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2. Think Tanks and Political Parties in

Canada: Competitors or Collaborators?

GERALD BAIER1 (University of British Columbia)

and HERMAN BAKVIS2

(University of Victoria)

In Canada, the role of political parties and perceptions about their utility to Canadian

democracy are long standing preoccupations. The last two decades have seen substantial

tumult in the Canadian party system. The Progressive Conservative party, the traditional alter-

native to the oft-governing Liberal Party of Canada, has effectively undergone a split and

reconstitution, forming a minority government in the early months of 2006. The Quebec nation-

alist Bloc Quebecois party continues to hold sway over large parts of that province, and with

the second minority in parliament since 2004, parties are playing as important a role as they

ever have in Canadas political system. That said, there is still substantial doubt about what

Canadas parliamentary system gets from its political parties outside of electing and organiz-

ing governing. This doubt was well expressed in the immediate aftermath of the 2006 parlia-

mentary elections when a Liberal cabinet minister from Vancouver, David Emerson, elected as

a Liberal in the election, re-emerged two weeks later as a part of the new Conservative min-

istry. Emersons move was met by considerable anger from his constituents and former col-

leagues, but was not unusual enough to suggest that his former party was falling apart.

Contentions that party labels mean much in the way of ideology or organization of anything but

the spoils of electoral politics dont stand up to such behavior.

The last major governmental effort to examine the role of political parties in Canadian society,

the 1991 Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (or Lortie Commission after

its chairman Pierre Lortie), emphasized the need to rejuvenate Canadas parties as primary polit-

ical organizations. (Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, 1991). To this

end, the Commission urged that Canadas electoral law be changed to encourage the creation of

party foundations. These foundations, or internal think tanks, would, it was hoped, bring a

degree of policy depth to the parties which have long been criticized for their shortcomings in

Think Tanks and Public Policies in Latin America 34

1. Gerald Baier (PhD, Dalhousie) is an Assistant Professor of the Department of Political Science of the University of British

Columbia. He joined the department in 2003. His teaching and research interests are in Canadian politics with a focus on theConstitution, federalism and public law. He is a regular commentator on federal politics in national and local media. His past

research has explored the role of judicial decision-making in the shaping of federalism in Canada, Australia and the United

States. He has recently completed a co-authored book on federalism and intergovernmental relations in Canada. He ispresently conducting a comprehensive study of the Supreme Court of Canada's institutional character and processes.

2. Herman Bakvis (PhD in Political Science, University of British Columbia, 1978; MA in Political Science, University of British

Columbia, 1972; BA Honours in Political Studies, Queen's University, 1971) joined the School of Public Administration at UVic

as a Professor in July 2005, after 26 years at Dalhousie University in both the Department of Political Science and School of

Public Administration. He was Director of the School at Dalhousie from 2000 to 2004. He has also held visiting appointmentsat the Australian National University, Queens University and the University of Saskatchewan. In addition to his academic

research interests (see below), he has been involved in applied policy research for departments and agencies such Human

Resources Development Canada, Transport Canada, and Treasury Board Secretariat, as well Royal Commissions such as the

Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing.


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this regard. The exhortations of the Lortie Commission have had little effect. Neither the

Conservative government to which it reported nor the subsequent Liberal government chose

to act on its recommendations. When the Liberals did undertake some important changes to

the laws governing political parties in 2003, the reforms were focused almost wholly on elec-

toral competition, the selection of candidates and funding of the parties as electoral machines.

The parties themselves have done little to increase their ability to think about policies inde-pendently of electoral competition. In this article we explore the failure of Canadian parties to

develop internal think tanks and offer some reasons why parties should revisit this issue. We

argue that the potential and actual role of think tanks, both within and outside parties, has been

misunderstood. Internal think tanks should not be thought of as a restricting force on the nec-

essary pragmatism of Canadian political parties. Neither should they necessarily be consid-

ered competitors, eating up the resources and talent necessary for fighting elections. Think

tanks often have less to do with policy development and much more to do with the promotion

and popularization of new ideas and the creation of political networks. At the same time, party

foundations are not an unmixed blessing. Institutes and foundations, if not properly monitored,

can become a conduit for questionable political and electoral spending.

Think Tanks as Competitors

In Canada, think tanks are generally not associated directly or even indirectly with political par-

ties. Think tanks and policy organizations like to emphasize their status as independent observers

and purveyors of information to the public marketplace of ideas. Unlike parties whose main goal is

to fill public office, and interest groups who seek to directly influence those officers, think tanks and

institutes seem to have one primary goal: to influence the policy agenda. They seek to shape pub-lic opinion and the intellectual climate in which decision makers operate. Their tools often include

one-pagers and backgrounders for the media and well-publicized conferences and seminars

drawing together intellectuals and practitioners around important public questions. Unlike lobby-

ists, think tanks tend to be prolific publishers, printing up a range of newsletters and briefing papers

as well as monographs and edited collections of essays on particular topics. They can also be seen

as brokers of information and ideas or, as Evert Lindquist puts it, a third community of profes-

sional intellectuals (Lindquist, 1990: 73-95). Canadian think tanks may attempt to capture the ear

of key decision makers when the opportunity presents itself. However, they generally pursue their

goals more publicly through clever packaging and promotion of ideas and policy solutions.

Unencumbered by the compromises of office, think tanks primarily present their policy and ideo-logical alternatives to the general public. So while think tanks do try to trade in the currency of ideas

with more determination than parties, their audience is often the same. In this sense, think tanks

weaken political parties, by competing directly with them in the shaping of public views.

An excellent illustration of how traditional think tanks perform this function can be found in the

public discourse over deficit reduction in Canada in the 1990s. Think tanks such as the C.D. Howe

Institute and the Fraser Institute, on the right, and the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives and the

Caledon Institute, on the left, effectively pre-empted much of the policy space normally occupied by

political parties on this issue. The Fraser Institute was particularly good at targeting public opinion



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with clever devices like Tax Freedom Day, the first day of the year in which the average tax payer

had completed paying the portion of their annual income that would be collected by governments

as tax. As Allan Tupper has argued, much of this analysis is shallow, even specious, and very lit-

tle of it is new (Tupper, n.d.: 530-546). Yet, the success of those championing fiscal restraint at get-

ting their message heard and shaping the priorities of Canadians and of their provincial and fed-

eral governments during the 1990s is undeniable. Provincial and federal governments across thefull range of political parties have all bought into the need for fiscal discipline as a basic compo-

nent of governing. Similarly, with the arrival of fiscal surpluses, the same institutes have helped put

tax cuts onto the political agenda.

On the other side of the spectrum, the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives has promoted an

annual alternative budget, one which typically puts much less emphasis on expenditure reduction.

Likewise, the Caledon Institute has succeeded in focusing public attention on the issue of child pover-

ty. Its president Ken Battle has even claimed credit for federal government innovations in seniors ben-

efits and child poverty legislation, a claim with which a number of observers concur (Valpy, 1996;

Greenspon, 1998). Jousting over issues such as changes to the Canada Pension Plan or EmploymentInsurance more often seems to take place among institutes of the left and right than between politi-

cal parties in Parliament. Similarly, arguments that erupt in the media upon the annual release by the

Finance Minister of the governments budget are more than often between these institutes.

Overall, the diversity of Canadas think tanks is most encouraging. If they are going to compete

with the political parties for the engaged publics attention and the skills of the best policy analysts

and innovators, it is heartening to see them add some pluralism to the public conversation. Indeed,

one senses that there is much greater diversity among think tanks than among political parties. And

while there are some think tanks that have larger budgets and command more attention than oth-ers, there is still remarkable variety. Murray Campbell has estimated that there are probably about

50 think tanks in Canada, with a collective budget of around $77 million. Of this total, only 15 to 20

think tanks have sufficiently substantial budgets and personnel to have a public profile of much sig-

nificance.3 On the whole, the policy community tends to be weighted to the right of the political

spectrum, but this is equally true of Canadas interest groups and political parties. The critical ques-

tion for political parties then is: should they develop links with think tanks or form their own in-house

think tanks in order to tap into this rich array of political talent and energy?

Think Tanks as Collaborators

With some minor exceptions, neither parties nor think tanks have attempted to develop link-

ages with each other in Canada. Nor have Canadian parties made much genuine effort to

develop in-house think tanks. Canada, however, is something of an exception in this regard.

As stated at the outset, Canadas political parties serve few purposes outside of electoral com-

petition and government formation. They do little to organize political socialization or organize


3. These range in size from the Conference Board of Canada (with a $23 million annual budget) to the more modestPearson-Shoyama Institute (with an annual budget of $150,000). See Wonks by Murray Campbell (1995: d1,d2).


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community life in the country. In other countries parties tend to have more links, both formal

and informal, with think tanks, ranging from official party foundations in Germany to founda-

tions linked directly to individual politicians in the United States (see Figure 1).

The United Kingdom lies somewhere nearer the middle, with mutually beneficial relation-ships between parties and external think tanks. The current Labour government has benefited

from informal associations with a number of think tanks. The Institute of Public Policy Research

(IPPR), the Fabian Society, the Social Market Foundation, the European Policy Forum and the

post-modernist Demos have all produced studies that have found their way into the hands of

Prime Minister Tony Blair. At the same time, with both the party and the various institutes

retaining their independence, Labour is not considered especially beholden to any of the insti-

tutes. The Prime Minister, on the other hand, has had at his disposal an almost inexhaustible

supply of ideas, yet still maintains strong control over how those ideas are to be used and

incorporated into his partys, and ultimately his governments, policy agenda. Think tanks have


Also rarelyassociated with aparty. Some linksdo occur, andpersonnel will workin Government orparties.

Rarely associatedwith a party.Infrequent, butoccasional exchangeof personnel.

Known links toparties, often notformal. Exchangeof personnelcommon andregular.

Formal ties toparties, legallyseparated for fundingand tax purposes.Provide advice andpersonnel directly toparty when needed.

Set up to endorsecandidates foroffice or leadership.Personnel oftenindistinguishablefrom electoral orpolitical staff.

CANADA USA (Brookings

model)

USA(Vanitymodel)

UK GERMAN/ DUTCH


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a sympathetic ear in government and thereby perhaps a greater incentive to research and rec-

ommend policy. In many respects, the important role presently played by think tanks in rela-

tion to parties in the United Kingdom can be credited to Margaret Thatcher. The Centre for Policy

Studies (CPS), founded by Margaret Thatcher and Sir Keith Joseph in the 1970s was the primary

vehicle for changing the course of the Conservative party. Furthermore, the CPS and other con-

servatively oriented think tanks for example, the Institute of Economic Affairs provided doses ofrejuvenation when the Thatcher cabinet appeared to falter, especially after the general elections of

1983 and 1987. So called neo-conservative think tanks in the United States served a similar role

in the reorientation of the Republican Party, providing outlets for conservative ideas and homes for

conservative intellectuals who were out of office during the Clinton years. George W. Bush has

been able to call upon the policy capacity of these organi-zations when attempting domestic

reforms in areas like Medicare and social security, but has also been inspired in much of his for-

eign policy by the ministrations of these independent groups.

Sharing the middle ground with these largely independent institutes is a more nefarious sort.

So-called vanity think tanks are built around particular individuals and leaders to repackagetheir ideology, communicate campaign style messages and, perhaps most importantly, circum-

vent increasingly strict campaign finance laws. Although this sort of think tank is found main-

ly in the United States, they have popped up elsewhere. In the United Kingdom, John

Redwood, challenger to then Prime Minister John Majors leadership of the Conservative party,

became involved in the founding of the Conservative 2000 Foundation, headed by his political

adviser and leadership campaign organizer. The independence of these think tanks from politi-

cians is certainly questionable, and their policy and research capacity is similarly suspect. They

do demonstrate, however, the potential for abuse that is inherent in close relations between

parties and think tanks.

In some countries, mostly in continental Europe, political parties regularly adopt or estab-

lish internal think tanks or party foundations. Germany in particular has a very strong tradition

of party foundations not only developing policy but also engaging in numerous other activities

under the official auspices of their associated parties. Germany can be seen as the polar oppo-

site of Canada in this regard. Subsequently, independent think tanks appear to have less sway

over the direction of public policy. It is the in-house party foundations that take on many of the

roles associated with think tanks. German party foundations also disburse foreign aid money

and play a critical role in the training and education of party members.

The Potential of Think Tanks

According to Robert Young, Canadas political parties desperately need a stronger capac-

ity to formulate policy (...) In a self-reinforcing cycle, people with genuine policy concerns seek

out interest groups to advance their causes, and the parties degenerate further into domina-

tion by leaders and their personal entourages, who play the politics of image and strategic

vagueness (Young, 1991: 77). Concerns about the excessive concentration of political

power in the Canadian Executive tend to blame political parties, which are dominated by their



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leadership both formally and informally. Parties are seen as part of the problem, rather than the

solution to reforming Executive Power in Canada. Think tanks, particularly internal ones, could

certainly help solve the idea problem, as well as supply the personnel to put together cohe-

sive policy packages. But developing policy, however broadly defined, is not the only or even

perhaps most valuable role that party linked think tanks could perform. Indeed, one can iden-

tify at least four main functions that think tanks could perform.

Think Tank as Policy Legitimator

The most obvious function of a think tank is still the ability to provide policy advice. The

think in think tank is supposed to be about policy and how to handle the challenges of the

complex modern State. In many countries, think tanks do exactly this and have had measura-

ble success in making an impact on policy. In both the British and American cases, think tanks

are often used selectively by the government of the day to provide intellectual or scientific jus-

tification for the policies that a committed government or leader may wish to pursue. As most

political parties can not often be relied upon to provide learned advice or strong ideologicalcommitments, those leaders who do wish to pursue a strong ideological course often find

ready support and policy resources in think tanks. The success of conservative think tanks in the

1980s serves as an ideal example. Both Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan drew heavily,

albeit selectively, from policy institutes when undertaking their general assault on the welfare

State. Given the antipathy that both governments had to the civil service, it was not surprising

to see them turn to outside advice rather than rely on senior bureaucrats to implement the down-

sizing or program cuts that the politicians desired. Only likeminded think tanks could provide the

policy resources and some of the credibility necessary to change the course of government.

Think Tank as Retreat and Sounding Board

Think tanks can also serve less direct policy purposes. Instead of prescribing specific poli-

cies or options, they can provide a congenial environment for decision makers to reflect, pro-

pose and experiment with new ideas, getting feedback from receptive and critical audiences.

Think tanks rarely close their doors to the outside world. On the contrary, the publication and

research programs of most think tanks are just a part of their activities. Conferences, retreats

and receptions are prominent weapons in their arsenal. Washingtons Brookings Institution is

known for Friday luncheons where Brookings researchers and associates meet informally with

policy makers to discuss issues of the day. Other institutes go so far as to provide quasi-for-mal training to political staff and interested public servants. The Institute for Policy Studies

(IPS) runs a Washington School to educate government officials on domestic and foreign pol-

icy topics. While these events can directly impact a policy makers ideas, they also serve the

more modest role of helping policy makers think through their own ideas. Cabinet ministers

may feel less threatened thinking out loud with think tank staff than in the Cabinet room or even

in front of their officials. An over-dependence on civil servants policy advice is another dan-

ger. To have a forum for discussing ideas removed from the cutthroat environment of a Cabinet,

or the influence of civil servants, can give a politician a chance to see the bigger picture and

develop innovative ideas.



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Think Tanks as a Money Pipeline

Think tanks have proven themselves useful for less noble purposes as well. The costs of

election and reelection have escalated dramatically in Western democracies. With increased

costs has come an increased need for campaign resources. While attempts have been made

to regulate campaign finance, reforms have met with varying success, and have spawned analmost fervent pursuit for loopholes that can help funnel money to parties and candidates and

the personnel that they wan to keep employed between elections. In this shady ground lurk

those who are willing to exploit the generally tax-free status and lack of expenditure controls

enjoyed by most think tanks and foundations. Americans have had notable difficulties in this

regard. Such high profile politicians as Republicans Robert Dole and Newt Gingrich, or

Democrats such as Jesse Jackson and Gary Hart, have used think tanks and charitable foun-

dations to funnel political donations to their campaign efforts.

These vanity think tanks, serve the dual purpose of spinning the candidates message or ide-

ology and jetting the candidate around the country on a tax-subsidized expense account. Onestudy of think tanks used by presidential hopefuls in 1988 showed the majority of potential candi-

dates had some affiliation with a think tank or charitable foundation. These organizations were

used to spend donations not subject to the same restrictions as campaign dollars. While serving

their reputed purpose by providing policy notes and background for the potential candidate, the

degree to which these think tanks actually attract gifted policy analysts or produce the kinds of

serious studies that come from more independent think tanks is still suspect.

Foundation as a Policy Network

Perhaps the most overlooked benefit of think tanks is their capacity to network individuals

as well as ideas. A foundation or think tank can provide a ready-made web of contacts that will

provide almost instant access to expertise. This may be especially useful to parties, as control

remains unquestionably in their hands. Experts are not foisted upon decision makers but are

called upon when needed. The policy agenda remains the preserve of the decision makers

themselves. For example, party foundations in Germany provide an important anchor for net-

works of experts who have a partisan affiliation to the Executive or executive in waiting. These

networks can become quite important in the provision of outside expertise. While policy net-

works of concerned actors, decision makers and experts undoubtedly would exist without

party foundations, changes in public policy are often initiated by those interest groups thatstand to gain the most from policies or changes in policy. Although a party foundation or think

tank network is still partisan, less overt interests may be at stake. By channeling this sort of

activity through the parties or their adjuncts, networks are built both inside and outside of gov-

ernment, increasing the expertise available to party leaders. Equally important, a network or

set of networks can help build support for a partys position within critical constituencies and

help draw interested and well-qualified people into the political process who might otherwise

not participate.



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Canadian Think Tanks and Parties

Canadas think tanks really occupy unique territory. Unlike think tanks in most countries,

they are almost all without formal or even informal ties to political parties. Canadian think tanks

are much more likely to work as independent policy entrepreneurs, influencing the agenda of

public policy from the outside. While institutes have occasionally organized conferences orpublic meetings on behalf of government, think tanks do not regularly leave an imprint on a

partys election platform or even have key figures move into a prime ministers or ministers pol-

icy entourage. Efforts by Canadas political parties to create or engage think tanks have large-

ly met with failure. The institutes that do have a profile in this country have few or no connec-

tions at all to political parties. Party foundations have popped up, but they have never been of

much consequence. Often these organizations appear after a particularly demoralizing defeat

in the polls, or after a change of party leadership. They are usually an attempt to revitalize or

reinvent a party in the short term rather than a genuine effort at party education and continu-

ing capacity to analyze ideas or propose policy.

The Liberal Party of Canada has had the least party foundation activity. Part of the explana-

tion for this drought of policy thinking may be the access that the Liberals, as the so-called

natural governing party have had to the instruments of the State. Liberals have been com-

fortable with the permanent bureaucracy and have unhesitatingly relied upon it for policy

advice. Conservatives have been more likely to express open hostility to the permanent staff

of the Canadian State, notably in the Diefenbaker and Mulroney years. The Liberal Party did

distinguish itself in 1993 with an election policy document known as the Red Book, the end

result of a lengthy soul-searching campaign by the Liberals beginning with the election of a

new leader in 1991. In November of that year, the party organized a modest policy conferencein Aylmer, Quebec. Journalists were quick to draw parallels to a similar conference 30 years

prior in Kingston, Ontario, a much more robust exercise which, combined with a national party

rally in 1961, created the Liberal Program for the 1962 and 1963 elections. Much of this

Program was made a reality; indeed it was in part the blueprint for the prime ministership of

Lester Pearson, a time which saw the last stages of development in Canadas modern welfare

State.4A sequel to the 1993 Red Book was prepared for the 1997 and 2000 elections, and rain-

bow of other policy agendas were released by the Liberals competitors in both those elections.

In the subsequent iterations of the Red Book the consultative process within the Liberal party

was much less vigorous; not even the Prime Ministers regular policy advisers had much

opportunity to take part in the creation of the 1997 version of the book it was left almost sole-ly to the prime ministers top electoral strategists.

The Progressive Conservative party found itself in a different situation in the 1990s. Given its

stunning defeat in the 1993 election, the party was forced to re-invent itself to maintain both pub-

lic support and the loyalty of its activists. Like the chastened Conservatives of former prime min-


4. Mitchell Sharp, who chaired the conference, provides an economical summary of its activities in his memoir, WhichReminds Me...: A Political Memoir(Sharp, 1994: 85-93). Similarly, Tom Kent (1988), in his book, A Public Purpose: AnExperience of Liberal Opposition and Canadian Government, describes the critical role of the Kingston Conference in

shaping the Liberal Partys social welfare policy for the subsequent decade.


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ister Joe Clarks first reign as party leader in the late 1970s, Jean Charests generation of the

Progressive Conservatives resorted to a quasi-foundation, the Presidents Council, as a site for

policy consultation and party renewal. Despite this intended purpose, it is not clear that the coun-

cil was able to have any effect on party policy in the 1997 election. Borrowing a page from the

Liberals, the party created a book of policy proposals for the 1997 election, Let the Future

Begin, but like the Liberals, the document was the product of electoral strategists not policythinkers. Despite having generated some of the internal capacity to create informed policy

through its Presidents Council, the partys leadership handed the policy platform over to election

specialists. The subsequent merger of the Progressive Conservatives and the Canadian Alliance

into the Conservative Party of Canada has seen the disappearance of both the Presidents

Council and the more populist policy making practices of the Alliance party which allowed dele-

gates to its annual convention to help create the partys platform. The success of the 2006

Conservative election campaign has already been credited to stricter control of the partys plat-

form and message by the leaders core entourage of advisers and strategists. 5

The one party that does currently operate a European style foundation is the NewDemocratic Party (NDP). The maintenance of its Douglas-Coldwell foundation would appear to

be in tune with the intellectual heritage of the party. The Cooperative Commonwealth

Federation (CCF), the precursor to the NDP, had its origins in the League for Social

Reconstruction (LSR), a group of socialist and left-leaning academics and intellectuals. The

LSR was dissolved after the creation of the party, but its initial involvement gave the CCF a rich

source of policy ideas and orientations. In striving for electoral success, however, the party has

moved away from the ideological commitments originating in the LSR. The current status of

the partys foundation is indicative more of this trend than of its ideological heritage. The Douglas-

Coldwell foundation has been kept at a considerable arms length from the party. The LortieCommission reported that the leadership of the NDP had difficulty engaging the institute. This it

believed was emblematic of the inability of the Canadian party system to establish a strong insti-

tutional basis that develops and presents cogent long-term and well-developed policy alternatives

to Canadian voters (Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, 1991: 297). The

NDPs links with organized labour has given the party access to policy research. The Canadian

Labour Congress (CLC), an umbrella group for Canadian unions, was a partner in the creation of

the NDP when it merged with the CCF. The CLC has a research branch, which produces a large

number of policy studies in fields like employment and social equity. The NDP, which has been offi-

cially supported by the CLC, has always been able to draw on this material.

The precursor to the Canadian Alliance (the party that is now merged with the Progressive

Conservatives to form the Conservative Party) was known as the Reform Party. In many ways the

Reform party tried to break the mould of Canadian party behavior. Reforms think tank relationships,

while still informal, were arguably stronger than those of its competitors. For example, the party had

notable connections with conservative movements and institutes in the western provinces. There

was frequent movement of personnel between the party and conservative quasi-think tanks like the


5. The final document was almost exclusively the work of John Rae and Eddie Goldenberg, with little involvement from thepartys policy advisory group or the party at large. See Edward Greenspon, Wanted: a national agenda (1997: d1,d2).


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National Citizens Coalition (NCC) a group once led by current Prime Minister Stephen Harper. In

addition, some of the partys elected members have worked in various capacities for the Fraser

Institute, another prominent conservative organization. Two of the partys stalwart Calgary MPs had

previously been directly in the employ conservative think tanks. Upon his retirement as party leader,

Preston Manning joined the Fraser Institute as a senior fellow. Along with Michael Harris, anoth-

er senior fellow and the former premier of the province of Ontario, Manning has written a mani-festo for improving Canadian party democracy which again calls on the parties to more formally

engage the policy, socialization and networking capacity of think tanks and institutes.

Are there any Prospects for Change?

Unfortunately, in the years since the Lortie Commission delivered its report there is even less

evidence than before of efforts by Canadas political parties to institutionalize their networking,

policy discussion and educational activities into something that is connected yet separate from

the party itself. The obstacles to achieving the kind of change proposed by the LortieCommission are both concrete and attitudinal. Concrete obstacles exist largely in the way in

which Canadas tax laws treat foundations and institutes. The political party foundations that

do exist are extremely cautious about maintaining their independence from their affiliated par-

ties for they risk losing their tax exemption status. Foundations are free to pursue research on

areas of concern to the party or its membership, but they cannot be seen to be providing direct

research work for the party. Canadas electoral laws also strictly control the degree to which

non-party actors can spend funds during election campaigns. Again, foundations and insti-

tutes are hesitant to offer endorsements or be too closely tied to parties or their risk breaking

those rules. Canadian authorities are much stricter about the connections between theseorganizations than their American or German counterparts. These and other distinct obstacles

in the way of parties interested in creating foundations have not helped matters.

Equally critical, however, is a fundamental attitudinal problem within the parties themselves,

namely an aversion to policy-oriented bodies within their ranks. Parties may erroneously see

party foundations solely as policymaking bodies that might compromise electoral strategies

considered essential to winning a broad base of support. The experience of party foundations

outside and even within North America suggests that this perception is misplaced; foundations

meet several needs other than policy creation. In fact, in many respects they may be much bet-

ter suited to networking, political education and political recruitment than to policy develop-ment work as such. Furthermore, party-linked think tanks typically take a longer term view of

policy, canvassing different possibilities and scenarios as opposed to developing specific poli-

cies suitable for immediate implementation. Critically, party foundations can help elicit the

involvement of talented individuals who might not otherwise become involved in political parties

by providing a setting that is low key rather than charged with partisanship or intra-party com-

petition. They can also provide opportunities for politicians to float new ideas with less likelihood

of being held hostage to them by political opponents. In brief, getting the parties to see past

some of their prejudices against policy clarity and to perceive some of the other benefits may

be one way to convince them of the merits of party foundations.



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To be sure, party foundations are not a panacea for the various ills that can befall pragmatic

political parties in any system. Furthermore, if the design of a foundation and the relationship

between a party and a foundation is not handled correctly, things can backfire. First and foremost,

the financing of such foundations ought to be as transparent as possible and safeguards must be

put in place that would prevent these entities from being used to channel funding, directly or indi-

rectly, to the parties or to specific candidates. Secondly, there should be a clear arms-length rela-tionship. With long term policy issues, where diverging debate is highly desirable, the function of

think tanks would be severely compromised by being tied too closely to the party. Ideally, legisla-

tion modeled on the recommendations of the Lortie Commission where foundations would be

treated similar to charities for tax purposes but allowed to become more politically involved would

provide a direct incentive for parties to create foundations or expand existing ones. The likelihood

of such legislation being passed in the near future may be slim, but the absence of such legisla-

tion should not prevent parties from taking initiatives on their own.

In considering the possible benefits of foundations, political parties may wish to look at the

wide variety of independent think tanks that are presently involved in the various politicaldebates over health care, free trade, deficit reduction and, more recently, whether to allocate

the fiscal surplus to tax cuts or new spending. Political parties may wish to ponder how they

too might take advantage of the obvious energy generated by these enterprises. Parties can

never pursue as narrow a perspective as most independent think tanks are wont to, but there

are still many aspects of think tanks and theirmodus operandithat parties may wish to emu-

late, particularly in what regards to their capacity to present and debate interesting ideas.

Political parties need to be exposed to the ideas produced by think tanks, as well as to the

people who become involved with them. Think tanks, in turn, need to engage politicians more.

It is the latter, after all, who have the final say over what ideas are ultimately enshrined in pub-lic policy.



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Board of Canada, Annual Report 1999.

Greenspon, Edward. Tearing down Canadas welfare wall, The Globe and Mail(June 19,

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Greenspon, Edward. Wanted: a national agenda, The Globe and Mail(July 5, 1997): d1,d2.

Kent, Tom. A Public Purpose: An Experience of Liberal Opposition and Canadian

Government. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1988.

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Documents

Baier y Bakvis_libro TT.pdf