Badran-The Means of Survival -Education and the Palestinian Community, 1948-1967

The Means of Survival: Education and the Palestinian Community, 1948-1967Author(s): Nabil A. BadranSource: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Summer, 1980), pp. 44-74Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2536124 .Accessed: 11/02/2015 01:46

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The Means of Survival: Education and the Palestinian Community, 1948-1967

NABIL A. BADRAN*

It has frequently been noted that the Palestinian Arabs have an exception- ally high rate of education. The purpose of this article is to examine the socio-economic causes of this level of educational achievement and to indicate some specific developments within the Arab world which have encouraged it. The period covered will be that between the end of the British mandate in Palestine and the 1967 war - years which were of crucial importance to the development of the Palestinian community, yet which are examined far less frequently than the subsequent period in which the Palestinians became an important political factor on the Middle East and international scene.

Because this article seeks to explain the Palestinian educational situation in the context of the socio-economic structure of the Palestinian community, its starting point will be a survey of this community as it existed at the end of the Mandate in Palestine, and then in its new situation in exile shortly afterwards.

THE LEVEL OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AT THE END OF THE MANDATE

At the end of the Mandate the natural population growth of the Arabs of Palestine was 30 per thousand - the highest rate for any Arab country at the time - and at the end of March 1947 the population was estimated at about

* Nabil A. Badran is the author of al-Ta 'lim wal-Tabdith fil-Mujtama' al- 'Arabi al-Filastini, 1948-67 (Education and Modernization in Palestinian Arab Society), (Beirut: PLO Research Centre, 1979) on which this article is based.


THE MEANS OF SURVIVAL 45

1,380,000, composed of 1,253,000 sedentary persons, and 127,000 thousand Bedouin.1

The age pyramid of the Arab population of Palestine in 1945 was as follows:

Age group 0-15: 43.6 percent 16-59: 50.2 percent 60 +: 6.2 percent2

As regards education, at the end of the British mandate about 30 percent of the Arabs of Palestine could read and write. The majority of them belonged to the rising generation, who had benefited greatly from the rapid growth of education after 1943. This expansion was greatest in the sector of public education, where the number of schools rose from 403 in 1942/43 to 555 in 1947/48. Hundreds of classrooms were being constructed, in addition to dozens of new schools. During the same period the number of pupils in this sector rose from 58,325 to about 103,000. These, along with some 45,000 pupils in private and religious schools, brought the total of Arab pupils to 148,000.

TABLE 1 DISTRIBUTION OF PUPILS BY STAGES OF EDUCATION AND KINDS

OF SCHOOLS 1946/47*

Stages of Public schools Private schools Total Education Males Females Males Females Males Females Total

Primary 72,650 18,400 23,800 15,000 96,450 33,400 129,850 Academic and Vocational 2,100 350 2,000 1,200 4,100 1,550 5,650 Secondary

* Jordanian Delegation, Review of the Educational Situation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, No. 1, UNESCO, Regional Centre for the Training of Civil Servants, Investigations of the delegates 1961/62 (Beirut, 1962), p. 60.

1 This figure is from the report of the Clapp Commission (the UN Economic Survey Mission of the Middle East), New York, 1949, p. 22. The Commission obtained it from the British government.

2 See United Nations, Assistance to Palestine Refugees, General Assembly, Sixth Session, Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Supplement No. 16 (A/1905), Paris, 1951, p. 30.


46 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

In 1946/47 pupils accounted for about 11.7 percent of the total population - the highest percentage in the Arab world after Lebanon. Table 1 shows their distribution among the various categories of schools and stages of education in 1946/47.

In the last year of the Mandate every major town had a complete public school preparing for the general secondary examination, while the other towns had secondary classes. Many of the private and religious schools also had secondary classes, a number of which prepared pupils for the general secondary examination. Many of the larger villages had also opened secondary classes.

In spite of this educational development, the education of girls living in rural areas continued to lag behind, whereas the towns had started to accept most girls of primary school age. The countryside still maintained the principle of refusing education to girls, and though this principle was somewhat relaxed, mixed classes remained unacceptable, and financial resources did not permit the building of special schools for girls.

A feature of education at that time was the large number of pupils who were older than the normal age of their class, because of their families' desire that their sons should be educated and complete their schooling. For this reason the elementary schools contained a high proportion of older pupils who were politically mature and conscious. This facilitated the expansion of the student movement to rural areas after the Second World War, and student political activity was influential in inducing the older pupils to join in nationalist activity.

The increased numbers of educated youth had an effect on socio-political activity. New political movements arose, such as the League for National Liberation and the Syrian Nationalist Party. Groups of educated and politically involved young men emerged, and the number of cultural clubs (public or attached to schools) increased. Branches of the labour unions were established in the towns and villages, which were run by working and educated youth.

Economic and educational developments encouraged the emergence of new concepts and values, even though they were unable to effect radical structural and social change. In the economic field, consumption and production incentives encouraged modernization and investment, but only at the individual level, or within the framework of family relationships. The services sector continued to dominate the towns, opening up horizons for work to the educated youth, but it did not encourage collective action in the economic field. On the contrary it led the individual to aspire to personal independence and to the achievement of individual financial success. This had some positive impact in that it achieved liberation from old relationships and from the stagnant pattern of artisan production, and to the extent that



it created in the individual the need to become acquainted with others at the professional and social levels.

With the emergence of a vast difference between town and country, and expanding investment opportunities and returns in the towns, the movement of the rural bourgeoisie to the towns increased. Part of their investment was transferred to the new urban sectors. This situation led to further movement of the bourgeoisie to the towns and to their taking on more urban characteristics. Their increased readiness to sell part of their land to well-off peasants led to the spread of small holdings in the country.

Cultural conditions in the towns also encouraged the dissolution of tribal ties, which in turn facilitated marriage outside the clan and the family, and the building of friendships and economic interests unrelated to this framework. The tendency to be liberated from the social and political pressures of the clan increased with long residence in the town and in streets and quarters where there were few other members of the clan.

This liberation did not rule out the maintenance of family relationships or of contacts with the village or continued local social and political activity. However, the aspirations of the new generation grew increasingly independent of tribal duties. In rural areas, on the other hand, the pattern of traditional relationships inherited from feudal society prevailed, with the clan and its relationships with the traditional feudal families predominant. The families of which the clan was composed were not economically equal and the well-off families were sometimes on good terms with each other and sometimes quarrelled in their struggle for leadership of the clan. The well-off families took advantage of economic development to increase their property and develop their agriculture and, in a subsequent period, to turn to economic activities in non-agricultural sectors.

The clan retained internal leadership by maintaining the domination of patriarchal and paternal authority for fear of revolt by the young. In the absence of mass and social institutions the clan succeeded in convincing the new generation that its influence must be maintained, inasmuch as this influence provided the individual with a sort of social insurance not to be found outside the clan. It also ensured that he acquired economic advantages through the success of the clan in local elections. Thus the municipal elections in Palestine and the 1946 elections constituted a renewal of the tribal conflict rather than a reflection of political trends. Some of the political trends in the traditional parties reflected local tribal interests which had links with the centres of influence in the towns.

In spite of the existence of conflict between the different clans and within the single clan, the circumstances of national struggle and the role of the village in public affairs led to the achievement of greater coordination within the village. The political struggle against Zionism encouraged joint



moves to support the Palestinian Arab position; this helped to bring the clans closer to each other and enabled intermarriage between them. To make improvements in the village it was necessary to take joint action to levy taxes and collect contributions for the execution of essential projects, as any secondary conflict tended to impede the development of the village and to make it lag behind other villages.

As a result of the long political struggle and of adherence to the Arab character of Palestine, feelings of religious affiliation became less intense, to be replaced by feelings of being Palestinian or belonging to the Arab nation. Certain specific struggles helped to consolidate Palestinian-Arab solidarity, such as the Arabization of the Orthodox Church and the defence of al-Haram al-Sharif against Zionist claims. Though the roots of the Palestinian nationalist movement initially lay in the Islamic-Christian committees, as the struggle developed there was no longer any need for these committees, and they were replaced by the unified nationalist movements.

DISPLACEMENT AND DISPERSION

The exodus of refugees in 1948-49 tended to be to the neighbouring areas because of their geographical proximity and because of the family, social and economic relations that existed with them. Table 2 shows the distribution in the unoccupied parts of Palestine and the Arab host countries of the Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA in 1951. This table illustrates a number of points:

Mass Emigration to the Neighbouring Areas 1. The majority of the refugees in Syria and Lebanon came from the

Haifa and Galilee districts. 2. Inhabitants from all districts emigrated to the West Bank and East

Jordan, because the West Bank interlocked with the various districts and because the qada (sub-district) of Beisan (Galilee district) was close to Transjordan.

3. The Gaza Strip received displaced persons from the Lydda and Gaza districts.

4. The populations of some districts and qadas were dispersed over a wider area because of the possibility of emigrating by sea to certain Arab ports (as in the case of the inhabitants of the city of Jaffa) or as a result of the need to go on to other areas because of overcrowding in the reception areas (from the West Bank to the East Bank, and from Lebanon to Syria).

Table 2 shows the distribution of most of the refugees in the host countries. The groups not mentioned in Table 2 include:



1. The refugees in Egypt (10,000) and Iraq (5,000) from the villages of the Triangle.

2. The well-off refugees who went to Jordan, Lebanon and Syria and who did not ask for aid from any quarter. The number of these is estimated

TABLE 2 DISTRIBUTION OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES REGISTERED WITH UNRWA

IN 1951 IN THE HOST COUNTRIES AND THE GAZA STRIP ACCORDING TO THE DISTRICTS THEY CAME FROM* (in percentage)

District Syria Jordan Lebanon Gaza Jerusalem (Qadas of Jerusalem, Hebron and Ramallah) 1.27 26.64 1.43 0.38

Lydda (Qadas of Jaffa and Ramleh) 8.81 37.08 11.13 40.49

Gaza (Qadas of Gaza and Beersheba) 0.36 12.07 0.08 58.34

Haifa (Qada of Haifa) 24.32 12.67 28.14 0.55

Nablus (Qadas of Nablus, Jenin and Tulkarm) 0.19 5.80 0.12 0.19

Galilee (Qadas of Acre, Beisan, Nazareth, Safad and Tiberias 65.05 5.74 59.09 0.05

Other Countries - - .01 -

100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

* UNRWA-PR, Statistical Bulletin, May 1950-June 1951, volumes for Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Gaza.



at 18,000,3 distributed as follows: 6,000 in Jordan 4,000 in Syria 8,000 in Lebanon. 3. A final group, whose names were deleted from UNRWA records

because of their comparatively high income, because they had received loans from UNRWA, or because they had gone elsewhere than the Arab countries. Their number is estimated at about 30,000.

This brings the total of Palestinian refugees in 1951 to about 900,000. In 1948 the Arab countries estimated their numbers at about 750,000, while the Clapp Commission, after a statistical study by the British mandate government, estimated them at about 726,000.

The Living Standard of Refugees from Rural Areas The living standard of the refugees fell drastically. The savings of some of

those who came from rural areas dwindled to nothing the longer they waited to return, and it was difficult for most of them to find regular work. They were consequently reduced to destitution and to depending on aid from UNRWA. In 1951 the average annual cash income of the individual refugee in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan was estimated at P?8.9, whereas this average income in Palestine in 1944 had been estimated at P?41.4 The 1951 income was thus about 22 percent of that of 1944. This average does not, moreover, show the disparity of income that existed between the various groups. The great majority of the work force worked intermittently, their total income in the three countries amounting to about one million American dollars. But 1,700 employers, who were also refugees in the same three countries, enjoyed an annual income of $2.09 million. Thus the average individual income of the labouring classes was much less than P?8.9. And even within these groups there were disparities of income according to different places of residence, because of differences in the extent of unemployment and the possibility of finding work.

The refugees in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank suffered most, because they were in areas with a limited economic capacity which were experiencing a period of economic stagnation as a result of the Zionist occupation of the rest of Palestine, which had left the majority of their original inhabitants unemployed and poor. The economic situation of the refugees in the other areas varied: those living in or near towns found intermittent or seasonal

3 Yusif Sayigh, "Economic Implications of UNRWA Operations in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon" (M.A. Thesis, American University of Beirut, 1952), p. 29.

4 Sayigh, pp. 29-30.



work, while some of the workers in the remoter rural areas were unable to do so because of the high degree of competition. Those who did find work did so at the expense of local workers who were unable to compete with the refugee workers because of the latters' willingness to accept very low wages. The refugees made up for their low income with aid in the form of food and clothing from UNRWA (rations).

The Situation of the Upper and Middle Bourgeoisie Let us now turn to the situation of the bourgeois groups. In connection

with the general income of Palestinians in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan mention has already been made of the relatively better situation of the upper and middle bourgeoisie. The Palestinian bourgeois refugees were able to transfer part of their cash savings to the Arab countries, and even before the disaster some businessmen had opened branches of their businesses in certain Arab capitals. As the fighting escalated they started to channel some of their orders to these branches, and after the disaster they tried to transfer all orders to them. In these new locations they soon applied themselves to expanding their businesses. They found an extensive market in the demand of the Palestinian middle and petty bourgeois refugees for essential consumer goods, which encouraged investment in this field. Moreover, the refugees provided a source of cheap labour which assisted cheap and competitive industrial production. This section of the bourgeoisie also brought with them experience in such economic fields as the distribution of goods and technical services.

The Palestinian bourgeoisie benefited from both the traditional and new links they had with the dispersed Palestinians, and from the high mobility of qualified and professional Palestinians, to set up a variety of contracting companies that operated in the different Arab countries.

This section of the bourgeoisie was eager to educate its children, number of whom obtained university qualifications. Before the disaster these children had constituted the overwhelming majority of the pupils of the final secondary stage, and after emigrating they continued their studies and went to university as soon as they could. As a result these university graduates rapidly found good posts because of the expanding need for such qualifications in the Arab countries after the Second World War. This class had provided the greater part of the senior civil servants of the Mandate government in Palestine; they had the high administrative qualifications required, and some of them assumed responsibility for the new administrative machinery in Jordan, while the oil states were ready to welcome them should they decide to leave Jordan and join their colleagues who had already gone to these countries.



Two further factors helped to improve the economic situation of the upper and middle bourgeoisie. The first was the payment of Mandate government bearer bonds, and the second the payment of compensation to that government's officials. The number of bonds held by Palestinian Arabs, both refugees and non-refugees, has been estimated at 150,000.5 The compensation paid by Britain to civil servants of the Mandate government was either in the form of a lump sum or monthly payments. The members of the bourgeoisie who had been Palestine government officials thus enjoyed great advantages as a result of the posts they had occupied and the length of their service in these posts. Even those who continued to receive monthly payments received large sums b-ecause of the accumulation of arrears. For the 41 months after the disaster, that is, up to the end of December 1951, compensation, indemnities and emergency aid totalled $10.8 million, $1.8 million of which was paid in annual compensation.6

As a general rule the middle bourgeoisie had experience in the modern economic sectors (commercial, industrial, administrative and professional), and after emigrating to the capitals and major cities of the Arab countries they were at pains to educate their children and send larger numbers of them to university. These advantages helped them to improve their standard of living and to make an economic recovery without delay. The disaster had liberated these groups from irrational consumption patterns, and led them to devote all their resources to making an economic recovery and to ensuring that their children obtained a university education. The demand for them was increased by their knowledge of the English language, which was required in the various Arab countries for the expansion of Anglo-Saxon commercial and production sectors, and by the need of international institutions for such professional personnel.

With the establishment of UNRWA and its need for certain kinds of commodities, its encouragement of self-help and its financing of production projects employing refugee labour, the middle bourgeoisie obtained the greater part of most of the tenders, aid and loans. The Agency's activities, along with construction and education, required a variety of materials, part of which had to be obtained from the markets of the Arab host countries Palestinian merchants and contractors provided a great part of these UNRWA encouraged certain groups, already possessing capital, to help themselves by starting private projects. In Lebanon, for example, about 3817 persons had received assistance by 1952, 202 of whom set up commercial

5 Sayigh, p. 25. 6 Sayigh, Appendix C, Item V. 7 UNRWA, Statistical Research Dealing with Fluctuations in Numbers of Refugees and Their

Movements in the Lebanon (Beirut, 1952), p. 202.


THE MEANS OF SURVIVAL 5 3

firms and shops, while other projects included farms, workshops, artisan activities and schools. The middle bourgeoisie was best able to make a new start because it had the financial resources and experience necessary to ensure the success of such projects. In 1951, UNRWA took part in the establishment of the Jordanian Development Bank, and by March 1954 the bank had granted 100 loans totalling 258,000 Jordanian dinars, for 85 agricultural and 15 industrial projects.8

Thus we find that the upper and middle bourgeoisie were able to make a new start thanks to both personal and external circumstances. Their standard of living rapidly improved with the increase of their savings and the development of the Arab economy, which encouraged further investment and economic activity. The release of the frozen deposits in the branches of the Ottoman Bank and Barclays Bank in their previous areas of residence increased their economic capability. By the end of 1955 frozen deposits released by these banks totalled ?2,5 38,642,9 distributed among depositors in the various Arab countries as follows:

Jordan ? 1,528,400 Lebanon 602,900 Syria 124,000 Gaza 24,000 Egypt 74,900 Other countries 184,442

Total ?2;5 38,642

The large total of deposits released to Palestinians living in Lebanon, as compared to the much lower figure for Palestinians living in Gaza, shows that a large part of the upper and middle bourgeoisie emigrated to Lebanon.

Our intention in reviewing the situation of the upper and middle bourgeoisie, after describing the state of the destitute working class, has been to show the immense discrepancy in their living standards, which was expressed in further education for the children of this bourgeoisie, most of whom wvere directed to higher specialization at university. But it must be noted that this improvement in living standards did not involve any falling off as regards nationalist attitudes. Most groups of this bourgeoisie held fast to their Palestinian identity, and their university-educated children played an

8 United Nations, General Assembly, Ninth Session, Report of Director..., Supplement No. 17 (A/2717), 1954, p. 11.

9 Palestine Arab Delegation, Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (1948-1961), New York (1962? ), p. 64.



important role in the rise of the Arab nationalist movement. Because they were educated, they felt profoundly the bitterness of defeat, the extent of Arab backwardness and the grave impairment of national honour. For them the idea of Palestinian liberation and return represented an Arab revival and the rejection of the backwardness and colonialist domination that were holding back social and economic growth in the Arab homeland. But the growth of their economic interests made them less revolutionary and more diplomatic, and less capable of understanding the real situation and the aspirations of the destitute masses living inside and outside the camps.

The Petty Bourgeoisie Let us now review the situation of the petty bourgeoisie, or rather that

part of it with qualifications and experience in modern economic activity (technical, administrative and professional). This group differed from the traditional group in that there was some demand for their qualifications, which increased with urban economic development.

Living conditions in the West Bank were such that displaced technical workers were unable to start their own businesses for lack of the necessary capital and because of the high rate of competition in a situation of economic stagnation. The wages earned by most of them were insufficient to ensure a minimum standard of living. But their readiness to move to economically developed areas inside and outside Jordan enabled them to improve their living standards. They lost no time in initiating their own projects whenever money was available in the form of aid and loans granted by UNRWA. They possessed advanced experience and social advantages (through family links and acquaintances) that enabled them to obtain a certain amount of money to start their own businesses. This led them to help their relatives who also had technical qualifications and sometimes to become their partners in projects. The fact that they had old or new relationships with well-off individuals - especially in the middle bourgeoisie - also gave them the chance to enter into economic partnerships with these persons in their projects. Furthermore, previous job relations in Palestine enabled them to attract old and new clients quickly, and this assisted their economic success.

The one condition for their rapid economic success was their mobility - their ability to go and live in new places and areas. The married men with large families were the least mobile, but their children, first the males and later the females, who had continued their schooling and completed all or part of the higher secondary stage, did move in search of work.

The decision of most groups of the urban petty bourgeoisie to emigrate to Arab cities or their environs favoured the continued education of their children and, with the granting of numerous privileges to refugee pupils,



most families kept their children in school and allowed them to pursue secondary studies, which were now free or almost free.

THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF THE PALESTINIANS IMMEDIATELY AFTER 1948

A disaster effects changes in social relations when there are new forces in a society capable of assuming leadership. But immediately after the disaster the Palestinian Arab people lacked such forces, and their geographical dispersion greatly reduced the possibility of contact between the emerging forces. Harsh living conditions and oppression by the local authorities meanwhile made movement and contacts even more difficult. But the bitterness of the disaster and the desire to return encouraged a determination to confront reactionary governments and foreign domination. New movements emerged which became increasingly popular in the second half of the sixties.

In the absence of such forces the groupings of refugees had to look after themselves; in this they were helped by Arab and international official and charitable organizations. Fearing their resentment the Arab regimes restricted their political activity, and the international aid organizations, headed by UNRWA, refused to recognize their national identity, regarding them as refugees and making every effort to settle them. This rendered the Palestinians more wary and resentful of the UN and its agencies. The refugees' suspicion and rejection of the Arab League was reinforced by its obvious military incapacity and the spirit of defeatism evinced by several of the Arab regimes.

The Palestinians rejected all forms of settlement, and those who rejected it most vehemently were the rural population, who had suffered more than other groups because of their lack of income and work opportunities. So tenaciously did they insist on the right to return that they often refused many important services, regarding the ration card as an official document establishing their right to return to the homeland. The rural population had an increasing sense of socio-economic isolation and deprivation, which increased their collective attachment to their traditional frameworks (family, clan, village). This phenomenon made its appearance at the start of the emigration, when it became clear to the refugees that a feeling of security could only be acquired within the framework of family and village solidarity When the camps were established, the dispersed refugees were reunited and the small groups distributed throughout the host country started to move in nearer to the larger body of the local society of the original village.

The village depended on its traditional organization to survive the stage of economic privation, because this organization provided it with the soundest advice and ensured social solidarity that helped to surmount harsh living



conditions. Dependence on the traditional leaderships made it easier to obtain additional services from official quarters such as UNRWA and the host countries. UNRWA, in turn, encouraged the emergence of the traditional local leaderships, with a view to getting the refugees organized. Before taking decisions it consulted the traditional Palestinian political leaderships and the local political authorities. The rural refugees realized that by moving to a place where people belonging to their clan and village were concentrated they would more easily find accommodation, and also obtain the full services of UNRWA without delay.

This development involved the greater part of the rural population, while the greater part of the former urban population followed a contrary pattern characterized by further disintegration of the social and economic relations between families. The people of the towns had confidence in their professional qualifications and their ability to look after themselves, and this tendency to independence helped them to take the economic and social initiatives that would lead to the realization of their aspirations. As a result of these values, after the disaster people started to leave their social groupings, preferring to withdraw from family attachments in their efforts to find work and opportunities to educate their children and to find suitable accommodation. This did not lead to total severance from the family environment; emotional needs and economic requirements demanded the maintenance of such ties, for, in the absence of institutional credit frameworks, family or personal sources of credit were generally the rule. But the townsman's concept of social security now ceased to be framed simply in terms of the need to maintain family ties and became much more closely linked to a belief in individual enterprise.

Their aspirations induced the heads of urban families to accept extensive mobility to ensure their livelihood and the education of their children. They sought and accepted posts in the developing oil countries. If residential and educational conditions there became favourable, the family would be sent for. The individualistic values which influenced their concept of social security did not rule out psychological, economic and socio-political attachment to the homeland on the part of townspeople. They were insistent on their right to their property and felt an emotional need for the social climate of the homeland. Their resentment was heightened by their sense of the loss of their national honour and the disclosure of the extent of the weakness and backwardness of Arab society after the disaster.

Increased education led to increased rejection of traditional society and politicians, especially among students. In general this rejection was based on the ideas of the modern bourgeois revolt against the leadership of the traditional elite, which wanted to stabilize the authoritarian tribal system and made colonialism its ally in its attempt to maintain its social and



economic influence. The prevalence of this type of analysis did not prevent the emergence next to it of a progressive movement employing dialectical materialism as the basis of its analysis of the socio-economic situation, and using historical materialism to determine strategic and interim goals. But most of the followers of this latter movement came from the Palestinian bourgeoisie, which limited the radicalism of their thinking and action.

The thinking of both Palestinian and other Arab educated youth was the same as regards the failure of tribal, authoritarian and backward society in the face of the challenge of a modern European society based on education and democratic organization (which was embodied locally in the Jewish community in Palestine). Constantine Zurayk's book The Meaning of the Disaster"0 provides the most searching analysis of the reasons for the failure of Arab society and the conditions for the building of a new society. This issue has also been dealt with by the Palestinian writers Musa Alami" and Qadri Tuqan."2 All three books stressed education and democracy as prime factors in development. This frank criticism of traditional society was accompanied by widespread resentment of colonialism and its direct and indirect presence, and an unequivocal call for its eradication from the Arab countries.

THE GROWTH OF THE ARAB PUBLIC SECTOR

With the annexation of the West Bank Jordan witnessed the rapid development of government departments. The number of ministries rose from five in 1947 to fifteen in 1955. Several specialized departments were set up with assistance from the American Mission and UNRWA."3 Most of these new ministries and departments needed educated and professional personnel.

With the development of the machinery of state in Jordan and the expansion of its activities, there was increasing internal pressure against the policy of discrimination and favouritism in appointments, accompanied by external pressure calling for the raising of the efficiency of this machinery. The state passed various laws to regulate the civil service. Some of the ministries, in particular the Ministry of Education, started to systematize

10 Constantine Zurayk, Ma'na al-Nakba (The Meaning of the Disaster), (Beirut: Dar al-'rlm lil-Malayin, 1948).

1 Musa Alami, 'Ibrat Filastin (The Lesson of Palestine), (Beirut: Dar al-Kashaf, 1949). 12 Qadri Tuqan, Ba'd al-Nakba (After the Disaster), (Beirut: Dar al-'Ilm lil-Malayin, 1950). 13 The extent of American interest in the development and management of the Jordanian

economy is indicated by the fact that when the Jordanian Development Board was established, it included as members delegates from the American Mission as well as UNRWA officials and Jordanian ministers.



appointments and salary scales to keep pace with the rapid development of its establishment and its efforts to attract personnel with various professional qualifications.

Under the new service regulations employees were divided into two categories: a first, higher category from grade 1 to grade 6, and a second, from grade 7 to grade 10, with five years service in each grade. In 1958 the Civil Service Regulations, which made certificates the basis of appointments, were issued. This basing of classification on certificates and length of studies arose because there were no entrance examinations and no job descriptions such as are the rule in advanced countries. According to Emile Shihadeh, this classification was a response to the growth of bureaucracy and to increasing public pressure for it to be made more efficient. It was also a response to the rapid increase in the numbers of university and secondary school graduates and their need for employment, which was practically nonexistent in the private sector of the economy. This classification could not be regarded as ideal because it did not seek real qualifications."4

The Jordanian Civil Service Regulations of 1958 defined certificates and their relation to classification as follows: 15

1) Holders of a matriculation certificate and high school graduates are appointed to grade 10 with the rate equivalent of year one.

2) Those with an additional year of schooling after matriculation are appointed to grade 10 with a rate equivalent of year three.

3) Those having two years of schooling after matriculation are appointed to grade 9 with a rate equivalent of year one.

4) Those with three years of schooling after matriculation are appointed to grade 8 at the rate equivalent of year one.

5) Holders of a Bachelor of Arts degree with four years of study after matriculation are appointed to grade 7 at the rate equivalent of year three.

6) Holders of a Master's degree are appointed to grade 6 at the rate equivalent of year one.

7) Holders of a Doctor of Philosophy degree and medical doctors receive grade 5 at the rate equivalent of year three.

8) Medical Doctors with one year of specialization receive grade 4 and the rate equivalent of year one.

9) Medical Doctors with more than one year of specialization receive grade 4 and the rate equivalent of year five.

According to this classification by certificates, new employees with lower educational qualifications than these were regarded as unclassified (with the exception of certain categories of technical personnel who could be classified in grade 10). But even in the appointment of unclassified employees,

14 Emile S. Shihadeh, "The Jordanian Civil Service: A Study of Traditional Bureaucracy" (Ph. D. thesis, Cornell University, 1965), p. 3.

15 Ibid., p. 86.



educational standards were taken into account. This classification was similar to the standards set by UNRWA, the Arab

countries, and in particular the Arab oil countries. This made Palestinians eager to obtain such certificates at all costs so as to ensure a higher income - the principal objective of the Palestinian masses, who had no other sources of income and wished to avoid the heavy burden of making a living as working class wage-earners. The educated had greater responsibility in their family because of the low wages of manual workers, and hopes were pinned on them to increase the family's income. The census of population and domicile carried out in Jordan in 1961 showed that each worker supported an average of 3.38 persons. This was one of the highest averages in the Arab world and much higher than those of advanced countries. The average varied in different districts of Jordan, being high in the West Bank and the principal towns in the East Bank which had a high proportion of Palestinian refugees. Within the West Bank, the average for the Nablus district was higher than that for the other districts, and in its rural areas the average was as high as 4.35 persons supported.16

To help solve the problem caused by the large number of graduates, the Jordanian Civil Service Regulations gave them priority in appointment and classification. But it never tried to find a full solution to the problem of holders of secondary certificates and graduates of the fifth secondary class whose numbers increased so greatly that the state machinery was unable to absorb them. The 1957 annual report of the Civil Service Board stressed the extent of this problem.

The number of applications for employment submitted to the Board this year was higher than last year. This was because the numbers of graduates holding secondary and fifth grade secondary certificates doubled. As a result it is clear that the number of applications for employment will increase year by year. The Board drew the attention of the quarters concerned to this problem and a committee was appointed to investigate it, but it never met.... The Table shows that 4,562 applications were submitted this year, but only 1,410 of these applicants were appointed - only 31 percent were thus appointed, and it is likely that this percentage will decrease year by year, for the number of government posts is tending to stabilize, while the number of applicants is increasing.

Soon, new educational standards emerged, which required higher qualifications. The number of teachers with modest or low educational qualifications started to decrease, while the categories of teachers with high educational qualifications increased (see Table 3). Once the pattern of primary education stabilized, the demand for male teachers with qualifications higher than the general secondary certificate started to increase

16 Hilde Wander, Analysis of Population Statistics of Jordan, Department of Statisties, Amman, 1964.



greatly. The number of women teachers with low qualifications remained very high, because the educational opportunities for girls lagged behind that for boys. Because of the importance of illustrating the trend in the appointment of male and female teachers in both the Jordanian Ministry of Education and UNRWA, a detailed breakdown of their educational qualifications in the year 1958/59 is given in Table 4.

TABLE 3 INCREASE IN NUMBERS OF MALE AND FEMALE TEACHERS IN JORDAN

ACCORDING TO EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT FROM THE SCHOOL YEAR 1952/53 TO THE SCHOOL YEAR 1958/59*

Educational Attainment School Year 1952/53 1953/54 1954/55 1955/56 1956/5 7 195 7/58 1958/59

A. Male Teachers Total 3,039 3,452 3,926 4,570 4,909 5,244 5,541 Primary Certificate and Below 255 71 81 69 51 64 59 Matric, Secondary Certificate and Below 2,229 2,330 2,900 3,392 3,643 3,679 3,931 University Degrees and Below 209 257 515 677 802 1,001 1,012 Vocational and Other Certificates 346 794 430 432 413 500 539

B. Female Teachers Total 1,403 1,629 1,794 2,141 2,523 2,775 3,079 Primary Certificate and Below 388 264 261 239 233 214 173 Matric, Secondary Certificate and Below 899 1,083 1,322 1,702 2,005 2,225 2,506 University Degrees and Below 27 50 104 150 225 277 324 Vocational and Other Certificates 89 232 107 50 60 59 76

* Jordan, Ministry of Education, Annual Report 1958/59, p. 90.



TABLE 3 (cont.)

Educational Attainment School Year 1952/53 1953/54 1954/55 1955/56 1956/57 1957/58 1958/59

C. Male and Female Teachers

Total 4,442 5,081 5,720 6,711 7,432 8,019 8,620

Primary Certificate and Below 643 335 342 308 284 278 232

Matric, Secondary Certificate and Below 3,128 3,413 4,222 5,094 5,648 5,904 6,437 University Degrees and Below 236 307 619 827 1,027 1,278 1,336 Vocational and Other Certificates 435 1,026 537 482 473 559 615

TABLE 4 DISTRIBUTION OF MALE AND FEMALE TEACHERS ACCORDING TO

EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATIONS IN MINISTRY OF EDUCATION SCHOOLS AND UNRWA SCHOOLS IN THE SCHOOL YEAR 1958/59*

Schools Sex Total Below Pri- Prepa- Fifth Matric Post Univ- Voca- Others Pri- mary ratory Secon- Secon- ersity tional mary dary dary

Ministry of Males 3,848 5 6 112 762 1,895 510 127 233 198

Education Females 1,610 8 38 255 495 585 163 37 3 26

UNRWA Males 853 3 7 86 303 292 52 23 38 49 Females 559 4 10 149 226 132 25 7 - 6

* Jordan, Ministry of Education, Annual Report 1958/59, pp. 111 and 138.

THE DEMAND FOR EDUCATED PERSONNEL IN ARAB COUNTRIES

Reference has already been made to the emergence of a demand for Palestinians with professional and administrative qualifications. The tech- nological developments that took place during the Second World War had given rise to a need for more oil and stressed its strategic importance. Both



the Korean War and the nationalization measures taken by Iranian Prime Minister Mossadeq in 1950 speeded up the production of Arab oil, which it was hoped could be used to exert pressure on the progressive regime in Iran. Oil production in Iraq was expanded, the extensive exploitation of the Kuwaiti fields began and attention started to be focused on the exploitation of Saudi oil.

As oil revenues began pouring in the local authorities started to expand their services and to activate the local economy. Unlike Iraq, the other oil countries had comparatively small populations, were culturally less advanced and lived a semi-Bedouin life. The number of foreigners attracted to work in the Iraqi economic sectors was limited, because human resources were available locally and could be rapidly trained. Kuwait, on the other hand, needed all categories of non-local workers for its economic and social development, and the rapidity of domestic growth and expansion ensured the continued influx of such non-local workers. The process was encouraged by the policy of financial inducements aimed at obtaining the best qualified personnel. The oil industry in Saudi Arabia started to attract large numbers of non-Saudi Arabs, and the public sector began to need educated personnel as a result of the policy of expansion in certain public sectors such as education and health.

Kuwait The need for non-local work forces in both the public and private sectors

(including the oil companies) led to an extensive population influx into Kuwait. In 1957 about 45 percent of the population resident in Kuwait were non-Kuwaitis - 92,000 in all, though some of them (the Iranians and Iraqis) had come before 1950. This economic growth attracted large numbers of qualified Palestinians who were prepared to go there and to stay a long time. According to the 1957 Kuwaiti census, there were 15,173 Jordanians and Palestinians (including 3,557 females), almost all of whom were Palestinian in origin.

The Palestinian community was then numerically the third largest after the Iranian and Iraqi communities, whose presence in Kuwait was traditional. But only four years later (1961) the Palestinian community was the most numerous of all.

We can discover the economic activities of most of the Palestinians in Kuwait from the 1961 Jordanian census, as a large proportion of Jordanians who emigrated went to Kuwait, and most of these came from the Nablus area. Table 5 shows the distribution.

Those working in professional, clerical and administrative jobs accounted for 22.4 percent of all Jordanians economically active outside Jordan, whereas only 8.8 percent of the total work force economically active inside



TABLE 5 PERCENTAGE OF JORDANIANS ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE INSIDE AND

OUTSIDE JORDAN BY BASIC OCCUPATIONS - 1961 CENSUS*

Basic Occupation In Jordan Outside Jordan

(0) Technical and Professional etc. 4.1% 9.9% (1) Administrative, Executive etc. 0.6 0.8 (2) Clerical 4.1 11.7 (3) Salesmen 6.8 18.2 (4) Agriculture, Fishing, Hunting, Forestry etc. 35.4 4.3 (5) Mining, Quarrying etc. 2.0 0.2 (6) Transport and Communications 5.5 8.6 (7/8) Craftsmen, Artisans, Production Workers,

Labourers and Porters (Not classified elsewhere) 28.7 39.7

(9) Services, Sport and Recreation 5.9 6.4 (10) Workers Not Classified by Occupation 6.9 0.2

100.0 100.0

* Jordan, Directorate General of Statistics, 1961 Census, Vol. 4, p. 90.

the country were employed in such jobs. The high proportion of these categories abroad, and particularly in Kuwait, was the result of the opportunities open to educated and professionally qualified personnel in Kuwait. There were fewer chances of finding work for non-professional Palestinian workers because of strong competition on the part of both Arabs and non-Arabs. The 1961 Jordanian census indicates that "Most of the Jordanians outside the country come from the better-off and best qualified strata of the population, otherwise they would not be able to travel or acquire the qualifications that help them to find high income jobs abroad."'7

We can appreciate how attractive Kuwait was to the Palestinian work

17 Wander, p. 88.



force by comparing the income levels in the public sector in Kuwait and J ordan.

Such a comparison yields the following information: 1. The high incomes of medium posts in Kuwait correspond to the second

grade in the Jordanian Civil Service Regulations, which includes all holders of general secondary certificates and higher certificates.

2. There are conspicuous differences between each grade and high annual increments.

This conspicuous difference between the salaries paid in the original host countries and those paid in Kuwait led to a drain of personnel working in the various Jordanian government departments to Kuwait. Resignations from the Jordanian government service continued and started to extend to the field of personnel with higher qualifications.

The 1965 Kuwaiti census showed that the Palestinian community had doubled in numbers and that an unmistakable demographic change had taken place.

1. The Palestinian (Jordanian + Palestinian) community totalled 77,712, 36 percent of whom were females (the percentage in 1961 had been 31 percent). The percentage of children under ten years of age was 31 percent of the total Palestinian community, whereas in the 1961 Jordanian census it had been 16 percent. The tendency was thus to settle in Kuwait and to bring members of the family.

2. The percentage of the total population constituted by the Palestinian community had risen from 11.61 percent to 16.63 percent.

3. The percentage of the labour force working in the services sector had increased to 42.6 percent, and the percentage of those working in the manufacturing sector (14.8 percent) was higher than that in the building and construction sector (11.9 percent). This confirms the higher rate of employment for the educated and qualified or semi-qualified work force. The illiteracy rate of males was only 8 percent.

4. The number of males and females holding secondary certificates had risen to 6,692, in addition to 645 persons holding higher than secondary certificates, 1,230 with university degrees and 65 with advanced university degrees. These constituted 17 percent of the age group of 15 and over.

5. Thirty-one percent of the Jordanians and Palestinians were engaged in technical or professional work, were directors, or were employed in administrative and clerical jobs.

What happened in Kuwait was a typical example of rapid development and the extensive need for non-local work forces, and the consequent readiness to pay tempting salaries and to offer numerous privileges to obtain the required qualified personnel. As we have seen, the demand for personnel with various qualifications resulted in resignations from the government



service in Jordan and from UNRWA, and in emigration to Kuwait and the other oil countries. Large numbers of university graduates started going to Kuwait and the oil countries in general immediately after graduation, rather than seeking employment in the original host countries.

Palestinians played a particularly important role in the development of education in Kuwait, where the education budget increased 31 times between the years 1946/47 and 1952/53. 18 Because of the lack of educated personnel, non-Kuwaiti teachers were employed, and most of those engaged were Palestinians, for historical and local reasons. In the absence of accurate statistics before the school year 1958/59, we shall use the statistics for that year to illustrate the extent of the emigration of Palestinian teachers.

Table 6 shows the breakdown of Palestinian (Jordanian + Palestinian) teachers in Kuwait.

TABLE 6

PALESTINIAN (JORDANIAN + PALESTINIAN) TEACHERS IN KUWAIT IN 1958/59 ACCORDING TO STAGES OF EDUCATION AND SEX AND THEIR PROPORTION

OF THE TOTAL OF TEACHERS IN KUWAIT*

Number Percent Number Percent of Males of Total of Females of Total

Kindergarten - - 61 56.5 Primary 390 65.0 283 66.0 Intermediate 125 43.7 71 44.8 Secondary 12 15.0 4 11.0 Special Schools 11 - - -

* Kuwait, Education Department, Annual Report 1958/59.

Saudi Arabia

During the same period as the demand for a non-local work force was arising in Kuwait, a similar demand arose in Saudi Arabia. At first no rapid economic development took place because of the prevailing conservative policy of rejecting quick development. But it was not long before the demands of the growing bourgeoisie for the provision of education and the

18 Kuwait, Education Department; Annual Report, from 1958/59 to 1966/67.



improvement of health services were met. Only after 1963 did extensive economic development start. But the demand for certain categories and qualifications had already begun.

The education of males in Saudi Arabia started to expand in the middle fifties. In the school year 1957/58, there were 1,348 non-Saudi teachers. In spite of the efforts of the Ministry of Education to provide local personnel, great numbers of non-local teachers were attracted to the country. The number of these rose to 3,841 teachers in the primary stage in 1962/63.

TABLE 7

BREAKDOWN OF JORDANIAN AND PALESTINIAN MALE TEACHERS IN SAUDI ARABIA IN 1963/64 AND THEIR PERCENTAGE AT EACH STAGE

OF ALL NON-SAUDI TEACHERS AND TEACHERS IN GENERAL*

Educational Total Total Palestinian Teachers Palestinian % Palestinian % Stage Teachers Non-Saudi of Total of All Non-

Teach ers Jordan- Pales- Total Teachers Saudi Teachers

ians tinians

Primary 8,301 3,829 2,731 709 3,440 41 90 Independent Intermediate 573 415 163 94 257 44 62 Secondary Intermediate 212 176 80 33 113 53 64 Secondary 129 100 37 13 50 39 50 Primary Teachers Institutes 420 307 129 48 177 42 58 Secondary Teachers Institutes 44 33 14 7 21 47 64 Intermediate Industrial 325 174 75 25 100 30.8 57.5 Intermediate Commercial 63 46 20 7 27 42.8 59 Intermediate Agricultural 57 55 44 1 45 78.9 82

* Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Education, Guide to Educational Statistics for the Year 1383 (1963/64)



After that the numbers started falling because of the availability of local male teachers.

Because the number of applicants exceeded the demand, as a result of the large numbers of holders of secondary certificates in the Arab countries and particularly in Jordan and Gaza, the Ministry of Education started cutting down salaries. This only harmed unemployed young Palestinians, who sought an income sufficient to support their families and to help them to complete their university education. The first detailed Saudi census we have been able to obtain for the year 1963/64 shows that there were 3,440 Palestinian (Jordanian + Palestinian) male teachers in the primary stage - 90 percent of all non-Saudi teachers and 41 percent of all male teachers in the primary stage (see Table 7). This census also shows the high proportion of Pales- tinians employed in the other educational levels, as a result of the small numbers of total personnel employed at these levels and of the refusal to appoint Egyptian teachers because of the political crisis between the two countries at the time. Jordan at this time was also encouraging the employment of its teachers abroad, by seconding teachers to work with the Saudi Ministry of Education.

The establishment of girls' schools, starting in 1958/59, and the expansion of their education in the sixties, led the Directorate General of Girls' Schools to appoint large numbers of non-Saudi female teachers.

Table 8 shows the rapid increase in the number of Palestinian female

TABLE 8

INCREASE IN NUMBERS OF PALESTINIAN (JORDANIAN + PALESTINIAN) FEMALE EMPLOYEES IN THE SCHOOLS OF THE SAUDI DIRECTORATE

OF GIRLS' SCHOOLS AND THEIR PERCENTAGE OF ALL FEMALE EMPLOYEES AND ALL NON-SAUDI EMPLOYEES IN THE SCHOOL YEARS 1961/62 TO 1966/67*

School Year Total Total Palestinian Female Employees %Palestinians %Palestinians Female Non-Saudi I of Total of Total Non-

Employees Female Saudi Female Employees Jordanians Palestinians Total Teachers

1961/62 386 297 72 85 157 40.7 52.9 1962/63 729 565 179 224 403 55.3 71.3 1963/64 1,454 1,228 646 400 1,046 72 85 1964/65 1,898 1,618 772 534 1,306 68.8 80.8 1965/66 2,573 2,139 936 654 1,590 61.8 74.3 1966/67 3,239 2,687 1,136 765 1,901 58.7 70.7

* Saudi Arabia, Directorate General of Girls Schools, Statistics Department, Statistical Guide to the Education of Girls in the Seven Years 80-81 to 86-87 (1960/61 to 1966/67), p. 62.



employees, including teachers, which increased 11 times in 6 years. Pales- tinian families in the Gaza Strip in particular welcomed this new opportunity of work for educated girls, and encouraged them to apply for employment in Saudi Arabia by contacting relatives there or going there with members of the family. Palestinians as a whole welcomed the expansion of work opportunities for girls in the education sector which had been made possible because of the free educational facilities capable of absorbing more girls in secondary education that had become available in certain areas where Palestinians lived, the best situation being in the Gaza Strip where the population concentration made the establishment of secondary schools easier.

THE GENERAL SECONDARY CERTIFICATE

Having illustrated the demand for teachers, let us now turn to the development of education itself among Palestinians. Table 9 shows the

TABLE 9 CANDIDATES FOR THE JORDANIAN SECONDARY STUDIES CERTIFICATE

FROM 1955/56 TO 1958/59*

School Year Sex Candidates Successful Percentage Candidates Successes

Male 1,181 870 74 1955/56 Female 330 172 52

Total 1,511 1,042 69

Male 2,101 1,510 72 1956/57 Female 393 260 66

Total 2,494 1,770 71

Male 3,669 2,141 58 1957/58 Female 604 329 54

Total 4,273 2,470 58

Male 4,242 2,533 59 1958/59 Female 744 414 55

Total 4,986 2,947 59




increase in the numbers of candidates for the general secondary certificate in Jordan. Primary education had spread to include all males, and the great majority of females in the early sixties. In 1966, 39 percent of the 13-18 age group were primary or secondary pupils - the third highest percentage in the Arab world, after Kuwait (60 percent) and Bahrein (46 percent).19 Since some of the preparatory and secondary pupils in Kuwait were Jordanians, the real Palestinian/Jordanian ratio of secondary students was probably even higher.

In the four years 1955-59, the number of male candidates for the examination increased 359 percent, and the number of females 325 percent. In the same period the average success rate rose 291 percent for males and 241 percent for females.

The demand for education was also visible among Palestinians outside Jordan. In the Gaza Strip, for instance, the number of pupils in the preparatory stage increased by 42 percent between 1961/62 and 1964/65. The ratio of girls at this stage was a striking 42 percent of all pupils. The secondary stage also increased rapidly - by about 33 percent (a third of the total pupils being girls).20

In Syria, the demand for education was shown by the rise in the percentage of those who completed the preparatory and the general or technical secondary stages. In 1960 these constituted 6.3 percent of all Palestinians over 10 years of age living in Syria (9.6 percent of males and 2.7 percent of females). The next census held in Syria, in 1970, showed a great rise in the percentage to 14.7 percent of the over 10 age group (19.6 percent of males and 9.6 percent of females).

The same enthusiasm for education was to be found in the Palestinians in Lebanon, though educational conditions after the preparatory stage had not been good for the working class. This was due to the lack of public secondary schools in the earlier period and limitations on the numbers of Palestinians accepted by public schools later.

HIGHER EDUCATION

This intensive demand for secondary education among the Palestinian communities outside the occupied territories resulted in a corresponding increase in the demand for higher, especially university education. This

19 See Muhammad al-Ghannam, Education in the Arab Countries in the Light of the Marrakesh Conference (1970), UNESCO Regional Centre for the Training of Senior Education Officials in the Arab countries (Beirut, 1970), p. 79.

20 Administration of the Governor-General of the Gaza Strip, Official Statistical Bulletin for 1959-1964.



TABLE 10 BREAKDOWN OF JORDANIAN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS STUDYING ABROAD

IN 1960/61*

Country Total Students Male Students Syria 1,188 1,046 Egypt 910 888 Lebanon 581 419 Iraq 48 46 Libya 6 3 Iran 17 17 Turkey 540 540 Pakistan 12 12 West Germany 609 608 Italy 16 12 Spain 11 10 USA 604 556

Total 4,542 4,157


demand grew rapidly as the employment opportunities and salaries for holders of the general secondary certificate decreased.

The first more or less comprehensive census of Jordanian university students was the educational census of 1960/61, which showed that they numbered 4,542 (4,157 males and 385 females). This census did not include students studying in the United Kingdom or those at higher institutes in Jordan. Because of its importance the census will be analysed in detail to show the basic characteristics of higher education in that period (Table 10).

This table discloses that: 1. There was a large number of students in Syrian universities (Damascus

and Aleppo), especially in the Syrian University at Damascus, and a preponderance of students of arts and humanities. This high figure is explained by Syria's proximity to Jordan and its low cost of living.

2. There was a large number of students at the American University of



Beirut, both because of its prestige and of the high number (155) of scholarships available.

3. The US remained the Mecca for specialization and higher studies. This also applied to the UK, although no statistics are available.

4. West Germany and Turkey were greatly in demand, because it was easy to find places in the faculties of medicine and engineering in both countries, and because the cost of living was low, especially in Turkey.

The sixties witnessed an expansion of higher education in the Arab countries, where some universities made their conditions for admission less strict. This development was the result of the great expansion of general education and the consequent need for teaching personnel. The result was that universities relaxed their terms of admission until eventually study by correspondence was permitted, with students attending only to sit for the final examinations. This measure had the advantage of avoiding extensive investment in higher education, which the various Arab governments ruled out because they could not afford it, because it was not clear to them what tangible advantages would accrue from the extensive expansion of university education and because they were afraid of the political consequences of large concentrations of students.

Jordanian students in general, and Palestinians students in particular, took advantage of the new opportunities and proceeded to register at the various universities before, while or after working. As a result of increased opportunities to join faculties of medicine and engineering in the Arab countries, the number of those seeking to specialize in these subjects increased, including some students whose marks in the general secondary certificate or whose material circumstances did not permit of their attending the classical universities.

A comparison between Tables 10 and 11 shows that the number of university students increased fourfold between the years 1960/61 and 1967/68. Although the Jordan University was established in 1962, it and other Jordanian higher institutes could only provide a limited number of places. Their students accounted for only 13.3 percent of all Jordanian university students.

With the expansion of the system of study by correspondence in the Arab University in Beirut and the Lebanese University, Lebanon began to draw larger numbers of university students. The number of students registered there constituted the largest single group of Jordanian students. Egypt could also provide great opportunities for those who wanted to study in the faculties of medicine and engineering. Jordanian students with high marks went there, while a large number of full-time students preferred to study in Egypt because of its high prestige in the Arab world, and because of the low cost of living there. Other Arab countries, such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia and



Algeria, also started to receive Jordanian students, but the desire of thousands of students to specialize in the applied sciences led them to turn even further afield, to Austria, Yugoslavia, Spain, Pakistan, Italy and India.

To complete our analysis let us consider the conclusions reached by a study conducted by the Directorate General of Statistics in Jordan of Jordanian students pursuing higher studies in the year 1969/70.

1. Eighty-two percent of Jordanian students studying abroad were at Arab universities. Fifty percent of those studying abroad were studying various branches of the arts, 25 percent of them studied economics, political science, business management and commerce, and the remainder were studying medicine, engineering, the natural sciences and agriculture, or attending industrial institutes. About 12,000 of the total were correspondence students, usually studying literature and the humanities, attending their universities once or twice a year, and working in Jordan or the occupied territories.

2. The students in Western Europe, including Yugoslavia, were studying medicine as a first priority, and then engineering. The situation was different in Eastern Europe, where engineering came first, followed by medicine. Most of the students in the Asian countries were studying engineering.

3. The percentage of the total number of students studying engineering, medicine, economics and literature and the arts were 8, 10, 23.5 and 41 percent respectively. Only 4.6 percent were studying natural sciences, 24 percent of whom were females.

In the sixties the situation of Palestinians in Jordan and the Gaza Strip was distinguished from that of other Palestinian communities outside the territories occupied in 1948 by the fact that in the latter the capacity for absorption of higher education was limited or non-existent. Jordanian nationality ensured those who held it of the chance of social mobility. Local conditions also played an important role in education for Palestinian students in Gaza. The great majority of the students of the Gaza Strip decided on Egyptian universities and higher institutes because of the grants and aid provided by the Egyptian government or UNRWA, and because of the low cost of living and minimal travelling expenses. The number of Gaza Strip students going to Egyptian universities was high: even in the school year 1961/62, they numbered 3,450.21 This figure had almost certainly doubled by 1967.

With the Syrian universities admitting larger numbers, the number of Palestinian male and female students attending them rose from 1,046 in

21 Muhammad Ali Khulusi, al-Tanmiya al-Iqtisadiya fi-Qita' Gbaza-Filastin, 1948-1961 (Economic Development in the Gaza Strip), (Cairo: al-Matba' al-Tijariya al-Muttahida, 1967), p. 295.



TABLE 11 BREAKDOWN OF JORDANIAN STUDENTS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE JORDAN

IN 1967/68*

Country Total Students Male Students East Jordan 3,420 2,501

Jordan University 2,292 1,749 Higher Technical Institutes 1,128 752

Outside Jordan 22,150 21,231 Syria 3,682 3,384 Lebanon 6,700 6,411 Iraq 656 621 Saudi Arabia 200 174 UAR (Egypt) 5,842 5,706 Pakistan 696 696 Turkey 508 498 India 54 53 Algeria 54 54 Russia 50 50 Yugoslavia 600 600 Austria 250 248 Britain 366 342 Italy 125 121 Spain 788 782 Germany 489 489 USA 717 661 Other Countries 373 341

Total 25,570 23,732

* Jordan, Ministry of Education, Yearbook of Educational Statistics in the Hasbemite Kingdom of Jordan for the Year 1967/68, pp. 253 and 294.



1960/61 to 2,083 in 1967/68. In addition there were hundreds of Palestinian students living in Syria studying outside Syria, most of them pursuing higher studies that were not available locally or on scholarships from the Syrian government.

No accurate statistics are available on the development of the higher education of Palestinians in Lebanon, but the Palestinian bourgeoisie resident there took an increasing interest in higher education. As we have seen, they were able to provide their children with good secondary education. With the establishment of the Lebanese University and the Arab University of Beirut, and with the increasing numbers of Palestinian students obtaining the Egyptian or Syrian baccalaureat, opportunities were provided for a large number of young Palestinians to obtain higher degrees in Lebanon; among them were increasing numbers of the working classes. Most of these students specialized in the arts and the humanities - branches of study which did not require constant attendance, which was made difficult by their jobs.

The Palestinian situation in Lebanon therefore developed in a different way, with the bourgeoisie seekirng to provide their children with advanced education that would place them in the forefront of professionals in the Arab world, while the children of the working classes were only able to specialize in other branches of study in universities of secondary order. Some working-class children did succeed in going to the American University of Beirut by obtaining grants from UNRWA or elsewhere, by depending on their own efforts to provide the required fees, or by securing remission of fees. However, their numbers remained small because of the difficulty of successfully completing the secondary certificate stage. They were, moreover, outstripped by the children of the petty bourgeoisie who were in a better position to take the available educational opportunities and who managed to obtain most of the UNRWA aid.


Article Contentsp. [44]p. 45p. 46p. 47p. 48p. 49p. 50p. 51p. 52p. 53p. 54p. 55p. 56p. 57p. 58p. 59p. 60p. 61p. 62p. 63p. 64p. 65p. 66p. 67p. 68p. 69p. 70p. 71p. 72p. 73p. 74

Issue Table of ContentsJournal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Summer, 1980), pp. 1-218Front Matter [pp. ]West Bank Sojourn [pp. 3-16]The Passions of Exile: The Palestine Congress of North America [pp. 17-43]The Means of Survival: Education and the Palestinian Community, 1948-1967 [pp. 44-74]The Mission of Palestinian Higher Education [pp. 75-95]The Palestinian Exodus in 1948 [pp. 96-118]Special FeatureThe National Rights of the People of Palestine [pp. 119-130]

Recent BooksInternal Colonialism [pp. 131-135]Urban Arabs and Ultra-Orthodox Jews [pp. 135-137]A Healthy Adjustment [pp. 138-140]Leaders under the Mandate [pp. 140-141]National Lawyers Guild Report [pp. 142-146]

Shorter Notices [pp. 147-148]From the Israeli PressWalking with Heads Raised [pp. 149-155]West Bank Elections Off [pp. 155-156]Israel's Policy in South Lebanon [pp. 156-158]Sadat Viewed from Israel [pp. 158-164]

Arab Reports and AnalysisThe European Initiative [pp. 165-171]Tweedle Dum and Tweedle Dee [pp. 171-172]The Cost of Egypt's Open Door Policy [pp. 172-176]

Views from AbroadNo Quiet on the West Bank [pp. 177-181]What Hope America? [pp. 182-188]

Documents and Source Material: Arab Documents on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict [pp. 189-203]Periodicals in Review: The Arab-Israeli Conflict in Periodical Literature [pp. 204-218]Back Matter [pp. ]