Baltuta Aquinas on Intelligible Species Philosophia 2013

8/17/2019 Baltuta Aquinas on Intelligible Species Philosophia 2013

1/14

Aquinas on Intellectual Cognition: The Case

of Intelligible Species

Elena Baltuta

Received: 5 February 2013 /Revised: 5 April 2013 /Accepted: 14 April 2013 / Published online: 24 August 2013# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Abstract The paper argues in favour of a direct realist reading of Aquinas’s theoryof intelligible species, in opposition to the recent representationalist challenges. Inorder to secure the direct realist reading, the paper follows three steps: a short description of Aquinas’s process of cognition, a survey of the direct realist argumentsand the analysis of the representationalist interpretation. The final step consists of investigating the representationalist reading as it is suggested by two scholars,Claude Panaccio in Aquinas on Intellectual Representation and Robert Pasnau inTheories of Cognition in the Latter Middle Ages. Thus, the paper can be construed as

a reply to these two authors, due to the thorough attention paid to their argumentativetrails. With regard to Panaccio’s reading the paper focuses on the identity between theintelligible species and the essence of the extra-mental object and argues that Panaccio understands identity in a very narrow sense. Concerning Pasnau’s line of reasoning the focus is on the primum cognitum status of the intelligible species, andthe main argument is that intelligible species is understood by Aquinas as the quo andnot the quod of cognition. As the paper shows, neither one, nor the other interpreta-tion poses a threat to the direct realist reading of Aquinas’s intelligible species.

Keywords Cognitive and causal role . Direct realism . Formal identity . Intelligiblespecies . Primum cognitum . Representationalism . Thomas Aquinas

This article revolves around one question: what role do the intelligible species play inThomas Aquinas’s theory of human cognition? The question might seem simple, but the answer causes enough debate among scholars to split them in two major camps:direct realists and representationalists. The classical view, direct realism, treats theintelligible species as playing a causal role. Scholars such as Robert Pasnau andClaude Panaccio have recently challenged this view and suggested that a

Philosophia (2013) 41:589 – 602DOI 10.1007/s11406-013-9481-y

This paper was supported by the CNCS-UEFISCDI under the project PN-II-ID-PCE-2011-3-0661.

E. Baltuta (*)“Alexandru Dragomir ” Institute for Philosophy, Romanian Society for Phenomenology, Bd. MihailKogalniceanu nr. 49, ap. 45, Bucharest, Romania RO-050104e-mail: [email protected]


2/14

representationalist answer, according to which the intelligible species have a cogni-tive role, is more adequate to Aquinas’s doctrine of intelligible species. I will arguethat the classical view is sound enough to resist the representationalist challenge. Inorder to do this, I will follow three steps: I will present a sketch of Aquinas’s first

operation of the intellect, after which the direct realist interpretation will be intro-duced, and, in the end, I will analyze the representationalist arguments put forth byClaude Panaccio and Robert Pasnau. Such an investigation is worth pursuing for at least two reasons: it provides the necessary tools for solving a conflict of interpreta-tions, but, more importantly, it helps us understand the implications and the com- plexity of such a simple question, which in turn triggers a new way of understanding both Aquinas’s epistemology and the initial question itself.

According to Aquinas, the simple act of looking at an object, which normally doesnot take more than a few milliseconds, is made possible by a whole process that

involves complex mechanisms of cognition, enabling the human beings to receive,sort, store and transform the information about the external object. The cognition of an external object starts with the external senses. For example, when a cognizer, callhim John, is looking at a piece of amber, his five external senses receive the sensiblespecies1 of the object. The sensible species contains the forms of the properties of theexternal object. According to the realists, they are the means by which (id quo)2 our senses actually sense the object, and not what (id quod ) is sensed. At this particular moment, John can see the yellow colour of the semi-precious stone, can sense thetexture, and can observe its size and shape, which are called the proper and common

sensible.

3

After the external senses are informed, the internal senses

4

gather all theinformation and form a phantasm, an image of the external object. Now John can“see” this particular stone with this particular shade of yellow, with a specific texturalstructure, placed in this particular moment in time and under specific spatial coordi-nates. From the phantasms, to which the intellect will always need to return in order to get a glimpse of the individual, the agent intellect abstracts the intelligible species.5

John is now able to apprehend in what size, in what shape and in what genus this“object ” consists. Inside the realist framework, the intelligible species is the thing bymeans of which (id quo) we cognize, in virtue of its similarity relation to the essentialform of the object, and not that which (id quod ) is cognized. At the end of this process, John is able to know the quiddity6 or the essence of the external hylomorphic

1 The sensible species are, as the realists would say, the first causal intermediary entities we come intocontact with. They are numerically different in different cognizers, and are the quo of our cognition, themeans by which we know; based on their similitude with the object, they work as causal mediators.2 See S.c.G. (II, 75, 7; II, 98) (Aquinas 1961); S.Th. (I, q.76, a.2, ad 4; I, q.85, a.2) (Aquinas 1952).3 The objects of sensation can be the proper objects, namely colour, smell, etc., the common objects, likemovement, size, etc., and the accidental objects, like trees, people, etc., which exceed the power of a singlesense.4 The internal senses are: the common sense, which acts like the root of all external senses, the cogitative

power, which prepares the images and compares different individual intentions, the memory, which storesthe images and recognizes past experiences, and imagination, which retains and combines the images.5 According to the realist interpretation, the intelligible species is a causal intermediary entity which, just like the sensible species, is assimilated by the cognizer. This stands for the interpretation of the intelligiblespecies as the quo and not the quod of cognition.6 The quiddity of an object signifies what is common to all natures, through which the various beings are

placed in various genera and species. In the case of human beings, humanity is the essence that can besignified by a definition, which includes both the common matter (body) and the substantial form (soul).

590 Philosophia (2013) 41:589 – 602


3/14

object. The final step of this first operation ends with the intellect actively forming aconcept, which can later be signified by a spoken word, helping John actually tounderstand the external object.

Each intermediary entity, be it the sensible or the intelligible species, marks a different

stage in the process of cognition. The manner in which the relation between theseentities and the external object is understood marks the difference between a realist and arepresentationalist interpretation of Aquinas’s theory of cognition. The realist interpre-tation analyses this relation as one of formal identity. Basically this means that theintelligible species which inform the intellect have the same formal content as theobject ’s essential form: when John understands the piece of amber, he has in mind theessential form of amber, the same one which exists in the external object. This identity is possible because the essential form of amber is able to exist not only in the matter-formcompound, but also in John’s mind, where it is separated from its material substrate. In

the external object, the form exists materially and naturally, while in the mind of thecognizer, it has an immaterial and intentional way of existence. This is the so calledthesis of the double existence7 of the same form, and it is crucial for realism, because it isthe assertion on which objectivity and veridicality of the process of cognition are based.

The id quo status of the intermediary entities, the formal identity and the doubleexistence of a form are the most common themes discussed by the advocates of therealist interpretation, but there are, also, two further ones: the idea that a form has adouble aspect,8 as a mental accident is a particular, while its content is an universal,and on a special way of understanding the similitude ( similitudo) aspect of the

intermediary entities. The double aspect argument states that, although the intelligiblespecies has a universal mode of existence in the intellect due to the fact that it is ableto produce cognition, it also has a singular existence there: although cognition isabout universals, that which enables cognition has the existence of a singular in theintellect. The special approach to similitude is based on the recognition that in most of the passages where Aquinas speaks about species he describes them as a similitudo of the object ’s form. At this point one can suggest similitudo is more in accordance witha representationalist interpretation, than with a realist one. One can suggest that thischaracter of a form can lead to its being understood as a sign for the external object, asign which needs to be decoded in order to understand what it stands for. For example, when we say that A is similar to B or A is like B, we can understand that,though A and B share some features, they do not share all of them, therefore A and Bare not identical. And if one knows A by means of B, which is similar to A only insome respects, then how come one is able to know A for itself rather than just itsfeatures shared with B? Still, the similitudo character of the species is advocated asone of the main arguments in favour of the realist interpretation, and this is possible because similitudo is a technical term (Perler 2000, 115) which stands not for sign, but for agreement or sharing of a form. To overcome any possible problems relatedwith similitudo, the realists point to the analysis of one passage from Aquinas’sSumma Theologiae (I, q.4, a.3, co) in which it is stated that the term similitudo is to beunderstood not in the sense of similarity or likeness, but in the sense of agreement or

7 See S.c.G. (III, 49, 2) (Aquinas 1961), Quod. (VIII, q. 2, a. 2, co.) (Aquinas 1996)8 See S.c.G. (I, 46) (Aquinas 1961); II Sent. (d. 17, q. 2, a. 2, co.) (Aquinas 1929); Perler (2000), 114; Spruit (1994), 169.

Philosophia (2013) 41:589 – 602 591


4/14

sharing of form, therefore it shouldn’t be understood as a mere representation, but asa formal identity. The fact that the form changes its way of existence, from material toimmaterial can be seen as an argument in favour of casting aside the term “identity”(identitas).

To conclude, the realist interpretation rests on: (1) the formal identity between theintelligible species and the essential form of the extra-mental object, and (2) thedouble aspect of the form, as an accident in the mind of the cognizer and as anuniversal because it leads to cognition. The first argument has the following conse-quences: (1.1) the id quo status of the intelligible species – that by which and not that which are cognized; (1.2) between the intelligible species and the essential form of the extra-mental object there is a similitudo relationship that is understood as agree-ment in form or as sharing of form; (1.3) the double existence of a form – material andnatural in the extra-mental object, immaterial and intentional in the mind of the

cognizer.Allow me to explain the realist arguments by means of an example. The formulaC10H16O accompanied by the appropriate knowledge of chemistry enables John torecognize amber. But though, on the one hand, C10H16O can be taken to be the samething as the form of amber (formal identity), on the other hand, it exists differently inthe material compound, where it is connected with matter, and in the mind of thecognizer, where it has no connection whatsoever with any material determinations(double existence). This form, which resides in the mind, C10H16O, can be seen as theintelligible species, and thus is not the thing we know, but only a means of knowing

the external object, the id quo of cognition. The similitudo relationship is based on the sharing of the form. Namely, C10H16O is the same form which informs the matter inmaking the natural compound known as amber, and exists in the mind of thecognizer, apart from the material constituents, enabling cognition of the externalobject. Though the intelligible species has a singular existence in the intellect, it alsohas a universal mode of existence by being able to produce cognition (double aspect).In other words, although cognition is about universals, that which enables it, the formin the mind, has the existence of a singular in the intellect. Using the same amber example, we can say that C10H16O has a singular and accidental mode of existence inJohn’s mind, and, at the same time, it enables his intellect to achieve cognition of theuniversal essence of amber.

In an article from 2002,9 Claude Panaccio criticizes the formal identity theory byadvancing the hypothesis that the intelligible species cannot be identical with thequiddity of the extra-mental object, since the intellect ’s proper object, the quiddity, isnot multipliable, while the intelligible species is multipliable in different cognizers.This results in the fact that, though the intelligible species is that by which ( id quo) wecognize the external object, it is not being assimilated with it, it does not redirect thecognition, but it represents the essential form of the external object. Roughly speak-ing, by combining the attributes of the intelligible species – the quo of cognition,

9 Claude Panaccio, “Aquinas on Intellectual Representation”, in Chaiers d ’epistémologie 002/2652 (2000).In his latest article, “Mental representation”, in The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, vol. 1, eds.Robert Pasnau and Christina van Dyke, Cambridge, (2010), 346 – 56, Panaccio seems to leave room for amore moderated view, which takes into account the fact that Aquinas’s theory of intellectual cognition is

build on two different levels, one of the intelligible species and one of the concept, which interwine. Apart from this, the line of argumentation does not go astray from the previous one.

592 Philosophia (2013) 41:589 – 602


5/14

multipliable in different cognizers and having an accidental mode of existence – andthose of the quiddities – the quod of cognition, non-multipliable in different cognizersand having a universal mode of existence – , Panaccio builds his way up to theconclusion that these two entities are not and cannot be treated as identical.

In fact, what Panaccio does, is to reject the formal identity thesis on three grounds:(A) the object of cognition is the quiddity of the thing, the intelligible species is not the object of cognition, and therefore the intelligible species is not identical with thequiddity of the thing; (B) the quiddity is not multipliable in different cognizers, theintelligible species is multipliable in different cognizers, and therefore the intelligiblespecies is not identical with the quiddity; (C) the intelligible species has an accidentalmode of existence in the mind, the quiddity is an universal, so it has a universal wayof existence; something universal cannot have an accidental existence, and thereforethe intelligible species is not identical with the quiddity. Let us consider each of these

arguments.Reformulated, Panaccio’s first rejection (A) seems to take the following form: howis it possible for the quo of cognition to be identical with the cognized thing and yet not to be cognized? The first argument appears to be right, but let us take a look at how Aquinas describes the intelligible species as being „in a certain way the quiddityand the nature of the thing itself according to intelligible existence, and not according

to natural existence, as it is in things”10 (Quod.VIII, q.2, a.2, co.) What Aquinas says

here is that the form can have two different types of existence: a natural and materialexistence in the hylomorphic compound, and an immaterial and spiritual one in the

mind of the cognizer. Let us take an example: for a chemist multiple concentric layersof calcium carbonate (CaCO3) represent a pearl. Though the layers of calciumcarbonate and the pearl are one and the same thing, CaCO3 exists in a material andnatural way, connected with matter, in the pearl, and in an immaterial and intentionalway in the mind of the chemist, where it exists separated from any material determi-nations. CaCO3 is, according to the realist interpretation, the intelligible species of pearl, and therefore it is not the one we cognize, the quod of cognition, but that bywhich we cognize, the quo. What we actually cognize in a simple cognitive act is the pearl. Bearing in mind this double existence of the form, Panaccio’s first argument seems to lose its robustness because, from the standpoint of formal content, theintelligible species and the quiddity are in fact identical, meaning that they both refer to the same thing.

10“(…) quodammodo ipsa quidditas et natura rei secundum esse intelligibile, non secundum esse natural,

prout est in rebus.” In this article I will make use of the following Latin editions and shortcuts: Quaestiodisputata De spiritualibus creaturis ( D.S.C .), in Opera Omnia, ed. J. COS, XXIV-2 (Roma & Paris:Commissio Leonina - Les Éditions du Cerf, 2000); Quaestiones disputatae de Potentia ( D.P .), ed. P. M.Pession (Torino & Roma: Marietti 1965); Quaestiones disputatae de Veritate (Q.D.V .), in Opera Omnia, ed.H. F. Dondaine, XXII (Roma & Paris: Commissio Leonina & Cerf 1970 – 1976); Quaestiones quodlibetales

(Quod ), in Opera Omnia, ed. R. – A. Gauthier, XXV (Roma & Paris: Commisio Leonina & Les Éditions duCerf, 1996); Scriptum super libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi episcopi Parisiensis(Super.Sent.), ed. P. Mandonnet (Paris: 1929); Summa Theologiae (S. Th.), ed. P. Caramello (Torino &Roma: Marietti 1952); Summa contra Gentiles (S. c. G.), ed. C. Pera (Torino & Roma: Marietti 1961). I alsomake use of the following translations: for Summa Theologiae the translation of the Fathers of the EnglishDominican Province; for I Sent. (d. 5, q. 1, a. 2, co.), II Sent. (d. 4, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4), D.S.C. (a. 9, ad 6) andQ.D.V. (q. 1, a. 11, co.) Pasnau’s translation from Theories of Cognition in the Latter Middle Ages; for IISent. (d. 17, q. 2, a.1, ad 3) and Quod. (VIII, q.2, a.2, co.) my own translations.

Philosophia (2013) 41:589 – 602 593


6/14

Panaccio’s second argument against the identity between the intelligible speciesand the quiddity of the extra-mental thing tackles the problem of multiplication of species in different cognizers. As he puts it: the quiddity is not multipliable indifferent cognizers, the intelligible species is multipliable in different cognizers,

and therefore the intelligible species is not identical to the quiddity of the thing. Thissecond argument looks more convincing than the first one, if we take into account thetransitivity of identity. If all intelligible species are identical with the quiddity, theywill, by the transitivity of identity, be identical with each other; but they are not identical with each other, therefore the intelligible species are not identical with thething’s quiddity. However, let us not rush to any conclusions and instead ask onequestion: how should identity be understood in this case of cognition? In various placesAquinas states that the intelligible species is multipliable in different cognizers.11 Thisentails that if I and the abovementioned chemist look at the same miniature we both see

the redness of the paint, but our intelligible species are not the same. So far so good, but despite the fact that our species are different and, in consequence, they are different fromthe quiddity of the thing, how come we are still thinking about the same thing? The onlyway in which Panaccio’s second argument can make sense is if we understand identity asstrictly numerical identity. In this case, our species are indeed different and both aredifferent from the quiddity of the thing. There is but one crucial flaw in this reasoning:the issue at stake here is not numerical, but formal identity. In other words, thoughintelligible species1 and intelligible species2 are not identical because they are accidentsin the mind of the cognizer, they are identical qua representational content:

“To the third it is to be said that, according to Avicenna, the known species can be considered in two ways, either according to the existence that it has in theintellect, and in this way it has singular existence; or with respect to its being asimilitude of such a known thing, as it leads to its cognition, and from thisaspect it has universality: because it is not a similitude of this thing according toits being this thing, but according to the nature in which it agrees with othersindividuals of its species.”12 II Sent . (d.17, q.2, a.1, ad 3)

As it can be seen the intelligible species can be understood from two perspectives: asan accident in the mind of the cognizer, and as an universal because it leads to cognition.Regardless of whether the intelligible species of cinnabar is or not in my intellect, myintellect will not cease to exist. At the same time, these accidents of the mind enable thecognition of universal essences, given the fact that they have a universal content, sincethe intellect ’s immateriality allows only the cognition of immaterial universal entities,and, finally, from this perspective the intelligible species are universal. CaCO3 has asingular accidental mode of existence in my mind and, at the same time, it can be

11 See for example S.Th. (I, q. 76, a. 8, ad 4) (Aquinas 1952); Comp. Th. (1, 85): “Quia si est alius

intellectus in me, alius in te, oportebit quod sit alia species intelligibilis in me, et alia in te, et per consequens aliud intellectum quod ego intelligo, et aliud quod tu. Erit ergo intentio intellecta multiplicatasecundum numerum individuorum, et ita non erit universalis, sed individualis” (Aquinas 1979).12

“Ad tertium dicendum, quod secundum Avicennam species intellecta potest dupliciter considerari: aut secundum esse quod habet in intellectu, et sic habet esse singulare; aut secundum quod est similitudo talisrei intellectae, prout ducit in cognitionem ejus; et ex hac parte habet universalitatem: quia non est similitudohujus rei secundum quod haec res est, sed secundum naturam in qua cum aliis suae speciei convenit ”(Aquinas 1929).

594 Philosophia (2013) 41:589 – 602


7/14

regarded as an universal because, through its universal content, it enables me to achievecognition of the universal nature of pearlness. If the species is considered from thisdouble perspective, Panaccio’s second argument seems no longer sound, becausethough the intelligible species1 and intelligible species2 are different because they are

singular accidents of two distinct minds, they both share the same representationalcontent. In other words, between the two intelligible species there is only a formalidentity and no numerical identity as Panaccio’s argument implies.

Before discarding Panaccio’s interpretation there is yet one more argument to betaken into account, namely (C)13: the intelligible species has an accidental mode of existence in the mind, quiddity is an universal, so it has a universal way of existence;something universal cannot have an accidental existence, and therefore the intelligible species is not identical with the quiddity of the thing. Despite the fact that both premises are true, Panaccio’s conclusion is wrong and the abovementioned double

aspect of the intelligible species is enough to prove this. Though the intelligiblespecies has an accidental mode of existence in the mind of the cognizer, it also has auniversal way of existence given its representational universal content which makes possible cognition of universal nature of the extra-mental thing.

Despite its appealing architecture, Panaccio’s argumentation does not seem con-vincing. But perhaps we might find more persuasive arguments in favour of repre-sentationalism if we follow Pasnau’s demonstration centred not on formal identity, but on the primum cognitum status of the intelligible species. Pasnau (1997) proposes anact-object theory of Aquinas’s cognition grounded on three argumentative steps. The

act-object doctrine states that we perceive the world by perceiving the species or, in other words, the species are received in order to receive something else. Unlike Panaccio,Pansau does not deny the formal unity,14 on the contrary, he uses it as an argument in hisfavour. The three steps for proving the validity of the act-object doctrine are: (1) pinpointing the passages where Aquinas affirms an act-object doctrine, (2) discoveringthat in none of Aquinas’s later works the act-object doctrine is denied and (3) showingthat the official position regarding species allows an act-object interpretation.

It is within the framework of the act-object doctrine that we should understandPasnau’s statement that the intelligible species is “in some sense” the object of cognition. The textual evidence invoked in the defence of this view consists of some passages, most of them extracted from works such as I Sent . (d.35, q.1, a.2, co.),Q.D.V . (q.1, a.11, co.) or D.S.C. (a.9, ad.6). For a better understanding of Pasnau’sreading, let us review the passages on which he builds his interpretation. I shall start with the passage from the Sentences, because there Aquinas states clearly that first theintelligible species is cognized:

“It should be known, nevertheless, that a thing is said to be intellectivelycognized in two ways, just as a thing seen. For there is a first thing seen, whichis a species of the visible thing existing in the pupil, which is also the

13 Besides this triple attempt to reject the realist interpretation at the level of the intelligible species,Panaccio also exploits the ambiguity of similitudo and stresses the fact that similarity is different fromidentity.14 Pasnau (1997) refutes the generally accepted thesis that formal identity secures direct realism, but I findhis line of argumentation unconvincing. For an article which goes in the same direction as mine, see Klima(1996).

Philosophia (2013) 41:589 – 602 595


8/14

completion of the one seeing and the source of vision and the intermediary light of the visible thing. And there is a second thing seen, which is the thing itself outside the soul. Likewise, the first thing intellectively cognized is the likenessof the thing itself, which is intellectively cognized through that likeness.”15 I

Sent . (d.35, q.1, a.2, co.) (P1)In the face of this kind of evidence one has two options: either one thinks that

Aquinas is committed to a brand of representationalism, or that this is nothing but asingular passage from one of his earliest writings, where his doctrine wasn’t yet veryclearly articulated. Let us consider that this is not a slip on Aquinas’s part. If this is thecase, then we need to find some reinforcements for this interpretation, and Pasnausuggest the following passage:

“As regards the apprehension of the senses, it must be noted that there is one

type of apprehensive power, for example, a proper sense, which apprehends asensible species in the presence of a sensible thing; but there is also a secondtype, the imagination, for example, which apprehends a sensible species whenthe thing is absent. So, even though the sense always apprehends a thing as it is,unless there is an impediment in the organ or in the medium, the imaginationusually apprehends a thing as it is not, since it apprehends it as present though it is absent. Consequently, the Philosopher says: “Imagination, not sense, is themaster of falsity.”16 Q.D.V. (q.1, a.11, co.)

Pasnau takes apprehension to have cognitive implications and therefore it is clear

that the act-object doctrine is not far away. But, let us not jump to any conclusionsand see what the consequences of this cognitive reading are. As far as I see things,this reading can have two consequences: either apprehension has two acts, or it hastwo objects. The first consequence is ruled out by Pasnau on the grounds of what Aquinas states in II Sent . (d.4, q.1, a.1, ad.4):

“In the case of cognitive power, there is a single conversion to the thing’sspecies and to the thing itself. Hence someone is not said to infer …”17

Since Aquinas rules out any form of cognitive idealism,18 Pasnau moderates his

views and puts forward a theory of cognition characterized by a single non inferential

15“Sciendum tamen est, quod intellectum dupliciter dicitur, sicut visum etiam. Est enim primum visum

quod est ipsa species rei visibilis in potentia existens, quae est etiam perfectio videntis, et principiumvisionis, et medium lumen respectu visibilis: et est visum secundum, quod est ipsa res extra oculum.Similiter intellectum primum est ipsa rei similitudo, quae est in intellectu; et est intellectum secundum quodest ipsa res, quae per similitudinem illam intelligitur ” (Aquinas 1929). When discussing Pasnau’s interpre-tation I will use his own translations for a better understanding of his decisions.16

“Sed circa apprehensionem sensus sciendum est, quod est quaedam vis apprehensiva, quae apprehendit speciem sensibilem sensibili re praesente, sicut sensus proprius; quaedam vero quae apprehendit eam re

absente, sicut imaginatio; et ideo semper sensus apprehendit rem ut est, nisi sit impedimentum in organo,vel in medio; sed imaginatio ut plurimum apprehendit rem ut non est, quia apprehendit eam ut praesentem,cum sit absens; et ideo dicit philosophus in IV Metaph., quod sensus non est dicens falsitatis, sed phantasia”(Aquinas 1970).17

“(…) quod virtutis cognoscitivae est una conversio in speciem rei et in rem ipsam; ( …) non dicitur conferre” (Aquinas 1929).18 If sciences were to be about objects in our mind, they would all turn out to be psychology. See S. Th. (I,q. 85, a. 2) (Aquinas 1952).

596 Philosophia (2013) 41:589 – 602


9/14

act of conversion toward two formally identical objects, the intelligible species andthe quiddity of the external object.

As coherent as this reading might be, it rests on two fallacious understand-ings: the cognitive implications of apprehensio and the semi-reifying of the

species, namely their understanding as the immediate object of cognition. If we take a closer look at what Aquinas states, in various19 places the intelli-gible species is treated, in simple cases of cognitive acts, as the quo of cognition and only in the case of introspection as the quod of cognition. Inaddition, the Latin apprehensio usually has no cognitive connotations, so it would be rather unusual for Aquinas to use it in Q.D.V. (q.11, a.1, co.) asPasnau suggests. A better translation and understanding of apprehensio would be, in my opinion, to grasp, a verb which has causal connotations. But this is just a personal opinion; the real flaws in Pasnau’s argumentation rest on

ignoring the double existence of the form, and on a deficient understandingof the formal identity. Aquinas speaks about only one act of conversiontoward the species and the object because the species and the object havethe same formal content which exists in two different ways: a material andnatural way in the extra-mental object, and an immaterial and intentional wayin the species.20 So far we’ve seen that Pasnau’s line of argumentation fails toalign with Aquinas’s doctrine of the species. The only irrefutable piece of evidence is the primum visum passage (P1) which, unfortunately, is never reiterated by Aquinas.

The second line of Pasnau’s case rests on the observation that later on, in hiswork, Aquinas does not reject the act-object doctrine, but an idealist version of representationalism. Pasnau is aware of the second article from the 85th ques-tion of the first part of Summa Theologiae, where Aquinas says that theintelligible species is that by which we cognize, and not the object of cogni-tion, but he doesn’t find it a strong argument against what he calls “represen-tational realism” – knowledge is concerned with the external world, but boththe species and the object are understood; the species are directly understoodand we never directly apprehend the external objects, though cognition is never distorted. This type of representationalism is opposed to the representationalidealism which states that the only things we ever know are our inner repre-sentations and we never understand the real object. It is this latter form of representationalism which Pasnau believes is rejected in Summa Theologiae (I,q.85), and his belief is right. Here Aquinas rejects Protagoras’ and Plato’sviews according to which we only cognize species. The consequences of sucha theory, relativism and subjectivism, are most bizarre. But let us take a look at Aquinas’s words:

“I answer that, some have asserted that our intellectual faculties know

only the impression made on them; as, for example, that sense is

19 See S.c.G. (II, 75, 5) (Aquinas 1961); S.Th. (I, q. 5, a. 2, sc; I, q. 85, a. 2) (Aquinas 1952).20 For a similar reading of the passage see Perler (2002), 85.

Philosophia (2013) 41:589 – 602 597


10/14

cognizant only of the impression made on its own organ. According tothis theory, the intellect understands only its own impression, namely, theintelligible species which it has received, so that this species is what isunderstood. This is, however, manifestly false for two reasons. First,

because the things we understand are the objects of science; therefore if what we understand is merely the intelligible species in the soul, it wouldfollow that every science would not be concerned with objects outside thesoul, but only with the intelligible species within the soul; thus, accordingto the teaching of the Platonists all science is about ideas, which they heldto be actually understood. Secondly, it is untrue, because it would lead tothe opinion of the ancients who maintained that “whatever seems, is true”[Aristotle, Metaph. iii. 5, and that consequently contradictories are truesimultaneously. For if the faculty knows its own impression only, it can

judge of that only. Now a thing seems according to the impression madeon the cognitive faculty. Consequently the cognitive faculty will always judge of its own impression as such; and so every judgment will be true:for instance, if taste perceived only its own impression, when anyone witha healthy taste perceives that honey is sweet, he would judge truly; and if anyone with a corrupt taste perceives that honey is bitter, this would beequally true; for each would judge according to the impression on histaste. Thus every opinion would be equally true; in fact, every sort of apprehension. Therefore it must be said that the intelligible species is

related to the intellect as that by which it understands: which is provedthus. There is a twofold action (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8), one whichremains in the agent; for instance, to see and to understand; and another which passes into an external object; for instance, to heat and to cut; andeach of these actions proceeds in virtue of some form. And as the formfrom which proceeds an act tending to something external is the likenessof the object of the action, as heat in the heater is a likeness of the thingheated; so the form from which proceeds an action remaining in the agent is the likeness of the object. Hence that by which the sight sees is thelikeness of the visible thing; and the likeness of the thing understood, that is, the intelligible species, is the form by which the intellect understands.But since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it under-stands both its own act of intelligence, and the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is understoodsecondarily; but that which is primarily understood is the object, of whichthe species is the likeness. This also appears from the opinion of theancient philosophers, who said that “like is known by like.” For they saidthat the soul knows the earth outside itself, by the earth within itself; andso of the rest. If, therefore, we take the species of the earth instead of theearth, according to Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), who says “that a stone isnot in the soul, but only the likeness of the stone”; it follows that the soul

598 Philosophia (2013) 41:589 – 602


11/14

knows external things by means of its intelligible species.”21 S.Th. (I,q.85, a.2, co.)

After presenting the outcomes of Protagoras’ and Plato’s positions, Aquinas goes

on by stating the adequate understanding of species as those by which (id quo) thesight sees and the intellect understands. The intelligible species becomes the objectsof cognition only when the intellect reflects upon itself; and even then, the species arewhat is understood only secondarily, because the extra-mental object remains the primary object of cognition. Indeed, Aquinas does not argue here against represen-tationalist realism (or the act-object doctrine), but he doesn’t defend it either. The text posits clearly that the intelligible species play a causal and not a cognitive role. If Aquinas actually advocated a view like that advanced by Pasnau, why would he not defend it here? Why would he not present it as the valid option with regard to theintelligible species? Why did he choose to put forth a direct account of the intelligiblespecies? To questions like these Pasnau points towards the following passage from

D.S.C. (a.9, ad 6):

“For both of these activities, the intelligible species is precognized, by whichthe possible intellect is actuated; because the possible intellect does not operate

21“Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt quod vires cognoscitivae quae sunt in nobis, nihil

cognoscunt nisi proprias passiones; puta quod sensus non sentit nisi passionem sui organi. Et secundumhoc, intellectus nihil intelligit nisi suam passionem, idest speciem intelligibilem in se receptam. Et

secundum hoc, species huiusmodi est ipsum quod intelligitur. Sed haec opinio manifeste apparet falsa exduobus. Primo quidem, quia eadem sunt quae intelligimus, et de quibus sunt scientiae. Si igitur ea quaeintelligimus essent solum species quae sunt in anima, sequeretur quod scientiae omnes non essent de rebusquae sunt extra animam, sed solum de speciebus intelligibilibus quae sunt in anima; sicut secundumPlatonicos omnes scientiae sunt de ideis, quas ponebant esse intellecta in actu. Secundo, quia sequeretur error antiquorum dicentium quod omne quod videtur est verum; et sic quod contradictoriae essent simulverae. Si enim potentia non cognoscit nisi propriam passionem, de ea solum iudicat. Sic autem videtur aliquid, secundum quod potentia cognoscitiva afficitur. Semper ergo iudicium potentiae cognoscitivae erit de eo quod iudicat, scilicet de propria passione, secundum quod est; et ita omne iudicium erit verum. Puta sigustus non sentit nisi propriam passionem, cum aliquis habens sanum gustum iudicat mel esse dulce, vereiudicabit; et similiter si ille qui habet gustum infectum, iudicet mel esse amarum, vere iudicabit, uterqueenim iudicat secundum quod gustus eius afficitur. Et sic sequitur quod omnis opinio aequaliter erit vera, et universaliter omnis acceptio. Et ideo dicendum est quod species intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum ut quointelligit intellectus. Quod sic patet. Cum enim sit duplex actio, sicut dicitur IX Metaphys., una quae manet in agente, ut videre et intelligere, altera quae transit in rem exteriorem, ut calefacere et secare; utraque fit secundum aliquam formam. Et sicut forma secundum quam provenit actio tendens in rem exteriorem, est similitudo obiecti actionis, ut calor calefacientis est similitudo calefacti; similiter forma secundum quam

provenit actio manens in agente, est similitudo obiecti. Unde similitudo rei visibilis est secundum quamvisus videt; et similitudo rei intellectae, quae est species intelligibilis, est forma secundum quam intellectusintelligit. Sed quia intellectus supra seipsum reflectitur, secundum eandem reflexionem intelligit et suumintelligere, et speciem qua intelligit. Et sic species intellectiva secundario est id quod intelligitur. Sed idquod intelligitur primo, est res cuius species intelligibilis est similitudo. Et hoc etiam patet ex antiquorumopinione, qui ponebant simile simili cognosci. Ponebant enim quod anima per terram quae in ipsa erat,

cognosceret terram quae extra ipsam erat; et sic de aliis. Si ergo accipiamus speciem terrae loco terrae,secundum doctrinam Aristotelis, qui dicit quod lapis non est in anima, sed species lapidis; sequetur quodanima per species intelligibiles cognoscat res quae sunt extra animam” (Aquinas 1952).

Philosophia (2013) 41:589 – 602 599


12/14

except by being in act through the visible species. Hence the visible species arenot considered that which we see, but that by which we see.”22 (P2)

I must admit that I was really puzzled while reading this passage, and, at the same

time, I was willing to agree with what Pasnau (1997, 212) says: “

How can we concludefrom such a premise that species aren’t themselves apprehended?” But the problem is it is not clear what Aquinas means here by ‘ precognized’ ( praeintelligitur ), so maybe it would be more careful not to assume that precognition is a form of cognition. On theother hand, neither is one allowed to conclude from such a premise that species are not inany sense cognized. The most we are entitled to conclude is that species play a certaincausal role: that the presence of species is a prerequisite for certain later operations.

If precognition is correlated with what P1 states and with the fact that the intelligiblespecies are not the only ones we cognize,23 one might think we are justified in sayingthat Aquinas has a representationalist position at the level of the intelligible species.Despite Pasnau’s very elegant and quite luring demonstration, I think it rests oninsufficient textual proofs and the rest of the argumentation is mainly based on circum-stantial evidence. Allow me to explain the reasons behind my disagreement. As alreadynoted P2 stands alone and without any real reverberations, if it is not correlated with P1.But let us take a closer look at what P2 really says. Everything seems to revolve around

praeintelligo – whether we understand it as a kind of cognition, or we read it as a type of preliminary data, emphasising the anteriority. If we assume the first reading, that praeintelligo means the precognition of the intelligible species, then we have to shedsome light on the subject of this action, the active or the possible intellect. If the

intelligible species is precognized by the possible intellect, we would find ourselveswith a case of cognition within cognition, because, for Aquinas, the process of cognitioninvolves a change in the subject; if the possible intellect was to precognize the intelli-gible species, this would in turn trigger a change in the possible intellect resulting information of another intermediary intentional form, and, in the end, we would findourselves in the paradoxical case of having not one, but two intelligible species whichstand in a formal identity relation to the external object. This addition would be useless,therefore I think Aquinas is implying that the agent intellect, and not the possibleintellect precognizes the intelligible species. Then, why wouldn’t the same consequence,

cognition within cognition, apply at the level of agent intellect as well? First andforemost, because things are a bit different at this level: due to the fact that the agent intellect acts before the actual cognzing of the quiddity taking place, we can name thislevel a pre-cognitive24 one. Within this pre-cognitive framework the praeintelligitur of

22“Utrique autem harum operationum praeintelligitur species intelligibilis, qua fit intellectus possibilis in

actu; quia intellectus possibilis non operatur nisi secundum quod est in actu, sicut nec visus videt nisi per hoc quod est factus in actu per speciem visibilem. Unde species visibilis non se habet ut quod videtur, sed ut quo videtur ” (Aquinas 2000).23

“Si igitur ea quae intelligimus essent solum species quae sunt in anima, sequeretur quod scientiae omnesnon essent de rebus quae sunt extra animam, sed solum de speciebus intelligibilibus quae sunt in anima.”S.Th. (I, q. 85, a.2, co.) (Aquinas 1952).24 By saying that the intelligible species operate at a pre-cognitive level, I am in fact stating that they are a

part of the process of thinking, which stands for the moving of the mind while it still deliberates. Moreclearly, it acts as a sort of preparatio for the actual act of understanding, by providing the matter for the

possible intellect: acting at a pre-cognitive level means being a part of a process which unfolds before theactual act of understanding. See also Pasnau (1997), 139 – 40.

600 Philosophia (2013) 41:589 – 602


13/14

the intelligible species can be understood not so much as a kind of cognition, but as akind of preparation ( praeparatio) for the actual act of cognition. Three reasons stand behind this option: (1) in compound adjectives the prefix prae is used to form wordswhich indicate that something takes place before a particular action, event or date; (2)

the root intelligo is used in this particular case because the whole action is located at thelevel of intellectual cognition; (3) the only functions the agent intellect has are theabstraction of the intelligible species from the phantasms and their illumination – inother words, the agent intellect ’s only role is to actualize the intelligible character of thesensorial data, so as to make it fit for the possible intellect. The preparation for the actual process of cognition would not mean, in this case, a fore-cognition, but an actualizationof the intelligible character of the intelligible species needed for their proper receival bythe possible intellect. Still, why cannot praeintelligo be understood as a form of cognition? The reason is very simple and it rests on textual evidence: Aquinas describes

the agent intellect as having only the two aforementioned operations. Against thecognitive reading of praeintelligo I can appeal to the formal identity and the doubleexistence of a form. If my reading of Q.D.V. (q. 1, a. 11, co.) is correct, the same readingshould apply here too. Therefore, my conclusion is, once more, that praeintelligo andapprehensio should be understood as having only a causal meaning. If praeintelligo isunderstood as a preparation for cognition, P1 stands alone, casting Pasnau’s ingeniousinterpretation into the shadow.

After indicating the passages that support the act-object doctrine from both theearlier and the later writings of Aquinas, Pasnau’s demonstration reaches its final

step: it underlines the complementarity of the official view position with the act-object doctrine. According to the former, the species are not, ordinarily, the object of cognition themselves, but they are the medium through which the extra-mentalobjects are apprehended; according to the latter, the fact that the species are not cognized translates into the claim that the species are not the objects of our judge-ments or beliefs. This translation is justified by appealing to passages from Quod.(VII, q. 1, a. 1, co.) and S.c.G. (I.53), appendix II8 from the 1961 Marietti edition,where the extra-mental objects are described as objects which we are first drawn toand which we first attend to. We are first drawn to the extra-mental objects and not tothe species because we form concepts and judgements not about the species, but about the objects. (Pasnau 1997, 216) The main body of the problem is not that we produce concepts and judgements about the objects instead of the species, this is afairly uncontroversial statement easily accepted by any direct realist. The real prob-lem is the cognitive understanding of expressions like turning toward , apprehending ,

precognizing , in cases where they are nothing but alternative expressions of the“taking on” of the species, as Scott McDonald suggested to Pasnau (1997, 208).

Let us now return to the leading question of this paper: what role do the intelligiblespecies play in the process of human cognition? Have I managed to gather enoughdata for settling the dispute between the direct realist and the representationalist interpretations of the intelligible species? As I have pointed out, there are morearguments in favour of treating the intelligible species as causal entities, and not somany arguments for treating them as cognitive entities. On the one hand, formalidentity, double existence, double aspect, id quo and similitudo blend in coherentlyand are supported by numerous passages ranging from Aquinas’s early to his later works. On the other hand, Panaccio’s attack on the formal identity lacks the resources

Philosophia (2013) 41:589 – 602 601


14/14

to persuade a careful reader to go in the direction of his version of representational-ism. And this happens for two reasons: first, he does not take into account the doubleexistence and the double aspect of a form, and second, he uses a very narrowunderstanding of identity, namely numerical identity.

In the case of Pasnau’s reading things are not equally obvious, and this happens because he embraces the formal identity. By accepting the fact that the content of theintelligible species is identical with the essence of the extra-mental object, Pasnauadvances an interpretation that is halfway between direct realism and representation-alism. However, his entire demonstration rests on fragile grounds. Here I have inmind the formal structure of his argumentation: A is affirmed in Aquinas’s earlyworks, A is not explicitly denied in Aquinas’s later works, A is compatible with theofficial view of species, and therefore A can be maintained. But it is not enough tosay that A is not explicitly negated, in order to be fully justified in maintaining A. If

we rely only on the fact that A is not negated, there is the possibility for A to bemaintained, but there is also the possibility for A not to be maintained. If we zoom in,things still do not seem to stand on a solid ground, because the cognitive understand-ing of verbs like apprehendo and praeintelligo contradicts the id quo and the doubleexistence status of the intelligible species. However, until someone finds passages inAquinas’s later works where the act-object doctrine is explicitly defended, thevalidity of this view is still opened to debate. Thus, the most robust answer to thequestion regarding the role of the intelligible species in the process of cognitionremains in the hands of direct realists, and, consequently, the intelligible species play

a causal role in the process of human cognition.

References

Aquinas, T. (1979). Compendium theologiae ad fratrem Reginaldum. In R. A. Verardo (Ed.), Opusculatheologica (Vol. 1). Torino: Marietti.

Aquinas, T. (1929). In P. Mandonnet (Ed.), Scriptum super libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardiepiscopi Parisiensis. Paris: P. Lethielleux.

Aquinas, T. (1952). In P. Caramello (Ed.), Summa theologiae. Torino: Marietti.Aquinas, T. (1961). In C. Pera (Ed.), Summa contra Gentiles. Torino: Marietti.Aquinas, T. (1965). In P. M. Pession (Ed.), Quaestiones disputatae de Potentia. Torino: Marietti.Aquinas, Th. (1970 – 1976). Quaestiones disputatae de Veritate, in Opera Omnia, ed. Dondaine, H. F. XXII.

Roma & Paris: Commissio Leonina & Cerf.Aquinas, Th. (1996). Quaestiones quodlibetales, in Opera Omnia, ed. Gauthier, R. – A. XXV. Roma &

Paris: Commisio Leonina & Les Éditions du Cerf.Aquinas, Th. (2000). Quaestio disputata De spiritualibus creaturis, in Opera Omnia, ed. Cos, J. XXIV-2.

Roma & Paris: Commissio Leonina - Les Éditions du Cerf.Klima, G. (1996). “ Nulla virtus cognoscitiva circa proprium obiectum decipitur ”, Critical comments on

Robert Pasnau, “The Identity of Knower and Known”, http://faculty.fordham.edu/klima/APA.htm.Accessed 19 July 2012.

Panaccio, C. (2000). “Aquinas on Intellectual Representation”, in Cahiers d ’epistémologie. Groupe de

recherche en épistémologie comparée, no. 2002.Panaccio, C. (2010). Mental representation. In R. Pasnau & C. van Dyke (Eds.), The Cambridge History of

Medieval Philosophy (Vol. 1). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Pasnau, R. (1997). Theories of Cognition in the Latter Middle Ages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Perler, D. (2000). Essentialism and direct realism: some late medieval perspectives. Topoi, 19(2), 111 – 122.Perler, D. (2002). Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter . Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman.Spruit, L. (1994). Species intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge (Vol. 1). Leiden: Brill.

602 Philosophia (2013) 41:589 – 602
http://faculty.fordham.edu/klima/APA.htmhttp://faculty.fordham.edu/klima/APA.htm

Documents

Baltuta Aquinas on Intelligible Species Philosophia 2013