Backhaus, Simmel's Philosophy of History and Phenomenology.pdf

8/10/2019 Backhaus, Simmel's Philosophy of History and Phenomenology.pdf

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Simmel's Philosophy of History and Its Relation to Phenomenology: IntroductionAuthor(s): Gary BackhausSource: Human Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2003), pp. 203-208Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20010328.

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2/7

k.J

Human Studies 26:

203-208,

2003.

203

f

?

2003 Kluwer Academic

Publishers. Printed

in

the

Netherlands.

Simmel's

Philosophy

of

History

and

Its

Relation

to

Phenomenology:

Introduction

GARY

BACKHAUS

Department

of

Philosophy

and

Religious

Studies,

Morgan

State

University,

Baltimore,

MD

21251,

USA

This

set

of three

papers

presents

an

inaugural

study

of the

relationship

of

Georg

Simmel's

philosophy

of

history

to

phenomenology.

These

studies function

as

provisional,

yet

trailblazing

explorations

in

the

sense

that

they

lack

corrobo

ration with

an

established

body

of

research.

They

are

meant

to

motivate fur?

ther

historical

research

concerning,

and

creative

use

of,

Simmel's

philosophy

of

history

towards the

goal

of

developing

a

phenomenological

approach

to

history.

One

task of this

brief

introduction

is

to

demonstrate that this

subject

matter

should

be

viewed

as

transcending

the

narrow

interests

of

a

circum?

scribed

group

of Simmelian

specialists.

This new direction in Simmelian stud?

ies

should be

recognized

as

potentially

effecting

important

consequences

in

the

fields of

both the human

sciences

and

philosophy.

Any

historical

period

of

theoretical

thought

needs

to

be

a

living

history,

continually

engaged

so

that it

dynamically

and

continually

unfolds

through

perspectival

modifications.

Otherwise,

the

historical

relation

(and

history

only

exists

as

a

relation)

becomes

reified:

we

forget

that

it

is

a

human

achievement

and

allow it

to

be

packaged

as

positivistic

facticities

( no

assembly

neces?

sary ),

rather

than

as

a

lived

relation.

Just

as

inauthenticity

is

a

fundamental

characteristic of

Dasein,

the

reification of

history

is

also

a

fundamental

mo?

dality

of

historical

inauthenticity.

Once

the

historicality

of

the

lifeworld is

objectivated

as

history,

the

hypostatization

of

the

temporal

process

can

be

accepted

without renewed

and

continued

reflection. Another

fundamental

aspect

of

history

is

anachronistic

thinking,

which

follows from

its

present-at

hand

objectivation.

Anachronistic

thinking

reads

an

outcome

back

into

its

genesis.

For

example,

we

think

of

Husserl

as

the

father of

the

phenomen?

ological

movement

and from

our

temporally

situated

reflective

glance

may

unthinkingly

place

the

present

meaning-context

back

into the

horizons of his

milieu.

This

anachronistic

thinking

is

quite

common

without

disciplined

train?

ing

in

historical

thinking

and

method,

but

only

a

lived-historical

reflection

can

counter

this

tendency

of

the

natural

attitude

to

de-historicize the

genesis

of

its outcomes.

This

set

of

papers

reopens

to

historical

reflection

a

fertile

moment

in

the

history

of

theoretical

thought

that

exhibited

great

intellectual

transformation.

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3/7

204

GARY BACKHAUS

Through relating

ourselves

to

it

we

bear

witness

to

the

waning

of neo-Kantianism

and

to

the

genesis

of the

phenomenological

movement.

It

is

a

contemporary

we,

a

succeeding generation

that

bears historical

witness,

for those within

the historical milieu

did

not

say

to

themselves:

We

are

bearing

historical

witness

to

the

waning

of neo-Kantianism

. .

.

They

could

not,

unless

they

fantasized

what their

successors

might

say

of them. We

successors

also bear

historical

witness

to

the

arisings

and

developments

of the human and social

sciences that occurred

during

Simmers

intellectual

times.

By raising

the

ques?

tion of Simmel's

philosophy

of

history

in

light

of its

possible

relation

to

phe?

nomenology,

our

three

studies

regenerate

the

lived-dynamics

of historical

perspective and open the potential for perspectival transformation. The pos?

sible

consequence

will not

merely

concern a

specific

sub-text

in

this

history,

but rather there

is the

potential

to

set

inmotion reverberations

throughout

the

historical

period

in

question,

which

engenders

consequences

for

our

living

relation

to

it.

Studies

concerning

the relation of Simmel's

work

to

phenomenology

are

virtually

non-existent.

Even

including

the studies

already accomplished by

the

authors

of this

set

there

simply

exist

scanty

serious

research

exploring

this

relation.

Some

thinkers

(Levine,

1997;

Psathas, 1973; Wolff,

1991)

have

com?

mented on Simmel's affinity to phenomenology's studies of essences and of

the

ontology

of

the

lifeworld,

so

we

must

ask

why

such studies have been

slow

in

materializing.

One

reason

is

that

Simmel

is

read

primarily

by

theoretical

sociologists

who have been

trained

in

the

history

of

German

social

theory,

but

not

in

phenomenology.

The

resulting

reified

historical

perspective

is

that

Simmel

is

an

original,

but

neo-Kantian

thinker.

However,

some

recent

histori?

cal reflections

(e.g.,

Jaworski,

1997)

have

linked Simmel with the

postmodern

perspective.

Simmel

has

proven

to

be

an

enigmatic,

ambiguous

figure

-

a

stat?

ure

that

probably

would have

pleased

him. Not

only

was

he

marginalized

during his lifetime, his influence, although recognized, generally has been

something

woven

inconspicuously

into

the

social

science

tradition,

which is

quite

ironic

given

his

notable,

intellectual

flamboyance.

New

insights

into

Simmel

are

welcome,

for

they

engender

a

living-exploration

of

his

work.

If

Simmel's

development

as a

thinker

can

be linked

to

a

phenomenological

ori?

entation,

his

works

appear

within

a

whole

new

light,

which

effects

a

transfor?

mation

in

our

living

history.

Non-phenomenological

sociologists

may

then be

drawn

into

an

exploration

of

phenomenology,

for

only

then

can

they

under?

stand and

critically

remark

on

the

Simmel-phenomenology

thesis.

The converse is also true:

phenomenologists

who have failed to

recognize

the

phenomenological

potential

in

Simmel

will

gain by viewing

him

as amem?

ber of the

fold

who

accomplished

valuable

applied/practitioner

studies.

It

is

ironic that the

philosopher

whose

battlecry

was

back

to

the

things

themselves

gave

us

no

applied

studies

to

speak

of,

unless

one

counts

the

things

that

were

on

Husserl's

desk

or

things

that

he

saw

outside

his

window,

which

served

as



4/7


5/7

206

GARY

BACKHAUS

Another

aspect

of

this

set

of

papers

concerns

the

specific

theoretical

area

addressed,

the

philosophy

of

history.

We

hope

that

our

studies

stimulate

sys?

tematic

comparative

research of various

philosophies

of

history by

compar?

ing

Simmel's work with that of others who also

sought

to

establish

the scientific

limits

for the field of historical research.

Moreover,

our

research

promotes

the

viability

of

Simmel's

work for continued theoretical

development

of

phen?

omenological

approaches

to

history.

If

Simmel's

approach

to

the

philosophy

of

history

can

be

shown

to

be

phenomenologically

oriented,

then his

work

in

this

area can serve

to

promote

further

theoretical and

applied study

as

well

as

to

train the

phenomenologically

oriented historian.

Some

general points

concerning

the fundamental

nature

of

phenomen?

ological

orientation

in

light

of Husserl's

goals

and

a

few

remarks

concerning

the

sense

of each of

our

three

papers

complete

this

introduction.

These studies

are

based

on

the

recognition

that various

strata

of Simmel's

thought developed gradually

from

a

consciously

oriented

neo-Kantianism,

through

various revisions that weakened

this

affiliation,

and

finally

to

exhibit?

ing

amore

phenomenological

basis.

Too much

hair-splitting

would

be

involved

to

decide whether Simmel's

later work should be labeled

quasi-phenomenol

ogy,

proto-phenomenology,

a

propaedeutic

for

phenomenology,

or

properly

phenomenological.

The first

point

is that the

early major phenomenologists

agree

with

Husserl's

fundamental

insight

that

non-constructive material

a

priori

knowledge

can

be uncovered

as

the field

of

phenomenological

inquiry.

For

example, Heidegger

states:

But

to

disclose

the

a

priori

is

not

to

make

an

''a-prioristic

construction.

Edmund

Husserl

has

not

only

enabled

us

to

understand

once more

the

mean?

ing

of

any

genuine philosophical

empiricism;

he

has also

given

us

the

nec?

essary

tools.

'A-priorism'

is the

method

of

every

scientific

philosophy

which

understands itself.

There

is

nothing

constructivist about

it.

(1962,

p.

490)

It

is

this

specific

character

of

non-constructivity

that

essentially

separates

the

sense

of

phenomenology

from neo-Kantian

perspectives.

Husserl's

methodo?

logical

strategies

for and

theoretical constraint

in

apprehending phenomen?

ological

evidence

become

more

understandable

by

keeping

this

single

point

in

mind.

Husserl

clung

to

his

Cartesianism,

not

because

he did

not

recognize

its

limits and inherent

problems,

but because

phenomenological

evidence

se?

cured

against

neo-Kantian

constructivism

was

his

goal

at

all

costs.

Recent

evidence shows that Husserl had already begun in the very early twenties to

replace

the

egological

standpoint

of

Cartesianism

with

intersubjectivity,

to

see

the

worldly

horizon

as

co-constituting

along

with

intersubjectivity,

and

to

ground

genetic

phenomenology

as a

concrete

deepening

beyond

the

abstrac?

tive

nature

of static

phenomenology

(Welton, 2000).

Husserl

already

had

begun

phenomenological

investigations

that

Heidegger

was

to

take

up

and

develop



6/7

introduction:

simmel's

philosophy of history

207

in

his

own

way.

But he

was

concerned

to

avoid

constructivisms

that would

corrupt phenomenological

evidence

in

those

non-egological investigations.

It

is

not

incompatible

to

have

papers

in

this

set

that exhibit

Simmel's

relation

to

both

Husserlian

and

Heideggerian

phenomenology.

In

light

of

a

broader

understanding

of

Husserl's entire

corpus,

we

believe

that

Husserl

would

not

have

been

opposed

to

Simmel's

starting

points

for

study,

but

that he

was

at?

tempting

to

find

a

way

to

rigorously

ground

such

starting points.

Simmel's

intellectual

flamboyance

allows him

to

leap

straightaway

into

areas

in

which

Husserl

was

too

cautious

to

venture.

We

claim

that

Simmel's

development

pushes

him

closer

to

a

phenomenological

viewpoint

because he

began to recognize structures present in the things themselves prior to any

cognitive

construction

on

the

theoretical

observer's

part.

It

was

this

honest

apprehension

that led

Simmel

to

modify

his

neo-Kantianism

and

then to

aban?

don

much of

it.

He

does

this

by starting

from

a

standpoint

of

immersion ;

from

the

empirical

subject

embedded

in

the

socio-historical

intersubjective

world,

which

allows him

to

advance

phenomenology

without

a

conscious

pre?

figuring

of

its

scope.

In

his

philosophical

anthropology

Simmel

strives

to

ground

a

fundamental

a

priori

basis

for human

feelings,

images,

and

narratives.

He

rejects

both

strictly

empirical approaches and sheerly speculative accounts in favor of piecemeal

advancements

into

a

wide

variety

of

human

activities,

attitudes,

and

world

views.

His

panoramic

compilation

of

human

studies

range

through

the

descrip?

tive

study

of

adventure

to

the

nature

of

the

bridge, through

ancient

ruins

to

modern

coquetry,

and

through

the

development

of

money

to

the

need for

tact.

His

work,

in

contrast

to

Husserl's,

arrives

at

the

parameters

of

phenomenol?

ogy

through

discovery;

that

is,

by

concrete

applications,

rather

than

through

a

highly

self-reflective

stance

of the

principles

of

phenomenology

prior

to

its

practice.

For Simmel, showing the legitimacy of history as a science

appeared

to be

an

important strategy.

Human

life

unfolds in

its

history;

thus

without

history

having

legitimacy,

the other

sciences,

which deal

with contents

of

an

histori?

cal

nature,

are

inherently problematic

sciences.

History

had

to

be

wrested

from

metaphysical

speculation

as

well

as

mere

storytelling.

Its

interpretative

meth?

odologies

had

to

be

justified

as an

epistemologically

sound

component

of

historical

science,

otherwise

the

legitimizing

course

would be

caught

in

the

errors

of

realism.

And

finally,

history

had

to

contain

a

logical

or

existential

component

such

that

it could

be

wrested

from

historicism.

The

philosophy

of

history that followed this course for

grounding

the

legitimacy

of historical

science

would

at

least

show

itself

to

be

not

incompatible

with

phenomenol?

ogy.

The

first of

the

papers

that

follows,

by

Gary

Backhaus

and

Richard

Owsley,

presents

a

discussion of

four

components

constitutive of

Simmel's

philoso?

phy

of

history

and shows

the

compatibility

ofthat

philosophy

of

history

with



7/7

208

GARY

BACKHAUS

phenomenology.

Comparisons

could

be made with

Droysen,

Dilthey,

Humboldt,

and others (Mueller-Vollmer, 1994). Such a task is modest in its claim, but if

one were

to

carry

this

out

systematically,

certain

thinkers,

such

as

Rickert,

put

forth

a

philosophy

of

history quite

incompatible

with

phenomenology.

The

paper

discusses

methodological

and

epistemological

affinities that

are

absent

from

many

thinkers who

expounded

a

philosophy

of

history,

and exhibits

Simmel's

phenomenological

affinities.

The

second

paper,

by

Backhaus,

takes

up

the

problem

of evidence and in?

terlaces Husserlian

texts

with Simmel's 1918

essay

on

the

philosophy

of his?

tory.

My

goal

is

to

show that

Simmel

recognizes

the intuitive

apprehension

of

evidence,

instead

of

cognitive

constructions of the

observer,

as the basis

for

a

science of

history.

I

propose

that Simmel

explicates

historical intuition

in

a

way

that

is

coherent

with Husserl's

categorial

intuition,

which

is consid?

ered

the

epistemological

breakthrough

that

opens up

the material

apriori

-

the

field of

phenomenology.

The third

paper,

by

John

Jalbert,

addresses Simmel's

philosophy

of

life

and

thus is oriented

to

ontological

issues

in which Simmel shares

Heidegger's

concerns.

He

assesses

Simmel's

struggles

to

account

for the relation

between

the

historicity

of

human

existence

as

the

uninterrupted

flow

of life and the

problem

of

history

as

the

product

of

historical

reflection.

In

other

words,

the

focus

here is

on

the relation

between

the

ontological

and the

ontic.

References

Backhaus,

G.

(1992).

The Foundations

of

Husserl and

Merleau-Ponty

and

the Phenomen?

ological

Critique

of

Science.

Ph.D.

diss.

The American

University.

Heidegger,

M.

(1962).

Being

and

Time,

trans.

John

Macquarrie

and

Edward

Robinson.

New

York:

Harper

and Row.

Jaworski,

G.D.

(1997).

Georg

Simmel

and

the

American

Prospect.

Albany:

State

University

of

New

York Press.

Levine,

D.N.

(1997).

Simmel

Reappraised:

Old

Images,

New

Scholarship.

In C.

Camic

(Ed.),

Reclaiming

the

Sociological

Classics.

Oxford:

Blackwell

Publishers

Ltd.

Mueller-Vollmer,

K.

(Ed.)

(1994).

The Hermeneutic

Reader.

New York: Continuum.

Psathas,

G.

(Ed.)

(1973).

Phenomenological

Sociology:

Issues

and

Applications.

New

York:

John

Wiley

&

Sons.

Welton,

D.

(2000).

The

Other

Husserl:

The

Horizons

of

Transcendental

Phenomenology.

Bloomington:

Indiana

University

Press.

Wolff,

K.H.

(1991).

Survival

and

Sociology:

Vindicating

the

Human

Subject.

New

Brunswick

NJ: Transaction Publishers.

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Backhaus, Simmel's Philosophy of History and Phenomenology.pdf