2015NYSlipOp25096

ELLANORAARTHURBAIDOO,Plaintiff,v.

VICTORSENABLOODDZRAKU,Defendant.

No.310947/2014.

DecidedMarch27,2015.

SupremeCourt,NewYorkCounty.

AndrewJ.Spinnell,Esq.,275MadisonAvenue,Suite1000,NewYork,NY10016,(212)6840317,forthePlaintiff.

MATTHEWF.COOPER,J.

Asrecentlyastenyearsago,itwasconsideredacuttingedgedevelopmentincivilpracticeforacourttoallowtheserviceofasummonsbyemail.Sincethen,emailhasallbutreplacedordinarymailasameansofwrittencommunication.Andwhilethelegislaturehasyettomakeemailastatutorilyauthorizedmethodfortheserviceofprocess,[1]courtsarenowroutinelypermittingitasaformofalternativeservice.

Thepastdecadehasalsoseentheadventandascendencyofsocialmedia,withwebsitessuchasFacebookandTwitteroccupyingacentralplaceinthelivesofsomanypeople.[2]Thus,itwouldappearthatthenextfrontierinthedevelopinglawoftheserviceofprocessovertheinternetistheuseofsocialmediasitesasforumsthroughwhichasummonscanbedelivered.Inthismatrimonialaction,theissuebeforethecourt,bywayofplaintiffwife'sexparteapplication,iswhethershemayservedefendanthusbandwiththedivorcesummonssolelybysendingitthroughFacebookbyprivatemessagetohisaccount.

Thestandardmethodorperhapsbetterstated,themethodoffirstresortforservingthesummonsinadivorceactionispersonaldeliverytoadefendant(NewYorkDomesticRelationsLaw[DRL]232[a]).Thisreflectsthegreatemphasisthatthisstateplacesoninsuringthatapersonwhoisbeingsuedfordivorceaproceedingthatcanhaveimmeasurablefinancialandfamilialconsequencesbemadeawareofandaffordedtheopportunitytoappearintheaction.Theproblemwithpersonalservice,ofcourse,isthatitinorderforittobeaccomplished,aplaintiffmustbeabletolocatethedefendant.Evenwhereadefendant'swhereaboutsareknown,therearetimeswhenitislogisticallydifficult,ifnotimpossible,foraprocessservertogainthecloseproximitynecessaryforpersonaldelivery.

Fortunately,theDomesticRelationsLawprovidesaremedyforapersonwhoisseekingadivorcebutfacestheprospectofbeingunabletoeffectpersonalservice.DRL232permitsplaintiffstorequestpermissiontoutilizeoneofthealternativemethodsallowedundertheCivilPracticeLawandRules(CPLR)thatdoesnotrequire"inhand"deliverytothedefendant.Onesuchmethod,oftenreferredtoas"substituteservice,"involvesdeliveringthesummonstoapersonof"suitableageanddiscretion"atthedefendant's"actualplaceofbusiness,dwellingorusualplaceofabode"(CPLR308[2]).Anothermethod,knownas"nailandmail"service,requiresaffixingthesummonstothedoorofadefendant's"actualplaceofbusiness,dwellingorusualplaceofabode"(CPLR308[4]),andthen,aswith"substituteservice,"mailingacopytothedefendant's"lastknownaddress"or"actualplaceofbusiness."Athirdmethodis"publicationservice,"wherethesummonsisprintedinanewspaperdesignatedbythecourtandwhichcanbegranteduponashowingthat"servicecannotbemadebyanotherprescribedmethodwithduediligence"(CPLR315).

Additionally,pursuanttoCPLR308(5),acourt,uponaplaintiff'sexparteapplication,maydirectthemannerbywhichserviceistobemade.Thisallowsacourttogobeyondanyofthespecificallyprescribedmethodsofserviceanddeviseamethodthatfitstheparticularcircumstancesofthecase.AnapplicationforalternativeserviceunderCPLR308(5)canbegrantedonlyuponasufficientshowingthatpersonalservice,"substituteservice,"or"nailandmail"servicewouldprove"impracticable."Caselaw,inaccordancewithwellestablishedconstitutionalprinciples,furtherimposestherequirement

thatthemethoddevisedbythecourtbeonethatis"reasonablycalculated,underallthecircumstances,toapprise[thedefendant]ofthependencyoftheaction"(HollowvHollow,193Misc2d691,696[SupCt,OswegoCounty,2002][quotingMullanevCent.HanoverBank&TrustCo.,339US306,314(1950)]).

Intheinstantapplication,plaintiffasksthecourttofindthatserviceofthedivorcesummonsviaasocialmediasite,inthiscaseFacebook,constitutesanappropriateformofalternativeserviceunderCPLR308(5).Moreover,contendingthatshehasnootherwaytoreachdefendant,sherequeststhatthisjudiciallycraftedmethodofservicebedesignatedtheonlymeansbywhichnoticeofthedivorceactionisgiven.Inorderforherapplicationtobegranted,plaintiffmustfirstdemonstratethatsheisunabletohavethesummonspersonallyservedondefendant,themethodofserviceinitiallyprescribedbyDRL232(a).Next,shemustshowthatitwouldbe"impracticable"toservehimby"substituteservice"onapersonofsuitableageanddiscretion(CPLR308[2])orbyusing"nailandmail"(CPLR308[4]).Finally,shemustshowthatsendingthesummonsthroughFacebookcanreasonablybeexpectedtogivehimactualnoticethatheisbeingsuedfordivorce.

Plaintiffhaseasilymettherequirementofdemonstratingthatshewillbeunabletoeffectpersonalserviceondefendant.Althoughthepartiesmarriedin2009,theyneverresidedtogether,andthelastaddressplaintiffhasfordefendantisanapartmentthathevacatedin2011.Plaintiffhasspokenwithdefendantbytelephoneonoccasionandhehastoldherthathehasnofixedaddressandnoplaceofemployment.Hehasalsorefusedtomakehimselfavailabletobeservedwithdivorcepapers.Asdetailedinherattorney'saffirmation,theinvestigativefirmsthatplaintiffhiredtoassistinlocatingdefendanthaveallbeenunsuccessfulintheirefforts,thepostofficehasnoforwardingaddressforhim,thereisnobillingaddresslinkedtohisprepaidcellphone,andtheDepartmentofMotorVehicleshasnorecordofhim.Inasmuchasplaintiffisunabletofinddefendant,personaldeliveryofthesummonstohimisanimpossibility.

Similarly,plaintiffhasshownthatitwouldbeanexerciseinfutilitytoattemptthetwoalternativeservicemethodsprovidedforbyCPLR308.Both"substituteservice"and"nailandmail"servicerequireknowledgeofthedefendant's"actualplaceofbusiness,dwellingorusualplaceofabode"(CPLR308[2],[4]).Therecordestablishesthatplaintiffhasbeenunsuccessfulinobtainingeitherabusinessorhomeaddressfordefendant,eventhoughshehasdiligentlysoughtthatinformation.Asaresult,shehasmetherburdenofdemonstratingthatitwouldbeimpracticabletoattempttoservedefendantbyeitherofthesemethods(seeFranklinvWinard,189AD2d717[1stDept1993]).

HavingdemonstratedasoundbasisforseekingalternativeservicepursuanttoCPLR308(5),plaintiffmustnowshowthatthemethodsheproposesisonethatthecourtcanendorseasbeingreasonablycalculatedtoapprisedefendantthatheisbeingsuedfordivorce.Thishurdleposesanumberofchallenges.First,thereareonlyahandfulofreporteddecisions,mostlyfromfederaldistrictcourts,thathaveaddressedtheissueofserviceofprocessbeingaccomplishedthroughsocialmedia,withtherebeinganalmostevensplitbetweenthosedecisionsapprovingitandthoserejectingit(compareFed.TradeCommn.vPCCare247Inc.,2013WL841037[SDNY,Mar.72013,No.12Civ.7189(PAE)][allowingserviceofprocessinpartbysocialmedia]WhosHere,Inc.vOrun,2014WL670817[EDVa.,Feb.20,2014,Civ.No.1:13cv00526AJTTRJ][same]NoelB.vAnnaMariaA.,20142014NYMiscLEXIS4708[FamCt,RichmondCounty2014][same]withFortunatovChaseBankUSA,N.A.,2012WL2086950[SDNY,June07,2012,No.11Civ.6608(JFK)][denyingservicebyFacebook]JoeHandPromotions,Inc.vShepard,2013WL4058745[EDMo,Aug.12,2013,No.4:12cv1728SNLJ][same]InreAdoptionofK.P.M.A.,341P3d38[Okla,2014][same]).Second,aswillbefurtherdiscussed,thecasespermittingsuchservicehavedonesoonlyonconditionthatthepaperscommencingthelawsuitbeservedonthedefendantbyanothermethodaswell.Thus,inseekingpermissiontoeffectuateserviceofthedivorcesummonsbysimplysendingittodefendantthroughaprivateFacebookmessage,plaintiffisaskingthecourt,alreadybeyondthesafeharborofstatutoryprescription,toventureintounchartedwaterswithouttheguidinglightofclearjudicialprecedent.

Considerationmustalsobegiventothefactthatthewayplaintiffproposestoprovidedefendantwithnoticeofthedivorcerepresentsaradicaldeparturefromthetraditionalnotionofwhatconstitutesserviceofprocess.Evendecisionsfromasrecentlyas2012and2013havereferredtotheuseofFacebookmessagingforthepurposeofcommencingalawsuitasbeinga"novelconcept"(PCCare247Inc.,2013WL841037[permittingitasasupplementalmethodofservice])and"unorthodoxtosaytheleast"(Fortunato,2012WL2086950[rejectingitasameansofservice]).

Thataconceptisnewtothelawissomethingthatmayverywellrequireacourttoexerciseahighdegreeofscrutinyand

independentlegalanalysiswhenjudicialapprovalissought.Butaconceptshouldnotberejectedsimplybecauseitisnovelornontraditional.Thisisespeciallysowheretechnologyandthelawintersect.Inthisageoftechnologicalenlightenment,whatisforthemomentunorthodoxandunusualstandsagoodchanceofsoonerorlaterbeingacceptedandstandard,orevenoutdatedandpass.Andbecauselegislatureshaveoftenbeenslowtoreacttothesechanges,ithasfallenoncourtstoinsurethatourlegalprocedureskeeppacewithcurrenttechnology(seeNewEnglandMerchantsNatl.BankvIranPowerGeneration&TransmissionCo.,495FSupp73,81[SDNY,1980]["Courtscannotbeblindtochangesandadvancesintechnology."]).AsnotedbytheUnitedStatesCourtofAppealsfortheNinthCircuitinRioProperties,Inc.vRioInternationalInterlink,284F3d1007,1017(9thCir,2002),oneoftheearliestcasesauthorizingserviceofprocessbyemail,the"broadconstitutionalprinciples"uponwhichjudiciallydevisedalternativeserviceisbased"unshackles...courtsfromanachronisticmethodsofserviceandpermitsthementryintothetechnologicalrenaissance."

Inthefinalanalysis,constitutionalprinciples,notthelackofjudicialprecedentorthenoveltyofFacebookservice,willbeultimatelydeterminativehere.Thecentralquestioniswhetherthemethodbywhichplaintiffseekstoservedefendantcomportswiththefundamentalsofdueprocessbybeingreasonablycalculatedtoprovidedefendantwithnoticeofthedivorce.Ormoresimplyposed:Ifthesummonsfordivorceissenttowhatplaintiffrepresentstobedefendant'sFacebookaccount,isthereagoodchancehewillreceiveit?

Inorderforthequestiontobeansweredintheaffirmative,plaintiffmustaddressanumberofthiscourt'sconcerns.ThefirstisthattheFacebookaccountthatplaintiffbelievesisdefendant'smightnotactuallybelongtohim.Asiswellknown,theFacebookprofilesomebodyviewsonlinemayverywellbelongtosomeoneotherthanwhomtheprofilepurportsittobe.Thishasledcourtstoobservethat"anyonecanmakeaFacebookprofileusingreal,fake,orincompleteinformation,andthusthereisnowayfortheCourttoconfirmwhethertheFacebookpagebelongstothedefendanttobeserved"(PCCare247,Inc.,2013WL841037,at*5[quotingFortunato,2012WL2086950,at*2]).Asaresult,thiscourtrequiredplaintifftosubmitasupplementalaffidavittoverifythattheFacebookaccountshereferencesisindeedthatofthedefendant.Plaintiffsubmittedsuchanaffidavit,towhichsheannexedcopiesoftheexchangesthattookplacebetweenheranddefendantwhenshecontactedhimthroughhisFacebookpage,andinwhichsheidentifieddefendantasthesubjectofthephotographsthatappearonthatpage.Whileitistruethatplaintiff'sstatementsarenotabsoluteproofthattheaccountbelongstodefendantitbeingconceivablethatifplaintiffherselforsomeoneatherbehestcreateddefendant'spage,shecouldfabricateexchangesandpostphotographsplaintiffhasneverthelesspersuadedthecourtthattheaccountinquestiondoesindeedbelongtodefendant.

ThesecondconcernisthatifdefendantisnotdiligentinloggingontohisFacebookaccount,herunstheriskofnotseeingthesummonsuntilthetimetorespondhaspassed.Heretoo,plaintiff'saffidavithassuccessfullyaddressedtheissue.HerexchangeswithdefendantviaFacebookshowthatheregularlylogsontohisaccount.Inaddition,becauseplaintiffhasamobilephonenumberfordefendant,bothsheandherattorneycanspeaktohimorleaveavoicemailmessage,orelsesendhimatextmessagealertinghimthatadivorceactionhasbeencommencedandthatheshouldcheckhisaccount(WhosHere,Inc.,2014WL670817,at*4["Courtshavetakenintoconsiderationwhetherdefendantalreadypossessedeitherknowledgeofsuitorthathemaybethesubjecttoasuit"]).

Thethirdconcerniswhetherabackupmeansofserviceisrequiredunderthecircumstances.Although,aswasdiscussed,othercourtdecisionshaveendorsedusingFacebookasameansofservice,theyhavedonesoonlywhereFacebookwasbutoneofthemethodsemployed,nottheonlymethod.AsthecourtstatedinPCCare247,Inc.,2013WL841037,at*5,"[t]obesure,ifthe[plaintiff]wereproposingtoservedefendantsonlybymeansofFacebook,asopposedtousingFacebookasasupplementalmeansofservice,asubstantialquestionwouldarisewhetherthatservicecomportswithdueprocess."Inthatcase,andaswellasinWhosHere,Inc.,theotherfederalcourtdecisionauthorizingFacebookservice,thecourtstressedthatitwasallowingtheuseofasocialmediasiteonlyinconjunctionwithnoticebeingsenttothedefendantsbyemail.InNoelB.,2014NYMiscLEXIS4708,at*4,theonlydecisionfromastatecourtpermittingserviceviaFacebook,thepetitionerwasrequiredtomailacopyofthechildsupportsummonsandpetitiontotherespondent's"previouslyusedlastknownaddress."

Here,plaintiffdoesnothaveanemailaddressfordefendantandhasnowayoffindingone.Nordoesshehaveastreetaddressfordefendantthatcouldconstituteaviable"lastknownaddress"defendant'slastknownaddressdatesbackat

leastfouryearsandthepostofficeconfirmedthatdefendantnolongerresidesthereandhehasleftnoforwardingaddress.Thus,plaintiffhasacompellingreasontomakeFacebookthesole,ratherthanthesupplemental,meansofservice,withthecourtsatisfiedthatitisamethodreasonablycalculatedtogivedefendantnoticethatheisbeingsuedfordivorce.

BeforegrantingplaintiffleavetoservedefendantviaFacebook,amethodofalternativeservicejudiciallydevisedpursuanttoCPLR308(5),thereisoneremainingquestionthatshouldbeaddressed:WhyuseFacebookaseitherthesoleorthesupplementalmeansofserviceinthefirstplacewhenthereisastatutorilyprescribedmethodofservicereadilyavailable?Thatmethodisservicebypublication,somethingthatisspecificallyauthorizedunderCPLR315.Afterall,publicationisnotonlyexpresslysanctionedbytheCPLR,butitisameansofserviceofprocessthathasbeenusedinNewYorkinoneformoranothersincecolonialtimes.Eventoday,itisprobablythemethodofservicemostoftenpermittedindivorceactionswhenthedefendantcannotbeservedbyothermeans.

Theproblem,however,withpublicationserviceisthatitisalmostguaranteednottoprovideadefendantwithnoticeoftheactionfordivorce,oranyotherlawsuitforthatmatter.(seeSnydervAlternateEnergyInc.,19Misc3d954[CivCtNYCounty,2008]AdamLiptak,HowtoTellSomeoneShe'sBeingSued,WithoutReallyTellingHer,NYTimes,Nov.19,2007,availableathttp://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/us/19bar.html).IndivorcecasesbroughtinNewYorkCounty,plaintiffsareoftengrantedpermissiontopublishthesummonsinsuchnewspapersastheNewYorkLawJournalortheIrishEcho.Ifthatweretobedonehere,thechancesofdefendant,whoisneitheralawyernorIrish,everseeingthesummonsinprint,eitherinthoseparticularnewspapersorinanyother,areslimtonone.Thedangersofallowingsomebodytobedivorcedandnotknowitaresimplytoogreattoallownoticetobegivenbypublication,aformofservicethat,whileneithernovelorunorthodox,isessentiallystatutorilyauthorizednonservice.Thisisespeciallysowhen,ashere,thereisareadilyavailablemeansofservicethatstandsaverygoodchanceoflettingdefendantknowthatheisbeingsued.

Moreover,thecourtwillnotrequirepublicationinanynewspaperevenasabackupmethodtoFacebook.Althoughamorewidelycirculatednewspaper,liketheNewYorkPostortheDailyNews,mightreachmorereaders,thecost,whichapproaches$1,000forrunningthenoticeforaweek,issubstantial,andthechancesofitbeingbyseenbydefendant,buriedinanobscuresectionofthepaperandprintedinsmalltype,arestillinfinitesimal.

Underthecircumstancepresentedhere,servicebyFacebook,albeitnovelandnontraditional,istheformofservicethatmostcomportswiththeconstitutionalstandardsofdueprocess.Notonlyisitreasonablycalculatedtoprovidedefendantwithnoticethatheisbeingsuedfordivorce,buteveryindicationisthatitwillachievewhatshouldbethegoalofeverymethodofservice:actuallydeliveringthesummonstohim.

Inlightoftheforegoing,plaintiffisgrantedpermissiontoservedefendantwiththedivorcesummonsusingaprivatemessagethroughFacebook.Specifically,becauselitigantsareprohibitedfromservingotherlitigants,plaintiff'sattorneyshalllogintoplaintiff'sFacebookaccountandmessagethedefendantbyfirstidentifyinghimself,andthenincludingeitherawebaddressofthesummonsorattachinganimageofthesummons.Thistransmittalshallberepeatedbyplaintiff'sattorneytodefendantonceaweekforthreeconsecutiveweeksoruntilacknowledgedbythedefendant.Additionally,aftertheinitialtransmittal,plaintiffandherattorneyaretocallandtextmessagedefendanttoinformhimthatthesummonsfordivorcehasbeensenttohimviaFacebook.

Thisconstitutesthedecisionandorderofthecourt.

[1]Thelasttimethelegislatureamendedaprovisionofthelawdealingwithserviceofprocessonindividualswasin1994,backatthedawnoftheinternetageandbeforeemailwaswidelyutilized.

[2]The"many"includesthe157,000,000peopleintheUnitedStateswho,accordingtoFacebook's2014fourthquartershareholderreport,checktheirFacebookaccountseachday.Itdoesnot,byandlarge,includethemembersoftheNewYorkStatejudiciary,whohavebeenadvisedthattheyshouldbewaryofusingsocialnetworksites(seeAdvisoryCommonJudEthicsOp08176[2009],AdvisoryCommonJudEthicsOp1339[2013]seealsoRichardRaysman,JudicialandAttorneyMisuseofSocialMediaCanEndCareers,NYLJ,Mar.10,2015,at5,col1).

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