this analogy:“Like a house, you can paint it, spruce it up,and make some cosmetic changes, but youcan’t really do major remodeling until thefoundation has been strengthened and fixedwhere necessary.” Tomick advocated a knowl-edge-based brand architecture, “where allaudiences of all the diverse businesses arestudied to develop a very clear vision andmission.” He also wanted the cultural andstyle differences to be addressed between thetwo organizations. Bank One had been veryaction-oriented, even aggressive, according toTomick; First Chicago NBD had been moreconservative and “study” oriented. JohnTomick maintained that branding at BankOne was a work in progress that wouldcontinue for some time.

With the addition of Tomick to the branddevelopment group, work was undertaken tomodify the Bank One brand developmentinitiative to embrace the needs of FirstChicago NBD.

The Ongoing Brand Development Process

Brad Iversen believed that most branddevelopment projects put too much focuson advertising and not enough on “customer

experience.” For this reason, he changed thetitle of the position “Brand Manager” to“Director of Customer Experience.”

Bill Faust and the team at Fitch developedan approach to help the various work groupsfocus on a variety of concepts rather than justwords. They developed large collages of pho-tographs, found objects, bank artifacts (suchas credit cards, forms, etc.), and even clothing.These collages helped to focus group discus-sion on the differences among each line ofbusiness, its customers, and its individual cul-ture and personality. For example, Bank One(the retail bank) had adopted business casualdress for all employees every day. The moreconservative commercial bank, First ChicagoNBD, required more traditional businessdress each workday. Through a mix of con-cept photos, clothing, bank artifacts, andcompetitive materials in these mini-exhibits—work groups were given a spring-board for meaningful discussion of a varietyof concepts relating to the emerging brandarchitecture. They even explored a variety ofconcepts for bank and office environments.(Exhibit 5 shows illustrative photographs ofmaterials used in this process.)

The Fitch process asked the work groupsto articulate a positioning statement theythought would work for the whole companyas well as for various business groups.Following consensus across the work groupson a positioning statement, the next stepwould be to develop a definitive set of attrib-utes based on the positioning statement. Faustnoted that these attributes were largely aspira-tional, rather than current reality across theorganization. Thus, he said that it was neces-sary to have a plan that would demonstratehow each business unit could make theseattributes a reality within its group.

Eventually Fitch would create a series ofdemonstration modules for each businessunit to show employees exactly how theycould try to achieve their goals. The previous-ly-mentioned “Brand Vision” booklet forupper middle management had been devel-oped to guide them in embracing all the ele-ments of the emerging brand and tocommunicate these elements within theirrespective organizations consistently.



Exhibit 5. Various photos of collages





Implementing the Bank One Brand Identity

By autumn 1998, agreement had beenreached on the brand architecture for themerged companies. All business unit presi-dents, Stevens, McCoy, and Verne G. Istock,Chairman of the Board, had approved thenew brand identity. It was to be a monolithicarchitecture with all business units operatingunder the Bank One name.

To support the new identity, Fitch devel-oped a “Brand Toolkit.” It contained all of theprecise standards, guidelines, templates, andrationale for implementing the brand compa-ny-wide. The toolkit took the form of a small,spiral-bound booklet. The stated purpose ofthe toolkit was to document the elements ofthe Bank One brand identity system and pro-vide guidelines for their use. Both Istock andMcCoy signed the foreword to the toolkitbooklet. Addressed to all Bank One employ-ees, it stated in part:

Bank One’s goal is to be among the top three

competitors in each of our lines of business and

in each market we serve. It’s more important

than ever that Bank One demonstrate a consis-

tent reflection of our brand to the public and to

all commercial and retail customers.

Text from the introduction to the toolkitinformed employees that:

The brand position should reflect how we are

perceived by our customers; therefore the

statements [that follow] are written from the

customers’ point of view.

Our Brand Position:

Bank One is more than a bank. It’s my trusted

source for financial services because it does

things that are in my best interest. It’s commit-

ted to delivering the best ideas and the best

solutions that I can act on with confidence. It

strives to make every experience I have easy and

understandable.

The contents of the toolkit were divided intosix sections: Statement of the Bank OneBrand Position; Core Elements which includ-ed the logotype, field of blue, and tone ofvoice; Secondary Elements including typogra-phy, color and photography; Differentiating

elements such as graphic use of the digit “1,”graphics in the field of blue, and use of theelement of surprise; MarketingCommunications application guidelines;Corporate Communications utilizing bothprinted stationery and electronic publishingtools. The toolkit also contained supportmaterials including reproduction art for thelogotype, color chips, and electronic files onCD. (Exhibits 6 and 7 depict the cover andsample pages from the toolkit.)

This toolkit was distributed in November1998, about six months after the merger hadbeen finalized. The toolkit was delivered to allmarketing and communications personnel ineach line of business as well as to all externalsuppliers of goods and services for each divi-sion. Fitch set up an 800 number and speciale-mail address as hot lines for anyone with aquestion about the contents of the toolkit.Key groups were given a live presentation byFitch staff. Other groups were simply sentcopies with instructions to speak first withtheir managers in the event of questions.

The new names and logos (Exhibit 1) wereunveiled in November 1998. According toJohn Tomick, during the initial transitionprocess the corporation used an endorsedapproach—“A Bank One Company”—afterthe name First Chicago NBD. This was emo-tionally more acceptable to First Chicagoemployees, customers, and investors, accord-ing to Tomick. “All audiences were importantand all audiences were looked at. FirstChicago NBD had a very clear vision andmission. Bank One did too. But [as noted

Exhibit 6. Toolkit cover




Exhibit 7. Toolkit inside spreads






above] Bank One was more action-orientedand aggressive than First Chicago NBD,which was more conservative and study-oriented. These differences have causedtensions.”

Reflections

In mid-1999, about eight months after theinitial rollout of the new name and brandstrategy, a task force of Fitch staff and BankOne staff began a process to evaluate whetherthe toolkit and brand precepts were workingas planned. Based upon both visual auditsand hot line question tracking and analysis,Faust believed there was nothing basicallywrong with the system but there were areaswhich needed greater clarification and neededto be covered in more depth.

The Bank One senior management groupand the consultants involved with the brand-ing program, still in its infancy at the time,admitted that it would require ongoing senior

management attention. Although manygroups in the company had embraced theprogram intellectually, some parts of thecompany initially resisted total involvement.Stronger, more compelling communications,according to Iversen, remained a key elementin the continuing process.

To address this situation, Tomick and hisstaff engaged an external communicationsconsulting firm to develop training modulesfor employees to help them understandbranding. As part of this project, a clear andwell-articulated corporate vision and missionstatement would be developed. The trainingmodule would address not only designelements of the brand identity, but alsobehavior, management style, and marketingphilosophy for the company. The stated goal:To effectively integrate and institutionalize themonolithic Bank One brand and its relatedphilosophy into all company cultures asquickly as possible. �


Documents

Bank One Case