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© Cyber Defense Research Group, Fraunhofer FKIE Steffen Wendzel Head of Secure Building Automation | with contributions by S. Szlósarczyk and J.Kaur BACnet Security & Smart Building Botnets [email protected] Cyber Defense

BACnet Security & Smart Building Botnets - SANS · BACnet Security & Smart Building Botnets steffen.wendzel@fkie ... Zwanger, V., Meier, M., Szlosarczyk, S.: Envisioning Smart Building

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© Cyber Defense Research Group, Fraunhofer FKIE

Steffen Wendzel

Head of Secure Building Automation | with contributions by S. Szlósarczyk and J.Kaur

BACnet Security &

Smart Building Botnets

[email protected]

Cyber Defense

© Cyber Defense Research Group, Fraunhofer FKIE

Smart Buildings?

Integrate a Building Automation System (BAS) for control, monitoring,

management

Early systems:

pneumatic components (1950’s)

heating, ventilation, air-

conditioning (HVAC)

Later:

first electronic components (60’s)

… and IT network components

© Cyber Defense Research Group, Fraunhofer FKIE

Smart Buildings?

Today:

Huge functionality spectrum

Integrated into “Internet of

Things”

“Smart”

Respond to internal and external

changes

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Smart Buildings: Goals

Energy saving

Reducing operating costs

Reducing the cost of churn

Enhanced life safety and security

Fast and effective service

Environmental friendly

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SECURITY Building Automation Systems:

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The Media

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REALITY? … and the

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Smart Building A != Smart Building B

professional operators

constant monitoring

of BAS functionality

immediate response to

problems

professional operators

constant monitoring

of BAS functionality

immediate response to

problems

Large Scale/ Complex

Large Scale/ Complex

janitors with limited skills

professional operation

via 3rd party

janitors with limited skills

professional operation

via 3rd party

Commercial Building

Commercial Building

private owners

most know-how lost after construction

finished

private owners

most know-how lost after construction

finished

Smart Home Smart Home

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How many are online accessible?

Nobody knows exactly!

Estimations exist

Malchow and Klick (2014) counted building automation environments

most were found in the US (circa 15.000)

of the found BAS, 9% were linked to known vulnerabilities

Alternative: local/regional BAS wardriving

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Security Aspects

First issues arose in the 1990‘s

Internet of Things increases security concerns

Easy to apply attacks known from TCP/IP (e.g. spoofing)

Focus of vendors: security << functionality

Lack of security awareness

Legacy hard- and software (security means are not always implementable)

Patchability problem

Insecure web-interfaces / remote access

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NOVEL ATTACKS

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Data Leakage via BAS

(Un)intentional data leakage using remote connection of a BAS

via network covert channel

Connection used for legitimate purpose (administration of remote buildings)

BAS Network

IP G

ate

way

Sensor

External (BAS)

Network or Internet

Passive Observer

BAS Protocol

Source: Wendzel, S., Kahler, B., Rist, T.: Covert Channels And Their Prevention In Building Automation Protocols: A Prototype Exemplified Using BACnet, Proc. CPSCom, IEEE, 2012.

© Cyber Defense Research Group, Fraunhofer FKIE

Data Leakage via BAS

Our Solution: Multi-level security BAS network architecture

Prototype already realized

BAS Network

Sensor

(CONFIDENTIAL)

External (BAS)

Network or Internet

Passive Observer

BAS Protocol

Source: Wendzel, S., Kahler, B., Rist, T.: Covert Channels And Their Prevention In Building Automation Protocols: A Prototype Exemplified Using BACnet, Proc. CPSCom, IEEE, 2012.

IP G

ate

way

ML

S F

ilter

MLS-based Routing

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Smart Building Botnets (SBB)

Short Definition:

A botnet consisting of BAS

bots placed either on control units

… or remote-control is directly

performed (no bot necessary)

Utilize physical capabilities of BAS

to perform malicious actions

no spam, no DoS, …

novel scenarios instead!

Source: Wendzel, S., Zwanger, V., Meier, M., Szlosarczyk, S.: Envisioning Smart Building Botnets, in Proc. Sicherheit, GI, Vienna, 2014.

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Smart Building Botnets (SBB)

How to build it?

Search Shodan

Perform BAS Wardriving

GPS-enabled smartphones with

malware

Source: Wendzel, S., Zwanger, V., Meier, M., Szlosarczyk, S.: Envisioning Smart Building Botnets, in Proc. Sicherheit, GI, Vienna, 2014.

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Example 1: Mass Surveillance

Remote access to sensor data

Monitoring of sensor values and

actuator states (temperature,

presence, heating levels, …)

Who in a smart city goes so often to

the bathroom each night and is

probably ill?

When can a break-in attempt to a

region be performed at the optimal

moment? Where exactly?

Source: Wendzel, S., Zwanger, V., Meier, M., Szlosarczyk, S.: Envisioning Smart Building Botnets, in Proc. Sicherheit, GI, Vienna, 2014.

© Cyber Defense Research Group, Fraunhofer FKIE

Scenario 2: Oil / Gas Producer

Thinkable regional attack

Slightly increase heating levels in

smart buildings over night

… to sell more oil or gas

Not easy to keep a low profile!

e.g. determining vacant rooms

using observation

Source: Wendzel, S., Zwanger, V., Meier, M., Szlosarczyk, S.: Envisioning Smart Building Botnets, in Proc. Sicherheit, GI, Vienna, 2014.

© Cyber Defense Research Group, Fraunhofer FKIE

© Cyber Defense Research Group, Fraunhofer FKIE

NETWORK PROTOCOLS Network Communication in BAS:

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Various Protocols Exist

Closed Protocols / Open Protocols

EIB/KNX, LONtalk, BACnet are most widely used

We focus on BACnet …

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BACnet in a Nutshell Overview

Building Automation Control and Network (BACnet)

A leading protocol in BAS

(remote) control and management of smart buildings

monitoring of buildings and according devices

Data and communication of all devices specified in ISO-Standard 16-484-5

Worldwide >>700 vendors

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BACnet in a Nutshell Comparison to OSI Layer Model

Defines four layers

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BACnet in a Nutshell NPDU

Network Protocol Data Unit (NPDU)

serves for communication of all the

devices on network layer

Control flow and address resolution

are managed with Network Protocol

Control Information (NPCI)

Opportunity to prioritize messages

Payload depicted in Network

Service Data Unit (NSDU)

network message, e.g. Who-Is

contents of application action

(APDU)

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BACnet in a Nutshell APDU

Application Protocol Data Unit

(APDU) serves for communication

of all the devices on application

layer

Datagram type (PDU Type) and

segmentation information are

managed via Application Protocol

Control Information (APCI)

Payload depicted in Service

Request field

Request /response for / of

application action of a device

encoded in ASN.1

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EXPLOITING BUILDING

AUTOMATION PROTOCOLS

Behind the scenes --- a contribution by S. Szlósarczyk

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Practical security flaws in BACnet

Authentication and encryption means are specified by the standard,

nevertheless they are rarely implemented

Interrogation / scanning made possible

Large attack surface (few were already known before)

Smurf-like attack

Router Adv. Flooding

Traffic Redirection

DoS Re-Routing

Malformed Messages

Inconsistent Retransmissions

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Behind the scenes: Exploiting BAS Attacking scenario

Attacker Eve: Sends

malformed or spoofed

messages remotely to one

or more devices in the BAS

subnet

BACnet Broadcast

Management Device

(BBMD) routes all the

messages to the

corresponding destination

device

Exploitation of device by

Eve

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Behind the scenes: Exploiting BAS Smurf Attack

Eve spoofs Who-is-Router-

to-Network messages with

victim’s source address

Victim receives all the

outgoing/incoming traffic

from all devices in the

subnet

Exploit: DoS in the case of

a too large amount of

messages

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Behind the scenes: Exploiting BAS Traffic Redirection

Eve fakes selected Router-

Available-to-Network

messages

BBMD simply forwards all

incoming and outgoing

messages

Exploit: Eve receives ALL

routed messages as the

devices register her as

“HOP”

© Cyber Defense Research Group, Fraunhofer FKIE

TRAFFIC NORMALIZATION

Our solution to prevent attacks:

© Cyber Defense Research Group, Fraunhofer FKIE

Traffic Normalization Methodology

Eliminates ambiguities and prevents devices of proposed attacks, e.g. several

types of Denial of Service (DoS) on network layer

Can ensure standard conforming network traffic

Ability to secure legacy systems which are not patchable

independent of any platform

can be integrated into each network protocol

Internet Intranet

Normalizer

Source: S. Szlósarczyk, S. Wendzel et al.: Towards Suppressing Attacks on and Improving Resilience of Building Automation Systems, in Proc. GI Sicherheit, Vienna, 2014.

© Cyber Defense Research Group, Fraunhofer FKIE

Traffic Normalization for BACnet

Developed a Snort extension for

BACnet

Developed a Scapy-based BACnet

protocol fuzzer

Realizing traffic normalization for

BACnet/IP‘s network and application

layer

New research project started with

industry partner (funded by German

BMBF)

„Building Automation Reliable

Network Infrastructure“ (BARNI)

Traffic

Normalizer

Source: S. Szlósarczyk, S. Wendzel et al.: Towards Suppressing Attacks on and Improving Resilience of Building Automation Systems, in Proc. GI Sicherheit, Vienna, 2014.

© Cyber Defense Research Group, Fraunhofer FKIE

DISTRIBUTED BACnet

TESTBED

Supporting the Research Community:

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Distributed BACnet Testbed

Large inter-connection of autonomous BACnet environments

Consisting of virtual and real BAS components

Source: J. Kaur et al.: A Cost-efficient building automation security testbed for educational purposes, poster at Securware, Lisbon, 2014 (to appear).

© Cyber Defense Research Group, Fraunhofer FKIE

Distributed BACnet Testbed

Why?

1. research (traffic recordings, traffic analysis, DLP etc.)

2. education (BACnet attack training and monitoring for students)

you can join!

Source: J. Kaur et al.: A Cost-efficient building automation security testbed for educational purposes, poster at Securware, Lisbon, 2014 (to appear).

© Cyber Defense Research Group, Fraunhofer FKIE

SUMMARY

© Cyber Defense Research Group, Fraunhofer FKIE

Summary

Traffic

Normalizer

Our means to increase security in BAS:

Multi-level security and data leakage protection

for building automation networks

Traffic normalizer for BACnet

Virtual Inter-connected testbed for

the research community

© Cyber Defense Research Group, Fraunhofer FKIE

Thank you for your kind attention!

Our Expertise:

Secure Building Automation

Data Leakage Protection

Network Steganography/

Network Covert Channels

Steffen Wendzel

Head of Secure Building Automation

Cyber Security Department

Fraunhofer FKIE

[email protected]

Personal website:

http://www.wendzel.de

Links to the publications mentioned in this talk:

http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=6468400&tag=1

http://www.wendzel.de/dr.org/files/Papers/EnvisioningSmartBuildings.pdf

http://www.wendzel.de/dr.org/files/Papers/BACnet_TN_Paper_GISich.pdf

If you want to know more about capabilities of network covert channels:

http://www.wendzel.de/dr.org/files/Papers/mp_survey.pdf