Bale - Cases - Canons 6-9

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CANON 6

[G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005]

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT(PCGG), petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division),LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T.SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TANHUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO

TAN KEE HIONG (represented by TARCIANA C. TAN),FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENGCHAN, CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUELKHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO,CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM,BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKINGCORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION,ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP.,FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP.,GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL

INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.,JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING SERVICESAND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORTCORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT,PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC.,SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS &DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P.MENDOZA, respondents.

D E C I S I O NPUNO, J .:

This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significancefor it concerns on one hand, the efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethicsof lawyers in government service and on the other, its effect on the rightof government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests.



In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK)encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerablefinancial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it toincur daily overdrawings on its current account with the CentralBank.[1] It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had

approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and relatedinterests totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtfuland P0.505 million as uncollectible.[2] As a bailout, the Central Bankextended emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a totalof P310 million.[3] Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recoverfrom its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued aresolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resumebusiness with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public,and ordering its liquidation.[4] Apublic bidding of GENBANK’sassets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tangroup submitted the winning bid.[5] Subsequently, former SolicitorGeneral Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court ofFirst Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the courtin GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic ActNo. 265.

In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcosgovernment. One of the first acts of President Corazon C. Aquino wasto establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand

Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, thePCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaintfor “reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting anddamages” against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan,Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee,Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N.Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, MarianoKhoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, CelsoRanola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, WillyCo, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and

Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp.,Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, GrandspanDevelopment Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and DevelopmentCorp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp.,Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant,Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp.,Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively referred to herein as



respondents Tan, et al .), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R.Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and GregorioLicaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of theSecond Division of the Sandiganbayan.[6]In connection therewith, thePCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly

acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of theirclose relationship and influence with former President Marcos.

Respondents Tan, et al . repaired to this Court and filed petitionsfor certiorari , prohibition and injunction to nullify, among others, the writsof sequestration issued by the PCGG.[7] After the filing of the parties’comments, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan forproper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos.0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al . were representedby their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has

then resumed his private practice of law.

On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions todisqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al .with the Second

Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos.

0005[8] and 0096-0099.[9] The motions alleged that respondentMendoza, as then Solicitor General[10] and counsel to CentralBank, “actively intervened” in the liquidation of GENBANK, which wassubsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became AlliedBanking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly “intervened” in

the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al . when, in hiscapacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Bank’sofficials on the procedure to bring about GENBANK’s liquidation andappeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petitionfor assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with theCourt of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and wasdocketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualifyinvoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting“engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he

had intervened while in said service.”On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of

the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGG’s motion todisqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005.[11] It found thatthe PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency betweenrespondent Mendoza’s former function as Solicitor General and hispresent employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that



respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken onbehalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General.[12] Itfurther ruled that respondent Mendoza’s appearance as counsel forrespondents Tan, et al . was beyond the one-year prohibited periodunder Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be

Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a formerpublic official or employee from practicing his profession in connectionwith any matter before the office he used to be with within one year fromhis resignation, retirement or separation from public office.[13] The PCGGdid not seek any reconsideration of the ruling.[14]

It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred fromthe Sandiganbayan’s Second Division to the Fifth Division.[15] In itsresolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division ofthe Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGG’s motion to disqualify

respondent Mendoza.[16]

It adopted the resolution of its SecondDivision dated April 22, 1991, and observed that the arguments werethe same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No.0005. The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion wasdenied in its resolution dated December 5, 2001.[17]

Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing theresolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the FifthDivision of the Sandiganbayan via a petition for certiorari andprohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[18] The

PCGG alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing theassailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer fromaccepting employment in connection with any matter in which heintervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) thatCentral Bank could not waive the objection to respondent Mendoza’sappearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil CaseNo. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.[19]

The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of

law. In view, however, of the import and impact of Rule 6.03 of theCode of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and thegovernment, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the substantiveissue.

I



Substantive Issue

The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. Again, the prohibitionstates: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept

engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which hehad intervened while in the said service.”

I.A. The history of Rule 6.03

A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we tracethe historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for

lawyers were pervasive in England and other parts of Europe. Theearly statements of standards did not resemble modern codes ofconduct. They were not detailed or collected in one source butsurprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust ofthe standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. Itunderscored the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation assuperior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigationduties were at times intricate, including specific pleading standards, anobligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to exploresettlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties --

competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees andservice to the poor -- originated in the litigation context, but ultimatelyhad broader application to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.

The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not differ markedly from those in England.The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight,and procedural rules to govern attorney behavior. The difference fromEngland was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation.The standards set in England varied over time, but the variation in early

America was far greater. The American regulation fluctuated within asingle colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations hadthe effect of setting some standards of conduct, but the regulation wassporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only three of thetraditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in theformal, positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary period: theduties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees.[20]



The nineteenth century has been termed the “dark ages” of legalethics in the United States. By mid-century, American legal reformerswere filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter ofthe highly influential New York “Field Code,” introduced a new set ofuniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of

eight statutory duties became law in several states in the second half ofthe nineteenth century. At the same time, legal educators, such asDavid Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers wereworking to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. Thesereformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail and thusbrought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number ofmid-nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the Field Code,governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations – e.g., the“do no falsehood” oath and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in somestates. Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly, limit anattorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of agency recognizedbasic duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property.Evidence law started to recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus, all ofthe core duties, with the likely exception of service to the poor, hadsome basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did not providea comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, bycontrast, were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's

duties, and they actually ushered a new era in American legal ethics.

[21]

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical

standards began to guide lawyers in their practice — the bar associationcode of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standardsformulated by lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primarysources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like theacademic discourses, the bar association codes gave detail to thestatutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the academiclectures, however, the bar association codes retained some of theofficial imprimatur of the statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar

association codes became extremely popular that states adopted themas binding rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codeswas the re-emergence of bar associations themselves. Local barassociations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but theydisbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the late nineteenthcentury, bar associations began to form again, picking up where theircolonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations,



most notably the Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar Association, assumed on the task of drafting substantive standards ofconduct for their members.[22]

In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar

association code of ethics. The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was themodel for several states’ codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.[23]

In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of alawyer were insufficient to attain the full measure of public respect towhich the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons ofProfessional Ethics.[24]

As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form

and function of the canons. Among their concerns was the “revolvingdoor” or “the process by which lawyers and others temporarily entergovernment service from private life and then leave it for large fees inprivate practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, andinfluence garnered in government service.”[25] These concerns wereclassified as adverse-interest conflicts” and “congruent-interestconflicts.” “Adverse-interest conflicts” exist where the matter inwhich the former government lawyer represents a client in privatepractice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt withwhile employed by the government and the interests of the current and

former are adverse.[26] On the other hand, “congruent-interestrepresentation conflicts” are unique to government lawyers and applyprimarily to former government lawyers.[27] For several years, the ABAattempted to correct and update the canons through new canons,individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABAamended one canon and added thirteen new canons.[28] To deal withproblems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was mintedwhich disqualified them both for “adverse-interest conflicts” and“congruent-interest representation conflicts.”[29] The rationale fordisqualification is rooted in a concern that the government lawyer’s

largely discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation totake action on behalf of the government client that later could be to theadvantage of parties who might later become private practiceclients.[30] Canon 36 provides, viz .:

36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment



A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the

merits of which he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public

employ should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection

with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office oremploy.

Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of thecanons and added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively.[31]

In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its ownCanons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.[32]

By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growingconsensus that the ABA Canons needed more meaningful revision. In

1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of acommittee to study the “adequacy and effectiveness” of the ABACanons. The committee recommended that the canons neededsubstantial revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed todistinguish between “the inspirational and the proscriptive” and werethus unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the UnitedStates likewise observed thatCanon 36 of the ABA Canons ofProfessional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of lawyersfor negligible participation in matters during their employment with thegovernment.

The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the1969 ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility.[33] The basicethical principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility weresupplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules ofconduct to which the lawyer must adhere.[34] In the case of Canon 9,

DR

9-101(b)[35] became the applicable supplementary norm. The draftingcommittee reformulated the canons into the Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegatesapproved the Model Code.[36]

Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfiedwith the results and indefinite standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) andthe Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus, inAugust 1983, the ABA adopted new Model Rules of ProfessionalResponsibility. The Model Rules used the “restatement format,” wherethe conduct standards were set-out in rules, with comments followingeach rule. The new format was intended to give better guidance and



clarity for enforcement “because the only enforceable standards werethe black letter Rules.” The Model Rules eliminated the broad canonsaltogether and reduced the emphasis on narrative discussion, byplacing comments after the rules and limiting comment discussion to thecontent of the black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number of

substantive improvements particularly with regard to conflicts ofinterests.[37] In particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9, citing thehopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety on thesubjective views of anxious clients as well as the norm’s indefinitenature.[38]

In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of ProfessionalResponsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court forapproval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions,

and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On June 21,1988, this Court promulgated the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility.[39] Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibilitydeals particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz .:

Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept

engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he

had intervened while in said service.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the

general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the Canons ofProfessional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase“investigatedand passed upon” with the word “intervened.” It is, therefore,properly applicable to both “adverse-interestconflicts” and “congruent-interest conflicts.”

The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspectof Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverseinterest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No.107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No.0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 beforethe Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue ofwhether there exists a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient todisqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, etal .

I.B. The “congruent interest” aspect of Rule 6.03



The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, themeaning of “matter” referred to in the rule and, second, the metes andbounds of the “intervention” made by the former government lawyeron the “matter.” The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion342, defined “matter” as any discrete, isolatable act as well as

identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation andspecific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing orinterpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, orbriefing abstract principles of law.

Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the “matter” which was thesubject of intervention by respondent Mendoza while he was theSolicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of respondentMendoza as constituting the “matter” where he intervened as aSolicitor General, viz :[40]

The PCGG’s Case for Atty. Mendoza’s Disqualification

The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of

the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in issuing the assailed Resolutions dated

July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to disqualify Atty.

Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty.

Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure of

GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said

bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of

Manila.

As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977

prepared by certain key officials of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior

Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then

Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special

Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor

Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and

Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March 28,

1977, they had a conference with the Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who

advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK. Thepertinent portion of the said memorandum states:

Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General

and he advised that the following procedure should be taken:



1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board

reporting that studies and evaluation had been made since the last

examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that

the bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so that it

may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors

and creditors and the general public.

2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order

the liquidation of the bank and indicate the manner of its liquidation

and approve a liquidation plan.

3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of

Genbank of the foregoing decision to liquidate the bank and the

liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.

4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of FirstInstance reciting the proceedings which had been taken and praying

the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the

Monetary Board where it was shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies

of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with

the court the petition for assistance in the bank’s liquidation. The pertinent

portion of the said minutes reads:

The Board decided as follows:

. . .

E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General

with a copy of the subject memorandum of the Director,

Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29,

1977, together with copies of:

1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and

Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of

Genbank;

2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank

and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;



3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial

and Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March 24,

1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265,

as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of

insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments; and

4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by

the Solicitor General for his use in then CFI-praying the

assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

Beyond doubt, therefore, the “matter” or the act of respondentMendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is “advising theCentral Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation andeven filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.” In fine,the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank

on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within theconcept of “matter” under Rule 6.03. The procedure of liquidation isgiven in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:

The provision reads in part:

SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. – Whenever, upon

examination by the head of the appropriate supervising or examining

department or his examiners or agents into the condition of any bank or

non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, it

shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, orthat its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its

depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of the department head

concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the

facts, and the Board may, upon finding the statements of the

department head to be true, forbid the institution to do business in the

Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a

person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as receiver to

immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as

possible collect and gather all the assets and administer the same for the

benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these

purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing

mortgages in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary

performing quasi-banking functions.

. . .



If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said

period that the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing

quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with

safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, if the

public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its

liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by

the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court of First Instance

reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the

assistance of the court in the liquidation of such institution. The court

shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed

claims against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing

quasi-banking functions and enforce individual liabilities of the

stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such

institution and to implement the liquidation plan approved by the

Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the

Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or

finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of the receiver

previously appointed by the Monetary Board under this Section. The

liquidator shall, with all convenient speed, convert the assets of the

banking institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing

quasi-banking functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose

of the same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of paying the

debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-

bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions,

institute such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate court tocollect and recover accounts and assets of such institution.

The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the

actions of the Monetary Board under this Section and the second

paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and

can be set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof that the

action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order

or injunction shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank

from implementing its actions under this Section and the second

paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proofthat the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in

bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of

the court in which the action is pending a bond executed in favor of the

Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining

order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved

upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which shall be in the form of



cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount

of the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the

damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or

the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of the New

Rules of Court insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with

the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution

of the restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.

Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the

inability of a bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing

quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual

and ordinary course of business. Provided, however, That this shall not

include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-

bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions caused

by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic commonly

evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial intermediary

performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or financial

community.

The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act

or the appointment of a receiver under this Section shall be vested

exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general

or special, to the contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos.

72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)

We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on theprocedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated byRule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA FormalOpinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the“drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law” are actswhich do not fall within the scope of the term “matter” and cannotdisqualify.

Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that

the above act of respondent Mendoza falls within the definition of matterper ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act ofrespondent Mendoza which is the “matter” involved in Sp. Proc. No.107812 is entirely different from the “matter” involved in Civil CaseNo. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for themselves. It is given thatrespondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the CentralBank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate



in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The “matter” where he gothimself involved was in informing Central Bank onthe procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courtsand in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the thenCourt of First Instance. The subject “matter” of Sp. Proc. No. 107812,

therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from thesubject “matter” in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondentsTan, et al ., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nordoes it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether theshares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is farremoved from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation ofGENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due, amongothers, to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners andofficers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK isnot an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of thePCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goeswithout saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because hisalleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No.107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matterinvolved in Civil Case No. 0096.

Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of

the “intervention” contemplated by Rule 6.03. “Intervene” means, viz.:

1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . .

2: to occur, fall, or come in between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in

or between by way of hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur

or lie between two things (Paris, where the same city lay on both sides of an

intervening river . . .)[41]

On the other hand, “intervention” is defined as:

1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2:interference that may affect the interests of others.[42]

There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word“intervene.” Under the first interpretation, “intervene” includesparticipation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or hasno effect or little influence.[43] Under the second interpretation,



“intervene” only includes an act of a person who has the power toinfluence the subject proceedings.[44] We hold that this second meaningis more appropriate to give to the word “intervention” under Rule 6.03 ofthe Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evilssought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist where the government

lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as “x xx drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.”

In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial andinsignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided that a former governmentlawyer “should not, after his retirement, accept employment inconnection with any matter which he has investigated or passedupon while in such office or employ.” As aforediscussed, the broadsweep of the phrase “which he has investigated or passed upon”

resulted in unjust disqualification of former government lawyers. The1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibitionextended only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in the governmentservice, had “substantial responsibility.” The 1983 Model Rulesfurther constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that “alawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter inwhich the lawyer participated personally and substantially as apublic officer or employee.”

It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza

in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and substantial. Wedisagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings isan initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondentMendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the recordis arid as to the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in thesubsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville for along number of years. None of the parties pushed for its earlytermination. Moreover, we note that the petition filed merely seeksthe assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. Theprincipal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the

Central Bank in determiningclaims of creditors against theGENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice butas an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims ofcreditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of theSolicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting theinterest of government.



II

Balancing Policy Considerations

To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility

represents a commendable effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade theethics of lawyers in the government service. As aforestressed, it is atake-off from similar efforts especially by the ABA which have not beenwithout difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United States isstill fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.

In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code ofProfessional Responsibility, the Court took account of various policyconsiderations to assure that its interpretation and application to thecase at bar will achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing other

values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to causea chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent. Atpresent, it is already difficult for government to match compensationoffered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will beable to reverse that situation. The observation is not inaccurate that theonly card that the government may play to recruit lawyers is have themdefer present income in return for the experience and contacts that canlater be exchanged for higher income in private practice.[45] Rightly,Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering governmentservice would be too great for most men to endure should ethical rules

prevent them from engaging in the practice of a technical specialtywhich they devoted years in acquiring and cause the firm with whichthey become associated to be disqualified.[46] Indeed, “to makegovernment service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealingto enter.”[47]

In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its useas a litigation tactic to harass opposing counsel as well as deprivehis client of competent legal representation. The danger that the rule willbe misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere

guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted“the tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to delayproceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of its choice, andharass and embarrass the opponent,” and observed that the tactic was“so prevalent in large civil cases in recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary.”[48] Even the United States SupremeCourt found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals’ description of



disqualification motions as “a dangerous game.”[49] In the case at bar,the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult todivine. The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long beena dead issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many years andonly after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of

respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualificationin the case at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of thepetitions for certiorari , prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Courtwhich were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan anddocketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.[50] At the very least, thecircumstances under which the motion to disqualify in the case at barwere refiled put petitioner’s motive as highly suspect.

Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was notunconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be caused by

its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualificationmotion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, butprobably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence.[51] Theclient with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the benefitof the work done by the latter.[52] The effects of this prejudice to the rightto choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result indenial of due process.

The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of atruncated reading of the rule on the official independence of

lawyers in the government service. According to Prof. Morgan: “Anindividual who has the security of knowing he or she can find privateemployment upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously,challenge official positions when he or she believes them to be in error,and resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee who lacks thisassurance of private employment does not enjoy such freedom.”[53] Headds: “Any system that affects the right to take a new job affects theability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits officialindependence.”[54] The case at bar involves the position of SolicitorGeneral, the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot

be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor General should beendowed with a great degree of independence. It is thisindependence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittalof the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuseto defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any unduedimunition of the independence of the Solicitor General will have acorrosive effect on the rule of law.



No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of theformer government lawyer of the freedom to exercise hisprofession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of aformer government lawyer may extend to all members of his lawfirm.[55] Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming

the lepers of the legal profession.

It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied byRule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the possibleappearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence ingovernment. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging publicperceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best[56] which can lead tountoward results.[57] No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that thelessening of restrictions as to former government attorneys will haveany detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the

government-client and its attorneys which the canons seek toprotect.[58] Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has beenrejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct[59] and some courts have abandoned per se disqualificationbased on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists, anddemand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government, thewitnesses in the case, and the public.[60]

It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all itsstrictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers who “switch sides.” It is

claimed that “switching sides” carries the danger that formergovernment employee may compromise confidential officialinformation in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow inthe case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza ininforming the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidateGENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil CaseNo. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondentsTan, et al ., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidentialofficial information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure,there are no inconsistent “sides” to be bothered about in the case at

bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for respondents Tan, etal., respondent Mendoza is not working against the interest of CentralBank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity of theaction of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for thisreason that Central Bank offered no objection to the lawyering ofrespondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents



Tan, et al . There is no switching of sides for no two sides areinvolved.

It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 isintended to avoid conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a government

employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still ingovernment service.[61] The example given by the proponents of thisargument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the company that he orshe is currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted to prosecuteless vigorously.[62] In the cautionary words of the Association of the BarCommittee in 1960: “The greatest public risks arising from postemployment conduct may well occur during the period of employmentthrough the dampening of aggressive administration of governmentpolicies.”[63] Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as “probablyexcessive.”[64] He opines “x x x it is hard to imagine that a private firm

would feel secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal to his orher last client – the government. Interviews with lawyers consistentlyconfirm that law firms want the ‘best’ government lawyers – the oneswho were hardest to beat – not the least qualified or least vigorousadvocates.”[65] But again, this particular concern is a non factor inthe case at bar . There is no charge against respondent Mendoza thathe advised Central Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye inlater defending respondents Tan, et al . of Allied Bank. Indeed, hecontinues defending both the interests of Central Bank and respondentsTan, et al . in the above cases.

Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what isperceived as the “excessive influence of former officials” or their“clout.”[66] Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this concern toofar. He explains the rationale for his warning, viz : “Much of whatappears to be an employee’s influence may actually be the power orauthority of his or her position, power that evaporates quickly upondeparture from government x x x.”[67] More, he contends that theconcern can be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quotehim further: “x x x The idea that, present officials make significant

decisions based on friendship rather than on the merit says more aboutthe present officials than about their former co-worker friends. It impliesa lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials that does not seem justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials willtend to disfavor their friends in order to avoid even the appearance offavoritism.”[68]



III

The question of fairness

Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others,that the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptiveperiod. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactivelyto respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquietedby the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the SolicitorGeneral, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by thisCourt, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was madeafter the lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify as

reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the unfairness ofthe rule if applied without any prescriptive period and retroactively, atthat. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be initially addressedby the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions datedJuly 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division ofthe Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.

No cost.

SO ORDERED.

EDNA S.V. OGKA BENITO, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2103

Complainant, (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 07-2664–RTJ)

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,

QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO,

*

CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

-v e r s u s - TINGA,**



CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,*

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION and PERALTA, JJ.

RASAD G. BALINDONG,

Presiding Judge, Regional

Trial Court, Malabang,

Lanao del Sur, Branch 12,

Respondent. Promulgated:

February 23, 2009

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R E S O L U T I O N

CORONA, J .:

In a complaint dated April 30, 2007, complainant Dr. Edna S.V. Ogka

Benito, then acting mayor of the Municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur,

charged respondent Judge Rasad G. Balindong of the Regional Trial Court

(RTC), Malabang, Lanao del Sur, Branch 12, with gross ignorance of the

law.

Complainant alleged that on May 3, 2005, she filed administrative and

criminal complaints against Mamarinta G. Macabato, then municipal

treasurer of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, for grave misconduct in the Office ofthe Ombudsman-Mindanao (Ombudsman) docketed as OMB-M-A-05-175-

E. On September 15, 2005, the Ombudsman impleaded then Mayor Hadji

Amer R. Sampiano as co-respondent. Complainant claimed that these



respondents refused to pay her salary as vice mayor since July 1, 2004

despite repeated demands.[1]

On May 16, 2006, the Ombudsman rendered a decision in that case

finding respondents therein guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest

of the service and imposing on them the penalty of suspension from office

without pay for a period of nine months. It further directed the Regional

Secretary[2]

of the Department of the Interior and Local Government,

Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (DILG-ARMM) in Cotabato City

to immediately implement the decision.[3]

In compliance with the decision of the Ombudsman, the Regional

Secretary of the DILG-ARMM issued Department Order (D.O.) No. 2006-

38 dated September 1, 2006 implementing said decision.[4]

Due to the

suspension of Mayor Sampiano, complainant was sworn in as acting

mayor.[5]

Meanwhile, on September 4, 2006, respondents in OMB-M-A-05-

175-E filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition[6]

in the RTC of

Malabang, Lanao del Sur, Branch 12. The petition was raffled to the sala of

herein respondent and docketed as Special Civil Action (SCA) No. 12-

181. Their prayer was to annul and set aside D.O. No. 2006-38 of the

DILG-ARMM and prohibit its implementation.[7]

On the same date, respondent issued an order granting a temporary

restraining order (TRO) effective for 72 hours directing the Regional

Secretary of the DILG-ARMM to cease, desist and refrain from

implementing the D.O.[8]



In an order dated September 6, 2006, respondent extended the TRO

for a period of 20 days.[9]

On September 25, 2006, respondent issued another order for the

issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing the Regional Secretary

to cease, desist and refrain from implementing D.O. No. 2006-38.

On October 5, 2006, respondent rendered an “order”/decision

annulling D.O. No. 2006-38.[10]

This decision and the writ of preliminary

injunction were annulled by the Court of Appeals (CA) in its February 8,

2007 decision.[11] The CA held that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the

petition filed by the respondents in OMB-M-A-05-175-E pursuant to

Sections 14 and 27 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6770[12]

(Ombudsman Act of

1989) and Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman,

as amended by Administrative Order No. 17-03.

Complainant asserted that, despite the clear provisions of the law and

procedure, respondent took cognizance of SCA No. 12-181 and issued the

TROs, writ of preliminary injunction and October 5, 2006 decision. Hence,

she submitted that respondent should be administratively disciplined because

of his gross ignorance of the law which prejudiced the rights of her

constituents in Balabagan, Lanao del Sur. [13]

Respondent countered that he issued the orders in good faith. He was

not moved by corrupt motives or improper considerations. This could be

shown by the fact that complainant filed this complaint only after eight

months from the resolution of SCA No. 12-181. Considering that



complainant failed to establish bad faith or malevolence on his part, the

complaint against him should be dismissed.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its evaluation dated

September 24, 2007, found that the pertinent provisions of the law were

clear. It stated that:

… the issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction is not

a mere deficiency in prudence, or lapse of judgment by

respondent judge but is a blatant disregard of basic rules

constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In the first place,

respondent Judge should have refrained from taking cognizance of

the said special civil action when it was raffled to his court, heought to know this, yet he did otherwise.

It recommended that respondent be held administratively liable for gross

ignorance of the law and fined P21,000.[14]

We agree with the findings and evaluation of the OCA but we modify

the penalty.

A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules

constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[15]

Judges are expected to exhibit

more than just cursory acquaintance with laws and procedural rules.[16]

They

must know the law and apply it properly in good faith.[17]

They are likewise

expected to keep abreast of prevailing jurisprudence.

[18]

For a judge who is plainly ignorant of the law taints the noble office and great privilege vested

in him. Respondent’s gross ignorance of the law constituted inexcusable

incompetence which was anathema to the effective dispensation of justice.



In SCA No. 12-181, respondents in OMB-M-A-05-175-E sought to

annul and set aside D.O. No. 2006-38 of the DILG-ARMM and prohibit its

implementation. Since D.O. No. 2006-38 was issued merely to implement

the decision of the Ombudsman, respondents in OMB-M-A-05-175-E were

actually questioning this decision and seeking to enjoin its implementation

by filing a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC.

This is not allowed under the law, rules and jurisprudence. Under

Sections 14 and 27 of RA 6770, no court shall hear any appeal or application

for a remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the

Supreme Court, on a pure question of law.

Section 14. Restrictions. — No writ of injunction shall

be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted

by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima

facieevidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside

the jurisd7iction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for

remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman,except the Supreme Court, on [a] pure question of law.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — (1) All

provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman areimmediately effective and executory. A motion for reconsideration

of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman

must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and

shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds:

xxx xxx xxx

Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when

supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order,directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or



reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary

shall be final and unappealable.

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,

directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may

be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for

certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written

notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the

motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court.

The above rules may be amended or modified by the

Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of justice may

require.

However, in Fabian v. Desierto,[19]

we enunciated the rule that

appeals from the decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary

cases should be taken to the CA. Following our ruling in Fabian, the

Ombudsman issued Administrative Order No. 17[20]

amending Section 7,

Rule III[21]

of Administrative Order No. 07:[22]

Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. —Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of

conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or

reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not

equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final,

executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may

be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for

review under the requirements and conditions set forth in

Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from

receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying

the Motion for Reconsideration.

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory.In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent

wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under

preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other



emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or

removal.

A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in

administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The

Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall bestrictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure

by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the

Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or

censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said

officer. (Emphasis supplied)

These provisions clearly show that respondent had no jurisdiction to

take cognizance of the petition and to issue his subsequent orders. He

proceeded against settled doctrine, an act constituting gross ignorance of the

law or procedure.[23]

Respondent’s defense of good faith has no merit. Indeed, good faith

and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations, are

sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law canfind refuge.

[24] However

… good faith in situations of fallible discretion inheres only

within the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply

where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principles

evident and basic as to be beyond possible margins of error.[25]

If ordinary people are presumed to know the law,[26]

judges are duty-bound

to actually know and understand it. A contrary rule will not only lessen the

faith of the people in the courts but will also defeat the fundamental role of

the judiciary to render justice and promote the rule of law.



Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge under

Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-

10-SC,[27]

punishable by either dismissal from service, suspension or a fine

of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.[28] Since this is

respondent’s first offense, we deem it proper to impose upon him a fine

of P30,000.

Members of the bench are enjoined to behave at all times in a way that

promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the

judiciary.[29]

Respondent's act of taking cognizance of a case which was

plainly not within his court’s jurisdiction failed to meet the high standards of

judicial conduct.

Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,[30]

this administrative case against

respondent as a judge, based on grounds which are also grounds for

disciplinary action against members of the Bar, shall be considered as

disciplinary proceedings against such judge as a member of the Bar.[31]

When respondent entertained SCA No. 12-181, issued a TRO and writ

of preliminary injunction and subsequently granted the petition, he acted

contrary to law, rules and jurisprudence. In doing so, he consented to the

filing of an unlawful suit, in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath. A judge who

falls short of the ethics of the judicial office tends to diminish the people’s

respect for the law and legal processes.[32] He also fails to observe and

maintain the esteem due to the courts and to judicial officers.[33]

Thus,

respondent violated Canons 1 and 11 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility (CPR):



Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws

of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.

xxx xxx xxx

Canon 11. A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due

to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar

conduct by others. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent’s gross ignorance of the law also runs counter to Canons

5 and 6 of the CPR:

Canon 5. A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education programs, support efforts

to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical

training of law students and assist in disseminating informationregarding the law and jurisprudence.

Canon 6. These Canons shall apply to lawyers in government

service in the discharge of their official tasks. (Emphasis

supplied)

Judges should be well-informed of existing laws, recent amendments and

current jurisprudence, in keeping with their sworn duty as members of the

bar (and bench) to keep abreast of legal developments.

For such violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and Canons 1, 5, 6 and 11 of

the CPR, respondent is fined in the amount of P10,000.[34]

WHEREFORE, Rasad G. Balindong, Presiding Judge of the

Regional Trial Court, Malabang, Lanao del Sur, Branch 12 is hereby

found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law. He is FINED P30,000.



Respondent is further hereby FINED P10,000 for his violation of the

Lawyer’s Oath and Canons 1, 5, 6 and 11 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility.

He is STERNLY WARNED that the commission of the same or

similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Let this resolution be attached to the personal files of respondent in

the Office of the Court Administrator and the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

CANON 7

ROSARIO T. MECARAL,

Complainant,

- versus -

ATTY. DANILO S.

VELASQUEZ,

Respondent.

A.C. No. 8392 [ Formerly CBD

Case No. 08-2175]

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,

CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

PEREZ, and

MENDOZA, JJ .



Promulgated:

June 29, 2010

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D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:

Rosario T. Mecaral (complainant) charged Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez

(respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee

on Bar Discipline (CBD)[1]with Gross Misconduct and Gross Immoral

Conduct which she detailed in her Position Paper [2]

as follows:

After respondent hired her as his secretary in 2002, she became his

lover and common-law wife. In October 2007, respondent brought her to the

mountainous Upper San Agustin in Caibiran, Biliran where he left her with a

religious group known as the Faith Healers Association of the Philippines, ofwhich he was the leader. Although he visited her daily, his visits became

scarce in November to December 2007, prompting her to return home to

Naval, Biliran. Furious, respondent brought her back to San Agustin where,

on his instruction, his followers tortured, brainwashed and injected her with

drugs. When she tried to escape on December 24, 2007, the members of the

group tied her spread-eagled to a bed. Made to wear only a T-shirt and

diapers and fed stale food, she was guarded 24 hours a day by the women

members including a certain Bernardita Tadeo.

Her mother, Delia Tambis Vda. De Mecaral (Delia), having received

information that she was weak, pale and walking barefoot along the streets

in the mountainous area of Caibiran, sought the help of the Provincial Social

Welfare Department which immediately dispatched two women volunteers

to rescue her. The religious group refused to release her, however, without



the instruction of respondent. It took PO3 Delan G. Lee (PO3 Lee) and PO1

Arnel S. Robedillo (PO1 Robedillo) to rescue and reunite her with her

mother.

Hence, the present disbarment complaint againstrespondent. Additionally, complainant charges respondent with bigamy for

contracting a second marriage to Leny H. Azur on August 2, 1996, despite

the subsistence of his marriage to his first wife, Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal.

In support of her charges, complainant submitted documents including

the following: Affidavit[3]

of Delia dated February 5, 2008; Affidavit of

PO3 Lee and PO1 Robedillo[4]

dated February 14, 2008; photocopy of the

Certificate of Marriage[5]

between respondent and Leny H. Azur; photocopy

of the Marriage Contract[6]

between respondent and Shirley G. Yunzal;

National Statistics Office Certification[7]

dated April 23, 2008 showing the

marriage of Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal to respondent on April 27, 1990 in

Quezon City and the marriage of Leny H. Azur to respondent on August 2,1996 in Mandaue City, Cebu; and certified machine copy of the

Resolution[8]

of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Naval, Biliran and

the Information[9]

lodged with the RTC-Branch 37-Caibiran, Naval, Biliran,

for Serious Illegal Detention against respondent and Bernardita Tadeo on

complaint of herein complainant.

Despite respondent’s receipt of the February 22, 2008 Order [10]

of the

Director for Bar Discipline for him to submit his Answer within 15 daysfrom receipt thereof, and his expressed intent to “properly make [his]

defense in a verified pleading,”[11]

he did not file any Answer.

On the scheduled Mandatory Conference set on September 2, 2008 of

which the parties were duly notified, only complainant’s counsel was

present. Respondent and his counsel failed to appear.



Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III of the CBD, in his

Report and Recommendation[12]

dated September 29, 2008, found that:

[respondent’s] acts of converting his secretary into a mistress; contractingtwo marriages with Shirley and Leny, are grossly immoral which no

civilized society in the world can countenance. The subsequent detentionand torture of the complainant is gross misconduct [which] only a beast

may be able to do. Certainly, the respondent had violated Canon 1 of theCode of Professional Responsibility which reads:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey

the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.

x x x x

In the long line of cases, the Supreme Court has consistently

imposed severe penalty for grossly immoral conduct of a lawyer like thecase at bar. In the celebrated case of Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose

Manuel Eala, the [Court] ordered the disbarment of the respondent formaintaining extra-marital relations with a married woman, and having a

child with her. In the instant case, not only did the respondent commit bigamy for contracting marriages with Shirley Yunzal in 1990 and Leny

Azur in 1996, but the respondent also made his secretary (complainant) hismistress and subsequently, tortured her to the point of death. All these

circumstances showed the moral fiber respondent is made of, which[leave] the undersigned with no choice but to recommend the disbarment

of Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez.[13]

(emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors of Pasig City, by

Resolution[14]

dated December 11, 2008, ADOPTED the Investigating

Commissioner’s findings and APPROVED the recommendation for the

disbarment of respondent.

As did the IBP Board of Governors, the Court finds the IBP

Commissioner’s evaluation and recommendation well taken.

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the state

upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the



qualifications required by law for the conferment of such

privilege.[15]

When a lawyer’s moral character is assailed, such that his

right to continue



practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, it behooves him to meet the

charges squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating

body and this Court, that he is morally fit to keep his name in the Roll ofAttorneys.

[16]

Respondent has not discharged the burden. He never attended the

hearings before the IBP to rebut the charges brought against him, suggesting

that they are true.[17]

Despite his letter dated March 28, 2008 manifesting that

he would come up with his defense “in a verified pleading,” he never did.

Aside then from the IBP’s finding that respondent violated Canon

1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he also violated the Lawyer’s

Oath reading:

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of

law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supremeauthority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution

and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constitutedauthorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any

in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay

no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyeraccording to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good

fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myselfthis voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of

evasion. So help me God, (underscoring supplied),

and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely

reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal

profession.



The April 30, 2008 Resolution[18]

of the Provincial Prosecutor on

complainant’s charge against respondent and Bernardita Tadeo for SeriousIllegal Detention bears special noting, viz:

[T]he counter-affidavit of x x x Bernardita C. Tadeo (co-accused inthe complaint) has the effect of strengthening the allegations against Atty.

Danilo Velasquez. Indeed, it is clear now that there was really physicalrestraint employed by Atty. Velasquez upon the person of Rosario

Mecaral. Even as he claimed that on the day private complainant wasfetched by the two women and police officers, complainant was already

freely roaming around the place and thus, could not have been physically

detained. However, it is not really necessary that Rosario be physicallykept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. In fact, shewas always accompanied wherever she would wander, that it could be

impossible for her to escape especially considering the remoteness and thedistance between Upper San Agustin, Caibiran, Biliran to Naval, Biliran

where she is a resident. The people from the Faith Healers Association hadthe express and implied orders coming from respondent Atty. Danilo

Velasquez to keep guarding Rosario Mecaral and not to let her go freely.That can be gleaned from the affidavit of co-respondent Bernardita

Tadeo. The latter being reprimanded whenever Atty. Velasquez wouldlearn that complainant had untangled the cloth tied on her wrists and

feet.[19]

(emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That, as reflected in the immediately-quoted Resolution in the

criminal complaint against respondent, his therein co-

respondent corroborated the testimonies of complainant’s witnesses, and

that the allegations against him remain unrebutted, sufficiently prove the

charges against him by clearly preponderant evidence, the quantum of

evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.

[20]



In fine, by engaging himself in acts which are grossly immoral and

acts which constitute gross misconduct, respondent has ceased to possess the

qualifications of a lawyer.[21]

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez,

is DISBARRED , and his name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of

Attorneys. This Decision is immediately executory and ordered to be part

of the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme

Court of the Philippines.

Let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines and circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5700 January 30, 2006

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, represented by Atty. CarlosR. Bautista, Jr.,Complainant,

vs.ATTY. DANTE A. CARANDANG, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a verified complaint for disbarment filed by the Philippine Amusement and

Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) against Atty. Dante A. Carandang.

The complaint alleges that Atty. Carandang, respondent, is the president of Bingo Royale,

Incorporated (Bingo Royale), a private corporation organized under the laws of the

Philippines.

On February 2, 1999, PAGCOR and Bingo Royale executed a "Grant of Authority to OperateBingo Games." Article V of this document mandates Bingo Royale to remit 20% of its grosssales to PAGCOR. This 20% is divided into 15% to PAGCOR and 5% franchise tax to the

Bureau of Internal Revenue.

In the course of its operations, Bingo Royale incurred arrears amounting to P6,064,833.14 asof November 15, 2001. Instead of demanding the payment therefor, PAGCOR allowed Bingo



Royale and respondent Atty. Carandang to pay the said amount in monthly installmentof P300,000.00 from July 2001 to June 2003.

Bingo Royale then issued to PAGCOR twenty four (24) Bank of Commerce checks in thesum of P7,200,000.00 signed by respondent.

However, when the checks were deposited after the end of each month at the Land Bank,U.N. Avenue Branch, Manila, they were all dishonored by reason of Bingo Royale’s "Closed

Account."

Despite PAGCOR’s demand letters dated November 12 and December 12, 2001, andFebruary 12, 2002, respondent failed to pay the amounts of the checks. Thus, PAGCOR filed

with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila criminal complaints for violations of BatasPambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 against respondent.

PAGCOR contends that in issuing those bouncing checks, respondent is liable for seriousmisconduct, violation of the Attorney’s Oath and violation of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility; and prays that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

In his "Opposition" to the complaint, respondent averred that he is not liable for issuingbouncing checks because they were drawn by Bingo Royale. His act of doing so "is not

related to the office of a lawyer."

Respondent explained that since the start of its operations, Bingo Royale has been

experiencing financial difficulties due to meager sales. Hence, it incurred arrearages inpaying PAGCOR’s shares and failed to pay the amounts of the checks.

On November 20, 2001, PAGCOR closed the operations of Bingo Royale. This prompted the

latter to file with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Makati City, a complaint for damagesagainst PAGCOR, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-1671.

Subsequently, Bingo Royale became bankrupt. Respondent now maintains that the dishonorof the checks was caused by circumstances beyond his control and pleads that our power todisbar him must be exercised with great caution.

On February 24, 2003, we resolved to refer this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.1

In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Doroteo B. Aguila, the Investigating IBPCommissioner, made the following findings and observations:

Whether to issue or not checks in favor of a payee is a voluntary act. It is clearly a choice for

an individual (especially one learned in the law), whether in a personal capacity or officer of acorporation, to do so after assessing and weighing the consequences and risks for doing so. As President of BRI, he cannot be said to be unaware of the probability that BRI, thecompany he runs, could not raise funds, totally or partially, to cover the checks as they felldue. The desire to continue the operations of his company does not excuse respondent’s act

of violating the law by issuing worthless checks. Moreover, inability to pay is not a ground,under the Civil Code, to suspend nor extinguish an obligation. Specifically, respondentcontends that because of business reverses or inability to generate funds, BRI should be

excused from making good the payment of the checks. If this theory is sustained, debtors will



merely state that they no longer have the capacity to pay and, consequently, not obliged topay on time, nor fully or partially, their debt to creditors. Surely, undersigned cannot agree

with this contention.

As correctly pointed out by complainant, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is an offense that involves

public interest. In the leading case of People v. Tañada, the Honorable Supreme Court

explained the nature of the offense, thus –

x x x

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing aworthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment xxx. The

thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions the making of worthless checksand putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on thepublic interest, thepractice is proscribed by law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property

but an offense against public order.

x x x

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of theparties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at

large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury tothe public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure

the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. x x x(Emphasis supplied)

The Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer to obey the laws of the land and

promote respect for law and the legal processes. It also prohibits a lawyer from engaging inunlawful conduct (Canon 1 & Rule 1.01). By issuing the bouncing checks in blatant violationof B.P. Blg. 22, respondent clearly was irresponsible and displayed lack of concern for the

rights of others nor for the canons of professional responsibility (Castillo v. Taguines, 254SCRA 554). Atty. Carandang deserves to be suspended from the practice of law for a periodof one year. Consistent with the ruling in this Castillo case, suspension for one year is the

deserved minimum penalty for the outrageous conduct of a lawyer who has no concern forthe property rights of others nor for the canons of professional responsibility. Moreover,conviction for the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is not even essential for disbarment (De

Jesus v. Collado, 216 SCRA 619).

Commissioner Aguila then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of

law for one (1) year.

On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2003-177

adopting and approving Commissioner Aguila’s Report and Recommendation withmodification in the sense that the recommended penalty is reduced to suspension of six (6)months, thus:

RESOLVED TO ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, theReport and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,herein made part of the Resolution/Decision as Annex "A" and, finding the recommendation

fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, withmodification, and considering that the Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer



to obey the laws of the land and promote respect of law and the legal processes, and alsoprohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful conduct, Atty. Dante A. Carandang is hereby

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.2

Section 1, B. P. Blg. 22 provides:

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons whoactually signed the check on behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.

(Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, even if the check was drawn by Bingo Royale, still respondent is liable.

In People v. Tuanda,3 we explained the nature of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as follows:

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a

worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment xxx. Thethrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checksand putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the

practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense againstproperty but an offense against public order.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of theparties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community atlarge. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to

the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injurethe banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

As a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law, especially B. P. Blg. 22. By issuingchecks in violation of the provisions of this law, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct.

In Camus v. Civil Service Board of Appeals,

4

we defined misconduct as follows:

Misconduct has been defined as "wrong or improper conduct;" and "gross" has been held tomean "flagrant; shameful" (Webster). This Court once held that the word misconduct implies

a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment.

In Lizaso v. Amante,5 we held that a lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice in

connection with his profession, but also for gross misconduct outside of his professionalcapacity, thus:

The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well asbetween court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorney,uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of good moral character. xxx So it is held

that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in hisprofession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties,which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the principles which hislicense and the law confer upon him. (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent likewise violated the Attorney’s Oath that he will, among others, obey the laws;and the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically the following provisions:



Cannon 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promoterespect for the law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal

profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness topractice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner tothe discredit of the legal profession.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Dante A. Carandang is declared GUILTY of serious misconduct andviolations of the Attorney’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Asrecommended by the IBP Board of Governors, he isSUSPENDED from the practice of law

for six (6) months effective from notice.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines, and all courts in the land for their information and guidance. The Office of theBar Confidant is DIRECTED to spread a copy of this Decision on the personal record of Atty.Carandang.

SO ORDERED

!"#$# &

[A.C. No. 5148. July 1, 2003]

Atty. RAMON P. REYES, complainant, vs. Atty. VICTORIANO T.CHIONG JR., respondent .

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Lawyers should treat each other with courtesy, dignity and

civility. The bickering and the hostility of their clients should not affecttheir conduct and rapport with each other as professionals andmembers of the bar.

The Case



Before us is a Sworn Complaint[1] filed by Atty. Ramon P. Reyes withthe Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Victoriano T. Chiong Jr. for violation of his lawyer’s oath and ofCanon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. After the ThirdDivision of this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines (IBP), the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline resolved tosuspend him as follows:

“x x x [C]onsidering that respondent is bound by his oath which binds him to

the obligation that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any

groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. In

addition, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a

lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his

professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing

counsel. In impleading complainant and Prosecutor Salanga in Civil Case No.

4884, when it was apparent that there was no legal ground to do so, respondent

violated his oath of office as well as the above-quoted Canon of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, [r]espondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the

practice of law for two (2) years.” [2]

The Facts

In his Complaint, Atty. Reyes alleges that sometime in January

1998, his services were engaged by one Zonggi Xu,[3]

a Chinese-Taiwanese, in a business venture that went awry. Xuinvested P300,000 on a Cebu-based fishball, tempura and seafoodproducts factory being set up by a certain Chia Hsien Pan, anotherChinese-Taiwanese residing in Zamboanga City. Eventually, the formerdiscovered that the latter had not established a fishball factory. WhenXu asked for his money back, Pan became hostile, making it necessaryfor the former to seek legal assistance.

Xu, through herein complainant, filed a Complaint for estafa againstPan, who was represented by respondent. The Complaint, docketed asIS 98J-51990, was assigned to Assistant Manila City Prosecutor PedroB. Salanga, who then issued a subpoena for Pan to appear forpreliminary investigation on October 27 and 29, 1998. The latter neitherappeared on the two scheduled hearings nor submitted his counter-affidavit. Hence, Prosecutor Salanga filed a Criminal Complaint[4] forestafa against him before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.[5] On April 8, 1999, the Manila RTC issued a Warrant of Arrest[6] against Pan.



Thereafter, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Warrantof Arrest.[7] He also filed with the RTC of Zamboanga City a CivilComplaint for the collection of a sum of money and damages as well asfor the dissolution of a business venture against complainant, Xu andProsecutor Salanga.

When confronted by complainant, respondent explained that it wasPan who had decided to institute the civil action against Atty.Reyes. Respondent claimed he would suggest to his client to drop thecivil case, if complainant would move for the dismissal of the estafacase. However, the two lawyers failed to reach a settlement.

In his Comment[8] dated January 27, 2000, respondent argued thathe had shown no disrespect in impleading Atty. Reyes as co-defendantin Civil Case No. 4884. He claimed that there was no basis to concludethat the suit was groundless, and that it had been instituted only to exactvengeance. He alleged that Prosecutor Salanga was impleaded as anadditional defendant because of the irregularities the latter hadcommitted in conducting the criminal investigation. Specifically,Prosecutor Salanga had resolved to file the estafa case despite thependency of Pan’s Motion for an Opportunity to Submit Counter- Affidavits and Evidence,[9] of the appeal[10] to the justice secretary, and ofthe Motion to Defer/Suspend Proceedings.[11]

On the other hand, complainant was impleaded, because heallegedly connived with his client (Xu) in filing the estafa case, which the

former knew fully well was baseless. According to respondent, theirregularities committed by Prosecutor Salanga in the criminalinvestigation and complainant’s connivance therein were discoveredonly after the institution of the collection suit.

The Third Division of this Court referred the case to the IBP forinvestigation, report and recommendation.[12] Thereafter, the Board ofGovernors of the IBP passed its June 29, 2002 Resolution.[13]

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In her Report and Recommendation, [14] Commissioner Milagros V.San Juan, to whom the case was assigned by the IBP for investigationand report, averred that complainant and Prosecutor Salanga had beenimpleaded in Civil Case No. 4884 on the sole basis of the CriminalComplaint for estafa they had filed against respondent’s client. In his



Comment, respondent himself claimed that “the reason x x x was x x xthe irregularities of the criminal investigation/connivance andconsequent damages.”

Commissioner San Juan maintained that the collection suit with

damages had been filed purposely to obtain leverage against the estafacase, in which respondent’s client was the defendant. There was noneed to implead complainant and Prosecutor Salanga, since they hadnever participated in the business transactions between Pan andXu. Improper and highly questionable was the inclusion of theprosecutor and complainant in the civil case instituted by respondent onthe alleged prodding of his client. Verily, the suit was filed to harasscomplainant and Prosecutor Salanga.

Commissioner San Juan held that respondent had no ground toimplead Prosecutor Salanga and complainant in Civil Case No.4884. In so doing, respondent violated his oath of office and Canon 8 ofthe Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP adopted theinvestigating commissioner’s recommendation for his suspension fromthe practice of law for two (2) years.

This Court’s Ruling

We agree with the IBP’s recommendation.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered toappear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties,responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as aconsequence.[15] Membership in the bar imposes upon them certainobligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession,they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Moreover, Canon 8of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “[a] lawyer shallconduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards hisprofessional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics againstopposing counsel.”

Respondent’s actions do not measure up to this Canon. Civil CaseNo. 4884 was for the “collection of a sum of money, damages anddissolution of an unregistered business venture.” It had originally beenfiled against Spouses Xu, but was later modified to include complainantand Prosecutor Salanga.

The Amended and Supplemental Complaints[16] alleged the following:



“27. The investigating prosecutor defendant Pedro Salanga knowingly and

deliberately refused and failed to perform his duty enjoined by the law and the

Constitution to afford plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan due process by violating his

rights under the Rules on preliminary investigations; he also falsely made a

Certification under oath that preliminary investigation was duly conducted and

plaintiff [was] duly informed of the charges against him but did not answer; he

maliciously and x x x partially ruled that there was probable cause and filed a

Criminal Information for estafa against plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan, knowing fully

[well] that the proceedings were fatally defective and null and void; x x x;

“28. Said assistant prosecutor, knowing also that plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan filed

said appeal and motion to defer for the valid grounds stated therein deliberately

refused to correct his errors and consented to the arrest of said plaintiff under

an invalid information and warrant of arrest.

“29. Defendant Atty. Ramon Reyes, knowing that the suit of defendant

Zongoi Xu is baseless connived with the latter to harass and extort money from

plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan by said criminal prosecution in the manner contrary to

law, morals and public policy, resulting to the arrest of said plaintiff and

causing plaintiffs grave irreparable damages[.]”[17]

We concur with the IBP that the amendment of the Complaint andthe failure to resort to the proper remedies strengthen complainant’sallegation that the civil action was intended to gain leverage against theestafa case. If respondent or his client did not agree with ProsecutorSalanga’s resolution, they should have used the proper procedural andadministrative remedies. Respondent could have gone to the justicesecretary and filed a Motion for Reconsideration or a Motion forReinvestigation of Prosecutor Salanga’s decision to file an informationfor estafa.

In the trial court, a Motion to Dismiss was available to him if he couldshow that the estafa case was filed without basis. Moreover, he couldhave instituted disbarment proceedings against complainant andProsecutor Salanga, if he believed that the two had conspired to act

illegally. As a lawyer, respondent should have advised his client of theavailability of these remedies. Thus, the filing of the civil case had no justification.

The lack of involvement of complainant and Prosecutor Salanga inthe business transaction subject of the collection suit shows that therewas no reason for their inclusion in that case. It appears thatrespondent took the estafa case as a personal affront and used the civil



case as a tool to return the inconvenience suffered by his client. Hisactions demonstrate a misuse of the legal process. The aim of everylawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not toharass them.[18]

Lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers withcourtesy, dignity and civility. A great part of their comfort, as well as oftheir success at the bar, depends upon their relations with theirprofessional brethren. Since they deal constantly with each other, theymust treat one another with trust and respect. Any undue ill feelingbetween clients should not influence counsels in their conduct anddemeanor toward each other. Mutual bickering, unjustifiedrecriminations and offensive behavior among lawyers not only detractfrom the dignity of the legal profession,[19] but also constitute highlyunprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action.

Furthermore, the Lawyer’s Oath exhorts law practitioners not to“wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawfulsuit, nor give aid nor consent to the same.”

Respondent claims that it was his client who insisted in impleadingcomplainant and Prosecutor Salanga. Such excuse is flimsy andunacceptable. While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interests oftheir clients, their office does not permit violation of the law or anymanner of fraud or chicanery.[20] Their rendition of improper serviceinvites stern and just condemnation. Correspondingly, they advance the

honor of their profession and the best interests of their clients when theyrender service or give advice that meets the strictest principles of morallaw.[21]

The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteemof their professional brethren. This esteem cannot be purchased,perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born ofsharp contests and thrives despite conflicting interests. It emanatessolely from integrity, character, brains and skill in the honorableperformance of professional duty.[22]

WHEREFORE, respondent is found guilty as charged and ishereby SUSPENDED for two (2) years from the practice of law, effectiveimmediately.

SO ORDERED.



SECOND DIVISION

JOSE C. SABERON,

Complainant,

- versus -

ATTY. FERNANDO T. LARONG,

Respondent.

A.C. No. 6567

Present:

QUISUMBING, J ., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA,

VELASCO, JR., and

BRION, JJ .

Promulgated:

April 16, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J .:

In a Complaint[1]

filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant, this

Court, complainant Jose C. Saberon (complainant) charged Atty. FernandoT. Larong (respondent) of grave misconduct for allegedly using abusive and

offensive language in pleadings filed before the Bangko Sentral ng

Pilipinas (BSP).

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Complainant filed before the BSP a Petition[2]

against Surigaonon

Rural Banking Corporation (the bank) and Alfredo Tan Bonpin (Bonpin),

whose family comprises the majority stockholders of the bank, for

cancellation of the bank’s registration and franchise. The Petition, he said,

arose from the bank’s and/or Bonpin’s refusal to return various checks and

land titles, which were given to secure a loan obtained by his

(complainant’s) wife, despite alleged full payment of the loan and interests.



Respondent, in-house counsel and acting corporate secretary of the

bank, filed an Answer with Affirmative Defenses[3]

to the Petition

stating, inter alia,

5. That this is another in the series of blackmail suits filed by plaintiff [herein complainant Jose C. Saberon] and his wife tocoerce the Bank and Mr. Bonpin for financial gain –

x x x x.[4] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent made statements of the same tenor in his Rejoinder [5]

to

complainant’s Reply.

Finding the aforementioned statements to be “totally malicious,

viscous [ sic] and bereft of any factual or legal basis,” complainant filed the

present complaint.

Complainant contends that he filed the Petition before the BSP in the

legitimate exercise of his constitutional right to seek redress of his

grievances; and that respondent, as in-house counsel and acting corporate

secretary of the bank, was fully aware that the loan obtained by his

(complainant’s) wife in behalf of “her children” had been paid in full, hence,

there was no more reason to continue holding the collaterals.

Complainant adds that respondent aided and abetted the infliction of

damages upon his wife and “her children” who were thus deprived of the use

of the mortgaged property.

In his Comment[6]

to the present complaint against him, respondent

argues that: (1) there was “nothing abusive, offensive or otherwiseimproper” in the way he used the word “blackmail” to characterize the suit

against his clients; and (2) when a lawyer files a responsive pleading, he is

not in any way aiding or abetting the infliction of damages upon the other

party.



By Resolution of March 16, 2005,[7]

the Court referred the case to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and

recommendation.

In his Report and Recommendation dated June 21, 2006,[8] IBPInvestigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa held that the word

“blackmail” connotes something sinister and criminal. Unless the person

accused thereof is criminally charged with extortion, he added, it would be

imprudent, if not offensive, to characterize that person’s act as blackmail.

Commissioner Funa stressed that a counsel is expected only to present

factual arguments and to anchor his case on the legal merits of his client’s

claim or defense in line with his duty under Rule 19.01 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility, as follows:

A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain

the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate

in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges toobtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

Moreover, he noted that in espousing a client’s cause, respondent should not

state his personal belief as to the soundness or justice of his case pursuant toCanon 15[9]

of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Investigating Commissioner also opined that by using words that

were “unnecessary and irrelevant to the case,” respondent went “overboard

and crossed the line” of professional conduct. In view thereof, he

recommended that respondent be found culpable of gross misconduct and

suspended from the practice of law for 30 days.

By Resolution No. XVII-2007-036 of January 18, 2007,[10] the IBPBoard of Governors disapproved the recommendation and instead dismissed

the case for lack of merit.

The Commission on Bar Discipline, by letter of March 26, 2007,

transmitted the records of the case to this Court.[11]



Complainant appealed the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors

to this Court via a petition filed on March 7, 2007, under Section 12 (c) of

Rule 139-B[12]

of the Revised Rules of Court.

Complainant challenges the IBP Board of Governor’s Resolution as

illegal and void ab initio for violating the mandatory requirements of Section

12(a) of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court that the same be “reduced

to writing, clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on which it

is based.”

Finding the ruling of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent

is guilty of grave misconduct to be in accordance with the evidence,

complainant nevertheless submits that the recommended penalty ofsuspension should be modified to disbarment. The offense committed by

respondent, he posits, manifests an evil motive and is therefore an infraction

involving moral turpitude.

In his Comment to [the] Petition for Review, respondent states that the

administrative complaint against him is a harassment suit given that it was in

his capacity as counsel for the bank and Bonpin that he filed the Answer

objected to by complainant.

Moreover, respondent claims that the purportedly offensive allegation

was a statement of fact which he had backed up with a narration of the

chronological incidents and suits filed by complainant and his wife against

his clients. That being the case, he contends that the allegation made in the

Answer must be considered absolutely privileged just like allegations made

in any complaint or initiatory pleading.

Respondent in fact counters that it was complainant himself who hadmade serious imputations of wrongdoing against his clients – the bank for

allegedly being engaged in some illegal activities, and Bonpin for

misrepresenting himself as a Filipino.

Nonetheless, respondent pleads that at the time the allegedly abusive

and offensive language was used, he was only two years into the profession,



with nary an intention of bringing dishonor to it. He admits that because of

some infelicities of language, he may have stirred up complainant’s

indignation for which he asked the latter’s and this Court’s clemency.

In his Reply,[13] complainant counters that respondent’s Commentreveals the latter’s propensity to deliberately state a falsehood; and that

respondent’s claim that the administrative complaint was a “harassing act,”

deducible from the “fact that [it] post-dates a series of suits, none of which

has prospered x x x against the same rural bank and its owner,” is bereft of

factual basis.

Complainant goes on to argue that respondent, as counsel for Bonpin,

knew of the two criminal cases he and his wife had filed against Bonpin and,as admitted by respondent, of the criminal charges against him for libel

arising from his imputations of blackmail, extortion or robbery against him

and his wife.

Finally, complainant refuses to accede to respondent’s entreaty for

clemency.

This Court finds respondent guilty of simple misconduct for using

intemperate language in his pleadings.

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:

CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,

fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall

avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings,

use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain therespect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist

on similar conduct by others.



Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,

offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted

members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advancethe interests of their clients.

[14]

However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and

courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive

language.[15]

Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be

emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not

offensive.[16]

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to

abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to

the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of

the cause with which he is charged.[17]

In keeping with the dignity of the

legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be

dignified.[18]

It is of no consequence that the allegedly malicious statements of

respondent were made not before a court but before the BSP. A similarsubmission that actuations of and statements made by lawyers before the

National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) are not covered by the Code

of Professional Responsibility, the NLRC not being a court, was struck

down in Lubiano v. Gordolla,[19]

thus:

Respondent became unmindful of the fact that in

addressing the National Labor Relations Commission, henonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an oath-bound servant

of the law, whose first duty is not to his client but to theadministration of justice and whose conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.[20]

The observation applies with equal force to the case at bar.



Respecting respondent’s argument that the matters stated in the

Answer he filed before the BSP were privileged, it suffices to stress that

lawyers, though they are allowed a latitude of pertinent remark or comment

in the furtherance of the causes they uphold and for the felicity of their

clients, should not trench beyond the bounds of relevancy and propriety inmaking such remark or comment.

[21]

True, utterances, petitions and motions made in the course of judicial

proceedings have consistently been considered as absolutely privileged,

however false or malicious they may be, but only for so long as they are

pertinent and relevant to the subject of inquiry.[22]

The test of relevancy has

been stated, thus:

x x x. As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to

make alleged defamatory matters privileged the courts favor aliberal rule. The matter to which the privilege does not extend

must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of

the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its relevancyand impropriety. In order that matter alleged in a pleading may be

privileged, it need not be in every case material to the issues

presented by the pleadings. It must, however, be legitimatelyrelated thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the controversy

that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trialx x x. [23]

Granting that the proceedings before the BSP partake of the nature of

judicial proceedings, the ascription of ‘blackmail’ in the Answer and

Rejoinder filed by respondent is not legitimately related or pertinent to the

subject matters of inquiry before the BSP, which were Bonpin’s alleged

alien citizenship and majority stockholding in the bank. Those issues were

amply discussed in the Answer with Affirmative Defenses without need ofthe further allegation that the Petition was “another in a series

of blackmail suits . . . to coerce the Bank and Mr. Bonpin for financial

gain.” Hence, such allegation was unnecessary and uncalled for. More so,

considering that complainant and his wife were well within their rights to



file the cases against the bank and/or Bonpin to protect their interests and

seek redress of their grievances.

Respecting the assailed Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors,

indeed only a “Notice of Resolution” was transmitted to this Court, togetherwith the Records of the case, which Notice simply stated that on January 18,

2007, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVII-2007-036 in

which it:

RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the

Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and toAPPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of

merit.

Upon such Notice, it is evident that there is no compliance with the

procedural requirement that the IBP Board of Governors’ decision shall state

clearly and distinctly the findings of facts or law on which the same is

based. Thus Section 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of

Governors. - (a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be

reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record andevidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The

decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and

shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on

which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period notexceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board

following the submittal of the Investigator's report. (Emphasis and

underscoring supplied)

The above requirement serves a very important function not just to

inform the parties of the reason for the decision as would enable them on

appeal to point out and object to the findings with which they are not in

agreement, but also to assure the parties that the Board of Governors has

reached the judgment through the process of legal reasoning.[24]



With regard to complainant’s plea that respondent be disbarred, this

Court has consistently considered disbarment and suspension of an attorney

as the most severe forms of disciplinary action, which should be imposed

with great caution. They should be meted out only for duly proven serious

administrative charges.[25]

Thus, while respondent is guilty of using infelicitous language, such

transgression is not of a grievous character as to merit respondent’s

disbarment. In light of respondent’s apologies, the Court finds it best to

temper the penalty for his infraction which, under the circumstances, is

considered simple, rather than grave, misconduct.

WHEREFORE, complainant’s petition is partly GRANTED.Respondent, Atty. Fernando T. Larong, is found guilty of SIMPLE

MISCONDUCT for using intemperate language. He is FINED P2,000 with

a stern WARNING that a repetition of this or similar act will be dealt with

more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar

Confidant for appropriate annotation in the record of respondent.

SO ORDERED.

[A. C. No. 5398. December 3, 2002]

ANTONIO A. ALCANTARA, complainant , vs. ATTY. MARIANO

PEFIANCO, respondent .

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:



This is a complaint against Atty. Mariano Pefianco for conductunbecoming a member of the bar for using improper and offensivelanguage and threatening and attempting to assault complainant.

The complainant, Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, is the incumbent

District Public Attorney of the Public Attorney’s Office in San Jose, Antique. He alleged that on May 18, 2000, while Atty. Ramon Salvani IIIwas conferring with a client in the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) at theHall of Justice in San Jose, Antique, a woman approachedthem. Complainant saw the woman in tears, whereupon he went to thegroup and suggested that Atty. Salvani talk with her amicably as ahearing was taking place in another room. At this point, respondent Atty. Mariano Pefianco, who was sitting nearby, stood up and shoutedat Atty. Salvani and his client, saying, “Nga-a gina-areglo mo ina,ipapreso ang imo nga kliyente para mahibal-an na anang sala.” (“Why

do you settle that case? Have your client imprisoned so that he willrealize his mistake.”)

Complainant said he was surprised at respondent Pefianco’soutburst and asked him to cool off, but respondent continued tofulminate at Atty. Salvani. Atty. Salvani tried to explain to respondentthat it was the woman who was asking if the civil aspect of the criminalcase could be settled because she was no longer interested inprosecuting the same. Respondent refused to listen and insteadcontinued to scold Atty. Salvani and the latter’s client.

As head of the Office, complainant approached respondent andasked him to take it easy and leave Atty. Salvani to settle thematter. Respondent at first listened, but shortly after he again startedshouting at and scolding Atty. Salvani. To avoid any scene withrespondent, complainant went inside his office. He asked his clerk toput a notice outside prohibiting anyone from interfering with any activityin the Public Attorney’s Office.

Complainant said that he then went out to attend a hearing, butwhen he came back he heard respondent Pefianco saying: “Nagsiling si

Atty. Alcantara nga pagwa-on na kuno ako dya sa PAO, buyon ngaklase ka tawo.” (“Atty. Alcantara said that he would send me out of thePAO, what an idiot.”) Then, upon seeing complainant, respondentpointed his finger at him and repeated his statement for the other peoplein the office to hear. At this point, according to complainant, heconfronted respondent Pefianco and told him to observe civility or elseto leave the office if he had no business there. Complainant said



respondent resented this and started hurling invectives athim. According to complainant, respondent even took a menacingstance towards him.

This caused a commotion in the office. Atty. Pepin Marfil and Mr.

Robert Minguez, the Chief of the Probation Office, tried to pacifyrespondent Pefianco. Two guards of the Hall of Justice came to takerespondent out of the office, but before they could do so, respondenttried to attack complainant and even shouted at him, “Gago ka! ”(“You’re stupid!”) Fortunately, the guards were able to fend offrespondent’s blow and complainant was not harmed.

Complainant also submitted the affidavits of Atty. Ramon Salvani III,Felizardo Del Rosario, Atty. Pepin Joey Marfil, Robert Minguez, HerbertYsulat and Ramon Quintayo to corroborate his allegations.

In his Comment and Counter-Complaint, respondent Pefianco saidthat the sight of the crying woman, whose husband had been murdered,moved him and prompted him to take up her defense. He said that heresented the fact that complainant had ordered an employee, NapoleonLabonete, to put a sign outside prohibiting “standbys” from hanginground in the Public Attorney’s Office.

Respondent claimed that while talking with Atty. Salvani concerningthe woman’s case, complainant, with his bodyguard, arrived andshouted at him to get out of the Public Attorney’s Office. He claimedthat two security guards also came, and complainant ordered them totake respondent out of the office. Contrary to complainant’s claims,however, respondent said that it was complainant who moved to punchhim and shout at him, “Gago ka! ” (“You’re stupid!”)

Prior to the filing of the present complaint, respondent Pefianco hadfiled before the Office of the Ombudsman an administrative and criminalcomplaint against complainant. However, the complaint was dismissedby the said office.

The Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines found that respondent committed the acts alleged in thecomplaint and that he violated Canon 8 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility. The Committee noted that respondent failed not only todeny the accusations against him but also to give any explanation forhis actions. For this reason, it recommended that respondent bereprimanded and warned that repetition of the same act will be dealtwith more severely in the future.



We find the recommendation of the IBP Committee on Bar Disciplineto be well taken.

The evidence on record indeed shows that it was respondentPefianco who provoked the incident in question. The affidavits of

several disinterested persons confirm complainant’s allegation thatrespondent Pefianco shouted and hurled invectives at him and Atty.Salvani and even attempted to lay hands on him (complainant).

Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility[1] admonisheslawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candortoward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold thedignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly andcandidly toward each other and otherwise conduct themselves withoutreproach at all times.[2]

In this case, respondent’s meddling in a matter in which he had noright to do so caused the untoward incident. He had no right to demandan explanation from Atty. Salvani why the case of the woman had not orcould not be settled. Even so, Atty. Salvani in fact tried to explain thematter to respondent, but the latter insisted on his view about the case.

Respondent said he was moved by the plight of the woman whosehusband had been murdered as she was pleading for the settlement ofher case because she needed the money. Be that as it may,respondent should realize that what he thought was righteous did notgive him the right to demand that Atty. Salvani and his client, apparentlythe accused in the criminal case, settle the case with the widow. Evenwhen he was being pacified, respondent did not relent. Instead heinsulted and berated those who tried to calm him down. Two of thewitnesses, Atty. Pepin Marfil and Robert Minguez, who went to thePublic Attorney’s Office because they heard the commotion, and twoguards at the Hall of Justice, who had been summoned, failed to stoprespondent from his verbal rampage. Respondent ought to haverealized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legalprofession in the public estimation and erode public respect for

it. Whatever moral righteousness respondent had was negated by theway he chose to express his indignation. An injustice cannot be rightedby another injustice.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Mariano Pefianco is found GUILTY of violationof Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, consideringthis to be his first offense, is hereby FINED in the amount of P1,000.00



and REPRIMANDED with a warning that similar action in the future willbe sanctioned more severely.

SO ORDERED.

!"#$# '

FIRST DIVISION

ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA , Adm. Case No. 6290

Complainant, Present:

DAVIDE, JR., C.J .,

- versus - PANGANIBAN, SANTIAGO, CARPIO, and AZCUNA, JJ.

ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL-TENORIO, Respondent.

Promulgated:

July 14, 2004

X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with the Committee on

Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 30 May

2000, complainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a former employee of

respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged the

latter with deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and malpractice or other gross

misconduct in office.



On deceit, the complainant alleged that the respondent has been

falsely representing herself to be married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., who

has a prior and subsisting marriage with another

woman. However, through spurious means, the respondent and

Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., were able to obtain a false marriagecontract,[1] which states that they were married on 10 February 1980 in

Manila. Certifications from the Civil Registry of Manila[2] and the National

Statistics Office (NSO)[3] prove that no record of marriage exists between

them. The false date and place of marriage between the two are stated in

the birth certificates of their two children, Donnabel Tenorio[4] and

Felicisimo Tenorio III.[5] But in the birth certificates of their two other

children, Oliver Tenorio[6] and John Cedric Tenorio,[7] another date and

place of marriage are indicated, namely, 12 February 1980 in Malaybalay,Bukidnon.

As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that the

respondent caused the dissemination to the public of a libelous affidavit

derogatory to Makati City Councilor Divina Alora Jacome. The respondent

would often openly and sarcastically declare to the complainant and her

co-employees the alleged immorality of Councilor Jacome.

On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainantalleged that the respondent (1) cooperated in the illegal practice of law by

her husband, who is not a member of the Philippine Bar; (2) converted her

client’s money to her own use and benefit, which led to the filing of an

estafa case against her; and (3) threatened the complainant and her family

on 24 January 2000 with the statement “ Isang bala ka lang” to deter

them from divulging respondent’s illegal activities and transactions.

In her answer, the respondent denied all the allegations againsther. As to the charge of deceit, she declared that she is legally married to

Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr. They were married on 12 February 1980 as

shown by their Certificate of Marriage, Registry No. 2000-9108 of the Civil

Registry of Quezon City.[8] Her husband has no prior and subsisting

marriage with another woman.



As to the charge of grossly immoral conduct, the respondent denied

that she caused the dissemination of a libelous and defamatory affidavit

against Councilor Jacome. On the contrary, it was Councilor Jacome who

caused the execution of said document. Additionally, the complainant and

her cohorts are the rumormongers who went around the city of Makati onthe pretext of conducting a survey but did so to besmirch respondent’s

good name and reputation.

The charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office was

likewise denied by the respondent. She claimed that her Cristal-Tenorio

Law Office is registered with the Department of Trade and Industry as a

single proprietorship, as shown by its Certificate of Registration of

Business Name.

[9]

Hence, she has no partners in her law office. As to theestafa case, the same had already been dropped pursuant to the Order of 14

June 1996 issued by Branch 103 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon

City.[10] The respondent likewise denied that she threatened the

complainant with the words “ Isang bala ka lang” on 24 January 2000.

Further, the respondent averred that this disbarment complaint was

filed by the complainant to get even with her. She terminated

complainant’s employment after receiving numerous complaints that the

complainant extorted money from different people with the promise ofprocessing their passports and marriages to foreigners, but she reneged on

her promise. Likewise, this disbarment complaint is politically motivated:

some politicians offered to re-hire the complainant and her cohorts should

they initiate this complaint, which they did and for which they were re-

hired. The respondent also flaunted the fact that she had received

numerous awards and citations for civic works and exemplary service to

the community. She then prayed for the dismissal of the disbarment

case for being baseless.

The IBP referred this case to Investigating Commissioner Atty.

Kenny H. Tantuico.

During the hearing on 30 August 2000, the parties agreed that the

complainant would submit a Reply to respondent’s Answer, while the



respondent would submit a Rejoinder to the Reply. The parties also agreed

that the Complaint, Answer, and the attached affidavits would constitute as

the respective direct testimonies of the parties and the affiants.[11]

In her Reply, the complainant bolstered her claim that therespondent cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband by

submitting (1) the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office[12] where the

name of Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is listed as a senior partner; and (2) a

Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card[13] signed by the

respondent as Chairperson where her husband is identified as “Atty.

Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.” She added that respondent’s husband even

appeared in court hearings.

In her Rejoinder, respondent averred that she neither formed a law

partnership with her husband nor allowed her husband to appear in court

on her behalf. If there was an instance that her husband appeared in court,

he did so as a representative of her law firm. The letterhead submitted by

the complainant was a false reproduction to show that her husband is one

of her law partners. But upon cross-examination, when confronted with

the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office bearing her signature, she

admitted that Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he and a

certain Gerardo A. Panghulan, who is also not a lawyer, are named assenior partners because they have investments in her law office.[14]

The respondent further declared that she married Felicisimo R.

Tenorio, Jr., on 12 February 1980 in Quezon City, but when she later

discovered that their marriage contract was not registered she applied for

late registration on 5 April 2000. She then presented as evidence a

certified copy of the marriage contract issued by the Office of the Civil

Registrar General and authenticated by the NSO. The erroneous entries inthe birth certificates of her children as to the place and date

of her marriage were merely an oversight.[15]

Sometime after the parties submitted their respective Offer of

Evidence and Memoranda, the complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw

Complaint on 13 November 2002 after allegedly realizing that this



disbarment complaint arose out of a misunderstanding and

misappreciation of facts. Thus, she is no longer interested in pursuing the

case. This motion was not acted upon by the IBP.

In her Report and Recommendation dated 30 September 2003, IBPCommissioner on Bar Discipline Milagros V. San Juan found that the

complainant failed to substantiate the charges of deceit and grossly

immoral conduct. However, she found the respondent guilty of the charge

of cooperating in the illegal practice of law by Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in

violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility based on the following evidence: (1) the letterhead

of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office, which lists Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., as a

senior partner; (2) the Sagip Communication Radio Group identificationcard of “Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.,” signed by respondent as

Chairperson; (3) and the Order dated 18 June 1997 issued by the

Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal Cases Nos. 20729 – 20734,

wherein Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., entered his appearance as counsel and

even moved for the provisional dismissal of the cases for failure of the

private complainants to appear and for lack of interest to prosecute the

said cases. Thus, Commissioner San Juan recommended that the

respondent be reprimanded.

In its Resolution No. XVI-2003-228 dated 25 October 2003, the IBP

Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the Report

and Recommendation of Commissioner San Juan. The modification

consisted in increasing the penalty from reprimand to suspension from the

practice of law for six months with a warning that a similar offense in the

future would be dealt with more severely.

We agree with the findings and conclusion of Commissioner SanJuan as approved and adopted with modification by the Board of

Governors of the IBP.

At the outset, we find that the IBP was correct in not acting on the

Motion to Withdraw Complaint filed by complainant Cambaliza. In Rayos-

Ombac vs. Rayos,[16] we declared:



The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedlyexecuted by complainant does not, in any way, exonerate therespondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardlessof interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is

whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge ofdeceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule ispremised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding forsuspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where thecomplainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is adefendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest andafford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken andprosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for thepurpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration ofpersons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to thecourt for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or theperson who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged

misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in theoutcome except as all good citizens may have in the properadministration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, therespondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance ofcomplainant or his withdrawal of the charges.

Hence, notwithstanding the Motion to Withdraw Complaint, this

disbarment case should proceed accordingly.

The IBP correctly found that the charges of deceit and grosslyimmoral conduct were not substantiated. In disbarment proceedings, the

complainant has the burden of proving his case by convincing

evidence.[17] With respect to the estafa case which is the basis for the

charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the respondent is

not yet convicted thereof. In Gerona vs. Datingaling,[18] we held that when

the criminal prosecution based on the same act charged is still pending in

court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act must

await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings.

We, however, affirm the IBP’s finding that the respondent is guilty of

assisting in the unauthorized practice of law. A lawyer who allows a non-

member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to practice law

is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, which read as follows:



Canon 9 – A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the

unauthorized practice of law.

Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified personthe performance of any task which by law may only be performed by amember of the Bar in good standing.

The term “practice of law” implies customarily or habitually holding

oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of

livelihood or in consideration of his services. Holding one’s self out as a

lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose like identifying

oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or

associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of

law.[19]

Such acts constitute unauthorized practice of law.

In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he holds

himself out as one. His wife, the respondent herein, abetted and aided him

in the unauthorized practice of the legal profession.

At the hearing, the respondent admitted that the letterhead

of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office listed Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., Gerardo A.

Panghulan, and Maricris D. Battung as senior partners. She admitted that

the first two are not lawyers but paralegals. They are listed in the

letterhead of her law office as senior partners because they have

investments in her law office.[20] That is a blatant misrepresentation.

The Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card is

another proof that the respondent assisted Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in

misrepresenting to the public that he is a lawyer. Notably, the

identification card stating that he is “Atty. Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr.,” bears

the signature of the respondent as Chairperson of the Group.

The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the

unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and

policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those

individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The



permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited

privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of

moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the

court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those

unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of theCourt. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus,

the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his

professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible

the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or

corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to

disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.[21]

WHEREFORE, for culpable violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 ofthe Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Ana Luz B.

Cristal-Tenorio is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a

period of six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning that a

repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more

severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be attached to respondent Cristal-

Tenorio’s record as attorney in this Court and furnished to the IBP and the

Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7056 February 11, 2009

PLUS BUILDERS, INC., and EDGARDO C. GARCIA, Complainants,vs.ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

NACHURA, J.:

Before us is a motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated September 13, 2006, findingrespondent guilty of gross misconduct for committing a willful and intentional falsehood



before the court, misusing court procedure and processes to delay the execution of a judgment and collaborating with non-lawyers in the il legal practice of law.

To recall, the antecedents of the case are as follows:

On November 15, 1999, a decision was rendered by the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite

(PARAD) in favor of herein complainant, Plus Builders, Inc. and against the tenants/farmersLeopoldo de Guzman, Heirs of Bienvenido de Guzman, Apolonio Ilas and Gloria Martirez

Siongco, Heirs of Faustino Siongco, Serafin Santarin, Benigno Alvarez and Maria Esguerra,who were the clients of respondent, Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. The PARAD found thatrespondent’s clients were mere tenants and not rightful possessors/owners of the subjectland. The case was elevated all the way up to the Supreme Court, with this Court sustaining

complainant’s rights over the land. Continuing to pursue his clients’ lost cause, respondentwas found to have committed intentional falsehood; and misused court processes with theintention to delay the execution of the decision through the filing of several motions, petitions

for temporary restraining orders, and the last, an action to quiet title despite the finality of thedecision. Furthermore, he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized practice of law – holding themselves out as his partners/associates in the law firm.

The dispositive portion of the decision thus reads:

WHEREFORE, Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct and isSUSPENDED for two years from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of thisDecision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with moreseverely.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney and served onthe IBP, as well as on the court administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their

information and guidance.1

Respondent duly filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period, appealing

to the Court to take a second look at his case and praying that the penalty of suspension oftwo years be reduced to mere reprimand or admonition for the sake of his family and thepoor clients he was defending.2

Respondent maintains that he did not commit the acts complained of. The courses of actionhe took were not meant to unduly delay the execution of the DARAB Decision dated

November 19, 1999, but were based on his serious study, research and experience as alitigation lawyer for more than 20 years and on the facts given to him by his clients in theDARAB case. He believes that the courses of action he took were valid and proper legal

theory designed to protect the rights and interests of Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al.3 Hestresses that he was not the original lawyer in this case. The lawyer-client relationship withthe former lawyer was terminated because Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al. felt that their former

counsel did not explain/argue their position very well, refused to listen to them and, in fact,even castigated them. As the new counsel, respondent candidly relied on what thetenants/farmers told him in the course of his interview. They maintained that they had beenin open, adverse, continuous and notorious possession of the land in the concept of an

owner for more than 50 years. Thus, the filing of the action to quiet title was resorted to inorder to determine the rights of his clients respecting the subject property. He avers that hemerely exhausted all possible remedies and defenses to which his clients were entitled

under the law, considering that his clients were subjected to harassment and threats ofphysical harm and summary eviction by the complainant.4 He posits that he was only being



protective of the interest of his clients as a good father would be protective of his ownfamily,5 and that his services to Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al were almost pro bono.6

1avvphi1

Anent the issue that he permitted his name to be used for unauthorized practice of law, hehumbly submits that there was actually no sufficient evidence to prove the same or did he fail

to dispute this, contrary to the findings of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). He was

counsel of Leopoldo de Guzman, et al. only and not of the cooperative KalayaanDevelopment Cooperative (KDC). He was just holding his office in this cooperative, togetherwith Attys. Dominador Ferrer, Efren Ambrocio, the late Alfredo Caloico and Marciano

Villavert. He signed the retainer agreement with Atty. Dominador to formalize their lawyer-client relationship, and the complainants were fully aware of such arrangement. 7

Finally, he submits that if he is indeed guilty of violating the rules in the courses of action hetook in behalf of his clients, he apologizes and supplicates the Court for kind consideration,pardon and forgiveness. He reiterates that he does not deserve the penalty of two years’

suspension, considering that the complaint fails to show him wanting in character, honesty,and probity; in fact, he has been a member of the bar for more than 20 years, served asformer president of the IBP Marinduque Chapter, a legal aide lawyer of IBP Quezon City

handling detention prisoners and pro bono cases, and is also a member of the Couples forChrist, and has had strict training in the law school he graduated from and the law offices heworked with.8 He is the sole breadwinner in the family with a wife who is jobless, four (4)

children who are in school, a mother who is bedridden and a sick sister to support. Thefamily’s only source of income is respondent’s private practice of law, a work he has beenengaged in for more than twenty-five (25) years up to the present.9

On August 15, 2008, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter fromrespondent, requesting that he be issued a clearance for the renewal of his notarialcommission. Respondent stated therein that he was aware of the pendency of the

administrative cases10 against him, but pointed out that said cases had not yet been resolvedwith finality. Respondent sought consideration and compassion for the issuance of theclearance -- considering present economic/financial difficulties -- and reiterating the fact that

he was the sole breadwinner in the family.

It is the rule that when a lawyer accepts a case, he is expected to give his full attention,

diligence, skill and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether heaccepts it for a fee or for free.11 A lawyer’s devotion to his client’s cause not only requires butalso entitles him to deploy every honorable means to secure for the client what is justly due

him or to present every defense provided by law to enable the latter’s cause to succeed. 12 Inthis case, respondent may not be wanting in this regard. On the contrary, it is apparent thatthe respondent’s acts complained of were committed out of his over-zealousness andmisguided desire to protect the interests of his clients who were poor and uneducated. We

are not unmindful of his dedication and conviction in defending the less fortunate. Taking thecudgels from the former lawyer in this case is rather commendable, but respondent shouldnot forget his first and foremost responsibility as an officer of the court. We stress what we

have stated in our decision that, in support of the cause of their clients, lawyers have theduty to present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law. This obligation,however, is not to be performed at the expense of truth and justice.13 This is the criterion that

must be borne in mind in every exertion a lawyer gives to his case.14 Under the Code ofProfessional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficientadministration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding execution

of a judgment or by misusing court processes.15



Certainly, violations of these canons cannot be countenanced, as respondent must haverealized with the sanction he received from this Court. However, the Court also knows how to

show compassion and will not hesitate to refrain from imposing the appropriate penalties inthe presence of mitigating factors, such as the respondent’s length of service,acknowledgment of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances,

humanitarian and equitable considerations, and respondent’s advanced age, among other

things, which have varying significance in the Court’s determination of the imposable penalty.Thus, after a careful consideration of herein respondent’s motion for reconsideration andhumble acknowledgment of his misfeasance, we are persuaded to extend a degree of

leniency towards him.16 We find the suspension of six (6) months from the practice of lawsufficient in this case

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the letter-request dated August 15, 2008 is NOTED.Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision datedSeptember 13, 2006 is hereby MODIFIED in that respondent is SUSPENDED from the

practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this Resolution.Respondent is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of said Resolutionwithin ten (10) days from receipt thereof.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney and served onthe IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator, who shall circulate it to all courts for their

information and guidance.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice

Documents

Bale - Cases - Canons 6-9