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HINGSTMAN 12

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UTILITARIANISM GOOD; DEONTOLOGY ANSWERSINDEX

Utilitarianism is a good standard for evaluating actionMoral absolutes are bad - they ignore the greater goodAnswers to: We cannot predict consequences of actionsAnswers to: Utilitarianism produces injusticeRights badAnswer to: Moral relativism makes utilitarianism impossibleAnswers to: KantAnswers to: Badiou

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Utilitarianism Good

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Utilitarianism is good because it looks at the world as a whole

Gordon Graham, Regius Professor of moral Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen,2004 '

[Eight Theories of Ethics, 2004, No Editors cited, p. ]

fll::;- ~intended his work to rescue the word 'utility' from corruption, bu~'

b,/ his efforts, the words utility and utilitarian in common speech sti!,,:

mean something opposed to pleasure and only indirectly connected withhappiness. But if the terminology of philosophical utilitarianism remainssomewhat specialized, the doctrine itself has come to have wide appeal inthe modern world. Even a cursory glance at most of the advice columns in

contemporary, newspapers and magazines, for instance, will reveal that ~ ~their writers assume the truth of something like the Greatest Happiness 90 'Principle. Moreover, they clearly regard such a view as not only correct, -;- 0-but uncontentious and incontestible. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to ~ 1

, say that utilitarianism has come to be the main element in contemporary ~ _~moral thinking. A great many people suppose that there can be no serious ~ .sobjection to the moral ideal of maximizing happiness and minimizing ~ ~unhappiness, both in personal relationships and in the world at large. , -+-

,When actions are prescribed that appear to have no connection with pleas- tme and pain (orthodox Jewish dietary restrictions, for instance) or when G isocial rules are upheld which run counter to the Greatest Happiness ~ ~Principle (Christian restrictions on divorce, for instance) it is those actions <:L- •.•

br restrictions which are most readily called into question, not theJ ,)Happiness Principle itself. ~, . J'5''a - l~.)

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Deontology Bad NEG

Utilitarianism Good

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Consequentialism is the only true ethics because it is based on the greater good /(

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Odell, Department of Philosophy The University of Maryland, 2004S. Jack, On Consequentialist Ethics

. ~nsequentialist theories define morality iq terms of goodconsequences. Whether or not I am morally obligated to do something,

.. and whether - or not I am, morally permitted to do something arequestions that are decided' on the basis of consequences. If theCODBequencesof an action A are good or at least better than I canexpect from any other course of action, and I am an action-specificconsequentialist, then I am obliged to do A. If I am a type-specificconsequentialist, however, my course of action will be determined onthe basis of a rule that formulates a practice that has been determined tohave better consequences than any of its options. But, it should beasked, what kinds of consequences are good ones?

Few thinkers dispute the claim that pleasure is good and pain isbad. Some go so far as to claim that pleasure and pain are the onlythings that are intrinsically good and bad, i.e., good and bad inthemselves. Pain and pleasure are, for these ethicists, who are referredto as hedonists, the only things that are indispuwb/y good and bad.Jeremy Bentham argued for this view, and so did MilLbut they differedregarding the issue of whether or not pleasure and pain could differ inquality. Both philosophers accepted without qualification the view thatpleasures and pains could differ in quantity-they both could be moreor less intense. Mill, however, thought that there were degrees ofgoodness associated with pleasures and pains. The pleasures one gainsfrom reading philosophy were siud by Mill to be superior in quality tothose that resulted from satisfyingthe appetites. The pleasure that onegets from food, drink, and sex were considered by Mill to bequalitatively inferior to reading Plato. It seems to me that Bentham wasright and Mill wrong on thiSscore, and I will try to convince the readerof this when I discuss utilitarianismin Chapter V. But for now I wish tosimplyconcede as obvious the fact that pleasure is good and pain is bad

even though one can, as commonsense recognizes, have too much of agood thing. One can overindulge the appetites to such an extent that thepleasure ceases, and is replaced by pain. This should not bemisconstrued to be an argument that pleasure can sometimes beunpleasant, that would be a contradiction. The truth is simplyoverindulgence in what is pleasurable can produce pain. Epicurus baseda philosophy of life on this recognition. The Epicurean is not, as he isoften misconstrued to be, someone who promotes a lifestyle associatedwith excessive self-indulgence. Instead, he is the one who teachesrestraint in all joys of the appetite. The consequence of such a lifestyleis, a,£cording.to Epicuru.s,.conte?tmen~ ?".. t{ .

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Utilitarianism Good

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Moral absolutes are stupid. They force us to take actions contrary to the greatergood.

, 'ty fMaryland 2004Odell, Department of Philosophy The UmverSl 0 ,S, Jack, On Consequentialist Ethics

jl<BPC has a distinct advantage over both literal and prima facierule"trtilitarianism. It denies that moral rules, are to be taken literally. It

also denies that t~ey,are prima faci~ rules. It maintains t?at moral ~es. ~

are simply abbrevtatl0ns or summanes ?f complex pr~ctlces--practlces ().~that do prescribe how we ought to act m those very Clfcumstancesthat l-.)..\t~. ti 17, .,..the prima facie interpretation misconceives .as excep ons. { Q./

Philosophers who concern themselves with explaining what they re~ard 0.. \.J1as legitimate exceptions to moral rules do so because .they consider ~.J...~moral rules to be categorical imperatives. Anyone who mterprets 'Do.not lie' literally to mean 'Never under any circumst~es lie,: will haveto deal with a vast number of what appear to be valid exceptiOnsto therule. They will have to deal with cases like lying to save a love? one:slife, killing a terrorist to keep him from detonating a bomb .which Willwipe out half the city, a parent's stealing of a loaf of bread m order tofeed her/his starving children, clubbing an assailant in self-defense or toprevent rus banning innocent children, or even lying to avoid hurtingsomeone's feelings. But a philosopher who defends folk ethics need notbe concerned with any of these so-called "exceptions." My view,FBPC, considers those cases that are ordinarily taken to be exceptionsto be already covered by the practices that our abbreviations designate.Our practice surrounding lying recognizes that it is sometimes ethicallypermissible to lie in order to save the lives of llmocent people. It alsorecognizes that it is sometimes ethically obligatory to do so. A case inpoint is the one I presented previously concerning the newsman on theisland about to be destroyed by an impending storm. Our practiceconcerning when it is wrong to lie incorporates the idea that for themost part, lying is wrong, while at the same time incorporating thosetimes when lying is permitted or obligatory. The same thing is true ofour practices concerning killing, harming, and stealing. In this way,FBPC can be said, in Wittgensteinian fashion, to dissolve rather thansolve the issue regarding whether or not there are valid exceptions tomoral rules. The rules that FBPC defends do not have exceptions, andso we are not forced to adopt act utilitarianism to deal with them.

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Railton's objection to rule consequentialism, which is that anaction can stem ITompractices or rules it would be best to have, and yetbe wrong, does not apply to folk based practice consequentialism.FBPC does not deal in new and exotic sets of rules. Its rules are thoserules t~t have been time-tested throughout the course of humanhistory. FEPC claims that adherence to certain rules has producedmuch better resu1ts than would have occurred in acting in opposition tothem. So the set that it advocates is the set that has been "mosteffective." FBPC does not claim that the set it recommends shouldnever be modified or changed-either by adding new rules ormodifYingexisting ones-but only that there has to be good reason fordoing so, and that the adoption of the modified set will have to bejustified empirically. The modified set will have to establish itself byproving to be an improvement over the original set. Otherwise, it wouldnot qualifYas the best set, nor would it garner general acceptance. Thebest set, or to speak more precisely, the "expectably" best set, in myview, will be that set which has proven itself over time, both in terms ofits positive results, and in terms of what would have been theconsequences of acting in opposition to some or all members of it. Anew and unique set of moral principles or rules might be imagined andintroduced by a philosopher seeking, in Platonic fashion, an ideal set ofmoral principles-call it "Alpha Best." That set could even be enactedinto law by our legislature, and publicized as "the best that 'money canbuy," but such procedures would not establish this set as the best set.Nothing short of success over time would qualify Alpha Best asexpectably best. An action cannot therefore, according to FBPC, stem .,

ftom practices or rules it would be best to have, and yet be wronu \?~\.~t'

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A2: Can't Predict Consequences

. We can generalize about cause and effect even it-we can't predict exactconsequences

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Gordon Graham, Regius Professor of moral Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen,2004

[Eight Theories of Ethics. 2004, No Editors cited, p. I] Jl~ \ When it comes to holding people responsible, on the other hand, the:.~ position is quite different. If we enter imaginatively into the driver's situa~\

tion, we have to decide what, as consequentialists, it would be sensible to:;

~ prescribe as his best action at the time and in the circumstances prevailing.:;"" Pretty plainly, having made his mistake, the recommendation would be.:-+- that he should turn the car in order to take the Archduke back safely. He'

~ was not to know that assassins would by chance enter the same street at7':" that moment. Therefore, because the anticipated consequences were good,J;, even though the actual consequences were not; he chose rightly.

This distinction between deciding how to act and assessing how we haveacted is obviously of the greatest importance for consequentialism, becausewe cannot know the consequences of our actions before we have taken

them. As a result, a doctrine restricted to assessment after the event wouldhave no practical application. But if we cannot assess actual consequencesbefore the event, how are we to decide what to do? The answer is that we

have to rely upon generalizations about cause and effect and follow generalrules. We estimate the likely consequences of a proposed course of action

on the basis of past experience, and we summarize our experience in use-\ful general rules of conduct . .-1


A2: Utilitarianism Produces Injustice

Consequentialism is not necessarily unjust.

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~ we saw in the previous chApter, itWe think:of the set of rulesthat utilitarianism espouses as necessary for human happiness, it wouldappear that one way to meet objection (H) would be to fiat a justiceprinciple, and argue for its acceptance on the grounds provided by theutility principle. One could argue that societies that persist in ignoringequity issues are not only subject to civil unrest, since they contain afused bomb, but often are the locus of riots and revolutions. So it isclear that there is an empirical basis for such a rule and the practice itwould initiate. This way of looking at the matter is quite misleading.however. It ignores the fact that such a practice already exists andfunctions as part of the folk morality incorporated in FBPC. The onlyproblem that remains is that the equity rule is often applied by theadvantaged, for the advantaged. Its application is frequently restricted,

.•'imd,not only to the pack. but also within it.The fact that morality tJnds to be selectively or unjustly applied is

not a unique problem for FBPC. Morality and its justification is onething. The actual practice of morality is another. FBPC does have anadvantage over other theories, however. Its advantage is its empiricalroots. All that it or any theory of morality can be required to do isdemonstrate the advantages of the universal applicationof the justice orequality precept, and this can, I venture, be easily accomplished byempirical means. History is the empirical laboratory that illustrateswhat happens when the justice principle is ignored~ I 3 'I

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A2: Utilitarianism Produces Iniustice

Utilitarianism is consistent with protection of rights and civil liberties

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(Mill 1871, 1998: 106).j. l'$6-f~

c+....., ~ - - - ~..r This amendment to the basic 'act utilitarianism' of Bentham was made bj~Mill. Mill regarded this apparent conflict with justice, such as 'is ilIustrate~;:by the case of the tramp, to be the biggest stumbling block to utilitarianisrri~:.. 'f

But, he claims: -:;ti

..,;~\The moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one another (in whkn~we must never fQrget to include wrongful interference with eaC'other's freedom) are more vital to human well-being than any maxirtt

however important, which only point out the best mode of managlsome department of human affairs.

It is the importance of the rules of justice for the happiness of us 'a

according to Mill, that commonly gives rise to a feeling of outrage when:'~one of them is broken. But though we have this very strong and special fe

ing about justice and rights, upon reflection we can see ~\"":':,~0~I

that justice is a name for certain moral requirements, which, regart!~' icollectively, stand higher in the scale of social utility, and are therefi!f:.. jil

of more paramount obligation, than any others; though particular casesmay occur in which some other social duty is so important, as to overrule anyone of the general maxims of justice.

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Consequentialism can coexist with laws.


\ It is unrealistic to expect most individuals to do a better job ofdetermining how to act under a variety of circumstances than has beendone by society over the centuries: Why not allow ourselves to be ingeneral guided by principles which fonnulate time-tested, muchadapted, practices? But, it is important not to ignore rules. One mightbe tempted to argue that there is no.need for rules; all we need do is

-- ok condition our youth to behave in accordance with folk ethical practices.~oJo,.'1- We must resist this temptation, however. It fails to recognize that ..$. verbalization is an essential part of the process we utilize to establish~ ~ dispositions necessary. for harmonious co-existence. The rules we

~.A fonnulate to abbreviate our practices assist us in realizing our~'--j educational' goals. They also allow us to discuss our folk ethicalv-. ~ practices and enable us to recognize where they need to be modified,~ ~ - and thereby accelerate their modification. Moreover, the formulation ofo '-..:.folk ~hical practices also assists us in making and passing laws. Many

of our laws are nothing more than legalized fonnulations (statutes) offolk ethical practicw I v{ 5""'

Rule utilitarianism is not unjust.

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Jbshould now be evident that the distinction between act and rule utili·

,,"ianism is a very important one because it has been called upon to pro,~;dethe means of replying to two serious objections. To the objection thatj:ilitarianism too readily justifies the use of unjust means to utilitariar

_,ds, (our example was the murder of a tramp to provide others with vita!"ansplant organs), a rule utilitarian (such as Mill) replies that the rules ane

'~e deep sense of justice which this sort of counter-example appeals to, an':fj1emselvesto be explained in terms of the greatest happiness principle.~"Second, to the objection that it would be a bad thing if our every actiorjt\Vasguided by the Greatest Happiness Principle, the rille utilitarian replie1

~fh.at our actions should be guided by an adherence to rules which anijifhemselves justified by appeal to the Greatest Happiness Principle.>

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Ri2hts Bad

The rights of the group outweigh the rights of the individual.

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J. C. Lester, Professor at University of Alabama. 2000. (Escape fromLeviathan)

\Suppose that many people find one particular person a cost tothem all by his very existence. There is something about thatperson which he cannot change but which others find objectionable in some way. Given my formula, he seems to be infringingthe liberty of others by his very existence. What is more, givenenough people who find him objectionable enough it would seemto follow that the minimizing-imposed-cost policy could be thatthey kill him to stop his nuisance value to them. Some might feelthat this is obviously illiberal, and so this interpretation of libertarian liberty is implausible. To see what is wrong with thiscriticism we have to make it more specific. It should clarify matters to take some examples for examination: a typhoid carrier, a

critic of religion. and libertarian utility monsters.J (},lI~

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Working for the greater good is compatible with liberty.

J. C. Lester, Professor at University of Alabama. 2000. (Escape fromLeviathan).I I have not yet mentioned imprisoning the carrier. That wouldct~" clearly be a restriction of his liberty in one common sense. HowIIIf bi.,. ever, it will still not be an (initiated) imposed cost if it is done in

~'.r self-defense (or in defense of other persons than oneself, of~ course) because of the carrier's attempts to impose his deadly

;~\\\, presence on others. And because such 'preventive restraint' doesnot impose a cost, there is no libertarian requirement for a detention centre 'luxurious enough to compensate soDieo-nefor thedisadvantages of being prohibited from living among others inthe wider society', as Nozick argues (1974; 144). The imprisonment of those who are no serious threat to others is, of course,utterly different: this clearly imposes a cost and there would belittle need for it in a libertarian society, which would probablyaim at swift and proportional retribution or restitution (see 3.5.bbelow1t ..,

Now assume, however fantastic it may seem, that the carrier

~ is so infectious that people. could catch the disease from him. " wherever he might be. The carrier would then be bound to im-\( pose a cost on others so great that it would be liberal to kill him

(f) if that is the only way to stop his being the cause of otherscatching, and dying from, the disease. It is illiberal to live whendoing so can be done only at theunconsenting and uncompensatable expense of other people. The cost imposed on the carneris uncompensatable now, but it is only a minute fraction of thatimposed on the others if he were to live. Though much moredrastic and unfortunate, killing him must, on balance, be theliberal solution. So this fantasy case fits the vague account givenabove, but it should not intuitively seem merely intolerantly illiberal (nor does it seem likely, and perhaps there are no realis

tic analogs»~_ 0G?

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05 ADI Hingstman/Harrigan/Keenan LabDeontology Bad NEG page of

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A2: Moral Relativism ~ U tt C( -'1 A // p", A /7___ ~ VT'I..f/j:"~/~--1Moral relativism justifies the Nazis !/)j?J JJ /~ L,tf-'- .

Phillip<=!Foot, 2002, philosopher, University of California Irvine [Moral Dilemmas]

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lJ:.he question is, therefore, whether we have the same reason to accept

relativism with regard to cultures with very different codes of right and

wrong as we have to accept it where there is such divergence in matters

of taste. This it seems to me that we do not. For our starting point therewas the thought that at least some very general judgements of taste could

be identified through any amount of variation in the application of the

key concepts through the relevant domain. I' myself have frequently

argued that by contrast such variation cannot be postulated in the case of

moral judgements, becaiIse the thought of moral goodness and badness

cannot be held steady through any and every change in the codes of

behaviour taught and in their grounds.7 From this it follows that not

everything that anyone might want to call 'a moral code' should pro

perly be so described. And this shows incidentally that hypotheses about

de facto cultural relativism are not totally independent of moral theory.

Even if an anthropologist is inclil1ed to call a certain code a moral code,

and to go on to talk about a morality radically different from our own,

it does not follow that we should accept this way of describing the phe

nomena. An anthropologist may be as confused or prejudiced as anyone

else in applying words such as 'morality' to the teachings of an alienculture.

I shall assume that even general moral terms such as 'right' or 'ought'

are restricted, to a certain degree, in their extension, at least at the level of

basic principles. It is not possible that there should be two moral codes

the mirror images of each other, so that what was considered fundamen

tally right in one community would be considered wrong at the same

level in the other. It seems that some considerations simply are, and some

are not, evidence for particular moral assertions. Nevertheless it does

not look as if a correct account of what it is to have a moral thought, or amoral attitude, or to teach a moral code, will suffice to dismiss relativism

throughout the moral sphere. Even if some moral judgements are per

fectly objective, there may be others whose truth or falsity is not easily

decidable by criteria internal to the subject of morality. We may suppose,

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I think, that it is clearly an objective moral fact that the Nazi treatment of

the Jews are morally indefensible, given the facts and their knowledge

of the facts. The Nazis' moral opinions had to be held on grounds either

false or irrelevant or both, as on considerations about Germany's 'his

tork mission', or on the thought that genocide could be a necessary form

of self-defence. It was impossible, logically speaking, for them correctly

to argue that the killing of millions of innocent people did not need any

moral justification, or that the extension of the German Reich was in

itself a morally desirable end. Yet after such things have been said the

problem of moral relativism is still with us.8 Even if the fact that it is

morality that is in question gives us some guaranteed starting-points for

arguments about moral right or wrong, how much is this going to settle?Are there not some moral matters on which, even within our own soci

ety, disagreement may be irreducible? And is it not possible that some

alien moral systems cannot be faulted by us on any objective principles,

while our moral beliefs can also not be faulted by theirs? May there not

be places where societies simply confront each other, with no rational

method for settling their differences?> > {- :5)-..

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A2: Kant

Kantian ethics is impossible because we can't divorce ourselves from theconsequences of our actions.

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Gordon Graham, Regius Professor of moral Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen2004 '


So far we have seen that Kant's view of the good life as the moral life is .

marred in tWo respects. First, the emphasis he places upon moral goodnessresiding in our will or intention to do our duty and not in the good or badconsequences of our actions is mistaken since a complete divorce betweenintention, action and outcome is impossible. For this reason, there can be

no question of judging an intention right or wrong without consideringthe goodness or badness of at least some of the consequences of that inten

tion. This means that the moral q~lality of a life cannot be decided purely

in terms of will and intention .. ~Second, even if we agree that intention must form a large part of our'

moral assessment, the idea of requiring the reasons upon which we actto be universally applicable, i.e. the requirement of universalizability,

does not supply us with an effective test for deciding which intentionsare good and whic)1 are bad. People can consistently pursue evil coursesof action, and wholly contradictory recommendations can consistently

be based upon the same reasoning. It follows that universalizability isnot an effective test at all. Any action or mode of conduct can be madeto meet it and hence no course of action can be shown to be ruled out

by it. ~1~'D.\

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A2: Kant

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Adherence to a moral code does not make someone a good person, only a fanatic.



?' In the previous chapter we saw that the existentialist's 'ethics of authen-

;'ticiry' - the idea that good actions are made good by the sincerity with ~ ~~which they are performed - has difficulty in accommodating the case of . ~ -r.. ·'0 J

Jihe sincere Nazi' 0 This is the person who engages sincerely in behaviour 0-- ~ -ridely recognized to be evil. Our intuitions suggest that this sincerity, far ('"'I

'):om making those actions good or even better than similar' actions per- 3 ~

:,6rmed in bad faith, actually makes them worse. Indeed it is arguable that ? ~

fj'~,•d actions become truly evil when they are freely, deliberately and sin-~ ~ '-< ,,~rely performed .• ~ ~'::oA similar objection to the Kantian ethics of intention can be found in ;-:":hatwe might call 'the consistent Nazi'. Let us characterize Nazis as peo

':Je who act on the maxim 'This person should be exterminated because

'.~/she is a Jew'. Now according to Kant's moral philosophy we can put,,'is maxim to the test by appealing to the categorical imperative - 'Act"ly according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that

'}should become a universal law' - and we might point out to Nazis that'jrwere a universal law of nature that Jews were regularly exterminated,

)n if they themselves were Jewish, they would have to be ext.erminated." w as a matter of fact it was not unknown for enthusiastic Nazis to be

:bnd to have Jewish ancestry, and if such people were to engage in some

'~cial pleading, some argument which made theirs a special case, we,Jd indeed accuse them of failing to judge in accordance with the categor

',>imperative. We could show, in other words, that the maxim 'This person.:'uld be exterminated because he/she is a Jew' was not being universalized.

,Ut if these people were consistent Nazis, who not only conceded but'itlvely endorsed the idea that were they to be found to be Jewish they

::must' perish, we could not find fault with them on these grounds. To:'iprepared to promote political ideals that taken to their logicalt ~

conclusion imply your own destruction may be a psychologically unlikely

attitude of mind for m?st people. But it is certainly logically possible anddisplays consistency. However, if a policy of genocide is deeply mistakenfrom a moral (as well as every other) point of view, consistency in its application is hardly any improvement. And in so far as people are prepared to

sacrifice themselves in a program~ of genocide, this reveals not theirmoral rectitude but their fanaticism. ') \\ ~ f \ ~~

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A2: Kant

Kantian ethics is insufficient as it fails to recognize consequences.


(V"lrtueethics, like Kantian ethics, puts the cart before the horse. A

, ~. '. deceptive illusion is created by the empirical success of certainIJ- -S practices, and this success~ be incorrectly interpreted to have been! ~ ~ produced by virtuous persons. The actions of a person of "good: .:s character" are the purist .examples of what must be done to insureI '--' -L... hannonious co-existence, but it is not the accumulated actions of such

i t ~I:S'\ people that bring about hannonious co-existence. Instead, it is the! :) C. accumulated actions of the majority that enables us all to enjoy,-..Jo.,. ~ e:. harmonious co-existence and all that it entails. Were it not for the1: ~::t realization of this consequence, we would have nothing on which to

- \,,;)base the idea that such and such characteristics are virtues. We would

'~. c ~ have no criteria on which to judge whether or not an action was_ -4- '" virtuous. This point is tied to Rachel's previously cited observation that~ virtue ethics cannot stand on its own, but must be supplemented by

h~'" some fonn of conduct ethics. If we did not consider lying to be wrong,

j,;? - f we would not consider honesty to be a virtue. But this means that we:E-l have to answer the question regarding why lying is wrong. My answer~ to Rachel's question is that honesty is better than dishonesty because

unless the majority of us are honest it is difficult to see how it would beempirically possible to achieve hannonious co-existence. Besides, thetruly virtuous person is a person who has the wherewithal to liveaccording to his or her convictions. Those who would need to base theirchoices on the actions of truly virtuous persons or an idealized modelof such persons would likely not have the sameforce of character as thetruly virtuous person, and because of this deficiencywould not be ableto act as the virtuous person would.1 \ '10

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A2: Kant

Kant gives us no incentive to follow his ethics. Numerous hypotheticals candisprove Kantian ethics.

Gordon Graham, Regius Professor of moral Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen,2004[Eight Theories of Ethics, 2004, No Editors cited, p. ]

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rhe previous chapter concluded that Kant's conception of the best humartJ-""J

ife as one lived in accordance with moral duty pursued for its own sake/

:ncounters serious difficulties. Three of these are specially important. Firsr,it seems impossible to disregard the successfulness of our actions in decid~'1ng how well or badly we are spending our lives. Second, Kant's categorii~

:al imperative, by means of which we are supposed to determine what oqV~futy actually is, is purely formal, with the result that contradictory pre-i!:

;criptions can be made to square with it. Third, the divorce betweenid:~

norally virtuous life and a personally happy and fulfilling life, and thg!

:mph'asis upon deserving to be happy rather than actually being happ'Y~

eaves us with a problem about motivation. Why should anyone aspiretq;~ive morally, if doing so has no necessary connection with living happily~

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Badiou's over-generalization makes his ethics useless and dangerous

Peter Hallward, Professor of Modem European Philosophy, 2001 (Ethics: An Essay intothe understanding of Evil, Introduction, translator)

~guably, however, Badiou's consequent characterizationof all human situations, individual and collective, as immeas

urably infinite multiplicities (and thus as bundles of pureand immeasurable 'differences', such that 'there are asmany differences, say, between a Chinese peasant and ayoung Norwegian professional as between myself and anybody at all, including myself')72 dramatically simPlifies thesesituations, leaving no space for the acknowledgement ofeffectively universal structuring principles (biological, cog-nitive, linguistic ... ) on the one hand, or of certain 'specifYing' attributes (based on culture, religion, class,gender, .. ) on the other. Instead, we are left with 'generichuman stuff' that is ontologically indistinguishable frompur~ mathematical multiplicity and effectively endowed, inits praxis, with a kind of indeterminate 'fundamental freedom'. (We might say that if the 'generic' indeterminationof the situation corresponds to some degree with Sartre's

pure freedom or praxis, then its state effectively occupiesthe vast conceptual space Sartre embraced under the concept of the 'practice-inert'). The potential risk, as I havesuggested elsewhere, is the effective 'despecification' (or'singularization') of situations in general, to say nothing ofthe truth-processes that 'puncture' them.73 Some readersmight prefer to settle for a slightly more 'impure' range ofpossibility were it informed by a more determinate, more

specific understan.ding of the situation as su~-~------ . ------------

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