Balkan Refugee Special Report

8/14/2019 Balkan Refugee Special Report

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Report

To

Senator Christopher J. Dodd (CT)On

Kosovo

Refugee Issues

WithRecommendations

By

William B. SeebeckApril 9, 1999


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Confidential

Report to

Senator Christopher J. Dodd

On

Kosovo Refugee Issues

With Recommendations

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1999 Seebeck International, L.L.C. All rights reserved. This document is

confidential. It is meant to be released only to its those who requested it. Any

reproduction of this report, in whole or in part, without the express written

permission of Seebeck International, L.L.C. is prohibited. This report containsinformation developed by Seebeck International, L.L.C. that is proprietary and

confidential and therefore should be considered and treated as a confidential by

the recipients.

91 Wolfpit Road Wilton, CT 06897-3412 v 203.834.9957 f 203.834.9987 http://www.seebeck.com

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Introduction

The purpose of this report is to briefly review the Balkan Refugee issues in light

of the authors experience in the housing and resettlement of Indochinese

refugees in 1975 and 1976. Further, I have been asked to make

recommendations to Senator Christopher J. Dodd of Connecticut based upon my

observations

In both the Balkans and Indochina, refugees appeared almost instantaneously

and action was required immediately. In the Indochinese situation, some

150,000 refugees were evacuated from land or were rescued from the South

China Sea. Operating within a military theatre, every transport available was

utilized to accomplish this task, although many were left behind. We know now

that those left behind were imprisoned or terminated by hostile forces.

In the Balkans, the Serbian leadership has used the people of Kosovo as human

bargaining chips played as if on a geographic game board. More than 250,000

of them have been pushed in our direction, deflecting NATOs ability to wage a

ground war by effectively clogging roadways and severely impairing the

infrastructure of its surrounding nation states. Whatever the purpose, we now

have to meet every need of a community of people twice the size of the city of

Trenton, the capital of New Jersey.

It should be pointed out that this report is not an effort of days, but of hours and

therefore is not complete, and its recommendations and observations are drawn

only from data I have been able to assemble myself.

A Look at the Refugee

(Excerpts of Dr. C.V. Teodorus 1975 Review of the Needs of the Indochinese

Refugee As Compared to the Post-World-War II European Refugee)

(The late Dr. C.V. Teodoru, a physician, was actively involved in the

resettlement of European refugees at the end of World War II. Upon completion

of that effort, he was named the director of the Romanian Red Cross. Dr.

Teodoru was able with members of his family to seek political asylum in the

1950s, while attending an International Red Cross conference in Paris. In 1975,

we asked Dr. Teodoru if he would visit the Indian Town Gap Refugee Center in

Pennsylvania and give us his opinion of the situation. His comments were


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audiotaped and excerpts of that transcript follow below. Many of Dr. Teodorus

views were implemented in 1975 to the benefit of the Indochinese Refugee. You

will find that his comments provide an interesting organizational, medical and

human perspective that has pertinence to the current situation in the Balkans.

His son, Dr. Daniel Teodoru, dedicated a substantial part of his life in 1975-76,

at his own expense, to the resettlement of the Indochinese refugees and today

practices medicine in New York City).

Initial Psyche of the Refugee

...According to my observation, the very first factors that may determine the

success or failure of such an enterprise are of a psychological nature. I assume

that the same thing will happen to the Vietnamese, as I know happened in

Europe, the first year the refugees developed a kind of complex -- everyone wasscared at the beginning. They came into other countries with established

excellence in many fields [of work, e.g., teachers, pharmacists, scientists, etc.].

They were afraid of not corresponding to the standards of another country or

locale. They had all types of complexes, particularly guilt for the people left

behind and of inadequacy and confusion. The result is that they tried to

overcompensate. They tried to reassure themselves almost unconsciously, but

they avoided taking a job or responsibility, always finding a reason that the job

was too small, that they are too educated or prepared for the job. But, in fact it

was simple fear that they would not be able to correspond or to adapt.

Inability to Communicate

If there is a lack of communication in addition to the psychological background,

this will complicate the situation even more. Many refugees were able to

understand English because English literature was widely read in Europe, but

unable to talk or to make themselves understood because of the accent or

difficulty in finding the proper expression.

Keeping the Refugees Together

So, it is my feeling that the first thing you have to do is to give reassurance to

those people and to keep them together for a period of time. In this way, they

can find, at least for certain psychological needs, somebody nearby of the same

culture and habits that can better understand their needs and feelings Even if that

someone cannot satisfy those feelings, at least they have a shoulder to cry on or

someone who can understand their feelings of despair or disappointment.


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Questioner: What you are saying Dr. Teodoru is that being together they lend a

support system to one another.

Yes, at least until they succeed to orient themselves and understand a little, the

new environment and especially to start to get means of communication and to

learn the language and to understand the other people.

Recreating Community and Economy

In addition to it, I think that they should be kept as near as possible to their

professional or trade habits. For instance, I think that in a community like this if

anyone repairs shoes, they should find a shoemaker within the group. The

shoemaker if he needs a tailor, he should find a tailor within the group, sowhatever money is within the group circulates within the group and it will reach

much further than if it is dispersed in the community around. Now, this may

seem a small matter to the community-at-large [the host country] but it maybe

very important for a small group. In addition to the fact that they have the

feeling that they have not quit completely their professional trade and are still

able to foresee the possibility of continuing to make a living in their given trade.

Many people, as you know define themselves by their professions. This was one

of my first observations of the refugees.

Leadership Positive and Negative/From Within and Without

I think, however, now among them as you very well have pointed out here, there

are many infiltrations whose aim is the failure of the program. Those involved

will favor failure in anyway possible. First of all, they will point out how the

refugees have many differences from themselves and others within the groupwill point to the many differences of those in the host country. This will create

discontent within the group and it will demoralize them.

Both those inside and outside who harbor such negative attitudes will also try to

attack the natural leaders that first grow up among the group as a whole. What

we found in Europe was that each person would have an older man or someone

who they consider wise man to go to and ask advice. If these people are


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deprived of such morale support, represented by their own leaders, the people

will become to very confused and irritated and very susceptible to being pushed

in a certain way. So, that it is important that the supervision be with local

American military types able to understand and communicate with them [the

refugees], then subversive actions will not take place and certain failure may be

averted.

Importance of Expressing Cultural Identity

My experience also shows that various groups have a very serious need for some

specific cultural activity religious, artistic or any other kind of such activity.

This must be supported within the group. Now some artistic manifestations,

whether art, music, dance, folklore of any kind are useful for the refugees andtheir group. It is a way to make a fusion with the community at large [outside

the refugee centers]. Once they organize a little, some cultural activity is critical

so that they feel that they are also perpetuating their traditions from which they

have been torn.

Once they have an opportunity to express their cultural activity, then I would

suggest that there be an exchange between this group and the population at

large. In this way, the local population can view for themselves the unusual

habits of this strange group of people now living amongst them and with the

new culture. This knowledge and shared understanding will make it easier to

disperse these people within the community-at large. It will also help alleviate

pent up fears and concerns.

Education

Naturally, these people should be given the opportunity to learn English or

anything else that will help them become assimilated into this population as

quickly as possible. Children can go to the public schools, once they have an

understanding of the language. From this point, if possible, it would be useful togive them an opportunity to work, first within the group as I described earlier.

The Importance of Work and the Identification of Professions


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My observation in Austria and Germany, wherever there were camps for

refugees, one of the most dangerous decisions that was made was not to let the

refugees work. The International Refugee Organization was aware of the fact

that if the refugee were to work in the camp or in the city, it would take some of

the jobs of the local population and would create a great deal of adverse

reaction.

The result of this was that some people who were extremely productive

individuals and many who had been professionals in their fields were obliged to

spend 12 hours a day laying down on a hard bed and looking at the ceiling

living. They lived on a very low caloric intake around 1200 to 1500 calories

per day, an existence that didnt let them die or live.

My observations was that those who have a very active mind need to conceive,

to build, to construct, to work. As they were not allowed to work in any way,

these camps created all types of subversive activities and the people became

dissatisfied.

Questioner: It creates a type of depression that leads to destructive subversion

The Danger of Destructive Subversion

Exactly, but a destructive subversion that is sometimes is directed toward

themselves. They become apathetic, not fighting anymore and not looking for

anything, and thats how you create material for welfare. And some others,

more aggressive and dynamic are directing this destructive subversion at the

society at large, which they blame for their depression. This is again a very

dangerous situation. History has shown us that whenever we deal with a group

that can be recognized for their differences by physical features or by culture or

whatever, it will only take one individual of this group to do wrong, and it will

reflect upon the whole group. This is one thing that should be avoided.

Discontent and depression should be detected before it takes a form that can beaggressive or dangerous to the society as a whole.

Questioner: Or irreversible.

Yes, or irreversible as you say. Now I hope that irreversibility does not exist in

people that have strengthened by so many years of adversity and suffering and


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so on. For usually people that survive and revive every time with the slightest

hope that anyone pains them. This is what comes first in my mind.

Simple Solutions Can Cause Despair

You must recognize that the refugees and I was concerned mainly with the

refugees from Romania. I had to recognize that although we are democratic in

nature and do not believe in qualitative differences between human beings, we

have to recognize however, that the necessities especially cultural and

sometimes physical differ from one group to another. They depend on the habits

they had before and how they used them. For instance, I found out that giving

beds without the mattress was a cause for extreme depression I would even say

despair for a man who had all his life a very soft mattress. However, this

condition may be perfectly satisfactory for one who had lived that way before[without a soft mattress]. Now this doesnt mean that one of the two men was

better, what it means is that on so little may depend the happiness and the

disposition of progress for one individual over another. This is why I believe

you have to take into consideration of various groups and must meet their

particular needs. For instance, those that came from an academic rank, they

need very much material for reading. Material that was advanced in their own

fields of activities, therefore, they should be given access to libraries. Other

types, farmers, for example, would be very disoriented in an city environment

really need to go to the farm. They would be the easiest to place, because they

have necessity and they want to learn the new techniques. Other workers would

be highly interested in the skills of the host country and in one way or another

should be exposed to these skill sets and processes. They then should be given

an opportunity to test hands on with what they have been shown. This might

be called the training and preparation period.

Food as an Expression of Identity

Somebody should tell the U.S. government that food in every country is also an

expression of the culture of their native country or region. It is also a needinduced by the environment. I experienced this myself as a refugee. One of the

secrets for good integration and adaptation in a new culture is to start with the

idea that the new people are bringing certain things different than what you are

doing within your own country. The ability to present food is a simple but

dramatic way to offer something to the host country that represents their identity.

Summary


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So, what follows are key issues that Dr. Teodoru indicated pertain to all

refugees. These should be considered when making any type of decision in

relation to their disposition, either temporary or permanent. We found these

points rang true with the Indochinese and I believe they pertain today to the

Kosovo refugee.

The Initial Psyche of the Refugee Fear

Loss of Identity

Inability to Communicate

The Importance of Keeping the Refugees together

Create An Environment Free From Fear and Hostility

Recreate Community and Economy Among the RefugeesMake Room for the Growth of Leadership

The Importance of Expressing Cultural Identity

Education

The Importance of Work and the Identification of Professions

Provide Sustenance that is more than Survival Subsistence

Support the Development of a self-sustaining Environment

The Danger of Destructive subversion

Simple Solutions can Cause Despair

Food as an Expression of Identity

Provide emotional strength by understanding their culture and heritage and using

it to achieve some level of acculturation.

Indochinese Refugee Resettlement of 1975-76

The Indochinese Refugee effort was very difficult, not only because it was soimmediate, involved some 150,000 people, but also because it occurred at a time

when the American people no longer wanted to hear the word Indochina or

Vietnam. Raising funds for the effort were difficult because President Ford

did not want to go to Congress for additional funding and possibly suffer a

defeat that would demoralize the refugees and further agitate the country.


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We were also unable to ask Congress that the Indochinese refugee be covered

under the Cuban Refugee Act of 1961, which would have solved many red

tape issues. These red tape issues included the refugees being designated

simultaneously as both parolees and refugees by the Immigration and

Naturalization Service (INS). This meant that as a parolee, they were not

permitted certain aid support including qualifying for a green card and

therefore were unable to work. Further, if they did something wrong,

technically they could be sent back to their country of origin. However, they

could not be sent back to their country of origin because they were also political

refugees with asylum in the United States.

When we began the effort with the Indochinese Refugees, we encountered many

issues such as the parolee/refugee issue. To follow Dr. Teodorus view, we had

put the refugee in a no-mans zone that caused only pain and despair.

Another example of this red tape factor involved South Vietnamese military

personnel. Under the Vietnamization program, we had trained the ARVN

recruits in the very same way we did American troops, using American

personnel. As some 50+% of the refugees were South Vietnamese soldiers, we

asked the Department of Defense to draw up a plan that would allow the

American military to accept such refugees into a special force that over time

would be fully assimilated into our military. If we had succeeded in this effort,

we would have supported our claim that Vietnamization worked, housed, fed

and otherwise provided jobs for thousands of refugees virtually overnight. DOD

thought this was a great idea, but a few days later came back to tell us that they

couldnt take the Vietnamese military types because they were officially

parolees and not eligible for a green card. To enter the U.S. military, you need at

a minimum, a green card.

Fortunately, the American people responded to the call by the President to help

the refugees. Thousands of citizens provided funds, housing, and support of all

kinds. We followed many of Dr. Teodorus ideas and kept families and natural

communities together, resettling them in same or adjoining housing units, etc.Vietnamese who were rice farmers, we moved to Louisiana and other areas

where rice farming was possible. Former Vietnamese vice president and air

marshal Ky went along with that group. The area between San Francisco and

Santa Cruz is known today as little Vietnam or Saigon, where Vietnamese own

thousands of businesses, hotels, restaurants, etc. I have visited these areas and

found that many of the decisions that we made did prove helpful to these people

now nearly 25 years later.


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There are so very many issues that are faced with refugees, particularly those

who are stripped of all identification. It is so very important to give them

back their identity. It is also important to feed them, house them, clothe them

and to free them from a hostile environment, so that they can breathe free and

without fear. Yet, as Dr. Teodoru said, ...you cant provide them with an

existence that doesnt let them die or live... That is now the challenge in the

Balkans.

My E-Mail on the Kosovo Refugee Situation

(The following e-mails represent contact with Janice OConnell of Senator

Dodds staff and Bob McPhearson of CARE. Bob was seriously injured on

Wednesday, April 7, 1999, when a vehicle he and four other CARE workers

were in went off a cliff in Macedonia. All were seriously injured and U.S.

military personnel later evacuated him to Germany).

Subject: Kosovo

Date: Wed, 31 Mar 1999 13:09:38 -0500

From: "William B. Seebeck"

Organization: Seebeck International, L.L.C.

To: [email protected]

Dear Janice,

This is a follow-up to the voice mail I left you a few minutes ago about the

Kosovo Refugee Issue.

I have become very concerned over the movement of people from Kosovo toAlbania and Macedonia, particularly since both of these nations are so ill-

equipped to deal with such a crush of humanity, so in need

of every aspect of care.

Today, I called Secretary of State Albright to see how I might be helpful. Her

assistant connected me with the Kosovo Task Force.


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Why I thought I might be helpful is because in 1975, I was appointed to the

business/labor committee of the President's Commission on Indochinese

Refugees (I had also been on the U.S.-Nicaraguan Earthquake

Relief Committee in 1973, following the earthquake that demolished Managua).

It was our task in the Indochinese effort to see to the organization, care and

resettlement of some 150,000 refugees. Fortunately, DOD had successfully

housed these refugees into I believe three sites (memory fails me a bit). The

largest was Indian Town Gap (Pennsylvania). This was a two year intensive

inter-agency and public effort with little budget (as President Ford did not want

to go back to Congress for yet more funds for Vietnam related issues).

I believe that what we had accomplished for the Indochinese refugees given a

similar size group may also be a method for the Kosovo refugees. I am not of

course suggesting they come to the U.S., but I know that inthe archives, DOD must have a report that would deal with the methods and

resources they used back in 1975-1976 to house, feed, clothe and otherwise

maintain 150,000 refugees over a two year period. I thought that if the cost of

that might be adjusted for current pricing that a refugee aid bill using such a

model might be put before the Congress by Senator Dodd and an appropriate

House member.

I realize that DOD has addressed refugee issues since 1976, particularly with

Somalia. However, I believe that in the case of Kosovo, it may be different, as

we may need to support and maintain them in an adjoining country for an

extended period of time, with the end objective being returning them to their

homeland once it is safe to do so and with an infrastructure that will support

them.

From your experience in the Peace Corps Janice, I don't need to tell you how

quickly this situation can become horrific. Further, I want you to know that

when I spoke today with the Kosovo Task Force at the State Department, they

seemed confused and unorganized (net, net, I did not get a feeling of anyone

being "in-control"). They told me that right now they were trying to figure outhow to get food to the people at the borders. I asked for the DOD liaison and

they said they didn't have one. They instead referred me to the Balkan Task

Force and I am currently awaiting a call from that task force's humanitarian

officer Tony Banberry. I also spoke with Bob McPhearson from CARE early

this morning (just before he left for the region) and told him about what I was

doing (trying to help get an organized refugee aid program) and he told me he


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had Iridium uplinks and asked that I stay in touch. By the way, in addition to

being a business consultant, I am also an

ordained Episcopal deacon.

Back in 1975, when the Indochinese refugee mission began, I was managing the

day-to-day operations of the Grace Foundation for W.R.Grace & Co. My

involvement in Vietnam was not in uniform, but as a member of a public policy

group during that time...

Subject: Kosovo Refugee II

Date: Wed, 31 Mar 1999 13:28:43 -0500


Organization: Seebeck International, L.L.C.To: [email protected]

Dear Janice,

A few minutes after sending you my first e-mail, I received a briefing from the

Balkan Task Force Humanitarian officer. He told me how the UNHCR will be

handling this effort and described how aid is on the way and how profound that

aid will be in support of these refugees. I was most heartened to hear of this

program.

Consequently, I gather that my note may be moot. I guess what I am still left

with is the feeling that as a citizen, I am very disconnected with participating our

nation's effort in this war. In the Persian Gulf War, I felt as a citizen fully

engaged (writing letters to servicemen, visiting families, sending packages, etc,

etc.). Now, we learn about so many things thirdly (first NATO, then State or

NSC, the press secretary, occasionally our military [haven't seen Gen. Clark

yet], occasionally our elected officials -- the president, never the vice president,

then the press). I have heard more on CNN from the Serbian Deputy Prime

Minister and U.S. Ambassador than from our own leaders.

I realize that this is a result of the structure of NATO, but it is also NATO's first

offensive engagement and we did not anticipate the same public

communications needs when we were in a defensive mode (i.e., we would

already been attacked in the original NATO plan).


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Is there more we can do as citizens in addition to sending a financial donation to

CARE or other such organizations?

Subject: Update

Date: Fri, 02 Apr 1999 10:46:50 -0500


Organization: Seebeck International, L.L.C.


Dear Bob,

Paul told me today that you had problems in transit. Trust they are clearing up

and you are on your way.

I promised that I would give you updates from my vantage point. Please realize

that no one understands the power and delivery capability of CARE more than I

do, but many in the general public do not. Communication with the general

public about what is going on with the refugees is very limited. Finally, I am

trying to be helpful in this difficult human situation. If I get in the way at all,

please tell me.

Now the Update:

When I spoke with Tony Banberry, the Humanitarian Officer of the Balkan Task

Force on the 31st, he told me that UNHCR would be coordinating aid to the

area, but that soon after the president signed Presidential

Determination No. 99-20 that day at 1:00 pm, that DOD had relief planes ready

to roll. The President did sign the Order, but as of right now, no one has been

able to confirm that these relief planes ever rolled. This morning, I spoke with

Will King, CNN's VP & Head of International Newsgathering. He told me that

their conversations this morning with Christiane Amanpour indicated a further

deteriorating situation. I asked him to have someone at CNN ask DOD at theirdaily (hopefully to be held today) briefing to ask about the refugees -- Food,

Housing,

Infrastructure, etc. (in yesterday's briefing, the press did not ask a single

question about the refugees, their current situation, let alone what happened to

the men).


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As you may recall, on the 31st, I sent a series of e-memo's to Sen. Dodds

foreign policy advisor (Janice O'Connell), whom you may come across in your

current travel. I gave her my views and concerns, shared my own experiences

and described the results of all of my calls and the U.S. government responses to

my questions.

This morning, the President is meeting (as I type) with State and DOD (further

described as an inter-agency meeting) and reportedly a number of private

organizations (Red Cross and others not named), because "...he is very

concerned about what the U.S. is doing on an interagency basis..."

Net, net, other than the terrible pictures on television, the refugee situation has

still not hit page one of government focus. It in fact may have, but that is

unknown to the general public. I mentioned this to CNN's King, but he said thatas far as they knew, nothing had changed in terms of aid on the ground.

Finally, I also spoke this morning with Wallace Coggins who is the legislative

fellow (on loan from DOD) to my congressman Jim Maloney who sits on the

National Security Committee (the subcommittee charged with funding military

procurement and personnel) of the House Armed Services Committee. I know

Jim and Wallace are making appropriate inquiries.

That's it for now. God be with you Bob, be safe.

Bill Seebeck ([email protected])

(As I finish this, the White House reports via CNN that the refugee number is

now close to 250,000 [AID estimate]).

Subject: Update 4:45 PM EST

Date: Fri, 02 Apr 1999 16:51:05 -0500

From: "William B. Seebeck" Organization: Seebeck International, L.L.C.


Bob,

Here is the update:


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Congressman Maloney's (CT) national security committee liaison Wallace

Coggins, reported to me around noon, that DOD's Task force gave him an update

of the situation. According to that update, food from UNHCR and

NGO stores are moving into the region. However, they have been delayed by

lack of infrastructure. However, the word was that the food is in transit to the

refugee site (see below). Further, it is reported that estimates of pre-positioned

food from UNHCR/NGO's in the region will last through mid-April. Wallace

also reported that the Pentagon will be moving HDR's (Human Daily Ration)

into the area from U.K. by air (200,000 units) and from U.S. by ship (500,000

units) to the region.

Shelter is reported as the worst situation. According the update, only 700 tents

are available in the region (each able to house 7 to 8 adults). An effort is

underway to secure plastic sheeting. Coggins on behalf of the Congressmanoffered DOD assistance on any procurement requirements.

Its 4:00 PM EST, Lt. Gen. John McDuffie, Logistics Director of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff is just now completing his press conference (viewed on CNN) on these

matters. His direct dial is 703-697-4121, his Exec. Officer, who I just spoke

with, is Col. Gary L. Border 703-697-1408. In his press conference, McDuffie

confirmed the Task Force report to Coggins. The General indcated that there

current estimates as of 2:00 EST today were that there are 138,500 refugees in

Albania, 17,400 in Montenegro and 86,000 in Macedonia. He said that the

Macedonia number could double by the end of the weekend. He indicated that

there were USAID Disaster Recovery Teams in the area and a DOD team would

be arriving within 24 hours. Further, General McDuffie indicated that the whole

operation "in country" will be coordinated by Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr., who is

in Naples, Italy (Direct Dial from U.S. 011390817212302). Admiral Ellis is the

former deputy Chief of Naval Operations. He was also former director of plans,

policies and operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Further, I spoke at the end of the press conference with Colonel Border who also

confirmed the Coggins report. He agreed that there is very little infrastructure inthe area, hindering smooth operations. Col. Border also confirmed that the food

is getting to the site only because of the assistance of the Albania army and

people, who have pitched in to help. I asked Border why DOD isn't sending a

combat construction unit into the area to build temp housing and he said that

State hadn't requested it. I felt that he wished they had.


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The process for aid, as described by McDuffie, was that requests would go from

State Department or NATO to UNHCR then back to State and then to NATO

and then back to DOD. Not a smooth operation. I just spoke (4:16 PM EST)

with Congressman Maloney directly and he said he would contact either the

Secretary of Defense or the President about streamlining this process.

I trust you are doing well and that's it from here. Very best Bob.

--- Bill Seebeck

Subject: Update

Date: Sun, 04 Apr 1999 09:24:53 -0400

From: "William B. Seebeck" Organization: Seebeck International, L.L.C.


Bob,

I am just going to assume that you are getting this e-mail. My update is as

follows:

There is a growing public concern now over the refugees here at home and the

government and media are speaking much more to the issue. That's good. Poll

numbers are going up on public concern and want for action, etc.

What still isn't good is that we are talking about small units of what is needed

right now. I spoke yesterday afternoon NYC time with Captain Burnett, USN in

Naples Italy, who is on the staff of Admiral Ellis. As

I indicated in my earlier message Ellis now has NATO/U.S. military

responsibility for relief and Captain Burnett is the staff coordinator for that

effort reporting to Admiral Ellis. Burnett's direct dial from U.S. is

011390817212263 and his e-mail is [email protected]. In theconversation, Burnett indicated that the food while on site or arriving on site,

still wasn't getting where it needed to go (he didn't seem happy with the

UNHCR effort) and I could tell he was frustrated. By the way, he seems like a

great guy who like most of the DOD people I have spoken with wants to get it

done ASAP.


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He said the big problem was housing and they are bringing tentage from all over

the world (primarily from U.S. bases), but he said it still won't be enough. I told

him that I had a conversation with Congressman Maloney about pushing to get

combat construction teams to the site for temp billeting. He wouldn't comment

on it other to say, it is needed. He also indicated that they have turned much of

the NATO force already in these countries to the relief effort. It was also

announced last night that 20,000 Italian troops have been assigned to the effort.

Not surprisingly, the continuing problem is lack of infrastructure and also I

think, the enormous pressure that is being put on these small countries to

shoulder so much of this burden, while trying to protect themselves against

Milosevic.

I will be monitoring today and expect to follow-up with Congressman Maloneyin the morning.

Recommendations

I have divided my recommendations into three categories policy, infrastructure

and the refugees. I have included policy as I have found that there are too many

hands in the pot. The result has been inaction or slowed reaction. In part this

is because requirements are being set by agencies and groups not able (because

it is not in their charter to do so) to follow through on the ground or to make

things happen. This has delayed vital and timely aid to the refugees that can

have horrific results.

Policy

Diplomacy has not succeeded in this effort. The response was military action.

As a result, the Department of State should no longer act as an intermediary in

this action determining military or other requirements in a theatre of war.

Rather, DOD should immediately assume these functions. The same actionshould be taken with all NATO allies.

Clearly, the command structure of NATO as it pertains to civilian, diplomatic

and military authority has failed. I would recommend that the structure used in

World War II be put in place. That is, the heads of state acting in direct concert

determine overall goals and objectives. Then the military chiefs present their

plans for meeting those goals and objectives to this group (not their


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representatives). Then they should be left to carry out those plans, in the pursuit

of an end victory.

As this is the first action of NATO, we should not apologize. NATO was created

as a defensive mechanism and only in the last eight years has it pursued the

possibility of an offensive posture. We should expect things to break and not

work. However, when it is clear that something doesnt work, dump it

especially when you are already engaged in combat.

The United States of America should never forget that it started NATO and it has

been a hallmark of U.S. foreign and military policy for 50 years. Therefore, we

must lead NATO forward, just as we planned and promised to do, albeit

defensively at the beginning. Now that the chips are down, we should not say,

well its a European problem. This must also provide better communicationswith the people of the U.S., who have supported NATO for half a century and

will not and have not been surprised by the objectives of NATO.

Some may find fault with the recommendations outlined above, but understand

that the Department of State is not structured to physically ACT overtly on

behalf of the nation. We are now engaged in war, with the lives of many at

stake. It is now time, as President Bush described it in the Persian Gulf War, to

pass the ball from the diplomats to the military, so that our objectives might be

met. At that time, it became the responsibility of the president to act as

commander-in-chief and the then secretary of state spent his time, running

between allies to make sure they were doing what they said they would and we

were doing what we said we would. The SOS was not being consulted on daily

targeting, nor should he have been. This also applies to the National Security

Council, whose job is not to run the war, but to report on the impact of the action

on allies, the enemy and potential enemies. This is the lesson of Vietnam. The

president and military in consultation with the Congress run wars. When you do

that, it works. Lets do it.

Infrastructure in Support of the Kosovo Refugees

Infrastructure does not exist in the countries where the refugees are now

positioned.

Diplomats cannot create infrastructure.


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Infrastructure requires action in the field, especially in a military theatre and that

means military intervention. If the U.S. has to go it alone on this it should.

The President should order combat construction teams immediately into these

areas to build roads, airports and shelter.

Ranger forces should also be ordered into these countries to protect these aid

teams.

The refugees must not be put in a position where they are in a no-man zone

separating aggressive forces.

The United States and other NATO nations should provide immediate hard

currency aid to Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro to assist them in the effortsthat they have already voluntarily begun, but also to strengthen them in

whatever means necessary to protect themselves against Serbian aggression.

The food and material available for these refugees will exhaust in a few months.

Plans must be initiated to deal with this situation. Failure to do so, will result in

possible worldwide shortages for other yet to be experienced disasters.

The Refugees

Refugees must stay in the region (at the very least Europe).

Refugees must not be sent to Cuba.

It should also be remembered that Cuba is not the United States.

If they are to be sent anywhere in the U.S., it should be to a like climate area

such as Massachusetts, New Hampshire or Maine, where DOD sites are

available and Albanian communities that can support them are within reach.

The Department of Defense should run the refugee camps.

If refugees are brought to the United States, a commission similar to that created

by President Ford in 1975 should be initiated. Those appointed to the

commission should be U.S. leaders in business, health, social services, housing,

religion, etc. Ideally, these leaders should be of non-Serbian Balkan background


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Documents

Balkan Refugee Special Report